With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the level of nuclear threat confronting the United States was reduced significantly. Yet, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, an estimated 30,000 nuclear warheads were spread among the former Soviet Republics. Approximately 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads were located outside of Russia on the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Political, social, and economic upheaval heightened prospects that the former Soviet republics would not be able to provide for safe disposition of these nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The dangers posed by this situation were clear: diversion or unauthorized use of weapons, diversion of fissile materials, and possible participation of Soviet weapons scientists in proliferation efforts in other countries. Despite significant positive changes occurring in the New Independent States (NIS), these weapons continued to pose a threat to U.S. national security.
Taking advantage of a historic opportunity, Congress initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in November 1991 to reduce the threat to the United States from these weapons of mass destruction. Often referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, this congressional effort provided the Department of Defense authority and funding for the CTR program. Through the CTR program, DoD provides assistance to the eligible states of the former Soviet Union to promote denuclearization and demilitarization and to reduce the threat of weapons proliferation.
A REVITALIZED PROGRAM
As of the summer of 1993, the CTR program had spent almost none of the $800 million authorized for denuclearization and dismantlement efforts. Expenditures awaited agreement between the United States and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan on how the funds would be spent. Once those agreements were signed in the fall and winter of 1993-94, obligations of funds soared from $113 million in January 1994 to $478 million in December 1994. Thirty-six agreements for committing nearly $900 million of available funds from FY 1992 to FY 1994 have been negotiated and signed, and will be executed over the next several months and in some cases years. The negotiation phase of the CTR program is over, and the implementation phase has begun.
To keep up with the increase in implementation activity, a CTR Program Office was created within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This office helps plan future assistance activities supporting CTR goals, manages the day-to-day business of working with representatives in recipient nations to identify specific needs, and oversees the contracts with U.S. (and in some cases recipient nation) firms to provide such assistance. Since the CTR program provides goods and services -- rather than cash -- expenditures are directly related to denuclearization, dismantlement, and proliferation prevention efforts.
CTR operations in Ukraine are symbolic of both the challenges of arranging for assistance and the benefits of cooperation. Despite Ukraine's pledge in the Lisbon Protocol of 1992 to become a non-nuclear state, the actual process of warhead removal to Russia was not agreed upon until the United States concluded the Trilateral Statement with Russia and Ukraine. Critical to the success of these negotiations was the United States' promise of CTR assistance. The agreements to begin the CTR program were not concluded until December 1993 -- two years after negotiations began. Promise of CTR made the Trilateral Statement in January 1994 possible; delivery of CTR assistance led to further progress. Once the necessary agreements had been signed, assistance began to flow, in the shape of security equipment, vehicles, cranes, fuel, transportation equipment, and similar items. In the course of efforts to implement the Trilateral Statement, Ukrainian officials requested several specific items on an accelerated schedule. Within three weeks, a shipment was on its way. In August 1994, Leonid Kuchma was elected president, and requested CTR assistance in helping meet important domestic and international goals within his first 100 days in office. Cooperating closely with the Kuchma government, the CTR program identified areas where speedy provision of aid would have visible impacts, and rushed fuel, lubricants, emergency response support equipment, and industrial and computer equipment to accelerate the deactivation of SS-19 and SS-24 missile silos. One outcome of this demonstrated willingness to help Ukraine live up to its commitments was the Ukrainian legislature's November 1994 vote to approve accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, an outcome no one took for granted. Ukraine formally acceded to the NPT in December. The case of Ukraine demonstrates how effectively and quickly the CTR program can be implemented, once the negotiation process is completed.
CTR PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the CTR program as established by Congress are:
These objectives are inextricably linked to each other, as are the corresponding CTR program activities. Meeting the objective of safeguarding nuclear weapons in Russia, for instance, will also help prevent proliferation, a growing concern in light of recent reports of nuclear smuggling.
CTR program activities generally fall into four categories in accordance with these objectives. First, Destruction and Dismantlement activities accelerate the destruction and dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and their launchers in the four eligible states where they remain by providing leverage to encourage these countries to dismantle and by providing the actual equipment and training required to implement dismantlement decisions.
Second, through Chain of Custody activities, the CTR program decreases the dangers from the nuclear warheads and fissile materials that remain in the NIS and represent a potential threat to the United States. During the difficult period of transition in these states, the continued security and custody of nuclear weapons and materials is vitally important to both the United States and the NIS.
Third, CTR supports Demilitarization efforts which decrease the long-term threat by reducing the capacity and economic pressures in the NIS to continue to produce weapons of mass destruction. The industrial partnership projects in CTR are an effort to reduce the potential of a future nuclear threat at its source. Furthermore, the transformations created through the industrial partnership arrangements prevent proliferation by reducing both the supply of WMD available for foreign sale or diversion and the incentives for relying on such sales for income.
Lastly, the CTR program supports Other Programs and Support such as the expansion of defense and military contacts with the NIS. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the republics it contained were left with structures, forces, and equipment that were not well suited to their new-found sovereignty. The United States, through defense and military contacts, has been able to assist in the development of democratic and civilian control of military departments and the restructuring and downsizing of defense capabilities to better reflect these new nations' current needs. For example, the CTR program sponsors regular exchanges on defense strategy and greater transparency of budgets and programs. These countries will remain important players in world events and the United States benefits greatly from the close contacts with its military and defense counterparts. These contacts are part of U.S. efforts across the board to expand the domain in which U.S. security concerns coincide, rather than conflict, with those of the NIS. Recognizing that differences will still occur, developing long-term institutional relationships contributes to improving substantive professional dialogue on important defense and military issues, in addition to facilitating denuclearization and nonproliferation activities.
PROGRESS IN CTR IMPLEMENTATION
To meet CTR objectives, the program consists of numerous separate projects agreed to in the agreements and memoranda of understanding between the United States and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The CTR program has grown impressively, particularly over the past year, with the baseline obligation rate increasing over four-fold, to about $434 million at the end of FY 1994 (see chart above). By that time, DoD had notified Congress of proposed obligations totaling nearly $969 million from funds authorized for FY 1992 to FY 1994 for specific projects for the eligible states. More importantly, the total assistance committed under agreements concluded with DoD and for which implementation is actually underway is now $898 million. The following chart indicates CTR funding commitments by program area.
The CTR process from negotiation, to project formulation, to requirements definition, to final execution, involves many steps in the respective state-to-state relationships as well as within the U.S. government. Congress has directed that American contractors be used for CTR support to the extent feasible. Accordingly, DoD contracting for CTR goods and services is accomplished based on Federal Acquisition Regulations to ensure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly. In the final analysis, CTR benefits the U.S. economy by providing additional jobs for American workers and expanded markets for U.S. corporations.
The United States is not the only country providing assistance to the NIS for dismantlement. The United States is closely coordinating its assistance efforts with its allies through the NATO and G-7 forums to eliminate needless duplication and meet the needs of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Japan has pledged $100 million of assistance, and the NATO allies are working with the United States to develop assistance programs in Ukraine. Additionally, numerous states and international organizations including Sweden and the International Atomic Energy Agency are developing material control and accounting assistance programs with Kazakhstan. In order to ensure that assistance provided under CTR is being used as intended, the CTR agreements include provisions for the United States to conduct audits and examinations of the assistance provided.
REDUCING THE THREAT
CTR activities have contributed significantly to the reduction of the threat over the past three years. U.S. offers of assistance under the program have been instrumental in convincing Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine that they could shoulder the economic, political, and technical burdens of weapons dismantlement and demilitarization.
The CTR assistance agreement signed with Ukraine in December 1993 paved the way for the January 14, 1994, Trilateral Statement agreed to by the United States, Russia, and Ukraine which provided the transfer to Russia for dismantlement of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine. As of October 1994, Ukraine was ahead of schedule, having deactivated 610 of 1,734 deployed warheads on its territory and sending 360 of them to Russia for dismantlement. CTR assistance also played a very significant role in encouraging Ukrainian accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 1994.
CTR program funds are used directly to stimulate and support faster dismantlement in the NIS and enhance nonproliferation efforts. CTR assistance has provided political and material support for:
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
These successes come not as the result of isolated donations of equipment, but are a product of the close interaction both between representatives of the United States and the recipient nations, and among the types of assistance provided. This integrated approach highlights the importance of all elements of the program to the goals it seeks to achieve.
CTR efforts in Ukraine demonstrate this multipronged approach. The assistance projects noted above are only part of the story for Ukraine. The complete story must be understood as a process of demonstrating to Ukraine that its security would be better served without nuclear weapons than with them. A key juncture in that realization came about in December 1993 when Ukraine and Russia could not agree on a course of warhead removal, and many in Ukraine doubted U.S. willingness to assist them in the course it had chosen. The Trilateral Statement had four components: transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement, compensation for fissile materials, security assurances to Ukraine, and CTR assistance. The United States was able to broker a deal in which the Ukrainians started the process of returning weapons to Russia, and Russia agreed to provide nuclear reactor fuel to Ukraine as compensation for the value of the fissile materials returned. This landmark agreement was cemented, as already noted, by U.S. pledges to provide assistance to Ukraine in their dismantlement efforts under the CTR program.
In an effort to speed the specific action that eliminates much of the threat to the United States -- removing warheads from missiles -- the United States offered to accelerate delivery of materials useful for this so-called early deactivation. The fruits of this effort were dramatically visible when the Secretary of Defense visited a missile facility at Pervomaysk in March 1994. There he witnessed both the seriousness of the launch officers and the U.S. targets of the missiles deployed there, and the stunning sight of a modern intercontinental missile with its 10 deadly warheads -- intended for cities and bases in the United States -- permanently removed.
These very tangible successes would have been impossible without other elements of the CTR program which were brought to bear on this challenge. The CTR program also financed a continuous series of defense and military contacts which went far to assure Ukraine that the United States (and the West) had powerful interests in Ukraine's stability and success beyond the nuclear weapons based on its soil. The United States has provided expertise and support in helping Ukraine develop a national armed force that reflects its sovereign needs. Visits to U.S. training centers, advice on budgeting and planning, participation in joint peacekeeping exercises, easing tensions with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet, and other activities have made tangible America's commitment to Ukrainian security.
Individuals involved with nuclear weapons deserve to know they have a viable future in a denuclearized Ukraine. The soldiers and civilians who devoted their lives to the production, operation, and maintenance of nuclear weapons are in the process of working themselves out of their jobs. If the United States desires the elimination of Soviet nuclear weapons, the economic and social consequences of dismantling the entire complex must be addressed. Two aspects of the CTR program provide some assistance in this regard, at the cost of only 16 percent of the entire program. At the missile bases in Pervomaysk and Khmelnitsky in Ukraine, the former officers of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces are the very people who are helping close the base. These military people have no other homes, and the Ukrainian constitution requires that housing must be provided before they can be demobilized. The pace of dismantlement is therefore inhibited by the inability of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to provide the required housing. The CTR program is helping to solve this problem as part of a program under which a former shipbuilding plant and a closing missile silo factory will produce with American partners housing for these demobilized missile officers, and later, for commercial sale. Providing profitable employment for former defense workers further reduces arguments for continued manufacture of missile components, and discourages them from taking their skills elsewhere. At the same time, U.S. businesses gain access to a new market for their goods.
This integrated approach addresses the full scope of the challenge facing these nations in completing their arms control agreements and preventing further nuclear dangers from threatening themselves or others. The absence of any one part of the effort will almost certainly result in the failure of other aspects.
PRIORITIES FOR FY 1995
The CTR program has shown important progress in all areas since its beginnings three years ago. In the past year, the program has matured and the number of activities has increased exponentially. However, much work still needs to be done.
For FY 1995, the CTR program will continue to provide Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine dismantlement and demilitarization assistance, with priority placed on accelerating strategic offensive arms elimination. CTR assistance is used to facilitate ongoing deactivation and dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems according to START I and the January 1994 Trilateral Statement and will facilitate and accelerate elimination of strategic delivery systems provided for under START II.
Additionally, the CTR program will continue to provide assistance to enhance the safety and security of nuclear materials with emphasis on strengthening the entire chain of custody -- from weapons elimination and dismantlement, to monitoring the storage of plutonium. In cooperation with the Russian MOD, CTR may provide assistance to strengthen the regime of security for nuclear weapons.
Another important CTR project involves assistance to Russia in efforts to destroy the 40,000 tons of declared chemical weapons agent Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. Without substantial technical and monetary assistance from the United States and other countries, Russia will have difficulties meeting the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) destruction schedules. Through the CTR program, the United States will continue to assist Russia in weighing alternative technologies to destroy its chemical stockpiles as required by the CWC. The subsequent task of actually destroying the stockpile might benefit from an infusion of U.S. technology, funds, and expertise provided under CTR and will be given careful consideration.
Finally, CTR future priorities include efforts to help demilitarize the nuclear infrastructure which supported the massive Soviet weapons arsenal. Nuclear infrastructure elimination will allow existing military manpower, material, infrastructure, and the supporting industrial base to be reoriented towards peaceful pursuits. In addition, industrial partnerships remain an important element of this effort and these activities will transition to the Defense Enterprise Fund for management.
The CTR Program is a small investment with a big payoff. The United States spent billions of dollars defending against weapons of mass destruction in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. With CTR assistance, substantial progress has been made in reducing the threat from these weapons and in preventing the emergence of new threats in the post-Cold War world. Continuing this program of defense by other means will continue to enhance U.S. national security for the future.
