

**STATEMENT OF
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**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES**

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Good afternoon, Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Akin, Ranking Member Thornberry, and members of the subcommittees. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department's progress in developing capabilities and capacities for irregular warfare and stability operations, and in integrating these capabilities with those of other U.S. Government departments and agencies. Both the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted the need to improve joint force and interagency proficiency in these areas when they testified before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this month.

Today and for decades to come, the United States and our international partners must contend with terrorism with a global reach; rogue regimes that provide support to terrorists and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction; threats emerging in and emanating from fragile states and poorly governed areas; and new manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict. This range of irregular warfare challenges blurs the line between peace and war. Indeed, many of these threats come from countries with which the United States is not at war, and manifest themselves in ways that cannot be overcome solely by military means. The responses they demand extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or department. As the U.S. Government wrestles with how to transform itself in order to address these threats, the Department continues to do its part by implementing the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review's vision to develop concepts and capabilities to address irregular challenges.

Irregular Warfare (IW) and Stability Operations Capabilities

It is my responsibility as ASD (SO/LIC&IC) to implement the vision provided in the QDR across all of the Department's warfighting capabilities while providing policy oversight over their employment. The QDR established that irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare. As a result, it was incorporated into the Department's force planning construct, influencing the size of the force as well as the types of capabilities needed.

Irregular warfare activities conducted by the joint force include a variety of operations and activities to prevent and respond to the challenges outlined above. These missions include, but are not limited to: counterterrorism (CT); unconventional warfare (UW); foreign internal defense (FID); counterinsurgency (COIN); and stability operations, which, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state. Irregular warfare operations may occur independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare campaigns. None of these IW missions is new to the Department of Defense. Many of the capabilities required to execute them are resident in some parts of our force, but not with sufficient capacity to meet expected demand. In other cases, we need to develop new capabilities to address emerging challenges.

Rebalancing the overall Defense portfolio to ensure that the joint force is as effective in irregular warfare as it is in traditional warfare requires focused efforts in three key areas: growing special operations forces (SOF) capacity, while maintaining quality standards; reorienting general purpose force (GPF) capabilities toward irregular warfare while maintaining the capability of GPF to prevail in traditional campaigns; and promoting increased integration between SOF and GPF.

To date, the Department of Defense has taken significant strides toward achieving lasting institutional change. It has invested in SOF growth; produced a Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare; launched a capability-based assessment process to identify the optimum force structure and capabilities to support IW missions; and completed a comprehensive review of the capability and capacity demands for GPF to conduct long-duration counterinsurgency operations, and to train, equip, and advise operationally significant foreign security forces in multiple theaters of operation. The Department has also incorporated IW concepts into plans, strategic guidance, and the analytic agenda.

An important complementary effort within the Department is implementing the DoD Directive on *Military Support to SSTR* (3000.05). As members of these subcommittees know, this directive set policy to adapt DoD processes and develop capabilities for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In particular, the Department is emphasizing improved civil-military integration for future stabilization operations. Institutionalizing the lessons of OEF and OIF – e.g., enhancing Provincial Reconstruction Teams and pursuing information sharing capabilities to improve our ability to share knowledge with our interagency, multinational, and private sector partners – remains a high priority within the Department.

We continue to build on the transformational concepts to enhance joint force irregular warfare capabilities. For example, Deputy Secretary England recently initiated a Department-wide review of the capabilities required to “Train, Advise, Assist” (TAA) foreign security forces. This effort, while still at a preliminary stage, builds on the findings of various joint assessments that have concluded that training foreign security forces will be an enduring mission for both SOF and GPF. As this effort continues, we are focusing on key questions regarding the types and echelons of foreign security forces that the joint force should be prepared to train or advise; appropriate operating concepts for whole-of-government foreign security force assistance; the roles and capabilities of all elements of the U.S. Government to achieve these missions; and what gaps in capability, capacity, resources, and authorities exist.

Experiences in OIF and OEF have shown that joint force transformation, as directed by the 2006 QDR, is on the right path. GPF have demonstrated the agility to train and advise foreign security forces at the tactical and operational level. This expanded GPF role in advising foreign forces has enabled SOF to devote more capabilities to its unique mission set – e.g., CT, training and advising foreign SOF, and UW. We continue to seek better SOF-GPF integration and force allocation methods that contribute to our GWOT strategic objectives. These efforts exemplify our strategy of increasing security by working with and through key partners, and by enhancing the capacity of our partners to defeat terrorist threats.

These transformational initiatives will soon be reflected in the Department’s force development planning and resource priorities. Strategic guidance will direct further examination of IW steady-state and surge requirements across the full range of IW scenarios. This effort will build on lessons learned from OEF and OIF, particularly in CT-, UW-, and COIN-related mission sets. The guidance will identify aspects of the defense capability portfolio where we can accept some risk in order to increase investment in areas where the joint force is less proficient – including irregular warfare and stability operations.

Finally, we are in the early stages of developing a DoD directive that takes a comprehensive view of irregular warfare concepts and requirements. This broader view goes beyond post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction -- it encompasses capabilities and operating concepts to address the preventive elements of the strategy to reduce irregular security challenges. In so doing, we will reinforce the QDR vision that IW capabilities be accorded priority comparable to traditional warfare capabilities – from the tools required to conduct steady-state CT operations to those required to conduct large-scale COIN and stabilization operations.

This comprehensive approach recognizes the synergy of employing common capabilities across a variety of environments. The skill sets that apply in stability operations – e.g., cross-cultural communications and language skills, enhanced intelligence through the use of social science expertise, indirect approaches, etc. – also apply to the broad suite of IW missions: FID, CT, UW, and COIN. The Department’s leadership believes this approach will facilitate more efficient use of DoD resources for training and educating personnel, and in identifying and fielding required capabilities. It should also drive the development of a robust cadre of expert military and DoD civilian career professionals who concentrate on irregular warfare mission areas throughout their careers. Our efforts to streamline internal DoD processes and capability development will enhance our ability to support whole-of-government efforts with improved capabilities and enhanced joint force capacity.

Interagency Integration

Many of today’s most pressing security challenges can emerge from within countries with which we are not at war. We face adversaries who are dispersed, stateless, and capable of inflicting damage globally. Ultimately, success in overcoming these adversaries lies in sustained support from indigenous populations for their legitimate governments. Helping our partners to meet the needs of their people in a responsible way requires a whole-of-government approach at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The Department supports the interagency planning efforts of the National Counterterrorism Center, which seeks to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the employment of diplomatic, financial, intelligence, military, and law enforcement instruments of national power. Today’s security environment not only requires focused interagency efforts to build partner capability to prevent exploitation of weak or failing states, but it also requires creative interagency approaches to defeat the most immediate threats to security.

For example, in Iraq, DoD is working with the Department of Treasury and other government agencies to undermine financial support for the insurgency through the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC). The ITFC was established to enhance the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence to support and strengthen U.S., Iraqi, and Coalition efforts to disrupt and eliminate key terrorist and insurgent financial network nodes.

Defeating threats can also include intelligence and kinetic capabilities to act in support of or on behalf of international partners in eliminating the most dangerous threats. In many cases these cooperative endeavors contribute toward creating the time and space needed for our partners to strengthen their capabilities to address

security challenges independently. In a separate venue, I would be happy to provide additional detail regarding the progress we have seen in our partnerships with the intelligence community to increase our effectiveness for these activities.

The “Global Train and Equip” authority provides commanders a means to fill longstanding gaps in our ability to build the capacity and capabilities of partner nations to address irregular challenges. The program focuses on places where we are not at war, but where there are emerging threats and opportunities. Our commanders consider this a vital tool in the war on terror, and it is a model of interagency cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense. This authority is executed under joint DoD and State Department procedures, requiring approval of proposals by Combatant Commanders and Embassies in the field, and both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State in Washington. I hope the members of these subcommittees also recognize the importance of this tool and will work with their colleagues in Congress to extend this authority and expand it to meet COCOM and Embassy needs.

On numerous occasions, Secretary Gates has supported proposals that increase resources for civilian agencies. A key complement to the Global Train and Equip authority is the “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance authority, which provides the U.S. Government greater flexibility to bring the right civilian expertise from across the interagency to bear alongside, or instead of, the joint force. This authority provides the State Department additional resources for rapid execution of programs to seize opportunities and mitigate emerging threats. Like the Global Train and Equip authority, 1207 is operated under “dual key” procedures. I appreciate your support for this authority.

DoD also supports the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), a \$249M program in the State Department’s FY09 budget request, which answers the President’s call to improve the United States’ ability to respond to instability and conflict. To realize fully the capabilities of CSI, the Department supports passage of H.R. 1084, the Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Management Act of 2007.

The Department continues to support the work of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in implementation of National Security Presidential Directive – 44 (NSPD-44), which provides the framework to guide civilian capability development for stabilization and reconstruction operations and the integration of those capabilities with those of the joint force. DoD has developed a plan that outlines critical DoD activities in support of NSPD-44, based on the guiding principle that DoD capabilities and expertise will be employed to enhance whole-of-government approaches and civilian agency capacities for stabilization and reconstruction. DoD remains engaged in the development of shared training and education programs and the on-

going work to produce a U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is another critical component of interagency efforts to address the range of 21st-century security challenges. As we support our partners' efforts to meet the needs of their people in a responsible way, we simultaneously seek to erode support for terrorists and insurgents. Successful efforts to counter ideological support to terrorism (CIST) must focus on the self-perceptions and self-interests of key audiences, rather than their perceptions of the United States. Its narrative must outline an alternative future – a future of hope and opportunity that is more attractive than the oppressive future offered by violent extremists. The positive narrative that explains these differences must contain more than just anti-extremist rhetoric. It must include elements that affect the lives of the population – fairness, justice, opportunity, liberty, health, education, hope, and, foremost, security.

Effective strategic communication in this arena requires more than just a compelling narrative – it requires taking actions that make our words credible. From a DoD perspective, such actions can range from building the capability of partner security forces to establishing a safe and secure environment and providing essential governmental services until appropriate civilian authorities can do so. The Department, collaborating with interagency partners, must improve its capabilities for these IW missions in order to match our words with action.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense continues to adapt our organizations and processes to meet contemporary security challenges. Key among these are invigorated capabilities for irregular warfare operations: CT, UW, FID, COIN, and Stability Operations. This Department recognizes that defending against ideologically-driven extremists requires synergistic effort from the entire U.S. Government, and active assistance from our key international partners. The QDR vision provides a viable roadmap for this Department to perform its mission in concert with our partners. With your continued support, we will continue to exercise the agility needed to strengthen these partnerships in ways that preserve and protect the values and interests of our Nation.