EURNATO
JS
B-2

~~TOP SECRET~~
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

Refer to: I-12896/60

MAR 7 1960

Dear Mr. Kohler:

In accordance with your telephone request of this date to ISA, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Douglas, has authorized the release to the Department of State of the attached two enclosures.

Sincerely yours,

(SIGNED)

Frederic H. Miller
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, European Region

2 Encls
1. JCSM-84-60 dtd 4 Mar 60 (Cy 8 - I-12875/60)
2. EC 9-10169 from USCINCEUR dtd 2 Mar 60 (DA IN 288660) (TS - Cy 16)

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF OSD/JS
17 MAY 1994
DATE
89-F-2318
CASE #

Honorable Roy D. Kohler
Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs
Department of State

Prepared by Col J.H.Schofield/elm/7 Mar 60
EurREg/ISA 3E253 Ext. 54812

Dist:
Addressee-Orig w/Encls & 2cc (C-21960)
JCS-3cc w/o encls
OSD Files w/o encls
R&C Files w/o encls
R&C Rdg File w/o encls
Comeback
Stayback

OASD(PA) REGISTER
TOP SECRET CONTROL 2
R-1
89-FOI-2318
93-TS-107
Document No. 13

~~TOP SECRET~~
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

I-12896/60
I-12875/6

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JCSM-84-60

4 MAR 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

References: a. Embassy Bonn Message to Secretary of State No. 1580, dated 18 February 1960
b. Buenos Aires Message to Secretary of State No. SECTO 11, dated 26 February 1960
c. Attachment to Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from JCS, dated 24 February 1960

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the tripartite agreement with our Allies (reference a) and the decision (reference b) on this subject and are prepared to resume high altitude flights into Berlin.

2. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this is primarily a cold war tactic, under the present circumstances, and that the military requirements for these flights are secondary.

3. If the flights are resumed, the military contingencies as outlined in the proposed warning message to USCINCEUR (reference c) might result. In the event an aircraft is damaged or destroyed by Soviet or GDR aircraft or ground fire, a logical follow-on would be to dispatch a subsequent aircraft at altitude to Berlin with fighter escort.

4. It is recommended that you approve the dispatch of the warning message to USCINCEUR as outlined in reference c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to issue appropriate execution orders to initiate these flights when you so direct.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

THOMAS D. WHITE,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF OSD/IS
17 MAY 1994
DATE
89-F-238

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I 12875/60
SEC DEF CONT NO. 243

373.5 Berlin (Berlin)

4 Mar 1960

EURNATO
JS
B-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAR 2 [illegible]

COVERING BRIEF

Refer to: I-12875/60
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MR. DOUGLAS

TO: The Acting Secretary of Defense

Robert H. [illegible]
Acting Assistant Secretary

FROM: The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Problem: To provide the JCS with guidance on the subject of future actions with regard to high altitude flights to Berlin.

Discussion: In the light of recent events with which you are fully familiar, it is considered that the last issued memorandum of the JCS (Tab A) should be answered for the purpose of officially informing them of the action taken on their recommendation and to provide them with guidance on this subject for use in regard to current and future plans and military requirements.

The attached memorandum (Tab B) reflects the above recommendation.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the JCS (Tab B).

2 Incls
1. JCSM-84-60, 4 Mar 60 (I-12875/60 - Cy 5)
2. Proposed memo for Chmn, JCS

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF OSD/JS
17 MAY 1994 89-F-2318
DATE CASE #

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[illegible] CONTROL 4
Copy No. R-1
Case No. 89-FOI-2318
[illegible] No. 93-TS-107
Document No. 14

No memo deemed necessary
JCS concurs per Mr Day
[illegible]

273.5 Germany

31 Mar 60

I-12875/60 Copy E-1 of 1 cc

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

References: JCSM-24-60, 4 March 1960

In view of the President's decision on Tuesday, 8 March, that there was not at present an operational need to fly in the Berlin corridors above 10,000 feet, the actions recommended in reference memorandum were not approved.

The President's decision, which was determined by current operational needs and after consideration of other factors related to this subject as of that date, did not preclude a future favorable consideration. The President specifically stated that there was tripartite agreement to conduct these flights when it was operationally necessary and desirable.

In view of these facts, I consider that these high altitude flights are requested from an operational point of view, such as the execution of contingency plans associated with air support of Berlin, authority for such flights can be expected. Therefore, plans should continue to contain provision for high altitude flights to Berlin as required.

The above guidance is furnished for use in future planning.

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF OSD/ISS
17 MAY 1994
DATE
94-F-2318
CASE #

Prepared by Col J.H.Schofield, Jr./elm/28 Mar 6
EurReg/ISA 3E253 Ext. 54812

Dist:
Addressee-Cys 1, 2, 3 & 4 (C-21966)
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I-12875/60

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MAR 31 1960

COVERING BRIEF

Refer to: I-12875/60

TO: The Acting Secretary of Defense

FROM: The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs

Robert H. Knight
Acting Assistant Secretary

Problem: To provide the JCS with guidance on the subject of future actions with regard to high altitude flights to Berlin.

Discussion: In the light of recent events with which you are fully familiar, it is considered that the last issued memorandum of the JCS (Tab A) should be answered for the purpose of officially informing them of the action taken on their recommendation and to provide them with guidance on this subject for use in regard to current and future plans and military requirements.

The attached memorandum (Tab B) reflects the above recommendation.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the JCS (Tab B).

2 Incls
1. JCSM-84-60, 4 Mar 60 (I-12875/60 - Cy 5)
2. Proposed memo for Chmn, JCS

Prepared by Col J.H.Schofield,Jr./elm/28Mar60
EurReg/ISA 3E253 Ext. 54812

Dist:
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R&C Files-Cy 2
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89-F-2318
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JCSM-84-60

4 MAR 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

References: a. Embassy Bonn Message to Secretary of State No. 1580, dated 18 February 1960
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4. It is recommended that you approve the dispatch of the warning message to USCINCEUR as outlined in reference c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to issue appropriate execution orders to initiate these flights when you so direct.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

THOMAS D. WHITE,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF OSD/KS
DATE 17 MAY 1994 CASE # 87-F-2318

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SEC DEF CONT NO. 243
T-12875

[redacted]

Mr Albright

TOP SECRET

EURNATO
JS
14 Excised Version

9 February 1960

381 Germany

HYPOTHETICAL LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN DEFENSE OF BERLIN

(Final Draft Parts I and II)

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Copy No.
89-F-2318
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

9 Feb 60

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EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5USC552
(b) (1) JS-89-F-2318

[redacted]

I-12527/60

Doc 15
Doc D:V R-2

HYPOTHETICAL LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN DEFENSE OF BERLIN

I. THE SITUATION

A. Situation Between the Western Powers and the Bloc

1. Interference with Allied Access to Berlin. After a series of relatively minor harrassments of U.S., U.K. and French access to Berlin, the Soviets have demanded that the Western Powers submit to new controls which, in effect, permit East German personnel, rather than the Western Powers to decide what persons and goods will move between the Federal Republic and Berlin in connection with the occupation of Berlin. The Allies have refused to accept these demands by the deadline fixed by the Soviets. The Soviets have thereupon declared that the Allies refuse to accept the only reasonable compromise which would permit the German Democratic Republic (GDR) personnel to continue clearing allied traffic through the "sovereign" GDR. The Western Powers have requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council and the adoption by the Council of a resolution calling upon the parties to refrain from actions violating existing agreements, to resume negotiations, and to report the results to the Council. The Soviets have vetoed this resolution and have withdrawn their personnel from the rail and road checkpoints. The GDR personnel at these checkpoints have refused to clear allied trains or vehicles, alleging that the postwar quadripartite agreements are not binding on the GDR and that the GDR will not permit free passage to the "NATO" forces which are bent on its destruction. Simultaneously, the Soviets have withdrawn from the Berlin Air Safety Center on the grounds that the GDR now enjoys full "air sovereignty" and the GDR has declared that its military forces will take defensive action against any aircraft which attempt to overfly GDR territory without GDR permission. Realizing that the allied position in Berlin is untenable

unless free access can be maintained, the U.K. and France have concurred with the U.S. in undertaking to employ force to test Soviet intentions and to attempt to reopen access.

2. Attempt to Gain Control of Western Sectors in Berlin. By infiltrating agitators into the Western Sectors of Berlin from the surrounding Soviet-occupied territory, the Communists have been able to stage serious riots throughout the city. The ostensible purpose of the rioting is to protest against the unwillingness of the Western Powers to deal with the East German authorities in seeking to move Western personnel and supplies across East German territory to Berlin. To aid the rioters, the East Berlin police and paramilitary (Kampfgruppen) forces have occupied points on the Communist-controlled rapid transit network (S-Bahn) in West Berlin. The Communist government of East Berlin (Magistrat), claiming to speak as the legitimate government of all Berlin, has openly supported the rebellious mob. The Magistrat has demanded that the Government of West Berlin (Senat) recognize the will of the people and withdraw from office. The Government of the so-called "German Democratic Republic" (GDR), declaring that Berlin (Including the Western Sectors) is the "capital of the GDR", has demanded the withdrawal from Berlin of the U.S., U.K. and French "NATO" Forces. Since these demands have not been met, the GDR has alerted the Kampfgruppen and the East German Army which are poised and ready to move into the Western Sectors and "restore order". Protests made by the Western Powers to the Soviet authorities in Berlin and the USSR Government in Moscow have been rejected by the Soviets on the grounds that the alleged incidents concern the internal order of the GDR, which, as a sovereign state, is alone competent to deal with them. After several days of contending with serious riots, during

which their reserves and paramilitary units (Bereitschaften) have been fully committed, the West Berlin Police have realized they will be unable to fend off the impending incrusions of the Kampfgruppen and the East German Army. In view of the gravity of the developments, the Allied Commandants in Berlin have assumed personal command of the defensive operations in the deteriorating situation. In conformity with established allied policy, the Commandants have implemented existing defense plans.

B. Enemy Objectives

The objectives of the USSR in permitting or directing the GDR to undertake the actions in A. preceding, and of the GDR itself, are to induce the Allies to withdraw from Berlin, thus to strengthen the Communist grip on East Germany, and to shake the faith of the world in the capacity of the U.S. to resist the USSR. The USSR hopes to achieve these objectives without the overt engagement of its own armed forces.

C. U.S. and Allied Objectives

To preserve the allied position in Berlin and to reestablish allied access to the city.

1. Factors Requiring U.S. Intervention

a. The United States, together with the U.K. and France, bears special responsibility as an occupying power for the security and welfare of Berlin. U.S. spokesmen have, moreover, repeatedly asserted that we would regard an attack on Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon ourselves.

b. Additional major factors bearing upon the U.S. decision on intervention are:

(1) Berlin has become a symbol of U.S. determination to prevent the USSR from swallowing up Europe.

(ii) U.S. failure to act to maintain the Allied position in Berlin could lead the German Federal Republic to conclude that it would be well advised to make the best accommodation possible with the USSR. As a consequence the whole NATO structure might begin to disintegrate, and confidence in the United States as the bulwark of the free world would be seriously shaken outside Europe.

(iii) Berlin has major intelligence and security values for the U.S. and its Allies.

2. Restraints on the use of nuclear weapons systems.

a. Use of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict over Berlin would not be in the U.S. interest from a foreign policy standpoint.

b. It would, because of the effect upon our allies, make it more difficult to maintain firm Western unity in the face of the Soviet challenge, and it would result in widespread criticism of the U.S. by neutral countries.

c. Fear of West European peoples that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead to the destruction of Europe makes it unlikely that the U.S. could gain the consent of the British and French governments to the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Berlin.

d. The political importance of placing upon the Soviet Union the onus for expanding the conflict by the first use of nuclear weapons represents a further limitation on their use by the U.S. in this instance.

e. A unilateral U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in order to give access to Berlin would only be warranted in the face of the considerations cited above, if such limited use seemed likely to achieve our purpose without generating a substantial increased probability of general war. This is not believed to be the case in the present instance.

f. The U.S. military action should thus be conventional in nature until and unless it becomes clear that U.S. national objectives cannot be achieved in this way, and a decision at that time to use nuclear weapons must be based upon a willingness to accept further risk of general war.

D. Non-Military Measures taken by Western Powers

1. During the development of the situation as described above, there has been a continuing, intensive diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free world governments Including:

a. Primary emphasis on Allied responsibilities to the free people of West Berlin and on the consequences for the entire free world should these free people be engulfed by the Communist empire, in addition to clarification of the legal basis of the Allied position, attempts to expose the Communist ploy of attempting to put the onus for resort to force over Berlin on the Allies.

b. Approaches to individual governments tailored to their particular interests and susceptibilities, giving due regard to the special positions of the other American republics and some of the more important uncommitted states.

c. Presidential letters, briefing of ambassadorial groups by high-level State Department officers, meetings of the Foreign Ministers of OAS, ANZUS, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, presentations at regular meetings of pact councils, etc.

d. Exploitation of the diplomatic capabilities of the UK, France, GFR and other friendly governments in particular areas and with respect to particular countries.

2. A persistent world-wide propaganda campaign has been launched with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major Allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence. This campaign is designed to reflect Allied determination to meet force with force if necessary and from time to time this determination is made explicit, making clear that the communists would bear the onus of aggressive use of force. The propaganda capabilities of the UK, France, GFR and other friendly governments are being fully exploited.

3. The following additional actions have been taken:

[redacted]

b. A continuing effort is being made through full consultation to maintain NATO solidarity on the Berlin issue.

c. In connection with continuing evaluation of possible use of the UN, a solid foundation for maximum UN support for the Allied position at the earliest practicable opportunity is being sought.

d. An urgent agreement is being sought with the UK and France on precise nature and timing of steps to be taken in the UN in order to be prepared for negotiations with the USSR.

e. Continuing close consultation is being maintained with Congressional leaders and frequent reports made to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.

E. International Reaction Including Expected Free World Support

1. There are grave fears throughout the world that the Berlin crisis will set off World War III. Despite wide divergencies of public opinion in the U.K. and France, the governments of these two countries have firmly insisted

that the allied position in Berlin must be maintained. The NATO Council has unanimously supported this stand. The other NATO governments have not, however, been asked to contribute forces to the defense of Berlin, in view of the special Three Power responsibility for that defense. The Three Powers propose to discharge that responsibility on the basis of previous tripartite planning.

2. Most of the other free governments, including those of the uncommitted states, have condemned the GDR threatened resort to force but are also urging the Allies not to respond in a manner that would make World War III inevitable. Several of these governments are engaged in intense diplomatic activity to support negotiations between the Allies and the USSR as to the future status of Berlin.

3. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is engaged in an intensive propaganda campaign focusing on two themes: first, that the continuing division of Berlin, an East German city, is an intolerable anachronism, and second, that the Allies must leave the city which they are using as a base for subversive, "cold war" attacks on the "people's democracies". The USSR has emphatically declared that the GDR must be "master in its own house".

4. U.S. public opinion has strongly supported a firm stand on Berlin. U.S. Government spokesmen have stated unequivocally that the allied position in Berlin is based on unchallengeable rights and that the United States is determined to maintain that position. We have made clear to the USSR in diplomatic demarches our conviction that the GDR is acting in this situation as the agent and puppet of the USSR.

II. MILITARY ACTIONS

A. Military Objectives

1. Enemy

a. To deny the tripartite surface and air access to West Berlin.

b. To force tripartite withdrawal from West Berlin.

2. Friendly

a. To maintain surface and air access to West Berlin.

b. To maintain the security of West Berlin.

c. To maintain an obvious U.S. and allied military capability and readiness to deal with any expansion of limited military operations relating to Berlin as may be considered appropriate to the objectives at stake.

B. Availability of Military Forces

1. Enemy Forces in the Area

a. Total Forces

(1) The East German Army, with an over-all strength of approximately 75,000, is organized into four motorized rifle and two tank divisions. In addition, there are approximately 50,000 troops in the Military Security Forces. There are some 220 aircraft in the East German Air Force of which 175 are jet fighters. This force is basically tactical, with a primary mission for the jet fighters of air defense of the homeland.

(2) The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSPG) consists of 10 tank and 10 motorized rifle divisions, supported by appropriate artillery and anti-aircraft artillery units. This force is organized and deployed within six ground armies and is supported by one air army. There are approximately 1,000 aircraft in the Soviet Air Forces stationed in East Germany. Of this total, 550 are jet fighters and 90 are jet light bombers.

b. Immediately Available

The GDR could redeploy its forces so as to position one division around the periphery of Berlin and one division athwart the access routes thereto, holding the remaining four divisions in reserve in present areas. The majority of the 175 jet fighter aircraft could be positioned to support ground operations against Berlin and along the Berlin-Helmstedt corridor, or to intercept Allied aircraft attempting to reopen access along any of the three air corridors. Internal security in remainder of the GDR could be assumed by Soviet forces, if necessary.

2. Friendly Forces in the Area

a. Total Forces

(1) The United States, United Kingdom and France have 11 M-Day Divisions committed to NATO. Approximately 17 additional M-Day Divisions in the Central European Area are provided by other NATO countries including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In addition, most of these countries have other forces, including paramilitary units with national missions which, however, probably could not be brought to bear effectively on the enemy during the early stages of a war, in the Central European Area.

(2) The United States, United Kingdom and France have over 1,200 aircraft, mostly jet, which can be utilized immediately along the Iron Curtain. Reinforcements in approximately the same number could be moved into the European theater if warranted by the world-wide situation at the time. The other NATO countries in Europe can muster approximately 1,000 combat aircraft, the majority of which are jet aircraft.

b. Immediately Available

Forces to test enemy intentions or to reopen access to Berlin are available in the U.S., U.K. and French forces located in West Germany.

C. Logistic Considerations and Limitations

1. Enemy. No significant logistic problems confront the East Berlin civil population, the East German Army forces or the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (should the latter be employed), in meeting any limited military action which might be taken by the Western Powers.

2. United States and Allies

a. West Berlin Civil Population

Logistic support for the relief of the West Berlin civil population poses no immediate problem because of the status of the stockpile program.

b. Logistic Posture of the Military Garrisons in West Berlin.

(1) The U.S. forces have a one-year level in all supply classes, except for ammunition (20 day level at combat rates).

(2) The U.K. and French stockpile of supplies is estimated to be approximately 120 days, except for ammunition which is somewhat less than that of U.S. Forces.

(3) Any supply maladjustments or imbalances encountered during blockade conditions could be remedied through reallocation of tripartite resources.

c. Logistic Posture of Theater Forces

(1) U.S. forces maintain all classes of supply in immediate readiness condition and availability to permit sustained action by D-Day forces at wartime rates in excess of 60 days.

(2) U.K. and French forces maintain a lesser readiness posture to ensure continuous operation of units for 30 days.

(3) There are no major logistic considerations or limitations which will impede any limited action now contemplated by the tripartite powers.

D. Synopsis of Military Action

1. General

a. Events have created an extremely difficult situation. Attempted forceful entry into Berlin along the autobahn through the narrow Helmstedt-Berlin corridor can easily be halted. This corridor will not accommodate large troop formations deployed for combat. Forces so employed could be outflanked from the outset, would be highly vulnerable, could be hampered by demolitions and physical barriers, and, if unsuccessful, might find withdrawal difficult. Even if initial penetration were successful, provision of continued security along the route is not militarily feasible. Access by train along any of the established routes or by barge up the Elbe River is not feasible since the trains and locks are operated by GDR personnel. The air situation is analagous to that on the ground. Combat aircraft, suffering some attrition, could effect penetrations and engage in air-ground operations. However, successful escort of cargo, troop carrier and passenger aircraft would be extremely difficult. With the existing balance of forces, no limited military action could, by itself, reopen access to Berlin if the Soviets remain determined to prevent such access by the use of force.

b. The military situation in Berlin is equally unfavorable. The garrison forces there are capable of maintaining of internal order, but cannot conduct a

successful defense without reinforcement against an attack by Kampfgruppen and East Germany Forces available. While the security of U.S. and allied non-combatants and dependents is in jeopardy, safe evacuation cannot be guaranteed at this time. Further, use of military force along the access routes may further aggravate the situation in the city.

c. Despite the above, a series of limited Allied ground and air actions could achieve the following results:

(1) Test GDR and Soviet intentions;

(2) Demonstrate Allied determination to reopen access;

(3) Possibly provide circumstances favorable to tripartite negotiations with the Soviets; and

(4) Compel the Soviets, if they persist in obstructing Allied access to Berlin or jeopardizing the security of the Allied Berlin garrison, to face the unmistakable imminence of general war.

2. Phase I

a. In some respects, the early sequence of events followed the pattern of the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis. A period of several weeks passed between the Soviet announcement of intent to introduce new controls permitting East German personnel to clear allied traffic, and the actual Soviet withdrawal from rail and road checkpoints. During this period of diplomatic negotiation, U.S. commanders world-wide were alerted to the possibility that operations might not be confined to this area. In accordance with previous planning, the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed on tripartite procedures, and further agreed that whatever military measures might be undertaken would be subject to tripartite agreement and coordination. It

was agreed that USCINCEUR would supervise tripartite military planning and would be the over-all commander in event of military action. The Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, (CINCBAOR) was designated the commander of field forces in event of ground action, and the Commander-in-Chief United States Air Forces, Europe, (CINCUSAFE) the commander of air forces in the event of air action. In Berlin, the Allied Commandants finalized plans to assume full control of their various sectors, coordinating their actions through the British Commandant.

b. Additionally, numerous quiet preparatory and precautionary military means prior to Soviet withdrawal were taken by the U.S. and her Allies. These were of a kind which did not create undue public alarm, but were detectable by Soviet intelligence. No one measure in itself was of great significance, but collectively, they provided substantial evidence that there was firm tripartite resolution to respond with force, if necessary. Military traffic along the autobahn and air corridors was increased. Guards at checkpoints, on trains, and at allied airfields in Berlin were augmented with additional personnel. Naval patrols were intensified, anti-submarine barriers strengthened; fleet carrier exercises conducted; and selected naval elements put to sea. Reconnaissance flights were conducted to photograph the autobahn, its checkpoints, and adjacent areas. Small tactical air units from the United States were rotated to Central Europe. Air defense systems were quietly exercised. In the United States pratice loadings for airborne troops were conducted. These actions were designed to dissuade the Soviets from turning over control of checkpoints to the GDR, improve the Allied military posture, and demonstrate Allied

solidarity. The application of force was planned to take place only after all other measures failed, and at a time when the Allies were prepared to accept the risk of general war.

c. PHASE I Comment It is possible that the foregoing actions would, in fact, dissuade the Soviets from turning over control of checkpoints to the GDR, provided negotiations permitted them to refrain from doing so without damage to their prestige. The possibilities of such a Soviet reaction are treated in Section III.

3. Phase II

a. On the day of Soviet withdrawal, Allied objection to GDR inspection and control was reiterated. All traffic to and from Berlin was suspended pending a tripartite test to be conducted from each end of the autobahn. Three unarmed vehicles, one French, one British, and one American, were dispatched together from West Germany and three from Berlin. Each vehicle bore its country's flag. In each instance, East German police manning the checkpoints stated that inspection was required prior to clearance for passage. Both the inspection and the stated requirement for GDR clearance were refused and the vehicles returned.

b. This action was followed by similar air probes consisting of single military transport planes from each country, dispatched along each of the three air corridors. Flight plans were transmitted to the Berlin Air Safety Center. Soviet representatives had withdrawn, and GDR personnel were refused entry to the Center. As a result, the GDR stated its "air sovereignty" had been violated. Allied air transport planes were met by GDR fighter aircraft in each instance and forced to return to base.

c. These actions constituted confirmation that the Soviets, in conjunction with East Germany, had taken action to deny to the Three Powers their rights of surface and air access to Berlin.

d. International tension increased and allied military activity was openly stepped up. Precautionary measures included cancellation of military leaves of absence, placing defense and warning systems on a higher state of alert. Bringing tripartite troop units in West Germany up to strength by personnel augmentation and increasing internal security measures. Also, it was announced that until further notice, there would be no civil defense exercises; and warnings received would be real, not practice.

e. PHASE II Comment The seriousness of the above developments could provide sufficient impetus to East-West negotiations so as to reach at least a temporary solution to the crisis. Since the crisis is entirely of their making, it must be assumed the Soviets would, at this point assess very carefully the risks attendant to maintaining their position, without compromise, as is indicated in Section III hereafter.

4. PHASE III

a. The heads of government of the tripartite power decided to conduct an armed probe to determine whether the GDR would meet force with force to keep the access route closed. Supplemental to this decision, the tripartite power decided to evacuate allied non-combatants from Berlin. On the recommendation of SACEUR, the North Atlantic Council held an emergency meeting and directed execution of a "Simple Alert" for all NATO forces.

b. CINCBAOR was directed to dispatch a platoon sized unit of armor vehicles along the autobann from Helmstedt. It was fully realized that such a unit could provide only a further test of GDR and Soviet intentions and a basis for decision as to whether employment of substantial forces to reopen access was necessary. The commander of the force was given orders to proceed as far as possible, adhering to tripartite procedures, but not accepting an additional restraints. Orders precluded initiation of fire, but permitted return fire and whatever defensive action might be necessary. The unit was then dispatched.

c. At the first checkpoint in Helmstedt, the probing force was halted by GDR police who refused passage when presented with proper identification. The commander informed the police that all proper requirements had been met and that his force intended to move on. He directed his first armored vehicle to crash through the barrier and the platoon proceeded down the autobahn. After progressing several miles, the platoon encountered physical obstacles across the road covered by an estimated GDR company. This unit opened fire with small arms at the lead vehicle, wounding the platoon leader. Since further passage was blocked, the probing force returned.

d. In the city of Berlin, the Commandants were directed to take whatever security measures were considered necessary to protect non-combatants. Rioting in the city became more serious. Members of the Kampfgruppen in civilian clothes infiltrated the Allied sectors. Formal intervention by GDR police under the pretext of restoring law and order was threatened. Sporadic sniper fire caused a few Allied casualities and certain Allied supplies were sabotaged.

e. In the face of all kinds of harrassment, attempts were made to evacuate non-combatants from Berlin by private automobile, augmented by civilian aircraft for medical evacuees after negotiations through Red Cross channels. Military personnel in Europe were advised that facilities would no longer be available for their dependents in Western Europe.

f. Following closely upon failure of the second probe, the President of the United States took the lead in increasing pressure on the Soviets. A state of national emergency was declared. Selected Reserve Forces were called to active duty. Partial industrial mobilization was commenced. Additional military forces were deployed to Europe.

g. Soviet submarines were reported to be penetrating anti-subbarriers; troop and air movements were reported within Russia; and there was evidence of considerable buildup of forces along the Chinese coast.

E. Additional Non-Military Measures to Put Pressure on Soviet Union and GDR During Preceding Phases

1. After it was determined at the end of Phase III above that the Soviets would permit the use of force by the GDR to keep the surface access routes closed to Allied traffic, the Western Powers made a final attempt, before resorting to an attempt to reestablish Allied freedom of access by force, to put pressure on the Soviet Union to conclude a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Parallel efforts were made to put pressure on the GDR.

2. The Western Powers redoubled their attempts to mobilize world opinion against the USSR as a threat to the peace. However, large elements of world opinion, including important elements in the Western countries, insisted that it was irrational for the Western Powers to take steps

propelling the world toward a general war rather than accepting nominal transit traffic controls over Allied movements at the hands of the GDR. The GDR warned that any resort to violence along the Autobahn could result in the cessation of interzonal traffic and that it would be entirely the fault of the Western Powers if transport and supply for the West Berlin population were cut off.

3. Counterharassment and economic measures taken by the Allies appeared to have no serious effect on the economy of the Soviet bloc. The Allies were unable to win the full agreement of the Free World which resulted in a Western decision against a large-scale program of this kind against the Soviet bloc.

4. The Western Powers made a new appeal to the Security Council for the restoration of the status quo ante, but the Soviet Union vetoed any Security Council action. The Western Powers then considered but decided against an appeal to the General Assembly. Substantive proposals on the Berlin problem were being made in the General Assembly at this juncture and some members, especially the neutrals, were seeking compromise without regard for the merits of the case. The prospect of winning General Assembly support for the maintenance of the Allied position in Berlin appeared too slim for the Western Powers to gamble on the outcome of a U.N. solution.

F. PHASE III Comment U.S. and Allied measures to place their forces in a high state of operational readiness and to mobilize their resources for any eventuality would have a very sobering effect upon the GDR and the USSR. The Soviets would certainly have serious doubts as to their ability to limit the situation in Berlin and along the autobahn now that military skirmishes have taken place. Possible Soviet reactions at this point are treated further in Section III.

G. Synopsis of Military Actions Continued - PHASE IV

1. Tripartite plans had already been prepared to utilize a substantial force to reopen access into Berlin if necessary Consideration was given in this situation to utilization of a compositite tripartite division acting in concert with appropriate air elements. This course of action was discarded because of the impact on the NATO general war posture, and the difficulities in employment of this size force along the narrow route. Consideration was also given to forceful reopening of air access. However, it was concluded that air action would be inconclusive with respect to permanent reopening of the air corridor and could indicate possible Allied willingness to accept closure of ground access. It was determined that allied aircraft could be used most effectively, in this situation by furnishing air support to a ground element.

2. Decision was reached to form a tripartite brigade, of three battalions, augmented with air support, but with plans to employ only one battalion initially along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn. NATO nations backed this decision and formal notification was sent to the Soviets that the battalion would be dispatched. Instructions to the force commander were: The force will approach the roadblock, identify itself according to agreed tripartite procedures, and request passage. If there is no opposition, the force will proceed to the opposite end of the autobahn. If resistance is encountered the force will overcome it and proceed toward the opposite end of the autobahn taking over control points as required. In the event over-whelming armed resistance is encountered or if physical barriers are beyond its capabilities to overcome, the force will disengage and await orders from higher authority.

3. The NATO Council directed major NATO commanders to place their forces on "Reinforced Alert". U.S. Commands throughout the world were placed on general war alert. Corresponding civil defense measures, including blackouts, were put into effect.

4. The tripartite battalion moved out.

5. It encountered only token resistance initially, and proceeded slowly as far as the Elbe. Here it was met by sizeable GDR forces. There was an immediate exchange of fire, initiated by the enemy, and the tripartite battalion deployed off the autobahn into battle positions. Heavy fighting ensued. It soon became evident that the tripartite force was not only seriously outnumbered, but that its avenue of withdrawal had been cut off. The commander established a perimeter defense and radioed that he was under attack and suffering heavy losses. Allied tactical aircraft, maintained on airborne alert while the battalion proceeded along the autobahn, furnished air support and resupply, despite engagement by GDR interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft fire.

6. In the city of Berlin, skirmishes between the East and West German police have occurred at the Sector boundries with significant casualties on both sides. The eleven thousand U.S., U.K. and French troops have been deployed into defense positions to back up the West German Police Forces against attack or incursion by the Kampfgruppen and the East German Army surrounding Berlin.

7. PHASE IV Comment Placing NATO forces on "Reinforced Alert", ordering U.S. forces world-wide to general war alert, and dispatching the tripartite battalion to force access to Berlin represented a most grave decision.

It demonstrated a readiness and willingness to take whatever measures might become necessary. Only if the Soviets were indifferent to subsequent eventualities could they permit the GDR to engage this force in combat. For further evaluation, see Part III.

H. Effect on U.S. Posture for General War

From the outset of deteriorating political events to the peak of the military crisis, the United States posture for general war steadily improved as a result of timely implementation of emergency measures.

I. Possible Courses of Military Action and Appraisal of Each

1. Courses of Action

There are now five possible courses of military action each with a large number of variables:

a. Accept military defeat along the autobahn and in Berlin, negotiating for withdrawal of forces to West Germany.

b. Accept military defeat along the autobahn and negotiate for withdrawal of these forces, while continuing to stand firm in Berlin pending negotiation of a 4-power settlement.

c. Commit the remainder of the tripartite brigade and air units associated therewith up the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor to continue and to intensify Allied efforts to reopen access to Berlin, and to relieve pressure on the Berlin garrison.

d. Employ substantial Allied forces on a broad front without regard to existing access routes but converging on Berlin, to inflict military defeat on the GDR and impose Allied will upon that country.

e. Resort to general war measures.

2. Military Appraisal

Military judgments concerning the above courses of action are contained in subsequent paragraphs:

a. Acceptance of complete defeat would represent failure of military force and threat of force to satisfy allied objectives relating to Berlin. It would have broader military implications in that it would have a degrading effect on the allied deterrent posture and cause a reassessment of allied military committments world-wide.

b. Acceptance of defeat along the autobahn only would have the same adverse military effects outlined in paragraph a above. While standing firm in Berlin does not represent total and immediate military defeat, neither can it be construed as a military victory. The 11,000 garrison troops in the city do not present a military problem to the enemy since they are both outnumbered and surrounded. An overt attack by the GDR on the Western sectors of Berlin would renew hostilities on a dangerous scale, but such action is not a military necessity. Allied forces in Berlin are not capable of taking effective offensive action, whereas they may be subjected to overt or covert harassing action by the enemy. In six to nine months these forces would require re-supply either by surface means or by an airlift. In either case access could be gained only under conditions acceptable to the enemy because of the acknowledged allied defeat along the corridors.

c. It is estimated that employment of the remainder of tripartite forces against determined resistance would not be successful in reopening access to Berlin or in relieving pressures on the Berlin garrison. The brigade could not be employed effectively within the corridor, nor could it be expected to solve the problem. If the brigade were permitted by the GDR to reach Berlin, it could not hold one hundred miles

of access route open behind it. Even in the remote possibility that it could be successful in extricating the remnants of the surrounded battalion this would be at cost of severe casualties.

d. (1) Employment of Allied forces along a broad front would involve engagement with Soviet forces in East Germany unless they withdrew. In this situation Allied use of tactical atomic weapons would probably be required to gain military objectives. A large portion of the Berlin garrison would probably be sacrificed, since a major Allied attack from West Germany would almost certainly trigger a GDR attack on West Berlin. Some degradation of the NATO posture for general war would occur through overextension of Allied forces.

(2) Such a major attack would almost certainly succeed against GDR forces alone. It would almost as certainly fail and probably expand to general war if the USSR intervened with major forces.

e. The military posture assumed by the Allies would contribute significantly to the Allied ability to wage general war, should it occur.

J. Considerations Pertaining to the Use of Nuclear Weapons

1. The enemy, possessing a significant military advantage in terms of numbers and position, did not find it necessary to use nuclear weapons to deny access to Berlin or to maintain pressure on the Western Sectors of the city. Neither would he require such weapons to prevent a substantially larger Allied force from accomplishing its mission. The USSR has not released control of any nuclear weapons to GDR forces through the situation as depicted. If the Allies chose to attack on a broad front utilizing tactical nuclear

weapons to achieve their objectives, the Soviets would almost certainly release nuclear weapons to the GDR and utilize them with their own forces in response.

2. The tripartite powers did not use nuclear weapons in the hypothetical military action. The use of small yield weapons along the access route would almost certainly result in casualties and destruction outside the corridor, with particular reference to small civilian communities. Neither would such use assure reopening of access because of lack of maneuver room for exploiting forces and creation of obstacles on the route itself (blown bridges, rubble and abatis blocking road, etc.). Consideration was given to detonating a single weapon in a carefully selected location as an indication of Allied intent, but this was rejected as providing insufficient military advantage to justify the censure of world opinion and the risk of retaliation.

3. Allied nuclear weapons were not stored in Berlin even during the period of tension leading up to the attempted reopening of access. Use of nuclear weapons in support of the Allied garrison has not been called for by the situation to date, and probably would not be undertaken even if an all-out attack were made on the Western sectors of the city.

4. If the Allies chose to make a large scale attack on a broad front from West Germany, they would, as previously indicated, use nuclear weapons if necessary to gain their objectives. The Allies would have made such a heavy commitment of forces that they could not afford to be defeated militarily. Further, the risk of general war would be already so great that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not add significantly to the risk.

5. In the event of general war, the Allies would, of course, use all forms of nuclear weapons in accordance with then current strategic plans.

III. CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. AND ALLIED RESPONSE

A. General The record of Allied and Soviet reactions described hereinafter is hypothetical. The following judgments are made to support the study and are not to be construed as intelligence estimates or a prognosis as to the course of events in an actual situation.

1. Bloc Reaction

a. In considering the Soviet reaction to the hypothetical U.S. response, we believe it reasonable to assume that: (a) the USSR, in sanctioning and controlling the GDR moves in the Berlin situation, has limited objectives and does not intend to precipitate general war with the U.S. and (b) the USSR estimates that the U.S. likewise will seek to avoid actions which would immediately precipitate a general war.

b. In accord with these assumptions, the Soviet posture and actions throughout the developing Berlin situation would be designed to: (a) avoid irrevocable commitment to GDR actions and positions, seeking always to provide for a possible Soviet exit through a settlement which would not badly damage Soviet prestige; (b) exert maximum diplomatic and propaganda pressure, involving threats and intimidation in order to weaken the Allied will regarding Berlin and to create friction among the U.S. and the NATO allies; (c) assure continued Communist control over East Germany, regardless of the outcome in Berlin, and (d) resist Western military probes with that degree of military force best calculated to minimize the risk of expanding the conflict into general war, provide the USSR with a strong bargaining position in any negotiations for settlement of the conflict, and place the blame on the West for any expansion of hostilities. At each new development in the situation, the Soviet leaders would weigh their next step in the light of these considerations seeking to assess the risks of each step as compared with the probable gain.

2. Allied Reaction

Reaction in the Free World would be conditioned almost exclusively by the fear that the situation would lead to general war. If the response were successful in leading to a return to the status quo or improvement of the Western position, U.S. prestige would be strengthened.

B. PHASE I

1. Bloc Reaction

The Soviet leaders would almost certainly have anticipated the U.S. and Allied actions taken in Phase I and would regard them as a normal reaction to their pressure.

2. Free World Reaction

During the initial stages of the Berlin crises, the Western European countries would join actively with the U.S. in the development of common Western action and policy. Widespread sympathy for the peoples of West Berlin, the recognition of the symbolic importance of a Free Berlin, a belief that evidence of Western determination and unity would cause the USSR to back down, and the governmental sense of obligation to prior commitments all would help to create a generally favorable climate for forthright U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives.

C. Phase II

1. Bloc Reaction

Having decided on the initiation of a new Berlin crisis, the Soviet leaders would probably have concluded in advance that they could and should go at least as far as to turn over the access controls. However, in deciding to turn over access controls to the GDR, the Soviet leaders have taken an important step in increasing the risks for them in the Berlin situation. In weighing the considerations involved, their decision to proceed on this course

was predicated on the conclusions that there remained further threshholds of decision before the risk of war became uncontrollable, and that Western determination would flinch before these threshholds were crossed. Despite the general atmosphere of crisis, the Soviets characterize the turnover of controls as a simple and peaceful recognition of the facts of life, declaring that the GDR was magnanimously ready to allow continued Western access, though of course having the right to end it.

2. Allied Reaction

Western European support for the first unarmored tripartite air and land probes, and the diplomatic resolutions attacking the GDR action, would be firm.

D. PHASE III

1. Bloc Reaction

a. The next major step for the USSR would be the decision to employ fire to halt the initial small Western probe force. The Soviet leaders might assess Western determination and the risks involved at this stage to be sufficiently high that they would prefer to let the probe force pass and seek to negotiate. However, there is at least an equal chance that they would take action to interdict the probe, since they would probably estimate that there still remained the option of backing down at a higher threshhold before the risks became uncontrollable. They would doubtless seek at this stage to capitalize to the fullest on growing Western fears of war by a massive campaign for maintenance of the current status quo during renewed negotiations. In negotiations, or in public statements, they would probably offer a "compromise" from original demands, retaining the substance of their objective but couched in terms calculated to appeal to those in the West eager to find an "honorable" way to accede and withdraw.

b. The Soviet reaction to a "stand-pat" posture by the U.S. following the failure of the small probe would probably be to wait. They would probably consider that Western prestige had suffered through this defeat, and that the chances of a subsequent resort to greater force had not necessarily increased. Over-all, they would conclude that their position was somewhat stronger than at the outset, and they could afford to await further developments.

2. Allied Reaction

With the failure of the tripartite armored platoon to achieve its mission Western European resolve would be shaken. The subsequent U.S. declaration of a national emergency would fan Western European fears that the situation was getting out of hand. As a consequence, pressures for a negotiated settlement at the cost of some concessions to Soviet demands would increase sharply, especially in the U.K. and the smaller European countries. Such thinking would be most vocal in the opposition parties of the several countries, but the reaction would be broad and essentially national in character. At the same time, however, the clear evidence of U.S. resolve would encourage government leaders in West German, France and the U.K., to continue to endorse a policy of firmness and military probing.

E. Phase IV

1. Bloc Reaction

By the time that the Western battalion had moved, the Soviets would have determined that the extent to which the Western powers were ready to compromise was much less than they had estimated at the initiation of the crisis. They would now face a decision whether to persist in a situation in which the risks would no longer be entirely

controllable by then. At the same time, the commitment of their prestige to the crisis would have increased. It is difficult to predict the outcome of these two opposing considerations. If negotiating feelers for a compromise settlement had been rejected prior to dispatch of the force, the Soviets might feel that it was necessary to take the increased risks in order to test Western determination still further, and as the only alternative to suffering a major political defeat. On the other hand, it is at least equally likely that they would decide that the risks now exceeded the potential return and that they ought not test Western determination further. In either event and particularly if there were a subsequent engagment of forces, they would at all times hold out the alternative of negotiated settlement, even though not offering terms as attractive as the status quo ante. In this connection the Soviet leaders would probably not invoke the Warsaw Pact at this time on the grounds that honoring the provisions of the Pact would shortly involve direct confrontation of Soviet and U.S. forces. In short, they would always offer an alternative to general war and show their preference for such alternatives, banking on Western readiness under great pressure to settle for limited political and even military reversals rather than bringing on an avoidable general war.

2. Allied Reaction

The failure of the tripartite Brigade would result in a widespread and aroused European opinion against further military efforts. The possible commitment of large-scale Western forces and use of nuclear weapons at this time would certainly be rejected by most of the NATO countries.

F. Reactions to Possible Subsequent Courses of Action

1. Bloc Reactions

a. If, following the failure of the tripartite battalion, the Western Powers were to decide to withdraw

from the Berlin situation the Soviets would do everything to facilitate the Western withdrawal without incident, considering the advantage of avoiding possible reversal of the decision as outweighing any further political capital from underlining further the Western defeat.

b. If, instead, the Allied powers decided at this point to commit the remainder of the tripartite brigade to action, East German forces would place them in the same position as the initial battalion.

c. The employment of substantial Allied forces on a broad front toward Berlin without regard to existing access routes would almost certainly be met by all available Soviet forces as well as by East German troops. The Soviets would not use nuclear weapons unless and until the Western powers used them, in which case they would probably respond with reciprocal limited use of such weapons against Western forces in East Germany, and possibly in West Germany. The Soviets would almost certainly not initiate general war by attacks on the U.S. for the following reasons:

(1) The Western restraint in choosing large-scale but limited action would be a clear indication that the Western powers preferred to avoid general war, and hence preemptive action would not be required;

(2) Optimum conditions for surprise attack would not obtain, in view of the Western alert status;

(3) Soviet superiority in capabilities for limited war in Central Europe would provide them the opportunity to contain and probably to defeat the Western forces without extending the limits of the hostilities. In addition, particularly if the Western actions were not clearly and authoritatively stated to be temporary

and limited to the purpose of restoring access -- and not to defeat and conquer East Germany -- the Communist political position in their own countries and in much of the world would be strong despite their own provocation of the initial crisis.

2. Allied Reactions

a. Without what they consider to be reasonable military options, the Western European countries would probably press to initiate negotiations which would permit withdrawal of the beleaguered Western force, and lead to a broader settlement of the Berlin problem. In order to achieve this, most Western European countries, including powerful forces in West Germany, would probably be willing to accept a solution which would afford the GDR de facto (e.g., control of access to Berlin) if not outright formal recognition. Considerable opposition to a direct retreat on the status of West Berlin would remain, but would not preclude willingness to accept a new contractual arrangement and reduction (and final withdrawal) of Western forces, especially if some face-saving procedure (e.g., phased substitution of UN for present Western troops) were provided.

b. Even at this stage, nevertheless, NATO countries would probably view U.S. leadership as decisive. A U.S. decision to pursue military efforts further would thus probably elicit substantial support, especially in West Germany and France. Pursuance of such military actions to the point of imminent general hostilities, or intent to initiate general war, would probably reopen serious rifts within NATO, and, time and circumstance permitting, possibly result in open defections.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. The adequacy of U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations in defense of Berlin is dependent upon demonstrated U.S. and Allied resolution to risk general war over this issue and Soviet unwillingness to accept such risk over Berlin.

B. The danger of accidental involvement in general war can be substantially reduced provided we make it unmistakably clear to the Soviets at an early date that we are willing to accept this eventuality if they persist in denying us our rights, and provided we then time our military actions so that at each threshold of increasing risk there is an opportunity for settlement through negotiation.

C. U.S. and Allied military operations of battalion or larger size with air support, conducted along the Berlin corridor, would force the Soviets to choose either to persist in a situation involving grave risk of general war or to decide not to test U.S. and Allied resolution further. Such operations are well within Allied capability. On the other hand, no limited military operation could, by itself, maintain the Allied position with respect to Berlin if the Soviets remain determined to force Allied withdrawal.

D. U.S. and Allied posture for general war in connection with the Berlin crisis would be significantly improved as a result of timely implementation of emergency measures such as a declaration of a national emergency, calling of reserve forces to active duty, deployment of additional forces to Europe, and placing U.S. forces world-wide on general war alert. Moreover, these emergency measures, taken separately over a period of several months prior to dispatch of the Allied force to open access to Berlin, would be extremely significant in convincing the Soviets

of Allied resolution, and might well be decisive in forcing a solution to the issue.

E. The Allies have in Berlin an adequate capability to prevent the loss of West Berlin, provided the city is not subjected to organized military attack. However, a substantial reduction in the strength of the Allied garrison would jeopardize this capability as well as reduce our stake in maintaining access rights.

F. Prestocked theatre logistic resources are adequate to support the level of limited military operations studied. However, in this area the danger of limited military operations expanding into general war is so great that partial industrial mobilization would be required on a precautionary measure and to validate the U.S. general war posture.

G. The purpose and character of the limited military operations studied in this situation are not suitable for assessing the effectiveness of weapons systems or types of warfare.

H. The use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations in defense of Berlin would not contribute effectively to the achievement of U.S. and Allied objectives. Political and military restraints inherent in the Berlin situation prevent effective use of such weapons by the Allies. Moreover, the Soviets have the capability of responding in kind with a consequent nullifying of any military advantage and a heightening of the risk of general war.

I. Success in achieving U.S. national objectives pertaining to Berlin would bolster U.S. prestige and Free World resistance to the spread of Communism. Conversely, failure to achieve our objectives would have a deleterious effect upon collective security.

J. The problem of evacuating U.S. dependents and non-combatans from Berlin could force a difficult choice between some acceptance of GDR controls for this purpose or abandoning evacuation plans. Evacuation of U.S. civilians could also have serious consequences for morale in Berlin, although it might also serve notice of our intention to resist forcibly in Berlin.

K. The efficacy of Allied limited military operations, or the threat of limited military operations, as a deterrent against possible Soviet actions to impair Allied rights of ground access to Berlin is related directly to the extent to which Western popular opinion can be prepared to accept the necessity for a solution of the problem by force, even at the risk of general war. The maintenance of such a state of opinion is in turn dependent on the broadest possible definition of the issues--i.e., in terms of Western commitments for the survival and freedom of Berlin rather than on technical aspects of stamping documents--in order to command free world support for these principles as a casus belli.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 April 1960

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Document No. 16

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
I-13160/60

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SUPPLY & LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, OASD (ISA)

SUBJECT: Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations

A State-CIA-JCS-Defense study is in process to prepare a report to the NSC on the U.S. and Allied capabilities for coping with limited war. The study is for the period to 1 July 1962 with basic assumption that essential elements of U.S. national strategy will remain unchanged.

The concept for the study is to examine likely situations (Berlin, Iran, Laos, Offshore Islands and Korea) which may develop and involve the United States in limited military operations. From these studies, conclusions are drawn with regard to capabilities existing in the period, particularly with regard to the achievement of U.S. objectives through military action calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Enemy and Allied operational and logistic capabilities are studied to include employment of nuclear, BW and CW weapons systems when applicable.

Your comment on the attached draft would be appreciated. In your review it should be recognized that the situation described is hypothetical and may or may not represent universal agreement on the most likely situation. However, it does represent one way in which the situation might develop and your review should be undertaken within the framework of the situation presented. Special attention should be given to the conclusions section and to that portion of the study dealing with your area of competence or responsibility. Detailed textual proposals are not required. Comment should be submitted to this office no later than 2 May on this section of the study.

Particular care in handling the present memorandum and its attachment is requested. No coordination with either the Joint Staff, the Services, or other OSD elements is necessary since separate action is being taken with these agencies.

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1 Incl.
Draft, Berlin, 9 Feb 60

James H Polk
JAMES H. POLK
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Planning

(Incl previously forwarded Dr. Paxson)(ODDR&E)

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I-14501/60

20 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAMS

SUBJECT: Summary of Comments by OSD Offices on Berlin LMO Study

In response to an ISA request of 15 April 1960, OSD offices submitted comments on the draft study, "Hypothetical Limited Military Operations in Defense of Berlin," dated 9 February 1960. The major views received are summarized below, and are followed by Plans Office comment where appropriate.

The Office of Special Operations made no comment. The Office of the ASD(S&L) found "no logistics implications that would prevent or limit the actions discussed within the framework of the assumptions given."

The Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy) strongly doubts that the phased increase in intensity of probing military actions by small conventional forces, as outlined in the study, will convince the USSR of U.S. or Allied determination. He believes these will result in failure and loss of prestige. In his view, "modern weapons" (atomic) should be used from the outset of military conflict to obtain a well-defined goal. Probing action should not be used to help make use of atomic weapons more acceptable, since he comments that "it has been clearly stated as NATO policy supported by the United States that atomic weapons will be used from the outset of military conflict."

Plans Comment: These comments appear to overlook the fact that the U.S. and Allied objectives set forth in the study are "To preserve the Allied position in Berlin and to re-establish Allied access to the city." (Page 3, para C). These objectives geared to seeking the status quo ante are not served by initiating nuclear conflict. As indicated in the study, use of nuclear weapons would not yield a military advantage and would heighten the risk of general war (p. 23, para J; p. 33, Conclusion H). The basic concept of phased probing actions is to provide increasing military incentive for the USSR to seek a political, rather than military, solution to the issue in a manner which is compatible with U.S. objectives.

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NATO policy does not state that "atomic weapons will be used from the outset of military conflict." NATO strategy, as defined in the December 1956 Political Directive, states that NATO forces must be designed to deal with incidents, such infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions, "without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons." To deal with other armed aggression NATO forces are to operate "in accordance with the concept of 'forward strategy', counting on the use of nuclear weapons at the outset." This strategy, which provides that nuclear weapons may rather than will be used, is fully consistent with U.S. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1) which states: (para 12a) "It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; ....."

The Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, felt insufficient attention was given in the study to the possibility of a strictly air-to-air war conducted over the corridor from Helmstedt to Berlin. For the purposes of refining R&D guidance, it would have been useful if the study had assessed the relative value of air-to-air missiles with differing ranges during air operations either (a) to insure access by transport aircraft, or (b) to conduct an aircraft attrition campaign. Surface-to-air missiles might have been given similar evaluation.
Plans Comment: The primary purpose of the study is to examine U.S. capabilities to achieve U.S. objectives, rather than to examine all possible courses of action which might provide planning guidance. As stated in the study, U.S. and Allied objectives are "To preserve the Allied position in Berlin and to re-establish Allied access to the city" (p. 3, para C). Air action alone would not meet these objectives, since such action does not lead to any finite time at which it can be made evident that air access has been permanently reopened. Air action alone also could imply Allied acceptance of closure of ground access, again failing to meet the U.S. objective of re-establishing the permanent access necessary to preserve the Allied position in the city.

The ASD (Comptroller) suggests that there may be several developments that may serve as a brake on the USSR's willingness to force the Berlin issue to the point of military action; e.g. Soviet troop reduction could reduce military readiness, and if followed by military conflict over Berlin, would discredit those favoring the reductions.
Plans Comment: This study was not designed to apply to the existing international situation, but was purposely geared to a hypothetical situation developed to contain major factors from which general analyses would be conducted.

The ASD (Comptroller) also suggests that any military action in the Berlin situation would require a rather extensive reconsideration of "our entire National Security Policy."

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Plans Comment: There is no concrete explanation given for this view. However, it would appear that deliberate Soviet willingness to engage in significant military action (i.e. at the level of the "platoon probe", Phase III, p. 15) would be an indicator of Soviet intentions that would justify a basic policy review. It would indicate Soviet willingness to adopt a militarily more aggressive posture in the world struggle.

The ASD (Comptroller) also suggests clarifying lesser points in the study, such as: Conclusion D - whether deployment of additional forces to Europe would be token or major; also in Conclusion D - whether a declaration of National Emergency would be limited, as in Korea, or all-out; whether we are "technically" at war with East Germany in our present legal position toward Germany.

It should be noted that none of the conclusions are challenged and that, except for General Loper, the concept is not challenged. Rather, other comments request clarifications or additions that will assist a particular staff section, certainly not the purpose of this study.

SIGNED

JAMES H. POLK
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Planning

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Prepared by:
R J Albright/)ASD(ISA)/Plans
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

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17 MAY 1994 89-F-2318
DATE CASE #

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D-1

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO ROUTINE			X	OSD		

FROM:

OSD WASH D C DTG 222312Z June

TO:

USNMR [redacted] PARIS FRANCE

TOP SECRET Df 979107 NOFORN. EXCLUSIVE FOR [redacted] GEN. NORSTAD

Info: Eyes Only for Shuff, Defrepnama, Paris, France

FROM MR. IRWIN.

Mounting apprehension concerning the political obstacles to the MRBM program has prompted State Department personnel to study quite closely a sea-borne deployment as an alternative to land-based MRBMs (including inland waterways). German participation is of particular concern to State posing as it does an expected opposition from several WEU countries including the U.K. Further they believe Soviet reaction to German participation could possibly take serious form steaming from a genuine fear of a resurgent Germany possessing a nuclear strike capability. On the other hand deployment in Germany without German participation could appear discriminatory to a degree that would cause a serious waning of German support of NATO. The State Department study gives support to the view that the political problems could to a great extent be solved by pursuing a sea-borne MRBM program. The study has been made available to

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Distr: None

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TOP SECRET CONTROL 2
Copy No. R-1
Case No. 89-FOI-2318
T.S. No. 93-TS-107
Item No. 18

DATE	TIME
22	
MONTH	YEAR
JUNE	1960

WRITER		RELEASER
SYMBOL		SIGNATURE
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
PHONE [illegible]	PAGE NR. 1 / NR. OF PAGES 2	John A. [illegible] Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Assistant Secretary
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

FROM:

OSD WASH D C

Mr. Thurston.

My office is in the process of evaluating the subject; however, we are reluctant to proceed without a clear understanding of the military requirements involved. I would greatly appreciate your views as to whether a sea-borne deployment of MRBM's would meet your requirements. Perhaps in this connection it may be worthwhile to consider in addition a sea-borne deployment of the MRBM supplemented by a land-based deployment of shorter-range weapons the existence of which would not engender the political opposition associated with the MRBM.

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIA
OASD/ISA/Exr Req NATO	2	2	[redacted]	JHI

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

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JS
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~~TOP SECRET~~ A-9

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JCSM-403-60
14 SEP 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Two LIVE OAK Proposals of USCINCEUR (U)

References: a. USCINCEUR message to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ECJCBT 9-10679, DTG 241353Z August 1960 (DA IN 35535)
b. USCINCEUR message to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ECJCBT 9-10678, DTG 241352Z August 1960 (DA IN 35536)

1. In the above messages, General Norstad proposes, respectively, to:

a. Assign a German Liaison Officer to the LIVE OAK Group.

b. Name the U.S. Commandant in Berlin as the Single Allied Commander responsible to him.

2. With regard to the first proposal, the original intent of LIVE OAK planning has been to keep the FRG informed adequately in order to coordinate and implement LIVE OAK Plans. Now that the major portion of LIVE OAK Planning has been completed, and since General Norstad, as the over-all tripartite commander, so recommends, it is considered that the United States should concur in his proposal.

3. With regard to the second proposal, LIVE OAK Planning has proceeded on the premise that the over-all field commander for tripartite military land operations, that is CINCBAOR, would for practical military purposes deal with a Single Allied Commander in Berlin. On 5 June 1959, the U.S. Government approved the designation of a Single Allied Commander in Berlin and indicated that the U.K. Commandant would be a logical choice. The British Government, likewise on 22 June 1959, indicated that they favored the designation of a single commander and were agreeable to the appointment of the U.K. Commandant, but that they considered the designation of this commander to be the prerogative of General Norstad. For

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various political and security reasons it has been inappropriate previously to name such a commander; however, in view of the current situation and in order to facilitate the consummation of arrangements, it is considered that the United States should support the proposal of General Norstad to name the U.S. Commandant in Berlin as the Single Allied Commander.

4. For the reasons stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in both proposals of General Norstad. However, since both proposals involve important political implications and therefore require both U.S. and tripartite approval, it is considered that a U.S. position of concurrence with General Norstad's proposals should be established.

5. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense note and support action by the J.C.S. Representative on the U.S. Coordinating Group, Berlin Contingency Planning, to:

a. Establish a U.S. position of concurrence with General Norstad's proposals.

b. Urge that the British and the French also concur in General Norstad's proposals.

6. At such a time as a U.S. position on General Norstad's proposals has been established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will advise General Norstad of the action taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy for:
USCINCEUR

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A-8

~~TOP SECRET~~

JUN 1 0 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

References: a. JCSM-308-60, 12 May 1960
b. JCSM-330-60, 26 May 1960

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference a. paragraph 2.a., stated that "...if it becomes evident that implementation of such plans is inevitable, certain political, economic, psychological and military measures should be taken to improve our military posture and to convince the USSR...".

In reference b. the Joint Chiefs forwarded a checklist of military and non-military measures which could be taken in connection with Soviet action against Berlin.

Recent events have emphasized the importance of being prepared to move to a posture of improved readiness on short notice. I would like, therefore, the Joint Chiefs to inform me of those specific military measures, in order of significance and timing, which they recommend be taken to improve our military posture, or to convince the USSR of our determination in the event of a change by USSR action to the current Berlin situation.

It is further requested that the list furnished me specify those measures which will require my attention and decision, and include where appropriate the estimated lead time from decision to achievement of capability.

Signed
JAMES H. DOUGLAS
Deputy

31 May 1960
Prep: Col. J.H. Schofield, Jr/elm
Rewritten: Col. Schofield
Eur Reg/ISA, 3D256, x54812
Distr: Addressee-Orig (Cy 1) & cys 2,3,4
OSD-Cy 5 (C-36273);
R&C-Cy 6
ISA-Cy 7
Comeback-Cy 8
Stayback-Cy 9

I-13931/60

SEC DEF CONT NO. TS-513

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Page 1 of 1 Pages.

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Document No. 7

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JUN 6 1960

Refer to: I-13931/60

TO: The Secretary of Defense

(Signed) John N. Irwin, II

FROM: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Problem: To determine the nature and timing of certain specific military measures related to Berlin contingency planning.

Discussion: The Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum JCSM-308-60 dated 12 May 1960 (Tab A) informed you that the U.S. military posture in mid-summer 1960 would permit implementation of Berlin contingency plans. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs noted that inherent in the implementation of these plans was the risk of general war, and that certain military measures should be taken when it becomes evident that implementation of these plans is inevitable. By cable (Tab B) DEF 97872, you were informed in greater detail with regard to the military and non-military measures referred to in para. 2.a. of Tab A.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished you, by attachment to memorandum dated 26 May 1960, subject: Studies of Military and Non-Military Countermeasures to the Berlin Crisis (U) (Tab C), a checklist of possible military and non-military measures that could be taken. This list does not indicate which measures are recommended by Joint Chiefs of Staff for implementation.

Recent events confirm the need for the U.S. to be fully prepared at all times for sudden shifts in Soviet policy and immediately ready to take appropriate measures. The Berlin situation is an example of where a policy shift of this type could occur. These military measures within the capabilities of the three Services and the Joint Chiefs are reflected in current capabilities and operational plans. However, certain measures can only be taken after approval at the level of the Secretary of Defense or higher, and may require action by other agencies of the Government. In order to familiarize you in advance with the scope and implications of these actions and the capabilities which will result from your decision, the Joint Chiefs should inform you of these measures and submit them to you as soon as possible.

The attached memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab D) informs the Joint Chiefs of your views in this regard and requests the necessary action to implement the above.

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Recommendation: Recommend signature and dispatch of the memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab D).

4 Encls
1. Tab A--JCSM-202-60, 12 May 60 (I-13931/60)
2. Tab B--DEF 977271, 16 May 60 (TS Cy 7)
3. Tab C--JCSM-220-60, 26 May 60 (I-14129/60)
4. Tab D--Proposed memo for Chmn, JCS

Prepared: Col. Schofield/js/31 May 60, Eur Reg/ISA 3D256, x54812

Distr: Addressee (Cy 1) (C-36274)
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JS
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A-I

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Excised version

JCSM-220-60

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Studies of Military and Non-Military Countermeasures in the Berlin Crisis (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 1 May 1959, and the memorandums by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-174-59, dated 8 May 1959, and JCSM-354-59, dated 31 August 1959.

2. As requested in your referenced memorandum, a current status of organization for planning, the planning undertaken for military and non-military actions and, in addition, a checklist of military and non-military measures that could be taken are forwarded as Appendices hereto.

3. In the light of recent developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing the adequacy of the subject planning, with particular reference to the checklist of military and non-military measures that could be taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

M. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (24 pages)

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APPENDIX "A"

ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

1. U.S. Coordinating Group:

Responsible for U.S. interagency coordination, and for the coordination of further planning on studies of military and non-military countermeasures, with particular reference to selection and timing, referring major decisions for the President's approval as they become necessary.

2. Tripartite Ambassadors in Washington:

Responsible for over-all coordination of Berlin contingency planning.

3. Three Embassies in Bonn:

Responsible for development of recommendations regarding identification of Allied movements, instructions regarding detailed procedures at checkpoints, and air access planning to the point where air traffic has been forcibly obstructed.

4. Tripartite Staff in Paris (Live Oak Staff):

Under the supervision of General Norstad, responsible for military planning of "Preparatory Military Measures"; the "Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions"; and for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access to assist the Three Embassies at Bonn; and for air access planning after the point that Allied air traffic has been forcibly obstructed.

5. Three Ambassadors to the United Nations:

Responsible for making recommendations regarding timing of approach to U.N. in effort to mobilize world opinion against USSR violation of agreements.

6. Berlin Headquarters of Three Powers:

Assist Three Embassies at Bonn.

7. National Military Authorities:

Develop national plans to support tripartitely planned measures.

SEC DEF CONT NO. 129
I-14129/60

APPENDIX "B"

CHECKLIST OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES

1. PRIOR TO SOVIET TURN-OVER - PURPOSE: TO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION.

a. Continue close consultation with Congressional leaders and frequent reports to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.

[redacted]

c. Diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free governments.

d. A persistent world-wide propaganda campaign should be conducted on Berlin with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence.

e. Consult NATO in advance to maintain solidarity.

f. SSK patrols in Iceland-Faeroes' Gap to be intensified.

g. Execute anti-submarine barriers at Straits of Gibraltar and in the Turkish Straits, with visible patrolling.

h. Utilize air corridors at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet, if required.

i. Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in Central and Eastern Mediterranean.

[redacted]

k. Conduct a tripartite military exercise which could be easily identified with the problem of forcing access to Berlin via the autobahn.

l. Assemble key tripartite commanders at Paris for readiness conference.

m. Have the military leaders of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany meet with General Norstad at the time political negotiations over the Berlin issues reach an impasse.

n. Tighten control of frontiers, ports and airports.

o. Increase air activity along USSR radar barrier.

2. SOVIETS TURN-OVER TO GDR - PURPOSE: TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION.

a. Review of foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Execute identification and checkpoint procedures.

c. Seek favorable U.N. Security Council Resolution.

3. GDR/SOVIET ACTIONS RESULT IN FORMALITIES OR CONTROLS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES - PURPOSE: TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION.

a. Early agreement with the U.K. and France in advance of negotiations with the USSR, on precise nature and timing of steps to be taken in the U.N.

b. A persistent world-wide diplomatic and propaganda campaign should be conducted on Berlin with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence.

c. Consultation to maintain NATO solidarity on the Berlin issue.

d. If appropriate, consult with SEATO and/or CENTO members to gain support.

e. Increase civil defense readiness.

f. Review plans for mobilization of industry.

g. Determination of the degree of harassment which can be applied that is compatible with forces deployed and political-military situation.

h. Conduct world-wide measures to counter Soviet harassment in connection with the Berlin crisis.

i. Reference to the concept of reprisal should be made in discussions with free world governments.

[ ]

k. Augment U.S. Fleet Marine Force in Mediterranean.

[

]

n. Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on trains and at Allied airfields in Berlin.

o. Replace (utilizing force if necessary) GDR guards and administrative personnel at the autobahn checkpoints with tripartite military personnel.

p. Start tripartite military police patrols of the autobahn, on a 24-hour basis, announcing tripartite assumption of responsibility for traffic to and from Berlin.

q. Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in tripartite convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with two-way communication equipment.

r. Increase tripartite utilization of the autobahn and air corridors to Berlin.

s. Utilize increased military traffic to Berlin to increase the stockpile of weapons and ammunition.

t. Deny GDR participation in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC).

u. Conduct reconnaissance flights in the air corridors to photograph the autobahn and its checkpoints.

v. Occupy the Steinstuecken enclave and exercise the right of access.

w. Increase intelligence collection activities in Berlin and East Germany.

x. Intensify and coordinate reconnaissance activity (electronic and visual).

y. The tripartite military powers in Europe implement appropriate alert measures to include, but not limited to:

(1) Protection against sabotage and subversion.

(2) Bringing air defense systems up to strength.

(3) Reinforcement of frontiers and refugee control.

(4) Implementation of the first stage of the ACE Communications - Electronic plan.

(5) Preparing forces for deployment.

z. Bring tripartite troop units in Germany to authorized strength and improve status of early warning systems.

aa. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises, and increase in-place exercise.

bb. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.

cc. Control radio traffic over shole area to suggest increased alert.

dd. Augment and vary pattern of detectable communications activity.

ee. Increase "information" programs in units.

ff. Intensify atomic training of tripartite forces.

gg. Elements of U.S. Second Fleet to proceed to war stations, exercising from U.K. ports and in Norwegian Sea.

hh. Turkish forces with U.S. and U.K. submarines to conduct exercises in Black Sea and along Turkish coast within terms of Montreux Convention.

ii. Active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to submarine activities.

jj. Rotate fighter interceptor force of no more than 5 squadrons to Central Europe.

kk. Similar and simultaneous movement and reinforcement of British and French Air Forces in coordination with two preceding statements.

ll. Rotate troop carrier squadron to Central Europe.

mm. Take further action to prestock airfields.

nn. Resolve, at least temporarily, special weapons storage problems affecting readiness.

oo. Accelerate deployment of missile units to West Germany.

pp. Produce and stockpile appropriate maps and issue on a limited scale.

qq. Arrange for temporary storage of weapons in additional delivery units.

rr. Through diplomatic channels take preliminary steps to arrange for U.S. access to foreign ports, staging areas, airfields, communications facilities, etc.

4. TRAFFIC (AIR OR GROUND) IS OBSTRUCTED - PURPOSE: TO EXECUTE A PROBE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SOVIETS/GDR WILL USE FORCE TO PREVENT ALLIED PASSAGE.

a. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or, if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Step-up civil defense measures.

c. Final tripartite determination of size and composition of forces to be used in the context of existing political-military situation.

d. Consult NATO in advance and seek to maintain solidarity, possibly including a NATO resolution, in support of local (ground) action. In addition, Benelux's concurrence and cooperation should be obtained.

e. Immediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this force will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn route to Berlin, but if blocked will reopen the route. The force will be directed not to fire unless fired upon.

f. Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.

g. Withdraw non-essential personnel, including dependents, from Europe.

h. Discontinue tourist and non-essential traffic to Europe.

[ ]

j. Deploy tripartite force to Helmstedt area.

k. Deploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to BAOR area.

l. Step up and practice alert and combat procedures.

m. Improve state of readiness of BAOR and RAF/Germany to include movement of combat service support units, and strategic reserve from U.K. to continent.

n. Establish air courier service between Paris and major tripartite headquarters in Europe and U.K.

o. Reinforce Adiz measures and extend them to the Austrian border.

p. Execute aircraft squadron dispersal plan.

q. Be prepared to execute demolition and mining plans.

r. Increase border patrol activity and surveillance.

s. Execute the probe.

5. FURTHER POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND ALLIED TRAFFIC IS STILL OBSTRUCTED - PURPOSE TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN, AND TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS.

a. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or, if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Final tripartite determination of the size and composition of forces to be used in the context of the existing political-military situation.

c. Seek support of all friendly nations.

d. Evaluation of possible use of the UN and the laying of a solid foundation for maximum UN support for the Allied position.

e. Review preparations for rationing.

f. Direct commanders of unified and specified commands to implement selected alert measures contained in their respective alert plans.

g. Consult and inform friendly nations and allied organizations, including NATO, SEATO, and CENTO of the seriousness of the situation and urge they take appropriate action including selected alert measures.

h. Execute electronic countermeasures.

i. Execute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR shipping.

j. Deploy to ACE compensatory replacements for the tripartite force.

k. Partial or complete evacuation of hospital patients to the rear.

l. Execute operation to reopen access.

6. DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADOPT GENERAL WAR MEASURES.*

a. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or, if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Alert Congressional leaders to the emminent likelihood of war, and seek Congressional authorization for use of forces, as necessary to redress our grievances, the President to inform the people of the gravity of the situation.

c. Diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied psoition on Berlin to all free governments.

d. Harass and impose increased security restriction on Soviet military personnel.

e. Take civilian political and economic steps in accordance with current plans.

f. Reinforcement of forces on the European continent.

g. Initiate mobilization.

h. Take any additional and final measures to achieve full U.S. military and civilian defense readiness for general war.

i. Present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.

j. Conduct military operations in accordance with current plans.

* NOTE: It should be noted that general war measures could be implemented at any appropriate time.

APPENDIX "C"

SUMMARY AND STATUS OF

MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

SECTION I

PREPARATORY ACTIONS COMMON TO ALL ALTERNATIVES

"A" MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Preparatory military measures for appropriate degree of mobilization, unit deployments, readiness and establishment of alert measures.	[redacted] On 23 July 1959 General Norstad forwarded additional preparatory measures that could be taken. Further additional preparatory measures were submitted in the Live Oak study, "More Elaborate Military Measures".	The degree of mobilization indicated will be recommended at such time as the situation dictates. On 23 July General Norstad forwarded additional preparatory measures that could be taken. By memo the JCS forwarded comments to Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
2. NATO forces should maintain a sufficient capability to contain a Soviet attack until our retaliatory forces can respond.		Action pending decision for commitment of military force. On 29 May SACEUR message to commanders and MOD's referred to stated intentions of France, U.K. and U.S. and to NAC declaration of Dec 58. He stated a situation might arise which would make it desirable to enhance the state of readiness in ACE. SACEUR requested commanders to study measures for establishing military vigilance that could be sustained.
3. Planning, on a tripartite basis under the general supervision of General Norstad (Live Oak Group) for quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in Europe of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence, to provide evidence of the three powers' determination to maintain their free access.	Measures have been outlined and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The French, U.K., and U.S. Governments have approved the plan.	General Norstad's study, on "More Elaborate Military Measures" to reopen ground access, includes the following statement: "The size of any tripartite ground force should be such that the removal of its elements from the NATO Shield would not seriously affect NATO's defense structure."

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
4. Early agreement between U.S., U.K., France and the FRG, as to nature and timing of the intial probe of Soviet intentions.	On 13 May General Norstad submitted his "Probe Plan". The French, U.K., and U.S. Governments have approved the Plan. The plan includes 3 courses of action; the U.S. prefers courses "B" or "C" and the U.K. prefers course "B". General Norstad's plan included a proposed command structure that was also approved; General Norstad to be the over-all Commander and he may exercise command from SHAPE, the Field Commander to be CINCBAOR.	Final decision on which course of action, "A", "B", or "C", and the timing of execution will be made at the time, and in light of the political and military situation. A letter of instruction from General Norstad to CINCBAOR was issued on 10 July that requires CINCBAOR to prepare supporting plans. USCINCEUR and his subordinate commanders, in fulfillment of their U.S. responsibilities, have prepared plans for employment of limited military forces to conduct a probe in order to determine Soviet and/or GDR intentions to deny our rights of access to Berlin.
5. Planning for maintenance of unrestricted air access to Berlin.	Final agreement at Bonn has been reached between the U.S., U.K. and FR on a basic plan for dealing with a possible withdrawal of Soviets from the Berlin Air Safety Center. General Norstad signed a Live Oak letter of instruction to CINCUSAFE, instructing him to prepare a detailed tripartite plan to maintain air access to Berlin. In anticipation of receiving this letter of instruction, CINCUSAFE conducted several tripartite	Plans exist for maintaining civil air services (PAA, BEA, Air France) under flight safety conditions not usually considered normal. By agreement between Bonn and the Live Oak Group in Paris it has been agreed that the Live Oak Group will be responsible for planning measures to be taken after air access has been forcibly obstructed by aircraft shot or forced down. These plans have been prepared.

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
	planning conferences with France and Royal Air Forces in Germany. As a result, CINCUSAFE's plan was completed and reviewed in Wiesbaden by Live Oak on 6 May. It has been sent to General Norstad for his review. On 5 May 1960 General Norstad signed a Live Oak letter of instruction to CINCUSAFE, instructing him to review and coordinate all military tripartite airlift contingency planning for Berlin and to assume operational control over these airlifts when implemented. In anticipation of receiving this letter of instruction, CINCUSAFE has had several conferences with French and Royal Air Forces in Germany, and has prepared a plan to comply with this letter of instruction. This plan has also been reviewed at Wiesbaden on 6 May by Live Oak and was presented by CINCUSAFE on 11 May to the three embassies at Bonn for coordination. Following this coordination the plan was submitted to General Norstad for approval. On 5 May General Norstad signed a Live Oak letter of instruction to CINCUSAREUR. This letter states, in part: "Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, has been delegated the authority to review and coordinate tripartite Berlin air contingency planning to include Operation TRIPLE PLAY."	CINCEUR has prepared, in fulfillment of their planning responsibilities, for U.S. and tripartite plans for: a. Tripartite "garrison airlift" plan - This plan provides for air supply of U.K., U.S. and French garrisons in West Berlin; provides for certain non-allied and non-official airlifts. (NOTE: Plan was developed at Bonn by the political counsellors of the three embassies, three civil air attaches, U.S. air attaches, and representatives of the three air forces.) b. Tripartite "civil airlift plans" - This plan is designed to maintain as normal a flow of air traffic for West German civilians as possible between West Germany and West Berlin, and to transport refugees normally carried by civilian airlines.

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
	By JCS message to USCINCEUR additional guidance was furnished USCINCEUR in connection with his air contingency plan Berlin as approved by JCS.	Embassies at Bonn recommendations granting appropriate allied air commanders discretion to order corridor flights over 10,000 feet in event implementation of air contingency plans as approved by U.S.
	USCINCEUR informed CINCUSAFE that a Berlin airlift would be undertaken only as a last resort, that any impression that the U.S. is preparing for a Berlin airlift should be avoided, and that this planning should be on a strictly need-to-know basis in order to prevent any indication to the USSR that the U.S. would accept an airlift in lieu of aggressively defending our rights of access to Berlin. Upon the concurrence of the U.K.	
	Chief of Staff (French have already concurred), CINCUSAFE will be delegated the authority to coordinate military planning for QBAL and to exercise operational control over the airlift efforts executed.	On 18 May 1960, the Secretary of State informed Foreign Ministers that plans for Berlin airlift should not be construed to mean that decision already taken to mount such airlift but merely that relevant plans exist.
	The U.S., U.K., and FR have approved a paper entitled "Possible Soviet Withdrawal from Berlin Air Safety Center", as a basis for more detailed planning by the three embassies at Bonn.	Contingency plans for a Berlin airlift and for the maintenance of air access to Berlin could be executed at any time.

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
6. Planning for reopening ground access to Berlin.	On 16 May 1960 the JCS approved a USCINCEUR plan for the maintenance of unrestricted air access to Berlin. The Live Oak staff developed a study for "More Elaborate Military Measures". On 5 August 1959, General Norstad submitted the foregoing study to the military chiefs of the U.S., U.K., and France. The U.S. position, forwarded to General Norstad, stated that the study was very useful, and requested that detailed contingency plans be prepared in accordance with the conclusions of the study. The U.K. and France authorized General Norstad to prepare detailed plans based on the foregoing study. On 7 May 1960 USCINCEUR informed the JCS that the detailed plans were being prepared by CINCBAOR, in coordination with CINCUSAREUR and CINC French Forces in Germany. This plan was submitted by CINCBAOR through the Live Oak staff to General Norstad. On 16 May 1960 the JCS approved a USCINCEUR plan for employment of limited U.S. military force for reopening ground access to Berlin.	The tripartite plan is known as "More Elaborate Military Measures", to be undertaken after the USSR has turned over its functions to the East German Government (GDR), and after allied traffic to Berlin has been forcibly obstructed. The tripartite plan for reopening access to Berlin could be executed at any time.

"B" NON-MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free governments.	Continuing	Diplomatic approaches to non-NATO Governments regarding the Foreign Ministers Conferences have been made in an effort to build support for possible future action in the UN. The U.K. has kept the Commonwealth members informed.
2. A persistent world-wide propaganda campaign should be conducted on Berlin with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence.	Continuing	
3. Hints of the possible nature of resort to force contemplated by the Allies should be disseminated through covert channels.	Continuing	
4. Consultation to maintain NATO solidarity on the Berlin issue.	The reports were made on the Berlin situation to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 1 April 1959 and on 14 April 1960.	General Norstad, the U.K., and French Ambassadors informed that U.S. position is that NAC should be consulted before initiation of a probe. In connection with alerting of NORAD, the Canadians have asked the U.S. what circumstances would constitute interference with our access to Berlin. The State Dept. has informed the Canadian Ambassador on this point at the same time they informed NATO.

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
5. Evaluation of possible use of the UN and the laying of a solid foundation for maximum UN support for the Allied position.	The U.S., U.K., and FR have agreed on a tripartite paper dated 25 May 1959 entitled, "Possible Reference of the Berlin Question to the U.N."	
6. Early agreement with the U.K. and France in advance of negotiations with the USSR, on precise nature and timing of steps to be taken in the UN.	There is an agreed tripartite position that the most advantageous point to seek UN action would be after negotiations had broken down and before the USSR withdraws from its functions in connection with Allied access to Berlin.	Tripartite agreement, 16 May 1960, that decision to enter UN would be taken in light of circumstances at appropriate time.
7. Continuing close consultation with Congressional leaders and frequent reports to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.	Continuing	
8. Drafting of detailed procedures at checkpoints and procedures for identification of allied movements.	The U.S., U.K. and FR have approved instructions for procedures to be followed by allied highway and railroad movements to Berlin in the event the Soviets withdraw from their present functions with respect to allied access.	Agreement reaffirmed by the tripartite Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State on 18 May 1960.
9. Coordination and development of further planning on studies of Military and Non-military Countermeasures in the Berlin Crisis on a national basis.	A coordination group was formed at the direction of the President. JCS has designated Brig. General Fields, USMC, Deputy Director, J-5, as the JCS representative. Continuing action.	Periodic reports are made to the President and the NSC. (On 16 June 1959 and on 18 May 1960).

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
10. World-wide measures to counter harassment in connection with the Berlin crisis.	The U.S. paper, "Allied Counter-Harassment of Soviet Bloc Transportation," dated May 15, was passed to the French and U.K. The French have concurred in principal, the U.K. are awaiting instructions from their foreign office.	The French indicate economic counter-measures as appropriate and desirable, the British have indicated strong opposition. The subject matter is still under discussion. On 18 May 1960, as a result of discussions among Foreign Ministers of U.K. and France and Secretary of State agreement reached to recommend that heads of government approve further planning re indirect counter-measures and possible harassment of German civilian access.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Appendix "C"

SECTION II. ALTERNATIVE NO. ONE

A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN GROUND ACCESS BY LOCAL ACTION

"A" MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Final determination of size and composition of forces to be used in the context of existing political-military situation.		Final decision on size and composition of force is contingent upon the political-military situation existing at the time, and agreed on a tripartite basis. See page 13.

"B" NON-MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Consult NATO in advance and seek to maintain solidarity, possibly including a NATO resolution, in support of local ground action. In addition Benelux's concurrence and cooperation should be obtained.	Continuing	Report of Paris Foreign Ministers' Meeting given to NAC. During the Geneva meetings, the NAC was informed of Allied positions and progress.
2. Immediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this force will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn route to Berlin, but if blocked will reopen the route. The force will be directed not to fire unless fired upon.		
3. Confidential, advance notice of the foregoing announcement should be provided to selected friendly governments.		
4. Preparation of a tripartitely agreed draft of a public statement to be made if and when the Soviet Government announces the imminent turning over of the checkpoints to the GDR.	A draft has been circulated by State to the U.K. and French Embassies.	The French apparently approve the draft. The British are awaiting comments from London.

SECTION III. ALTERNATIVE NO. TWO

A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN AIR ACCESS, IF BLOCKED

"A" MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Final determination of the size and composition of forces to be used in the context of the existing political-military situation.		Final decision on size and composition of force is contingent upon the political-military situation existing at the time, and agreed on a tripartite basis.

See page 10.

"B" NON-MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Consult with NATO in advance and seek to maintain solidarity, possibly including a NATO resolution, in support of local air action.	Continuing	
2. Preceding the commitment of combat aircraft into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that these aircraft will reopen the established air corridors to Berlin.		
3. Selected friendly governments should be informed of proposed action.	In March 1960, a paper entitled, "Situations Which Could Arise if Soviets Withdrew from their Functions with Respect to Allied Access to Berlin", and the basic tripartite paper "Berlin Contingency Planning", dated 4 April 1959, were circulated to the Germans in the pre-Summit working group on Germany.	

SECTION IV. ALTERNATIVE NO. THREE

REPRISALS AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS IN OTHER AREAS

"A" MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Final determination of the degree of harassment which can be applied that is compatible with forces deployed and political-military situation.	[redacted]	See page 16.

"B" NON-MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Reference to the concept of reprisal should be made in discussions with free world governments.		See page 16.
2. Consult NATO in advance to maintain solidarity.		See page 14.
3. If appropriate, consult with SEATO and/or CENTO members to gain support.		
4. Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.		
5. Encourage UK and France to announce the imposition of controls.		

SECTION V. ALTERNATIVE NO. FOUR

GENERAL WAR MEASURES

"A" MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Take additional final measures to achieve full U.S. military and civilian defense readiness.	Plans constantly under review	If action becomes necessary, it will be in accordance with NSC 5904/1 and current emergency war plans.
2. Conduct military operations.		Action in accordance with current emergency war plans.

"B" NON-MILITARY

ACTION	STATUS	REMARKS
1. Seek support of all friendly nations.		
2. Alert Congressional leaders to the imminent likelihood of war and seek authorization for use of force.		
3. When war is imminent, inform NATO and seek implementation of NATO alert stages.		
4. Undertake the consultations provided in the Rio, SEATO and ANZUS Treaties. Consult with CENTO members.		
5. Present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.		

EURNATO
JS

DRAFT/Col Schofield/elm/54812
15 Sept 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~

A-10

U.S. should give serious consideration to the following elements as possible new guidance for Live Oak military planning:

1. Any force committed to reopen ground access should have a capability of buildup to sufficient size to successfully engage the GDR alone and thereby require the Soviet Union to commit Soviet troops; and

2. The initial application of force should be Allied in composition and could be of battalion or smaller size, but if met by GDR military formations, it should rapidly pass through solely West German units up to division or larger in size with larger Allied formations remaining in reserve. The consideration being that East Germans faced with West Germans would create a situation of such danger to the USSR that their time for decision would be immediate. The approval yesterday of a Federal Republic of Germany liaison officer for attachment to the Live Oak group and the introduction of West Germany into more active participation in the military planning for Berlin contingency makes the above now feasible for consideration. Although this aspect of Berlin contingency planning is not the part of the responsibility of ISA, it is believed the idea could be informally discussed with Gen. Lemnitzer or the Chairman, JCS.

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Document No. 9

Prep by Col. James H. Schofield
European Region/ISA
15 Sept 1960

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JS EUKNATO

A-11

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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TO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

CONFIDENTIAL JCS XX 984632 From JCS, J-5, Joint Staff sends. Reference your letter ECLO 600/74. Tour 60

A U.S. position of concurrence with your proposal contained in Para 3 of reference has been established.

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Cleared by:
G. G. O'CONNOR
Colonel, USA
Executive, J-5

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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JCSM-473-60

19 OCT 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Advance Training of the Battalion Combat Team Force, TRADE WIND (LIVE OAK) (S)

no record R+C or OSD

1. In a letter, subject as above, dated 7 October 1960, General Norstad formally requested the concurrence of the National Military Authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in his proposal to issue a directive to CINCBAOR to assemble and train, under a suitable cover plan, the tripartite force to restore ground access to Berlin.

2. In his letter, General Norstad stated, "With increasing Soviet and East German provocations over the status of West Berlin and routes of access thereto, I consider it essential from a military standpoint that I should be ready to implement operation TRADE WIND immediately on the direction of the three Governments. At the present time the assembling and training of the integrated Battalion Combat Team for use in operation TRADE WIND will take at least sixteen days and, because of problems concerning control of this integrated force, possibly longer to achieve a high standard of operational efficiency."

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the view of General Norstad that it is essential to conduct training for the tripartite force in order that it be prepared to execute plans in a minimum of time. For the reasons stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in General Norstad's proposal, and, in view of the political implications involved, consider that a U.S. position of concurrence should be established.

4. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense note and support action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the U.S. Coordinating Group, Berlin Contingency Planning, to:

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SEC DEF CONT NO. 7 18273/60 1039

19 Oct 1960

a. Establish a U.S. position of concurrence with General Norstad's proposal.

b. Urge that the British and French also concur in General Norstad's proposal.

5. At such a time as a U.S. position on General Norstad's proposal is established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will advise General Norstad of the action taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy to:
USCINCEUR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OSAD (ASI)
OCT 16 1 PM '60

EURNATO
JS

A-12

Mr. Irwin

5 December 1960

General Miller (I-18,414/60)

Meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning

1. A meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group has been scheduled by Mr. Merchant for 1530 hours, Monday, 5 December 1960, Room 5100, State. A meeting of the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group is scheduled for the same time and place the following day.

2. It is understood that these meetings were called by Mr. Merchant with a view to cleaning up, insofar as possible, current business prior to his trip to the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting. It is further understood that the principal item to be discussed will be the 2 November 1960 working paper on "Possible Non-Military Countermeasures." (See Enclosure A.)

3. The Joint Staff has recommended to Admiral Ferrall that he raise the following subjects at the meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group by making statements substantially as indicated in the referenced enclosures:

(a) Downgrading of the Classification of Certain LIVE OAK Matters. (See Enclosure B.)

(b) Items from the U.S. Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for early unilateral implementation or for emphasis in tripartite discussions. (See Enclosure C.)

(c) Summary of outstanding actions which should be undertaken or completed by the U.S. Coordinating Group. (See Enclosure D.)

4. It is not likely that the items listed in Enclosure C marked with red stars will be raised by Admiral Ferrall since these will require further coordination at the Chiefs' level. However, one of these items, "Intensified Planning for Appropriate Economic Measures," would be pertinent for you to raise in view of your correspondence with Mr. Merchant on this subject. (See Enclosures E and F.)

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I-18414/60

5. Although Mr. Merchant in his reply states that "we find ourselves in complete agreement on the fundamentals involved," his suggested course of action, which is to await action by the Committee of Political Advisers and the North Atlantic Council on the Bonn Non-Military Countermeasures Study (Enclosure G), introduces the possibility of a delay which could defeat the effectiveness of any action in this area. Furthermore, the cabled instructions of the Department, which were sent to Paris for use in discussions on the Bonn countermeasures paper (Tab H), lack urgency and positiveness. In addition to the points raised by you in your letter on the proposals on economic sanctions, recent developments in the Inter-Zonal Trade meetings between West Germans and East Germans make it appear that the West Germans may believe, either correctly or incorrectly, that they are negotiating from a position which lacks depth vis-a-vis the GDR. The GDR has recently received assurance from Khrushchev in Moscow that it will receive full and unrestricted support from the USSR in this trade conflict.

Recommendation: You should raise the subject of economic sanctions and stress that, in your opinion, there is an urgency to obtaining a political decision as a foundation for possible economic sanction actions, and that, in view of the imminence of the NATO meeting, the U.S. should initiate with determination the obtaining of this decision. Of secondary priority, but equally important, is the need for development of the mechanics or framework to implement action in this field. The ability of NATO to reach agreement in this difficult area would be a convincing demonstration to the USSR of Western determination, and would strengthen the negotiating position of the FRG in trade talks with both the GDR and the USSR.

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B-1

FEB 25 1960

In reply refer to: I-12745/60

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor

The attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides USCINCEUR with instructions with regard to the above subject and specifically informs him of those actions authorized under varying degrees of Soviet harassment.

It should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no reference in their instructions to the applicability of NSC 5604, subject: U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Aircraft. This policy authorizes "Hot Pursuit", that is, "In the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against U.S. aircraft outside Communist territory, those U.S. aircraft attacked or located in the immediate area of the attack may take against the Communist attacking force during the course of the attack aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible immediate pursuit of the Communist attacking force into hostile air space."

The Department of Defense has previously concluded that NSC 5604 does apply in the Berlin air corridors. The Joint Chiefs' recommended actions do not preclude a later use of this policy by the U.S. In fact, their statement that subsequent to Soviet harassment further instructions will be furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the next scheduled flight, would provide an opportunity for the U.S. Government to consider authorization of the "Hot Pursuit" actions of NSC 5604.

I have approved the recommended course of action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the draft instruction to USCINCEUR and transmitted these draft instructions to the Department of State for use in fully informing the President, at the time of his considering the approval of the tripartite agreement for resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor.

(Signed) John N. Irwin, II
John N. Irwin, II
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Prepared by Col JHSchofield/elm/25Feb60
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2 Incls
1. Tab A-Memo for SecDef fr JCS (JCSM-66-60) w/Encl
2. Tab B-Ltr to Sec/State

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I-12745/6
I-12748/1

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2/3.5 Germany

25 Feb 60

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FEB 2 5 1960

In reply refer to: I-12745/60

Dear Mr. Herter:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in anticipation of early approval by the President of the resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor, have prepared a warning instruction for dispatch to USCINCEUR (Inclosure).

The Department of Defense considers that, in addition to providing explicit instructions to USCINCEUR prior to resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor, the attached draft message informs the President more fully of these U.S. actions presently contemplated should the high altitude flights be subjected to secure Soviet harassment.

It is requested that the President be fully informed on this subject at the time the tripartite agreement for resumption of high altitude flights is submitted to him for approval.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
THOMAS S. GATES

1 Incl
Draft msg (I-12745/60)
(Cy 4)

Prepared by Col JHSchofield/elm/25 Feb 60
EurReg/ISA 3e853 Ext. 54812
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The Honorable Christian A. Herter
The Secretary of State
The Department of State

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cc: JCS (3)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JCSM-66-60

24 FEB 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the progress being made toward tripartite agreement to the resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor. In anticipation of approval by the President, a warning instruction has been prepared for dispatch to USCINCEUR.

2. It is believed explicit instructions should be given to USCINCEUR prior to resumption of such flights. The attached message is designed to serve this purpose.

3. In view of the guidance contained in a memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject: USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin, dated 9 May 1959, and the implications of applying NSC Policy 5604, dated 19 February 1959, to flights in the Berlin corridor, it is requested you secure the necessary approval for the attached message prior to dispatch to USCINCEUR.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARLEIGH BURKE,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Enclosure:
message

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE

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24 Feb 1960

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A-1

MAR 28 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Berlin (U)

Reference: State-Defense-JCS-CIA Study, "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin", dated 15 April 1959

Mr. Khrushchev has stated that unless a satisfactory agreement on Berlin is reached at the Summit meeting he will proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This would result in East German responsibility for land and air access to Berlin.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested on the following questions related to this situation and to the joint study on Berlin access referenced above:

a. Will the U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 be such as to permit implementation of contingency plans, accepting and being prepared for the risks of general war?

b. What actions are recommended be taken relating to the Berlin garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin in the event the USSR announces its firm intention to sign a separate peace treaty?

SIGNED
JAMES H. DOUGLAS
ACTING

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Rewritten by:
Secy Douglas/cja
28 Mar 60

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93144303

TOP SECRET

COVERING BRIEF

REFER TO: I-13,019/60

TO: The Secretary of Defense (Signed) John N. Irwin, II

FROM: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Problem: To secure a statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to U.S. ability to implement Berlin contingency planning.

Discussion: The report at Tab A was approved by the President on 23 April 1959 as a basis for further planning, with the caveat that implementation of the measures would be subject to later decision. The report lists "general war measures" as one of the four alternative courses of action (page 1) and states that "each of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force here considered would introduce the risk of general war with little warning" (page 6, para. B-9). In order that the Secretary of Defense may properly advise the Secretary of State and the President as to Defense support for the U.S. negotiating position at the Summit, it is desirable to secure the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to U.S. military posture in relation to Berlin contingency plans.

A general answer to the above question can be drawn up on the basis of NSC 5912, Part 1, Section II, pp. 1-2, wherein it is stated that current military capabilities assure that the United States and its Allies will prevail in a general war. However it is desirable to secure a statement specifically referring to Berlin contingency plans.

~~In addition it would be desirable to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the proposed letter to the Secretary of State previously forwarded to the Secretary of Defense under ISA Covering Brief I-12,574/60.~~

Recommendation: Signature of the attached memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab B).

Concurrences: None required.

Prep'd:Col. JETyler/msw
OASD/ISA-Eur Reg 3D-266/Ext 713
3-15-60 Distr: Cy 1&2 w/encls
Addee; 3-R&C; 4-Comeback; 5-ISA
Rdg.

Encls. 2
1. Tab A - Report "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin" (I-13,669/9)- cy #5 Ser "A"
2. Tab B - Proposed Memo for Chmn, JCS

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DATE 17 MAY 1994
CASE # 84-F-2319

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R+C

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)*
INTEROFFICE CONTROL SHEET

DATE: 3/15/60

LOG NUMBER: I-13,019/60

	TO:	INITIAL	FOR: INFORMATION	CONCURRENCE	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	ACTION	DISPOSITION
2	ASSISTANT SEC/DEF *(ISA)*					2		
1	MILITARY ADVISOR				1			
	DIRECTOR, MA EVALUATION							
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT							
	EXECUTIVE OFFICER							
	DEPUTY ASD							
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EUROPE							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NESA							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FAR EAST							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, WH							
	DIRECTOR, FOREIGN MIL. RIGHTS AFFAIRS							
	DIRECTOR, FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS							
	DEPUTY ASD/NSC & PLANS							
	DIRECTOR, NSC PLANS							
	DIRECTOR, OCB AFFAIRS							
	DIRECTOR, PLANNING							
	DIRECTOR OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE							
	DEPUTY DIRECTOR/MA							
	COMPTROLLER *(ISA)*							
	DIRECTOR, WPNS PRODUCTION & SALES							
	DIRECTOR, MA PLANNING							
	DIRECTOR, PROGRAMMING							
	DIRECTOR, MANPOWER & TNG							
	LEGAL ADVISOR							
3	RECORDS AND CONTROL *(ISA)*							3

SUBJECT: Berlin (U)

ORIGINATOR AND EXTENSION: Col. J. E. Tyler, USA J E Tyler
Ext. 71386

REMARKS

Recommend signature of attached Covering Brief, which is self-explanatory.

Frederic H. Miller
Frederic H. Miller
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, European Region

Coordination:
None Required

Upon removal of attachments this document becomes

UNCLASSIFIED

SD FORM 1 DEC 59 161

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JS
EUKNATO

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

A-2

JCSM-202-60

12 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1 13019/60 Col Tyler

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
OD/JS
17 MAY 1994
DATE
89-F-2318

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 28 March 1960, requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the U.S. military posture in the mid-summer of 1960, and actions recommended to be taken relating to the Berlin Garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that:

a. The U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans and the courses of action set forth in the State-Defense-JCS-CIA study, "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin," dated 15 April 1959, provided the assumptions on page 3 of the study are valid. The risk of general war is inherent in the use of military forces. In this connection, when and if it becomes evident that implementation of such plans is inevitable, certain political, economic, psychological and military measures should be taken to improve our military posture and to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war. The military measures should include, on a progressive basis, increased alert, unit deployments or dispersal, and use of emergency powers of the President to effect an appropriate degree of mobilization.

2

R-1
89-FOI-2318
93-TS-107
Document No. 2

b. In the event the USSR announces its firm intention to sign a separate peace treaty, there are no additional military actions to be taken relating to the Berlin Garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin, other than those that are currently foreseen in tripartite and unilateral plans which would be implemented at the appropriate time.

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Copy 2 of 9 copies each
2 pages series

1 13931/60

SEC DEF CONT NO. 481

3. It is realized that a delicate balance must be maintained between the implementation of military and non-military measures and the possibility of unduly alarming the nation. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it is essential that the United States convince the Soviets of our ability and determination to maintain our rights in Berlin in an effort to deter them from adverse actions and decisions based on a miscalculation of our capabilities and intentions. It would be most difficult to establish in the Soviet mind the U.S. determination to accept a general war as an alternative to the relinquishment of our rights, without making manifest preparations for such a possibility.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed
N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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(ASD) DSAO
~~TOP SECRET~~
08 MAR 25 9 21 AM
RECEIVED

EURNATO
JS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

A-3

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO PRIORITY						

FROM:

OSD WASH D C 162312Z May

TO:

DEFREPNAMA PARIS FRANCE

TOP SECRET 977271 FROM OASD(ISA) EXCLUSIVE [redacted] FOR IRWIN FROM KNIGHT. TOREPNAM 485

Reference JCS views on Berlin Contingency Planning, as contained in JCSM-202-60.

[redacted] Representatives of the Joint Staff have concurred with the following interpretation of JCSM-202-60. I am, however, clearing this interpretation tomorrow with the JCS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans provided the assumptions on page 3 of the 15 April 1959 study are valid.

The political, economic, psychological and military measures, referred to in the third sentence of paragraph 2a of reference, are not considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be essential to the military ability of the United States to carry out the military measures of the 15 April 1959 study. However, when and if it becomes

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OASD(ISA) DOCUMENT CONTROL
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T.S. No. 93-TS-107
Document 3

2

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR

WRITER		RELEASER
SYMBOL		SIGNATURE MAY 1960
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature of Signer)		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
PHONE: U. Tyler, USA	PAGE NR. / NR. OF PAGES	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		

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17 MAY 1994 89-F-2318
DATE CASE #

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

evident that implementation of contingency plans is inevitable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend those measures to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war and to improve U.S. military posture. The additional political, economic and psychological measures would probably be chosen from among those of the agreed 11 April 1949 analysis of non-military measures to induce the Soviet Union to remove obstructions to Western access to Berlin. The additional military measures would include those given in the last sentence of paragraph 2a of reference.

EURNATO
JS

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A-4

MAY 16 1960

REFER TO: I-13,966/60

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOUGLAS

SUBJECT: JCS Views on Berlin Contingency Planning

Attached for your information is a copy of a paper carried by Mr. Irwin on 12 May for possible discussion with Secretary Gates during the flight to Paris.

(Signed) Robert H. Knight
Robert H. Knight
Acting Assistant Secretary

Enclosure
Memo for Secy of Def
(Cy 1 of 1 cys Ser "B")

Prep'd:Col JETyler/msw 5/13/60
Eur Reg/Reg &NATO Affrs 3D-262
Original w/cc to ADDEE w/encl.;
Blue -R&C ISA; Yellow-Comeback;
White-ISA Reading

092 Berlin Summary

16 May 60

OASD(PA) DFOISR
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93-TS-107
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MAY 16 10 20 AM '60

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)*
INTEROFFICE CONTROL SHEET

DATE: 13 May 60

LOG NUMBER: I-13,966/60

	TO:	INITIAL	FOR: INFORMATION	CONCURRENCE	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	ACTION	DISPOSITION
1	ASSISTANT SEC/DEF *(ISA)*					1		
3	DEPUTY ASD							
7	SPECIAL ASSISTANTS							
1	EXECUTIVE OFFICER							
	DEPUTY ASD/POLITICO-MIL AFFAIRS							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EUROPE							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NESA							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FAR EAST							
	REGIONAL DIRECTOR, WH							
	DIRECTOR, FOREIGN MIL RIGHTS AFFAIRS							
	DIRECTOR, FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS							
	DEPUTY ASD/DISARMAMENT AND MIL AFFAIRS							
	DIRECTOR, DISARMAMENT & UN AFFAIRS							
	DEPUTY ASD/NSC & PLANS							
	DIRECTOR, NSC AFFAIRS							
	DIRECTOR, OCB AFFAIRS							
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	DIRECTOR, MA EVALUATION							
	LEGAL ADVISOR							
	PUBLIC AFFAIRS							
2	RECORDS AND CONTROL *(ISA)*							2

SUBJECT: JCS Views on Berlin Contingency Planning

ORIGINATOR AND EXTENSION: Col. J. E. Tyler, USA Ext. 71386

REMARKS

Recommend signature of attached memorandum.

Frederic H. Miller
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, European Region

SD FORM 1 APR 60 161 — PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

G41744

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JCSM-202-60

FROM	Twining,N.F.(JCS) I-13019/60				LOG I-13931/60et
C.L.	Top Secret				DATE 5/12/60
D.D.	C92 Germany(Berlin)				Cy 4
C.R.	334 JCS				Attached as Encl (Tab A) to
C.R.	Action Cy 4				I-13,943/60 which was attached
REF.	D/Europe	B&C			to I-13,966/60 as Encl.-Memo for
I.D.	5/12/60	5/13/60			Mr. Douglas for sign ASD/ISA 5/13
D.D.	5/26/60				

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)
Cys 4 & 5 of Memo for Sec Def FRS 431
Cy 4 routed above
Cy 5 (1)D/ASD(2)DASD/DRMA(1.) B&C

481

SIGNATURE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROUTING SLIP

	TO	INITIAL	ADV ACTION COPY TO	INFO COPY TO
	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE			✓
	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE			✓
	ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY			
	SECRETARY OF THE ARMY			
	SECRETARY OF THE NAVY			
	SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE			
	DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING			
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(Comp)*			
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(H&M)*			
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(P&I)*			
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(S&L)*			
1	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(ISA)*		✓	
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(PA)*			
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(MP&R)*			
	GENERAL COUNSEL			
	DIRECTOR, ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY			
	ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(AE)*			
	ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(Special Operations)*			
	ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(LA)*			
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT			

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INFORMATION COPY	
FOR	
PREPARATION OF DRAFT REPLY FOR WHITE HOUSE SIGNATURE AND TRANSMITTAL LETTER	
PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SIGNATURE	
PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SIGNATURE	
NOTE AND FORWARD	
APPROPRIATE ACTION	1
REPLY DIRECT *(Forward copy of reply to Secretary of Defense files)*	
INFORMATION AND RETENTION	
INFORMATION AND RETURN FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FILES	
DATA ON WHICH TO BASE A REPLY	
COMMENT AND/OR RECOMMENDATION	
COORDINATION WITH	
PRIORITY	

REMARKS **Refs**

Cy #4 attached as encl. (Tab A) to I-13,943/60 which was attached to I-13,966/60 as an Encl - Memo for Mr. Douglas for sign ASD/ISA 5/13/60 - Memo prep'd Col. Tyler Regional & NATO Affairs, European Region 5/13/60

[redacted] I-13951/60

SUSPENSE DATE	ROUTING DATE	CCS CONTROL NO.	
None	May 12 1960	481	

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FROM: OSD X-I-13931/60 I-14239/60

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET DATE 16 May 60

TO: EXECUTIVE FOR MR. IRWIN FILE: 092 Germany

C. R. TOREPHAM 485

C. R. DEF 977271

REFERRED	DEP AIF		ASD
ISSUE DATE	17 May 60		
RUE DATE	Cy #3		

TOREPHAM 485 DEF 977271 - DZH 162312Z - 17 May 1960
FM OSD to DEPREPHAMA PARIS - TOREPHAM 485 fm Knight to Irwin - ref JCS views on Berlin Contingency Planning /slb JCSM-202-60 (I-13931/60)

Leave attached

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SD FORM 1 JUL 58 59 (9 PARTS) CONTROL REFERENCE

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6/3/60

Inez:

The attached "crept" into R&C from D/Eur yesterday. I don't know where it came from before it got there. The snowflake is oddly typed.

I am adding an "I" number for reference, and sending to you in case Mr. Irwin wishes to retain this.

Thanks:

Margaret T.

file R&C
Per Inez
6/3/60

A 9407

A-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE NORTH ATLANTIC & MEDITERRANEAN AREAS

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

MSG NO: TOREPNAM 485 PRIORITY RCD: 170215Z MAY 60
DEF 977271
DTG: 162312Z

FROM: OSD WASHDC

TO: DEFREPNAMA PARIS FRANCE

TOREPNAM 485. FROM OASD(ISA) EXCLUSIVE FOR IRWIN FROM KNIGHT.

Reference JCS views on Berlin contingency planning, as contained in JCSM-202-60.

Representatives of the Joint Staff have concurred with the following interpretation of JCSM-202-60. I am, however, clearing this interpretation tomorrow with the JCS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that U.S. military posture in midsummer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans provided the assumptions on page 3 of the 15 April 1959 study are valid.

The political, economic, psychological and military measures, referred to in the third sentence of paragraph 2a of reference, are not considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be essential to the military ability of the United States to carry out the military measures of the 15 April 1959 study. However, when and if it becomes evident that implementation of contingency plans is inevitable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend those measures to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war and to improve U.S. military posture. The additional political, economic and psychological measures would probably be chosen from among those of the agreed 11 April 1959 analysis of non-military measures to induce the Soviet Union to remove obstructions to Western access to Berlin. The additional military measures would include those given in the last sentence of paragraph 2a of reference.

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CASE # 88-F-88
DATE

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION:
Mr. Irwin

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Copy Number: 9
Page 1 of 1 Page
TS Control Number: 1039 CONTROL NO: REP 2443
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JS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL A-6

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ACTION PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO			X	OSD		

FROM: OSD WASHINGTON D C 172402 May

TO: DEFREPHANA PARIS FRANCE

CONFIDENTIAL of 977329 FROM OASD (ISA) EXCLUSIVE

FOR IRWIN FROM KNIGHT. TOREPHAM 488 . Reference TOREPHAM 485.

Joint Chiefs of Staff confirm interpretation of JCSM 202-60 given in reference.

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89-F-2318 CASE #

3

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Case No. 89-FOI-2318
T.S. No. 93-TS-107
Document No. 5

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DATE	TIME
MONTH May	YEAR 1960

WRITER

SYMBOL: OASD/ISA-Reg & NATO Affrs/Eur Reg

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): Col. J. E. Tyler, USA

PHONE | PAGE NR. | NR. OF PAGES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: (Signed) Robert H. Knight

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: (Signed) Robert H. Knight

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

EXCLUSIVE

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ACTION PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE X	OSD		
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FROM: OSD WASH D C

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Distr: Joint Staff, Gen. Fields

TO: DEFREPNAMA PARIS FRANCE

DEF XX 977271

TOP SECRET FROM OASD(ISA)/FOR IRWIN FROM KNIGHT. TOREPNAM 485

EXCLUSIVE

Reference JCS views on Berlin Contingency Planning, as contained in JCSM-202-60.

~~Discussion of reference with Joint Staff establishes following interpretation~~ Representatives of the Joint Staff have concurred with the following interpretation of JCSM-202-60. I am, however, clearing this interpretation tomorrow with the JCS.

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DATE	TIME
MONTH MAY	YEAR 1960

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17 MAY 1994
DATE
P9-F-2318
CASE #

WRITER

SYMBOL: OASD(ISA)Eur Reg NATO Affairs

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): Col. J. E. Tyler, USA

PHONE: x-71386 PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

Robert H. Knight
Deputy Assistant Secretary

4

DD FORM 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

DEF 977271 (May 60)

PAGE NR. 1

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013

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET~~

evident that implementation of contingency plans is inevitable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend those measures to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war and to improve U.S. military posture. The additional political, economic and psychological measures would probably be chosen from among those of the agreed 11 April 1959 analysis of non-military measures to induce the Soviet Union to remove obstructions to Western access to Berlin. The additional military measures would include those given in the last sentence of paragraph 2a of reference.

SYMBOL | PAGE | NR OF | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | INITIAL

ORIGIN: SCTY ~~KNIGHT~~ (OSD)
DISTR: GEN FIELDS (JCS)
DEF 977271 (May 60) DTG: 162312Z lvd/4

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3

DRAFT MESSAGE

TO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

INFO: CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY

USCOB BERLIN GERMANY

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET From JCS.

Ref a. Message Embassy Bonn to State No. 1580, info Paris No. 536, dated 18 Feb 1960;
b. DAIR/P(45)71 Second Revise, dated 22 Oct 1956;
c. Message USCINCEUR to Hq USAF, info Chairman, JCS, No. EC 9-4281, DTG 141101Z Aug 59.

1. In view of ref a, make preliminary preparations for resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor above 10,000 feet by C-130 aircraft within 24 hours after receipt of execution order from the JCS. Following guidance applies:

a. Conduct flights under presently agreed quadripartite rules for air corridors contained in ref b.

b. Conduct flights at the most efficient cruise altitude of the C-130 above 10,000 feet on a regularly weekly schedule as outlined in ref c. In the event sufficient lead time is given conduct such flights on the first Wednesday after receipt of execution order and each Wednesday thereafter; otherwise, within the time limit specified in the execution order and each week thereafter. Essential that flights are maintained on a regular and continuous schedule without restriction to visual flight conditions.

c. In the event of Soviet/GDR interference with these flights such as:

(1) Harassment by fighter passes or formation flying:

(a) Continue flight, and ignore efforts to divert aircraft from corridor;

(b) Continue scheduled flights;

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OSD/JS
17 MAY 1994 89-F-2318
DATE CASE #

SecDef Cont. No. 208
Z-12748/60

(c) Anticipate protest will be made at the appropriate level.

(2) Ramming - intentional or unintentional:

(a) Prepare to continue scheduled flights;

(b) Anticipate protest will be made at the appropriate level;

(c) Further instructions will be issued by the JCS prior to the next scheduled flight.

(3) Soviet and/or GDR aircraft or AAA fire across nose of or at the transport aircraft:

(a) Instruct aircraft commander to take whatever action is necessary for safety of aircraft and crew;

(b) Prepare to continue scheduled flights;

(c) Anticipate protest will be made at the appropriate level;

(d) Further instructions will be issued by the JCS prior to the next scheduled flight.