

**Opening Statement of  
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**Before the Defense Subcommittee  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States House of Representatives  
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Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and report on what we are doing in U.S. Joint Forces Command. With over a million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines—some 80% of the Nation’s general purpose forces—U.S. Joint Forces Command is the primary force provider for our country’s other unified Commanders-in-Chief around the world. My headquarters is in Norfolk, Virginia, with subordinate commands stretching across the continental United States.

Our area of operations encompasses the North and middle Atlantic Oceans and nearby arctic waters and includes Iceland and the Azores. This area is very important to our trade and security relations with the rest of North America and with Europe. I am also the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a separate NATO staff, also at Norfolk. You may have seen this NATO headquarters featured in the news reports during the President’s visit in February of this year. Our NATO connection is an important link to our allies. It is our trans-Atlantic bridge and promotes interoperability within the alliance.

In U.S. Joint Forces Command, we also stand ready to provide military support to civil authorities here in our country’s homeland. Along with traditional assistance to local, state, and Federal agencies in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances, we have also taken on an important new role. Some enemy may choose to attack our country

with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or enhanced high explosive weapons. Consequence management would be a critical task, and we must be ready. For that purpose, we have formed and trained a headquarters named Joint Task Force-Civil Support. Joint Task Force-Civil Support is ready to respond today to support the lead on-site Federal agency if we have an attack by weapons of mass destruction. We work closely with local, state, and Federal authorities to be ready. In particular, we work closely with the National Guard. The commander of Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Major General Bruce Lawlor, is himself a Guardsman. That has really helped with teamwork as we train on this important task.

Those are important roles, and I look forward to discussing them in more detail during the question and answer period. But this afternoon, I want to spend most of my time talking about our most important and exciting role at U.S. Joint Forces Command. I want to talk to you about our role in the Transformation of our country's Armed Forces.

With our redesignation as U.S. Joint Forces Command on 1 October 1999, we assumed the responsibility to lead the Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. By "lead" we mean go first, walk point, doing the scouting. Our primary focus is to operationalize—to make real—the ideas in *Joint Vision 2020*, the description of future joint warfighting put forth by General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I want to report to you and to our stakeholders—the American people—where we are today, where we are going, and what we need to do to transition our military capabilities.

## **A Transformed U.S. Military**

*Joint Vision 2020* foresees a day where we will have full spectrum dominance. That means that whether in peace, conflict, or war, anywhere on the spectrum of operations, we can do our job and do it well. Regardless of the mission, tomorrow's U.S. Armed Forces have to get there quicker, dominate the situation, and win decisively. It will require agility, versatility, and highly trained, competent forces and leaders.

Getting there is very important. It's the necessary precondition to any operation. Our future forces require the right mix of airlift and sealift, pre-positioning at sea and ashore, and forward basing and forward operating locations coupled with premier power projection installations here in the U.S. to ensure we bring decisive joint combat power to every fight. To be more efficient we require new information technologies to reach back to facilities not in the battle area. That minimizes our footprint out front under fire, reduces our lift requirement, and gives our forces more operational flexibility.

Equally important, we have to configure our forces to deploy rapidly and with the right capabilities to fight and win. We want to go directly from our home bases into battle without stopping at intermediate facilities to reorganize or get resupplied. Stealth,

speed, and powerful precision munitions are part of this equation. But future joint forces must also be ready to do forcible entry if required by airborne, air assault, and amphibious means. They have to be ready to kick in the door. We want to pick the time and place of our entry...to leverage our asymmetrical capabilities. Joint forces that get there quickly and possess the capability to fight their way in will be relevant to the future fight.

Some might say that we can do it all from a distance. Well. . . maybe. Sometimes it works that way. We know that standing off and bombarding our enemies is an important capability. We are unmatched at it. But long-range precision firepower alone does not and will not meet the full range of threats. There are enemies now—and there will be in the future—who do not break and run when we hit them with smart munitions. Additionally, there are certain critical missions—like evacuating American noncombatants from a downtown embassy or seizing key terrain—that demand a capability for close combat. We must maintain and improve a multi-dimensional (balanced joint) force capable of conducting attrition warfare if required.

With this in mind, our future joint force must be balanced between land, sea, air, space, and special operations capabilities. When we intentionally choose not to consider such a balanced joint force, we limit our options and increase our risks. A decisive joint force brings what we need to win and creates an operational dilemma for the enemy. In the future, we need to be able to get forward quickly with the right mix of forces across the spectrum of conflict.

Fighting to win far from our homeland requires an expeditionary ethos. Forces need to be balanced in capability, but they must also be modular and flexible, “plug and play,” as the saying goes. We cannot and will not go through long preparatory phases and buildups at vulnerable intermediate staging bases. Nor can we afford to start operations by a predictable pattern of assaults on enemy seaports and airports, trying to bull our way through their well-defended front gates. We need to go around back, come in from the top, go under their radar and around their sonar—going right for the critical objectives. We need to do it simultaneously, overwhelming the enemy with a massive blow, and then following up swiftly to finish him off. We’ll mass effects in time rather than the older model of massing forces in location. This calls for an expeditionary, non-linear mindset.

It also demands that we develop a higher degree of joint command capabilities, specifically joint headquarters competencies. Our components and units know their jobs thanks to sound Service doctrine and training. But the joint headquarters have a much steeper learning curve.

Right now, we have good, sound joint doctrine for our joint task force headquarters. But since there are no permanent conventional joint task force headquarters, we are repeatedly challenged to translate our doctrine into practice. There’s a real need for a “how to do it” guide. As a joint trainer, I see this a lot. I have lived it myself in training and on actual missions. Our various three-star headquarters

come in with a wide variety of ways to do things like run their command posts, gather intelligence, target the enemy, and send and receive communications. Each of our subordinate joint headquarters has some great methods, but due to personnel rotations, they never mature the process. They spend a lot of each training event, and a lot of time on a real operation, getting organized. We are working to fix this.

We need Joint standing operating procedures (SOPs) and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), standardized playbooks that we all understand. These need to be codified throughout the joint force. We're working on this in U.S. Joint Forces Command, both for today's joint warfighter and for those of the future. That will do a lot to give us the joint expeditionary ethos that we need.

Getting there and fighting are about speed and power. But making it count—winning—depends on knowledge superiority. In the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, we talked of the great advantages of sea superiority. In the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, we added air superiority coupled with land force dominance as the critical determinant of victory. Now, at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, we think knowledge superiority may be just as important. Over two thousand years ago, the Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu wrote in his *Art of War*: “Know the enemy, know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated.” Back then, you had to get on a high hill and hope for a clear day to observe the battlefield. Today, our increasing abilities to gather, analyze, and share critical information electronically allows us to fulfill Sun Tzu's dream.

This includes hardware and software to create a joint force “backbone” to share a common picture of the battle, alert all to key information, and communicate reports and orders. That alone is a tall order. But it is only part of the answer.

We then need to teach leaders and units how to use this new information technology. That will require changes in doctrine, organization, and training, in material fielding in all its aspects, in leader education, personnel policies, and in facilities, including simulators and gunnery ranges. All of that takes time, especially leader development. It takes twenty years to grow battalion, squadron, and warship commanders. It takes decades to create superb senior noncommissioned officers, our standard-bearers who ensure a cohesive fighting force. We have to invest early, keep investing, and sign on for the long haul. There is no quick fix.

If we simply glue new hardware on today’s force, we get it only half-right, like handing a machine gun to a Roman centurion. He’d probably use it as a club, and who could blame him?

We know better than that. Armed with knowledge superiority and adequately resourced training, we can put decisive combat power right where we need it most to accomplish the mission, and do it right the first time. It will change the way we fight. It is a powerful concept.

## **Where We Are Today: Moving Toward Transformation**

We can see the beginnings of our future joint warfighters in today's joint force. In some fields—such as long range precision strike—we are well on our way toward achieving the goals of *Joint Vision 2020*. In others—joint logistics and joint force deployment, for example—we have a long way to go. Most of all, we presently lack an overarching joint warfighting concept that might serve to tie everything together, to show us where we need to work harder and where we might take prudent risks.

We need a complimentary Transformation Strategy that is linked to National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. We need to accomplish a strategy to task analysis that incorporates the combatant commander's Joint Mission Area Analysis. And we need to develop our process for identifying/defining future joint concepts based on the threats of the future.

Our efforts at U.S. Joint Forces Command go right at that key issue: developing a unifying joint warfighting concept. Doing that requires two things. First, we need a concept, a big thought to get us going. Second, we need a method to institutionalize our efforts to test, validate, and modify our new-born concepts.

We do have a concept today, which we call Rapid Decisive Operations. Think Panama 1989. An oppressed people go to sleep under a tyrant's boot heel. They wake up to a new dawn of freedom. It's that fast, and that overwhelming.

Operation *Just Cause* in Panama got overshadowed because the Gulf War came along right afterward. But it deserves a good, long look. We took down twenty-seven targets in about 45 minutes, coming in at night by air, ground, and water. That first set of attacks smashed our enemy's command structure, seized critical facilities, and isolated his forces. Just as important, we kept up the tempo. We took advantage of opportunities to re-task committed joint forces and go after new targets with minimal pauses. The enemy did not recover. We won fast and won decisively.

Our future Rapid Decisive Operations will be like *Just Cause* on steroids. Instead of twenty-seven targets, there could be ten-times that many. And these will be the right targets. Our success in Panama was due in a large part to our intimate knowledge of the enemy and our capabilities, and because of our ability to strike precisely. Rapid Decisive Operations will allow us to project this kind of joint combat power half-way around the globe, against a much more capable enemy. That's our goal.

Rapid Decisive Operations are non-linear. They bypass conventional staging and intermediate basing, skip bloody fights for well-defended seaports and airports, and go right for the enemy's vitals. This method is simultaneous, not sequential.

The Panama example and others—the first nights of the air war against Iraq in *Desert Storm*—show us the promise of Rapid Decisive Operations. We have done them to some extent here and there, but they are not our traditional way of war. They could be,

if we can learn how to do them on a broader scale and at longer ranges. We think we can do that.

So with Rapid Decisive Operations, we have a concept to get us started. Our method to proof and improve this concept—and junk it if necessary—involves joint experimentation. Along with our Services and our fellow unified Commanders-in-Chief (the other CINCs), we have established a sensible path of joint concept development and experimentation that will allow us to see just how much merit there is to Rapid Decisive Operations, and whether we can achieve the ideas of *Joint Vision 2020* regarding dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, full-dimensional protection, and information superiority.

We've developed a pattern of continuous limited objective experiments that proof key parts of concepts and test important subtasks. We work closely with the Services, to include their battle labs, as well as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the rest of the military and industrial research and development community. Our goal is to find and try out cutting edge ideas and technologies that can help the future joint warfighter.

These limited experiments occur in a computer simulation environment. We can model the same events over and over, adjusting critical variables and seeing if that makes a difference. This is especially important in trying to build joint command and control

systems that will have to cross continents and oceans. Step one is beaming across the laboratory floor.

Our limited experiments form a foundation. We then move to major field experiments, currently scheduled in even numbered years. We completed a prototype called *Millennium Challenge 2000* last summer, in which we brought together previously designed Service and fellow CINC experiments under a loose joint umbrella. We gained some insights, including a recognition that Rapid Decisive Operations was worthy of more intense study and experimentation. In the progression “crawl, walk, run,” *Millennium Challenge 2000* was a crawl. But it got us started.

Next year, we move to a walk—a brisk walk—with our large-scale *Millennium Challenge 2002* field experiment. This will bring together a major joint force of about 15,000 personnel for combined computer and live force-on-force operations in the air, on the sea, and on the land ranges of southern California and Nevada. The Army is providing the joint task force headquarters—the XVIII Airborne Corps—as well as airborne forcible entry and new medium brigade early entry units. The Navy will bring in a multi-capable amphibious and strike battle group, and the Marines have committed a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Air Force will contribute a wing-sized Aerospace Expeditionary Force. We will also have a Joint Special Operations Task Force, plus many other smaller units of various types from the Services and selected Defense agencies. There will be allied observer teams from several NATO countries and other allies.

We intend to carry out Rapid Decisive Operations. Our joint forces will engage a wide range of objectives simultaneously all across southern California and Nevada and the nearby Pacific Ocean. We'll use Nellis Air Force Base, Fort Irwin, China Lake, Camp Pendelton, George Air Force Base, 29 Palms Marines Air Ground Combat Center, and the San Nicholas Sea Ranges. That will give us a big enough spread to try out the kind of overwhelming joint force attack that we think characterizes Rapid Decisive Operations. Then we will quickly re-task from field locations and maneuver forces and fires to exploit emerging operational opportunities.

Will it work? We think so. The main thing is that we try it a few times in the desert, air, and ocean to learn. You can do a lot of things in the lab, but sooner or later, you must go out and try in the dirt, in real air, in real seawater. It is imperative that we validate these concepts with people and systems and not simply icons on a computer.

Three years from now, we move out at a run, with a more comprehensive effort known as *Olympic Challenge 2004*. In this case, we'll bring in our coalition partners in a big way—they have only observer roles in *Millennium Challenge 2002*. We have to develop the right communications links to share a common picture with our allies, no small issue with different languages, military procedures, and levels of training. We'll turn to that immediately after we wrap up *Millennium Challenge 2002* next summer. In fact, we're doing preliminary work right now. In this important area of coalition operations, my role as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO gives us a direct

and strong trans-Atlantic link to our allies. That link will be fundamental for *Olympic Challenge 2004* and future joint experiments.

There are many technologies that we use and need, some of which we have yet to identify. We realize the importance of Information Technology, which really acts as the glue that allows nonlinear, simultaneous joint warfighting. But we also rely on a wide range of sensors, including high quality human reconnaissance, and we need shooters on land, sea, and in the air. Information superiority becomes real when we can act on it. In the end, we may have to use it to kill our enemies, to wreck their things, and to break their will. That part of war has not and will not change.

### **What We Need to Get There: Readiness Today, Commitment to Tomorrow**

During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many programs. For FY 2002, the President's budget includes funding to cover our most pressing priorities. I should note, however, that the programs I will discuss, and the associated funding levels may change as a result of the Secretary's strategy review which will guide future decisions on military spending. The Administration will determine final 2002 and outyear funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask that you consider my comments in that light.

Much as we want Transformation and are working toward it, we have a big job right now. We have to get through today to get to tomorrow. And today has lots of

demands of its own, all of which challenge our ability to Transform. It's like saying you want to buy a new car when you haven't paid off the old one—which by the way needs an overhaul, new tires, a paint job, and a tank of gas.

Our present joint forces are good, but they are overstretched and overdue for recapitalization—replacing the key platforms and facilities. We need these legacy systems to fight today and bridge our modernization gap.

Overstretched refers to operations tempo: OPTEMPO. Our military is very busy. As the CINC responsible for 80% of the general purpose forces in the continental United States, I get a good look at our deployments and operations worldwide. There are a lot of them. I dialogue with the commanders and the troops and understand the myriad challenges they are confronted with to meet operational and training demands.

We are still in Germany, Japan, and Korea. To those traditional Cold War areas we have added the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, both major joint theaters of operations, both “contested” areas. We have also carried out expeditions in the Caribbean, Africa, southeast Asia and the long, long list of places that flare up: East Timor, the Taiwan Straits, Aden, and Colombia, for example. We do all of those, plus numerous nation-to-nation exercises, port calls, and alliance training. All these are important and take training, time, effort, and resources. Many are dangerous.

Of course, throughout, we have to do our own demanding combat training, to be ready to fight and win when our Nation calls. That is critically important and cannot be taken for granted. We are the best in the world largely due to our hard training—at sea, in the air, in the mud, often with live ammunition. Forces not deployed on operations are training to fight and win. That, too, takes a toll on people and equipment.

That being said, it's a full plate. In fact, it's past a full plate.

You can see the fraying around the edges right now. Here are some examples:

- Low-density, high-demand units, like electronic warfare planes or key intelligence platforms, get worked and worked. We do not have enough and all the CINCs need them. So we run the same people and equipment from point to point.
- Aviation spares for our frontline carrier battle groups—we don't have enough. We hand off our spare parts inventory from a returning carrier to its outbound replacement...okay as long as we commit carriers one at a time. It's like two families sharing the same fire extinguisher. What happens when both have a fire?
- Recruiting and retention has been difficult across the board. It's not that our people are not willing—they are. It's just that we keep going to the

same well over and over. Our people are not chess pieces. They vote with their feet.

One of the things our people tell us is that they are concerned about the age and repair of our equipment, and about our crumbling installations. Ask any Navy Chief or Air Force flight line mechanic. What we do about our equipment and our bases tells our people in uniform and our citizens that we are serious about our Nation's defense. We have to invest more in our maintenance, training and facilities. We have migrated money to off-set other under resourced mission areas.

There's a bill due in recapitalization. That means buying new things, or at least, rebuilding our old things with new subsystems. We have experienced an extended "procurement holiday" and we are feeling the effects.

Our people fly, sail, and drive into battle in the legacies of the Cold War. Ten years ago, those platforms were fresh from the Gulf War, battle-tested and proven. Now they've got another hard decade of wear and tear from patrolling the Gulf, the Balkans, Korea, the Sinai, plus a lot of "911" missions. We have used them at a higher anticipated rate. We have numerous examples of important weapons and support systems that have grown "long in the tooth."

We are not building enough aircraft, enough ships, or enough fighting vehicles to keep the current force up to strength. In some units, we cannot even backfill training

attrition, so we have to cut the numbers of platforms assigned to front line battalions and squadrons. During combat, numbers do count. Our numbers are eroding daily with no significant turnaround in sight.

Rebuilding is an option, and a good one. Our B-52 *Stratofortress* bombers are still a viable weapon system due to advances in munitions and smart upgrades over the years. The basic design may be decades old, but it's still a fundamentally capable aircraft. The Navy's *Spruance*-class destroyers went through similar upgrades. Out of necessity, both the B-52 and the *Spruance* have grown to meet new requirements. We need open architecture built into our weapons from the beginning.

Whether we buy new stuff or rebuild old stuff, we must do something to improve our joint warfighting capability.

We have already done that all too much with our facilities. Our people expect us to improve barracks and family housing...we're doing it, but not fast enough. We put people to work in buildings that date back to World War II, with sputtering electrical systems and unreliable heating, then wonder why they are dissatisfied with their quality of life. We have runways that need resurfacing, piers that need shoring, fuel farms that need resealing, and so on. Gunnery ranges need new targets and in many cases, have become too small or antiquated for new munitions. If we were landlords on the open market, we would not attract too many business or private tenants.

This is especially true in terms of simulators—both computer wargame type and crew trainers—and firing ranges. We build these into new equipment full unit fielding but these are often the first things cut when we field new weapons and budgets get tight. The local arcade has state-of-the art simulators and computer wargames, but most of our joint warfighters do not. We're still waiting for the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS), our first real joint mega-wargame, the sort of thing that would let you try out Rapid Decisive Operations in a computer environment. Without it, we try to rig together various Service combat simulations and use a lot of umpires and guesswork to fill in the blanks.

As for our ranges, we are trying to shoe-horn longer-ranged weapons onto World War II ranged installations. It's getting cramped. Either we "dumb down" our current capabilities to fit or we don't shoot. You fight the way you train. Right now we're training to pull our punches. Spending some resources on training facilities is important.

We have justified deferred maintenance and postponed new starts on our facilities by saying that we have to pay for fighting readiness and real-world missions first. You'd expect that. You should expect that. Our people understand. The mission comes first. But enough is enough.

You have to get through today to get to tomorrow. The biggest potential distractor from Transformation is what we're doing—and not doing—today. We have to

address today's needs in terms of OPTEMPO and recapitalization or we won't Transform very much. In the broadest sense, we have three options:

- Reduce missions.
- Increase resources, including forces.
- Change policies to force the hard efficiencies; we've already gotten the easy ones.

We don't pick our missions or our resource levels, though we can recommend on each. Getting our strategy straight is critical. The President and Secretary of Defense know this and stated that when they came on board, and they are leading a good, hard look at our strategy. We fully support them. Right now, there's a clear mismatch between what is currently defined as our endstate and the means to achieve it. We're feeling the strain and it's affecting Transformation.

### **Final Thoughts: Toward Transformation**

We are on our way. Transformation means future battlefield dominance. There is nothing more important. Readiness today coupled with a strategy for tomorrow can move us a long way down the field.

All this Transformation talk is great, but we have to remember the basics. War remains close, personal, and brutal. There is no silver bullet that can change that. Gunpowder, nuclear bombs, and computers—there have been revolutions before in how we fight. But in the end, it still comes down to our willingness and capability to kill them before they get us. It's never safe, easy, or risk-free. The enemy sees to that.

Today while I talk to you, there are people flying, sailing, and standing in harm's way, under enemy guns, at night, and far from America. They and their successors will define our success. I look forward to working with you to give them what they need.

Thank you.