

Baker Hamilton (B/H) Commission vs The New Way Forward

- Of 79 B/H recommendations:
 - 4 are very good new ideas and are being explored by the interagency
 - 58 are good ideas; the New Way Forward Incorporates it
 - 14 are neutral; the recommendations were fine, but there were some issues that needed to be resolved before they could be realistically implemented (i.e. change in GOI policy, additional resources)
 - 3 are bad ideas
- Over 25 B/H recommendations with military equities are adopted by the New Way Forward, including:
 - Recommendation 20, calling for GOI to take the lead in reconciliation, security and governance.
 - Recommendation 43, calling for military priorities in Iraq to shift to training, equipping, advising, the support mission and CT operations.

B/H recommendations incorporated into the New Way Forward will help Iraq troops, supported by embedded Coalition Forces, take the lead in capturing terrorists and murderers and protect the population. This will provide a window of opportunity to allow the government to make progress in other critical areas and will create conditions for true national reconciliation.

Interagency Review of Baker/Hamilton Report

Purpose. Provide report of interagency review of Baker/Hamilton (B/H) Iraq Study Group recommendations.

Issue. Interagency representatives from NSC staff, DoS, OSD, JS, DoS, Treasury, and DoJ reviewed every recommendation of the B/H report; many are incorporated into the New Way Forward.

Bottom Line

- The New Way Forward has incorporated 59 recommendations from the B/H report to date.

Background.

- Of 79 B/H recommendations:
 - 4 are "very good new ideas" (one adopted)
 - 58 are "good ideas" which the New Way Forward incorporates
 - 14 are "neutral"; the recommendations were fine, but there were some issues that needed to be resolved before they could be realistically implemented (i.e. change in GOI policy, additional resources)
 - 3 are "bad ideas"

Recommendations with Military Equities Incorporated Into The New Way Forward:

- Recommendations 2,4-8, 10-12: Calling for an International Support Group, to include Iran and Syria, to lend assistance to the GOI. The International Compact with Iraq is the mechanism for facilitating the ISG "Support Group" concept. Iran and Syria do participate in International Compact meetings and we would like to see increased constructive participation and cessation of deleterious activities by both.
- Recommendation 20, calling for GOI to take the lead in reconciliation, security and governance.
- Recommendation 22, calling for POTUS to state that he does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq.
- Recommendation 40, calling for our troop commitment to not be "open-ended".
- Recommendation 41, stating that US forces to may be redeployed from Iraq if US security interests dictate.

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- Recommendation 42, calling for completion of the train/equip mission by 1st Quarter 2008.
- Recommendation 43, calling for military priorities in Iraq to shift to training, equipping, advising, the support mission and CT operations.
- Recommendation 44, calling for high quality officers in embeds.
- Recommendation 45, calling for better equipment to the ISF by accelerating FMS to the GOI and leaving behind some US equipment.
- Recommendation 46, calling for healthy civil-military relations.
- Recommendation 47, calling for high level of military readiness.
- Recommendation 48, calling for sufficient appropriated funds to return equipment to full functionality.
- Recommendation 49, calling for congressional assessment of the budgetary impact of the war on future force readiness
- Recommendation 54, calling for MOI control of the Facilities Protection Services.
- Recommendation 70, calling for more flexible security assistance program for Iraq.
- Recommendation 77 and 79 calling for increased intelligence support and activity.

Recommendations with Military Equities Not Incorporated Into The New Way Forward:

- Recommendation 56 and 60 call for Department of Justice to take the lead in developing MOI capacity. MOI capacity development should continue under the direction of the DOD, but the DOD should coordinate more closely to DOJ to incorporate DOJ's capabilities where possible.
- (U) Recommendation 50, 51 and 55 call for placing Iraqi National Police and Border Police under the direction of the MOD. These are GOI decisions to make. JS view is that these units should continue under the MOI.

Very Good New Ideas:

- Recommendation 57, calling for experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world to be embedded with Iraqi Police.
- Recommendation 64, calling for U.S. economic assistance to increase (rather than decline), to include funding for capacity development and jobs creation programs. (pending supplemental & budget approval)
- Recommendation 67, calling for a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. (Implemented)
- Recommendation 68, calling for Chief of Mission authority to expend funds, similar to the CERP funds used by DOD (pending supplemental approval)

Bad Ideas:

- (U) Recommendation 16 calls for a return on the Golan Heights to Syria in conjunction with a full peace agreement between the US and Syria. In principal we agree that cessation of hostilities between Israel and Syria could include a return of occupied territories—do not believe we should specify this as a solution at this point.
- Recommendation 21 calls reduction of US support if the GOI fails to meet benchmarks. To threaten withdrawal because a nascent GOI is struggling would embolden terrorist and insurgents—they would work that much harder to try to prevent the GOI from achieving its goals.
- Recommendation 34 recommends using the future of US force presence as a negotiating point in reconciliation talks with militias and insurgents. Force presence is not on the table, however the PIC process will occur when areas are safe and ISF capable of managing security. Long term security relationship must be determined to ensure unity of effort and consistent USG message on this recommendation. Those elements who don't want the US force presence to continue are disingenuous in their motives and seek to undermine GOI security efforts.

Prepared by: (b)(6) J5-Iraq, (b)(2)

Interagency Review of Baker/Hamilton Report

Purpose. Provide report of interagency review of Baker/Hamilton (B/H) Iraq Study Group recommendations.

Issue. Interagency representatives from NSC staff, DoS, OSD, JS, DoS, Treasury, and DoJ reviewed every recommendation of the B/H report; many are incorporated into the New Way Forward.

Bottom Line

- The New Way Forward Incorporates 58 recommendations from the B/H report.

Background.

- Of 79 B/H recommendations:
 - 5 are "very good new ideas"
 - 57 are "good ideas; the New Way Forward Incorporates it"
 - 14 are "neutral"; the recommendations were fine, but there were some issues that needed to be resolved before they could be realistically implemented (i.e. change in GOI policy, additional resources)
 - 3 are "bad ideas"

Recommendations with Military Equities Incorporated Into The New Way Forward:

- Recommendations 2,4-8, 10-12: Calling for an International Support Group, to include Iran and Syria, to lend assistance to the GOI. The International Compact with Iraq is the mechanism for facilitating the ISG "Support Group" concept. Iran and Syria do participate in International Compact meetings and we would like to see increased constructive participation and cessation of deleterious activities by both.
- Recommendation 20, calling for GOI to take the lead in reconciliation, security and governance.
- Recommendation 22, calling for POTUS to state that he does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq.
- Recommendation 40, calling for our troop commitment to not be "open-ended".
- Recommendation 41, stating that US forces to may be redeployed from Iraq if US security interests dictate.

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- Recommendation 42, calling for completion of the train/equip mission by 1st Quarter 2008.
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- Recommendation 47, calling for high level of military readiness.
- Recommendation 48, calling for sufficient appropriated funds to return equipment to full functionality.
- Recommendation 49, calling for congressional assessment of the budgetary impact of the war on future force readiness
- Recommendation 54, calling for MOI control of the Facilities Protection Services.
- Recommendation 70, calling for more flexible security assistance program for Iraq.
- Recommendation 77 and 79 calling for increased intelligence support and activity.

Recommendations with Military Equities Not Incorporated Into The New Way Forward:

- Recommendation 56 and 60 call for Department of Justice to take the lead in developing MOI capacity. MOI capacity development should continue under the direction of the DOD, but the DOD should coordinate more closely to DOJ to incorporate DOJ's capabilities where possible.
- (U) Recommendation 50, 51 and 55 call for placing Iraqi National Police and Border Police under the direction of the MOD. These are GOI decisions to make. JS view is that these units should continue under the MOI.

Very Good New Ideas:

- Recommendation 57, calling for experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world to be embedded with Iraqi Police. **(IN PROCESS—OUTREACH EFFORT IS STATE ACTION)**
- Recommendation 64, calling for U.S. economic assistance to increase (rather than decline), to include funding for capacity development and jobs creation programs. **(IN PROGRESS—AMB SATTERFIELD SAID STATE WILL ASK FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING IN FY 07 SUP AND FY 08 FOR STABILITY OPS)**
- Recommendation 65, calling for international involvement in reconstruction efforts. **(ACTION REQUIRED—RECOMMEND STATE TAKE LEAD AND GET ADDED TO THE COMPACT)**
- Recommendation 67, calling for a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. **(IN PROCESS—STATE ACTION)**
- Recommendation 68, calling for Chief of Mission authority to expend funds, similar to the CERP funds used by DOD **(ACTION REQUIRED—CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS REQUIRED)**

Bad Ideas:

- (U) Recommendation 16 calls for a return on the Golan Heights to Syria in conjunction with a full peace agreement between the US and Syria. In principle we agree that cessation of hostilities between Israel and Syria could include a return of occupied territories—do not believe we should specify this as a solution at this point. **(NO MOMENTUM)**
- Recommendation 21 calls reduction of US support if the GOI fails to meet benchmarks. To threaten withdrawal because a nascent GOI is struggling would embolden terrorist and insurgents—they would work that much harder to try to prevent the GOI from achieving its goals. **(NO MOMENTUM IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT THERE IS CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS IDEA)**
- Recommendation 34 recommends using the future of US force presence as a negotiating point in reconciliation talks with militias and insurgents. Force presence is not on the table, however the PIC process will occur when areas are

safe and ISF capable of managing security. Long term security relationship must be determined to ensure unity of effort and consistent USG message on this recommendation. Those elements who don't want the US force presence to continue are disingenuous in their motives and seek to undermine GOI security efforts. **(NO MOMENTUM)**

Prepared by: (b)(6) J5-Iraq, (b)(2)

JS J-5 Review of Baker/Hamilton Report

Purpose. Provide report of current status of Baker/Hamilton (B/H) Iraq Study Group recommendations.

Bottom Line

- The New Way Forward incorporates 66 of 79 recommendations.

Background.

- Of 79 B/H recommendations:
 - 2 are "very good new ideas" still requiring action
 - 66 are "good ideas; the New Way Forward Incorporates it"
 - 10 are "neutral"; the recommendations were fine, but there were some issues that needed to be resolved before they could be realistically implemented (i.e. change in GOI policy, additional resources)
 - 1 is a "bad idea"

Recommendations with Military Equities Incorporated Into The New Way Forward:

- Recommendations 1,2,4-12: Calling for an International Support Group, to include Iran and Syria, to assist the GOI.
- Recommendation 20, calling for GOI to take the lead in reconciliation, security and governance.
- Recommendation 22, calling for POTUS to state that he does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq.
- Recommendation 40, calling for our troop commitment to not be "open-ended".
- Recommendation 41, stating that US forces to may be redeployed from Iraq if US security interests dictate.
- Recommendation 42, calling for completion of the train/equip mission by 1st Quarter 2008.
- Recommendation 43, calling for military priorities in Iraq to shift to training, equipping, advising, the support mission and CT operations.
- Recommendation 44, calling for quality officers in embeds.
- Recommendation 45, calling for better equipment to the ISF by accelerating FMS to the GOI and leaving behind some US equipment.
- Recommendation 46, calling for healthy civil-military relations.
- Recommendation 47, calling for high military readiness.

- Recommendation 48, calling for sufficient appropriated funds to return equipment to full functionality.
- Recommendation 49, calling for congressional assessment of the budgetary impact of the war on future force readiness
- Recommendation 54, calling for MOI control of the Facilities Protection Services.
- Recommendation 70, calling for more flexible security assistance program for Iraq.
- Recommendation 77 and 79 calling for increased intelligence support and activity.

Very Good New Ideas:

- Recommendation 57, calling for experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world to be embedded with Iraqi Police. **(ACTION REQUIRED— OUTREACH EFFORT IS STATE ACTION)**
- Recommendation 74, calling for increased interagency international involvement in Iraq. **(ACTION REQUIRED— CONGRESS MUST STUDY AND REVIEW EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITIES)**

Recommendations with Military Equities Not Incorporated Into The New Way Forward:

- Recommendation 56 and 60 call for Department of Justice to take the lead in developing MOI capacity. MOI capacity development should continue under the direction of the DOD, but the DOD should coordinate more closely to DOJ to incorporate DOJ's capabilities where possible.
- (U) Recommendation 50, 51 and 55 call for placing Iraqi National Police and Border Police under the direction of the MOD. These are GOI decisions to make. JS view is that these units should continue under the MOI.

Bad Ideas:

- (U) Recommendation 16 calls for a return on the Golan Heights to Syria in conjunction with a full peace agreement between the US and Syria. In principal we agree that cessation of hostilities between Israel and Syria could include a return of occupied territories—do not believe we should specify this as a solution at this point. **(NO MOMENTUM)**

Prepared by: (b)(6), J5-Iraq (b)(2)

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