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4

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Berlin Planning, East German Uprising (1907/478 State EG2 Western Attitude) and (1907/487 State EGU-1 Relationship Between Uprising and Military Operations) (TS)

1. PROBLEM: To discuss with General Norstad the status of General Planning concerning a possible uprising in East Berlin/East Germany and U.S. or Allied reaction thereto.

2. MAJOR ISSUE: Whether current unilateral military plans for intervention are adequate and feasible. Does current political guidance provide suitable alternatives? Should the subject of allied assistance to revolutionary East Germans, in the absence of Allied military operations, be re-opened?

3. JOINT STAFF POSITION: Not applicable.

4. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT AND DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS: JCS stated (Tab 5) and Sec Def supported (Tab 6) to Sec State that the United States should not have a pre-determined no-intervention policy. Planning and resource development should proceed to provide for the option to intervene in an East German uprising. Secretary Rusk's views (Tab 7).

5. RECOMMENDED POSITION: First State Policy Paper (Tab 8) generally ignores JCS view in that a passive policy is pre-determined for an uprising occurring in the absence of military operations. CINCEUR expresses no problem in implementing. American Embassy Bonn seriously questions (Tab 11) the current quadripartite policy. CINCEUR's views on merits of policy not known. Should subject come up, determine Gen Norstad's views on desirability of attempting to re-open question of prior determination of non-intervention. Second State Policy Paper (Tab 9) would provide guidance for Allied planning to support East German uprising which might occur during military operations undertaken in the Berlin issue. CINCEUR's views unknown. Air Staff considers USCINCEUR OPLAN 200-16 (Tab 10) adequate but that unilateral action infeasible. Support need for Quadripartite plan. See Talking Paper at Tab 2. Background Paper at Tab 3.

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Colonel Cosby/mel/77016
23 January 1962

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BACKGROUND PAPER

on

BERLIN PLANNING, EAST GERMAN UPRISING

- The Dept of State Paper No. BQD-EG-2 (JCS 1907/478) (Tab 8) on "Western Attitude in Event of an Uprising in East Germany/East Berlin: outlines courses of action that the Quadripartite Powers should take in the absence of military operations and in the absence of a decision to intervene

  - Paper covers intelligence and rules of conduct -

    - The four governments have approved the paper and the quadripartite forces have acknowledged receipt of this guidance

    - Paper generally ignores JCS views (Tab 5) in that a passive policy is pre-determined

    - No difficulties are foreseen in implementing the rules of conduct -

  - A chronological listing of messages pertaining to BQD-EG-2

	FROM	TO	DTG	SUMMARY
1.	JCS	CINCEUR	021746Z Dec	Transmits "Rules of Conduct," extracted from BQD-EG-2 (Revised) as a guide for issuance of instructions to Tripartite and FRG Personnel. Points out that messages sent to the three Ambassadors at Bonn and the three Chiefs of Missions in Berlin. Requests that action requisite to the capability for implementing the "Rules of Conduct" be accomplished in coordination with Ambassador Dowling and JCS notified whether any difficulties foreseen in implementation.
2.	CINCEUR	LO BONN	041430Z Dec	Passes JCS 2442 and requests comments thereon by 8 Dec 61.
3.	CINCEUR	CINCUSAREUR	060910Z Dec	Directs preparation of instructions to implement "Rules of Conduct." Dissemination of JCS 2442 authorized to degree considered necessary.
4.	JCS	LIVE OAK	071650Z Dec	Ambassadorial Group has approved BQD-EG-2. Requests Gen Norstad's comments on BQD-EG- be forwarded Ambassadorial Group.

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	FROM	TO	DTG	SUMMARY
5.	BONN	STATE CINCEUR	091210Z Dec	AmEmb Bonn comments on intelligence estimates and rules of conduct. Points out shortcomings and "Entertains other doubts about premises of document. These will be subject of further communications. Signed Dowling - (Tab 11)
6.	CINCUSAREUR	CINCEUR	12547Z Dec	Draft instructions prepared by CINCUSAREUR in response CINCEUR ECJC 9-9795'. Sees no difficulties in implementing the Rules of Conduct.
7.	CINCEUR	JCS	181800Z Dec	CINCEUR interim reply to Item 1 above. No difficulties are foreseen in implementi Rules of Conduct.
8.	JCS	LIVE OAK	192059Z Dec	Advises LIVE OAK that BQD-EG-2 is official quadripartite document to be implemented and used as a basis for planning.
9.	BONN	CINCEUR	201700Z Dec	Amemb Bonn tentative comments on USAREUR draft instructions contained in message at Item 6 above.
10.	BERLIN	STATE	211200Z Dec	Clay to Rusk commenting on instructions relating to uprisings along borders. (Tab 12)
11.	BONN	CINCEUR	211800Z Dec	Bonn recommends that CINCEUR transmit instructions contained in CINCUSAREUR SX 7500 (Item 6 above) to State.
12.	BONN	STATE	220800Z Dec	Amemb Bonn advised their agreement with Foreign Office to begin quadripartite discussions on BQD-EG-2 starting 3 Jan 62.
3.	CINCUSAREUR	USCOB USAB	231117Z Dec	CINCUSAREUR states "I feel the instructions contained in reference cable (Item 6 above) are sound as general guidance in the event of such incidents."
14.	USCOB	CINCUSAREUR	241330Z Dec	Response to preceding message. USCOB states problems of incidents during holiday season has been discussed with other Commandants and they are prepared to deal with it.
15.	BONN	STATE	5 Jan 62	Points out that results of 3 January quadri partite meeting on BQD-EG-2 unproductive as French Representatives without instructions. Additionally, German Foreign Office not ready to discuss implementation of paper. Embassy also points out its reservations on BQD-EG-2.

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FROM	TO	DTG	SUMMARY
16. JCS	CINCEUR	102238Z Jan	For Gen Norstad from Gen Lemnitzer. Requests instructions issued by you and CINCUSAREUR in implementation of basis State Department Document BQD-EG-2.
17. BONN	STATE	111700Z Jan	Embassy was informed by FRG Foreign Office that FRG not yet established position on BQD-EG-2, hence discussions will have to be deferred until "late January."

- The Dept of State Paper No. BQD-EGU-1 (JCS 1907/487) (Tab 9) concerning "Relationship between a possible uprising in East Germany and/or East Berlin and Possible Allied Military Operations related to Berlin" was drafted by the U.S. element of the East German Sub-group as a follow-on paper to provide a basis for further consideration of the problem by the Ambassadorial Group - copies sent to U.S. embassies in Bonn and Moscow, the U.S. Mission in Berlin and USCINCEUR for comments
  - Paper covers advantages and disadvantages of stimulating resistance in East Germany to cause the Soviets to relax tensions regarding Berlin
  - Throughout the paper reference is made to Allied military authorities and Allied planning
- Two major paragraphs
  - Paragraph 22 - Military. Following a political decision - would require Allied military authorities to provide assistance to support ar uprising overtly
  - Paragraph 26 - Planning. Would require Allies to plan for dealing overtly with the East German population and defecting East German forces during Allied military operations

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Talking Paper

on

BERLIN PLANNING, EAST GERMAN UPRISING

- The U.S. Plan (USCINCEUR OPLAN 200-16) to support any revolutionary outbreak in East Germany is considered adequate for unilateral U S. action.
  - 200-16 provides following courses of action:
    - "A" - provide logistic support from stocks available in the theater
    - "B" - deploy U.S. Army special forces to assist revolutionary forces
    - "C" - direct military intervention by U.S. military forces
      - Degree and order of magnitude dependent upon Soviet/GDR reaction
    - Forces available
      - All forces assigned to EUCOM component commanders plus CONUS based augmentation
    - But unilateral U.S. action is not considered feasible or desirable
- We need quadripartite planning and participation to support an uprising effectively
  - No tripartite or quadripartite plans are in existence to support an uprising in East Germany
  - The U.S. unilateral plan requires at least Allied approval to implement and assumes UK, France and FRG will make available necessary assets and facilities. This assumption should be replaced by firm quadripartite plans
  - With planned Allied support, probability of success would be much greater
  - For the common good and mutual solidarity of the quadripartite powers, plans should be expeditiously developed to support any East German uprising

Recommended Action:

- CINCEUR's views should be determined with regard to
  - Reopening question of present policy for non-intervention in the absence of military operations, and
  - Attempting to institute action for quadripartite planning in this regard
  - Recognizing
    - Possible Sec Def reluctance

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- Sec State's earlier implied rejection
- Obvious probable difficulties with UK and possibly French
- (Not a question of preventing encouragement to East Germans to rise up -- this could be bad)

- Should CINCEUR feel strongly that action be undertaken
  - Recommend JCS reopen question with Sec Def and opt for strong representation to State
    - To adopt policy of no prior determination of non-intervention
    - Undertake negotiations with 4 powers to develop quadripartite plan.

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JS-0348

Sub BQD-Military 18

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

International Security Affairs
Refer to: I-25097/62

22 January 1962

MEETING OF MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP
3:00 P.M., 17 January 1962

Participants

United States
Mr. Nitze, Chairman
General Gray, JCS
Admiral Lee, ISA
Colonel Showalter, ISA
Colonel Meacham, ISA
Colonel Armstrong, ISA
Colonel Schofield, ISA
Colonel Preer, SG, NATO
Mr. Ausland, State
Mr. Day, State

Germany
Dr. Wieck
General Steinhoff
Colonel Schwerdtpheger
Captain Guggenberger
Lt. Cdr. Krug

United Kingdom
Lord Hood
Sir George Mills
Mr. Brooke
Colonel Duncan

France
Mr. Winckler
Admiral Duequet
General Ezanno
Mr. Pelen
Colonel Honou



Single Commander for Berlin

Mr. Nitze opened the meeting by announcing the agenda items, the first of which dealt with the problem of a single Allied Commander for Berlin on which two messages had recently been received from LIVE OAK, SHLO 9-00045 and SHLO 9-00052. He proposed that the subject be taken up at a future meeting; in the meantime a Working Subgroup would clarify the problem and the positions of the governments. All agreed to this proposal.

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Col Jenkins - XPS-PL
(30 JAN-02)
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TSC 8-3-96

NATO-Tripartite Relationships Paper

Mr. Nitze noted that the FRG Government had agreed to accept the French amendment regarding German forces. We are now prepared to forward the paper to the four Permanent Representatives in Paris. A draft of a transmittal message was distributed. Mr. Ausland and Colonel Meacham were to meet with members of the other delegations on Thursday, 18 January to attain a coordinated draft. All agreed to this procedure.

Military Countermeasures

Mr. Nitze noted that the Working Subgroup had reached quadripartite agreement at the Military Subcommittee level as represented in the new paper BQD-M-20 (Revised 15 January 1962) and that it was proposed to transmit this paper to the Contingency Coordinating Sub-Group for its use. Lord Hood remarked that the measures do not imply commitment by governments at this time. All agreed to the proposed procedure.

Ground Access Status Chart

Mr. Nitze called attention to the paper "Status of Quadripartite Ground Operational Planning, as of December 21, 1961", BQD-M-21, which he proposed be transmitted to LIVE OAK for comments. It would be considered only a U.S. draft at this time.

Mr. Winckler said he had asked his government about the proposal to transmit the paper to LIVE OAK but had as yet received no answer. Mr. Nitze asked if we should wait until word was received from Paris. Mr. Winckler replied that he could see no reason why it should not be transmitted now as a U.S. draft only.

Lord Hood added that this could be done, but he asked what would be the purpose of sending it?

Admiral Lee answered that this would provide a check for accuracy and might also save valuable time in the long run.

Lord Hood said that we do not want LIVE OAK to embark on planning based on this chart without the positions of the governments; therefore, their comments would be a basis for further quadripartite discussion here.

Mr. Nitze then summarized that we would send the paper as a U.S. draft for LIVE OAK comments and as a basis for further quadripartite discussion in Washington. All agreed to this procedure.

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Air Access: JACK PINE Rules of Engagement

Mr. Nitze then asked if there were any other questions to be raised.

Lord Hood said that he had a question as to what was to be done next regarding General Norstad's message on expanding the JACK PINE Rules of Engagement.

Admiral Lee said that the subject is under discussion in the Air Access Subgroup and that all delegations have not yet received their instructions on air-to-air rules, specifically, the French.

Mr. Winckler said that he had proposed in the Contingency Coordinating Group that purely technical problems of air access could be more efficiently discussed in LIVE OAK than here.

Mr. Ausland asked if this would include the proposed amendments to the JACK PINE plan. Mr. Winckler replied that it would. General Gray commented that LIVE OAK had requested this be handled here in Washington.

Lord Hood said that the next step should be for us to discuss the Norstad messages in the Military Subcommittee. There will be one or two political questions on the part of the U.K. When we can determine the governmental positions, it could be referred back to LIVE OAK to finalize the wording on technical aspects, but we need to provide LIVE OAK with some direction from here.

Mr. Nitze summarized that we should try to settle the broader issues here before the narrow technical issues can be spelled out. The problem will be further discussed in the Air Access Subgroup and then taken up at the next Military Subcommittee Meeting.

Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

Mr. Nitze referred to the last meeting of 10 January 1962 at which he had outlined U.S. thinking on the above subject and on which there was a discussion of the strategic situation, including the effect of the strategic balance on Soviet thinking and restraints. He noted it had been agreed to have several sessions to think the subject through and then to try and prepare a paper to send to the four respective delegations in the North Atlantic Council. He invited the other delegations to comment on the previous discussions.

Lord Hood said that he had not received instructions from London, so his comments should not be construed as UK commitments. He agreed that the Soviets would be constrained not to initiate nuclear war, but the Soviets would believe the West to be similarly constrained and so they would use their conventional superiority to counter actions the West might take.

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Mr. Winckler said that the French views were also preliminary. The French agreed that the U.S. concepts were generally in line with the Western policy of showing determination to the Soviets, thereby causing them to keep Berlin access open. He noted that the question of being committed in advance to a specific progression of events must be left open. He raised questions on how the four phase concept would progress without overlapping, especially considering such an operation as the expanded JACK PINE plans. He was concerned about situations of partial blockage of access and where naval countermeasures would fit in the sequence of phases. He said the French still believed that air actions were less risky than ground actions.

All delegations wanted to know more about General Norstad's planning for expanded operations. Admiral Lee gave a brief outline of the preliminary BERCON plans for expanded air, ground and naval action on which SHAPE and the NATO subordinate commanders were currently working.

Dr. Wieck then presented the preliminary thinking of the FRG which was also in the process of formulating its positions. He agreed on the desirability of a single concept coordinating all measures and plans relating to Berlin. The FRG has also concluded that the Soviets will be under restraints because of the nuclear balance and because, while West Berlin is of vital interest to the West, it is only a political objective for the Soviets. But he cautioned that Soviet restraints might not hold up if Eastern Europe should be jeopardized, for this area is of vital interest to them. He believed that the Soviets might doubt Western determination to use its nuclear superiority, so this determination should be made absolutely clear to the Soviets. He questioned how much of a build-up of NATO forces would be involved in the U.S. concept. He felt that expanded conventional operations in phase III might lead quickly to nuclear operations in phase IV. He again alluded to the desirability of naval countermeasures as a means of bringing pressure on the Soviets outside the sensitive area of Central Europe. Finally, he asked whether the U.S. had a draft paper giving more details about the four phase concept.

Mr. Nitze said that the U.S. had intended to table a draft paper in the fourth or fifth meeting. In the meantime, a paper would be prepared for the next meeting presenting U.S. views on the Soviet-Western nuclear balance and an assessment of the implications stemming therefrom. It was agreed by all that because of the sensitivity of the discussions on Berlin strategy, detailed written dissemination of the meetings would be undesirable.

The meeting adjourned at 5:00 P.M.

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Talking Paper for the JCS for SECDEF - General Norstad - JCS Meeting 25 Jan 62.

Subject: Status of Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1. US Planning:

US contingency planning for Berlin is based on JCS 1907/411, dated 28 Sep 61, wherein the JCS promulgated a Program of Plans to the commanders of unified and specified commands. It listed 67 courses of action, world-wide, by which a wide variety of military pressure could be brought to bear on the Bloc when and as directed Twenty-four of these actions are applicable directly in Germany. The remaining 43 are applicable in other areas or world-wide (e.g. maritime harassment of Bloc shipping).

CINCs were directed to prepare specific plans as appropriate to implement appropriate courses of action. Their responses, and the status of JCS review are tabulated in Enclosure A

2. Tri-Partite Planning (Live Oak): Contingency planning specifically for Berlin is being done both in a NATO context (below) and by the three Western Occupying Powers. The latter involves planning for three scales of ground action, up to Division size, and several courses of air action, all related to air and ground access to Berlin Live Oak plans contain no provisions for employment of nuclear weapons. Status of planning as known here (as of 27 Dec 61) is tabulated in Enclosure B.

3. NATO Planning (BERCON): Planning for expanded action in connection with Berlin is being done in the NATO context. The SHAPE staff is drafting outline plans for 3 air, 4 ground, and 4 maritime actions as indicated in Enclosure C. All these plans contain provision for nuclear operations if directed. It is not clearly known here how or whether General Norstad intends to make these plans available to US military authorities. It is understood that the NATO Standing Group is preparing instructions to the principal NATO Commanders - SACEUR, SACLANT, CINCCHAN - to submit their detailed supporting plans concurrently to the Standing Group and the MOD's. After "appraisal" of these plans, the Standing Group will submit them to the NAC.

Approved by: _____ Director, J-3

Talking Paper prepared by: Col U.G. Gibbons, USA
Ops Plans Div/Combat
Plans Br/x77254

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Enclosure B

STATUS OF LIVE OAK PLANNING

(27 December 1961)

Name	Operation	Status
FREE STYLE	Ground Probe Convoy	Completed (West to East)
BACK STROKE	(Platoon)	Under Preparation (East to West)
TRADE WIND	Battalion Combat	Completed (West to East)
LUCKY STRIKE	Team	Under Preparation (East to West)
JUNE BALL	Division Size Force/ Air Support	Under Preparation
JACK PINE	(a) Airlifts: Civil Garrison TRIFLE PLAY	Completed Evacuation
	(b) Probe (Air)	Completed
	(c) Air Tactical Operations	Completed except new proposed air-to-air rules of engagement under consideration by Ambassadorial Group. Proposed air-to-ground rules of engagement have been submitted by LIVE OAK to the Ambassadorial Group.
CLOUD CAPER	Crew Substitution Plan	Completed. Extension of JACK PINE, providing for substitution of military crews for civilian crews on civil aircraft, has been submitted by LIVE OAK, and is under consideration by the Ambassadorial Group.

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ENCLOSURE C

NATO BERLIN CONTINGENCY (BERCON) PLANS

AIR OPERATIONS:

BERCON ALPHA I -- Provides for large scale fighter escort in Corridor 3 with forces up to 3 wings Has a nuclear annex

BERCON ALPHA II - Provides for a non-nuclear air battle for local air superiority over East Germany. Has a nuclear annex.

BERCON BRAVO -- Provides for nuclear demonstrations on a small number of nuclear targets (up to 5). For demonstration purposes rather than military effects.

GROUND OPERATIONS:

BERCON CHARLIE I- Provides for a reinforced division attack along Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn to a penetration depth of not over 20 miles. Has a nuclear annex.

BERCON CHARLIE II-Provides for a 2-division envelopment attack on the Kassel salient Has a nuclear annex.

BERCON CHARLIE III -- Provides for a corps attack along autobahn to the Elbe. Has a nuclear annex.

BERCON CHARLIE IV -- Provides for a 3-division attack in the Thuringer Wald to straighten lines in that area Has a nuclear annex.

NAVAL OPERATIONS:

BERCON DELTA I -- Provides for surveillance and control of shipping in areas adjacent to Europe and European straits. Has a nuclear annex.

BERCON DELTA II - Provides for control [redacted] Has a nuclear annex.

BERCON DELTA III- Provides for control [redacted] Has a nuclear annex.

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BERCON DELTA IV - Provides for boarding, search and arrest of Bloc shipping. Has a nuclear annex

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REPORT BY THE J-5

by the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

US VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (U)

References. a. JCS 1907/440 — PL
b. JCS 1907/454 — PL
c. JCS 1907/491 — PL ✓
d. JCS 1907/492 — PL
e. JCS 2305/698 — info

Note by the Secretaries

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US VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a memorandum* from the Assistant Secretary of Drfense (ISA) to prepare detailed specific suggested changes to a background paper, subject as above, for the use of the members of the Quadripartite Military Subcommittee.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The US policy on military actions to be taken in a Berlin conflict was approved by the President and is contained in NSAM No. 109** dated 23 October 1961.

3. The rationale paper "NATO Military Policy in the Berlin Crisis" on which comments were submitted on 15 November 1961*** and "the Remarks by Secretary McNamara" presented to the NATO Ministers on 14 December 1961**** provide an expanded discussion of this policy.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the Quadripartite Military Subcommittee advises that a primary purpose of the background paper is to provide further US views on Phase III of the sequence of action in NSAM No. 109** in order to get the Allies to agree to the US proposed action.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The draft prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), "US Views of the Strategic Environment and Its Implications" is overly optimistic and contains a series of unfounded military judgments.

* Attachment to JCS 1907/491
** Attachment to JCS 1907/440
*** JCS 1907/454
**** Attachment to JCS 2305/698
\# Enclosure to JCS 1907/492

USAIRR TSC # 3-96

6. The suggested revision appended hereto proposes changes which would remove the overly optimistic tone from the draft paper prepared in Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and is founded on sound military judgment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure hereto, together with its Appendix, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

COORDINATION

Agency	Concur or Nonconcur	Name	Reference
J-3			
Army		BGEN Hutchin	
Navy		CAPT Caldwell	
Air Force		MGEN Carpenter, III	
Marine Corps		BGEN Anderson	

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US View of the Strategic Environment and Its Implications (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum*, dated __February 1962, _____, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted preliminary views on the draft background paper "US View of the Strategic Enviroment and its Implications".

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a more detailed review of the subject background paper. The results of this review are contained in a revised draft appended hereto. It is recommended thatthis revised draft be used by members of the Quadripartite Military Subcommittee in the current discussions of the sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict.

* To be inserted when the paper is signed

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

REVISED DRAFT

U. S. VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (U)

The way the US perceives the strategic environment and what that implies for Alliance politico-military actions in Europe was stated by Secretaries McNamara and Rusk before the NATO ministers on 14 December 1961. While addressed to the overall situation, these judgments not only are applicable to the immediate, concrete problem of Berlin but in fact describe its essential backdrop. In separate conversations with the other three quadripartite Ministers of Defense, the US Secretary of Defense has pointed out the US view of the relationship between the general setting and Berlin. The material following is intended to make easily accessible to those few quadripartite officials directly concerned with the Military Sub-Committee the US judgments as already expressed bilaterally and to NATO Ministers. Security sensitivity of these central strategic judgment [illegible] suggests discretion in their use.

The Balance of Forces

In nuclear strike capability, the USSR has today is estimated to have relatively few ICBMs, a moderate number of long-range bombers ~~force that is not large~~, and a modest number of submarine-launched missiles capable of attack on North America. Being few in relation to the critical military targets which Soviets interests should consider for attack call for hitting, these present only a limited threat to our nuclear land based striking force ~~based in the US~~ or those deployed at sea. Since the Soviet strike force is today primarily bombers, we would expect to have N more than adequate warning of any sizeable attack and could alert our forces. The Soviet force is increasing, especially in numbers of missiles and in the yield of missile warheads and bombs. But we are improving the size, dispersal, hardening, and mobility

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of our own strike force at such a rate that we will have, a steadily growing force emerging even after a Soviet strike, a substantial nuclear capability for attacking ready to visit nuclear destruction on the USSR.

Against the European NATO area the Soviet nuclear strike capability is indeed formidable, comprising several hundred each of missile launchers and missiles, and jet bombers of medium ranges, as well as and shorter-range fighters. and missiles. However, the use of these forces, in the near term, even in conjunction with a first strike on the United States, cannot would not alter the US ability to mount an overwhelming a decisive counter-attack by the substantially intact surviving US strategic nuclear forces.

Soviet ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, and bombers are vulnerable to attack, being deployed at fixed, soft bases. Although Soviet air defenses are extensive, we are confident that we have sufficient knowledge of their locations and their performance limitations to avoid or neutralize them can penetrate them successfully. Despite intensive Soviet efforts to develop anti-missile defenses, it is not believed that the USSR does not have has an operational capability against ballistic missiles at the present time and it is unlikely to achieve anything beyond a token capability at least for some time to come. that they will achieve one at an early date.

By contrast, the Allies have available a large and diversified nuclear arsenal which provides adequate to provide a decided advantage in both external strategic delivery systems and nuclear weapons of practically every category. Moreover this superiority is growing and we are determined that it this superiority shall be maintained. Our strategic forces include 50 operational ICBMs, and close to 1700 heavy and medium bombers, including the V-force, and available carrier based

aircraft. In addition, 80 operational POLARIS missiles and 90 IRBMs are deployed. Further, NATO now has a ~~vast~~ growing arsenal of [tactical] aircraft and missiles in ~~the~~ its tactical nuclear strike forces. We have good reason to believe that our stockpile and diversification of nuclear weapons ~~for delivery by this extensive system~~ is ~~of~~ significantly ~~for~~ greater ~~magnitude and diversification~~ than that of the Soviet Union. ~~We have tens of thousands of warhead, ranging from a fraction of one kiloton to the largest size for which we now see any military uses.~~

~~Even more important than our numerical superiority is~~ ~~the fact that~~ The over-all NATO nuclear posture of the West, including varied and dispersed forces external to the European continent, is ~~far less~~ not as [vulnerable] susceptible to neutralization by enemy attack ~~than~~ as is the Soviet system, ~~Our~~ since this diversified strength is deployed to strike Russia from ~~every~~ many directions, and much of it is remote from the Soviet Union. ~~In contrast, theirs is centralized and more easily reached. Our strength is better protected, more mobile, more dispersed, more diversified and generally more advanced technically than theirs.~~

In particular, the external nuclear forces of the Alliance ~~have a great and growing~~ are constantly increasing their capacity to survive surprise attack, ~~gained through~~ by such measures as a 15-minute ground alert for half the US bomber force, airborne alerts, early warning systems, hardened and dispersed ICBM sites, and deployment of the POLARIS submarines with their ability to stay submerged even while launching missiles. We believe the US command and control system will ~~continue~~ become increasingly more effective under major nuclear attack, ~~thanks to~~ as a result of improving hardened underground control centers, ~~a continually~~ airborne command posts, and a command ships at sea.

The net result is an ~~clear~~ over-all Allied military superiority for major nuclear conflict, even should the Soviet strike first. ~~After nuclear exchange, by whomever begun, Allied superiority in surviving strategic nuclear forces would be by an even greater margin than before.~~ Since the Soviet cannot attack the ~~relatively well protected main base of~~ over-all Allied nuclear strength in sufficient force to keep us prevent the Alliance from inflicting ~~enormous destruction~~ unacceptable damage ~~on their delivery systems and on all parts of the civil societies of the Soviet Union as well~~ unacceptable to the Soviet Union. to them.

Soviet inflicted damage to the civil societies of the Alliance could, however, be grave, ~~for some portion of the Soviet strike force would survive any Allied nuclear attack.~~ particularly if the Soviet were to strike first. The nature and extent of the damage would depend not only upon the number of surviving attack vehicles and upon defenses against them, but also upon the strategy chosen by the Soviet Union. Hitting our military forces would be a high Soviet priority, and nuclear forces deployed in the European area are vulnerable to a surprise attack. ~~and~~ In view of the substantial Allied nuclear superiority it would not seem militarily sound for the Soviets to attack civil targets. To do so would invite prompt, certain and massive destruction within the Soviet Union. Hopes of ultimately controlling a relatively intact Europe might also dissuade the Soviets from nuclear attack on civil targets. However, the rationale of the Soviet attack cannot be accurately predicted, cities may be targeted, and even in an attack aimed primarily at military forces, extensive civil destruction would probably occur. ~~In addition, nuclear forces deployed in the NATO area are vulnerable to an initiative surprise attack.~~ see line 1 The anticipated degree of damage to the Alliance can, of course, be reduced depending upon the measures taken in advance, such as civil defense measures, and appropriate alert. and appropriate alert. ed

~~However~~ On the other hand, should the situation develop in such a manner that the Alliance chose struck to strike first, or to

launch a pre-emptive strike, the Soviet inflicted damage from their response would be less severe. It is almost certain that some portion of the Soviet nuclear capability would survive any Allied nuclear attack. Hence, the nature and extent of the damage would depend not only upon the numbers of surviving attack vehicles and upon the Allied defenses against them, but also upon the strategy chosen by the Soviets for their response.

Thus the likely results of a full nuclear exchange, regardless of which side strikes first, might be would probably be the substantial ~~virtual~~ destruction, not only of the nuclear power of the Soviet Union, and but of its economic and social fabric as well; contrasted with and the survival of the NATO nations, but with serious damage to their human and material resources.

As to nonnuclear forces, NATO's situation in the center is becoming sounder than it has been in the past though it still needs major improvements. ~~Some thinking in the Western Alliance appears to be influenced unduly by past assessments of the balance of forces.~~ Initially, NATO was very weak compared to Soviet conventional strength, although in prior those days, owing to our virtual nuclear monopoly, the weakness seemed fairly irrelevant. Since that time Soviet nuclear strength has grown and become a major strategic factor, hence, the relevance of the nonnuclear balance has gained ~~high~~ increased emphasis. ~~More than the meaning of the balance has shifted however -- The actual balance itself has moved in a direction that is less unfavorable to the Alliance.~~ ~~The~~ ~~way in~~ degree to which NATO's recent efforts to achieve gains in nonnuclear strength have modified ~~present~~ past capabilities ~~and suggest future opportunities~~ has been successful, deserves ~~attention~~ examination.

~~The improved conventional force situation comes mainly from the major increases of Allied strength.~~ While slow growth

has been was continuous throughout during the early years of NATO's existence, it has increased in recent years and been accelerated in the last half-year. The creation and turn-over to NATO of trained German divisions has made a major addition significant contribution to NATO strength. To meet the Berlin crisis the process was speeded, and in addition, Additionally, two French divisions have already were moved up onto the Continent, [illegible] with the possibility of more expected to follow. While US reinforcing units and individuals have been added to NATO's ready forces. The conventional capability of the tactical air forces of the Alliance have been steadily developing with further improvements expected as allied air forces are modernized. NATO ground strength improvements have been matched in the growing tactical air forces of the Alliance. NATO naval superiority has been maintained, and application to the ASW problem has improved our ability to meet the only real Soviet naval threat.

On the ground, there is a rough numerical balance in effective divisions now deployed in the central front and East Germany, the area immediately critical to the Berlin situation. we can count today some 24 NATO divisions in Central Europe, compared to the 26 Communist Bloc divisions concentrated in East Germany as well as plus additional divisions Bloc forces readily available in Czechoslovakia and Poland. A number of factors make this ratio less unfavorable to us than the numbers suggest. Our NATO's basic task is defense, and it is the offense which requires a large superiority of force. We would operate in areas where populations are thoroughly sympathetic and would add to rather than erode our combat capability. A major factor that offsets these advantages, however, is the Soviets' larger total reinforcement capability. Moreover, likewise, NATO has fully adequate combat and logistical support for only 50 per cent of its forces whereas the Soviets have no known major deficiency.

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Numbers of divisions tend to be deceptive, so widely does the meaning of "division" vary. The satellite divisions, under certain conditions, are of doubtful reliability, and about a third of the nominal estimated 147 active Soviet divisions are kept at only cadre strength. Others are disposed for operations in other areas of the Soviet Union, while still otheres are in low states of readiness. On the other hand, the Soviets do have extensive reserves. They have large equipment stocks, and both supplies and reinforcements are relatively near to the critical area, by contrast with the trans-Atlantic origin of much of NATO's sustenance. Considering the larger available Soviet quantities, but also their geographic, logistic, and especially political and strategic limitations on committing added forces against the NATO Center, including the threat of Allied capability for nuclear warfare, it has been estimated that a total of only 55 or so Soviet divisions would be brought to bear effectively in the ~~first 30 days~~ early phases of hostilities.

Against this estimated ground threat, NATO could this Spring have about 28-31 divisions deployed in Central Europe, with a capability of increasing this number up to 35-40 divisions within 30 days, utilizing National strategic reserves and 1st echelon units. The result, taking into account Soviet and Satellite Divisions, although not ideal is not ~~an unacceptable ratio~~ hopeless for the defenders, ~~particularly~~ in view of the strategic nuclear balance which presently favors the Alliance. It is within the capability of the Alliance to ~~provide develop~~ a nonnuclear defense of the NATO area adequate to oppose at least to hold a Bloc nonnuclear attack long enough to let the Soviet Union realize the gravity of the course on which it proceeds. Additional forces capable of undertaking defensive actions ~~etc~~ Army's #1

Air strength available for nonnuclear action is hard to assess quantitatively because of its flexibility, and its effect is influenced by many qualitative factors. The respective forces which now can be brought rapidly to bear in Central Europe favor the Bloc numerically. The margin is a fairly close one, however, depending on what conditions are assumed in computing it. Both sides can reinforce rather rapidly, and if each did so to a maximum degree, then there would be an additional quantitative edge to the Bloc. Such action would sacrifice other strategic considerations; hence something less than the maximum seems more reasonable to expect. Concentrated effort on the part of the West can reduce Soviet numerical advantage.

The build-up of NATO air forces in the Central Region currently in progress will provide forces to respond with greater flexibility to possible Bloc reactions which might arise out of Berlin contingencies. Further, those NATO forces are capable of forcibly demonstrating allied determination to maintain their access to and rights in Berlin. However, at the present time, Allied tactical air forces in the Central Region, plus back-up units in the United States which are available for immediate deployment to Europe, are considered insufficient to support large scale nonnuclear air operations to a successful conclusion against the air effort of which the Soviet Bloc is capable. The factors which presently limit the capability of the NATO Central Region air forces are such as to prevent these forces from being able to conduct extensive prolonged nonnuclear operations.[6] Actions in progress and planned will steadily improve the NATO air forces nonnuclear capability. The ability of the NATO air forces with nonnuclear

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weapons to assist in forcing a pause in Bloc actions will depend upon the mass of force and determination with which the Bloc chooses to engage NATO forces.

NATO air forces have the capability to contribute adequately to the establishment of the credibility of NATO determination to maintain allied rights with respect to Berlin. With proper application, the over-all air strength of NATO nations is such that execution of Berlin Contingency Plans, as well as other related actions, can be undertaken with the confidence that adequate air power is available to counter military action by Bloc air forces and to prevail in general war if it eventuates. However, if the Soviet Bloc nonnuclear air operations clearly indicate the achievement of air superiority, a timely decision would have to be made regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons with the attendant risks of escalation. The time for this decision can not be determined in advance and the time interval available for decision may be extremely short.

To achieve marked improvement in NATO nonnuclear air capability a substantial increase in the quantity of NATO air power will be required. Within the CURRENT time frame, from the present through 30 June 1962, improvement in NATO Central Region capability to conduct limited nonnuclear air operations can best be realized from means designed to raise combat effectiveness of theater forces now deployed, or planned for deployment in event of a Berlin crisis. Improvements can be made in terms of logistics, personnel, operational readiness status, base availability and facilities and other factors.

~~While the outcome of nonnuclear air operations could be expected to depend significantly upon the starting conditions and the conduct of the action, a number of more or less constant key factors would contribute in any case. Quality of aircraft~~

and-of-pilot-training,-for-example,-are-crucial.--Both-are generally-agreed-to-favor-NATO,-although-despite-past-experience and-present-intelligence,-some-uncertainty-exists.--In-air-defense, the-Alliance-has-advantages--in-quality-and-quantity-of sophisticated-weapons-systems,-but-the-Bloc-has-better-integration. Over-crowding-on-Allied-bases,-especially-those-used-by-the-US, offers-highly-lucrative-targets-and-might-be-a-critical-factor. Allied-deficiencies-in-logistic-support-are-not-known-to-be matched-by-similar-Soviet-problems.

Since-air-strengths-engaged-would-depend-so-heavily-upon strategic-choices-by-both-sides-in-the-context-of-a-developing conflict,-and-since-these-are-not-accurately-predictable,-one cannot-be-precise-in-assessing-the-resultant-balance.--There seems-a-clear-chance-that-either-side-might-succeed-in-a nonnuclear-air-superiority-operation-over-Central-Europe. If-one-assumed-that,-owing-to-the-external-nuclear-threat, the-Soviets-did-not-redeploy-an-air-defense-forces-from homeland-protection-missions,-while-reinforcement-with-nuclear strike-forces-from-the-US-made-it-unnecessary-for-the-NATO nuclear-strike-forces-to-be-held-out-of-the-nonnuclear-action, one-could-see-some-prospects-for-Alliance-success-in-a-local air-superiority-action.--Contrary-assumptions,-or-unfortunate circumstance-during-the-course-of-the-action,-might-well bring-the-opposite-result.--That-neither-NATO-nor-the-USSR is-entitled-to-high-confidence-about-nonnuclear-air-operations in-themselves-is-clear.--That-the-rapid-pace-and-the-volatility of-such-operations-could-make-both-sides-highly-apprehensive- about-escalation-into-nuclear-conflict-is-also-clear.

At sea, despite the very serious Soviet submarine threat, the NATO Alliance possesses over-all superiority. Geography alone contributes immense advantages. The Allies have virtually unrestricted access to the sea, as well as a highly

developed and distributed network of bases and a substantial capability for afloat support. The Soviets, severely restricted in all respects, must also face Allied control of most of the narrow sea passages on which they rely, usually including access by Allied land-based air. Allied merchant shipping capacity is great, while the Soviet cannot carry all their own commerce, let alone that of others. The allies have a high preponderance in surface naval strength including substantial carrier strength.

The Soviets have a numerically superior submarine fleet, but predominantly of snorkel types. They are credited with a growing nucleus of nuclear powered boats but lag far behind the United States in development of nuclear attack and SSBN types. In the event of an intensive anti-shipping campaign by Bloc submarines we could expect to suffer serious merchant ship losses. However, Allied over-all ASW capability has advanced to such a technological and operational state of readiness that the Allies could prevail even in the face of unrestricted submarine warfare. In the event of such a campaign conducted without resort to a nuclear exchange, we could hope to succeed using only conventional weapons. Even so a sustained long term war at sea limited to such weapons is not envisioned nor would it be realistic. ~~Magnification of Allied shipping losses would soon force a decision to use nuclear weapons and employ strikes at Bloc submarine bases.~~ Such a decision would result in submarine losses unacceptable to the bloc. Should the enemy attack with submarines at sea, it would be particularly important that the enemy be quickly convinced of our determination and capability to win. Nuclear weapons which could be used in anti-submarine warfare have a low yield, offer an order of magnitude advantage in kill

probability, and reduce the probability of nuclear escalation if used because the environment is removed from land areas and the resulting civilian population. Military forces would be facing enemy military forces. Civilians would not be endangered either directly from the weapons nor from any fallout. Immediate demonstration of our anti-submarine capability by promptly using nuclear weapons would result in lower morale for the remaining enemy submarine force and result in a continuing advantage for us at sea.

~~Soviet submarine strength is high, and Allied merchant shipping would suffer serious losses if it were fully engaged. Allied anti-submarine warfare capability has grown and has advanced, technologically. In the event of an all-out Soviet submarine campaign, we would hope to prevail using conventional weapons only and without initiating attacks at source. Should such a war at sea begin to go badly, however, and should the prospect of unacceptable Allied losses begin to appear, the question of nuclear ASW weapons and that of attacking Soviet submarines at their source would arise. In their decisions about submarine warfare against us, the Soviets would have to consider these possibilities and estimate their consequences in light of the over-all strategic situation. On balance, the naval power of the Alliance is such that we can almost at will deny the Soviets the use of the sea, except for submarines, outside the close cover of Soviet air power, to any chosen degree, while continuing our own use of the sea lanes, though with losses.~~

~~In sum, NATO's nonnuclear situation as it relates to possible Berlin conflict appears more hopeful than some among the Alliance have recognized. It is in ground strength and ASW capability that our most serious problems lie. In ground strength~~

and ASW capability that our most serious problems lie. In ground strength there has been significant improvement. In fact, we are now within sight of what has seemed to many to be an impossible objectives to provide a true forward defense of NATO territory. Such a defense is still lacking, but with increased effort we believe it can be achieved.

Given the successful completion of the above NATO planned build-up to include an improvement of logistical support, the Alliance can also achieve the capability to make their decision to use NATO force make credible plain to the Soviets. The non-nuclear air operations could aim at an expanding campaign for local air superiority, extending the area of superiority as feasible in the GDR and adjacent satellites. The Ground operations could move into the GDR, not to overpower enemy forces but to make clear and urgent the approach to the moment of Western decision for general war. Accompanying naval action could be maritime controls, blockage or limited war at sea.

Beyond the NATO area there are other aspects of the strategic environment which would bear upon assessments and decisions by the respective sides. These include opportunities for diversion and harassment, as well as possible injury, through military and paramilitary action. Examination of these has not so far revealed any which might have major impact upon the actions of either side in a Berlin conflict, where the most central issues of survival are potentially and perhaps imminently involved. Even so, politico-military situations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere may have some influence upon Berlin actions.

A number of conclusions concerning general and limited war flow from these basic judgments.

General nuclear war NUCLEAR superiority is and must remain a fundamental strength of NATO. The Alliance must maintain the psychological and physical readiness for general nuclear war as central objective of its military policy in order to

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defend the vital interests of its members. The effects of general nuclear war, however, could be so grave that the Alliance should engage in such action only when necessary in the defense of these vital interests and only after exhausting all feasible political, economic, and other lesser military actions.

Short of general nuclear war, the relative nonnuclear balance leaves the West vulnerable to the continued aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviets can attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities, always trying to avoid the threshold of general nuclear war, by a series of minor aggressions or possibly through limited but serious nonnuclear actions, probably followed by a prompt call for negotiations to avoid Western reaction. A NATO capability to defeat Soviet aggression at whatever level it occurred would make such Soviet actions clearly futile. NATO now has superiority in nuclear warfare and at sea. To repeat, in the short term the Alliance can offer a nonnuclear defense in Central Europe capable at least of holding Bloc nonnuclear attack without significant withdrawal for some period. In the longer run it is within the capability of the Alliance to create still larger nonnuclear forces. In our view, the Alliance should make certain that a future crisis will find us better prepared than the present one.

Deterrence, the prevention of war while achieving NATO's objectives, must remain ourpprincipal goal. However, NATO has heretofore not given adequate consideration to the possibility that deterrence may fail and that war may come in spite of our best efforts to the contrary. It is our belief that deterrence against larger scale Soviet military aggression based primarily on the threat of general nuclear war is not credible against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military, none of which is grave enough, in itself, to warrant recourse to general nuclear war.

The United States considers that we must recognize the dangers of exclusive reliance on general nuclear war as an

instrument of policy and make the effort required to build a strong nonnuclear capability as well.

The Resulting Restraints

The ultimate consequences to the West of the loss of Berlin, to whose defense the West is unequivocally committed, would be so serious in terms of its impact on the entire Alliance that vital interests of the Alliance are clearly at stake in this issue. To the Soviets, Berlin is also important in terms of the possibility that and if they force a Western withdrawal, they would have many opportunities to gain a major tactical advantages. However, a failure to force the West out of Berlin would not in itself be a defeat for vital Soviet national interests. It is in this context that the restraints which flow from the preceding discussion on the nuclear and conventional balance of forces as between East and West must be viewed.

Both sides have strong reason to avoid general nuclear war, so long as other courses of action may possibly preserve their vital interests. Either antagonist would accept willingly the foreseen consequences of such a war only if estimating that the alternative would be more harmful. Unless one side thinks it must instantly launch a strategic nuclear strike to pre-empt an apparently imminent attack on itself, a direct jump to general nuclear war is not likely to be preferred over lesser military action.

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Uniquely sensitive vital interests of the Alliance being involved in the Allied effort to maintain its position in West Berlin, ~~however,~~ would indicate that ~~it is~~ the Allies ~~who can~~ should be prepared to accept the greater risks. ~~In fact,~~ With the Alliance prepared in the end to go to general nuclear war, should that be necessary, rather than allow the Soviets to gain control of West Berlin, the Allies have scope to make this willingness clear to the Soviets, to whom the control of West Berlin is not vital. By progressively applied [commitment] increases of nonnuclear forces up to substantial levels, the Allies can hope to make the Soviets increasingly convinced of the seriousness of our purpose and of our intention to use whatever forces are required, including nuclear weapons. ~~By applying expanding nonnuclear forces,~~ Thus the Allies ~~can~~ could give the Soviets a chance to break off hostilities rather than risk a general nuclear war which they could not survive even if they made a pre-emptive strike. Since Soviet interests are not engaged to a comparable degree in West Berlin, nuclear restraints would bear more heavily on them.

The Soviets do, however, possess what appear to them to be vital interests in the matter of control over Eastern Europe. ~~and the Allies do not judge their contrary interests to merit the use of force.~~ Soviet anxiety to protect their control of Eastern Europe seems likely to affect Soviet restraints in varying ways at different stages. So long as only a latent threat to their control over the satellites existed, the Soviets might act with increased restraint in order to forestall Allied action to activate the threat and perhaps encourage and support uprisings. But should some effective anti-regime activity have begun, the Soviets seem likely to act boldly in protecting their vital interests.

~~If the Allies wish to sustain clearly superior willingness to run nuclear risks, they must avoid giving the appearance of direct attack on Soviet control of the satellites, although some effect might be had from a latent Allied threat to do so later. (The US is now preparing a separate paper on this subject, which it hopes to distribute soon.)~~

In this regard, air and ground action into East German territory will constitute a challenge to a vital interest of the USSR, i.e., her control of the GDR, unless both political and military actions of NATO are carefully designed to communicate a lesser objective. Political and military plans must, and can, be made with these restraints in mind.

Restraints on Soviet action have two main origins.

The first is their concern to escape the destructive consequences of a general [nuclear] war. Altering Berlin's status and inflicting a temporary non-nuclear defeat on the West should not in their view seem worth accepting ~~these~~ the consequences of general war. Hence, in seeking to gain their Berlin objectives, they could be expected to ~~should~~ seek even harder to avoid triggering a general [nuclear] war. The large uncertainties over escalation ~~will~~ should tend similarly to restrain the Soviets from nuclear conflict at lesser levels, and Allied ~~versatility in~~ tactical nuclear armament should reinforce this tendency. These restraints, it should be noted, apply against more than just Soviet initiation of nuclear war; they also influence ~~other~~ Soviet military actions which, though non-nuclear, involve enough force that the Soviets ~~would~~ should consider that the chances of Allied nuclear reply were appreciable. While the Soviet military preference, in the event of Allied combatant action inside East Germany, ~~might~~ would be for strong reflexive action against NATO forces or territories, the over-all state policy choices controlling the use of military forces would have to take due account of the probabilities of provoking Allied nuclear ~~action~~ response.

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The second ~~origin~~ restraint is Soviet concern (desire) to sustain an image of inexorable Communist success, although this also produces some compulsions for action as well as some restraints. Much of Soviet influence with the underdeveloped world is related to the wave-of-the-future image, and failure in a power contest with the West would weaken it. This would tend to restrain them from embarking on military action against the West over Berlin without a clear prospect of success. It also, however, tends to compel them toward completing at some point the Berlin power play which the USSR began three years ago. If they had once started out on a military solution of the problem, the same distaste for visible failure would dispose them somewhat toward carrying it all the way through. ~~This latter effect might be avoided if the Alliance could find some way to achieve its objectives but to blur the appearance of Soviet backdown. Not to be ignored is the related tendency for Soviet leaders to try to avoid personal political loss.~~ From Soviet faith in the inevitability of their triumph there also comes significant restraint against risking the USSR's future or even paying too high a present price, merely to gain a prize which they believe will be brought them in the long run by the tide of history.

There are serious restraints on the Allies, also, stemming from a number of foreseeable risks. War of any kind contains risks, but there are greater hazards involved in a nuclear war, of whatever initial size or sort. There is the danger, too, that out of the use of force might develop a situation in which the Soviets consider their vital interests to be more directly involved. Thus the Soviets might, in response to what seems to them a threat to or a direct assault upon their control in Eastern Europe, take counteraction aimed at some ~~corresponding area in~~ NATO territory, away from the immediate vicinity of Berlin and its access routes, or even elsewhere in the world.

Two fundamental requirements underlie the restraint which the Allies will impose upon their own action. They must sustain the necessary degree of integrity and cohesion within the Alliance, in the face of pressures tending to impel some lesser members toward

frightened neutrality. They must also sustain among their populations the degree of support necessary to make their chosen courses of action possible, [and this public] Such support [is to be had] for successive increases in the seriousness of Allied action can be achieved only by a clear showing that lesser measures have been tried and no reasonable alternatives exist.

From these factors emerge four ~~[principles describing concrete restraints]~~ principles applicable to the Allies ~~in judging specific actions~~. The Allies should exhaust their nonmilitary opportunities for preserving vital interests before passing to substantial combatant action. They should also make the maximum use of [exhaust] the possibilities of nonnuclear action before initiating nuclear conflict. They should avoid maneuvering the Soviets into such a position that only by seriously sacrificing their vital interests can the Soviets allow the Allies to gain their objectives. And the Allies should so conduct their operations that, while persuading the Soviets of their serious intent, they avoid Soviet misinterpretation that could lead to a Soviet assumption of [pre-emptive] nuclear initiative [strike by the Soviet Union]. This initiative should be perceived for NATO

More generally, given the relative conventional strengths and the geographic situation of Berlin, the Allies cannot use nonnuclear force to overpower Soviet opposition on the Continent but should use it to try to induce change in the Soviet decision to infringe on vital Allied interest.

Finally there is the compelling necessity for the Allies to avoid failure, or what appears to the Free World as failure, in a power struggle with the Soviet Union over vital interests of the Alliance.

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AFXPD-PL-CP/Col Dettre/72889/gmh/2 February 1962

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BERCON Plans (U)

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1. (U) The information herein is forwarded in response to your recent oral query on the BERCON plans.

2. [redacted] BERCON plans are Berlin contingency plans developed by SHAPE for NATO in response to a North Atlantic Council directive "Instructions to NATO Military Authorities," dated 9 November 1961. This NAC directive evolved from tripartite efforts to foster NATO understanding of, and support for, necessary military planning for possible Berlin contingencies. In particular it was agreed by the Tripartite Powers that NATO was vitally concerned and should be kept informed of Tripartite plans and that provisions should be made for smooth transition of command from LIVE OAK to NATO at the appropriate time. Following briefing of the NAC by Norstad on the purpose, scope, and general concept of LIVE OAK plans, the NAC agreed upon the need for NATO planning to meet a Berlin crisis and issued the directive "Instructions to NATO Military Authorities."

3. (U) General Norstad briefed the Military Committee on Chiefs of Staff Session 11-12 December 1961 on the general concepts of the BERCON plans, which were not completed at that time. No plans to brief the NAC on this subject about 15 February 1962.

4. (U) No copies of the BERCON plans are available here. However, they are expected in mid-February. General Norstad was instructed 25 January 1962 by Standing Group message to forward the plans to the Standing Group for review and to send copies to the MOD's. The Standing Group will appraise the plans in consultation with the Military Committee. General Duffner, the U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, will ask the JCS for guidance in stating the U.S. position on these plans. Subsequently, the plans will be referred to the [illegible] by the Military Committee for final approval. The plans are not approved yet. Apparently they have been approved by General Norstad, but he is not the final approving authority.

5. [redacted] The plans fall into four categories - ground, nuclear, air, and naval. A summary of the plans follows. In each case related plans and courses of action listed by the JCS in instruction to Unified and Specified Commanders in SM 1024-61, "[illegible] Contingency Planning in Berlin" are included under the heading Remarks.

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[illegible] Alpha I — provides for large scale [illegible] escort in the corridors and immediate vicinity. Forces assigned: + wings. Blockades are not hit. Hot pursuit is unrestricted equivalent to Jack Pine.

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[redacted]

REMARKS: USCINCEUR 200-10, LIVE OAK "J[illegible] I and II," [illegible] 1022-61 courses of action 12, 13, 16, 17.

BERCON Alpha II -- provides for a non-nuclear air battle for local air superiority over East Germany. It involves a maximum strength initial strike at all air fields in East Germany, and at vital fields in other satellites, plus hitting SAM. It scrupulously avoids Russia. The staff is optimistic about the results of this plan in the short term (a few days) but expects the Soviet reinforcement capability to outweigh us in time. The initial maximum level strike would obviously create a great risk of nuclear response, but SHAPE's current thinking is that it is a necessary aspect of the plan. [redacted]

REMARKS: [illegible] 1022-61 courses of action 1[illegible], 19, 2[illegible], 21,

NUCLEAR:

BERCON Bravo -- provides for nuclear demonstrations on a small number of nuclear targets (up to 5) for demonstration purposes rather than military effects. Targets could include [redacted] ntrol would be highly centralized under General [illegible] personally. Restraints would include minimizing fall-out, etc.

REMARKS: USCINCEUR [illegible] for Small Scale Use of Nuclear Weapons. [illegible] 1022-61 courses of action 2[illegible],

GROUND:

BERCON Charlie I -- provides for a reinforced divisional attack along [illegible] Autobahn. The depth of penetration contemplated [illegible] be not over 2[illegible] miles with a [illegible] perimeter.

REMARKS: USCINCEUR 2[illegible]-1[illegible], LIVE OAK "JUNE B[illegible]," 1022-61, course of action 4.

BERCON Charlie [illegible] -- provides for an envelopment of the salient in [illegible] Kassel [illegible] the salient.

REMARKS: [illegible] plans. Related to [illegible] courses of action 6, 7, [illegible].

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] Charlie III -- provides for a corps attack on the autobahn to penetrate "not beyond" the line.

REMARKS: SM 1022-61 courses of action 6, 7, 8.

BERCON Charlie IV -- calls for an attack by three divisions in the Thuringer Wald to make a substantial straightening of the line in that area.

REMARKS: SM 1022-61 courses of action 6, 7, 8 related.

NAVAL:

BERCON Delta I -- provides surveillance and control of ACE focal straits.

REMARKS: CINCLANT OPORD 1-61, CINCLANT Planning Directive 114-61, CINCLANT OPORD 20-61, CINCNAVEUR OPORD [illegible]-61, CINCNAVEUR OPLAN [illegible] 21[illegible]-61, [illegible] 1022-61 courses of action [illegible] 30, 3[illegible], 39, 43.

[illegible] -- provides for control [redacted]

REMARKS: CINCLANT Planning Directive 114-61, CINCLANT OPORD [illegible]-61, 20-61, CINCLANT OPLAN 202-59, USNAVEUR OPLAN 2[illegible], SM 1022-61 course of action 3.

BERCON Delta II -- same for [redacted]

REMARKS: USNAVEUR OPLAN [illegible], [illegible], 50-60. Diagonal [illegible] Plans. [illegible] 1022-61 course of action 3.

[illegible] -- calls for boarding, search and [illegible] of bloc shipping. Note: [illegible] full blockade.

REMARKS: [illegible] courses of action 25, 26, 27, 2[illegible], 35, [illegible], 40, 42, 43, 44.

[redacted]

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Sub BQD-Military 21

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

RL(62) 38-9 Berlin (2)

International Security Affairs
Refer to: I-25237/62

26 February 1962

MEETING OF MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP
3:00 P.M., 21 February 1962

Participants

United States
Mr. Nitze, Chairman
Colonel Spragins, JCS
Colonel Burke, ISA
Captain Shane, ISA
Colonel Armstrong, ISA
Colonel Preer, SG, NATO
Mr. Rutter, ISA
Mr. Ausland, State
Mr. Weiss, State
Dr. Schick, ISA

Germany
Dr. Wieck
General Steinhoff
Colonel Schwerdtfeger

United Kingdom
Lord Hood
Sir George Mills
Admiral Crawford
Mr. Thomson
Mr. Brooke
Commander Homan
Commander Dunlap

France
Mr. Winckler
Colonel Honou
Mr. Pelen

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T.S. No. 98-TS-047
Document No. 6

Norstad Briefing to NAC on Berlin Planning

Mr. Nitze announced that there were two items on the agenda: the Norstad briefing and the paper on Naval Countermeasures, BQD-M-24, 24 January 1962, which had been a subject of the previous meeting.

Lord Hood said that his remarks would go beyond the Norstad briefing, in that he had been thinking about the procedures for producing a response to the NAC instructions of last autumn dealing with the prospective plans of the NATO military authorities. As he sees it, the

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procedures as laid down in the instructions have two stages. The first stage is an appraisal of the Commander's plans by the Standing Group in consultation with the Military Subcommittee; the second stage is the forwarding of the plans and appraisal to the NAC and its consideration of them. Lord Hood thought there were two aspects involved in these procedures: the scope of the work at each stage and the extent to which the four governments should coordinate views during the process. As to the scope of work in the first stage, he was of the view that the Standing Group should concentrate on the military questions in the Commander's plans, examine each of the plans individually, make a judgment on the forces to be committed and assess the likely Russian reaction to the plans. The second stage would be essentially political at the level of the NAC. The NAC can examine all questions in the plans and consider them in the light of the Standing Group's work. Its responsibility would be to produce an overall plan into which each of the Commander's plans would fit. As to the extent to which the four governments should coordinate views during the process, Lord Hood thought it desirable for the Military Subcommittee to act in the first stage as a forum for the consideration of political-military questions in the plans. The later NAC discussions would be complicated, however, if the other governments outside the four received the distinct impression that the four had concerted their views. Nevertheless, he felt it desirable for the four not to be altogether inhibited in their own discussion but to be as unostentatious about it as possible. In the first stage, it would be useful for the three to coordinate instructions to their Standing Group Representatives. It would also be valuable for the four to act concurrently with the Standing Group on political-military matters. In the second stage, he thought the four should exchange views in Paris informally between their Permanent Representatives. He brought this whole subject up now because of the forthcoming Norstad briefing.

Dr. Wieck said the Subcommittee should examine Lord Hood's suggestion carefully. He asked at what stage the FRG would receive knowledge of the Commander's plans.

Sir George Mills pointed out that the MOD's would get the plans at the same time that the Standing Group received them.

Mr. Nitze asked if that was the procedure for SACEUR's plans.

Colonel Spragins replied that it was.

Mr. Nitze said he thought Lord Hood's statement was well taken. It is clear that the plans go first to the Standing Group, then to the NAC. The scope of the Standing Group's work is not in question.

The NAC's task is a broader one involving political considerations. Lord Hood's term "overall plan", he would equate with "preferred sequence". The problem of how the process is conducted without exacerbating friction in the Standing Group or the NAC would sensibly call for continuing quadripartite consultation during the first stage. Within the framework of the Subcommittee the issues would be brought out between the four and between them and the other members of NATO. The U.S. view is that the time has come to move forward in the planning process because of the possibility that contingencies may arise in the near future.

Lord Hood added that before London sends instructions to their Standing Group Representative, there might be some advantage in trying them out on the Subcommittee to iron out wide differences.

Mr. Nitze said this was a new idea and that the U.S. would have to consider it.

Lord Hood said alternatively that perhaps UK instructions could be sent to the British member of the Standing Group and that if differences arose there, then the Subcommittee could act as a coordinating center without going back to the capitals.

Mr. Winckler agreed that since the function of the Standing Group is a military one, the Subcommittee could perform a political-military coordinating function somewhere along the line. The final reconciliation between the military assessment and political considerations can only be effected by the NAC, but the crucial work in that reconciliation would have to be done by the Subcommittee.

Mr. Nitze said that in the last analysis the horsepower for the planning would have to come from the four.

Dr. Wieck agreed.

Mr. Winckler said that it was also necessary to envisage early quadripartite coordination in the planning process because of the responsibilities the three have outside the NATO area and in LIVE OAK.

Mr. Nitze concluded that there was a preliminary concurrence in the Subcommittee on Lord Hood's procedural suggestions except on the point of coordinating instructions to each of the three's Standing Group Representatives.

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Naval Countermeasures

Mr. Nitze stated that it was his hope to have the Subcommittee complete its consideration of the paper on Naval Countermeasures, BQD-M-24, as soon as possible.

Mr. Winckler offered to make some general comments on the paper. He said it appeared that the aim of countermeasures in general is to bring to bear in a limited area like Berlin the superiority the Allies would otherwise have in a more strategic situation. It is desirable to add the weight of superior naval forces to the elements of increasing pressure in the event the Soviets carry out their threats against Berlin. There are risks involved in implementing countermeasures at sea, but the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Measures short of war involving protracted action at sea or the seizure of ships in security zones are measures which go beyond the purview of NATO. The four should take these actions in their natural capacity as states. Planning in this respect should proceed independently of SACLANT and other NATO naval authorities.

Lord Hood agreed with these general remarks, but had reservations about the countermeasures not covered by NATO plans.

Mr. Nitze said these latter plans can be handled through the coordination of national planners. He then turned to a paragraph by paragraph consideration of the paper itself. (Since the participants made notations on their copies of the paper, the detailed changes will not be noted here.) After an extended discussion, the Subcommittee did not quite finish the consideration of the paper. Mr. Nitze adjourned the meeting at 6:00 P.M.

[redacted]

3

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: U.S. View of the Strategic Environment and its Implications (U) (JCS 1907/500)

1. PROBLEM: To discuss an OSD/ISA draft paper (Tab 1), subject as above, which OSD/ISA proposes (Tab 2) be given to the Military Subcommittee of the Ambassadorial Group as part of the effort to obtain Quadripartite support of U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict.

2. MAJOR ISSUE: Whether the draft paper is overly optimistic; whether sections of the paper on U.S. second strike capability and on the need for larger nuclear weapons should be revised as previously recommended by the JCS; whether the section on NATO non-nuclear air capability, as revised, incorporates the principal ideas contained in the wording suggested by the JCS.

3. JOINT STAFF POSITION: Reiterate JCS views (Tab 3) on issues stated above. Talking Paper prepared for Chairman at Tab 4.

4. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT: None apparent.

5. RECOMMENDED POSITION: Stick with original JCS views (Tab 3). Attempt to have Sec Def address this paper. Addressing revised OSD/ISA draft can only result in further watering down of JCS views. As appropriate use Talking Papers: U.S. Second Strike Capability at Tab 6, NATO Non-nuclear Air Capability at Tab 7. Background Paper at Tab 5.

6. FALL BACK POSITION: Support Joint Staff position as presented by the Chairman. Introduce the thought that progress is being made in the Ambassadorial Group without this paper. Although it might be somewhat embarrassing to Mr. Nitze not to provide the paper as requested by Allies, submitting to the Military Subcommittee is not essential and might be counter-productive. Talking Paper on additional Controversial Areas at Tab 8.

Colonel R. H. Dettre/cvl/77016
5 March 1962

AFXPD-PL E T Cragg

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BACKGROUND PAPER

on

U.S. VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

- The subject concerns an OSD/ISA paper which has been prepared as part of a calculated campaign to obtain full Quadripartite support to the U.S. concept and policy of four distinct phases of military action or Berlin.
- Specifically, the paper is the fourth step in the campaign to obtain acceptance of Phase III - Non-nuclear Combat Operations - by the Allies. (Note Phase I - Determining Soviet Intent, Phase II - Non Combatant Counteraction; and Phase IV - Nuclear Operations)
- 10 Jan 62 - Outline of the concept of the Poodle Blanket - four phases - presented orally to the Military Sub-committee of the Berlin Ambassadorial Group.
- 17 Jan 62 - French, British and Germans expressed their views, recognized the need for four phases, but had reservations on the West ability to keep actions in phases.
- 23 Jan 62 - Restraints or Nuclear Action portion of OSD/ISA paper read to Military Subcommittee.
- 26 Jan 62 - U.S. View on the force balance portion of OSD/ISA paper read to Military Subcommittee - Allies requested U.S. views in writing.
- 2 Feb 62 - OSD/ISA requested JCS views on the paper which had been read to the Military Subcommittee - The JCS concluded that the OSD/ISA paper was overly optimistic and contained a series of unfounded military judgments.
- Specifically the following JCS considerations were forwarded
  - The Strategic Implications of the force balance portion was inadequate.
  - Paper proposes offensive action but discusses relative force comparisons from viewpoint of defense, therefore it is misleading.
  - Paper infers that achievement of MC 70 goals would provide adequate forces to implement a changing strategy.
  - Balance of air strength portion of paper is at variance from JCS judgments.
  - Paper raises false hope that ASW conventional campaign would succeed.

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- Air and ground offensive action into East German territory would be less susceptible to political control than paper indicates.

- 5 Feb 62 - The JCS line-in and line-out of the OSD/ISA paper was forwarded.
- 15 Feb 62 - Third OSD/ISA draft dated 8 Feb 62 informally commented on by Maj Gen Gray, JCS representative on the Military Sub-Committee, as follows
  - Paper gives impression of greater NATO strength than can be proven;
  - Paper should avoid statements that may be easily challenged or it will arouse suspicion that an attempt is being made to sell a strategy based on weak or faulty premises. -
- 21 Feb 62 - Current draft paper produced.
  - This paper contains approximately 60 percent of line-in - line-out changes recommended by JCS, but
  - Most of the JCS recommendations accepted only improved the paper editorially.
  - The current draft is less objectionable than previous ones but still has an over-optimistic tone.
  - Specific items which should be discussed with Sec Def are included in Talking Paper for the Chairman (Tab 4).

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Talking Paper

on

U.S. SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY

- Questions: After taking a Soviet surprise nuclear strike, what would our surviving U.S. long range strike capability be? Is it growing?
- There is no one answer to these questions.
- Answer depends on degree of surprise and magnitude of Soviet strike.
- We expect virtually all air alert aircraft and Polaris on or near station to survive, from 50-85% of ground alert aircraft in ZI, 5-15% non-alert aircraft and 40-80% of our ICBM's to survive. These are some of factors in guidance for SIOP 1963.
- As hardened Minuteman enters our order of battle, our posture will improve, but we can count on Soviet posture improving also.
- Growth of our second strike capability depends upon our greater relative improvement.
- In recent years we have tended to under-estimate Soviet technology. We should not now categorically state as facts our conclusions and judgments based on intelligence information which might not be complete and accurate.
- Recent Soviet tests showed highly sophisticated weapons technology. In some instances, weapons appeared to be of a design to which there is no U.S. counterpart.
- Soviets seem to have caught up with U.S. technology in megaton range.
- In multimegaton range, 5MT and above, USSR ahead - higher yield/weight ratio with reasonable economy in fissionable materials, higher burning efficiency.
- These Soviet accomplishments, plus probably improvements in delivery accuracy, tend to compensate for U.S. numerical superiority in weapons. In addition the U.S. is continuing to reduce the numbers of high yield weapons in the nuclear stockpile.

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Talking Paper

on

NATO VERSUS SOVIET BLOC AIR CAPABILITIES

- This discussion in ISA draft (pgs 6-7) is not loud and clear.
- JCS recommended revision along the lines of the JCS memo to Sec Def in November '6' "Evaluation of NATO versus Soviet Bloc Air Capabilities."
- Current ISA draft is mostly a reorganization of the earlier one commented on by JCS. JCS language has not be incorporated.
- The following points have either been omitted or rephrased to softer impact
  - Over-all quantitative comparison in Central Europe favors the Bloc.
  - One-half SACEUR U.S. offensive forces on nuc alert causes further non-nuc imbalance in favor of Bloc.
  - Logistics favor Bloc over long period because NATO LOC is to CONUS.
  - Initiative and surprise favor Bloc.
  - *Capability to disperse in depth favors Bloc*
- Net result is that ISA draft is over-optimistic, infers that MC 70 posture designed for nuclear strategy is adequate to institute non-nuclear pause strategy.
- ISA draft does include JCS-recommended statement that NATO air forces in Central Region are not now sufficient to support large scale non-nuclear air operations to a successful conclusion
  - Later in non-nuclear summation (pg 8) ISA draft says our most serious problems lie in ground strength and ASW capability.
  - Omission of air strength as a problem infers air strength is sufficient.
  - This is contradictory.
- Question: Is NATO capability so far below the Soviet capability that Soviet effort to gain air superiority would require immediate NATO decision on the use of tactical nuclear weapons?
- Answer:
  - Air forces are most vulnerable on the ground.

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- NATO forces concentrated on relatively few fields close to Iron Curtain.
- Soviets can disperse in depth among many fields, some at great distance from Allied bases, and can stage from base to base.
- Soviets have well integrated air defense system and could sustain attacks longer on our aircraft penetrating Bloc defenses to reach more distant airfields.
- In conventional war of attrition, side with most bases spread over larger area has the advantage.
- Use of nucs would be needed by NATO to deny use of bases to enemy, equalize the battle.
- Logistics, conventional weapons stocks in particular, would pose an early problem to NATO forces, soon force decision to use nucs.
- Time decision must be made cannot be determined in advance because it depends on magnitude and perseverance of Soviet effort.

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Talking Paper

on

ADDITIONAL CONTROVERSIAL AREAS IN ISA DRAFT
"US VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS"

- Recommend following changes for accuracy and clarity

  - Pg 4 (Tab 9): "The improved conventional force situation comes mainly from the major increases of Allied strength and decreases in Soviet strength of a conventional sort."

  - "We can count today some 24 NATO divisions in Central Europe, compared to the 20 Soviet, 6 GDR, and 14 Czech division in ~~relative~~ immediate contact with our Central Region forces."

  - Pg 5 (Tab 10): ". . . there are ~~substantial~~ limitations on the number of Soviet divisions that could be brought to bear effectively in the early phases of hostilities."

  - Pg 6 (Tab 11): Delete "The margin is a fairly close one, however depending on what conditions are assumed in computing it."

  - Pg 8 (Tab 12): The Alliance must maintain the psychological and physical readiness for nuclear war as a central ~~objective~~ capability of its military ~~policy~~ posture in order to defend the vital interests of its members.

  - Pg 9 (Tab 13). Short of use of nuclear weapons, the relative non-nuclear balance leaves the West vulnerable to the continued aggressive policy of the Soviet Union.

    - Note Without added words an important intermediate level of conflict is overlooked.

  - Pg 9 (Tab 14) "In the longer run it is within the capability of the Alliance to create non-nuclear forces capable of holding even a major attack for some period."

    - Note Recommend statement be deleted. It is vague and assertive.

  - Pg 12-13 (Tab 15): The four principles which "emerge" from the discussion in this paper as guidelines for the Allies in judging specific actions constitute a very weak, negative, defensive policy.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Special Report - Mr McCone, CIA

1. PROBLEM: To note information to be provided by Mr. McCone, Central Intelligence Agency, concerning Berlin, and the possibility of an imminent crisis.

2. MAJOR ISSUE: Does hard intelligence exist, which indicates that a new Berlin crisis is imminent?

3. JOINT STAFF POSITION: None

4. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT: None. CNO recommended that Mr. McCone be invited to address the JCS on Berlin matters.

5 RECOMMENDED POSITION: Note the briefing. Background paper at Tab 3 contains pertinent available information.

J. SCOTT

Col E.E. Jenstrom/gm/77016
19 July 1962

AFXPD-PL Neil J. Graham

Carpenter

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BACKGROUND PAPER

on

SPECIAL REPORT - MR. McCONE, CIA

- Recent Berlin events
  - 10 July - Chairman, Berlin Commandants conveyed to Mayor Brandt their surprise and concern over Brandt's recent public statements on issues in Berlin -- Purpose was to caution Mayor Brandt not to raise inflamatory issues.
  - 10 July - U.S Commandant in Berlin indicates
    - There has been a decline of incidents
    - Soviets and GDR tightening Berlin Wall by a second line of obstacles, creating no-man's land.
    - Believes Soviets sensitive to repercussions on recent GDR actions and are putting pressure on GDR to restrict VOPO actions.
    - Soviets have proposed disarming VOPO's and West Berlin Police to "defuse" situation.
  - 11 July - United Kingdom called an urgent special Ambassadorial Group meeting apparently on basis of Moscow Reports indicating imminent crisis.
    - Khrushchev had told Kreisky, of GDR, that Soviets would have to sign seperate peace treaty if no further progress was possible in US-USSR talks. Khrushchev had apparently said this would result in stoppage of Allied traffic, but not civil access.
  - 12 July - USSR disappointed at U.S. reaction of "categoric rejection" of Soviet proposal to replace occupation troops in Berlin with combination of other NATO country and Warsaw Pact forces
  - 14 July - Soviet note delivered to U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Note concerned itself with provocations to GDR by West Berlin Police, indorsement of these actions (i.e. firing over border) by West Berlin

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Senat and Mayor Brandt; attacks 4 power (e g UK, France, U S and USSR) talks in Berlin proposed by U.S ; and recommends investigation by U.S. since U.S. is responsible for West Berlin police actions.

- 16 July - At Secretary of Defense meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. McNamara alluded to possibility of a Berlin crisis in the near future.
- 17 July - Watch Committee Report contained no reference to Berlin. *A reference should have been made, if a Berlin crisis is imminent.*
- 18 July - CNO suggested Mr. McCone report to JCS on this matter and alluded to Rusk talks in Geneva with Gromyko on the subject
- 17 July - Izvestia article declared US-Soviet talks on a German peace treaty have entered a "crucial stage".
  - Discusses NATO base aspect of Berlin - Cites fact that US bases Saudi Arabia and Morocco liquidated and Laos and Algeria are free of NATO-SEATO hold - Berlin is to be next.
- 18 July - Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva will include Berlin-journalists have indicated that if no solution is reached a peace treaty will be signed within "two months", in fact, Khrushchev may announce the event *in a few days*.

- The hardening of Soviet line is undoubtedly related to Rusk-Gromyko talks.
- Reflects Moscow's impatience on Berlin
- Moscow trying to inject note of urgency into discussions.

- 18 July 62 - Berlin Report -
  - No significant incidents
  - Protests lodged with Soviets on the matter of a Pan American Airways plane and a Federal Aeronautics Authority plane encountering MIG-type aircraft in Berlin Control Zone and North Corridor on 17 Jul 62.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Buildup and Deployment in Phase II of a Berlin Contingency

In planning for the buildup and deployment of forces contemplated in Phase II of a Berlin contingency as described in NSAM-109, it would be useful to encourage our Quadripartite Allies to develop plans of a similar nature. Their and our plans should be compatible and complementary in order to ensure that the Allies present an effective deterrent if the necessity to implement Phase II should arise. In addition, this joint effort should facilitate development of supporting plans by our remaining NATO Allies and thereby lend added emphasis to the deterrent posture presented to the USSR.

To this end, the Department of Defense, in informal coordination with the State Department, has prepared in broad outline a plan which will make available on call during Phase II varying levels of augmentation of forces, and will make possible rapid deployments appropriate to the degree of threat posed by Soviet action. The intent is to provide necessary forces and their support to maintain control of a developing situation, to deny the Soviets the advantage of forcing us to oscillate between the extremes of normal readiness and all-out mobilization, and to enable the Allies to implement a broader choice of appropriate actions.

In order to provide a wide range of response, the plan calls for the augmentation of existing forces in Europe in three separate increments and includes appropriate reserve, alert and call-up measures and limited logistic buildup. The composition of the increments could be altered, depending upon the situation at the time Phase II commences. However, in order to plan for the generation of forces and required logistic support, it is visualized that the probable sequence would be as outlined below. The plan does not provide for automatic implementation of a succeeding increment if the generation of a previous increment has proved sufficient to the need.

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It is anticipated that the sequence for implementation would be as follows: The first increment would effect the heaviest force increase (a Corps force of 3 Army Divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, 10 Air Force Fighter Squadrons and naval units); the second would generate a lesser ground force but more naval and air force (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, the US 2nd Fleet and up to 25 TAC fighter squadrons with necessary combat and logistic support forces); the third increment would add a force of one Army division. In the event that forces deployed in all three increments are not sufficient to cope with the situation, implementation of general war plans would be the final step and in addition to the measures of partial mobilization necessary to support and compensate for the foregoing deployments, would call for complete mobilization.

Approximately 30 days would be needed to effect the majority of the actions required for the first increment; 60 days for the first two increments; and the major deployments of all three increments could be accomplished in approximately 90 days.

The plan was developed under the assumption that the only contingency requirements were those associated with Berlin. Therefore, should other contingencies exist at the time the plan is to be implemented, the plan would need to be reviewed and possibly altered to fit the conditions extant. For example, during the present Cuban situation it is visualized that the first increment which would be deployed during Phase II of NSAM 109 would consist of two Army divisions slated to "marry up" with their equipment prepositioned in Europe, a third Army division (initially without support elements), and ten TAC fighter squadrons. The ten Fighter Squadrons would either have to be released from the Cuban contingency or mobilized

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from the reserves. Expanded commercial sea and air lift would also be required. Contingent upon the situation as it develops while the first increment is being deployed, the forces available and/or required for the remaining increments would be adjusted as necessary.

It is requested that you approve in concept this plan which is outlined above, and authorize its use in exploratory discussions in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group in order to encourage our Allies to develop supporting plans consistent with NSAM-109. Plans which are forthcoming from these discussions will be studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the plans progressing above the Military Sub-Group level.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT A Briefing by the JSSC on Berlin Planning

1. PROBLEM: The JSSC will present a 20 minute briefing on the current status of Berlin Contingency Planning, both US and Quadripartite

2. MAJOR ISSUE None.

3. JOINT STAFF POSITION: The briefing will review the plans and actions appropriate to each of the four phases of US/Allied Berlin reaction Actions currently not fully agreed upon among the Allies will be highlighted, and the briefing officer will conclude with a list of several problems outstanding in preparing for Allied response.

4. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT: None.

5. RECOMMENDED POSITION. Note the briefing Background paper at Tab 3 contains an outline of the points to be discussed

Major A. W. Braswell/rew/77016
2 August 1962

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BACKGROUND PAPER

on

Berlin Review Briefing

- NSAM 109 outlines the four phases of response (National Security Action Memorandum 109, Berlin Planning Policy, signed by the President)
  - Phase I: Test Soviet intentions and attempt to restore access with minor force. Fight only in self-defense.
  - Phase II: Measures include mobilization, economic action, maritime countermeasures and political action.
  - Phase III: Expanding non-nuclear action in Germany, initiated by the Allies
  - Phase IV: Initiate nuclear action. Escalation to General War a possibility
- The briefing will include the following points:
  - A policy such a NSAM 109 is needed for NATO
  - Relationship (transfer of control) between LIVE OAK and NATO not yet agreed upon
  - Autobahn convoy procedures among the Allies are not uniform
  - Allied contingency plans for civil access are still under study
  - Air access actions are covered in JACK PINE plan and are agreed upon
  - Coordination of naval countermeasures is still under study
  - General Norstad's recommendation to attempt development of an Allied plan for air harassment of Soviet aircraft outside bloc territory is being considered by the Joint Staff.
  - The briefer will mention the necessity of shifting troops to implement the "forward strategy".

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- In conclusion, the major outstanding issues, according to the Joint Strategic Survey Council.
  - Tri-partite-NATO relationship. (When is control transferred from LIVE OAK to NATO?)
  - Coordination and control of naval countermeasures.
  - NATO version of NSAM 109.
  - Final approval by North Atlantic Council of BERCON/MARCON plans and detailed preparation of supporting plans
  - Countermeasures against Soviet civil air.
  - Completion of projects in JCS 1907/52C ("Reappraisal of the Berlin Situation").
- The following terms may be used in the briefing. A brief explanation of each is shown:
  - LIVE OAK refers to General Norstad in his role as tri-partite military commander for Berlin actions. Also used in reference to his staff and to the tripartite contingency plans. The most important of these are:
    - JACK PINE refers to a family of plans concerning air operations. Ranges from civil harassment counters up to tactical air support of ground probes. (CINCUSAFE commands JACK PINE operations)
    - FREE STYLE. A platoon-size probe to test intentions in case of ground interference
    - TRADE WIND. A battalion-size probe, may be used to extricate a platoon probe
    - JUNE BALL: Tri-partite division, largest of the planned LIVE OAK probes.
    - CINCBAOR: Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, who commands LIVE OAK ground actions.
  - BERCON (Berlin Contingency Plans). SACEUR's family of NATO plans to restore access by force. Covers a wide range of actions, mostly in Phase III.

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- BERCON ALPHA: A family of non-nuclear air action plans
- BERCON BRAVO: Small scale demonstration use of nuclear weapons to show Allied readiness for nuclear action
- BERCON CHARLIE A series of four plans for offensive ground action in East Germany.
- BERCON DELTA: SACEUR's naval countermeasures plan for the European area

- MARCON (Maritime Contingency Plan): SACLANT's plans for NATO naval response in the Atlantic, ranging through six levels of action
- FORWARD STRATEGY: A term used to describe a specific proposal that NATO ground forces be permanently positioned forward in their desired war defense positions Forces are presently concentrated in rear areas, with light covering forces forward

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MILITARY SUB-GROUP PROPOSAL FOR

WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP REPORT ON

The Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

GENERAL

In its instructions to NATO military authorities, CM(61)104, the Council expressed several considerations that ought to underlie Berlin planning. One dealt with the need for military and other actions to fit together in an overall strategy. The Council has previously been informed concerning the tripartite Live Oak military plans, and the Council has before it a paper on the NATO-Tripartite relationship. SACEUR's and SACLANT's plans, along with the appraisal by the Standing Group in consultation with the Military Committee, have now come before the Council. It yet remains to be seen how these tripartite and NATO military actions might fit in relation to each other and to the various non-military activities that likewise would be part of the overall strategy seeking to preserve vital Alliance interests.

The Council may therefore wish to give attention to what would be my government's conception of the preferred sequence of military actions in the event military force must be used in the Berlin situation. In the account which follows, the extensive non-military actions which would be taken are broadly described merely to cross-reference their general timing relative to military actions. No attempt has been made to describe Western reaction if Soviet action should threaten NATO territory or integrity beyond the point of a Berlin blockade, since it is assumed that present NATO strategy would be applied in such event.

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Any attempt to set out a preferred sequence of Western action has to remain rather general and cannot establish firmly separated categories and concepts for various phases. Soviet action against Western access to Berlin can be initiated in various ways whose differing natures would tend to influence Western reactions to a large degree.

Governmental decisions will be necessary for implementation of any of the military plans at the time. Several factors which bear decisively on such decisions will remain of uncertain nature and indeterminable relative weight. Such factors are, for example: Soviet reaction to prior military and non-military moves in a heightening crisis, the danger of stimulating uprising and revolt in East Germany or satellite areas, the state of world and home opinion, and the relative state of Western and Soviet mobilization.

Governments will also have to consider whether steps are necessary to ensure that the Soviet Union remains in no doubt as to the continued validity of the existing Western guarantees for West Berlin.

The broad, general considerations relating to progress through the several phases are:

a. There is a compelling necessity for the Allies to succeed in protecting their vital interests relating to Berlin and to ensure that this success is recognized in the Free World. They should make clear to the Soviet Union the enormous risks involved in opposing Allied communications to Berlin by force. The purpose of Allied operations, however, should not be to overpower the Soviet Union or to disintegrate the satellite area, but to make the Soviet government

USAMHI TSC # 3-96

change their policy on Berlin. Therefore, the Allies should give the Soviet Union opportunity to draw back and even--without creating the appearance of failure on our part-help them to cover up this retreat

b. No military operations after the initial probes would appear convincing to the Soviet Union unless preceded or accompanied by Western mobilization and readiness for war. The most effective means of inducing the Soviet Union to change their policy may be intensive mobilization measures themselves.

c. The Allies should take all practicable advantage of the possibilities of measures which do not initiate offensive military action before taking stronger steps. Such measures on the military side might include, for example, mobilization, build-up and deployment of forces, certain alert measures, certain maritime and air measures, and, on the non-military side, economic embargo measures and diplomatic actions

d. The Allies should take all practicable advantage of the possibilities of non-nuclear military action before proceeding to the use of nuclear weapons. This does not necessarily mean the implementation of all available non-nuclear plans.

PHASE I

If Soviet/"GDR" administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air the Allies will initiate action designed to deter Soviet/"GDR" continued or additional interference and, failing that, to establish the fact that the Soviet Union/"GDR" intends to use force to interfere with Berlin access.

Planning for the appropriate action to meet a variety of contingencies (interference with air access to Berlin, ranging from minor administrative harassment to a determined Soviet effort to interdict all Allied transport; interference with ground access to Berlin, Allied and/or German; harassments within Berlin) is being conducted among the four governments.

The purpose of such planning is to agree as far as possible in advance what in each contingency would be the appropriate response and countermeasures, with final decisions, however, being reserved for governments at the time, as is normally the case in contingency planning. This planning is continuous and continuing.

It is hoped that a quick and determined Allied response to the initial Soviet move will deter the Soviets from continued or additional interference. This proved to be the case in March 1962 when the Soviets initiated harassments in the air corridors.

If, however, this hope is falsified, and when the degree of interference reaches a point where continued access is in doubt, an Allied military probe of Soviet/"GDR" intentions will be launched without delay. Selected LIVE OAK plans, such as JACK PINE, FREE STYLE, and BACK STROKE (which is an operation identical with FREE STYLE but conducted from the Berlin end of the autob[illegible] will be executed. Any unblocked mode of access would continue to be used.

Control of military operations will remain tripartite, but NATO military and political authorities will be kept informed and NATO governments would be asked to undertake appropriate states of vigilance or alert (see OES TS CES/62/1).

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Western action should either restore access or make it clear that force is being used by the Soviet Union/"GDR" to deny access to Berlin.

PHASE II

If the actions under Phase I have shown that force is being used by the Soviet Union/"GDR" to deny access to Berlin, the Allies will bring increasing pressure, short of offensive combat, to bear on the Soviets in an effort to induce them to desist and re-open access.

This phase would be characterized by intense diplomatic activity (e.g., representations in Moscow, mobilization of world opinion against the USSR, action at the U.N.) conducted against the background of mounting Western pressures. These would include a growing military build-up; naval measures (national, tripartite, and/or NATO) and air measures; and economic countermeasures, including repressive measures against Bloc maritime and air traffic, of ascending intensity up to and including a full embargo, together with restrictions on the movement of Soviet Bloc nationals and officials, with the aim ultimately, in this or a later phase, of isolating the Bloc. The aim of all these measures would be to bring increasing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to restore our rights and vital interests.

A major element of military action will be to mobilize and deploy jointly additional military forces, particularly into the Central Region, at an accelerating rate, while at the same time rapidly increasing the combat readiness of all M-Day forces, with the dual purpose of (1) achieving force levels and states of readiness necessary to the defense of NATO and the launching of BERCON/MARCON operations, and (2) displaying to the Soviets that armed conflict will be the consequence

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of continued infringement on vital Allied interests.

Any unblocked access to Berlin should continue to be used fully. In the event of partial or intermittent blockage of air access, the three Powers would if necessary use fighter escorts in an effort to keep flights going. Should the risks and loss of aircraft be too great to warrant further flights unless Allied air operations extend outside the corridors, flights would be suspended until NATO decides, in the light of the state of the military build-up and the general situation, when an attempt should be made to re-open air access.

The length of this phase cannot be forecast since it will depend on the development of events, notably in the air corridors and in Berlin itself. If the blockade of Berlin is total, and if the pressures applied by the Allies lead to violent Soviet response, the Allies may be compelled to move on to operations envisaged for Phase III. But in the absence of such compulsion, there are advantages for the Allies in not moving too early into Phase III, because the growing military build-up will be a firm demonstration of Allied determination to assert their rights in Berlin, and this and other Phase II measures need time to have their impact on the Soviets

PHASE III

If, despite Allied actions in Phase II, Berlin access has not been restored, the time will have come to draw on the catalog of plans "from which appropriate action could be selected by political authorities in the light of circumstances and with the aim of applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access" (para. 6 (b) of NAC Resolution 104).

Resolution 104).

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At the present stage of the NATO deliberations, there is no question of approving the execution of any particular plan since it is laid down in para 8 of the NAC Resolution that "the execution of approved plans will be the subject of decisions by governments at the time." The Council may, however, wish at this stage, in the light of the Standing Group's appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee, and in view of the fundamentally political purposes of the military operations planned, to consider the preferred sequence in which plans might be implemented.

If there is consensus on the general considerations set out in the introduction to this paper, it would seem to follow, in accordance with the concept that operations should be graduated but determined, that the initial operations* in certain circumstances to be reinforced in the course of the operation, to be executed by the Allies in this phase (possibly after a further appropriate tripartite probe) should be non-nuclear and should not be open to misinterpretation by the Russians as an attack directed at the stability of the Soviet satellite empire (notably East Germany) or on the Soviet nuclear strike capability. Accordingly, the choice would seem to lie among

a Air operations which, though extending outside the corridors, would be related to reopening air access.

b Ground operations with limited objectives on one of the main access routes, with appropriate air support

c Intensified maritime control or blockade measures

d Some combination of the above.

*US would delete bracketed language.

3-96

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/(US would include) These initial operations should be developed to involve substantial non-nuclear force and to continue long enough to allow the Soviets to back down./

PHASE IV.

If, despite the accumulated pressures resulting from the actions described above, the Soviet Union has not backed down, the Allies would have to intensify the pressures by initiation of some form of nuclear action, selective or otherwise (e.g., some combination of nuclear and non-nuclear action).

This phase might begin with one of the following courses of action:

A. Selective use of nuclear weapons for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use them, or

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons.

In this phase general nuclear war would be imminent.

STATUS OF BERLIN ACTIONS

PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE III	PHASE IV
ACTIONS TO INCLUDE BLOCKAGE OF ONE OR MORE ACCESSES	ESSENTIALLY NON-MILITARY MEASURES	NATO MILITARY MEASURES LESS THAN GENERAL WAR	NATO GENERAL WAR
1. NATO CONCEPT (NSAM 109)	1. ECONOMIC COUNTER-MEASURES	1. BERCON	EDP
2. L.O. NATO RELATIONSHIP	2. MOBILIZATION	ALPHA 1	FORWARD STRATEGY
3. HARASSMENT & INTERFERENCE		ALPHA 1.5	
A. CONVOY PROCEDURES		ALPHA 2	BERCON BRAVO
B. CHECKPOINT PROCEDURES		CHARLIE 1	
C. CIVIL ACCESS		CHARLIE 2	
D. VISAS & PASSPORTS		CHARLIE 3	
E. AIR ACCESS		CHARLIE 4	
4. LIVE OAK CONTINGENCY PLANS	←	DELTA	
A. FREESTYLE			
B. TRADEWIND	←	2. MARCON	
C. JUNEBALL			
D. JACKPINE	←	3. E. GERMAN UPRISINGS	→
(1) AIR TRANSPORT OPNS			
(2) AIR TACTICAL OPNS			
(3) GROUND SUPPRESSION & AIR OBSTRUCTION OPNS			
5. MINOR NAVAL COUNTERMEASURES	→		
6. MINOR AIR COUNTERMEASURES	→		
7. SOVIET-GDR PEACE TREATY			

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BERLIN COORDINATION



1. JCS ACTIONS
2. INFORMAL COORD.
3. BTF ACTIONS
4. MIL SUB COMMITTEE
5. BRIEFINGS
6. INFORMATION

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14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Berlin Contact Meeting, 14 August 1962

1. (TS) The primary point of discussion during the meeting was a need for a more flexible mobility plan with regard to Berlin Contingency. General Gray made the point that the President and the Secretary of Defense consider our mobilization plans most important to the Berlin problem. The problem is what combination of mobilization capabilities would provide the maximum over the first 60 days included in Phase II Berlin measures. As General Gray expressed it, the point of D+60 appears to be most significant since the first 30 days would be occupied by deployments. The question that will concern all Services is that if Phase II continues after D+60, what would be the mobilization capabilities of each 30 day increments thereafter. Several approaches to this problem were discussed. One aspect is as shown in Figure 1 below.

FAMILY OF PLANS



Figure 1.

This approach would consider Phase II in separate plans over periods of 30 days, then 60 days, then 90 days, etc. The approach in Figure 2 was considered to be the most likely in meeting a Berlin situation. This approach considers mobilization of the first 60 days with the first 30 being identified then followed by increased mobilization in increments of 30 days thereafter. It was stated that this type of mobilization plan is one that we do not now have.



Figure 2

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Figure 3 is the long range mobilization plans currently in existence and is deemed to be applicable to the Berlin situation after a rather extended period in Phase II has been consumed.



Figure 3.

2. (TS) The following are other items mentioned by General Gray.

a. Last Tuesday the President was briefed that we could possibly get through Phase II without mobilization. Further clarification of this point was not made but rationale behind it was questioned.

b. The Berlin situation will probably appear on the United Nations' agenda subsequent to 18 September. The U.S. issue, in dealing with Soviet proposals, will be on the "right of self-determination" as the solution to the Berlin problem. It is probable that a four-power meeting will be held in Washington prior to the convening of the United Nations on 18 September.

c. The State Department has asked for information concerning how our military posture has been improved since the last Berlin crisis considering that the reserves called-up have been demobilized. This data is currently being redrafted by Army and Air Force. Information previously submitted to the Joint Staff by the Navy is apparently current. General Gray stated that when received, this information will be consolidated and forwarded to the Department of State. However, if this information is to be used by State for propaganda or psychological purposes, the Joint Staff will request another review.

d. As a part of the information connected with Berlin contingency planning, General Gray pointed out that the study Group on Tactical Nuclear Weapons during one war game came to the same conclusion as the study group on conventional weapons; i.e., the Soviets cannot mass an offensive with what they have now in East Germany. They are in a defensive posture and would require mobilization which the West would probably detect prior to attack.

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e. During the Presidential briefing last Tuesday, discussion was held concerning whether Congress should extend the Presidential powers to call up reserve forces. Current opinions are that these powers can be gotten rapidly from Congress, the provisions will probably terminate this month and therefore Congress will not be asked to extend these measures. General Gray is considering to pose the question whether it would be more influential on Soviet actions to extend these powers now or whether it might be more dramatic to allow them to expire and then renew them, when required, as a show of determination.

3. (TS) Purely for information, General Gray has stated that he had read one of the books recommended by the President, titled "Guns of August", author not named, which is a factual story about how World War I could have been prevented or stopped.

4. (U) Attachments 1 and 2 were received at the conclusion of the meeting.

RICHARD G. BULGIN
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Joint Plans Branch
Combined Plans Division
Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&P

2 Atch
1. Sub BQD-Military 29, dtd 30 Jul 62
2. Status of Berlin Actions, Berlin Coordination Charts

OFFICE SYMBOL					
GRADE AND SURNAME OF COORDINATING OFFICERS	Scott				

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Sub BQD-Military 29

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

International Security Affairs
Refer to: I-25840/62 30 July 1962

MEETING OF MILITARY SUBGROUP, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP
3:00 P.M., July 30, 1962

Participants

United States
Mr. Nitze, Chairman
Admiral Lee, ISA
Colonel Spragins, JCS
Colonel Armstrong, ISA
Captain Cotten, ISA
Colonel Meacham, ISA
Dr. Schick, ISA
Mr. Ausland, State
Mr. Blitgen, State
Mr. Kranich, State
Mr. Weiss, State
Mr. Klein, White House

United Kingdom
Lord Hood
General West
Admiral Greig
Mr. Thomson
Mr. Brooke
Commander Homan

France
M. Lebel
General Ezanno
M. Fayard
M. Boidevaix

Germany
Dr. Wieck
General Steinhoff
Colonel Schwerdtfeger
Mr. Von Magnus

Discussion of the UK Working Paper on Phasing

Mr. Nitze opened the meeting by suggesting that the discussion continue on Lord Hood's paper.

Dr. Wieck announced that the FRG was prepared to make a contribution to the phasing discussion by submitting a paper on Phase I which he distributed.

Mr. Nitze, after reading the paper, asked if it was the German intention to make a contribution to Phase II, III and IV.

Dr. Wieck said the FRG version of Phase II is identical to that of the UK, but he had alternative versions of Phase III and IV.

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Lord Hood asked what the alternatives were.

Dr. Wieck said what he had in mind was the suggestion in Lord Hood's paper that the larger ground operations should be relegated to the bottom of the list where they might be considered as an alternative to nuclear actions in Phase IV. The FRG preferred a shorter Phase III relying upon CHARLIE ONE. In Phase IV, all plans that border on general war should be put together, i.e., ALPHA TWO, BRAVO, CHARLIE TWO and FOUR with nuclear annexes.

Mr. Nitze asked how, with this arrangement, we would initiate expanded military operations after Soviet resistance had been established. He then turned to Lord Hood's paper and asked if there were any further comments on Phase III. He questioned the last sentence in paragraph 15 which reads: "Alternatively, the Russians might challenge the blockade and this would be likely to lead to limited war at sea which the Allies would have to wage under very unfavorable circumstances, since they would not be able to attack the Soviet submarine bases." He noted that Allied bases would not be under attack either and expressed the view that the circumstances of a limited war at sea would favor us in military action. Undoubtedly, we would have to sustain shipping losses but the over-all result would not necessarily be unfavorable to the West.

Lord Hood thought the idea of a limited war at sea was contrary to NATO doctrine. Moreover, it is a great problem to convoy and protect shipping on a world-wide basis.

Admiral Lee pointed out that the Soviets are at a geographical disadvantage for attacking shipping on a world-wide basis.

Mr. Nitze noted that a recent wargame on this problem indicated that over one-half of the Soviet submarine forces were destroyed in three months of a limited war at sea. This result was not with nuclear depth charges, but with MK 44 torpedoes. Our losses were not excessive.

Admiral Greig said this was not the British view. In a limited war we could not attack Soviet submarines until they attacked our ships. The damage to our trade over the short term would be substantial, ships will refuse to sail, and great fiscal difficulties will arise. In a limited war at sea, we will suffer more than the adversary particularly in sporadic combat. He did not doubt, however, that we could prevail over the long term.

Mr. Nitze said in assessing the sequence of actions, the US prefers naval measures to come early.

Admiral Lee thought we should take the initiative in maritime measures.

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Admiral Greig observed that it takes a long time to bring a submarine war under control.

Admiral Lee thought the ratio of submarines afloat to those sunk would not favor the Soviets.

Admiral Greig agreed to this assessment of Soviet losses, but was concerned about Allied losses.

Lord Hood asked for clarification as to what naval measures will actually be used.

Mr. Nitze thought this was a planning gap that should be filled. In Phase II, what we mean by mobilization should also be clarified. He then turned to discuss Phase IV.

Dr. Wieck wondered if the Subgroup intended to discuss the types of ways for using nuclears. BQD 28 envisaged further consideration by the Four. He referred to paragraph 5, first sentence, of the UK paper, in saying that not every use means a "quantum jump." Non-nuclear operations and certain nuclear operations should be weighed against each other.

Mr. Nitze said the US concern is that BRAVO as an isolated operation will not have much effect against the USSR. How will it restore our vital interests in Berlin? He did not see how the Russians would feel BRAVO was anything more than a demonstration. He thought Khrushchev would not be frightened and would counter
831 demonstrate.

Dr. Wieck thought BRAVO would be isolated only in theory, but not in fact. The situation at the time would be tense because other operations would already be under way. BRAVO would be connected in a timely fashion with other measures and its significance could hardly be overlooked by the adversary. To change Soviet policy we will have to challenge the nuclear integrity of the USSR and the territorial integrity of the GDR.

Mr. Nitze asked Dr. Wieck if he had in mind that the CHARLIE operations would be underway when we would resort to BRAVO.

Dr. Wieck thought they would be because Phase III should initially be non-nuclear. Once they fail, however, then we have to weigh an increase in non-nuclear operations against the timely message of BRAVO.

Mr. Nitze thought this point was similar to paragraph 4 of Lord Hood's paper. He asked if BRAVO should be used in support of CHARLIE FOUR.

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Dr. Wieck said he needed clarification as to how to channel the selected use of nuclears.

M. Lebel said it was his personal view not to reserve nuclear action until Phase IV. He thought there would already be an exceedingly tense situation brought about in Phase III. If we find it necessary to enter Phase IV, it would only be because we were unsuccessful in Phase III. If we wait until Phase IV, the use of nuclears could set off an all-out war. If we combine with Phase III, certain elements of Phase II, then, the situation will be less tense. At that point the demonstrative use of nuclears would tell the Soviets that, if we begin land operations, such operations will have nuclear support.

Mr. Nitze asked M. Lebel if he would favor the use of nuclears prior to TRADE WIND.

M. Lebel said that he would. When we are visibly ready for land operations, a demonstration will manifest at a time when tension has not gotten out of hand that we are willing to use nuclears.

Mr. Nitze asked if the Soviets just respond to our use of one or two nuclears with three or four of their own without relieving Berlin, what do we do next? Do we proceed slowly with TRADE WIND and CHARLIE ONE as non-nuclear operations or do we use the CHARLIE nuclear annexes? If nuclear action were to follow, would it not be better to make a larger strategic strike.

Lord Hood thought if the Soviets respond with four nuclears of their own, they signify their acceptance of the risks of general war. During Phase II, we have attempted by all means short of aggressive action to change Soviet policy and have girded ourselves for military action. The hope is that we will be successful in Phase II. If not, the severing of peacetime relations and massing of large forces that follow will produce a very critical situation. Operations in Phase III should initially be non-nuclear and he thought the Subgroup was agreed on this point. Contrary to what M. Lebel had said, he thought the first "demonstration" should be non-nuclear. Only if that fails should we consider the initial use of nuclears. It is conceivable, however, that our first non-nuclear actions may lead us into a situation where self-defense requires nuclears. The CHARLIE plans might very rapidly lead us into this situation.

M. Lebel thought his position was not far apart from Lord Hood's. It would be Phase III when the first use of nuclears occurs. If you use nuclears before the Phase III operations have run their course, the situation will be less tense than it would be later on.

Mr. Nitze asked how the situation would be more under control in Phase III than later on.

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M. Lebel thought the non-nuclear war at sea, for example, would be relatively easier to control than Phase IV operations. The use of nuclears at sea would be easier to control than their use on land.

Mr. Nitze thought all this would do little to relieve Berlin.

M. Lebel objected, for he thought it would bring to bear in Moscow the idea that their next move may be their last. They will get this message if a nuclear weapon has been exploded somewhere.

Lord Hood agreed in that it seemed to him that the initial measures taken in Phase III are likely to be more readily controllable at sea than on land.

Mr. Nitze concurred that measures at sea and in the air are more controllable, except for ALPHA TWO. But limited nuclear action at sea is political action, not military. The question is what counter political action will the Soviets take? Perhaps, they will back off under cover of a conference. Or, they might respond with an eye for an eye or an eye and a half. But it is difficult to envisage reopenning of access as a result of our using nuclears. What happens then? We cannot simply return to non-nuclear operations. We will have to begin nuclear bargaining in which the dangers of preemption will multiply. We are on very unpredictable ground when we have come this far.

M. Lebel asked Mr. Nitze if the US could distinguish at all between a really destructive use of nuclears and their political usage. The Ambassadors in the countries will be able to tell the difference.

Mr. Nitze agreed that the demonstrative use of nuclears is of some importance.

M. Lebel thought a way out should be left open for the Soviets. It will be easier for them to find a pretext if nuclears have been used. They will see the demonstration as the warning that it is.

Mr. Nitze said he reserved great skepticism for an exchange of nuclear demonstrations.

M. Lebel agreed skepticism would be warranted if there were just an exchange, but he did not think the Soviets were accustomed to a mere exchange.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that a mere exchange will leave us in a more dangerous position having cut off other options. He agreed with Dr. Wieck that the weight of nuclears should be added at some point in the sequence of action, but the question is where to add it. There are several ways of adding it.

HANDLE VIA TALENT

Dr. Wieck thought we should be prepared to select a moment for the political use of nuclears. After having tried to change Soviet policy by engaging in a buildup in West Germany, we should conduct another autobahn probe to ascertain if Phase II has brought results. In the event that they do not blunt the probe immediately, it would indicate they had made a decision to negotiate. If they do blunt it, should we, at this point, add the weight of nuclears for political purposes? Or should we wait for the outcome of non-nuclear air and ground action? Although he considered it urgent to reopen access, he thought that probes of various sorts should not be repeated. He preferred a shorter Phase III, an enlarged Phase IV.

Mr. Nitze said he would prefer to implement TRADE WIND, CHARLIE ONE and THREE including their air annexes in Phase III. These operations would be commensurate with diplomatic activity at the time. They would also give you time for deciding on the use of nuclears. Once nuclears have been used, however, the opportunity for diplomatic action can be lost.

Lord Hood thought there would be time for diplomacy. He asked what the objective of TRADE WIND would be.

Mr. Nitze thought its objective would be to assert tripartite legal rights. The hope is that it will not be resisted since the Soviets will observe the buildup behind it. The TRADE WIND objective is to test our access, to see if we can get through to Berlin. It should be supplemented by CHARLIE ONE, backed up by CHARLIE THREE.

Lord Hood thought we would not need greater operations, once we have seized a portion of GDR territory. He asked further if we would need CHARLIE THREE if CHARLIE ONE were thrown back.

Mr. Nitze assumed we would in order to have time for diplomacy. TRADE WIND might only take a few hours, but a three division attack would take longer.

Lord Hood asked if we would reinforce TRADE WIND.

Mr. Nitze said yes.

Lord Hood asked if we would then throw in more troops.

Mr. Nitze said yes, but added that if this process does not become successful, we will have to resort to nuclear operations. But, then, there will be little time for diplomacy.

M. Lebel said this was his reason for suggesting an earlier warning shot before we get stuck in a ground operation.

Lord Hood thought what was said today confirmed his view that the ground operations are very questionable.

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JC AIRP TSC # 3-76

Mr. Nitze objected, for he said if we have read the balance and restraints/of nuclear war correctly, the rational course for the Soviets would be to get out of the CHARLIE chain of operations. They can trump our nuclear demonstration with one of their own. The next step would be an extensive nuclear war beyond anyone's control.

Lord Hood reiterated that he thought ground action in itself is questionable.

Mr. Nitze thought ground action must be viewed in its context.

Lord Hood thought the Soviets could respond to our non-nuclear operations by seizing Berlin. When we put our fingers into the GDR, they will grab hold. When we put in our whole hand, they will drag the rest of us in. In the air, we would have much more freedom of maneuver. When the air corridors are menaced, that is where we should respond.

Mr. Nitze thought a reliance on air action for success would involve us in ALPHA TWO. ALPHA ONE is not far removed from JACK PINE with ground site attacks added. Perhaps a JACK PINE plus would be more reasonable where we would be taking risks earlier. He then suggested the Subgroup devote itself to discussing two specific tasks: the kind of mobilization to be undertaken in Phase II and the kind of expanding naval actions to be taken throughout the phasing. After these tasks are discussed, we would suggest preparing a paper for the NAC.

M. Lebel suggested a further discussion of the phasing question before submitting a paper on it to the NAC.

Mr. Nitze pointed out in MBQD 28 that the Four have already stated what is in dispute between them.

Lord Hood suggested that the Subgroup study the FRG paper Dr. Wieck had distributed.

Mr. Nitze adjourned the meeting at 4:20 P. M.

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13 September 1962

Talking Paper for the JCS for the SecDef-JCS Meeting, 17 Sep 62

Subject: Berlin (U)

Background - The long-range US goal for Berlin rests upon the reunification of Germany under conditions acceptable to the US and her Allies. Progress toward the attainment of this objective has been negligible because of Soviet insistence upon terms unacceptable to the US and her Allies.

- Our current policy is aimed at maintaining the "status quo" of West Berlin by insuring:

a. Presence and security of the Western garrison.

b. Freedom and viability of the city.

c. Freedom of access to the city

- Intermittent harrassments of allied rights in Berlin have been continuous since 1945 (Summary in Enclosure A.)

- In reacting to these harrassments, quadripartite powers have endeavored to pursue commonly agreed policies; however, concepts of approach differ The Allies have been unable to agree on the use of "hard measures" which would show Allied resolution in the Berlin situation. The status of agreement among the Allies on major areas is shown in Enclosure B

- The Soviet/GDR have a wide range of actions that can be taken to threaten or deny Allied vital interests in Berlin US and Allied planning is adequate to determine Soviet/GDR intention to use force in denying vital Allied interests in Berlin. A political decision is required to execute them.

Discussion - The US and Allied policy of maintaining the "status quo" is defensive in nature, and generally limit actions on the scene to responses to Soviet actions which threaten Allied vital interests. Prompt and effective Allied response to Soviet threats is achieved only through extensive planning and prior approval of the nations concerned. In this connection, the following would greatly improve US and Allied reaction capabilities

a. Allied fulfillment of force goals to permit the implementation of a NATO forward strategy.

b. NATO action to provide adequate logistical preparedness for war.

c. NATO and Quadripartite settlement of those divisive issues which serve to fragment and weaken NATO.

d. Favorable resolution of the following issues.

(1) Economic countermeasures.

(2) Naval countermeasures.

(3) Air countermeasures.

(4) NATO version of the US NSAM 109.

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(5) Approval by NAC of BERCON/MARCON plans.

(6) Approval by NAC of the Tripartite-NATO relationship paper.

- During the past year the Allies have improved their position with respect to plans, they have shown united resolve in certain instances and have accomplished some augmentation of NATO forces (notably US and FRG). However, the military position of the Allies in West Berlin is recognized as being indefensible and the political atmosphere is deteriorating. This is evident from the following.

a. Intensified threat of Soviet/GDR peace treaty and abolishment of Soviet Berlin Commandant.

b. Aside from the US and FRG, Allied response to the military build-up has been inadequate.

c. The Soviets, in violation of international agreement, have divided Berlin by building a wall around West Berlin.

d. The requirement for prior tripartite agreement on any use of military force has resulted in inaction and the appearance of Allied disunity, weakness and indecision.

e. Planned acquiesence to GDR control of Allied autobahn traffic when serving as agents of the Soviets with no change in the then current procedures.

f. Planned self-denial of entry into East Berlin in event ID cards are demanded of military personnel in uniform.

g. Permitting unopposed entry of Soviet combat vehicles (APCs) into West Berlin for use in transporting the Soviet war memorial guard.

h. Discontinuation of routine flights in the air corridors above 10,000 feet, and restriction of US helicopter flights over East Berlin to altitudes not less than 1,000 feet, except in an emergency.

RECOMMENDATIONS - It is recommended that the JCS indicate their growing concern over the continued erosion of the US and Allied position in Berlin, and emphasize the need for early accomplishment of:

a. Allied fulfillment of NATO force goals, and NATO logistical preparedness

b. Favorable agreement on air, naval and economic countermeasures.

c. NATO approval of recommended tripartite-NATO relationship, BERCON/MARCOM plans and the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict.

Approved by _____ (Director, J-5)

Opinion as to Recommendation

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF _____ (Concurs) (~~Nonconcurs~~) that this paper gives good background but its use at home and may type statements

Talking Paper prepared by. Colonel J. V. Langston, USA
European Branch, J-5
Extension 54149

USAIRR TSC # 396

Encl A - Soviet/GDR Interference
Encl B - Agreements & Disagreements on Berlin

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ENCLOSURE A

SOVIET-GDR INTERFERENCE

1. The basis of the current Berlin crisis is essentially that which has existed since 1945, namely. Soviet desire to expel Western presence and influence from Berlin

2. NIE 11-9-62 estimates that

> "While a direct challenge to the Western position in Berlin proceeding from a separate 'peace treaty' with East Germany cannot be excluded, it seems more likely that the Soviets will continue to pursue their aims by diplomatic pressure and by small unilateral steps designed to whittle away the Western position and to establish the de facto sovereignty of the East German regime."

3. The Soviets and GDR to date have taken the following actions infringing on the rights of Western Allies.

a. Restricted movement of Allied personnel to one entrance into East Berlin

b. Restricted movement of West Berlin citizens to four entrances into East Berlin and West Germans to two entrances.

c. Denied free access to West Berliners to their East German friends, relatives or associates by strict control of East German personnel entering West Berlin, and in process mercilessly killing those detected in an attempt to escape East Berlin

d. Buzzed Allied military and civil aircraft in the corridors

e. Attempted restrictions of Allied local Berlin flights to West Berlin.

f. Attempted to deny or interfere with air access to Berlin by: (1) scheduling unusual numbers of flights in corridors, (2) attempting to reserve all airspace in corridors from surface to 10,000 feet, (3) dropping chaff in and near Berlin air access corridors

g. Required identification of and detained US military personnel in Autobahn in two instances

h. Refused entry to US personnel in civilian clothing into East Berlin without showing "proper" identification.

i. Harassed assistance vehicles on Autobahn.

j. Denied entrance to General Watson and his POLAD to East Berlin unless POLAD showed VOPO idenfication.

k. Constructed a "maze" at the Babelsberg exit of the Autobahn and at the allied entrance into East Berlin at Freidrickstrasse.

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l. Harrassed and detained military patrols in East Berlin.

m. Subjected allied duty trains enroute to and from West Berlin to harrassing delays.

n. Abolished the office Soviet Commandant in East Berlin, and replaced it by the establishment of an East German Commandant (Gen Poppe), thereby disrupting established channels of communication between East Berlin and West Berlin Commandants.

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ENCLOSURE B

STATUS OF ALLIED AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS ON BERLIN

1. Areas of Agreement

a. Berlin - The importance to the Western Allies of maintaining Allied rights in Berlin.

b. Forces - The need to strengthen NATO conventional military capability. (Response to this need has varied among nations and planned force goals have not been met.)

c. LIVE OAK (Tripartite)

(1) Established as a tripartite planning staff having limited operational capability.

(2) The family of plans (FREE STYLE, TRADE WIND, JACK PINE, JUNE BALL, etc.)

(3) "Rules of Conduct" for autobahn convoys.

d. Single Allied Command, Berlin (Tripartite). Circumstances under which the US Commandant, Berlin, will assume over-all command of tripartite forces in Berlin (overt armed attack and in event of grave civil disturbance) and succession to command.

e. Tripartite - NATO Relationship (Quadripartite)

Procedure for passage of command from LIVE OAK to NATO in the event of expanding military operations in connection with Berlin. This quadripartite position has been introduced into the NAC for consideration.

f. Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict. (Quadripartite) The Ambassadorial Group, Washington, is preparing a quadripartitely agreed version of the US four-phase concept of a preferred sequence of military action in a Berlin conflict (NSAM 109). The current plan is to introduce this matter for NAC consideration on 19 September 1962.

h. Plans (NATO). In response to a NATO directive, SACEUR and SACLANT have prepared a series of plans designed for use in expanding military operations related to Berlin. These plans are scheduled to be presented for NAC consideration at an early date.

2. Areas of Disagreement

a. Negotiations (Quadripartite). France does not agree with the other quadripartite nations on the best method for bringing about negotiations. She refuses to be associated with informal talks with the Soviets or negotiations while the Soviets continue harassing measures.

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b. Level of Forces (NATO). While there is general agreement on the need for strengthening NATO forces in the Central Region and some increase has been achieved, efforts by the United States to further the NATO build-up to the 30 divisions SACEUR has stated to be the minimum required to establish a forward defense strategy, have met with little success.

c. Economic Countermeasures (NATO). There is considerable reluctance on the part of the NATO Allies to plan for economic countermeasures to be taken against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Although a complete economic blockade is looked upon with some favor as an extreme measure short of military action, selective economic countermeasures are not favorably considered because of the economic impact on many NATO nations and the belief that they would be ineffective.

d. Naval Countermeasures (Quadripartite). Naval countermeasures are viewed with mixed feeling. While the United States and Germany strongly support them, Britain feels they would be ineffective and the French position is somewhat in between. US plans call for LIVE OAK and SEA SPRAY (CINCLANT) to serve as coordinating agencies for operations within their respective areas of responsibilities.

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Enclosure B

[redacted]

[redacted]

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Berlin (U)

1 PROBLEM To review current and long-term US objectives on Berlin along with the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Soviet intentions towards Berlin

2 MAJOR ISSUE What action can be taken to achieve US objectives in Berlin.

3 JOINT STAFF POSITION The J-5 Talking Paper reaffirms reunification as a long term objective and status quo as short term objective. Outlines areas of Soviet/GDR interference (Tab 1A) and indicates status of Allied agreements and disagreements on Berlin (Tab 1B) J-5 recommendation reiterates statement of requirements which have been under consideration for some time, i.e., meeting MC 26-4 goals, increase force readiness, obtain NATO agreement on air/naval and economic countermeasures, and early approval of BERCON/MARCON plans and the NATO preferred sequence of military action in Berlin (Tab 1). These J-5 recommendations fall short of submitting more positive measures.

4 SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT None known

5 RECOMMENDED POSITION Recommend you use J-5 Talking Paper (Tab 1) and the USAF Talking Paper (Tab 2) in discussion of Berlin and associated matters with Secretary of Defense.

Col E Mikolowski/mbt/75059
13 Sep 62

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TALKING PAPER ON

BERLIN SITUATION - THE OBJECTIVE

- I am still seriously worried about not only the current situation in Berlin, but also over future prospects for Berlin. Where are we going? Where should we be going?

- Much has been said and written about our goals in Berlin - the most recent "opus" was the Joint Strategic Survey Council report which we approved on 9 August.

- You will recall the JSSC report summarized the US policy decision and action, and analyzed possible courses of action that may favorably influence a solution.

- Study looked at six (6) possible solutions to Berlin dilemma

  1. Overt withdrawal of US (and Allied) support of West Berlin
  2. Covert withdrawal of US support
  3. Maintain existing rights "status quo."
  4. Internationalization.
  5. Barter West Berlin for equal compensation elsewhere.
  6. Unify Germany.

- As national policy, it was concluded that only Courses of Action 3 and 6 seemed acceptable.
  - "Status quo," however, is not a permanent solution
  - And "unification," though offering a permanent solution, is hardly attainable with Soviet pre-condition (i.e., neutral Germany)

- All others would offend FRG and lose prestige for US.

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- We therefore end up supporting objectives which (a) offer no permanent solution or (b) offer no chance of attainment (unification).

- Accordingly, I thought it would be wise to "review the bidding" - i.e., ours and theirs What is the bidding?
  - The present US objectives are unchanged.
    - Maintain presence and security of Allied forces in Berlin
    - Maintain freedom of Berliners.
    - Maintain viability of Berlin.
    - Maintain free access to Berlin.

- At Tab 2A are extracts of statements made by US leaders on Berlin, reflecting solemn declarations of US moral obligation to guarantee stated objectives.

- Following on US national objectives is US policy on military actions in a Berlin conflict, in NSAM 109 (Tab 2B)

- Reference is also made to the Basic National Security Policy statement touching on Berlin.

> "It follows, however, that Germany must be treated within the European and Atlantic communities as a full-fledged major partner, and that the West must not abandon its long-run commitment to the reunification of Germany. We should represent to German opinion that the most effective way - and perhaps the sole peaceful way - to move toward reunification lies in enhancing the strength, stability, and attractive power of the European community into which East Germany might eventually be absorbed. The

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credibility of this posture is dependent upon a firm defense of the freedom of West Berlin, and the maintenance of its viability as a city of international significance, since West Berlin remains a symbol of unification to German opinion

- For the first time, NATO authorities have issued a political directive to its military authorities, spelling out military actions to be taken in Berlin and requesting the contingency plans be prepared.
  - BERCON/MARCON Plans on NAC agenda, 19 Sep
  - "Poodle Blanket" - NATO version of NSAM 109, nearing adoption. (Tab 2C)

- In summary, US, Tripartite Nations, and NATO in full agreement on objectives.
  1. Presence and security of 3 Western garrisons.
  2 Freedom and viability.
  3 Freedom of access
- Also nearing agreement on courses of action and NATO "take over" time table

- Soviet bid includes diametrically opposite actions
  1 Remove Western "occupation forces."
  2 Deny freedom to Berliners
  3 Deny access to Berlin
  4. Destroy viability of Berlin

- Obvious that objectives are irreconcilable.
  - Despite prolonged efforts on negotiations, Allies' position deteriorating, e.g.,
    - Permanent division of Berlin
    - Closing out Soviet Kammandant.

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- Harassments on autobahn, air corridors.
- Transfer to GDR control over road, rail and air traffic.
- Wall
- Threat of German Peace Treaty
- Ability of USSR to control "on" and "off" crises

- As to the future intentions on Berlin, the Special NIE (Tab 2D) in essence indicates Soviets may
  1. Hold door open to further stalemated negotiations (to control situation and collect concessions).
  2. Sign an abbreviated peace treaty (short of complete or immediate turnover of controls)
  3 Increase pressures, e.g., -
     - leave Berlin Air Safety Center
     - put GDR in greater control
     - involve UN at tense phase

- In summary, tension will continue to be built up and exploited by Soviets.
  - Allies will continue to react to Berlin
  - USSR moves in other areas
  - Allies devote tremendous efforts and energies (on daily basis) to reacting.
  - Numerous plans and lists developed for counter actions.
    - Few implemented.
    - Many confusing.

- Although we have to continue supporting stated objectives and pursue courses of action which we know are not permanent solutions, we are not precluded from considering the establishment

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of alternate solutions, the objectives of which would be to improve the current Berlin situation by

(a) Attempting to gain control over access ways to Berlin in hands of FRG, Tripartite Group, NATO, or an international commission (in that order) in any negotiations.

(b) Internationalizing Berlin (including East Berlin) under UN or some form of international body with a UN police force to control, which would include US - and if necessary, Soviet - troops as part of the force. Such an arrangment -- unacceptable unless US forces were part of the UN force

- Above designed to wrest control of access from hands of Soviet/GDR. In the meantime, our long term objectives of reunification and short term objective of maintaining the status quo should be pursued vigorously and new ideas/concepts conceived to exploit the Berlin situation to US advantage.

- Possible advantages to be accrued from crises

1. Serve as a continuous war barometer.
2. Tensions in Berlin bring greater cohesion and harmony among Allies.
3. Permits US to assume better readiness and defense posture
4. For general war, works to disadvantage of Soviets. From Soviet view, Berlin crises is worst time for them to initiate general war. Best for us
5. Serve as "trip wire" for retaliatory forces
6. Gains support of Germans for us
7. Enables us to raise threshold of Soviet response

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- Allies should "keep things stirred up" by taking steps in Berlin and outside of Berlin, i.e., counterpoints - using ways and means of our choosing at times and places that will be most effective and advantageous to US interests. At same time, deny Soviets similar courses of action against us. For example:

  (a) Embark (unilaterally, if necessary) on some of 42 actions recommended (outside Berlin area) JCS 1907/508

  (b) CUBA - Although possible alteration of US action towards Cuba may be necessary, it may be advisable to develop a series of US initiated phased actions against Cuba of varied intensities which would be designed not only to regain Cuba, but also to keep the Soviets "off balance."

  - Reverse the tactics used by Soviets
  - Provide US with opportunity to act rather than react.
  - Has cumulative effects for application to other areas.

  Actions against Cuba include economic sanctions and embargo against friendly and Soviet maritime carriers bringing supplies to Cuba

  - Covert, inadvertent, then overt overflight of Cuba with armed recce aircraft
  - Step up aid to liberation forces
  - Be prepared to respond immediately to request for aid to liberation movement
  - Be prepared for Soviet counteraction in Berlin

  All above done in conjunction with effective propaganda campaign.

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(c) React in Berlin as per NSAM 109, but first "keep pot boiling" by:

- Flying transports over 10,000 ft
- Flying combat aircraft in corridors and later Berlin
- Building wall around Soviet War Memorial under guise
  - to protect from vandalism, riots, etc.

(d) Keep door open to negotiation

- Offer free elections under UN supervision in Cuba/ Berlin.
- Establish German Mixed Committee of both Germanies with neutral country as non-voting member(s).
- Press for German plebiscite

- In conclusion, if US is to stem deteriorating process started by Soviet through Berlin, it must take initiative at places and time of our choosing to be able to gauge reactions of Soviets.
  - Obtain control
  - Get away from "telegraphing our punches "

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SELECTED STATEMENTS ON BERLIN

President Truman - July 19, 1948

"I made the decision ten days ago to stay in Berlin . I insist we will stay in Berlin--come what may."

Secretary of State George C. Marshall - June 30, 1948

"We are in Berlin as a result of agreements between the Governments or the areas of occupation in Germany, and we intend to stay."

Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson - June 29, 1952

"We have given notice, in plain and unmistakable language, that we are in Berlin as a matter of right and of duty, and we shall remain in Berlin until we are satisfied that the freedom of this city is secure We have also indicated in unmistakable terms that we shall regard any attack on Berlin from whatever quarter as an attack against our forces and ourselves "

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles - December 20, 1955

"We possess rights in relation to Berlin which derive from the wartime agreements. We do not believe that the Soviet Union can evade those obligations by setting up a puppet regime in East Germany and East Berlin and claim that it now has authority. We plan to hold the Soviet Union to its very formal and clear obligations with respect to Berlin and access to Berlin . . . "

President Eisenhower - March 16, 1959

"We have no intention of forgetting our rights or of deserting a free people. Soviet rulers should remember that free men have, before this, died for so-called 'scraps of paper' which represented duty and honor and freedom . We cannot try to purchase peace by forsaking two million free people of Berlin . . We will not retreat one inch from our duty."

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President Kennedy - 1961

"The world must know that we will fight for Berlin. We will never permit that city to fall under Communist influence. We are defending the freedom of Paris and New York when we stand up for freedom in Berlin."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk - July 15, 1962

"The West is in Berlin. We are rightfully in Berlin We are not there at the sufferance or at the behest of the Soviet Government. We certainly are not there through the permission of the East Germans. And we are not going to be pushed out."

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US MILITARY POLICY

- National Security Action Memo #109, dated 23 Oct 61, is US national policy
- US response to Soviet denial of Berlin access in four phases.

PHASE I

- Soviet/GDR administratively interfere with air or ground access, no definite blockade
- Response is to execute tripartite contingency plans
  - probe by platoon on ground.
  - fighter escort in air
  - full use of any unblocked access.

PHASE II

- Tripartite actions unsuccessful. Soviet/GDR determined to maintain significant blockade.
- Response escalates to NATO Allies
  - Noncombatant actions
    - economic embargo
    - maritime harassment
    - United Nations actions
  - Prepare for military actions
    - mobilize and reinforce
    - use fully any unblocked access to Berlin

PHASE III

- NATO Phase II actions unsuccessful
- Make clear intentions to gain reopened access.

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- European Theater
  - Expanding non-nuclear air action
    - gain local air superiority
    - extend size and scope as necessary
  - Expanding non-nuclear ground operations
    - into GDR at division or greater strength
    - strong air support
- World-Wide
  - Maritime control
  - Naval blockade
  - For reprisal and pressure
  - Exploit Allied naval superiority

PHASE IV

- IF, despite these actions, Soviets persist, then Allies use nuclear weapons.
  - Selective nuclear attacks to demonstrate will to use nuclear weapons.
  - Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons
    - to gain significant tactical advantage
    - preservation of Allied forces committed
    - extend pressure
- GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR.

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NATO POLICY

- Berlin Quadripartite Plan (BQD-M-30)
  - BQD - version of NSAM 109
  - Essentially same as NSAM 109
  - National differences exist as to when to use nuclear weapons
    - Germans and French prefer selective use earlier than US.
    - UK desires naval actions involving force at later date

- Sec Def and Sec State have requested Presidential approval to forward BQD plan to North Atlantic Council
  - Council meets 19 Sep on Berlin contingency planning, i.e.,
    - BERCON/MARCON Plans
    - Tripartite plans
    - NATO plans
    - Relationship of above plans.
  - Hopes to establish consensus on preferred sequence of action with NSAM 109 and BQDM-30 as basis.

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SUMMARY OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
BERLIN, DATED 1 AUG 62

"Soviet Intentions with Respect to Berlin"

- Estimate is that Khrushchev has concluded US-Soviet talks
  - Will not gain Soviet's advantages in Berlin agreement.
  - That to continue talks would weaken Soviet stated intention to solve Berlin problem.
  - Therefore, USSR is almost certainly considering new tactics.

- Possible Soviet Actions
  - Continue talks in low key, hold tensions in check.
    - Transfer talks to some new forum.
    - Unlikely due to recent tensions, i.e.,
      - Wall shootings, Kommandanturs removal, APCs
    - Shows willingness to raise tensions further.
  - Sign separate peace treaty.
    - Soviets appreciate risks involved in giving East Germans access control
    - However, Soviets past emphasis on intent to do so may force decision
    - No evidence, but may happen any time
  - Increased pressures.
    - More likely one more effort to extract Western concessions
    - Impair Allied or unilateral access rights.
      - Close East Berlin to Western military traffic.
      - Withdraw from Berlin Air Safety Center.
      - More East German activity in administration of access control.
      - Increased propaganda to create atmosphere of "imminent show-down."

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- These actions intended to probe Western reaction
  - Convey Soviet determination to win Berlin on their terms.
  - Gain some of their objectives by cut in four power responsibilities

- Soviets probably doubt harassment will change Western attitude.
  - Recognize risks might be uncontrollable.
  - Probably feel some harassments can be controlled and will use these to raise tensions.

- Soviets probably feel risks are better than appearance of conceding to Western stalling.
  - Less risky than separate peace treaty

- Probable subsequent developments
  - Soviets keep door open to further negotiations.
    - Can use talks to gain any possible concessions.
    - Determine what East German controls West would tolerate
    - Assess impact of harassment actions.
    - Use negotiations to cover retreat if tensions get too high.

- Soviets might sign treaty to avoid loss of prestige in face of Western firmness.
  - Even during treaty preparation, Soviets likely to keep door open.

P/C

[redacted]

- Soviet approach to situations involving East-West confrontation
  - Soviets realize no change in balance of power.
  - Would proceed with caution.
  - Seek to minimize risk.
    - Might develop abbreviated treaty
    - Alter conditions of access short of complete or immediate GDR control.

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MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ERWIN

SUBJECT: Weekly Berlin Contact Group Meeting - 14 September 1962

1. General Gray indicated that the Ambassadorial Group had approved the NATO Poodle Blanket on Thursday, 13 Sep 62. This paper will be addressed by the North Atlantic Council at their meeting on Wednesday, 19 September.

2. He also mentioned that SACEUR's revised BERCON Plan to include additional actions between ALPHA I and ALPHA II should be in this headquarters this weekend. The Joint Staff may request that this plan be addressed prior to Tuesday, 18 September 1962.

3. General Gray will attend the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris during the week of 18 September. Meetings for that week will be on a on-call basis.

JOHN M. BUCHEMENDT
Colonel, USAF
Combined Plans Division
Deputy Director of Plans
for War Plans
Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&P

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Minutes of the Military
Sub-Committee

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Sub BQD-Military 31

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

International Security Affairs
Refer to: I-25930/62

30 August 1962

MEETING OF MILITARY SUBGROUP, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP
2:30 P.M., August 30, 1962

Participants

United States
Admiral Lee, Acting Chairman
Colonel Armstrong, ISA
Captain Cotten, ISA
Captain Shane, ISA
Captain Clinton, OPNAV
Colonel Meacham, ISA
Colonel Spragins, JCS
Mr. Sargent, ISA
Mr. Ausland, State
Mr. Kranich, State

United Kingdom
Lord Hood
Admiral Greig
Commander Grahar
Mr. Brooke

France
M. Winckler
M. Pelen
Captain Fayard

Germany
Dr. Wieck
Colonel Beermann
Lt. Commander Krew

Discussion on Tripartite Naval Countermeasures

Admiral Lee opened the meeting at 2:30 P.M. He mentioned the fact that the redraft of yesterday's paper should be in the embassies by now. He raised the question of whether they needed to meet again. The US would be ready next Thursday or Friday and would want to speak on the residual split, clarifying the US position.

Lord Hood was concerned with the fact that the paper would not get to NATO before September 12. He was surprised that the US had apparently swung over to the opposite point of view.

Winckler expressed agreement.

Lord Hood said he was unsure whether he was ready to accept yesterday's paper. London may not be ready to accept. He expressed his feeling that there was every advantage in leaving the disagreement open. He sees three choices: (1) to finish any operation we were engaged in, (2) to begin a new one, or (3) to go to nuclears.

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Admiral Lee said that there was nothing more he could say because the paper was under consideration by various elements in the government.

Lord Hood asked if he could not catch it. Is it necessary to take a position? Can't we send the paper as is?

Admiral Lee emphasized the gigantic importance of the differences.

Lord Hood said there was a disadvantage in that we won't know until next week. Couldn't we let London see it now? London may be concerned with the same issues; furthermore, if we want to promote NATO discussion then we have done our job. Apparently the Germans know where they are going; but the rest of us have yet to have our positions finalized. Perhaps we could meet tomorrow.

Admiral Lee stated that he would convey Lord Hood's position. Before anything further could be said by the US, the paper would have to be passed around.

M. Winckler stated that he was quite prepared to send yesterday's paper with the recommendation that it be adopted. He was wondering if we could not thrash out the question of the bracketed language.

Admiral Lee stated that he would carry that position to Mr. Nitze. He asked that the meeting turn its attention to the subject under discussion, naval countermeasures.

Lord Hood began his remarks stating that he had referred home a paper of the other day, Annex B to an August 17 paper which dealt with US ideas on coordination and control of naval countermeasures. The basic principle underlying the subject of coordination is that there must be the closest liaison between the control of air and ground measures and the control of naval countermeasures. Second, is the fact that the worldwide aspect of these measures made necessary a high degree of coordination. He stated that the third point he wished to make was that any organization established for purposes of coordinating the planning and operations must be so set up that it would facilitate the transfer of control to NATO. So far as planning is concerned, this group is the responsible quadripartite authority. The four governments' views are coordinated and determined in an effort to achieve a quadripartite view. The first task is for us to reach agreement on the measures we want planned. The planners need to know what they are planning for.

There needs to be a single military authority. What authority might that be? There are two obvious choices: (1) Live Oak, (2) Norfolk. The better choice is the second. There should be in Norfolk a quadripartite group which would be responsible for developing and coordinating plans. Also, it would be desirable to reinforce Live Oak with naval officers so they can work with planners on any European theater plans (insofar as actions are under General Norstad).

In fact the UK sees this as similar to the formulation of MARCON plans. Needed first are political instructions. In other words we need a political decision specifying those measures for which we will need plans. Norfolk would then present plans for consideration to the group here. Thereafter national planning groups would carry out planning the details.

On the operational side we feel that this subgroup is the place where decisions would be taken to institute naval countermeasures on the recommendations of someone like General Norstad or on the initiative of any one government. In considering such a proposal they could rely upon the staff in Norfolk.

Once an order had been given the operations as planned would be carried out under the command of one officer - whatever his nationality - an officer who would act in the name of the other nations as well as in the name of his own. National forces would be earmarked but would be under the command of this one officer. This officer should correspond to a NATO commander. This makes it much easier to change command under any change from tripartite to NATO control.

This does not cover the seas beyond the NATO area. Other situations would be met under appropriate national commanders. For instance, it frequently could fall under Norfolk - both planning and operations.

Regarding the change of control from tripartite to NATO aegis, the control would pass at the same time on the sea that ground or air control passes.

These are the UK thoughts. They coincide with the United States up to a point. The US is suggesting a naval group in Washington not provided for by the UK proposals.

Admiral Lee stated that there seem to be two differences. Regarding the group in Washington, it would be a very informal one. One could argue either way, Washington or Norfolk. Norfolk does have facilities and could perform its functions. The fundamental difference is the question of a command structure for the quadripartite powers where a single commander would both plan and coordinate. This does not fit our command structure. We would need an intermediate group. For instance, even under the British proposal, requests for decision would need to come back from Admiral Dennison to Washington. Washington is the center of our planning, where we get the worldwide outlook.

As far as the single commander is concerned it does not seem necessary to install one. Any system with a single commander would probably break down anyway into a series of national units. What we want is a two-step operation to NATO not a three-step. For instance, what we would do with an East Atlantic problem would be to break down the entire operation, assign different functions to different nations. Orders would come from national governments.

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This is to be contrasted with the situation such as would exist in the corridors where a single command is necessary. On the seas however there is no need for such a command. Each Navy could handle its part of the total operation and of course there would be the necessary coordinating links.

Lord Hood asked if it were not normal practice to divide geographically into theater areas as is done in NATO. For instance, if you are going to institute maritime control between the Shetlands and Iceland, would it not be better to have one admiralty not three?

Admiral Lee stated that detailed planning certainly should be done under one command and in that instance it would be best to give the task to one nation.

Lord Hood questioned whether such a move might not have serious consequences for NATO planning.

Admiral Lee said that he hoped he was not seeing too much from the US viewpoint but it seemed to him to be much simpler to make just one transition in switching to NATO control.

Lord Hood answered the transition would be easier under his plan, where the ships would be under the same command prior to the transition as afterward.

Admiral Lee suggested that in either case a high degree of coordination would be possible thus perhaps minimizing any real problems.

Lord Hood suggested that it was unnecessary to try to settle this issue now. He emphasized the UK's intention that any one of these measures should be carried out by the forces of all three governments. In any instance it would clearly be a tripartite operation. M. Winckler concurred.

Admiral Lee also concurred saying that our unity should be clearly evident.

M. Winckler, referring to discussion of sea measures undertaken during March, stated that it was the French Navy's conclusion and his that there should be national navies coordinated and controlled at the Washington level. Our views fit in with those of the US. We could use naval officers from Norfolk as we might need them. There is no need for a permanent staff, in that there is no necessity for an intermediate body between national and NATO commands.

Admiral Lee asked if he might present the framework in which he saw possible future operations. The US visualized no full-time staff for the group it proposed setting up. There are officers in Washington from each of our governments capable of doing the job. For instance, men from our Joint Staff could serve. Of course Admiral Dennison feels they could perform better outside of Washington where the group would have more rapid access to information.

M. Winckler expressed his preference of using people already in Washington and that existing commands not be duplicated.

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Admiral Lee asked if the two German officers could be assigned to CINCLANT.

Dr. Wieck said that they could.

Lord Hood asked for clarification. If we go to the US position to whom would the Board of Admiralty answer? To this group? What would be the relationship, for instance, between the British Naval Commander and General Norstad?

Admiral Lee stated that this would involve General Norstad in his non-NATO role. On the autobahn and in the corridors it is highly desirable that we be able to implement measures immediately but in maritime measures time is not of the same importance. We would use our entire national naval structure with tripartite coordination; that is, our local admirals could be used for logistics support. The process of coordination would be done in broad strokes here and then the details in the field. As a matter of fact, imagine the frustrations that will arise from the fact that it might take three days to implement measures.

Lord Hood said that he understood the US position on coordinating. Now what would we do about planning?

Admiral Lee said that planning would be done along the lines of our existing system; primarily our Joint Chiefs would do the overall US planning on the basis of theater plans presented from below. Then the procedure would be to coordinate these plans with those of other nations in the Military Subcommittee. The example of France in the Agean Sea was brought up. This was handled in relatively broad strokes. In an actual situation CINCLANT or CINCPAC could plan the details.

M. Winckler said that this was in line with his understanding.

Lord Hood asked where do we make the decision as to what we want to plan for?

Admiral Lee suggested that this would result from quadripartite discussions.

Lord Hood asked if we would not want plans developed quickly, such that broad but specific measures should be studied prior to the time in which they would be implemented.

Admiral Lee introduced the point that factors of the amount of our forces of time and of geographical location would complicate such planning. However, under these circumstances naval officers could prepare broad plans.

Lord Hood thought this operation could be refined for determining which types of instances are worth having four-power plans drawn up for. Some will not be worth any time; others such as harassment and a possible blockade show how plans can be developed which are readily transferable into action.

Admiral Lee said that of course there would be differences in availabilities and that plans would need tying together. As they stand, the rules of engagement are all-right. Significant parts of our planning will come from these. In any

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event we would want to be very cautious before eliminating possibilities until an actual situation arose. The example of trailing was introduced as a measure which could be eliminated perhaps. Admiral Lee went on to say that for the political planning it would be helpful to have people familiar with charts and facts however informal the meeting might be.

Lord Hood said that the British saw this being done in Norfolk.

Admiral Lee stated that Admiral Dennison also saw it this way. Even if the group were to be set up here it would be advantageous to have personnel frequently here from Norfolk. There are considerable benefits resulting from an intermingling of the officials in Washington and in Norfolk. No matter where the group might be established, personnel should travel back and forth often.

Lord Hood suggested that perhaps Norfolk would be hesitant in asking for advice from the quadripartite group.

Admiral Lee felt that the point was well taken and that the question of how much formality the group would have in either location was unimportant. One of the problems is that Norfolk does not focus worldwide. Isn't it also true in your own countries that your representatives would have to be close to your governments?

Lord Hood concurred as did M. Winckler. The latter expressed his belief that it was good to have officers who had been specializing in the affairs of their own country rub shoulders with those of other countries. Moreover, the fact that we (in the subgroup) are politically preoccupied will be good for those responsible for planning. We would not really need to go back and forth but the travel can be beneficial.

Admiral Lee said that Norfolk is an area which specializes in naval command. Also there will be a need to communicate with other commands, for instance, with the Mediterranean Command which is located in London. And the center of our command structure is Washington.

M. Winckler felt that the same was true for the French and used the Ambassadorial Group as an example.

Admiral Lee asked if the Germans wished to add something.

Dr. Wieck stated that the command coordinating should take place in Washington, that the worldwide picture is most obvious. It is difficult to gain this kind of a picture in Norfolk. This is the easiest location for issuing instructions. Basic instructions would come from various governments and then BQD M-24 would be the basic document for national planning. The Ambassadorial Group would coordinate areas, etc., and coordinate with Live Oak. Since all German ships are assigned to NATO in peacetime, German ships could not participate in either national or quadripartite operations. This problem could only be solved by a transfer to NATO.

(Pause)

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Admiral Lee received confirmation from M. Winckler that French instructions had not yet been forthcoming. He said that it seemed wise to make the coordinating structure which the US proposed as consistent as possible with NATO's structure and planning.

Lord Hood asked if the first thing to do wasn't to decide on a list of measures.

Admiral Lee asked if this meant an ad hoc group.

Lord Hood said yes, of course we cannot agree yet on a coordination organization. We must send our views home but perhaps we can establish what we would want an organization to do once it is established. Lord Hood said that there were two sources, first the list we have here and, secondly the list in the Green Book plus the two additional measures. We need to bring our thoughts in line with NATO's.

Admiral Lee suggested that there was a need to relate plans to forces and areas more specifically.

Lord Hood agreed saying that it was his thought that we should have one master list before us of quadripartite plans.

Dr. Wieck suggested that this might be a revised annex. The appropriate groups would be set up.

Lord Hood suggested that some measures on the list might not be worth planning for.

Admiral Lee stated that the task of generating such a list which would coordinate all proposed measures, sumultaneously defining these measures, would be a fairly mechanical task but, he went on, there is a need to put some flesh on these bones. We need to generate concrete examples and also need to relate them to existing NATO Rules of Engagement.

Lord Hood stressed the point that it was not necessary to put flesh on unnecessary bones. For instance, would quadripartite coordination be needed for the augmentation of national naval forces?

Admiral Lee said he agreed 100 percent that some things might be put on the list only to eliminate them.

(Pause)

Admiral Lee continued with the point that on a number of other issues, such as security zones and seizing ships, it would be most useful to have a working group's ideas.

Lord Hood questioned whether this should be done here and not in Norfolk.

Admiral Lee replied that Washington was the place but emphasized that Norfolk's resources would be used.

(Pause)

Lord Hood questioned whether there was any more that could be accomplished today, expressing his desire to report home. He went on addressing Admiral Lee: you have seen actual operations and you see no need for a whole-time staff here, do you? Is it better to do the planning here?

Admiral Lee stated that he too feared the possible disadvantages of centralizing, but reiterated his belief that it could be done best in Washington.

Lord Hood asked that if you are going to have a national operations and coordinating group in Washington, won't you have a headquarters command?

Admiral Lee emphasized that he was on orders not to do that. However, it does not seem to use that we will be operating here. After plans which have been tied together here the group's immediate responsibility will cease. The plans would be sent to the Joint Chiefs and from the War Room would be sent out to commanders. Even if Norfolk performed that function the plans would be sent back to Washington and logistics operations would be run from Washington. Norfolk could not possibly take on all of the logistics problems.

Our problem actually would be much broader than the immediate problem because information regarding command and logistics would need to be assimilated from all theaters. Perhaps it is similar to the UK's case where the Admiralty's advice would apply to more than one theater?

(Pause)

Admiral Lee expressed his desire to transmit Lord Hood's remarks to the Joint Chiefs.

Lord Hood wondered if the above procedure would complicate a NATO take-over.

Admiral Lee said that this is of course a problem we will have to face. It is not so much a NATO-national problem but from an EDP standpoint there will be problems but in a sense we are making problems for ourselves because our forces can move rapidly to adjust to a new command structure. The meeting adjourned at 3:50 P.M.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4 October 1962

RL(62)3 & 4 Berlin (7)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Draft "Estimate of the Situation"

Enclosed herewith is one copy of subject document.

It is requested that you review the attachment and at the Tuesday 9 October, Berlin Contact Group meeting, give the undersigned any comment, suggestions, etc. for consideration in preparation of finalized version. Written comments or changes on the attached would be appreciated.

/s/

R. B. SPRAGINS
Colonel, US Army
Secretary, JSSC

Enclosure
a/s

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4 October 1962

D R A F T

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION # ____

1. Political Situation.

a. The Soviets and GDR to date have taken the following actions infringing on the rights of Western Allies and citizens of Berlin within Berlin and between West Germany and West Berlin

(1) Restricted movement of Allied personnel to one entrance into East Berlin.

(2) Restricted movement of West Berlin citizens to four entrances into East Berlin and West Germans to two entrances.

(3) Denied free access to West Berliners to their East German friends, relatives or associates by strict control of East German personnel entering West Berlin.

(4) Attempted to create a neutral zone on West Berlin side of intra-city border.

(5) Buzzed Allied civil aircraft in the corridors.

(6) Attempts by Soviet BASC personnel to restrict Allied local Berlin flights to West Berlin.

(7) GDR police requested identification and detained US military personnel on autobahn in two instances.

(8) TRAPO and VOPO refusing entry to US personnel in civilian clothing into East Berlin without showing "proper" identification.

(9) Harassing assistance vehicles on Autobahn.

(10) Denied entrance to General Watson and his POLAD to East Berlin unless POLAD showed VOPO identification.

(11) Construction of a "maze" at the Babelsberg and Helmstedt exits of the autobahn and crossing points between East and West Berlin.

(12) Harassing and/or detaining military patrols in East Berlin.

(13) Subjected allied duty trains enroute to and from West Berlin to harassing delays.

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West Berlin to harassing delays.

[redacted]

(14) Continued indications that passport and visa laws of the East German government will be applied. Exact method and timing of application not clearly determined. However, there have been recent reports that Allied travelers are occasionally being given a new type travel document (Laufzettel) by the Soviets at Helmstedt to present to the East Germans at their barrier. Verification has not been made as yet.

(15) Attempts to saturate the air corridors with Soviet flights scheduled through BASC in an attempt to force Allied civil and military flights to comply with Soviet demands for filing beacon crossing times and filing flight plans 24 hours in advance.

(16) Interference with navigational aids by sowing chaff across air corridors.

(17) Withdrawal of Soviet Commandant in East Berlin and replacing with an East German thus complicating the communication problem on greater Berlin problems as well as establishing de facto GDR control of East Berlin.

(18) Shooting East Germans attempting to escape to West Berlin.

(19) Sporadic harassment of Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany.

(20) Attempting to equate Soviet access to West Berlin with Allied access to West Berlin.

b. The series of bilateral top level meetings between heads of government of the Quadripartite powers, the Quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris 11 - 12 Dec 1961, the Foreign Ministers NATO meeting, 13-15 Dec 1961, NATO meeting, May 1962, Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva, June 1962 and the post-Geneva Rusk-Dobrinin talks have accomplished little in the solution to the current Berlin Crisis. The Soviet proposal of an "internationalized" West Berlin with the removal of the special status held by Allied forces in

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Soviet proposal of an "internationalized" West Berlin with

[redacted]

[redacted]

West Berlin has been unacceptable to the Allies. The Soviets (TASS, 11 Sep 1962) have indicated that they will permit the current Berlin situation to exist until after the U.S. elections in November. This possible postponement of a peace treaty does not exclude interim Soviet unilateral action on local Berlin scene designed to achieve de facto changes before eventual peace treaty but probably does preclude major steps likely to entail serious risks. Concurrently with the foregoing, the Soviets/GDR have advanced the following feelers as to the method to be used in the future Berlin discussions possible Rusk-Gromyko talks while Gromyko is attending UN session, four power deputy foreign ministers conference, the UN and German to German contacts. Some of these alternatives probably arise from the fact that bilateral US-Soviet discussions have developed into "hard" positions concerning vital interests which are non-negotiable.

c. Current Soviet statements indicate that a separate peace treaty with the GDR could be accomplished by the end of this year, however, no specific date has been announced. The Soviet vagueness regarding a date possibly stems from the Soviet desire to continue negotiations through one of the channels mentioned above while continuing to use the peace treaty as a veiled threat against the Allies. There is increasing evidence that the East German regime is trying to influence the situation by issuing their positions on negotiable issues. The possibility continues to exist, however, that the Soviets may announce agreement on a treaty on short notice and then formally sign the treaty shortly thereafter

2. Military Situation.

a. Soviet Bloc. The combat effectiveness of Soviet Bloc ground units is at a level considered normal for this time of year. The call-up of new conscripts and demobilization of men completing their service are following seasonal patterns.

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The build-up noted after establishment of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was gradually reduced as tension eased. Disposition of Soviet line divisions remains essentially unchanged with 20 in East Germany, 2 in Poland and 4 in Hungary. There are 45 divisions in the Western Soviet Military Districts. The East German Army comprises 6 ground divisions. The capabilities and readiness of Bloc forces are maintained at a high level through a comprehensive annual training cycle which culminates in large-scale field exercises each fall. Warsaw Pact maneuvers involving Soviet, East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces will probably be held in the forward areas this fall. The Soviet-Satellite Air Forces are in the process of modernizing their forces by re-equipping existing units with higher performance aircraft. The FISHBED/MIG-21 equipped Soviet units based in East Germany are now receiving an all-weather version of this aircraft with some of the older models being transferred to the East German Air Force. The East Germans have approximately 25 of these aircraft presently in their inventory and will probably receive additional aircraft. In addition other Soviet units in the satellites are being re-equipped with the Mach 2 FITTER aircraft which appears to be designed for ground support and a new tactical bomber designated FIREBAR. There is no indication of an acceleration of the Soviet modernization program which began over two years ago. There are no indications that the Satellite air force strengths are being increased.

b. United States.

(1) US forces in Europe were strengthened in 1961, but a substantial proportion of the reinforcement has been, or is scheduled to be, withdrawn. The following summary sets forth the increases and withdrawals:

(a) Army

1. Deployments

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (U)
89 non-divisional support units (U)

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2. Withdrawals

42 of reinforcement units have been withdrawn and 7 more are scheduled to return to the CONUS during the balance of the first half of FY 63. (S)

(b) Air Force

1. Eleven Air National Guard Squadrons (10 fighter squadrons and 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron) were deployed to Europe in November 1961. They were returned to the CONUS during July 1962.(U)

2. One B-66 Tactical Bomber Wing (3 squadrons) stationed in the United Kingdom was inactivated in May 1962. (U)

3. One Tactical Fighter Wing, consisting of four F-84F squadrons, was activated in Europe during May 1962 and will be operationally ready by 1 December 1962. (U)

4. 20 B-47 aircraft (SAC) were deployed to Europe in September 1961 and remain there on "reflex" rotation. (U)

(c) Navy - A Hunter-Killer Group was initially deployed from the east coast of the United States to eastern Atlantic, thence to the Mediterranean. This Hunter-Killer Group returned to the United States, without relief, in September 1962. (U)

(2) CONUS forces were strengthened and expanded, but with the recent release of Reserve component units have been somewhat reduced.

(a) CONUS Army forces currently include eight divisions (all deployable), supporting forces, and a training base capable of handling some 130,000 trainees.

(b) CONUS deployable Air Force elements include 27 tactical fighter squadrons, 4 tactical reconnaissance

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squadrons, 4 tanker squadrons, and 13 troop carrier squadrons. SAC maintains 50% of its strike force on ground alert, capable of reacting within 15 minutes. Of this force, 12 B-52's are kept on continuous airborne alert. In addition, approximately 75 SAC missiles are maintained on 15 minute alert.

(c) Naval forces were strengthened by

1. The retention of 1 CVA, 1 CVS, 1 DD, 5 DERs and 4 APAs, all previously scheduled for inactivation.

2. The activation of 1 CVG, 1 CVSG, 11 fleet support ships and 22 amphibious ships.

3. The recall to active duty of 18 ASW squadrons and 40 DD/DEs from the Reserve components.

4. The 18 ASW squadrons and 40 DD/DEs are not now on active duty The CVA, CVS, CVG and CVSG will be inactivated in October and/or November.

c. NATO (Less United States).

(1) In the Central Region Army strength has reached a level of 27 Division equivalents wher both M-Day and 1st Echelon committed forces are considered. It is expected that two additional German divisions will soon be added and it is possible that two additional French divisions will be added when forces are returned from Algeria. Air capability totals 2,130 aircraft of various types.

(2) In the Northern Region Army strength remains at 4-2/3 divisions. Air strength is 341 aircraft. These divisions, except for one which is a German Division, are not deployed to defend against a ground attack. M-Day units are 50-60% strength and 1st Echelon units require approximately 90 days training after mobilization. Over-all capacity to defend the Northern Region is limited.

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(3) In the Southern Region, Army strength is 36 Division equivalents but the forces are widely separated. Air strength is 993 aircraft.

(See next page.)

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3 Courses of Action

a. Phase I. This phase is considered to be the period up to actual denial of an Allied right by Soviets or GDR. The main thrust of Soviet/GDR actions during this phase appears to be directed toward turn-over to the East German authorities as many of their post-World War II responsibilities as possible and in such a manner as not to present the Western Allies an issue which might cause a confrontation. At some point in this turn-over process, when it best serves Soviet/GDR interests, a Peace Treaty can be expected. It must be anticipated that the treaty will, as a minimum, formalize those functions which the East Germans, in fact, control at the time.

(1) Soviet/GDR courses of action with respect to East-West Berlin access:

(a) Cause minor harassments to Allies with respect to their rights. These could include temporary closing of the border, harassment in the Berlin Control Zone through changes in procedures, ECM or buzzing of air carriers, delays in allowing Allied personnel to pass between West and East Berlin, temporary breaks in telecommunications, interruption of S-bahn, U-bahn, change crossing point, etc. These harassments have the advantage of acting on the nerves of Allies and West Berlin personnel. They also serve as probes and tests of intentions and determination of the Allies. They can serve to distract the Allies from the larger and broader problems They have no disadvantages from the Soviet standpoint. There has been little new in the way of harassment. It is essential for the Allies to react vigorously when there is a direct conflict with Allied basic rights. However, a show of force should not be made unless there is an intent to use it. These harassments are minor now but can be increased readily by the Soviet/GDR should it serve their purposes.

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it. These harassments are minor now but can be increased

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(b) Restrictions with respect to Allied civilian personnel. At present the VOPO's request identification of all Allied civilian personnel whether in official cars and whether accompanied by military personnel. British provide identification, the United States and French do not. The United States and French restrict official civilian personnel from attempting to enter East Berlin in automobiles. The United States permits official civilian personnel to enter East Berlin on foot or by U-bahn or S-bahn and authorizes showing of either ID card or passport but restricts this movement to a few individuals. French practice in this respect is the same as the United States. The United States should continue the above practice since showing ID cards might provoke further restrictions and prejudice our position with respect to procedures on the Autobahn. US non-official civilian personnel such as tourists or businessmen are allowed to show their passport.

(c) Communications between West Berlin Commandants and East Berlin. With the withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant in East Berlin and replacement by an East German, the Allied commandants are left without an opposite number with whom problems internal to Berlin can be discussed. This has forced internal Berlin problems to be handled by other channels, e.g., CINC to CINC, etc.

(d) Showing identification cards by military personnel in uniform. Military personnel in uniform now move freely between East and West Berlin without check. If the GDR attempts to force identification (which would appear to be a possible move by the new East German Commandant in an attempt to demonstrate his authority) the US position is one of self denial of

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ertry to East Berlin rather than accede. No effort at forceable entry will be made. British have concurred temporarily with this position. French have agreed.

(e) Movement of checkpoint. There has been some indication that GDR might attempt to close Friedrich-strasse and open a new checkpoint in the British or French sector. (The possibility of this happening would appear to have increased since the Allies in Berlin have forced the Soviet War memorial guard to cross at Sandkrug Bridge in the British Sector) The three powers have agreed that the Allies would use a new checkpoint but still require the Soviets to use Friedrichstrasse for entry into West Berlin except for the Soviet War Memorial guard.

(f) Action with respect to exclaves such as Steinstucken. The United States now maintains a three man patrol in Steinstucken which is periodically relieved by helicopter. The United States attempts no ground access operations with respect to Steinstucken. Access by West German workmen to Steinstucken is severly restricted. Occasional refugees are being flown out. US position is that no military force can be used against Steinstucken without authority from Washington. JCS position would delegate authority to US Commander, Berlin, to use force in support of patrol within Steinstucken if required.

(2) Soviet/GDR courses of action with respect to access to Berlin.

(a) Harass vehicular movement on Autobahn. This occurs sporadically in connection with alleged traffic violations, closing the autobahn for repairs, procedural delays at checkpoints, as well as restricting autobahn at Helmstedt/Babelsburg from 4 to 2 lanes. If it would develop to a point where it appears to be a systematic campaign of harassment to individual vehicles the following courses are open: the use

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of assistance vehicles could be reinstituted, increase use of armed convoys, supply and/or civilian vehicles could move in convoy with armed escorts.

(b) Turn over responsibility for supervision of Autobahn to GDR but without change in procedures. This action could occur at any time. If this occurs, the Allies have already agreed quadripartitely to acknowledge GDR supervision as Soviet agents as long as there is no change in procedure.

(c) After assuming responsibility for Autobahn, GDR attempt to change procedures. This could occur by requests to substitute new documents authenticated by GDR, by placing customs restrictions on movement or by requiring different documentation. Any of these changes should be considered interference with basic Allied rights and should be cause for application of procedures outlined in Phase II in this paper. (Paragraph 3b).

(d) Interference with air access. Interference with air access, e.g., buzzing, ECM, preempting flight altitudes, etc., is considered possible at any time that such a move is felt by the Soviets/GDR to be in their best interests. If this interference occurs, the Allies should take action in accordance with contingency plans that have been prepared.

(e) Restrict West German barge, rail or road traffic to West Berlin. Such action would affect the viability of West Berlin. Contingency plans, generally in the economic countermeasures area, for this eventuality have been developed. However, no specific military plans have been developed which would take West German civilian traffic under Allied aegis. Consideration of this course of action is still under study in Washington, Bonn and LIVE OAK.

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(3) Soviet courses of action with respect to a peace treaty with the GDR. The most dangerous situation concerns signing a peace treaty prior to successful negotiations with the Western Allies. The Soviets could sign such a treaty on short notice, possibly within two weeks. Such a treaty could provide for an immediate turnover of all sovereign rights to the GDR or it could provide for a progressive turnover, or at a specified later date. In any event, such a peace treaty would complicate any negotiations since the Soviets could hardly back away from commitments made to the GDR in a peace treaty. Such a signature of a treaty without prior East-West negotiations would probably accelerate a major confrontation. Current Soviet actions indicate they intend to sign a treaty. However, no date has been established, probably with the hope that by piecemeal transfer of responsibilities to the GDR, a de facto situation can be established which would merely be formalized by a separate peace treaty. There are indications that the Soviets desire to try to resume East-West talks in some manner (Summit-possibly if Khrushchev attends the UN, introduction of Berlin/German question in the UN, bilateral, etc.) before finalizing the terms of a treaty.

(4) Allied Courses of Action. During this pause there are few, if any, courses of action open to the Allies which would not be responses to Soviet actions, since the basic position of the Allies is for the time being to maintain the status quo. Available courses of action are as follows:

(a) Take action to eliminate existing restrictions. This would include removing of the obstacles at entrances into East Berlin or at Babelsberg and would probably require the use of force. If successful, this would have the advantage of restoring the status quo temporarily, but it is doubtful that such action would

prevent future restrictive actions by the Soviets or GDR. The great disadvantage is the vulnerable tactical position of the Allies in Berlin itself where all restrictions now exist. If restricted by force, the Allies could not win and would, therefore, suffer a psychological as well as military set back which would have extensive consequences. Currently neither US national policy nor that of its Allies favors this course of action.

(b) Take reprisals in Berlin and elsewhere in the world for Soviet's restrictive actions. Without actually using force, the number of reprisal actions are relatively limited during this phase. To date the Czech and Polish missions in West Berlin have been denied certain privileges, Bloc vehicles in West Berlin have been periodically harassed and the Soviet Commandant has been denied entrance into the American sector of Berlin. The most potent reprisal is economic countermeasures including restriction of IZT. It is generally not considered desirable to expend this weapon in relation to the restrictive actions that have thus far been taken. Further, there is no agreement among the NATO Allies on selective economic countermeasures which would be applicable during this phase. Likewise, all reprisal actions would have an irritating effect and, taken as a whole, do not appear sufficient to cause the Soviets to back down. However, there may be actions which can be taken, especially in Berlin which could lean against the barrier and cause the Soviets concern. The stationing of an ambulance at Checkpoint "CHARLIE" is a recent example of "leaning" against the Wall. Further possibilities are being explored by the Allied representatives in Berlin. One suggestion is to withdraw current Allied reservations on West Berlin incorporation in the FRG.

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explored by the Allied representatives in Berlin. One

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(c) React to any harassment, restriction, or reprisal taker by the Soviets. This has the advantage of probing Soviet intentions and also showing determination to restrict encroachment on rights. The disadvantage lies in possible escalation. However, the advantages are overriding. Together with this course of action there must be a logical and continuous series of actions taken to show determination and which indicate preparedness for serious action to include war. To be effective Allied action must be promptly applied and in sufficient force to at least establish the status quo. The recently tripartitely adopted rules of conduct for autobahn convoys and the suspension of TTDs are examples.

(d) Development of Leverage. The basic weakness in the Allied position is that it lacks adequate political or economic leverage which can be applied against vital Soviet/GDR interests in order to prevent Soviet/GDR actions. Such leverage which the Allies ment exists for the development of usable leverage.

b. Phase II. This phase covers the period following an actual continuing blockage of an Allied right by the Soviets or the GDR and lasts until such time as military operations commence.

(1) Soviet Courses of Action. As previously discussed, curtailment of rights could come from either the Soviets or the GDR. This interference could be with land or air access rights or a combination thereof. It would occur at any time but it is unlikely to occur prior to the signing of a peace treaty. A Soviet/GDR peace treaty,

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signing of a peace treaty.

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depending upon its content, might well signal the imminence of Phase II. It must be expected that during this phase the Soviet bloc will react in the political, economic and military fields to offset Allied actions.

(2) Allied Courses of Action. When Allied rights are denied NATO should go on an appropriate alert, nations should mobilize and preparedness for war to include world-wide deployment accelerated. Appropriate reprisal measures such as minor naval and air countermeasures should be initiated. All efforts made to attain objectives, by nonmilitary means such as economic blockade and political measures, should continue concurrently. During Phase II any unblocked access route should be used to the maximum.

c. Phases III and IV. These phases cover the military operations conducted by NATO designed to persuade the Soviet/GDR to restore Allied rights in Berlin, and failing persuasion with respect to rights in Berlin, to defeat the Soviet Bloc. Plans designed to meet these situations have been developed.

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4. A Probable Soviet/GDR Course of Action. It appears that for the next several weeks the Soviets and GDR intend to maintain essentially the status quo. A recent Soviet announcement indicates that this lull will last through the US elections in November. It must be anticipated that at a time to suit Soviet conveniences the Berlin situation will become more active, probably preceded by Soviet overtures for further discussions. At any time after discussions have resumed, a peace treaty may be signed. The following is considered as a course of action best calculated to achieve their objectives without precipitating war:

a. Gradually transfer Soviet responsibilities for East Berlin to the GDR. Responsibilities transferred would be non-provocative to the Allies but establishing a de facto situation of including East Berlin in the GDR.

b. Impose additional restrictions on the movement of Allied civilian and military personnel into East Berlin which would be unacceptable to the Allies and which would in effect complete the sealing off of East Berlin from West Berlin.

c. Begin gradual application of harassments and restrictions in areas designed to weaken the morale of West Berliners and effect the viability of the city. At the same time intensify the already strong psychological warfare program against West Berlin.

d. Transfer responsibility for ground access to Berlin to the GDR without change in procedures.

e. Institute minor harassments and restrictions designed to test Allied intentions and increase the possibilities of dissension among the Allies. At the same time intensify the campaign to convince West Berliners of the hopelessness of their situation and encourage West Berliners to leave the city.

f. Continue to attempt to equate Soviet access to West Berlin to Allied access to West Berlin.

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g. Increase the Soviet presence in West Berlin.

h. Continue to downgrade the position of the Allied commandants in Berlin.

i. When West Berlin morale is sufficiently eroded, begin a coordinated program of gradually escalated restrictions on Allied access similar to the process used in Berlin.

j. Gradually turn over to the GDR certain functions now performed by Soviet military followed by a relocation of Soviet military forces toward the East (away from the West German-East German border) and replacement with GDR forces. This realignment would initially confront any Allied military probe with GDR rather than Soviet forces.

k. If ground access is blocked without precipitating military action, then initiate actions to effect blockage of air access as well.

l. Throughout the period of the above listed actions, carry on a program of military preparation designed to outmatch any preparations by the Allies and likewise intimidate the Free World. Simultaneously carry on a psychological program of threats intermingled with conciliatory gestures designed to influence so-called uncommitted countries.

m. Utilize the UN as a forum justifying their theme "the war has been over 17 years and a new status for Berlin is necessary."

5. Political Implications of the Probable Soviet/GDR Course of Action for the Allies.

a. Since the United States has accepted as national policy that force will not be used to maintain rights in East Berlin, the GDR will be able to effectively seal East Berlin. None of the Allies will oppose the United States in this course of action.

b. The attack on the morale and viability of West Berlin will pose a problem for the Allies as how best to combat it. There is no solution at present. The transfer of autobahn

There is no solution at present. The transfer of autobahn

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procedures to GDR without change will not precipitate a crisis as quadripartite agreement has already been reached that this change will not be opposed.

c. The initiation of any change in procedures will force the Allies to face the issue of whether to consider the initial changes as basic interference with Allied rights.

d. If it is considered as basic interference, then probes would be initiated and a major confrontation could ensue. If the initial change is not considered as basic interference, then the Allies could be faced with the same gradual erosion of their position as has been encountered in Berlin.

e. If a long period of gradual harassment and restriction is allowed to transpire and the Soviet effort to erode West Berlin morale is successful, it is possible that a mass exodus from West Berlin would reach such proportions that the present Allied objectives with respect to Berlin would have little further validity.

f. The signing of a peace treaty may or may not affect East-West relations over Berlin, depending upon the provisions. If the peace treaty only formalizes the de facto situation existing at the time with no provisions for an extension of GDR impingement upon Allied rights, a serious situation is not apt to develop. However, secret portions of the treaty may well remain unknown to the Allies.

6. Military Implications. Following are military implications of the present situation and the actions and counteractions analyzed above.

a. Forces. NATO requires 30 divisions as a minimum in the Central region to successfully defend Central Europe in a nuclear war. To be ready for such a war approximately five additional divisions beyond those now projected should be provided in Europe (preferably by Allies), existing units brought to strength, essential support units added and

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logistical backup provided. Since an extreme crisis could develop quickly without time for a desirable buildup, every measure should be taken now that would expedite a rapid buildup if required. In addition, prior to and during negotiations it is extremely important that every effort be made to convince the Soviet Bloc of our intent. Force buildup is the biggest factor. Therefore, concomitant actions of varying degrees should be taken in all fields of preparedness which would present to Soviet intelligence an unescapably clear picture of an alliance actively and purposefully preparing for a war contingency. However, if Allied rights are suddenly denied within the next month, the flexibility of Allied response in Central Europe will be limited. Our problem now is that we are entering on a period of uncertainty when timing of military preparations is most difficult. Khrushchev has set no deadlines for signing a treaty. There are no firm indications of, if, or when negotiations may take place.

b. Plans. The Quadripartite Powers agreed over-all concept has been introduced into NAC for NATO consensus. Tripartite contingency plans to test ground and air access are complete through levels of operations consistent with tripartite guidance provided LIVE OAK. NATO defensive plans are complete, and concepts of operations for land, sea and air offensive operations are currently being considered by NAC. There has been no coordination of national plans on a world-wide scale outside the NATO area. Further work by the NATO nations is required in order to provide SACEUR sufficient authority to place forces rapidly in the proper state of alert prior to implementing contingency plans.

c. Command and Control. Tripartite command procedures (LIVE OAK) are generally complete. A suggested coordination between LIVE OAK and NATO has been developed by the quadripartite powers and is currently being considered by NAC.

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The problem of accelerating the speed with which governmental decisions can be agreed upon between the Allies has not been resolved as yet. Coordination and control measures for tripartite naval countermeasures are incomplete as are harassing measures which can be taken against Soviet Bloc civil and military aircraft when flying over Allied territory.

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16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Weekly Berlin Contact Group Meeting, 0845, 16 October 1962

1. There is an attitude change in the air, source is unknown but suspected to be a fallout of Mr. McGeorge Bundy trip to Europe. The change is the thought that there must be more delegated authority given to the commanders relative to the problem of Berlin. Gen Gray believes the degree of delegated authority depends upon the circumstances obtaining at the time, and that current delegated authorities are adequate.

2 On aid to the injured on the East Berlin side of the wall, there is a question as to whether new guidance issued; i.e., use the "shortest route" to render assitance, means going over the wall or using the nearest gate through the wall. J-3 and representatives from the State Department are addressing the question to determine whether an "over the wall" capability should be developed.

3. Chambering the bridges over the Havel River for demolition charges -- there is some question as to the real value of preparing the bridges for destruction. USCINCEUR has recommended the action on "purely military grounds." The question arises as to the desirability on political grounds and on the possibility of undesireable psychological effects. J-5 is preparing a lengthy reply for use by Gen Gray in discussion with State -- J-5 indicates that the JCS will not address the issue unless specifically desired by the Services.

4. Sea Spray, the controlling agency for maritime countermeasures, is getting underway in CINCLANT Headquarters at Norfolk. There is some thought being given that possibly there should be a Super Sea Spray to report directly to the Ambassadorial Group and to control world-wide naval countermeasures. At present Sea Spray covers the Atlantic, while CINCUSNAVEUR covers the Mediterranean for Live Oak.

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5. Approval of Marcon Plans. There are two problems:

a. Belgium questions the need for demonstrative nuclear weapons in Bercon/Marcon Plans. Gen Norstad is to submit views on this point to the Standing Group. The U.S. position is to have plans for the use of nuclear weapons in the plans, leaving the question of whether they are used or not to an evaluation of the circumstances.

Declassified by DFOISR
on 18 March 02

b. The use of nuclear weapons at sea as reflected in Marcon Plans is considered to be an unresolved question. The problem grows from SACEUR alluding to the need for predelegated authority to use nuclear weapons in defense of forces at sea. When the Bercon/Marcon plans were reviewed by the North Atlantic Council, SACLANT and SACEUR were both

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instructed to delete from their maritime plans any implication that there was a predelegated authority to use nuclear weapons. SACEUR deleted the assumption but the idea was introduced into the discussion portion of his plans; that SACEUR should have the authority predelegated to use nuclear weapons at sea in self defense. State and Defense believe that Gen Ruffner should be directed to address the issue and have the Standing Group take action through military channels to introduce a political comment in rebuttal of SACEUR's opinion. (NOTE: Gen Gray commented that the Defense Dept is quoting a Navy study, now on Admiral Anderson's desk, that concludes that the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea would be unwise. The Navy member of the Berlin Contact Group will research.)

6. As a result of Gen Chapman, USAF, Live Oak, conversation with Gen Maxwell Taylor, the summary of current Berlin actions was prepared (Atch 1).

7. A new study on Berlin Contingency Planning is under consideration by the Secretary of Defense. The study involves the examination of Phase II transition into Phase III. The issues are whether Phase II is too long and whether the transition should be from Phase I into Phase III. Gen Gray commented that this should have been resolved before the current North Atlantic Council paper on the phases was presented. Gen Gray had advance copies of the SecDef letter, but did not distribute them pending official receipt.

8. Another new thought in the air is that possibly more aggressive; i.e., Phase II, actions are called for in Berlin operations. This is closely tied in with the proposed study above and the discussions attendant to relating the NATO Alert System actions to National Alert Systems of NATO member nations.

9. A matter of White House interest is the prepositioning of a company of U.S. troops at the Helmstedt area to reduce reaction times of the launching of ground probes. Two messages apply: ALO 876, DA IN 276141, 131446Z Oct 62. SHLO 9-000107, DA IN 276198, 131440Z Oct 62. These messages discuss in detail the timing involved in execution of ground probes.

10 Gen Gray has recommended that the historical summary of Berlin actions prepared by the Joint Staff be distributed to the Services.

11. Gen Chapman, USAF, Live Oak, stated that he will initiate discussions with USCINCEUR/SACEUR on the value of designating a Single Commander for Berlin as a step in anticipation of heightened tensions or problems in Berlin. At present, the Single Commander designation is a reactive action after difficulties arise.

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12. Gen Chapman also discussed conversation held with Mr. Brockway McMillan, Asst Secretary of the Air Force (R&D). The discussions concerned the operation of Bamboo Tree (ECCM) equipments. Gen Chapman is of the opinion that there is an operational control gap existing which possibly requires the establishment in Berlin of a Central Operational authority to coordinate civil air traffic, military air traffic and Bamboo Tree equipment operation. A concern is felt that if the full capability of this latest in the state-of-the-art countermeasures gear is revealed, that the Soviets will take further steps to offset the gains made. Another consideration is that communications security measures must be taken to limit the acquisition of information by the news media, who pre-empt official action through news stories flashed to the world. He cited the fact that one news agency monitors air traffic control frequencies, and is thereby immediately informed of air corridor problems. Secretary McMillan will visit Europe in the near future and Gen Chapman will at that time pursue Bamboo Tree operational considerations further.

EINO E. JENSTROM
Colonel, USAF
AFXPD-PL-CP

2 Atch
1. Charts - mil actions
2. Estimate of Situation #8

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15 October 1962

The attached summary charts were prepared by General Gray at the direction of the Chairman, JCS. The charts include those major military actions which are currently under consideration or might be within the near future. These are for information and planning only.

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SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURRENT JCS CONCERN
1. Chambering of Havel River Bridges Recent review of Berlin defense plans by Allied Staff Berlin (ASB) reveals bridges over the Havel are not chambered. This situation has been reported through State channels from Berlin with request for political guidance as to whether or not chambering should be done.	Recommendations from Berlin and Bonn recommend no chambering now due to possible psychological impact. J-5 currently developing military position considering CINCEUR recommendation.	X
2. Aid to Wounded Tripartite Allies in Berlin maintain an ambulance at Friedrichstrasse crossing point prepared to render aid to East Berliners wounded on the East Berlin side of the wall while attempting to escape.	On 8 Oct 1962 the British Ambulance from Friedrichstrasse was denied entrance into East Berlin when attempting to render assistance. State considering what action, if any, is to be taken with respect to maintain an ambulance watch in the future.	X
3. Steinstucken The exclave of Steinstucken lies adjacent to the American Sector of West Berlin and is administered by West Berlin authorities. Surface access between West Berlin and Steinstucken crosses GDR territory and passage is therefore subject to harassment. US maintains MP patrol in Steinstucken and uses only helicopters for communication. USCOB has a military plan for ground probe.	No problem at the present. US policy states no attempt will be made to force ground access without authority from Washington.	
4. Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) Quadripartite (US,UK,Fr & Soviets) air center through which flights in the air corridors and in the Berlin Control Zone are cleared to assure safety.	No problems at the present. Procedures have been worked out over a period of time. BASC is subject to Soviet intransigence at any time.	

[redacted] SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURRENT JCS CONCERN
5. Military Missions US, UK and Fr maintain military missions in East German while Soviets maintain military missions in West German.	No problem at the present. Occasional harassment by East German police or Soviets-tailing, detaining, etc.	
6. Channels of Communications with Soviets With the withdrawal of Soviet Commandant in East Berlin in Aug 1962, and the establishment of an East German Army Officer as his replacement, Allied Commandants have no opposite number with whom to deal on local Berlin matters. The result has been that communication channel has now been established CINC to CINC (Freeman to Yakubovsky). The effect of the Soviet move has been to down grade the position previously held by the Allied Commandants.	No problem at the present.	
7. LONG THRUST This is a continuing military exercise by which 2 Battle Groups from US based Divisions are maintained in Europe for 6 months TDY. One Battle Group is located in Wildflecken, West Germany, and other is located in West Berlin.	J-3 is currently evaluating requirement for continuing LONG THRUST as presently constituted. The requirement for a 3d BG in Berlin is recognized as a purely political requirements.	X
8. Single Commandant, Berlin CINCEUR has been authorized by the Tripartite nations having forces in Berlin to give the US Commander, Berlin, executive responsibility as the single Commander, Berlin in the following situations: a. Overt armed attack against West Berlin. b. In the event of grave civil disturbance.	No problem at the present.	

SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURR JCS CONCERN
9. US Military Activities in East Berlin (Patrols, etc.) USCOB dispatches military patrols, sightseeing tours, etc. into East Berlin on a periodic basis. As the situation dictates these activities are increased to make US military presence in East Berlin noticeable.	No problem at the present. Occasional harassment by East German police or Soviets-tailing, detaining. No policy exists to cope with the possible situation of Soviet/GDR seizure and prolonged detention of patrol or sightseeing tour.	X
10. Helicopters over East Berlin There is a continuing military requirement for periodic helicopter flights to obtain intelligence. In the past the Soviets have protested these flights. However, there is no legal basis for Soviet protests. Periodic flights continue. Soviets have threatened to fire on extremely low flying helicopters over East Berlin.	No problem at the present, although Soviet protests are filed when helicopters fly over East Berlin. CINCEUR has directed flights be in excess of 1,000 feet and avoid Soviet installations. Exceptions must be approved by CINCEUR.	
11. Checkpoint Procedures Agreed tripartite procedures for clearing the autobahn checkpoints manned by the Soviets have been developed. Minor differences in exact procedures do exist e.g. British lower tailgates while US and France do not, but these differences have been identified and tripartite authorities in Berlin are aware of them. Soviets have from time to time attempted to force acceptance upon all Allied traffic those procedures practiced by one Ally (i.e. tailgates) upon the other Allies in an attempt to exert greater control over autobahn traffic. These attempts have been successfully resisted.	No problem at the present, but the checkpoints represent potential trouble spot at all times. Occasional harassment such as new demands by the Soviets can be expected at any time.	

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SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURRENT JCS CONCERN
12. Convoy Rules Tripartitely agreed Rules of Conduct for Convoy Commands have been developed. These rules cover in detail the following situations which might confront a convoy commander. a. Administrative resistance at checkpoint (refusal to honor properly documented papers). b. Passive undefended and/or defended obstacles within the checkpoint. c. Undefended or passive obstacles which can be removed by means integral to the convoy. d. Undefended or passive obstacles are encountered between checkpoints on the autobahn. e. Troops bodily attempt to block autobahn. f. Large number of persons or accumulation of traffic not disposed in defensive positions. g. Defended obstacles which cannot be removed with means integral to convoy or sizeable troop units disposed for defense. h. Interference with convoy by GDR personnel. i. Convoy fails to get through.	No problem at the present.	
13. BAMBOO TREE This is an Air Force project designed to equip Templehof airport and selected USAF planes with the most up-to-date ECCM equipment in order to improve airlift capability to defeat any Soviet/GDR ECM effort. The project is virtually complete. The electronic installations represent the most advanced equipment within the present state of the art.	No problem at the present. In spite of the effort which has been put into this project there is no positive assurance that Soviet/GDR maximum ECM effort can be penetrated. Soviet/GDR capability in ECM is not fully known.	

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SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURRENT JCS CONCERN
14. LIVE OAK PLANS LIVE OAK ground plans (FREE STYLE, BACK STROKE, TRADE WIND, LUCKY STRIKE) and air plans (JACK PINE) are complete. JUNE BALL (tripartite Division plan) is currently being prepared at CINCEAOR.	No action at the present. Efforts should be made to expedite completion of JUNE BALL plan.	X
15. RAIL PROBE LIVE OAK is presently finalizing a rail probe plan designed for use in the event Soviet/GDR block Allied military rail access.	No action at the present. When the Rail Probe plan is received, prepare to review.	
16. German Civilian Access German Civilian Access ties in with the viability of West Berlin. This problem has no present military implications since the counter actions presently under quadripartite consideration are generally political and economic. However, it is possible that at some future time there may be a requirement to develop military plans which would take German civilian traffic under military aegis in the form of armed convoys.	No action at the present. Be prepared if required to have military plans prepared.	
17. BERCON/MARCON PLANS The operational concepts developed by SACEUR and SACLANT are currently being reviewed by the NAC. Detailed supporting plans have not been developed by subordinate military commanders.	Press for early approval by the NAC of operation concepts. Press for rapid development by subordinate military commanders of their detailed plans.	X

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SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURRENT JCS CONCERN
18. Forward Strategy The Berlin situation has made more urgent the desirability of NATO adoption of the forward strategy. Adoption of such a strategy would be visible evidence of Allied determination with respect to Berlin. However, such a strategy is dependent upon increasing the NATO strength.	Currently under active study by SACEUR	X
19. Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures. Naval countermeasures which the quadripartite nations to counter Soviet/GDR Harassment in Berlin are being considered. In addition to those measures which might be usable, the method of quadripartite command and control are being considered.	Under consideration by the Quadripartite Military subgroup.	X
20. Minor Air Countermeasures. Minor air countermeasures are those minor harassing measures which the NATO nations might take against Soviet Bloc civil and military aircraft outside of Bloc territory in retaliation for harassment in Berlin. The measures to be successful must be supported on a NATO wide basis.	EUCOM at JCS direction is currently conducting study on the actions which would appear appropriate. When completed it is anticipated that LIVE OAK will then prepare plans which can be turned over to NATO nations for implementation.	X

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SITUATION	[illegible]	[illegible]
21. 3d Set of Division Equipment CINCEUR has recommended that an additional set of Divisional equipment be pre-stocked in Europe. This would be in addition to the equipment for one (1) Infantry and one (1) Armored division already pre-stocked.	Under consideration by the Joint Staff.	X
22. Tripartite NATO Relationship A quadripartitely agreed paper which sets out the relationship between the planning and operational responsibility in military matters between the tripartite powers (LIVE OAK) and NATO. This paper details the method by which command changes from LIVE OAK military operations (FREE STYLE, TRADE WIND, etc.) to NATO military operations (BERCON/MARCON).	Being considered by NAC.	
23. NATO Preferred Sequence of Action. A quadripartitely agreed "Preferred Sequence of Action" has been introduced into the NAC for their consideration in conjunction with the tripartite-NATO relationship paper and the BERCON/MARCON plans. The "NATO Preferred Sequence of Action" is based on NSAM 109 (US Preferred Sequence of Action - "Poodle Blanket").	In NAC for consensus. It would be most desirable if NAC would approve this document since it would then serve as a strategy document for use by all NATO nations.	
24. Coordination of NATO Alert System with NATO Preferred Sequence of Action Papers The NATO Preferred Sequence of action indicates the four preferred phases through which a Berlin crisis would develop (Soviets permitting). The problem of what alert measures should NATO take during each of these phases remains to be determined. Additionally, a reduction in the number of items within the NATO alert system upon which nations reserve must be reduced to permit NATO commanders more flexibility.	The coordination of the Preferred Sequence and NATO alert system is currently being considered by SGI. The problem of reducing the number of national reserved items is being considered by the NAC.	

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SITUATION	CURRENT STATUS	CURRENT JCS CONCERN
25. Military Buildup The problem is one of determining the degree and phasing of military actions and buildup during Phases I and II within the context of NATO preferred Sequence of action. Relatively little on a NATO wide basis has been accomplished in this area.	Upon acceptance of the NATO Preferred Sequence of Action, push for a NATO program of those military actions and buildup which each nation would undertake.	X

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ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION # 8

1. Political Situation

a. The Soviets and GDR to date have taken the following actions infringing on the rights of Western Allies and citizens of Berlin within Berlin and East Germany and between West Germany and West Berlin.

(1) Restricted movement of Allied personnel to one entrance into East Berlin.

(2) Restricted movement of West Berlin citizens to four entrances into East Berlin and West Germans to two entrances.

(3) Denied free access to West Berliners to their East German friends, relatives or associates by strict control of East German personnel entering West Berlin.

(4) Attempted to create a neutral zone on West Berlin side of intra-city border.

(5) Buzzed Allied civil aircraft in the corridors.

(6) Attempted to restrict Allied local Berlin flights to West Berlin.

(7) GDR police requested identification and detained US military personnel on autobahn in two instances.

(8) TRAPO and VOPO refused entry to US personnel in civilian clothing into East Berlin without showing "proper" identification.

(9) Harassed assistance vehicles on autobahn.

(10) Denied entrance to General Watson and his POLAD to East Berlin unless POLAD showed VOPO identification.

(11) Construction of a "maze" at the Babelsberg and Helmstedt exits of the autobahn and crossing points between East and West Berlin.

(12) Harassed and/or detained military patrols in East Berlin.

(13) Subjected allied duty trains enroute to and from West Berlin to harassing delays.

(14) Indicated that passport and visa laws of the East German government will be applied. Exact method and timing of application not clearly determined. However, there have been recent reports that Allied travelers are occasionally

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being given a new type travel document (Laufzettel) by the Soviets at Helmstedt to present to the East Germans at their barrier. Verification has not been made as yet.

(15) Attempted to saturate the air corridors with Soviet flights scheduled through BASC in an apparent attempt to force Allied civil and military flights to comply with Soviet demands for filing beacon crossing times and filing flight plans 24 hours in advance.

(16) Interfered with navigational aids by sowing chaff across air corridors.

(17) Withdraw Soviet Commandant in East Berlin and replaced with an East German thus complicating the communication problem on greater Berlin problems as well as appearing to establish de facto GDR control of East Berlin.

(18) Shoot East Germans attempting to escape to West Berlin.

(19) Sporadically harassed of Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany.

(20) Attempted to equate Soviet access to West Berlin with Allied access to West Berlin.

b. The series of bilateral top level meetings between heads of government of the Quadripartite powers, the Quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris 11-12 Dec 1961, the Foreign Ministers NATO meeting, 13-15 Dec 1961, Thompson-Gromyko talks in Moscow Jan, Feb, Mar 1962, NATO meeting, May 1962, Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva, Mar and Jul 1962, and the post-Geneva Rusk-Dobrinin talks have accomplished little in the solution to the current Berlin Crisis. The Soviet proposal of an "internationalized" West Berlin with the removal of the special status held by Allied forces in West Berlin has been unacceptable to the Allies. The Soviets (TASS, 11 Sep 1962) have indicated that they will permit the current Berlin situation to exist until after the United States elections in November. This possible postponement of a peace treaty does not exclude interim Soviet unilateral action on local Berlin scene designed to achieve de facto changes before eventual peace treaty but probably does preclude major steps likely to entail serious risks.

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Concurrently with the foregoing, the Soviets/GDR have advanced the following feelers as to the method to be used in the future Berlin discussions: Rusk-Gromyko talks while Gromyko is attending UN session, four power deputy foreign ministers conference, the UN, German to German contacts and possible "summit" between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev in the event the latter attends the current UN session. Some of these alternatives probably arise from the fact that bilateral US-Soviet discussions have developed into "hard" positions concerning vital interests which are non-negotiable.

c. Current Soviet statements indicate that a separate peace treaty with the GDR could be accomplished by the end of this year, however, no specific date has been announced. The Soviet vagueness regarding a date possibly stems from the Soviet desire to continue negotiations through one of the channels mentioned above while continuing to use the peace treaty as a veiled threat against the Allies. There is increasing evidence that the East German regime is trying to influence the situation by issuing their positions on negotiable issues. The possibility continues to exist, however, that the Soviets may announce agreement on a treaty on short notice and then formally sign the treaty shortly thereafter, or as a variant, sign a peace treaty and immediately introduce the Berlin situation into the UN in the hopes of blocking Allied reaction.

2. Military Situation

a. Soviet Bloc. The combat effectiveness of Soviet Bloc ground units is at a level considered normal for this time of year. The call-up of new conscripts and demobilization of men completing their service are following seasonal patterns.

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The build-up noted after establishment of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was gradually reduced as tension eased. Disposition of Soviet line divisions remains essentially unchanged with 20 in East Germany, 2 in Poland and 4 in Hungary. There are 25 divisions in the Western Soviet Military Districts. The East German Army comprises 6 ground divisions. The capabilities and readiness of Bloc forces are maintained at a high level through a comprehensive annual training cycle which culminates in large-scale field exercises each fall. Warsaw Pact maneuvers involving Soviet, East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces will probably be held in the forward areas this fall. The Soviet-Satellite Air Forces are in the process of modernizing their forces by re-equipping existing units with higher performance aircraft. The FISHBED/MIG-21 equipped Soviet units based in East Germany are now receiving an all-weather version of this aircraft with some of the older models being transferred to the East German Air Force. The East Germans have approximately 25 of these aircraft presently in their inventory and will probably receive additional aircraft. In addition other Soviet units in the satellites are being re-equipped with the Mach 2 FITTER aircraft which appears to be designed for ground support and a new tactical bomber designated FIREBAR. There is no indication of an acceleration of the Soviet modernization program which began over two years ago. There are no indications that the Satellite air force strengths are being increased.

b. United States.

(1) US forces in Europe were strengthened in 1961, but a substantial proportion of the reinforcement has been, or is scheduled to be, withdrawn. The following summary sets forth the increases and withdrawals:

(a) Army

1. Deployments

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (U)
89 non-divisional support units (U)

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2. Withdrawals

42 of reinforcement units have been withdrawn and 7 more are scheduled to return to the CONUS during the balance of the first half of FY 63. (S)

(b) Air Force

1. Eleven Air National Guard Squadrons (10 fighter squadrons and 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron) were deployed to Europe in November 1961. They were returned to the CONUS during July 1962.(U)

2. One B-66 Tactical Bomber Wing (3 squadrons) stationed in the United Kingdom was inactivated in May 1962. (U)

3. One Tactical Fighter Wing, consisting of four F-84F squadrons, was activated in Europe during May 1962 and will be operationally ready by 1 December 1962. (U)

4. 20 B-47 aircraft (SAC) were deployed to Europe in September 1961 and remain there on "reflex" rotation. (U)

(c) Navy - A Hunter-Killer Group was initially deployed from the east coast of the United States to eastern Atlantic, thence to the Mediterranean. This Hunter-Killer Group returned to the United States, without relief, in September 1962. (U)

(2) CONUS forces were strengthened and expanded, but with the recent release of Reserve component units have been somewhat reduced.

(a) CONUS Army forces currently include eight divisions (all deployable), supporting forces, and a training base capable of handling some 130,000 trainees.

(b) CONUS deployable Air Force elements include 27 tactical fighter squadrons, 4 tactical reconnaissance

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squadrons, 4 tanker squadrons, and 13 troop carrier squadrons. SAC maintains 50% of its strike force on ground alert, capable of reacting within 15 minutes Of this force, 12 B-52's are kept on continuous airborne alert. In addition, approximately 75 SAC missiles are maintained on 15 minute alert.

(c) Naval forces were strengthened by:

1. The retention of 1 CVA, 1 CVS, 1 DD, 5 DERs and 4 APAs, all previously scheduled for inactivation.

2. The activation of 1 CVG, 1 CVSG, 11 fleet support ships and 22 amphibious ships

3. The recall to active duty of 18 ASW squadrons and 40 DD/DEs from the Reserve components

4. The 18 ASW squadrons and 40 DD/DEs are not now on active duty. The CVA, CVS, CVG and CVSG will be inactivated in October and/or November

c. NATO (Less United States).

(1) In the Central Region Army strength has reached a level of 27 Division equivalents when both M-Day and 1st Echelon committed forces are considered. It is expected that two additional German divisions will soon be added and it is possible that two additional French divisions will be added. Air capability totals 2,130 aircraft of various types

(2) In the Northern Region Army strength remains at 4-2/3 divisions. Air strength is 341 aircraft. These divisions, except for one which is a German Division, are not deployed to defend against a ground attack. M-Day units are 50-60% strength and 1st Echelon units require approximately 90 days training after mobilization. Over-all capacity to defend the Northern Region is limited.

(3) In the Southern Region, Army strength is 36 Division equivalents but the forces are widely separated Air strength is 993 aircraft.

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3. Courses of Action

a. Phase I. This phase is considered to be the period up to actual denial of an Allied right by Soviets or GDR. The main thrust of Soviet/GDR actions during this phase appears to be directed toward turn-over to the East German authorities as many of their post-World War II responsibilities as possible and in such a manner as not to present the Western Allies an issue which might cause a confrontation. At some point in this turn-over process, when it best serves Soviet/GDR interests, a Peace Treaty can be expected. It must be anticipated that the treaty will, as a minimum, formalize those functions which the East Germans, in fact, control at the time.

(1) Soviet/GDR courses of action with respect to East-West Berlin access:

(a) Cause minor harassments to Allies with respect to their rights. These could include temporary closing of the border, harassment in the Berlin Control Zone through changes in procedures, ECM or buzzing of air carriers, delays in allowing Allied personnel to pass between West and East Berlin, temporary breaks in telecommunications, interruption of S-bahn, U-bahn, change crossing point, etc. These harassments have the advantage of acting on the nerves of Allies and West Berlin personnel. They also serve as probes and tests of intentions and determination of the Allies. They can serve to distract the Allies from the larger and broader problems. They have no disadvantages from the Soviet standpoint. There has been little new in the way of harassment. It is essential for the Allies to react vigorously when there is a direct conflict with Allied basic rights. However, a show of force should not be made unless there is an intent to use it. These harassments are minor now but can be increased readily by the Soviet/GDR should it serve their purposes.

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(b) Restrictions with respect to Allied civilian personnel. At present the VOPO's request identification of all Allied civilian personnel whether in official cars and whether accompanied by military personnel. British provide identification, the United States and French do not. The United States and French restrict official civilian personnel from attempting to enter East Berlin in automobiles. The United States permits official civilian personnel to enter East Berlin on foot or by U-bahn or S-bahn and authorizes showing of either ID card or passport but restricts this movement to a few individuals. French practice in this respect is the same as the United States. The United States should continue the above practice since showing ID cards might provoke further restrictions and prejudice our position with respect to procedures on the Autobahn US non-official civilian personnel such as tourists or businessmen are allowed to show their passport.

(c) Communications between West Berlin Commandants and East Berlin. With the withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant in East Berlin and replacement by an East German, the Allied commandants are left without an opposite number with whom problems internal to Berlin can be discussed. This has forced internal Berlin problems to be handled by other channels, e.g., CINC to CINC, etc.

(d) Showing identification cards by military personnel in uniform. Military personnel in uniform now move freely between East and West Berlin without check. If the GDR attempts to force identification (which would appear to be a possible move by the new East German Commandant in an attempt to demonstrate his authority) the US position is one of self denial of

entry to East Berlin rather than accede. No effort at forceable entry will be made. British have concurred temporarily with this position. French have agreed.

(e) Movement of checkpoint. There has been some indication that GDR might attempt to close Friedrichstrasse and open a new checkpoint in the British or French sector. (The possibility of this happening would appear to have increased since the Allies in Berlin have forced the Soviet War memorial guard to cross at Sandkrug Bridge in the British Sector.) The three powers have agreed that the Allies would use a new checkpoint but still require the Soviets to use Friedrichstrasse for entry into West Berlin except for the Soviet War Memorial guard.

(f) Action with respect to exclaves such as Steinstucken. The United States now maintains a three man patrol in Steinstucken which is periodically relieved by helicopter. The United States attempts no ground access operations with respect to Steinstucken. Access by West German workmen to Steinstucken is severely restricted. Occasional refugees are being flown out. US position is that no military force can be used in support of Allied interest in Steinstucken without authority from Washington. JCS Position would delegate authority to US Commander, Berlin, to use force in support of patrol within Steinstucken if required.

(2) Soviet/GDR courses of action with respect to access to Berlin.

(a) Harass vehicular movement on Autobahn. This occurs sporadically in connection with alleged traffic violations, closing the autobahn for repairs, procedural delays at checkpoints, as well as restricting autobahn at Helmstedt/Babelsberg from 4 to 2 lanes. If it would develop to a point where it appears to be a systematic campaign of harassment to individual vehicles the following courses are open: the use

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of assistance vehicles could be reinstituted, increase use of armed convoys, supply and/or civilian vehicles could move in convoy with armed escorts.

(b) Turn over responsibility for supervision of Autobahn to GDR but without change in procedures. This action could occur at any time. If this occurs, the Allies have already agreed quadripartitely to acknowledge GDR supervision as Soviet agents as long as there is no change in procedure.

(c) After assuming responsibility for Autobahn, GDR attempt to change procedures. This could occur by requests to substitute new documents authenticated by GDR, by placing customs restrictions on movement or by requiring different documentation. Any of these changes should be considered interference with basic Allied rights and should be cause for application of procedures outlined in Phase II in this paper. (Paragraph 3b).

(d) Interference with air access. Interference with air access, e.g., buzzing, ECM, preempting flight altitudes, etc., is considered possible at any time that such a move is felt by the Soviets/GDR to be in their best interests. If this interference occurs, the Allies should take action in accordance with contingency plans that have been prepared.

(e) Restrict West German barge, rail or road traffic to West Berlin. Such action would affect the viability of West Berlin. Contingency plans, generally in the economic countermeasures area, for this eventuality have been developed. However, no specific military plans have been developed which would take West German civilian traffic under Allied aegis. Consideration of this course of action is still under study in Washington, Bonn and LIVE OAK.

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(3) Soviet courses of action with respect to a peace treaty with the GDR. The most uncertain situation concerns signing a peace treaty prior to successful negotiations with the Western Allies. The Soviets could sign such a treaty on short notice, possibly within two weeks. Such a treaty could provide for an immediate turnover of all sovereign rights to the GDR or it could provide for a progressive turnover, or at a specified later date. In any event, such a peace treaty would complicate any negotiations since the Soviets could hardly back away from commitments made to the GDR in a peace treaty. Such a signature of a treaty without prior East-West negotiations would probably accelerate a major confrontation. Current Soviet actions indicate they intend to sign a treaty. However, no date has been established, probably with the hope that by piecemeal transfer of responsibilities to the GDR, a de facto situation can be established which would merely be formalized by a separate peace treaty. There are indications that the Soviets desire to try to resume East-West talks in some manner (Summit-possibly if Khrushchev attends the UN, introduction of Berlin/German question in the UN, bilateral, etc.) before finalizing the terms of a treaty.

(4) Allied Courses of Action. During this phase there are few, if any, courses of action open to the Allies which would not be responses to Soviet actions, since the basic position of the Allies is for the time being to maintain the status quo. Available courses of action are as follows:

(a) Take action to eliminate existing restrictions. This would include removing of the obstacles at entrances into East Berlin or at Babelsberg and Helmstedt and would probably require the use of force. If successful, this would have the advantage of restoring the status quo temporarily, but it is doubtful that such action would

prevent future restrictive actions by the Soviets or GDR. The great disadvantage is the vulnerable tactical position of the Allies in Berlin itself where all restrictions now exist. If restricted by force, the Allies could not win and would, therefore, suffer a psychological as well as military set back which would have extensive consequences. Currently neither US national policy nor that of its Allies favors this course of action.

(b) Take reprisals in Berlin and elsewhere in the world for Soviet's restrictive actions. Without actually using force, the number of reprisal actions are relatively limited during this phase. To date the Czech and Polish missions in West Berlin have been denied certain privileges, Bloc vehicles in West Berlin have been periodically harassed and the Soviet Commandant has been denied entrance into the American sector of Berlin. The most potent reprisal is economic countermeasures including restriction of IZT. It is generally not considered desirable to expend this weapon in relation to the restrictive actions that have thus far been taken. Further, there is no agreement among the NATO Allies or selective economic countermeasures which would be applicable during this phase. Likewise, all reprisal actions would have an irritating effect and, taken as a whole, do not appear sufficient to cause the Soviets to back down. However, there may be actions which can be taken, especially in Berlin, which could lean against the barrier and cause the Soviets concern. The stationing of an ambulance at Checkpoint "CHARLIE" is a recent example of "leaning" against the Wall. Further possibilities are being explored by the Allied representatives in Berlin. One suggestion is to withdraw current Allied reservations on West Berlin incorporation in the FRG.

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(c) React to any harassment, restriction, or reprisal taken by the Soviets. This has the advantage of probing Soviet intentions and also showing determination to restrict encroachment or rights. The disadvantage lies in possible escalation. However, the advantages are overriding. Together with this course of action there must be a logical and continuous series of actions taken to show determination and which indicate preparedness for serious action to include war. To be effective Allied action must be promptly applied and in sufficient force to at least maintain the status quo. The recently tripartitely adopted rules of conduct for autobahn convoys and the suspension of TTDs are examples.

(d) Development of Leverage. The basic weakness in the Allied position is that it lacks adequate political or economic leverage which can be applied against vital Soviet/GDR interests in order to prevent Soviet/GDR actions. Such leverage which the Allies possess in these fields is minor and, if exercised, may well cause a Soviet/GDR reaction which will be on balance, to the Allied disadvantage. An urgent requirement exists for the development of usable leverage.

b. Phase II. This phase covers the period following an actual continuing blockage of an Allied right by the Soviets or the GDR and lasts until such time as military operations commence.

(1) Soviet Courses of Action. As previously discussed, curtailment of rights could come from either the Soviets or the GDR. This interference could be with land or air access rights or a combination thereof. It would occur at any time but it is unlikely to occur prior to the signing of a peace treaty. A Soviet/GDR peace treaty,

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depending upon its content, might well signal the imminence of Phase II It must be expected that during this phase the Soviet bloc will react in the political, economic and military fields to offset Allied actions.

(2) Allied Courses of Action When Allied rights are denied NATO should go on an appropriate alert, nations should mobilize and preparedness for war to include acceleration of world-wide deployment. Appropriate reprisal measures such as minor naval and air countermeasures should be initiated. All efforts made to attain objectives, by nonmilitary means such as economic blockade and political measures, should continue concurrently. During Phase II any unblocked access route should be used to the maximum.

c Phases III and IV. These phases cover the military operations conducted by NATO designed to persuade the Soviet/GDR to restore Allied rights in Berlin, and failing persuasion with respect to rights in Berlin, to defeat the Soviet Bloc. Plans designed to meet these situations have been developed.

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4. A Probable Soviet/GDR Course of Action. It appears that for the next several weeks the Soviets and GDR intend to maintain essentially the status quo. A recent Soviet announcement indicates that this lull will last through the US elections in November. It must be anticipated that at a time to suit Soviet conveniences the Berlin situation will become more active, probably preceded by Soviet overtures for further discussions. At any time after discussions have resumed, a peace treaty may be signed. The following is considered as a course of action best calculated to achieve Soviet/GDR objectives without precipitating war:

a. Gradually transfer Soviet responsibilities for East Berlin to the GDR. Responsibilities transferred would be non-provocative to the Allies but establishing a de facto situation of including East Berlin in the GDR.

b. Impose additional restrictions on the movement of Allied civilian and military personnel into East Berlin which would be unacceptable to the Allies and which would in effect complete the sealing off of East Berlin from West Berlin.

c. Begin gradual application of harassments and restrictions in areas designed to weaken the morale of West Berliners and effect the viability of the city and at the same time intensify the already strong psychological warfare program against West Berlin.

d. Transfer responsibility for ground access to Berlin to the GDR without change in procedures.

e. Institute minor harassments and restrictions designed to test Allied intentions and increase the possibilities of dissension among the Allies. At the same time intensify the campaign to convince West Berliners of the hopelessness of their situation and encourage West Berliners to leave the city.

f. Continue to attempt to equate Soviet access to West Berlin to Allied access to West Berlin.

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g. Increase the Soviet presence in West Berlin.

h. Continue to downgrade the position of the Allied commandants in Berlin.

i. When West Berlin morale is sufficiently eroded, begin a coordinated program of gradually escalated restrictions on Allied access similar to the process used in Berlin.

j. Gradually turn over to the GDR certain functions now performed by Soviet military followed by a relocation of Soviet military forces toward the East (away from the West German-East German border) and replacement with GDR forces. This realignment would initially confront any Allied military probe with GDR rather than Soviet forces.

k. If ground access is blocked without precipitating military action, then initiate actions to effect blockage of air access as well.

l. Throughout the period of the above listed actions, carry on a program of military preparation designed to outmatch any preparations by the Allies and likewise intimidate the Free World. Simultaneously carry on a psychological program of threats intermingled with conciliatory gestures designed to influence so-called uncommitted countries

m. Utilize the UN as a forum justifying their theme "the war has been over 17 years and a new status for Berlin is necessary."

5. Political Implications of the Probable Soviet/GDR Course of Action for the Allies.

a. Since the United States has accepted as national policy that force will not be used to maintain rights in East Berlin, the GDR will be able to effectively seal East Berlin. None of the Allies will oppose the United States in this course of action.

b. The attack on the morale and viability of West Berlin will pose a problem for the Allies as how best to combat it. There is no solution at present. The transfer of autobahn

procedures to GDR without change will not precipitate a crisis as quadripartite agreement has already been reached that this change will *not* be opposed.

c. The initiation of any change in procedures will force the Allies to face the issue of whether to consider the initial changes as basic interference with Allied rights.

d. If it is considered as basic interference, then probes would be initiated and a major confrontation could ensue. If the initial change is not considered as basic interference, then the Allies could be faced with the same gradual erosion of their position as has been encountered in Berlin.

e. If a long period of gradual harassment and restriction is allowed to transpire and the Soviet effort to erode West Berlin morale is successful, it is possible that a mass exodus from West Berlin would reach such proportions that the present Allied objectives with respect to Berlin would have little further validity.

f. The signing of a peace treaty may or may not affect East-West relations over Berlin, depending upon the provisions and the Soviet/GDR implementing actions. If the peace treaty only formalizes the de facto situation existing at the time with no provisions for an extension of GDR impingement upon Allied rights, a serious situation is not apt to develop. However, secret portions of the treaty may well remain unknown to the Allies.

6. Military Implications. Following are military implications of the present situation and the actions and counteractions analyzed above.

a. Forces. NATO requires 30 divisions as a minimum in the Central region to successfully defend Central Europe in a nuclear war. To be ready for such a war approximately five additional divisions beyond those now projected should be provided in Europe (preferably by Allies), existing units brought to strength, essential support units added and

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logistical backup provided. Since an extreme crisis could develop quickly without time for a desirable buildup, every measure should be taken now that would expedite a rapid buildup if required. In addition, prior to and during negotiations it is extremely important that every effort be made to convince the Soviet Bloc of our intent Force buildup is the biggest factor. Therefore, concomitant actions of varying degrees should be taken in all fields of preparedness which would present to Soviet intelligence an unescapably clear picture of an alliance actively and purposefully preparing for a war contingency. However, if Allied rights are suddenly denied within the next month, the flexibility of Allied response in Central Europe will be limited. Our problem now is that we are entering on a period of uncertainty when timing of military preparations is most difficult. Khrushchev has set no deadlines for signing a treaty. There are no firm indications of, if, or when negotiations may take place

b Plans. The Quadripartite Powers agreed over-all concept has been introduced into NAC for NATO consensus. More desirable than a consensus would be NAC approval of the over-all concept. Approval would provide to all levels of SHAPE commanders a NATO approved strategy Tripartite contingency plans to test ground and air access are complete through levels of operations consistent with tripartite guidance provided LIVE OAK. NATO defensive plans are complete, and concepts of operations for land, sea and air offensive operations (BERCON/MARCON) are currently being considered by NAC. Lack of formal NAC approval on BERCON/MARCON operational concept has delayed detailed development of plans below SHAPE level. There has been no Allied coordination of national plans on a world-wide scale outside the NATO area. Further work by the NATO nations is required in order to provide SACEUR sufficient

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authority to place forces rapidly in the proper state of alert prior to implementing contingency plans.

c. Command and Control. Tripartite command procedures (LIVE OAK) and for a single commander for Berlin in an emergency are generally complete. A suggested coordination between LIVE OAK and NATO has been developed by the quadripartite powers and is currently being considered by NAC The problem of accelerating the speed with which governmental decisions can be agreed upon between the Allies has not been resolved as yet. Coordination and control measures for tripartite naval countermeasures are incomplete as are harassing measures which can be taken against Soviet Bloc civil and military aircraft when flying over Allied territory

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23 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT Weekly Berlin Contact Group Meeting, 23 October 1962

1 OLD BUSINESS. Under this category, General Gray brought up the subject of what to do about the ambulance stationed in the Allied Sector Since there is a current policy, it would not appear that there would be a need to come up with a new policy until the end of this month, when a rotation of responsibility for manning the ambulance occurs. State Department has not made up its mind as to what the U.S. position should be The UK feels that it is best to let it die, France had no expression of view General Gray pointed out that State Department does recognize some value in maintaining the ambulance "on station" and is reluctant to see it die on a chance that it may have some value. The undersigned raised the question regarding the possible uses of helicopters in place of the vehicles, pointing out the advantages to be gained through the use of helicopters as opposed to the ambulance. General Gray evinced some interest, and stated that he would raise the question with State

2 NSAM-107 (RUNNING BULLDOZER INTO THE SOVIET WALL). State and the Director of the Joint Staff made inquiries into the status of NSAM-107. General Gray, after checking with J-3, learned that NSAM-107 was rescinded by J-3 and was being processed through DOD to State.

3 SEA SPRAY: General Gray reported that they were still waiting for the French to come up with their reply Informal discussions with the Allies indicated that the French may be willing to accept the establishment of Sea Spray as a SACLANT responsibility at Norfolk, providing that an additional "Super-Committee" could be established at Norfolk or Washington, to allow Admiral Max Douguet to play some part This proposal would permit the French to provide input through their French representative directly to Admiral Denrison as SACLANT Although the official French Government position has not been received, the French on the Ambassadorial Group seem to be willing to accept the Sea Spray solution as presently contemplated.

4 BERCON AND MARCON PLANS The two original problems still remain:

a Approval of the BERCON/MARCON plans are held up pending the provision of answers to the Canadian and Belgian questions regarding the nuclear demonstration proposal. SGN obtained information from SACEUR to use as a basis of their reply to the Council, and forwarded this information to the Council. SGN reiterated what SACEUR stated in his plan and their original comments, and considered that these should satisfy the NAC request

b The problem regarding the use of nuclear weapons at sea, as covered in Paragraph 8 of the MARCON Plan, still remains unresolved. General Norstad has not reversed his position on when nuclear weapons can be used at sea, and the SGN felt that their original position stated in the first appraisal would suffice The SGN originally did not intend to comment on SACEUR's position The U.S., UK and French representatives in Paris interpreted this inaction as an indorsement of SACEUR's views and, accordingly, the UK and French advised that military representatives on the Standing Group should reconsider their position and submit comments to the Council The U.S. joined the UK and France, and the Standing Group forwarded its comments to the Council, which, in essence, stated that the use of nuclear weapons on the sea would be a matter of decision at the time With these comments before the Council, it is hoped that the Council will approve the BERCON/MARCON plans at today's Council meeting (NOTE. There were several expressions of opinion around the table which indicated that approval of these plans would not be given until the NATO Alert Measures paper is finalized by the SGN)

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5. EFFECT OF CUBA ON BERLIN: General Gray explained that, last week, the Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC) had written a quick paper on what they figured would be Soviet reaction on a world-wide basis to U.S actions in Cuba and, in essence, came up with the following conclusions.

a The USSR would not go to General War, principally due to the nuclear superiority of the U.S.

b The USSR would react on a world-wide basis more on a political than military basis in Berlin. In addition, it was pointed out that, at a meeting last night, held with the U.S., French and Federal Republic of Germany representatives, there was a consensus that the Soviets would react However, it was not determined exactly in what fashion Up to the present moment, there was nothing from the Soviets; and the deduction is made that they are apparently checking their options

6 JSSC ESTIMATE No 8. General Gray explained briefly the contents of JSSC Estimate No 8, which had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff This estimate was based on the assumption of the U.S. "going into Cuba". The conclusions of the Estimate include the following reactions which could be expected from the Soviets.

a The USSR's greatest military reaction would be on the sea

b Soviet military actions against Iran

c Creation by the Soviets of an atomic incident against U.S. nuclear test sites in the Pacific.

d Since U.S. is already committed to raise the ante in South-East Asia, Soviet reaction is not considered likely in this area In Taiwan it was concluded there would be no long-term benefits to the Soviets and, therefore, little likelihood existed of Soviet actions there In Korea, it was concluded, because of the tie-in with the UN, no advantages could accrue to the Soviets by military actions In Turkey, the NATO involvement would discourage Soviet actions

e In Africa, due to accessibility difficulties, little or no actions would be expected.

7 THE NATO PREFERRED-SEQUENCE-OF-ACTIONS PAPER. It was reported that a copy of this document was sent informally to the Secretary General and, at the same time, officially to the National Governments, through the Military Committee. The National comments are expected to be processed through the Military Committee on Friday, October 26, and then on the NAC Agenda by the end of this month

EDWARD MIKOLOWSKI
Colonel, USAF
AFXPD-PY-IAE

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USAIRR 150 # 3-76

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S AIR FORCE

SUBJECT. Berlin Contingency Planning (JCS 1907/558)

1. PROBLEM Io consider a proposed draft memorandum concerning buildup and deployment plans for Europe related to Phase II of a Berlin Contingency.

2. MAJOR ISSUE: Whether the draft memorandum (Tab 1) for the Sec Def concerning Berlin plans (Tab 5) is acceptable to the JCS Whether the JCS should agree that this plan (Tab 5) should be introduced in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group as proposed in the draft memorandum.

3. JOINT STAFF POSITION: Unknown.

4. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT: Unknown.

5. RECOMMENDED POSITION: Approve the draft memorandum (Tab 1) with the annotated changes indicated in pencil.

6. BACKGROUND Information on TAC squadrons is contained at Tab 3.

Scott

Lt Col Personeus/gnh/7706
1 November 1962

AFXPD-PL

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USAIRR TSC # 3-96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Buildup and Deployment in Phase II of a Berlin Contingency

In planning for the buildup and deployment of forces contemplated in Phase II of a Berlin contingency as described in NSAM-109, it would be useful to encourage our Quadripartite Allies to develop plans of a similar nature. Their and our plans should be compatible and complementary in order to ensure that the Allies present an effective deterrent if the necessity to implement Phase II should arise. In addition, this joint effort should facilitate development of supporting plans by our remaining NATO Allies and thereby lend added emphasis to the deterrent posture presented to the USSR.

To this end, the Department of Defense, in informal coordination with the State Department, has prepared in broad outline a plan which will make available on call during Phase II varying levels of augmentation of forces, and will make possible rapid deployments appropriate to the degree of threat posed by Soviet action. The intent is to provide necessary forces and their support to maintain control of a developing situation, to deny the Soviets the advantage of forcing us to oscillate between the extremes of normal readiness and all-out mobilization, and to enable the Allies to implement a broader choice of appropriate actions.

In order to provide a wide range of response, the plan calls for the augmentation of existing forces in Europe in three separate increments and includes appropriate reserve, alert and call-up measures and limited logistic buildup. The composition of the increments could be altered, depending upon the situation at the time Phase II commences. However, in order to plan for the generation of forces and required logistic support, it is visualized that the probable sequence would be as outlined below. The plan does not provide for automatic implementation of a succeeding increment if the generation of a previous increment has proved sufficient to the need

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It is anticipated that the sequence for implementation would be as follows: The first increment would effect the heaviest force increase (a Corps force of 3 Army Divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, 10 Air Force Fighter Squadrons and naval units), the second would generate a lesser ground force but more naval and air force (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, the US 2nd Fleet and up to 25 TAC fighter squadrons with necessary combat and logistic support forces); the third increment would add a force of one Army division. In the event that forces deployed in all three increments are not sufficient to cope with the situation, implementation of general war plans would be the final step and in addition to the measures of partial mobilization necessary to support and compensate for the foregoing deployments, would call for complete mobilization.

Approximately 30 days would be needed to effect the majority of the actions required for the first increment; 60 days for the first two increments, and the major deployments of all three increments could be accomplished in approximately 90 days.

The plan was developed under the assumption that the only contingency requirements were those associated with Berlin. Therefore, should other contingencies exist at the time the plan is to be implemented, the plan would need to be reviewed and possibly altered to fit the conditions extant. For example, during the present Cuban situation it is visualized that the first increment which would be deployed during Phase II of NSAM 109 would consist of two Army divisions slated to "marry up" with their equipment prepositioned in Europe, a third Army division (initially without support elements), and ten TAC fighter squadrons. The ten Fighter Squadrons would either have to be released from the Cuban contingency or mobilized

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USAIRR TSC # 3-96

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from the reserves. Expanded commercial sea and air lift would also be required. Contingent upon the situation as it develops while the first increment is being deployed, the forces available and/or required for the remaining increments would be adjusted as necessary.

It is requested that you approve in concept this plan which is outlined above, and authorize its use in exploratory discussions in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group in order to encourage our Allies to develop supporting plans consistent with NSAM-109. Plans which are forthcoming from these discussions will be studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the plans progressing above the Military Sub-Group level.

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Sub BQD-Military 35

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

International Security Affairs
Refer to: I-26143/62

22 October 1962

MEETING OF MILITARY SUBGROUP, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP
6:00 P.M., 22 October 1962

Participants

United States

Mr. Nitze, ISA, Chairman
General Gray, JCS
Dr. Mountain, ISA
Col. Meacham, ISA
Col. Armstrong, ISA
Capt. Cotten, ISA
Col. Preer, SG
Mr. Hillenbrand, State
Mr. Ausland, State
Mr. Blitgen, State
Mr. Smyser, State
Mr. Klein, White House

United Kingdom

Lord Hood
General West
Mr. Brooke
Mr. Greenhill
Colonel Coke
Captain Fanshawe

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Document No. 21

France

M. Winckler
Admiral Douget
Colonel Hounau
M. Pelen

Germany

Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Dr. Wieck
General Steinhoff
General Huecklerheim

Mr. Nitze opened the meeting by saying that in early September it seemed unlikely to the U.S. that the Soviets were putting offensive missiles into Cuba. There was some evidence of surface-to-air missiles, but nothing of a different kind was believed to be there. During the latter part of September there were a few scattered refugee reports of offensive missiles going in. Refugee reports are not always highly reliable and during the month of October we tried to get confirmation of these reports. Our first actual confirmation was obtained last Tuesday, October 16. Since then we have made a great effort to get precise information on these weapons. What we have learned is described in a report three copies of which we will now distribute to each delegation. This is information of a very high

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classification, and it will be necessary for us to collect these copies at the end of this meeting. The report includes photographs. (Report distributed to members of the delegations).

Lord Hood: Will this information have been made available to governments other than through this meeting?

Mr. Nitze: This information has been placed in the hands of the heads of the three governments by people who left Washington yesterday by plane.

Mr. Nitze: The photographs in the book are not nearly as precise as the ones from which they were printed. The detailed photos are very precise. It is facts of this nature that the President has to communicate to the country and to the Alliance as a whole since all of us are affected by it. The President will announce by a speech the course of action the U.S. intends to pursue. His speech will follow this general outline: First, facts, second, background of previous Russian assurance as late as last Thursday that it had no interest in placing offensive weapons in Cuba and, third, actions to include the following:

1. A strict quarantine may be extended, but will not deny the shipment of necessities of life as the Soviets did to the people of Berlin during the Berlin blockade

2. Increased and close surveillance of developments in Cuba.

3. A launch of any of these Cuba based weapons against any nation in the Western Hemisphere will be considered a Soviet attack.

4. Reinforcement of Guantanamo and placing additional military units on an alert basis.

5. A meeting of the OAS will be called.

6. In the UN we will call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council.

7. Calling on Khrushchev to halt and eliminate the threat.

Further actions involve: The Military Committee of the NAC is being briefed. Ambassador Finletter is proposing to the NAC that it authorize military commanders to take appropriate vigilance measures. U.S. national forces have already been placed in a more vigilant state. There is a Continental U.S. Air Defense augmentation in the southeastern United States. Instructions to the Navy to prepare to undertake the quarantine have already been issued. The quarantine will extend up to 500 miles from Cuba. Every effort will be made to effectuate it by signals, but in cases where this is not effective a shot across the bow will be used, and if this does not accomplish the purpose the necessary disabling shot will be employed in accordance with general practice in these matters.

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Lord Hood: Vessels may be brought into U.S. ports?

Mr. Nitze: Yes. The quarantine will apply to ships of all nations. The surveillance will be continued. As to consultation, all allied governments are being informed as to the situation and the U.S. actions. This meeting of the Military Sub-Group is part of the consultation and is for the purpose of exploring what actions may be required in this forum. One hypothesis about the Khrushchev action is that it is connected with Berlin.

Lord Hood: At one point you used the phrase "nuclear"; did you mean that the quarantine will apply only with regard to nuclear material?

Mr. Nitze: The purpose is to deny a nuclear capability, and this clearly could extend to the vehicles capable of delivering a nuclear attack.

Lord Hood: Does this include any type of fuel?

Mr. Nitze: At this time, no. But an IL-28 can carry a nuclear weapon and at some point the problem of fuel for an IL-28 enters the picture.

Lord Hood: Then it does not involve turning back every tanker?

Mr. Nitze: No, not ab initio. However, it could develop into that. But it seemed wise to have the quarantine initially directed to just what was threatening.

Mr. Nitze: With further regard to consultation, the U.S. is consulting in other alliances. Ambassador Stevenson will speak in the U.N. The President has sent a message to Chairman Khrushchev. Action will be taken to apprise the OAS of the situation and the U.S. actions.

M. Winckler: Is there a time limit for the Cubans to dismantle the weapons already there?

Mr. Nitze: None has been set at this time.

M. Winckler: Is any measure of this sort on time limit envisaged?

Mr. Nitze: Not at this time. Not today.

M. Winckler: It is noted in the report that the missiles will be operational in December, but are not now.

Mr. Nitze: That is correct.

Lord Hood: How do you stop aircraft?

Mr. Nitze: It is not proposed initially to stop aircraft. The President's speech will say that these are initial measures. If they should be required, steps to stop aircraft will be taken, but obviously this is more difficult. You can't very well "disable" an aircraft in the same way as you can a ship.

NLJ/RAC 3-96

Lord Hood: What about submarines?

Mr. Nitze: Submarines will be invited to surface. We have very good information as to where Soviet ships are which are headed for Cuba. We also have good information in the submarine field.

Mr. Nitze: Dr. Wieck, do you wish to comment?

Dr. Wieck: Are there any proposals for precautionary measures in Berlin?

Mr. Nitze: This is something we wanted to consult about in this group.

Mr. Nitze: The legal case for these actions is strong if this is supported by two-thirds of the OAS. We are going forward in any case, but this points up two aspects; that is, the prompt imposition of measures versus delays involved in seeking two-thirds support.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Ambassadors of the OAS are being briefed on the situation.

Mr. Schippenkoetter: Apart from the OAS, what political moves are expected?

Mr. Nitze: If Mr. Khrushchev were to come back tomorrow with a withdrawal order things, of course, would be changed.

M. Winckler: What is your assumption on possible reaction in Berlin?

Mr. Hillenbrand: One of the possible ways in which the Soviets might choose to react would be through measures in Berlin, as for example by harassment, possibly just against the U.S., possibly of a wider scope. However, Berlin isn't the only place in which they might choose to react.

Mr. Nitze: They have several alternatives. One of the reasons for the use of "quarantine" and not "blockade" is to avoid the connection which Khrushchev is trying to make between Cuba and Berlin.

M. Winckler: Is your assumption now, considering the present balance of forces, that Khrushchev will not move in Berlin?

Mr. Nitze: I think it is wholly accurate to say that Gromyko stated more forcefully than has been done before the Soviet intention to proceed in Berlin.

Lord Hood: Regarding the Soviet promise not to act on Berlin before the U.S. elections, they said, "unless the U.S. acts". This is the "unless".

Mr. Nitze: It has become clear what they meant by holding off until the U.S. elections. Would it not be useful for us to explore in this group what we judge Soviet intentions are in the steps they have taken?

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Lord Hood: Any statements I could make would be off the top of my head.

M. Winckler: I think it would be a profitable thing to do.

Mr. Nitze: I can give only my personal feelings, but from a long range point of view the Soviet intention could be to secure the removal of U.S. forces from overseas bases, which would include Western forces in Berlin. As an intermediate goal, the Soviets may be seeking to put pressure on the Alliance structure in the hope of producing fissures in it. The U.S., of course, has been under ICBM's for some time, but this Soviet move in Cuba is a very extreme one. It changes the balance of power.

M. Winckler: This is a pretty big gamble.

Mr. Nitze: Yes, it is a quantum jump on Khrushchev's part. This suggests to me, personally, if the crisis has been stepped up by this quantum jump, that the perspective in which to view some of the issues before this group has changed and some of the issues have become minor to the extent that we ought to settle them quickly or forget about them, and also that we have got to deal with some of the major issues. A failure to act is dangerous, and we might proceed on the basis that (a) we must have unity in the Alliance, (b) minor issues must be disposed of, and (c) we must deal with the major issues with both caution and resolution.

As to the tactical reasons behind this Soviet move, some have suggested that it was necessary to keep the momentum of Soviet leadership. This I regard as questionable, although you may remember the report of a Soviet Ambassador stating to someone that he had seen the Soviet plans for Berlin and they now meet the Chinese criteria. It is possible that Khrushchev's interests in Latin America are behind this move, and that this is a major ploy in this direction. He may be thinking of setting up a negotiating position. Again, he might have contingent objectives, and depending on our reaction, may pursue one or another.

Lord Hood: It may be a test of U.S. intentions. He may want to see if the U.S. will react in any way. The next question is, will he call that order off? If he got a real capability, will he want to trade off against bases in other parts of the world?

Mr. Nitze: There was a TASS piece yesterday referring to the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Mr. Greenhill: There does not appear to be any elaborate concealment of these installations.

Mr. Nitze: It is interesting to me that Khrushchev has not yet preempted the President's speech. Despite the excellent U.S. security in this matter, Khrushchev must have seen something coming.

Lord Hood: Khrushchev didn't know how much you knew.

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3-96

Mr. Nitze: He might have thought we would not find out as much as we have.

Dr. Wieck: He is probably waiting to see just what the U.S. action is before taking any steps. His tactics in the Security Council will be interesting, particularly whether he chooses to enlarge the scope of the matter beyond Cuba.

Mr. Nitze: I foresee a two-hour harangue by someone which will repeat all the previous points they have made.

Lord Hood: Have you made up your mind how you will play it in the UN?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is still being discussed.

Lord Hood: You will report what you have done to the Security Council?

Mr. Nitze: We intend to get in before the Soviets do to the Security Council. There is some U.S. opinion for a strong, even extreme, U.S. position. But this is still being discussed.

Mr. Schnippenkoetter: I have two points. First, are the number of topics to be discussed between Washington and Moscow now wider than before: What does this mean for Berlin? Is Berlin being put aside, or does it come into sharper focus in this situation?

Mr. Nitze: We can't tell until we see what the Soviets say.

Lord Hood: Or, even more important, what they do.

Mr. Nitze: I would say that high on the list of probabilities, is some move in Berlin.

Lord Hood: I agree.

M. Winckler: I think this means that we must move on such matters as alerts, etc.

Mr. Nitze: I think it is fair to expect that our business here will boom.

Mr. Schnippenkoetter: My second point is that Berlin contingency plans have been made in a context which was principally limited to Berlin. Does the new picture which emerges from these actions taken by your government alter the general nature of our plans? Does this place new restraints on these plans or will this situation speed them up and strengthen them?

Mr. Nitze: Our planning has been based on the development of a crisis, and although the initiation of the crisis could be in Berlin, our planning has proceeded beyond that immediate area. I would therefore say that the basis for our planning has been sound and is not overturned by these recent events. (Discussion then halted so that the group could listen to the President's speech. At the end of the speech, there was no further group discussion and the meeting adjourned at 7:20 P.M.)

P12

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29 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Weekly Berlin Contact Group Meeting, 26 October 1962

1. The Administration's organization for control during the present time of crisis was described by General Gray.

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Doc 22

WHITE HOUSE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Defense Representation: Mr. Nitze & Gen Taylor
Meets Daily 1000 Hours

A/ ROSTOW COMMITTEE
Cuba-Long Range
Gen Turnage

B/ NITZE COMMITTEE
Berlin-NATO
Gen Twitchell & Gen Gray



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A/Considers Cuban affairs and alternative courses of action available to the United States on a long-range basis

B/Gen Gray indicated that the Nitze Committee has not specifically settled upon what their function is to be. At present the Committee is coordinating the efforts of State and Defense on Berlin matters. The views of each are: State -- the Committee is AD HOC only and its primary mission is to be a means of coordination. Defense -- the Committee should actively address U S Policy problems related to Berlin and proffer recommendations. For example: Nuclear assistance to France should be addressed. This Committee publishes papers under a BER-NATO identification (Example is Atch 1)

2 Gen Gray announced that the staff could expect correspondence from the Rostow and Nitze groups which would require fast coordination. The two groups meet daily at 1100, and normally would want to consider the papers produced on one day at the next meeting as coordinated papers, if possible. Gen Taylor commented on this point in discussing military participation on the committees with Generals Gray, Twichell and Turnage of the Army.

3. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has not agreed to BERCON/MARCON plans as yet. The Standing Group NATO has submitted views and the International Staff is in the process of developing comments for the NAC.

4. BER-NATO #7, (Atch 1) was circulated for informal Service comments prior to preparation of the J-5 Memorandum of Transmittal to Gen Gray. Mr. Nitze would like to discuss in general terms the phased build-up of forces in NATO under Phase II Berlin operations.

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Incremental build-ups of 30, 60 and 90 days could prove to be the time basis upon which the discussions will depend

5. NATO Alert as related to Cuba. Secrecy of the Cuban situation prevented Norstad from preparing for the crisis. Rather than respond fully upon declaration of DEFCON 3 with a NATO Simple Alert, which had not been prepared for at Governmental level in NATO Nations, he chose to select 5 of his Simple Alert Measures (i.e., Manning of Hq on 24-hour basis, Command Post augmentation, etc.) and recommended to each NATO Nation their implementation. A recent message from USCINCEUR recaps the reaction. Not all of the countries accepted the recommendation. (DA IN 278930, 230009Z Oct 1962).

6. Mr. Nitze is undertaking the preparation of a BER-NATO paper, a scenario on reactions in Europe with respect to Berlin. The major decision concerns when the Allies should be advised of the actions to be taken by the United States. The attached report of the Military Subgroup is an example (Atch 2) whereas the Quadipartite Ambassadors were advised of the U.S. action about to be taken on Berlin. Gen Gray indicated that the consensus was that we could not get away with leaving the Allies out of the picture, especially where actions on Berlin might be taken. As we may move into more aggressive acts on Berlin, the Allies must be informed before action is taken.

7 Reaction time of the Free Style probe is still under review. Gen Gray stated that he had advised the Chairman, JCS, that the reaction time problem was basically a British Army On the Rhine (CINCBAOR) problem. It takes CINCBAOR at least 24 hours to move his advanced command post into position, possibly more, and to arrange for the necessary communications control to all applicable headquarters. His suggestion was that if the UK will not fully prearrange all physical facilities that rapid execution of Free Style was not possible.

8. Cooperation with France on nuclear matters is again being raised. Mr. McNamara has expressed the views of the JCS on this matter except for the type and amount to be given. State is still opposed, and if the matter is to be discussed, recommends talks at Rusk-McNamara level. SecDef desires the Nitze Committee to address the problem.

9. North Atlantic Council debate on BERCON/MARCON plans raised the issue of whether there were any political plans for the future on the Berlin problem. State is resurrecting last years plan of the Ambassadorial Group and updating it.

10. Live Oak message (AF IN 57630, 251305Z Oct 1962) recaps the predelegated authorities of Gen Norstad to react in Berlin matters. SecDef is desirous of clearing up problems, such as French withholding decision on introducing fighters into Berlin air corridors.

EINO E. JENSTROM
Colonel, USAF
AFXPD-PL-CP

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USAIRN TSC # 3-94

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
J-5 (PLANS AND POLICY) DIRECTORATE
Washington 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General D. W. Gray, Joint Strategic Survey Council

INFO: General Heintges
General Hutchin
Captain Caldwell
General Worden
General Cushman

Subject: Coordination of Papers for NSC Executive Committee, Berlin Nato - BER-NATO #7

1. Informal Service and Joint Staff comments at the Action Officer level have been utilized in preparing the changes indicated in the attached draft BER-NATO #7. Most of the changes are suggested for accuracy.

2. The sentence added to the last paragraph is extremely important. It is considered desirable to secure advanced authority from the President to commence these discussions with our Allies. However, prior to discussions proceeding beyond the broad outline contained in the Memorandum to the President, plans should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for concurrence.

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on 18 March 02

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DRAFT/Capt JHCotten/25 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Buildup and Deployment in Phase II of a Berlin Contingency

The Department of Defense has prepared in broad outline a plan for the buildup and deployment of forces which is contemplated, and as required, in Phase II of a Berlin contingency as described in NSAM-109. It is based on the projection of information* provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has been coordinated informally with the Department of State. It does not yet, however, constitute a governmental position.

The purpose of the plan is to make available on call varying levels of augmentation of forces, and to make possible rapid deployments, which will be appropriate to the degree of threat posed by Soviet action, and to provide alternatives to piecemeal expediency or premature general mobilization. It is intended to provide necessary forces, and their support, to meet a developing situation, and to deny to the Soviets the advantage of the accordion tactic of forcing us to oscillate between the extremes of normal readiness and all-out mobilization, with the severe national disruption this would entail.

The plan is divided into four increments, each of which, if ordered directly into effect, would encompass all the provisions of the preceding increment(s). There is no built-in automaticity, however, which would require implementation of a later increment if the previous one has proved sufficient to the need.

Each increment includes appropriate reserve alert and call-up, and logistic measures. The first increment provides the heaviest force increase (a Corps force of 3 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, 10 Air Force Fighter Squadrons and naval units), the second a lesser ground force but more naval and air force (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, the US 2nd Fleet,

* JCS 1907/527

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and up to 25 TAC fighter squadrons with necessary combat and logistic support forces), the third includes 1 Army division force, and the fourth calls for general mobilization. No increment is directly dependent on any pre-set date or event for its execution but can be implemented when required. Each increment requires approximately 30 days for execution of the measures which it contains; execution of the increments in succession, if so ordered, is on a cumulative time scale.

Although the buildup and deployment plan is primarily oriented toward Berlin, it is adaptable in appreciable measure to a crisis anywhere, and at any time. For instance, in the present Cuban context there remains substantial US strategic reserves to reinforce Europe on schedule by utilizing expanded commercial air and sea lift. Without regard to the timing of Cuban contingency plans, a modified first increment would include two Army divisions forces slated to "marry up" with the equipment already positioned for them in Europe, a third Army division without support elements and 10 TAC Fighter Squadrons released from the Cuban contingency or mobilized from the reserves. ~~The only major units which are bound to a Berlin (or a NATO) contingency are the two divisions which are slated to "marry up" with the equipment already positioned for them in Europe, and USCINCEUR is continuously prepared to receive any additional forces. In the present Cuban context, the only major unit which would not be available for European assignment is the 1st Increment Marine Division/Wing Team, with its amphibious task force, which has been pre-empted for service in the Caribbean. If the 10 TAC squadrons planned for the 1st Increment are required instead for Cuba, it would be necessary to Mobilize a corresponding number of reserve squadrons. With these exceptions the movement of the first 4 Army divisions can be accomplished while maintaining the present alert for Cuba.~~

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It would be useful if the corresponding plans of our Berlin partners could be generally built on the same incremental framework as our own. This would ensure that our mutual plans dovetail as closely as possible so as to present a united deterrent if the necessity to implement them should arise. It would, in addition, facilitate development of similar plans by the remaining NATO Allies, and lend added emphasis to the message conveyed to the Soviets.

In order to undertake discussions in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group directed toward this end, authority is therefore requested to discuss on a no-commitment basis with the representatives of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom this general outline plan as discussed above, and to solicit from them their plans, in turn, for discussion ad referendum. Plans will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and concurrence prior to progressing beyond the informal discussion stage in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Buildup and Deployment in Phase II of a Berlin Contingency

In planning for the buildup and deployment of forces contemplated in Phase II of a Berlin contingency as described in NSAM-109, it would be useful to encourage our Quadripartite Allies to develop plans of a similar nature. Their and our plans should be compatible and complementary in order to ensure that the Allies present an effective deterrent if the necessity to implement Phase II should arise. In addition, this joint effort should facilitate development of supporting plans by our remaining NATO Allies and thereby lend added emphasis to the deterrent posture presented to the USSR.

To this end, the Department of Defense, in informal coordination with the State Department, has prepared in broad outline a plan which will make available on call during Phase II varying levels of augmentation of forces, and will make possible rapid deployments appropriate to the degree of threat posed by Soviet action. The intent is to provide necessary forces and their support to maintain control of a developing situation, to deny the Soviets the advantage of forcing us to oscillate between the extremes of normal readiness and all-out mobilization, and to enable the Allies to implement a broader choice of appropriate actions.

In order to provide a wide range of response, the plan calls for the augmentation of existing forces in Europe in three separate increments and includes appropriate reserve, alert and call-up measures and limited logistic buildup. The composition of the increments could be altered, depending upon the situation at the time Phase II commences. However, in order to plan for the generation of forces and required logistic support, it is visualized that the probable sequence would be as outlined below. The plan does not provide for automatic implementation of a succeeding increment if the generation of a previous increment has proved sufficient to the need.

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It is anticipated that the sequence for implementation would be as follows: The first increment would effect the heaviest force increase (a Corps force of 3 Army Divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, 10 Air Force Fighter Squadrons and naval units); the second would generate a lesser ground force but more naval and air force (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, the US 2nd Fleet and up to 25 TAC fighter squadrons with necessary combat and logistic support forces); the third increment would add a force of one Army division. In the event that forces deployed in all three increments are not sufficient to cope with the situation, implementation of general war plans would be the final step and in addition to the measures of partial mobilization necessary to support and compensate for the foregoing deployments, would call for complete mobilization.

Approximately 30 days would be needed to effect the majority of the actions required for the first increment, 60 days for the first two increments; and the major deployments of all three increments could be accomplished in approximately 90 days.

The plan was developed under the assumption that the only contingency requirements were those associated with Berlin. Therefore, should other contingencies exist at the time the plan is to be implemented, the plan would need to be reviewed and possibly altered to fit the conditions extant. For example, during the present Cuban situation it is visualized that the first increment which would be deployed during Phase II of NSAM 109 would consist of two Army divisions slated to "marry up" with their equipment prepositioned in Europe, a third Army division (initially without support elements), and ten T/C fighter squadrons. The ten Fighter Squadrons would either have to be released from the Cuban contingency or mobilized

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from the reserves. Expanded commercial sea and air lift would also be required. Contingent upon the situation as it develops while the first increment is being deployed, the forces available and/or required for the remaining increments would be adjusted as necessary.

It is requested that you approve in concept this plan which is outlined above, and authorize its use in exploratory discussions in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group in order to encourage our Allies to develop supporting plans consistent with NSAM-109. Plans which are forthcoming from these discussions will be studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the plans progressing above the Military Sub-Group level.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AF PLANNER'S MEMO NO. 179-62
13 November 1962

SUBJECT: Build-up and Deployment in Phase II (NSAM 109) (U) (J-5 1907/563/1)

TO: Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

1. I have reviewed J-5 1907/563/1 and recommend the following changes:

a. Page 3, para 3. Change lines 16-17 as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended ~~that immediate~~ requirements of Phase II, NSAM 109 could best be met by deployment of active duty forces to Europe. ~~include~~ The forces recommended for deployment were three Army divisions. . . ."

REASON: Accuracy. See page 3099, JCS 1907/527.

b. Page 3, para 4. Change line 24 as follows:

". . .and possible deployment in Phase II. . . ."

REASON: Accuracy, First para, page 3239, JCS 1907/560.

c. Page 7, Note I. Change as follows:

"Note I - Contemplated build-up and possible deployments. . . ."

REASON: Consistency with JCS 1907/560, page 3239, first paragraph.

d. Page 7. Insert the following additional "Notes" and renumber present Notes II and IV.

"Note II - With respect to reinforcement of EUCOM forces during Phase II of NSAM 109, military readiness should be increased. Immediate deployment of certain active duty forces (indicated below) to the European area should be effected when requested by USCINCEUR.

"Note IV - The plan does not provide for automatic implementation of a succeeding increment if the generation of a previous increment has proved sufficient to the need."

REASON: Consistency with JCS 1907/527, page 3095, para 3a, and JCS 1907/560, page 3240.

e. Page 7, Note IV. Change as follows:

"The six Army Divisions deployed ~~do not~~ include the two airborne divisions . . . rapid air deployment ~~in event of an emergency~~ as required

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in the 2nd and/or 3rd Increment."

REASON: JCS 1844/363, Part I to Annex A, US Army Forces for EUCOM, M-Day through M+3 (90 days) indicates 6 Divisions including 2 Airborne.

f. Page 7, 1st Increment. Change as follows:

"(Deployments completed within approximately 30 days after order to execute.)

Deploy from USSTRICOM -	1 Army Corps Force Composed of following:	Capability to close in Europe
	1 Armored Division - (Personnel only by air, equipment prestocked)	14 days
	1 Infantry Division - (Personnel only by air, equipment prestocked)	14 days
	1 Inf/Armored Division-Sea (After ~~10~~ 15 day alert)	38 48-55

REASON: Accuracy, based on 1907/527, page 3099, and JCS 2147/280, page 1886, line C.

g. Page 8, top of page under USLANTCOM. Change as follows:

"Other appropriate naval forces including ASW Task Force to the ~~North-East-Atlantic~~ Mediterranean 7-10 days"

REASON: Accuracy, based on JCS 1844/363, pages 2 and 4, Part I to Annex A, (JSCP-63) referenced in Facts Bearing The change proposed by the Buff does not appear in earlier JCS paper.

h. Page 9, Follow-on Actions. Change as follows:

"~~General mobilization~~ Continued deployments and operations in conformance. . "

REASON. Self-evident

2. Subject to the above changes I approve J-5 1907/563/1.

RUSSELL E DOUGHERTY
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Asst Director of Plans
Joint Matters, DCS/P&P

Information copies:
Army
Navy
Marine Corps

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USAIRS TSC # 3-96

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT. Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Council for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Berlin Planning (JCS 1907/566) —

1. PROBLEM. To provide JCS comments on a proposed JSSC solution to the Germany-Berlin problem.

2. MAJOR ISSUE: Is the JSSC proposed solution a militarily and politically sound plan for presentation by the JCS to the Secretary of State?

3. JOINT STAFF POSITION: The JSSC paper proposes a radical solution to the Berlin problem (Tab 1). JSSC proposed solution is based on rationale of "vital interests" which US and USSR cannot have damaged (Tab 1A) Therefore answer lies in disengaging these "vital interests" (Tab 1B). However, the only basis U.S. should consider negotiations would be that of a political disengagement for a political vital interest or a military disengagement for a military vital interest (Tab 1C). In essence, the JSSC solution includes Political Disengagement via (1) Signing peace treaties with GDR and FRG. (2) Merging E. Berlin into GDR and W. Berlin into FRG. (3) Obtaining guaranteed access to W. Berlin under control of FRG. (4) Seeking NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty and Military Disengagement via (1) Reduction or Withdrawal from Berlin. (2) Eventual withdrawal from E. and W. Germany. Finally, urge E. and W. Germans to solve their own problems and reunify (Tab 1D) Paper also recognizes need for national and allied acceptance and for further development of proposed concepts but since Berlin is under U.S. study, JSSC request proposal be transmitted to Sec/State for consideration (Tab 1E).

4. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT. Army and Navy concur in paper.

5. RECOMMENDED POSITION: That the Chief of Staff recommend JCS note study and use it in formulating position on Berlin when requested by Defense and/or State, as per CSAFM at Blue Tab. Talking Paper at Tab 2 is prepared for your use. Tab 2A lists questions which can be [illegible] Tab 2B lists status of USAF comments.

Col Edward Mikoloski/cg/54709
4 December 1962

AFXPD-PY Williams

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TALKING PAPER

on

JCS 1907/566

- I want to compliment the JSSC for the thought and effort put into the paper - as being illustrative of different and perhaps radical approaches to the Berlin dilemma.

- The JSSC has produced a thought-provoking paper.

- However, I do not feel that the JCS should give it their military "blessing" at this time.

- Although I might agree that some of the ideas suggested may have merit, nevertheless, I have certain misgivings about the JCS approving the study and sending it forward to Sec/State.

- Primarily, I am not certain that the JCS want to go on record erdorsing a proposal which suggests the disengagement or withdrawal of military forces from Germany and Berlin.

- I am concerned about the impact such a proposal may have on the FRG, the tri-partite nation and our NATO allies.

- Especially, since the U.S. has urged the FRG and NATO to take firmer political and military steps in regard to Berlin.

- U.S. has achieved good degree of success e.g.,

  - Berlin build-up action among NATO nations.

  - Obtained NATO Political Directive on Berlin.

  - Developed Bercon/Marcon Plans.

  - Altering NATO Alert Measures to meet Berlin crisis.

  - Developing NATO version of NSAM-109 ("Poodle Blanket")

- Is this the time to reverse our position and these trends that the U.S. has set in motion?

- Additionally there are many other questions which we need answer to before we can propose acceptable solutions.

- All are inter-related and inter-dependent.

- Some are purely political or purely military.

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- Others are purely national while others are international.

- Some have strong economic implications.

- Questions on specific items proposed by JSSC are at Tab 24.

- In looking over the JSSC proposal I see the following gains and losses which may result.

GAINS	LOSSES
1. Disengages US/Soviet forces.	1. Removes allied forces from Berlin
2. Reduces tensions.	2. Recognizes division of Berlin.
3. Provides "guaranteed" access to Berlin.	3. Recognizes G.D.R. as sovereign State.
4. Allows Germans to solve own problems and <u>may</u> lead to reunification in future.	4. Reduces viability of Berlin.
	5. Restricts freedom of Berliners.
	6. Places control of events into hands of FRG/GDR in place of allies/US
	7. Vital interests still engaged via NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances.
	8. Withdraws US forces from FRG.
	9. Serious effect on NATO.

- It is immediately apparent that the consequences of this proposal have significant and far-reaching implications of a national and an international politico-military nature.

- However, from purely a military standpoint, I am not prepared at this time to support any proposal which suggests the disengagement or withdrawal of military forces from Germany and/or Berlin.

- Especially in the absence of any stated directive to us changing U.S. policy toward Berlin, the tripartite nations, and/or NATO.

- Also, I do not believe the U.S. should at this time withdraw from its position of treating Berlin as an undivided city. The Division of Berlin is contrary to human decency and morals. It is an unnatural state and for the U.S. to acquiesce in accepting the division of that city, would be tantamount to renouncing before the world U.S. leadership and defense of the principles of liberty, freedom, and self-determination.

- The JSSC proposal pays "too high a price for too little a return." P4

QUESTIONS TO BE POSED ON JCSC
"BERLIN PLANNING" PAPER

Regarding Change Needed in Berlin

- Is a change in status of Berlin militarily or politically desirable?

- What are military advantages of retaining "status quo" in Berlin?

- What are military disadvantages of retaining 'status quo" in Berlin?

Regarding Peace Treaty

- What nations other than Bloc countries will attend signing of E. or GDR-USSR Peace Treaty and sign the treaty?

- What is the import of a USSR-GDR Peace Treaty if only Soviet Bloc countries sign document?

- What is impact of recognizing sovereignty of GDR? On FRG? On NATO? On U.S.? On USSR?

Regarding Merger of E. Berlin into GDR and W. Berlin into FRG

- What is impact of this action on current U.S./Allied policy regarding indivisibility of Berlin?

- What will the effect be on people of Germany?

- How are U.S.-Soviet "vital interests" disengaged if U.S. and USSR are tied to Berlin via NATO and Warsaw Pacts?

- Is internationalization of all of Berlin better or worse than the division of Berlin between FRG and GDR?

Regarding Guarantee of Access to W. Berlin under FRG Control

1. What kind of "guarantees" are envisioned and how will these guarantees be enforced in case of harassments and/or abrogations?

2. What will be the status of air corridors into Berlin?

3. How are "vital interests" disengaged if access to W. Berlin is guaranteed "perhaps by NATO and the Warsaw Pact?"

4. Would an International Control Authority have any advantages for guaranteeing and running access ways to Berlin?

Regarding U.S.-USSR Political and Military Disengagement in Berlin

- What are the attitudes of the UK, France and FRG on the proposal of political disengagement?

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- Why should an offer of disengagement be made at this time since USS is not pressing for action?

- Would current Soviet posture of Khrushchev as "Man of Peace" be more in keeping with concluding treaties in other areas as nuclear testing, disarmament, arms inspection etc.?

- Would U.S. willingness to offer package proposal of disengagement be construed by Soviets as sign of weakness or over-eagerness on part of U.S. to negotiate?

- Should U.S./Allies obtain other indications from USSR regarding their sincerity and genuineness to reach peaceful agreements? e.g., disarmament, nuclear testing, removal of "barriers" between East and West Berlin, etc.

Withdrawal of U.S.-USSR Military Forces from Germany

1. Are the JCS prepared to support military withdrawal from West Germany?

2. Are the proposed withdrawals or even reductions, militarily advantageous to the U.S.?

3. What will be the effect of U.S. withdrawals/reductions on NATO and other regional alliances?

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STATUS OF USAF COMMENTS ON JSSC PAPER
ON BERLIN PLANNING (JCS 1907/566)

General

1. The JSSC incorporated the greatest part of the substantive comment by our CSAFM. However, while including the USAF comments the JSSC neglected to delete the sections for which the USAF substitutions were recommended.

2. In the main, we objected to all JSSC references of "withdrawal of forces from Berlin and/or West Germany and recommended the substitution of "reduction." The JSSC included our "reduction" phrasing, but also retained the original "withdrawal" sections throughout the paper.

Specific ("Snowflaked")

Change a.	Page 3266 Par. 1	Not Accepted.
Change b.	Page 3266 Par. 2 Line 7	Accepted.
Change c.	Page 3267 Par. 5 Line 5	Not Accepted.
Change d.	Page 3268 Par. 1 Line 6	Not Accepted.
Change e.	Page 3268, Par. 1 Line 14	Partially Accepted by re-wording.
Change f.	Page 3268, Par. 1 Line 15	Not Accepted.
Change g.	Page 3269a, Line 14	Accepted with minor modifications as in Appendix C
Change h.	Page 3269a thru 3273	Accepted.
Change i.	Page 3270, New Par. 7a, Lines 22-23	Not Accepted.
Change j.	Page 3271, New Par. 9, Line 33	Accepted.
Change k.	Page 3272, New Par. 9, Lines 3-5	Not Accepted. Sentence qualified.
Change l.	Page 3272, New Par. 10, Line 15	Not Accepted.
Change m.	Page 3272, New Par. 10, Line 16	Accepted.
Change n.	Page 3272, New Par. 10, Lines 17-19	Not Accepted.
Change o.	Page 3273, New Par. 13, Lines 17-19	Not Accepted.

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MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on CSAFM_____

MEMORANDUM BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COUNCIL FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON BERLIN PLANNING (U)

1. I have reviewed JCS 1907/566 and find that, although the JSSC have incorporated the bulk of the Service comments, the proposal still remains basically the same as the original version, and retains features which, in my judgment, are militarily questionable.

2. Specifically, I find the proposal still suggesting military withdrawal not only from Berlin but also from West Germany. This, as you will agree, is diametric to the current U.S. National and Allied policy of retaining military forces in Berlin and to the U.S. policy of maintaining adequate forces in NATO. The effects of the JSSC proposed action in these areas alone could have damaging repercussions on U.S. and NATO military posture from which we may find it difficult, if not impossible, to fully recover.

3. During the past year, our NATO Allies, upon U.S. insistence, have undertaken stronger interest and steps in regard to Berlin. Now they expect the U.S. to keep the lead in Berlin by reaffirming its support for the maintenance of essential Western rights and interests in Berlin. It could be deleterious to the U.S. and NATO if word would leak out that the U.S. is contemplating reversal of its policy by proposing "reduction", "withdrawal", "disengagement", "non-aggression pacts", etc.

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4. Additionally, I question the wisdom of the JCS injecting themselves into the political arena of Berlin and Germany at this time. The political questions of Berlin and Germany are too complicated and too deeply enmeshed with bilateral, quadripartite and international entanglements for the JCS to become involved without full knowledge of all the political, economic and social ramifications.

5 I cannot endorse a proposal with these weaknesses and one which is contrary to current U.S. and JCS policy, i.e , indivisibility of Berlin, maintenance of forces in Berlin, and support of NATO with forces in-being on European soil.

6 Accordingly, I cannot approve the transmittal of JCS 1907/566 and recommend the JCS note the study and use it in the formulation of a JCS position on new solutions to Berlin when, and if, requested by Defense, State, and/or the Executive Departments

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