Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
The
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding
from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences
for all mankind,
Considering
that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would
be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms
and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving
nuclear weapons,
Proceeding
from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems,
as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic
offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions
for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
Mindful
of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring
their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation
of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions
in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,
Desiring
to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening
of trust between States,
Have
agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems
and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty.
2.
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory
of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to
deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided
for in Article III of this Treaty.
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Article
II
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently
consisting of:
(a)
ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b)
ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching
ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c)
ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role,
or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
2.
The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include
those which are:
(a)
operational;
(b)
under construction;
(c)
undergoing testing;
(d)
undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e)
mothballed.
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Article III
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except
that:
(a)
within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and
fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys national capital, a Party
may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than
one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars
within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex
being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers;
and
(b)
within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and
fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy:
(1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred
ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM
radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational
or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM
system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more
than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential
of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.
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Article IV
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems
or their components used for development or testing, and located within
current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more
than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.
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Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2.
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher,
not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity,
not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar
systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.
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Article VI
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems
and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:
(a)
not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to
test them in an ABM mode; and
(b)
not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national
territory and oriented outward.
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Article VII
Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement
of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.
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Article VIII
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the
areas specified in thisTreaty, as well as ABM systems or their components
prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed
procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.
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Article IX
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes
not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national
territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
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Article X
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which
would conflict with this Treaty.
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Article XI
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations
on strategic offensive arms.
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Article XII
1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions
of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification
at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles
of international law.
2.
Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means
of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph
1 of this Article.
3.
Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in
current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
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Article XIII
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this
Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission,
within the framework of which they will:
(a)
consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed
and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
b)
provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c)
consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical
means of verification;
(d)
consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing
on the provisions of this Treaty;
(e)
agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM
systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of
this Treaty;
(f)
consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the
viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty;
(g)
consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting
strategic arms.
2.
The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate,
Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures,
composition and other relevant matters.
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Article XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments
shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the
entry into force of this Treaty.
2.
Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals
thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.
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Article XV
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from thisTreaty if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six
months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include
a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
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Article XVI
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force
on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2.
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter
of the United Nations.
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RICHARD
NIXON
President of the United States of America
FOR
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L.
I. BREZHNEV
General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
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Agreed
Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements regarding
the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles
1.
AGREED STATEMENTS
The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads
of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added):
Agreed
Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems
[A]
The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be
deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty,
those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature
of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the
national capital may be retained.
[B]
The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted
power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the
two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article
III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three
million.
[C]
The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area
centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment
area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated
by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.
[D]
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems
and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty,
the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical
principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific
limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion
in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article
XIV of the Treaty.
[E]
The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations
not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery
by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided
warhead.
[F]
The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential
(the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square
meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III,
IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects
in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.
[G]
The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation
of the United States and the USSR not to provide to other States technical
descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of
ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.
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2. COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS
Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached
during the negotiations:
A.
Location of ICBM Defenses
The
U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:
Article
III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment
area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area
containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement
on the following statement: "The Parties understand that the center
of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and
the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers
for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers."
In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment
area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi
River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment
area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)
B.
ABM Test Ranges
The
U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:
Article
IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided for
in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used
for development or testing, and located within current or additionally
agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that
there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our
understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM
components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges
are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current
Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that
non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation
purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference
in Article IV to "additionally agreed test ranges" to mean that
ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior
agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM
test ranges.
On
May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding
on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars
for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty,
that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test
ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying
current test ranges.
C.
Mobile ABM Systems
On
January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Article
V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking
not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their
components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view,
a prohibition on development of mobile ABM systems and components would
rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent
fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation.
Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. sides interpretation put forward
on May 5, 1971?
On
April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding
on this matter.
D.
Standing Consultative Commission
Ambassador
Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:
The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial
implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement
on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement* establishing
the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until
that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT
is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles
can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session,
ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles
may be made through diplomatic channels.
Minister
Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the
U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.
E.
Standstill
On
May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:
In
an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation
is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe
the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning
from the date of signature of these two documents.
In
reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:
The
United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May
6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature
but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that,
pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action
prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding
would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory
of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.
The
Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.
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3. UNILATERAL
STATEMENTS
The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations
by the United States Delegation:
A.
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
On
May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:
The
U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches
to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive
arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement
on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive
arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on
negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats
to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The
USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain
unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more
complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize
that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of complete
limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete
strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years,
U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would
constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The United States
does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the
USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize
the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete
limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform
the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM
Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.
B.
Tested in an ABM Mode
On
April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Article
II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode,"
in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations
concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common
understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions
of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after
the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may
have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have
made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth
the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while
prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent
testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components
for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in
an ABM mode," we note that we would consider a launcher, missile
or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for example, any
of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM
interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against
a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of
a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in
conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar
at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent
with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed,
(3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the
kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory
or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor
missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes
such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application
of these criteria.
C.
No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty
On
April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
In
regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory
statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions
of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered
for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer
of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require
a different solution.
D.
No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars
On
July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Since
Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect
and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant
ABM potential. Accordingly, the United States would regard any increase
in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent
with an agreement.
_________________________
*See Article 7 of Agreement to
Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September
30, 1971.
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