Statement of

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before

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Regarding

Global Strike Issues

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Our strategy for transforming U.S. strategic forces is contained in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of December 2001. The NPR was written in response to Congressional direction, and reflected Presidential guidance to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to the lowest levels consistent with U.S. national security and our commitments to allies.

The NPR called for an overhaul of U.S. strategic forces and concepts, and provided a framework to guide the future development of these forces in the new and uncertain environment we found following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The NPR directed reductions in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from around 6,000 to levels between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. The NPR also established a New Triad composed of:

- Offensive strike systems–to include nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-kinetic capabilities that can generate strategic effects promptly and precisely, and at great range;
- Defenses–both active and passive; and
- A responsive defense infrastructure–including the U.S. nuclear weapons complex–to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

These New Triad capabilities will be integrated by improved planning, intelligence, and command and control.

When fully implemented, the New Triad can provide the range of capabilities and options needed for a credible deterrent against a range of potential adversaries whose values and calculations of risk, gain and loss may be very different from–and more difficult to discern than–those of past adversaries. These capabilities will also be important should deterrence fail. This New Triad is designed to transform our strategic capabilities to deal with

an uncertain future, and reflects new thinking about the meaning and purpose of U.S. strategic capabilities.

For example, during the Cold War the term "strategic strike" was virtually synonymous with the employment of nuclear weapons. This is no longer so. The development of precision targeting capabilities, flexible and collaborative planning systems, net-centric national command and control systems, and improved intelligence and surveillance capabilities now enable us to envision using highly precise and responsive conventional weaponry to achieve strategic effects that once required nuclear weapons. Today, in appropriate areas, we can add conventional Global Strike to the mix of capabilities able to achieve strategic effects.

During the Cold War, the main challenge facing the United States was deterring the former Soviet Union from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and its allies. At that time we designed our strategic nuclear forces to deter a single foe, and generally treated all others as "lesser included cases."

The new security environment is much-changed, however. As noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review released last month, Russia is unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, although it remains a country in transition. It is no longer an adversary but not a traditional ally. Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to

compete militarily with the United States, and there are potential flash points with which we must be concerned, such as Taiwan.

At the same time the United States faces a threat from an expanding number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups that seek to acquire and use WMD. Even when they do not pose a direct threat to the United States, these states may threaten the U.S. or its allies indirectly by transferring weapons or expertise to terrorists. The United States cannot predict with confidence which nation, nations, non-state actors, or a combination of the above may pose a threat to its vital interests, or those of its friends and allies, in the decades ahead. As the NPR noted: "The September 11th attacks dramatically illustrated the unparalleled extremism, hostility, and unpredictability of some foes...."

In this new and uncertain environment, a "one size fits all" approach to deterrence is no longer appropriate; we must re-think our approach to 21st Century threats and tailor deterrence to assure our allies and friends, and achieve specific effects against a wide array of potential adversaries and circumstances, such as advanced military competitors, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorist networks. To do this we must have a broad range of credible strategic capabilities–including a mix of nuclear and non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities, defenses, and a revitalized and responsive infrastructure.

The Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 set forth, and was based on, the following assumptions:

- Expect Surprise;

- Unpredictable Future;
- Deterrence continues to be important, but uncertain;
- Future adversaries (e.g., rogue states) possess WMD; Denial and deception complicate characterization of WMD facilities;
- Terrorists and non-state actors seek WMD;
- China modernizing conventional and nuclear forces; Taiwan a potential flash point;
- Russia no longer an adversary, but uncertain future.

Since its publication in December of 2001, the logic, strategy and the fundamental assumptions of the NPR have been reviewed periodically and subjected to rigorous internal scrutiny, for example, in the 2004-2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment. Based on the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment, the 2004-2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment concluded that the NPR's planning assumptions remain valid, although conditions are trending toward–if anything–a more stressing strategic landscape, for example, with respect to North Korea, Iran and nuclear proliferation. Additionally, we are increasingly concerned over the sale to others of disruptive weapons technologies by Russia–a country in transition–as well as by others. These same assumptions were revalidated by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

But the NPR was only a starting point for the transformation of U.S. strategic capabilities and concepts. Since December of 2001 the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, and the Services have been working together to develop

detailed implementation plans and operational concepts. I would like to highlight some examples of our progress to date:

1. New missions have been assigned to USSTRATCOM beyond its continuing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces.

   These include:

   - Global Strike–to include nuclear, non-nuclear and non-kinetic effects;
   - Integration of Missile Defense;
   - Space Operations;
   - Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence;
   - Offensive Information Operations; and
   - Integrating and synchronizing DoD's role in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

2. We have made significant progress in several areas, for example:

   a. We have fielded an initial ballistic missile defense capability at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and expanded international cooperation and participation in our missile defense program.

   b. We are reducing U.S. nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. We are on-track to meet our interim goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007.

   - We removed the last Peacekeeper ICBM from its silo in September of 2005;
   - We completed the conversion to SSGNs of two of the four SSBNs that are being retired from strategic service; and

- We implemented a new plan for the nuclear stockpile that will cut the total number of active and inactive warheads nearly in half by 2012.

c. We also are making progress in developing non-kinetic strike capabilities and improving planning, intelligence, and command and control capabilities that are needed to integrate New Triad capabilities effectively.

3. There are, however, areas where we have made only limited progress; these include:

- fielding prompt conventional capabilities for Global Strike;
- transforming a Cold War nuclear arsenal to meet new challenges; and
- revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure.

We are working to make greater progress in these three areas in order to realize the broad mix of capabilities called for by the NPR. Instead of the legacy Cold War strategic posture, with its reliance on high-yield, nuclear weapons delivered by ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to deter the Soviet Union, we need to transform and strengthen our posture to enable us to tailor deterrence against the full spectrum of post-Cold War threats. This, in turn, will require delivering on new capabilities that are credible and useful in affecting the decision-making of potential adversaries, and are effective against high-value, strategic targets.

For example, in a regional crisis against an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction, the credibility of our deterrent may turn on our ability to threaten highly-valued

assets of importance to that state's leadership, while minimizing collateral damage. These assets may include WMD, missiles, command and control, or leadership bunkers protected in hard and deeply buried facilities. Conventional Global Strike capabilities are meant to augment the existing military options for holding such targets at risk, and expand the range of prompt, long-range strike options available to the President–currently limited to nuclear weapons. Thus, rather than rejecting deterrence, prompt, conventional Global Strike capabilities are intended to strengthen deterrence in the changed and evolving strategic environment.

As Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized in the *Foreword* to the NPR, our direction is designed to "improve our ability to deter attack," while "reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons" to do so. The NPR does not reject deterrence in favor of "nuclear war-fighting," nor does it "lower the nuclear threshold." By fielding a New Triad of capabilities that includes conventional Global Strike assets, and defenses, and a responsive infrastructure, we strengthen the overall credibility of our deterrent posture and maintain the nuclear threshold at an appropriately high level.

By placing greater emphasis on advanced non-nuclear and defensive capabilities, we seek to *increase* the credibility of our deterrent posture for many contingencies, while *reducing* the emphasis on nuclear weapons in our strategic posture. The broad array of New Triad capabilities can better assure our allies and friends that they should continue their reliance on the U.S. strategic deterrent–that they need not seek an alternative or independent nuclear capability for their security–thereby strengthening our alliances <u>and</u>

supporting our nonproliferation goals. At the same time, the more flexible and capable strategic posture that the New Triad represents will help dissuade potential adversaries from investing in capabilities to challenge the United States, and help deter aggression.

While our national strategy calls for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, these weapons will continue to play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. Nuclear weapons provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and large-scale conventional military forces. And nuclear weapons possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk a wide variety of target classes--some of which cannot be held at risk in any other fashion. Nuclear weapons will retain a vital role in deterring WMD threats, assuring allies of U.S. security commitments, holding at risk an adversary's assets and capabilities that cannot be countered through non-nuclear means, and dissuading potential adversaries from developing large-scale nuclear or conventional threats.

To achieve that goal we need to sustain flexible and credible nuclear forces. Sustaining such a force will help mitigate the risks associated with the drawdown of nuclear forces, provide a broader range of options to the President, and offer the means necessary to tailor deterrence against a range of potential adversaries and circumstances.

However, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent we need to transform the nuclear stockpile so that the weapons we retain are appropriate for the challenges and uncertainties

we will face in the coming decades. What we need is not a smaller version of the Cold War-era nuclear stockpile; we need capabilities appropriate for 21st Century threats.

To accomplish the transformation of our nuclear stockpile it will be necessary to restore the nation's nuclear infrastructure. The National Nuclear Security Administration has a plan for revitalizing this essential leg of the New Triad. Revitalization is essential in order to assure the long term safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads, strengthen deterrence for the new security environment, and provide a hedge against an unforeseen, catastrophic technical failure of any element of the nuclear force, or adverse geopolitical changes.

To assist in transforming the composition of the nuclear stockpile, and to help place the nation's nuclear infrastructure on a sound footing, it is imperative that we continue, without delay, to field a Reliable Replacement Warhead. The purpose of the RRW program is to ensure the long-term sustainability of a nuclear weapon stockpile for U.S. national security by, among other things, eliminating hazardous materials, and simplifying warhead manufacturing–all without nuclear testing. If successful, RRW may enable further reductions in the size of the stockpile by demonstrating a real capability to manufacture highly reliable, certified replacement warheads. In this respect, the Reliable Replacement Warhead is a first step towards the responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure called for in the NPR.

III. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

As noted earlier, DoD has periodically reviewed the fundamental assumptions of the Nuclear Posture Review and subjected them to rigorous scrutiny. In the recent Quadrennial

Defense Review, for example, senior civilian and military leaders reviewed several areas associated with the implementation of the NPR and development of the New Triad, and concluded that:

1. The U.S. needs to tailor its strategy of deterrence to each potential adversary;
2. The U.S. needs to make greater progress in fielding prompt, accurate, non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities; and
3. The U.S. can make further, modest reductions in the strategic nuclear force structure with minimal risk.

I would like to discuss each of these QDR conclusions in turn.

Tailored Deterrence

As I noted earlier, the U.S. needs to tailor its strategy of deterrence to each potential adversary across a wide range of scenarios. Tailored deterrence will require that we understand each potential adversary to a greater degree than in the past. We must constantly ask ourselves who we may need to deter, and what we may need to deter them from doing. It also means having the capability to create the specific and appropriate effects needed to influence the decision-making of each potential adversary. Together with transforming DoD operational capabilities, U.S. declaratory statements will also need to be tailored so that our policy statements and our operational capabilities work together to underpin our deterrence strategy.

Global Strike and the Conventional Trident Missile

As an element of a more tailored deterrent posture, the Department seeks to deploy, within two years, an initial capability to promptly engage targets globally with precision-guided conventional weapons. This initial prompt Global Strike capability will be achieved by arming a small number of long-range Trident missiles with accurate, non-nuclear warheads. The rationale for focusing on ballistic missiles, in general, and on a non-nuclear Trident missile in particular, is that Conventional Trident represents a near-term, affordable, relatively off-the-shelf and low-risk option for providing the President of the United States with an important, new capability. By deploying SSBNs armed with Conventional Trident missiles we will close a long-standing gap in our strike capability for engaging an adversary promptly and precisely, any where in the world, without having to resort to nuclear weapons.

I understand that there is a concern about the possibility that the operational launch of a non-nuclear Trident missile might cause other nations, like China and Russia, to mistake it for a nuclear attack. The U.S. has employed dual-role weapon systems for many years, but we recognize that a non-nuclear Trident missile aboard an SSBN will represent a significant new development. I should point out that, for the near-term, only Russia will have the ability to both detect and respond promptly to ballistic missile launches. Fortunately, we already have in place links between U.S. senior leaders and their Russian and Chinese counterparts.

To mitigate the risk of misperception we are exploring a variety of additional transparency and confidence-building measures. These measures include advance notification and military-to-military talks so that others understand our concept of operation

for this new capability. We are also exploring the proper command and control procedures and release authority issues associated with deploying SSBNs with conventionally-armed Trident missiles. Our experience with hundreds of at-sea test launches over the past four decades, without incident, demonstrates that appropriate transparency measures can greatly reduce the potential for misunderstanding. We believe the benefits to be gained from Conventional Trident are important and the potential risks manageable.

In this context, it is important to remember that while every military action involves risks, there may also be risks–and sometimes regrets–in not acting. By developing and deploying a Conventional Trident we will provide the President with one more option with which to defend against threats to the United States.

We also are studying other, longer-term solutions, both sea- and land-based, in order to broaden our portfolio of non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities and provide even greater flexibility in our strategic posture. The initiatives underway include assessing options for kinetic and non-kinetic non-nuclear capabilities. For example, the Air Force's Land Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives study is seeking to identify a cost-effective set of global strike solutions; the Army is studying a concept for fielding an Advanced Hypersonic Weapon; and the Navy is studying the development of a conventionally-armed Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile with a range of about 1500 nautical miles to increase the versatility of the cruise missile-armed submarine (SSGN). In addition, there are other initiatives underway across DoD that support the Prompt Global Strike mission; these include major enabling capabilities such as the transition to a net-centric based command, control,

communications architecture, and improved global situation awareness with enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools.

Further Reductions in the ICBM Force

As I noted earlier, we have made considerable progress to date in drawing down our operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons to the 1700-2200 level; this includes the withdrawal of all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs from their silos, and the withdrawal of four SSBNs from strategic service and conversion to SSGNs. In light of our progress in making these reductions and fielding New Triad capabilities, the QDR re-evaluated our strategic nuclear force posture. As a result, DoD's senior leaders determined that–with minimal risk–we could make a further, modest reduction in the number of nuclear-armed ICBMs by retiring 50 Minuteman IIIs. This represents a ten percent reduction in the size of the Minuteman III force as envisioned by the NPR in 2001, but it will not affect the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads we are planning to deploy by 2012.

IV. Concluding Remarks

A sustained partnership between the Department of Defense and the Congress will be needed if we are to succeed in transforming our nation's strategic capabilities to meet the uncertainties and challenges ahead. The Department will require your continued support to replace the legacy Cold War force posture with a New Triad that is better suited to the new security environment. In closing, I would like to summarize my main points.

1. Conventional Trident Missile is a near-term means of addressing the current lack of capability for prompt, conventional Global Strike. The longer-term goal is to develop a range of prompt Global Strike capabilities that can provide the President with a wider range of options for addressing the dangers of the new security environment.

2. Continued progress on ballistic missile defense is essential. The Department has made great strides since the President's decision in 2002 to field missile defenses, and we appreciate the continued support of this Committee as we field this important capability.

3. Transformation of the nuclear force is not only a matter of making reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Making tailored deterrence a reality, and fielding a strategic force that is properly configured for the 21st Century, will require us to make adjustments in our force posture, in our residual nuclear stockpile, and in our thinking.

Finally, as we transform U.S. strategic forces to deal with new security challenges, we must also re-think important issues and ideas–especially our understanding of deterrence. We cannot contend with 21st Century uncertainties with a Cold War force posture, a Cold War nuclear stockpile, or Cold War thinking.