The Department of Defense has made significant progress during the past year moving the Counterproliferation Initiative from policy formulation to operative implementation throughout many functions of the Department and other agencies of the U.S. government. Much work remains, and DoD is continuing to identify potential response measures to prepare for the dangers stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
BACKGROUND
The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is part of the reorganization of forces and plans after the Cold War and therefore is best understood in context with the Bottom-Up Review (BUR). As a result of the BUR, DoD now focuses its planning on two major regional conflicts (MRCs), conducted nearly simultaneously, rather than on global war with the Soviet Union centered on the defense of Europe. As DoD's understanding of these MRCs developed, it became clear that there was a very high probability that aggressors would threaten, wield, or use WMD. Earlier assumptions that conflicts not involving the Soviet Union would be fought solely with conventional weapons needed to be reviewed and new guidance issued.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons -- collectively weapons of mass destruction -- are no longer a hypothetical threat in regional conflicts. Almost anywhere the United States is likely to deploy forces around the world -- Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Europe -- states are likely to have WMD. For DoD to do its job in this new era, to reshape its forces for the new world, it must take seriously this aspect of future conflicts. The American people expect their armed forces to be ready to win, and the men and women in uniform deserve to have the best equipment and training for all future conflict, including if opponents resort to WMD. This is what the Counterproliferation Initiative is intended to do.
The American experience in Operation Desert Storm inspired this work on counterproliferation. Although U.S. forces performed spectacularly, one can see in Operation Desert Storm the implications of WMD for defense becoming evident. In each of the categories of weapons of mass destruction, and in missiles, U.S. forces received a surprise.
First, Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapon program was farther along and of a different technical character than was thought before the war, although not yet to the point where he had enough fissile material for a bomb. Second, Hussein had a large stock of chemical weapons, had already used them in a war, but did not use them against the coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm. His reasons for non-use must be understood. The third surprise has to do with biological weapon threats. Saddam Hussein was known to have certain biological weapon facilities, but U.S. forces did not understand fully how to destroy them while minimizing collateral contamination. The next conflict cannot be fought without the answers to these important questions. Finally, Iraq's Scud missiles had a significant political impact during the conflict on Iraq's neighbors and their likelihood of entering the war or being drawn into the conflict. Even though the military impact of the Scuds was minimal, the United States must be better prepared to defend against missiles the next time.
In spite of Iraq's rudimentary arsenal of WMD, each area mentioned above delivered an unpleasant surprise. U.S. forces must not be caught unaware again; they deserve the best efforts to ensure that they are not. The Counterproliferation Initiative addresses the role of WMD in major regional conflicts and is therefore an essential part of preparing U.S. forces for future conflicts.
Although the counterproliferation effort grew out of experiences with the potential military consequences when states acquire WMD, the first priority remains to prevent the proliferation of WMD. Where proliferation is successfully prevented, the operational consequences for forces of threatened or actual WMD use are negligible. Military preparations complement and support prevention efforts in two ways.
First, defense preparations for WMD use make clear to potential proliferators that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are not the Achilles' heel of otherwise superior U.S. conventional forces, nor will an aggressor with WMD be able to deter the application of U.S. military power. To the extent that states seek to develop WMD to gain some degree of leverage over the United States and its allies, the results of the Counterproliferation Initiative should lessen their motivation to proliferate.
Second, as understanding of the military consequences of WMD improves, prevention policies become better focused on those issues and items of greatest military significance. For example, in the field of export controls, DoD's military and technical expertise make an important contribution to judgments as to the military significance of a particular export.
As these examples make clear, counterproliferation is able to build on proliferation work the Department has been involved in for some time in the context of an East/West conflict with the Soviet Union. Similarly, DoD has been a strong, active, long-time participant in U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation through diplomacy. The handling of the nuclear challenge from North Korea provides just one example. The Department's paramount concern in this critical region was the halting of the existing North Korean nuclear program, poised last June to leap forward in its production of weapons-grade plutonium. Under the Framework Agreement now in place, North Korea has halted and must eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons-related program, and comply fully with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards. Unfortunately, in other cases the experience with Iraq shows both that dedicated states can break through prevention barriers, and that U.S. forces need to be better prepared.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION
To be successful, DoD's support for government-wide prevention efforts and its drive to improve protection capabilities must be applied across a range of possible responses to proliferation. This demonstrates a fundamental aspect of an effective strategy to grapple with proliferation -- it requires the consistent, integrated application of the entire range of possible responses at the government's disposal.
For illustrative purposes, the range of possible government responses can be summarized as follows:
ONE YEAR'S PROGRESS
The first year of the counterproliferation policy initiative has produced progress in several areas of defense activity, including acquisition planning, budgeting, military planning, international cooperation, and support to arms and export control regimes. As is essential with all new initiatives, the right balance has been struck between thorough, step-by-step planning and early action to remedy long identified shortfalls. A comprehensive review of the military issues related to counterproliferation has been completed to ensure that all aspects of the issue -- from weapon systems to logistical support -- are assessed. At the same time, several acquisition programs already in the pipeline have been augmented with modest funding to remedy known shortfalls. While much work is yet to be done to ensure that counterproliferation is fully integrated throughout the Department, there have been several important achievements to date.
The Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
The Deputy Secretary of Defense led an interagency study of nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities as Chairman of the Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (NPRC). This was in accordance with Section 1605 of the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act in which Congress identified eight functional areas for study:
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The NPRC identified 16 priority technologies and programs with the greatest potential for making contributions to U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation capabilities. Generally, these efforts emphasize seven areas:
The Executive Branch has established two committees to continue the research and development (R&D) program review process. The Senior Standing Committee on Nonproliferation and Export Controls will operate as an executive committee of the National Security Council's Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group will report to the relevant policy IWGs and to the Committee on National Security within the National Science and Technology Council structure. Congress also directed DoD to lead a follow on, interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, composed of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of Central Intelligence, to continue the work of the NPRC, but with a scope limited to identifying priority counterproliferation technologies and programs, which will report in May 1995 and 1996.
Counterproliferation Acquisition Funding for FY 1995
DoD has a number of programs and activities currently underway that are either unique to the counterproliferation mission or are strongly related. Unique activities include detection of NBC hazards, characterization of NBC targets, and defeat of tactical ballistic missiles and aircraft carrying NBC weapons. Strongly related activities include application of surveillance assets, such as unmanned ground sensors, to perimeter monitoring. As part of the NPRC report, DoD determined that for FY 1995, the Department has budgeted $522.1 million for unique programs and activities, and another $1.9 billion for strongly related programs and activities.
Taking into account current programs and activities, the NPRC nevertheless determined that there were high priority shortfalls in DoD's operational capability to implement its counterproliferation mission and identified priority efforts totaling approximately $295 million. DoD, however, could only fund $80 million for counterproliferation programs in the first year of the FY 1996-2001 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and approximately $556 million over the POM's six years. These programs, current and planned, are an essential contribution to ensuring that DoD is fulfilling its responsibility to the American people to have the best prepared forces in the world for any and all future conflicts.
For FY 1995, Congress authorized $60 million for DoD counterproliferation programs. This money will be used to accelerate top priority DoD programs in the areas identified in the NPRC report and prioritized by the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) for deterrence/counterproliferation. It will be managed according to an execution plan that identifies specific objectives to be achieved, products to be provided, schedules for achieving objectives and providing products, and year-by-year funding allocations for each specific project. These programs are:
New Counterproliferation Missions and Functions for the Military
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at the request of the Deputy Secretary, conducted a six-month review of the missions of the Commanders in Chief and functions of the armed services in support of the counterproliferation policy and will soon present several recommendations to the Secretary. To guide his study, the CJCS issued terms of reference for counterproliferation activities to combatant commanders that cover situations where the military might be called upon to support U.S. policy. The study addressed how the Services organize, train, and equip their forces to support the counterproliferation policy and missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command.
Improved Intelligence Support for Counterproliferation
Effective intelligence support is central to all aspects of the DoD counterproliferation effort, and the Intelligence Community continues to respond to meet new needs for operation-specific products. The Non-Proliferation Center (NPC) -- the focal point in the Intelligence Community of the collection and analysis of intelligence related to proliferation -- now has a Deputy Director for Military Support in recognition that one of the its important tasks is supporting military needs, in addition to its traditional work in support of diplomatic nonproliferation efforts. Toward the same goal of greater emphasis on support to the military, DoD has tripled the number of personnel it assigned to the NPC. Correspondingly, the Defense Intelligence Agency is also ensuring that appropriate attention is given to military intelligence for countering WMD.
International Cooperation
The Department has been working with America's long-time allies in Europe and with Japan to develop a common approach on counterproliferation. Following President Clinton's emphasis at the January 1994 Summit on the danger to NATO from proliferation of WMD and the initiative launched by allied leaders, DoD has made significant progress toward integrating a counterproliferation policy into the new, post-Cold War agenda of the alliance.
In May 1994, NATO approved two milestone documents: a political framework paper structuring the broad political-military approach of the alliance to proliferation, and a three-phase work plan for the Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) to address the defense implications of proliferation. The DGP is co-chaired by the United States and one of the European allies (currently France) on a rotating basis. Having assessed the risks posed by WMD proliferation to the alliance, the DGP will now begin work on its second phase -- grappling with the operational implications of WMD use for alliance military capabilities. The DGP's work in assessing proliferation risks to NATO is an important part of NATO's continuing adaptation to the new security environment. While diplomatic efforts to prevent proliferation remain NATO's primary goal, NATO must also ensure that it has the range of capabilities needed to discourage WMD use and to counter, if necessary, threats to NATO populations, territory, and forces. Political-military uncertainties and future technological trends related to WMD will inform NATO's decisions today about needed future capabilities. NATO is concerned about the continuing risks of illicit transfers of WMD and related materials, growing proliferation risks on NATO's periphery, and the role of suppliers of WMD-related technology to states on NATO's periphery.
The NATO work clearly shows that the United States is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of proliferation. The alliance remains relevant and forward-looking on military topics central to its core mission of collective defense, and demonstrates the continued interest of the European allies in cooperative transatlantic security with the United States.
The Government of Japan also has recognized the growing danger from attacks with missiles armed with WMD warheads, the need to strengthen the defensive capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces, and the necessity of maintaining capabilities for combined joint operations. To meet this threat, the United States and Japan are working to identify the TMD capability Japan will need and to evaluate options for acquiring that capability in future years, including opportunities for cooperative programs.
Status of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Opened for signature on January 13, 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) currently has 159 signatories and will enter into force 180 days following deposit of the 65th ratification with the United Nations (22 countries have ratified to date). The CWC bans the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. Since February 1993 and until entry into force (EIF), the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) is meeting to complete the details necessary to have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fully operational at EIF. DoD has participated actively throughout this PrepCom process, providing a full range of experts on numerous CWC implementation issues such as inspection procedures, data management, and inspector training. As mandated under the CWC, DoD will declare and destroy the U.S. chemical weapon stockpile, as well as the nonstockpile items (former production facilities, training weapons, and so forth) covered by the CWC.
Counterproliferation Education
In addition to developing a counterproliferation policy throughout the Department, work is ongoing to ensure that future senior military officers arrive at assignments well grounded in the defense implications of proliferation and DoD counterproliferation policy. In this regard, the Center for Counterproliferation Research was established at the National Defense University (NDU) in April 1994 with a mission to educate senior military officers on the new dangers from proliferation and the DoD role in responding through counterproliferation. The Center also will support policy work in the Department through research and analysis of specific proliferation threats. The Center was instrumental in developing a major international conference at NDU in November that brought the counterproliferation issues and U.S. policy to a wide audience.
STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES
The Department is continuing to tailor its contribution to important nonproliferation regimes, the primary tools to prevent acquisition of WMD and to promote roll-back of WMD programs. DoD is building on its traditionally strong participation in the negotiation of and, in some cases, leadership in the implementation of arms control and nonproliferation regimes. While DoD shares responsibility for U.S. policy on international regimes with the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and others, it has unique technical and military expertise vital to making these regimes effective.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons establishes certain obligations for both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states regarding the transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It allows all parties to participate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty mandates an extension conference 25 years after entry into force (1970) to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for a fixed period or fixed periods. This conference will take place in 1995. DoD has been represented at all preparatory committee meetings to prepare for this NPT Extension Conference and is strongly behind the U.S. position to support indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The President has directed that the United States seek to conclude negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest possible time. A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and constrain development of nuclear weapons capability in proliferant states and the nuclear weapon states. DoD is a key player in developing U.S. positions in the negotiations.
Biological Weapons Convention
The President has directed that the U.S. promote new measures that provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). DoD will participate in the U.S. delegation to the BWC Ad Hoc Group mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference and will play an important role in U.S. efforts to develop off-site and on-site measures for consideration by the Group. The United States strongly supports the development of a legally-binding protocol of such measures to strengthen the BWC.
TECHNOLOGY SECURITY AND EXPORT CONTROL
DoD's technology security program is designed to prevent the transfer of dangerous and sensitive technologies to countries that pose a threat to international security, as well as to ensure that when technology is transferred it is done in a manner that does not endanger U.S. interests or compromise its military advantages. In addition to controlling transfers of destabilizing conventional weapons and associated dual-use technologies, technology security program supports the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative by preventing transfers that would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems. The Department also provides support to law enforcement and intelligence agencies working in activities to prevent the unwarranted transfer of defense related goods, services, and technologies.
Inhibiting the spread of WMD technologies and countering the threats that may arise from the transfer of arms and sensitive technologies pose different challenges and require different approaches. While it is U.S. policy to prohibit and curtail the proliferation of WMD technologies, U.S. policy recognizes that the sale and export of conventional weapons and technologies is not inherently threatening or destabilizing. In fact, appropriate exports of such weapons and technologies can be an integral tool of national security policy aimed at bolstering the security of allies and friends as well as supporting regional defense strategies (see Appendix J, Security Assistance). Such exports also serve to support efforts to maintain a strong and responsive industrial base. The United States recognizes that it is not the only supplier of conventional weapons and technology; accordingly, it seeks to harmonize its policies and export practices with other suppliers in order to deny enemies military advantages and to limit destabilizing capabilities in critical regions where tensions can lead to military conflict.
Overall, the United States will seek to maintain and strengthen controls on so-called chokepoint technologies; that is, key enabling technologies that are still produced by a limited number of states. These controls can still have a dramatic effect on slowing the pace of programs and raising their costs. This contribution is important to the ongoing efforts to focus and strengthen key international export control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), and the Australia Group and to create a new international regime to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).
Founding the COCOM Successor Regime
DoD has played a central role in negotiations designed to replace COCOM with a new export control regime that addresses the new world order. The aim is to provide transparency, responsibility, and restraint in transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies to countries and regions of concern including where U.S. and allied forces might face hostile military actions. The regime is intended to establish basic principles and policies among like-minded states that would be implemented on a national discretion basis. One example is the United States' desire to deny arms sales to countries of concern. The regime will enable the United States and other participating countries to better track and monitor sensitive arms and technology transfers as they occur. This will benefit DoD by providing an inventory of information on foreign military capabilities that might not otherwise be discernible. This information is important to military planning for contingencies as well as long-term R&D and weapons development efforts. Information exchange and consultation on major arms and dual-use technology transfers to regions of instability build confidence among major exporters and thereby foster greater cooperation.
This regime is designed to complement and reinforce other export control regimes, such as the NSG, the Australia Group for chemical and biological material and technology, and the MTCR. Russia and other formerly COCOM proscribed countries have been given incentives to join the regime, such as greater access to advanced technologies, provided they meet established norms of behavior. Including these countries in the regime serves as a means of promoting responsible behavior with respect to control of sensitive weapons and related technologies. This parallels other DoD efforts, such as Cooperative Threat Reduction, to address the potential for the spread of WMD, advanced conventional weapons, and associated sensitive dual-use technologies from Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU).
Missile Technology Control Regime
The only multilateral missile nonproliferation regime, the MTCR, is a voluntary arrangement of 25 states including the United States, Canada, their major trading partners in Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Hungary. The United States strongly supports this regime which seeks to control exports of equipment and technology -- both military and dual-use -- that are relevant to missile development, production, and operation.
Nuclear Suppliers' Group
This group consists of 30 nuclear suppliers and seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both dual-use and specially designed and prepared. Russia is a member of this group and therefore bound by its controls, though other former Soviet nuclear republics -- particularly Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan -- along with other major suppliers like China and Brazil are not. The United States views observance of the NSG guidelines by these states as an important means of stemming the flow of nuclear materials and technologies.
Australia Group
An informal arrangement of 28 industrial countries including the United States, Canada, most of Western Europe (including the European Union), Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, the Australia Group seeks to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons material and technology. The Group holds information exchanges and prepares lists of chemical precursors, microorganisms, and related equipment for member countries to control by export licensing and monitoring. DoD's contribution to U.S. participation in the Australia Group has paralleled its participation in the negotiation of and the implementation planning for the CWC.
OTHER TREATY ACTIVITIES
The Department has numerous responsibilities in arms control negotiation, implementation, verification, inspection and other related activities. Arms control remains one of a growing number of tools by which U.S. security can be enhanced through cooperative arrangements with other nations.
START I
On December 5, 1994, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) entered into force, ushering in a new era in nuclear arms control. START I is the first accord that will actually reduce, rather than just cap, deployed strategic nuclear forces in the United States and the states of the FSU. START I requires a 50 percent reduction in FSU heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), considered the most destabilizing strategic systems. START I also requires the total number of accountable warheads on each side to be reduced by over 40 percent, and the number of strategic delivery systems to be reduced by roughly one-third, from 1990 levels. The treaty further establishes an extensive notification and inspection regime to assist in verifying compliance. Moreover, as a result of the Lisbon Protocol to START I and associated documents, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear weapon states and committed to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from their territories within the seven-year START I reduction period. START I is thus an historic achievement that will lead to dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals.
The history of START I spans three U.S. administrations. Negotiations began in 1982 during the Reagan Administration, with the primary goal of improving stability in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance while significantly reducing the level of nuclear weapons on each side. The Bush Administration concluded these negotiations, and the treaty was signed in July 1991. In the aftermath of the December 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration negotiated with the newly independent states to make START I a multilateral treaty. These efforts culminated in the May 1992 Lisbon Protocol by which Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine became parties to START I. However, because the Russian parliament ratified START I with the condition that the treaty could not enter into force until the other three former Soviet states had acceded to NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, START I entry into force was delayed. During the following two years, the Clinton Administration encouraged these states to join NPT as quickly as possible. A major achievement in this regard was the January 1994 Trilateral Statement signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia for dismantlement in exchange for fuel assemblies for Ukrainian nuclear power stations. Also as part of this statement, the United States and Russia agreed to provide security assurances to Ukraine once Ukraine acceded to NPT and START I entered into force. The Ukrainian parliament's vote to accede to NPT in November 1994, along with earlier accessions by Belarus and Kazakhstan, allowed the five START I parties to exchange instruments of ratification in December 1994 and thus bring the treaty officially into force.
The significance of START I extends beyond the treaty itself, however, since START I laid the groundwork for additional measures to reduce nuclear weapons. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991 and January 1992, which the Soviet Union and Russia reciprocated to a degree, greatly reduced deployments of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and curtailed modernization of strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which requires even more far-reaching cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, built upon the existing provisions of START I.
START II
In January 1993, the United States and Russia signed START II, which calls for the most sweeping nuclear arms reductions in history. The treaty requires elimination of destabilizing strategic systems -- heavy and multiple-warhead ICBMs -- and requires each side to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 3,000-3,500. As a result, deployed strategic forces will be reduced by about two-thirds from pre-START I levels. All reductions and eliminations must be completed no later than January 1, 2003.
In part because START II is based largely on START I, it was possible to negotiate the former in less than one year. However, since START II relies on START I for many implementing provisions, including the verification regime, START II could not enter into force without START I being in effect. The recent entry into force of START I thus opens the way for ratification and entry into force of START II. This was anticipated at the September 1994 U.S.-Russia summit, where Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin stated their intention to seek early ratification of START II (once START I had entered into force) and expressed their desire to exchange instruments of ratification, thus enabling START II to enter into force, at the next U.S.-Russia summit in 1995. The Presidents also agreed to pursue early deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II, once it enters into force, as a way to enjoy the security benefits of the Treaty at an early date.
Conventional Forces in Europe
The Department of Defense continues to play a very active role in the verification and compliance activities associated with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). These efforts are necessary to realize the Treaty's contribution to stability through reducing levels of conventional armaments throughout Europe and ensuring that there can be no destabilizing concentrations of forces in the region. In 1994, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) participated in over 120 inspections under the Treaty in states of the former Warsaw Pact and escorted foreign teams during five inspections of U.S. forces in Europe.
Open Skies
DoD is also continuing preparations for implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. The Treaty will permit participating states to overfly other parties and collect photographic and other specified data, thereby strengthening stability and cooperative security through increased openness and transparency. The U.S. Open Skies aircraft, operated by the Air Force and staffed by OSIA have participated in 15 trial flights in 1994, over half including foreign participants.
On-Site Inspection Agency Activities
The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is a joint-Service DoD organization responsible for U.S. readiness and implementation of inspection, escort, and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of arms control treaties and agreements. OSIA was formed in January 1988 by Presidential Directive to implement the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Under the CFE Treaty, OSIA inspectors have conducted over 130 inspections and, with the support of NATO allies, witnessed the destruction of thousands of pieces of combat equipment -- tanks, armored combat vehicles, aircraft, and artillery. Short notice inspections at Russian and U.S. chemical weapons storage, production, and development facilities under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding were completed in late 1994. OSIA will also support implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
The Open Skies Treaty establishes aerial observation rights among the 27 signatories. When it enters into force, OSIA will lead and manage U.S. teams performing observation duties in Air Force modified weather reconnaissance aircraft (OC-135B) equipped with optical, video, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar sensors. OSIA will escort foreign teams flying over the United States.
Preparations for implementation of START I and II have been thorough. Agency personnel have conducted roughly 200 mock inspections of 35 Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities, including submarine, intercontinental ballistic missile, and heavy bomber sites since early 1991. Personnel and equipment are ready to deploy to Pavlograd, Ukraine, to implement START monitoring provisions.
OSIA is the executive agent for DoD support to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), pursuant to U.N. Resolutions 687 and 715. OSIA has the authority to task the DoD components to procure or provide DoD unique equipment, services, facilities, and personnel in support of the UNSCOM for the purpose of eliminating Iraq's capabilities, vis-a-vis WMD and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. Another goal of UNSCOM is to ensure Iraq does not reacquire these capabilities.
OSIA is tasked with the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP). A security and intelligence countermeasures program, DTIRP provides arms control security awareness training and services designed to ensure that onsite inspections of U.S. industrial facilities and military installations do not result in foreign access to nontreaty relevant information.
OSIA has been called upon to provide team leadership and inspection expertise in the latest bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia involving mutual reciprocal inspections of nuclear warhead components. This emerging agreement continues the trend of cooperation between both nations in safeguarding and providing transparency for nuclear components.
Finally, OSIA assists in the implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. OSIA personnel receive, escort, and assist in the delivery of CTR equipment in-country; act as experienced linguists; and conduct audit and examination activities to confirm that equipment sent to CTR recipients is used for its intended purposes.
DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative has begun to influence the day-to-day business of the Department and its contribution to U.S. policy on the proliferation of WMD. The policy guidance and goals are clear -- preventing proliferation and protecting U.S. forces, vital interests, allies, and homeland from opponents with WMD and missile capabilities. But there are many challenges ahead. In the coming year, DoD will continue to develop and implement its strategy for new military capabilities to deal with the proliferation threat. The Department is committed to tailoring its unique contribution of military and technical expertise to the negotiation and implementation of nonproliferation regimes.
