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MACSOB DOCUMENTATION STUDY (F)

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
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER

PART I. INTRODUCTION

A. (TS) BACKGROUND



In this capacity, the JPRC would be the coordination authority and focal point for all post-SAR recovery matters.



B. (TS) SCOPE

1. Tied in to JPRC activities was the establishment of evasion and escape procedures, which were disseminated to all aircrews.



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PART II. INCEPTION OF JPRC

A. (TS) COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

In June 1965, the Embassy Mission Council in Saigon established a Committee on Prisoners and Detainees with membership composed of representatives from each element of the Country Mission Team. Under Embassy chairmanship, the Committee was given the primary responsibility for formulating policy recommendations and coordinating actions relating to US military prisoners and civilian detainees held by the Viet Cong^(VC) in South Vietnam. The Committee was also tasked to formulate policy recommendations to the Mission on the following additional categories of detained persons: US prisoners held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in North Vietnam; and third country civilian detainees and military prisoners held by the VC in South Vietnam, except non-US civilians. The Committee was further tasked to initiate necessary liaison with Vietnamese authorities and to coordinate any necessary Mission action that might be required concerning US prisoners or detainees in third countries, specifically Laos.*

B. (TS) JOINT RECOVERY CENTER

1. (S) Acting on the recommendations of the Committee, and with the concurrence of the Mission Council, the Ambassador, General Maxwell Taylor, established a Joint Recovery Center (JRC), which would:
 - a. Be manned by individuals provided by the Department of Defense (DOD), US Overseas Mission (USOM), US Information Service (USIS), the Embassy, and [REDACTED]
 - b. Be directly responsible to the Ambassador for all operational matters.
 - c. Coordinate operations in adjacent areas, particularly Laos, with the appropriate embassy or command.**

* (TS) Joint AMEMBASSY/MACV Msg, 140525Z Jun 1965
† (TS) History of JPRC dated 1 January 1967

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2. (TS) In speaking to the DOD manning requirement for the JRC, the Ambassador indicated the need for 10 professionally qualified military representatives. Further, it was recommended that the DOD assign a USAF colonel having the technical qualifications and command experience as the JRC's Director.

3. (TS) The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff take appropriate action to furnish the requested officer, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, requested comments and recommendations concerning command arrangements and designation of the JRC.* CINCPAC concurred in the establishment of a recovery center, manning and command arrangements, and the terms of reference. CINCPAC suggested the term JPRC be used to mean Joint Personnel Recovery Center since the term JRC was presently used to designate the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) within the J-3 Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

4. (TS) Upon reviewing the prisoner recovery problem in Southeast Asia, COMUSMACV, in September 1965, indicated that, in close cooperation with the American Embassy [redacted] an aggressive program to determine the location of, and assist American prisoners held by the VC, the DRV, and the Pathet Lao had been initiated. With the concurrence of the American Embassy, COMUSMACV withdrew the request for appointment of a Director for the JRC indicating that the officer would be provided from available personnel.***

C. (TS) JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC)

1. (TS) During an evasion and escape (E&E) planning conference at CINCPAC Headquarters in December 1965, a recommendation was made that a recovery center be established in Southeast Asia which would include personnel recovery operations after search and rescue (SAR)

* (TS) JCS Msg, 232050Z Jun 1965
** (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 032241Z Aug 1965
*** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 151136Z Sept 1965

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efforts had been terminated. It was visualized, by CINCPAC, that
the functions of the JRC, then operating in Vietnam, would be
absorbed within this new organization. A general concept of a
possible arrangement for post-SAR recovery operations envisioned
by CINCPAC would be as follows:

a. Recovery operations would involve forces and/or activities
varied both as to parent organization and location. The locale
of recovery operations might include South Vietnam, North Vietnam
and Laos. Therefore, to maximize the effectiveness of such
operations, COMUSMACV would be designated as coordinating
authority for post-SAR matters.

b. COMUSMACV would establish a Personnel Recovery Center to
aid in his coordination authority role. The center would serve
as a focal point for the collection and collation of all informa-
tion and intelligence bearing on personnel recovery, and would
plan and coordinate the operational aspects of recovery/assistance
of US/Allied personnel detained/held prisoner by, or evading
enemy forces.

c. Actual conduct of recovery operations would continue to be
a function of the department/agency or Service component to
which forces engaged in specific recovery operations were assigned.

d. Diplomatic arrangements for exchange of prisoners and
release of personnel would continue to be a function of the State
Department.

2. (TS) CINCPAC requested comments from COMUSMACV on the possible
arrangement outlined above, and submission of proposed terms of
reference (TOR) for the Center. CINCPAC indicated that the TOR should
recognize the requirement for appropriate coordination with the
various US Chiefs of Mission and with the representatives of US
departments and agencies within the Mission. Further, the TOR should
also recognize Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF)
functions and responsibilities for SAR matters, as established by

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CINCPAC INSTRUCTION 3130.10 of 25 June 1965 and the functions of
the Southeast Asia SAR Center which CINCPAC directed be established
in March 1966.*

3. (TS) The terms of reference, pertaining to the establishment
of a JPRC, proposed by COMUSMACV and coordinated with the 7th
Air Force, and the US Embassy, Saigon, were as follows:

"a. PURPOSE: The purpose of the JPRC is to establish a capa-
bility within MACV Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) for
personnel recovery operations subsequent to termination of search
and rescue (SAR) efforts.

"b. RESPONSIBILITIES: MACSOG will be responsible for oper-
ating the JPRC, for collating intelligence data pertaining to
detained/missing personnel recovery planning, and for conducting
operations related to the recovery of US and allied personnel
detained by unfriendly forces within SEASIA.

"c. FUNCTIONS:



"(4) Performs liaison and coordination with US and allied
Departments and Agencies to insure maximum utilization of
available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for
launching recovery operations.

"(5) Monitors and coordinates operations with agencies
external to MACSOG during execution of approved plans.

"d. FORCES:

"(1) Primary forces for recovery operations will be those
assigned to MACSOG; however, these forces will be augmented by
MACV component forces as required for specific operations.

"(2) If US forces, in addition to those currently under
MACV control, are required for recovery operations, they will be
requested from CINCPAC. If feasible, they will be placed under
operational control of MACSOG for the operations.

"(3) If cases arise in which the use of MACSOG or MACV
component forces are not advisable, the use of indigenous forces
is indicated, and MACV is tasked to accomplish the mission,
MACSOG would act as the coordinating authority for MACV. Advice
and assistance will be furnished by MACSOG as requested and
appropriate.

* (TS) CINCPAC msg, 270016Z April 1966

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"e. RELATIONSHIPS:

"(1) The JPRC will function as an element of MACSOG, under the command and control of COMUSMACV.

"(2) Areas of operation and appropriate coordinating agencies are as follows:

"(a) South Vietnam: coordination affected with USEMB, Saigon.

"(b) Laos: Coordination affected with USEMB, Bangkok and approved by USEMB, Vientiane and CINCPAC prior to initiation of operations.

"(c) North Vietnam and Cambodia: Coordination with USEMB, Bangkok or USEMB, Saigon and approved by CINCPAC prior to initiation of operations.

"(d) Red China: Not envisaged at this state of development."

In providing CINCPAC with the above proposed TOR, COMUSMACV noted that as of 15 June 1966, a total of 315 personnel, predominantly US were either detained or missing. COMUSMACV further indicated that the rising total from 22 in 1964 to 172 in 1965 and to the mid-June 1966 figure of 315 personnel illustrated the rapid increase resulting from expanded US and allied operations.

4. (TS) In September 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following terms of reference as proposed by CINCPAC and concurred in by the American Embassies in Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon:**


"...Terms of Reference

"a. PURPOSE: The purpose of the JPRC is to establish a capability within COMUSMACV for personnel recovery operations subsequent to termination of search and rescue (SAR) effort. COMUSMACV is designated the coordinating authority for post-SAR recovery matters in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

"b. FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: COMUSMACV will be responsible for operation of the JPRC, which will perform the following functions:



* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 021235Z July 1966
** (TS) JCS Msg, 012308Z Sept 1966



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"(5) Coordinate and establish liaison with US and allied departments and agencies to insure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for launching recovery operations.

"(6) Monitor and coordinate operations with agencies external to COMUSMACV during execution of approved plans.

"c. FORCES: Primary forces for recovery operations will be those assigned to COMUSMACV.

"(1) If US forces in addition to those currently under COMUSMACV operational control are required for recovery operations, supporting forces will be requested from CINCPAC. CINCPAC will specify command and control arrangements at the time arrangements at the time supporting forces are designated.

"(2) In cases where indigenous forces are utilized, COMUSMACV will act as the coordinating authority and provide advice and assistance as requested and appropriate.

"d. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

"(1) The JPRC will function as an element under the command and operational control of COMUSMACV.

"(2) Areas of operation and appropriate coordinating agencies are as follows:

"(a) South Vietnam: Recovery operations will be coordinated with the American Embassy, Saigon prior to initiation.

"(b) Laos: Recovery operations will be coordinated with the American Embassy, Saigon and American Embassy, Vientiane and approved by CINCPAC prior to initiation.

"(c) Thailand: Recovery operations entering Thai airspace, staging from or through Thailand, or utilizing Thailand based forces will be coordinated with the American Embassy, Bangkok prior to initiation.

"(d) North Vietnam and Cambodia: Recovery operations will be coordinated with the American Embassy Saigon and approved by CINCPAC prior to initiation. Coordination with American Embassy Vientiane will be effected when overflight of Laos if involved.

"(e) Communist China: Not envisioned at this time."

CINCPAC, in providing authority and guidance to COMUSMACV in establishing the JPRC, requested their plans for early activation of the center in accordance with the above TOR.*

* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 160232Z Sept 1966

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D. (TS) JPRC ACTIVATION

1. (TS) The JPRC was established on a temporary basis within MACSOG, by COMUSMACV on 29 August 1966, and officially activated on 17 September 1966 upon receipt of the authority message from CINCPAC. [REDACTED] on temporary additional duty from the 13th Air Force, initially served as Chief, JPRC. Upon activation, the following personnel were assigned to the center:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Title</u>
O6	Chief, JPRC
O4	[REDACTED]
O4	Operations & Plans Officer
E5	[REDACTED]
E5	Clerk-Typist
E3	Clerk-Typist

2. (TS) Early in September 1966, the JPRC effected coordination and established a communications link with the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) and the 7th Air Force for the purpose of having these activities forward to the JPRC all pertinent data on downed airmen and results of SAR efforts. This data would be closely monitored by the JPRC to determine if and when MACSOG or other assets could be utilized in recovery operations.

3. (TS) COMUSMACV determined, that, as a separate staff element of MACSOG, the JPRC would be responsible [REDACTED] to insure complete utilization of all CINCPAC resources and capabilities. Any initial conceptual planning would be the responsibility of the JPRC, and when MACSOG resources were utilized in recovery operations, the operational planning and execution would be the responsibility of the MACSOG Staff. Further, operational control and execution would be performed in the same manner as other MACSOG operations. When other than MACSOG resources were used to effect recovery, operational control would be as prescribed by the TOR.

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* COMUSMACV msg to CINCPAC and other addressees, COMUSMACV
210226Z September 1966

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PART III. JPRC HISTORY - 1966

A. ~~(TS)~~ JPRC ACTIVATION

1. ~~(TS)~~ On 22 September 1966, COMUSMACV sent a message of notification of activation of the JPRC to military and State Department agencies operating within the CINCPAC area of responsibility. The message stated that the purpose of the JPRC was to establish a capability within MACV for personnel recovery operations subsequent to termination of SAR effort. Further, it would also serve as the coordination authority and focal point for all post-SAR recovery matters in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. COMUSMACV listed the following functions that the JPRC would perform:



d. Prepare basic operational procedures and plans for the recovery or assistance of detained US or allied personnel.

e. Coordinate and establish liaison with US and Allied departments and agencies to insure maximum utilization of available resources, and to achieve minimum reaction time for launching recovery operations.

f. Monitor and coordinate operations with agencies external to MACV during execution of approved plans.

2. ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV requested all message addressees to forward to Headquarters, MACV, JPRC by the most expeditious method, and on a continuing basis, all data pertaining to missing or detained personnel in Southeast Asia.*

* ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 220938Z Sept 1966

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3. (TS) COMUSMACV also advised the major military commands 1
under MACV of the activation of the JPRC, and indicated that the 2
nickname BRIGHT LIGHT had been assigned for JPRC messages. 3
For the JPRC to accomplish its purpose, COMUSMACV requested 4
the following data be passed to the JPRC by the most expeditious 5
means. 6

a. Information concerning missing and/or captured personnel. 7

b. Alleged or confirmed locations of prisoner of war (POW) 8
camps or holding areas. 9

c. Information which would indicate the policies of any 10
of the hostile forces toward the handling of Allied prisoners. 11
Subordinate commands were also apprised of means by which they could 12
communicate directly with the center, and COMUSMACV directed that 13
no element of the command would initiate operations designed solely 14
or primarily for the release of captured personnel without coordination 15
and approval of the JPRC.* 16

B. (TS)



(TS) COMUSMACV Msg. 061226Z Oct 1966

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
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
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~~(PS) COMUSMACV Msg, 011138Z Nov 1966~~


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
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~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 240148Z Sept 1966

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3. (TS) The above E and E procedures for aircrews were approved for implementation effective on 1 October 1966, and CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT take expeditious action to inform aircrews of the procedures.*

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* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 280315Z Sept 1966

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~~(PS) Appendix V to Annex M, 1966 MACV Command History dated
5 May 1967~~

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F. (TS) POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS ON RECOVERY OPERATIONS

1. (TS) A problem area was noted by COMUSMACV, in November 1966, relative to the amount of coordination required when conducting cross-border recovery operations. An example was given of an operation which involved an airman downed in Laos which required recovery teams to be staged through an Air Base located in Thailand. It was felt that the time required to effect coordination with the American Embassies in Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok, and also CINCPAC in order to launch a cross-border recovery seriously limited the capability of the JPRC to respond promptly. It was further noted that the blanket authority granted by CINCPAC to conduct operations for evading or escaped airmen in NVN without prior CINCPAC approval would help alleviate this situation.*

2. (TS) The following specific recovery operation is cited to illustrate the impediments to immediate reaction and restrictions in the use of MACV recovery assets occasioned by the system of coordination required.

→ "a. On 23 September 1966, the JPRC was advised that a beeper signal was heard in the Lactian panhandle area. Although voice contact could not be established, instructions to turn off the beeper were promptly complied with on two occasions. The location of the beeper and time frame of the signal correlated most closely with a [redacted] who went down in this general vicinity on 12 September. On 24 September, the JPRC requested the area be visually searched by low level, prop driven aircraft. That night a strobe light was reported in the vicinity of the previously reported beeper signal.

"b. The American Embassy, Laos, was queried on 24 September concerning [redacted]

[redacted] would be utilized to conduct the recovery operation.*

(TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 011138Z Nov 1966

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"c.



"d. In addition to the excessive delay, the [redacted] search conducted [redacted] pointed out these weaknesses in the planning and conduct of the operation: ←

"(1) All the team members [redacted]. Also, the search team made contact with local villagers, and questioned them concerning the downed airman. This seems particularly unwise for two reasons:

"(a) It alerted the local populace to the possibility that a US airman might be down in the area.

"(b) If [redacted] were observing the team from [redacted], this act could only reinforce any idea he might have had that these were unfriendly forces. It is entirely possible that [redacted] might have seen the search team, but successfully evaded it in the belief that it was composed of unfriendly forces. ←

"(2) The search team committed by the American Embassy, Laos is not specifically trained in search/recovery operations. The team MACV had in standby status had been specifically trained to perform this function. The upshot was that a team [redacted]

"(3) While the loyalty of the search team used in this operation is not being questioned, it seems unlikely that it could be as highly motivated as a team led by elite US personnel searching for a fellow countryman.

"(4) Finally, the American Embassy, Laos, took cognizance of the fact that the pilot might be hiding and refusing to expose himself until he saw an occidental face. On 1 October, COMUSMACV received a message from the Embassy suggesting that a team led by US personnel be dispatched for a final search. In light of the amount of time which had elapsed since any signal had been received, plus the search activities which had been conducted in the area, COMUSMACV felt it was highly unlikely that the airman would still be in this vicinity and the team was not dispatched.

"e. It may never be known conclusively whether [redacted] or indeed any US airman, was in fact down at this location. By the same token it will never be known whether or not the MACV recovery [redacted]. However, it seems apparent that the best resources available were not used in this operation. This is difficult to countenance where the lives of American airman might be at stake." ←

(TS) MACSOG Supplemental Data Sheet, Subj: Political Restrictions on Military Cross-Border Operations, dated 8 October 1966

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g. (TS) OPERATIONS, 1966

1. (TS) Upon activation in September 1966, the JPRC immediately commenced recovery operations. Generally speaking, these operations took one of two forms. One was the raid-type operation against known or suspected enemy prisoner of war (POW) camps. The other type of operation conducted by the center involved the search of an area where personnel who were evading, or who had escaped, were known or strongly suspected to be hiding.*

2. (TS) In October 1966, JCS stated a need for current and timely E&E and PW information. CINCPAC, in turn, requested that COMUSMACV prepare a weekly message BRIGHT LIGHT report to cover activities to that date.** For the purposes of future analysis, a chronology of recovery operations and other related incidents reported by the JPRC during 1966 follows. The information provided is taken directly from the weekly MACV BRIGHT LIGHT message reports which were prepared by the JPRC.

a. Operations, 17 September-31 October 1966**

(1) First Recovery Operation

(a) On 24 September, SAR notified the JPRC that US planes had heard and fixed a beeper at [REDACTED] on the morning of 23 September. They advised that the area had been searched with negative results and that they were suspending their efforts. JPRC, after evaluation and collation of all available data on aircrew members down in the vicinity, determined beeper transmission could have been F-105 pilot, USAF [REDACTED] reported downed 12 September, at a point approximately 45 nm north of reported beeper fix.

* (TS) Appendix V to Annex M, "1966 MACV Command History," dated 5 May 1967

** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 011138Z Nov 1966

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(2) JPRC requested that a low-level visual reconnaissance be flown the night of 24 September. The mission was flown and a strobe observed for approximately four to five seconds.

(3) A BRIGHT LIGHT team was immediately alerted and approval to launch the team requested from CINCPAC, AMEMB Vientiane and AMEMB Bangkok, as it was planned that the team would be launched from Nakhon Phanom. Approval was received from CINCPAC and AMEMB Bangkok, but AMEMB Vientiane denied approval to launch team stating that they had resources capable of performing operation.

(4) AMEMB Vientiane launched search team on 26 September. Search continued until 3 October with negative results. Operation terminated as of this date.

b. Second Recovery Operation

(1) On 29 September, an F-4C was reported downed at [REDACTED]. One pilot was recovered by SAR and the other pilot's parachute was in sight, but the pilot had not been recovered. On 30 September, SAR notified the JPRC and requested assistance.

(2) After securing necessary approval, a BRIGHT LIGHT team was launched. The body of [REDACTED] was recovered at approximately 011635H October 1966. The body was recovered at [REDACTED], which is in NVN rather than at [REDACTED] as reported, which is in Laos.

(3) Pilot's death apparently caused by fall of approximately 100 feet when he released himself from parachute harness during the night of 29 September.

c. Operation CANASTA 572

(1) At 120149Z October 1966, a Navy A-1 call sign, CANASTA 572 was downed in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. Voice contact was made with the pilot and his exact location determined, but rescue efforts on 13 and 14 October were not successful due to the fact that some enemy were in the area, and to inability to get sling to pilot through heavy foliage. JPRC was called for assistance on 14 October.

In the area, and to inability to get sling to pilot.

(2) A BRIGHT LIGHT team was readied and launched that evening. It arrived on the carrier, INTREPID, at approximately midnight and was prepared to launch at first light, 15 October. Weather on 15 October was such that it was not feasible to launch the operation.

(3) The team was helo-lifted to the area of the downed airman and landed at a point approximately 800 meters from his last known location at 160930H Oct. Plan was to sweep toward pilot in skirmish formation. At a point approximately 100 meters from target, team encountered a large trail under jungle canopy. This trail was taken under surveillance. After approximately 15 minutes, an NVN uniformed patrol, obviously engaged in search, approached the team to within 10 meters and the team leader thought they had been detected. The patrol was engaged and all four members were killed. As team was compromised, team leader requested exfiltration.

(4) During exfiltration, one helicopter was hit by ground fire and eventually lost. Three team members (one US, two VN) were wounded when the helicopter was hit. Wounds were not serious.

(5) Electronic and visual search of the area was continued for several days with negative results.

d. Operation CRIMSON TIDE

(1) On 30 August 1966, a 17 year old VC rallied to Chieu Hoi. Interrogation revealed that on 25 August 1966, he had observed an American Negro prisoner being held by the VC. He gave a detailed description of the location of the prison site. Aerial photography of the area was requested and flown, but yielded nothing conclusive. The rallier was reinterrogated on 28-29 September, and based on information acquired in this interrogation, low-level photography was requested. AF combat cameraman, using hand-held camera from O-1 aircraft, obtained excellent photographs. On 9 October 1966, the photos were flown to

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Can Tho and shown to the rallier, who positively identified 1
the prison area. The rallier agreed to a polygraph test, 2
which was administered on 11 October. Results of the test 3
indicated rallier probably was telling the truth. Final 4
arrangements were made with the Senior Corps Advisor to 5
conduct a raid. 6

(2) On 18 October, a company-sized recovery force was 7
heliborne to the prison site. Contact with the VC was made, 8
but no US personnel were recovered. Interrogation of two 9
VC seized during the raid produced no information concerning 10
US prisoners. 11

(3) Inasmuch as source accompanied the raiding force and 12
accurately pointed out fortifications and areas where booby 13
traps were located, it appears he was telling the truth. 14

e. Operation SWITCH-I 15

(1) On 12 October, JPRC received a spot report to the 16
effect that a Vietnamese woman had escaped from a VC prison 17
camp at approximately 112300H October. She reported that 18
this camp contained eight Americans and 22 ARVN prisoners. 19
On 13 October, JPRC received TALK QUICK request from G-2, 20
I PFORCEV, requesting authority to launch a recovery opera- 21
tion utilizing a Special Forces B team and elements of the 22
1st Cavalry Division. Authority was granted and a member 23
of the JPRC was sent to Phu Cat to monitor the operation. 24

(2) Upon arriving at Phu Cat, JPRC representative found 25
that information which 1st Cavalry Division had concerning 26
camp was considerably different than that originally 27
received by JPRC. Deputy Division Commander also said that 28
JPRC-trained forces should be used for the operation rather 29
than 1st Cavalry forces. 30

(3) JPRC is of the opinion that information presently 31
available is far too incomplete and contradictory to justify 32
recovery operation. J-2 assistance in obtaining additional 33
information was requested. Information obtained indicates 34

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F-23

Approved: 7

that prisoners are not now at reported location, if indeed, 1
they ever were. It seems highly doubtful that this opera- 2
tion will materialize. 3

f. Operation SWAP 4

(1) On 13 October 1966, G-2 III MAF advised that a 5
Catholic priest near Hue had been contacted by the VC 6
regarding possibility of exchanging two American prisoners 7
held by them for a VC Captain and a VC Lieutenant. JPRC 8
contacted AMEMB Saigon, and it was decided that it would 9
be desirable to secure VC officers for the exchange from 10
prisoners recently captured by US forces and not yet turned 11
over to ARVN control. G-2 at I FFORCEV was contacted and 12
asked to screen prisoners from Operation IRVING for 13
possible VC officers who could be used in the exchange. 14
They indicated shortly thereafter that two such prisoners 15
had been located, and G-2 III MAF was instructed to proceed 16
with negotiations. 17

(2) When JPRC received details on prisoners selected by 18
I FFORCEV, they were found not to be suitable. After con- 19
sulting the AMEMB Saigon and MACV PM, it was decided to 20
task J-2 with providing appropriate enemy prisoners. They 21
currently are trying to locate same. 22

(3) The priest has been contacted and indicates he has 23
been in contact with the VC, who have clarified their 24
terms for the exchange. The priest says he would like to 25
have the negotiations handled by the ICRC wa word of his 26
participation has leaked and he feels his life might be 27
in danger. AMEMB Saigon was contacted and advised that 28
ICRC participation was not possible. This word has been 29
passed to the field. JPRC has advised intelligence 30
officers in the field to try to keep the negotiations open 31
until suitable prisoners for an exchange can be located. 32

The [REDACTED] 33
[REDACTED] has arranged a meeting with the priest 34
for 31 October. Future of this operation is very much in 35
doubt. 36

[REDACTED] has arranged a meeting with the priest 37

g. Operation RIP TIDE

(1) On 16 September, a Vietnamese source reported that he knew the location of three American being held prisoner on a sampan just inside the Cambodian border. The squad leader who is in charge of the prison guard is the source's brother-in-law according to the source and is interested in defecting. Source stated he was willing to go back to prison boat and bring out further proof of the fact that Americans are being held there.

(2) On 17 September, representative of JPRC met with source, and gave source a letter to take to prisoners and a small camera with which to take prisoners' pictures. Source departed for prison boat that day. During period following source's departure from Saigon, the area in which the prison boat purportedly is located was heavily flooded making travel in that region extremely difficult.

(3) Aerial photography of the area described by source was requested and has been flown. A boat which answers description provided by source has been located on photographs approximately one kilometer inside the Cambodian border.

(4) On 12 October, source alleges he received camera containing pictures of prisoners as well as letters from prisoners from his brother-in-law, the VC squad leader in charge of the prison guard. Source further alleges that as he was departing the area where these items were passed to him, he was challenged by two VC who had followed him. They threw a grenade in his boat, which sank along with camera and letters, according to source. Source was wounded in leg, but managed to escape and ultimately was hospitalized at Can Tho.

(5) Source was contacted [REDACTED] shortly after being discharged from the hospital. He provided all information at his disposal

concerning prison camp, but stated he did not feel he should attempt contact with his brother-in-law again. He stated, however, that perhaps contact could be established with the VC squad leader through his, the source's, mother-in-law. He stated VC squad leader was still interested in defecting.

(6) Another letter to the prisoners has been prepared. At the present time, an attempt is being made to place this letter in the hands of source's mother-in-law.

h. Operation FIRST LETTER

(1) On 26 October, JPRC was notified by CB III MAF that aerial photo taken on 25 October revealed an extended parachute with the [REDACTED] nearby. Comparative photography taken 13 October, revealed no evidence of either parachute or letter. Position of sighting was approximately one kilometer north of the DMZ.

(2) A BRIGHT LIGHT team was alerted and SAR was asked to perform visual reconnaissance of the area. Two SAR A-1s, accompanied by one BRIGHT LIGHT team member, performed visual reconnaissance for two hours. Negative sightings were made, and the mission terminated when one of the aircraft received 15 hits from automatic weapons fire in the search area.

(3) Further efforts have been suspended pending additional indications that airmen might be evading in the area. At present time, this is considered unlikely.

i. Operation SHARK

(1) At approximately 1810H, 27 October, an F-105 went down in the [REDACTED]. A forward air controller working in the area in conjunction with a SHINING BRASS operation established voice contact with the downed airman.

(2) A radio message was sent to Dak To requesting helicopter be sent for a recovery operation. Two UH-1B gunships and one armed helicopter were dispatched.

(3) The pilot was located when he fired three pen gun flares. Utilizing his landing light, the unarmed UH-1B picked the pilot up at approximately 1900 hours.

flares. Utilizing his landing light, the unarmed UH-1B

(4) The helos returned and landed at Dak To. The recovered pilot was then flown to Pleiku in an O-1E aircraft.

(5) No contact with enemy forces was made during the recovery operation. The operation was carried out in coordination with the SAR mission commander in the Crown aircraft.

4. ~~(TS)~~ Recovery Operations, 1-9 Nov 1966*

a. Operation SWITCH-I. Further efforts have been suspended pending receipt of additional information concerning possible location of US prisoners.

b. Operation SWAP

(1) On 31 October 1966, the Catholic priest was interviewed. He was advised that his efforts were appreciated and he would be given names of VC prisoners as soon as they could be obtained. The priest stated he will continue to try and do his best to obtain the release of the Americans.

(2) It appears the channel for a possible exchange remains open; however, it is doubtful that Province Officials have authority to exchange prisoners. The J-2 is having difficulty locating suitable VC prisoners.

c. Operation RIP TIDE. A Vietnamese source departed Saigon in an attempt to give another letter to the mother-in-law (ML) of the VC squad leader. Source reports ML is afraid to carry the letter to the wife of the VC, who lives in Cambodia. Efforts now being made to have wife travel to SVN to obtain letter and give it to her husband, the VC squad leader. It is not yet known if the wife will agree to give her husband the letter.

d. Operation FIRST LETTER. No additional evidence has been received to indicate that airmen may be evading in the area. This operation was terminated.

e. Operation CANASTA 572. Operation CANASTA was terminated.

* ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 101152Z Nov 66

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f. Fourth Recovery Operation. On 8 November, an observation aircraft was downed by hostile fire in SVN. Observer was recovered by SAR. He reported PAC was dead. On 9 November, 7th Air Force requested an attempt be made to recover the body. On that date, body was recovered by a SHINING BRASS recovery team.

g. Operation DOUBLE TALK. Interrogation of a rallier on 1 November indicated nothing of JPRC interest; however, reinterrogation on 7 November indicated alleged current location of several US prisoners. Observation flight on 9 November did not confirm the suspected area. Attempt will again be made on 10 November to locate the area. If this observation confirms the rallier's data, JPRC will assume planning and coordination action soonest.

5. () Recovery Operations, 10-13 Nov 1966*

a. Operation SNAP

(1) On 10 November 1966, the Hue [REDACTED] submitted the names of two VC prisoners as possible candidates for the prisoner exchange being negotiated by the Catholic priest. Review of background of these prisoners indicates they meet qualifications as laid down by VC who have been in contact with priest.

(2) VC prisoners currently being held by 1st ARVN Division who have agreed to hold them only until 17 November.

(3) JPRC advised Hue [REDACTED] to contact Catholic priest soonest and provide him names and background of VC prisoners.

(4) Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps was instructed to contact 1st ARVN Division and attempt to make arrangements for them to retain prisoners beyond 17 November date, if exchange negotiations continue beyond that date.

b. Operation RIP TIDE. No new developments since last report.

(TS) COMUSMACV Msσ, 150929Z Nov 66

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Appendix F

c. Operation DOUBLE TALK

(1) Rallier was reinterviewed on 12 November. A trained photo interpreter was on hand to assist in pinpointing location of POW camps from aerial photos. Although results not entirely conclusive, enough positive identification of land marks obtained to look promising.

(2) On 14 November, a request was made to 7th Air Force for both low-level aerial photography with a hand held camera and medium-level strip photography of suspected POW camp area. Both of these missions have been frugged and will be flown as soon as weather permits.

(3) Arrangements have been made to have rallier undergo polygraph examination.

d. Operation LATE NIGHT

(1) On 10 November, JPRC notified by 1st Bde 101st Abn Div that three former VC prisoners had been recovered at



(2) Interrogation of one former detainee disclosed that he had been held prisoner at a camp located two to six kilometers southwest of the point where he was taken into custody by US troops. He stated that the camp contained 115 to 180 prisoners and was guarded by 10 to 30 VC. He volunteered to lead US forces to the camp.

(3) 1st Bde requested permission to exploit this information and permission was granted verbally by TALK QUICK on 10 November and by message on 11 November. Additionally, JPRC provided information on all holdings concerning prison camps in that vicinity.

(4) In view of large number of prisoners allegedly being held in this camp, it is thought highly unlikely that American POWs being detained there. If evidence of US prisoners develops, however, have requested that JPRC be notified soonest in order that representative may be sent to observe operation.

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(5) No further word received from 1st Bde since permission to exploit information granted. 1
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6. (TS) Recovery Operations, 14-20 Nov 1966* 3

a. Operation SWAP 4

(1) This operation received a major setback when the two VC prisoners selected as candidates for the exchange, escaped from 1st ARVN Division custody on the night of 13 November. 5
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(2) Messages were immediately dispatched to the G-2's of I FFORCEV and the III MAF to be on the alert for VC captives in their areas of operation who might be suitable subjects for the proposed prisoner exchange. These VC prisoners, when and if located and identified, are to remain in US custody throughout the period of negotiations. 9
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b. Operation RIP TIDE. No new developments since last report. A status report from the person who acts as intermediary between JPRC and the VC squad leader's wife is expected soon. 15
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c. Operation DOUBLE TALK 19

(1) The rallier reporting the prison camp information underwent a polygraph examination on 16 November. Polygraph results show no deception indicated. 20
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(2) The aerial photography of the suspected prison camp area which was requested on 14 November was not flown during the reporting period due to persistent bad weather in that area. The photo missions have been fragged, however, and will be flown at the first opportunity. 23
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d. Operation LATE NIGHT 28

(1) On 15 November, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Division informed the JPRC that their forces had overrun a sizeable deserted VC prison camp in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. The prison camp had been very hastily abandoned as evidenced by the fact that weapons, foodstuffs and medical supplies were left behind by the fleeing VC. 29
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* Message, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV 230201Z Nov 66 (TS)

(2) Although this prison camp is located in the same general vicinity as the camp reported by the recently liberated VC detainee, it is not at the precise location he provided and there is some doubt as to whether this is the camp he described.

(3) A message has been dispatched to CO of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Division requesting that they advise JPRC if they feel this is camp described by former VC detainee, or if they intend to continue their efforts to locate this camp.

e. Operation COMMANDO 01

(1) On 16 November, an AF AIG of the 14th ACW, call sign COMMANDO 01, went down at [REDACTED]. Three persons were aboard the aircraft and all exited the aircraft successfully.

(2) SAR efforts were initiated immediately, and the pilot and co-pilot were recovered. The crew chief, who was the first man to leave the disabled aircraft, was not found. The pilot stated that he had definitely seen the crew chief with a good chute.

(3) JPRC was notified of above developments by JSARC. Since crash/bailout area was very close to a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] appraised of the situation, and asked to provide search recovery forces if deemed feasible.

[REDACTED]

(4) At 161710H Nov, [REDACTED] contacted JPRC and advised that they considered a search feasible and were pre-positioning forces for infiltration into the area on 17 November.

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(5) At sunset on 16 November, an Air American Dornier 1
made a loudspeaker flight over the area advising the downed 2
airmen to build a fire for recognition purposes as a night 3
low-level recon would be flown that evening and that 4
indigenous recovery forces would be searching the area 5
beginning the following day. An A-26 aircraft performed the 6
low-level recon at 162010H with negative results. 7

(6) On 17 November, a recovery team of 40 personnel was 8
infiltrated into the area utilizing HH-3C helicopters of 9
the 20th ACS and search operations began. 10

(7) On 18 November, the search force was augmented to a 11
total strength of 150 personnel. Search operations con- 12
tinued throughout the remainder of the reporting period with 13
negative results. 14

7. ~~(msg)~~ Recovery Operations, 21-27 Nov 1966* 15

a. Operation SWAP. No new developments since last report. 16

b. Operation RIP TIDE. No change 17

c. Operation DOUBLE TALK. Bad weather continues to hamper 18
picture taking efforts. A photographer is standing by and 19
pictures will be taken first opportunity 20

d. Operation LATE NIGHT 21

(1) On 16 November, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Division 22
discovered an abandoned POW camp at [redacted] There were 23 ←
two sick people left at the site. They indicated that 24
other prisoners had been evacuated west on 15 November. 25

(2) This terminates Operation LATE NIGHT. 26

e. Operation COMMANDO 01 27

(1) Operation was terminated 241800H Nov. 28

(2) The main body of troops which searched area where 29
[redacted] parachute was believed to have fallen found no 30 ←
sign of [redacted] or his parachute. Villages in the area were 31 ←
abandoned. The villagers found claimed to have no knowledge 32
of [redacted] fate. 33 ←

* (US) COMUSMACV Msg, 290830Z Nov 66

(3) It is felt that [redacted] was either killed or captured within 24 hours after bailout. The early disappearance of [redacted] chute indicates enemy presence. The area where [redacted] is believed to have fallen is heavy jungle where retrieving a chute would require an effort beyond the capability of one man.

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(4) During the eight-day period, 161105H Nov to 241800H Nov, a total of [redacted] flown. [redacted]

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(5) Refugees, ralliers, prisoners and visitors from the Ban Phone area will be monitored in an attempt to gain information on [redacted]

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8. (ps) Recovery Operations, 28 Nov-4 Dec 1966*

- a. Operation SWAP. No change.
- b. Operation RIP TIDE. No change.
- c. Operation DOUBLE TALK. Poor weather continues to hamper photo efforts.

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d. Operation LIGHTNING. On 3 December, 25th Inf Div requested authority to conduct a search and destroy mission on a VC element which may have one captured US soldier. Authority was granted.

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e. Operation SCRAMBLE

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(1) A Delta Team, recon unit of 5th SF Gp, of two US and four indigenous, [redacted]

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[redacted] During an attempted helo exfiltration, one helo with five crewmembers was shot down. Last contact with team was 021040H Dec.

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(2) Concurrence to launch a personnel recovery operation was received from CINCPAC, [redacted]

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[redacted] Bad weather prevented visual recce of recovery area.

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(PS) COMUSMACV Msg, 070034Z Dec 66

(3) A recovery team is on alert and will be launched, 1
if feasible, when weather permits. 2

f. Operation ROWBOAT 3

(1) On 3 December, two strobe light sightings were 4
observed at [redacted] and [redacted] Visual daylight recce 5 ←
on 4 December produced negative results. 6

(2) In anticipation of deploying a recovery team in a 7
rescue effort, permission was obtained to move the team to 8
Nahkon Phanom and deploy through Lima Site 36 after addi- 9
tional information is learned. No contact was established 10
on 4 December. 11

g. Operation ALPHA OMEGA. A spot report was received which 12
initially appeared to have some validity concerning location 13
of a captured US soldier being detained by the VC. After a 14
complete debriefing of the source on 4 December, it was deter- 15
mined he had only observed the American when the VC were 16
passing through the source's village. Source was unable to 17
furnish additional information concerning the prisoner's 18
current location. 19

9. (25) Recovery Operations, 5-11 Dec 1966* 20

a. Operation SWAP. No Change. 21

b. Operation RIP TIDE. No change. 22

c. Operation DOUBLE TALK. Photography was obtained 23
11 December. Currently being read out. 24

d. Operation LIGHTNING. 25th Inf Div launched an air- 25
mobile attack in the vicinity where an alleged US prisoner 26
was being detained. There was no evidence to indicate any 27
prisoners had been in the area although limited contact was 28
made with the enemy. Operation has terminated. 29

e. Operation SCRAMBLE 30

(1) On 5 December, two indigenous Delta Team members 31
were observed on the ground and picked up by helo. They 32
reported having last seen the two US, vicinity [redacted] 33 ←
on 2 December. Also, that one indigenous was KIA and 34
other believed captured. 35

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(2) On 9 December, a recovery team infiltrated into area 1
by helo with additional forces on 10 December. They found 2
the remains of five persons who were downed in the helo 3
which was attempting to exfiltrate the Delta Team, 2 Dec. 4
The bodies had been burned, mutilated and heavily booby 5
trapped. 6

(3) On 10 and 11 December, the recovery forces were 7
exfiltrated by helo. 8

f. Operation ROWBOAT. Personnel recovery team was deployed 9
to Nahkon Phanom on 5 December. After negative strobe and day- 10
light visual checks, operation was terminated on 6 December. 11
Personnel recovery team returned to Kontum on 8 December. 12
Operation terminated. 13

10. (CS) Recovery Operations, 12-18 Dec 1966* 14

a. Operation SWAP. No change. 15

b. Operation RIP TIDE 16

(1) It has been learned that the ML was afraid to cross 17
the border after observing the activity in that area. A 18
different approach is now being made. 19

(2) [REDACTED] the contact who was injured in previous attempt 20
to return the camera and letter, will be offered a large 21
financial reward to assist in possibly securing the release 22
of the US personnel. 23

c. Operation DOUBLE TALK. The photography made on 11 December 24
was of no value in pin-pointing the suspected US prisoner loca- 25
tion. III MAF has been tasked to conduct ground recce to con- 26
firm or deny the suspected US prisoner location. 27

d. Operation SCRAMBLE. On 14 December, an ARC LIGHT strike 28
was made on the downed helo. Subsequently, a Hornet Force, 29
approximately 35 personnel, infiltrated into the area by helo. 30
Two complete bodies and partial remains of an unknown number 31
of others were recovered. All remains were exfiltrated by the 32
Hornet Force on 14 December. Operation terminated. 33

~~(CS) COMUSMACV Msg, 200715Z Dec 66~~

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Appendix F

~~(CS) COMUSMACV Msg, 200715Z Dec 66~~

e. Operation RAGGED DAGGER



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11. (TS) Recovery Operations, 19-25 Dec 1966*

a. Operation SWAP. No change.

b. Operation RIP TIDE. No change.

c. Operation DOUBLE TALK. III MAF has tasked the 3d Marine Division to conduct the ground recce to confirm or deny the suspected US prisoner location vicinity [redacted] SVN. Projected launch date is 26 Dec 66. Estimated duration of operation is three to five days.

d. Operation COBRA TAIL

(1) On 23 December, source was debriefed in detail utilizing oblique photos. Several discrepancies were eliminated from info contained in initial debriefing. These were probably due to the language barrier difficulties.

(2) On 25 December, AMEMB, Saigon concurred in a personnel recovery operation

(3) On 25 December, source was debriefed using vertical photography flown on 24 December. This debriefing revealed the following significant factors:

(a) The camp location was re-established and is now thought to be at a point 30 meters inside Cambodian border [redacted]

(b) Prison camp defenses were obtained in detail.

(c) A VC force of, from 200-300 is located approximately three kilometers North of the camp.

(d) Source sketched the layout of the camp and approaches to it.

(TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 270711Z Dec 66

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(4) Source will be returned to his home on 27 December, which was date initially agreed upon with source. Provisions for re-contact have been made should this become necessary.

(5) Upon receipt of proper authority, all available data on the prison camp will be passed to the appropriate Army commander along with the recommendation that a raid on the prison camp be undertaken.

12. ~~(TS)~~ Recovery Operations, 26 Dec 1966 - 1 Jan 1967*

a. Operation SWAP. Instructions have been prepared for dispatch to the Catholic priest at Hue. He is being requested to re-contact the VC and determine if captured VC from regions other than I CTZ would be acceptable in the prisoner exchange. Captured VC of the desired rank have not become available in I CTZ.

b. Operation RIP TIDE. No change.

c. Operation DOUBLE TALK. A representative from JPRC was sent to Danang on 26 December to monitor the ground recce to be conducted by III MAF. Adverse weather prevented conduct of the operation the entire week, and the JPRC representative returned to Saigon on 31 December. The 3d Marine Division is holding the recce force in ready status and will launch the operation as soon as weather permits.

d. Operation COBRA TAIL. Operation was conducted on 30 December with negative prisoner personnel recovered. Detailed final report on operation forwarded earlier in COMUSMACV Msg 301150Z Dec 66 ~~(TS)~~. Operation has terminated.

e. Operation HOT SNAP. On 28-29-30 December 1966, reports were received from three separate sources concerning six US POW's being held by an NVA Bn in the 1st Air Cavalry Division area of operations. These prisoners believed to have been taken when 1st Cav Artillery emplacement overrun on 27 December.

* ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 030920Z Jan 67

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Appendix F

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On 31 December 1st Cav requested JPRC permission to conduct personnel recovery operation based on above information. Permission was granted and a representative of JPRC was dispatched to monitor operation on same date. Operation conducted on 2 January 1967 with negative personnel recovered. Details of operation not available present time. Will be included in next week's report.

f. Operation GREEN PATCH. On 31 December JPRC received msg from 67 Recon Tech Sq, Yakota, Japan, stating that readout of photography from TROJAN HORSE mission flown on 25 December revealed possible [REDACTED] very near designated pick-up point in [REDACTED] Recce pilots reported that code letter appeared to be natural phenomenon consisting of a ditch and stones. Photo recce has been ordered and will be carefully studied to determine whether letter is natural or man-made.

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H. (TS) JPRC EVALUATION, 1966

1. (TS) During the period 1-13 November 1966, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a member of the Special Operations Division, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff, made an inspection trip to Vietnam. One of the purposes of the inspection was to assess the operational status of the JPRC. Following the trip, in a Memorandum for the Record, he made the following observations concerning the status of the JPRC:

a. The JPRC was operating as a major component of MACSOG, and reporting to COMUSMACV through MACSOG. The Center was located in MACSOG Headquarters in Saigon, and the organizational location of the Center seemed to be both logical and efficient since much [REDACTED] was derived from MACSOG resources, and the bulk of the operational forces which were being used to assist in personnel recovery were assigned to MACSOG.

b. The Center was serving as the primary focal point for

[REDACTED]

In turn, MACSOG recommended action by exant MACSOG resources to COMUSMACV. No target had been found against which resources outside of MACSOG were required. If such a target developed in the future, COMUSMACV could directly assess deployed US units with the mission, under such command and control arrangements as were deemed appropriate.

c. It is imperative that reaction time be held to the absolute minimum if successful recovery operations involving escape or evading personnel are to be conducted. When

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recovery operations are mere extensions of SAR efforts, it
would appear the the JPRC (COMUSMACV) should have the authority
to conduct recovery operations without prior approval from the
various Embassies. The regional approach, involving timely
coordination, is not acceptable for operations designed to
recover the evadee or escapee. *

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~~(TS)~~ Colonel W. A. McClean, USA, SACSA Memorandum for the
Record dated 18 Nov 1966 .

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Appendix F

PART IV. JPRC HISTORY - 1967

A. (TS) JPRC ORGANIZATION

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At the end of 1967, there were five officers and five
enlisted men assigned the JPRC. The addition of two officers and
two enlisted men during 1967 reflected the increased data
collection and operational workload placed on the Center. The
JTD, at that time, was as follows:

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<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Chief	AF	O6
Opns & Plans	A	O4
Opns & Plans	AF	O4
→ [REDACTED]	N	O4*
Opns Sgt	A	O4
Intel Analyst	A	E8
Chief Clerk	N	E6
		E5*


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B. (TS) EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM

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* Appendix V to Annex G, USMACV Command History, 1967.
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 110247Z Jan 1967
*** (U) JPRC ltr of 20 January 1967 to CO, 1st Plt Det, Nha Trang;
subj: Survival Kits.

2. (TS) Survival School Training. Representatives of the 7th
 Air Force, Directorate of Operations Services (DOOS) coordinated
 with the JPRC, in 1967, on a study then being conducted to
 update training material on E&E procedures at USAF survival schools.
 AS a result of this coordination, the JPRC provided
 DOOS, with material on JPRC doctrine and techniques to be used to
 update instruction at survival schools.*

3. (TS)



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4. (TS)

* () Appendix V to Annex G, MACV 1967 Command History.
 ** () COMUSMACV Msg, 231010Z May 1967.
 *** () Appendix V to Annex G, COMUSMACV 1967 Command History.



5. (TS) Aircrew Briefings. As a continuing policy in 1967, JPRC representatives presented 26 briefings on the JPRC mission, organization and personnel recovery capabilities to aircrews and E&E personnel attached to the 7th Air Force, 7th Fleet, and Army aviation groups operating in SEASIA.*



C. (TS) REWARD PROGRAM

1. (TS) Acting on a proposal submitted by the JPRC, CINCPAC in April 1967 recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve a Reward Money Program for the recovery and return of missing US personnel in Laos and NVN. It was envisioned that the Reward Money Program would supplement the current Blood Chit Program then in effect in SEASIA. (The Blood Chit is a small cloth chart depicting an American flag and a statement printed in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded.)

* (TS) Appendix V to Annex G, COMUSMACV 1967 Command History.
** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 211050Z Feb 1967.

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2. (TS) Essentially, the Reward Program offered immediate 1
monetary rewards to any person in Laos or NVN who, in any way, 2
helped US airmen or other missing personnel. This help would 3
range from actually returning US airmen to friendly control, to 4
providing information or other evidence which would reveal the 5
status or disposition of US missing persons. The amount of 6
money to be offered would be determined by the JPRC after 7
reviewing the facts concerning each recovery but would be limited 8
to a maximum of \$2,000 to be paid to Laotians and a maximum of 9
\$5,000 to be paid to Vietnamese. Proposed reward scales for Laos/ 10
NVN were: 11

A. \$2,000/\$5,000 for returning a US missing person to friendly 12
control. 13

B. \$250/\$500 for providing information leading to the recovery 14
of missing US personnel by friendly forces. 15

C. \$200/\$400 for returning a deceased US missing person to 16
friendly control. 17

D. \$160/\$250 for providing information which would lead to 18
the recovery of a deceased US missing person. 19

E. \$100/150 for providing information, or returning 20
equipment, which revealed the disposition or status of missing 21
US personnel. 22

3. (TS) As envisioned by CINCPAC, the program would be widely 23
publicized by the use of leaflets and radio broadcasts from the 24
Voice of Freedom and the Voice of America. The psychological 25
objectives of this program were to induce the inhabitants in various 26
areas of Laos and NVN to support the program by helping downed airmen 27
and missing persons to return to friendly control, and to furnish 28
information and to return equipment or other evidence revealing 29
the status of US missing persons and which led to their recovery 30
by friendly forces.* 31

* (S) CINCPAC Msg, 252330Z Apr 1967.

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4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, upon approving the program in June 1967; further approved a recommendation that it include Cambodia as well as Laos and NVN.*

5. (TS) MACV-PD and JUSPAA developed leaflets to disseminate information on the reward program, and in July and August 36 million of these leaflets were dropped from aircraft in NVN and 3.5 million were dropped in Laos. In October, an additional two million revised leaflets were dropped in NVN.** In December, the Royal Laotian Government denied the United States permission to use a Laotian language reward leaflet. The reason given for the denial was that such a leaflet would acknowledge US presence in Laos which might be exploited by the opposition and produce "psychological shock" among Lao troops who would compare rewards for Americans with efforts expended for their own recovery.*** At the end of 1967, two other leaflet programs were under development; one for the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, and one for selected areas in SVN. Tab 3 is an English Version of leaflet prepared for SVN.

6. (TS) Rewards were paid to the following individuals in 1967 in accordance with the provisions of the Reward Program:

a. Two Montagnard villagers near Pleiku for assisting

[REDACTED] in returning to US control after he survived the crash of an OH-23 helicopter on 8 September.

b. A Chieu Hoi, [REDACTED] a former VC interrogator, was rewarded for identifying [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as prisoners of the VC.

c. A reward was paid to four Vietnamese fishermen who recovered and returned to US control the body of a member of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade who had drowned during a combat operation.

* (S) JCS Msg, 021552Z Jun 1967.

** (TS) Appendix V to Annex G, 1967 COMUSMACV Command History.

*** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 121300Z Dec 1967.

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d. In December, Montagnards near Pleiku were rewarded for returning the body of a 4th Infantry Division soldier who had been killed in action. #

~~D. (TS) FULTON RECOVERY SYSTEM~~

1. (TS) In February 1967, the JPRC conducted exercises employing the Fulton Recovery System (SKYHOOK) in order to determine if this retrieval system would give the Center a capability of recovering personnel in denied areas in which recoveries had not previously been attempted.

2. (TS) Encouraged by the demonstrated capabilities of the System, the Center initiated a briefing program on the use of the SKYHOOK to aircrews in SEASIA. At the same time, Fulton Recovery Kits were prepositioned for subsequent delivery by high performance aircraft to downed aircrews. **

3. (TS) In an attempt to recover two crewmen who were shot down 30 miles southwest of Hanoi, NVN, a Fulton Recovery Kit was dropped to these pilots on 21 May 1967 during recovery operation GAMBLER. Although the kit landed with 100 yards of one of the pilots, it was recovered by North Vietnamese, and the Fulton Recovery operation was aborted.

4. (TS) As a consequence of Operation GAMBLER and other operations, the following appraisal was made of the SKYHOOK recovery concept:

"The Fulton Recovery System has proven to be of doubtful use in the recovery of aircrews downed in hostile environments. If SAR forces are unable to recover downed airmen due to the presence of hostile troops, automatic weapons, antiaircraft artillery, etc., it is extremely unlikely that the use of the Fulton System will succeed where they have failed. The drop of a Fulton kit to a downed aircrew may give away their position, and the amount of time required to retrieve and activate the kit gives hostile forces ample time to locate and capture the aircrew, or prepare an ambush for the aircraft making the pick-up." ***

* (TS) Appendix V to Annex G, 1967 COMUSMACV Command History.
** (S) MACV Msg, 141026Z Mar 1967.
*** (TS) Appendix V to Annex G, 1967 COMUSMACV Command History.

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E. ~~(TS)~~ RECOVERY PROCEDURES IN LAOS

1. ~~(TS)~~ A Joint Memorandum of Agreement (see Tab 4) was initiated by the American Embassy, Vientiane and concurred in by the JPRC and the 7th Air Force in August 1967. The Agreement set forth procedures to be followed and tasks to be accomplished relative to the post-SAR recovery procedures for airmen downed in Laos.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Procedures and tasks that were set forth in the Agreement are summarized below:

a. Procedures

(1) In normal circumstances, SAR missions in Laos are accomplished by the air rescue resources of the 7th and 13th Air Forces based in Thailand and deployed in forward areas of Laos.

(2) Occasionally, when special circumstances warrant, rescue is effected under [REDACTED] with air support assets either from Thailand or from Laos.


(3) It is only when the above resources are unable to accomplish a rescue that the JPRC is brought into action.

(4)



(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 142206Z Aug 1967.

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Appendix F

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F. (TS) OPERATIONS, 1967

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1. (TS) Recovery operations engaged in by the JPRC during 1967 were predominantly the prisoner of war (POW) type within SVN. Of the 19 of this type in 1967, 12 POW recovery operations did not progress beyond the planning stages due to insufficient intelligence or information on POW camps that proved to be false upon detailed analysis.

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2. (TS) In the 1967 Command History, COMUSMACV outlined the problem areas involved in POW recovery operations as follows:

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"a. To date, the greatest problem has been in obtaining sufficient accurate data with which to plan and initiate PW recovery operations. This problem is a result of the following factors:

"(1) VC security of PW camps is excellent; they are usually located in inaccessible areas which are under VC control.

"(2) U.S. PWs are segregated from other PWs and are usually kept in small groups of no more than five men.

"(3) U.S. PWs are frequently moved, apparently as a matter of routine.

"(4) Indications are that a number of U.S. PWs have been taken to Cambodia where information collections is difficult.

"b. In an attempt to solve these problems, JPRC has taken the following steps:

"(1) Contact has been made with the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), Saigon. The PRU employ small indigenous reconnaissance teams under U.S. leadership that have the capability to operate in VC controlled areas, not normally accessible to U.S. personnel or indigenous sources employed by the U.S. intelligence community. At the end of 1967 the PRU were involved in two potential recovery operations.

"(2) JPRC has

"(3)

In addition, newly arrived intelligence personnel now receive a JPRC briefing at an orientation course sponsored by the 525th MI Group."

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3. (TS) Following is a chronology of recovery operations conducted and other related activities during 1967. The information is taken directly from the weekly MACV BRIGHT LIGHT reports which were prepared by the JPRC. In certain instances, operations which were initiated in 1966 are continued in this chronology.

a. Operations, 2-8 Jan 67*

(1) Operation SWAP. No change.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) On 6 Jan, [redacted] wife of the Vietnamese who was injured while previously attempting to confirm the US PWs presence traveled to Saigon. She advised that [redacted] the guard on the prison boat, had stolen several weapons and when this was discovered, he fled to another area in Cambodia. [redacted] has kept in contact with the camp situation through cutouts and has learned his successor, [redacted] who is a good friend, would like to rally to SVN. [redacted] is willing, within reason, to aid in rescuing the US personnel. [redacted] believes [redacted] will cooperate.

(b) The previous letter has been rendered unusable by continuous handling. A new letter was given to [redacted] who will give the letter to her husband who will give it to [redacted]. She departed Saigon on 7 Jan.

(3) Operation DOUBLE TALK. No change. Weather continues to hold up ground recce of suspected PW camp.

(4) Operation GREEN PATCH. Low level recce was flown and pilots reported that what appeared as a code letter in aerial photos looked like a natural formation consisting of a ditch and rocks. Additional photography has been requested, but has not been flown due to adverse weather conditions.

(TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 136/110247Z Jan 67

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(5) Operation HOT SNAP. On 2 Jan, 1st Air Cav Div 1
 launched a prisoner recovery operation vicinity [redacted] 2 ←
 Light VC contact was made, but no evidence was found which 3
 would suggest the presence of US PWs either then or in the 4
 recent past. Revised figure of US personnel captured on 5
 27 Dec is one. The other five persons previously reported 6
 missing have been accounted for. A JPRC representative 7
 was on hand to monitor the entire operation which has 8
 terminated. 9

b. Recovery Operations, 9-15 Jan 1967* 10

(1) Operation SWAP. No change. 11

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. No change. 12

(3) Operation DOUBLE TALK. At 131025H Jan 67, patrol 3A1 13
 was inserted in vicinity of coordinates [redacted] and estab- 14 ←
 lished a radio relay station. At 131700H patrol 3F was 15
 inserted in vicinity of coordinates [redacted] and moved to 16 ←
 vicinity [redacted] where they established a night position. 17 ←
 At 140930H, patrol 3F commenced moving east from night 18
 position and established an operation vicinity [redacted] 19 ←
 At 141220H, patrol 3F sighted four prisoners with full packs 20
 and one guard moving south. They returned heading north at 21
 141250H with empty packs. No Americans have been sighted. 22
 Surveillance and reconnaissance will continue. 23

(4) Operation GREEN PATCH. Adverse weather conditions 24
 continue to hamper photo mission. Photos will be taken 25
 as soon as weather improves. 26

c. Recovery Operations, 16-22 Jan 1967** 27

(1) Operation SWAP. No change. 28

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. No change. 29

(3) Operation DOUBLE TALK. Marine patrol 3F was led to 30
 the POW camp by [redacted] the source, on 16 Jan. The camp 31 ←
 [redacted] consisted of three huts, one on west side 32 ←

(TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 238/170740Z Jan 67
 (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 335/240720Z Jan 67

of trail and two on east as previously described by Lap. 1
 The huts were partially destroyed and the cap had not been 2
 used for at least one month. [redacted] positively identified 3 ←
 the camp. The patrol became engaged in firefight while 4
 trying to take pictures of the camp and were forced to 5
 leave the area. Patrol was extracted by hoist through 6
 heavy canopy of virgin forest vicinity [redacted] at 7 ←
 161515H Jan 67. Helos and men under sporadic small arms 8
 fire during extraction. Patrol killed two VC during the 9
 operation and captured one rifle. The patrol suffered 10
 no casualties. Comments of team indicate [redacted] performed 11 ←
 in excellent manner. He has been paid a total of VN 12
 \$15,000 and has been returned to a Chieu Hoi Center. 13
 This operation is terminated. 14



(5) Operation MONGRAL AIR. On 20 Jan, JPRC received 15 ←
 notification from 13th Recce Tech that [redacted] 16
 has been readout on photography flown 19 July. Location 17
 is [redacted] Immediate visual recce was 18
 ordered and flown on 20 Jan. Recce pilots report letter 19
 seems to be formed of foliage which is either growing or 20 ←
 very recently cut. Pilots also report letter appears to 21
 be man-made. A survival kit containing food, water, a 22 ←
 radio and flares was prepared by 7th AF and flown to Udorn 23
 on 20 Jan. On 21 Jan, JPRC notified that JLG had reported 24
 that letter was there when their forces were pushed out of 25
 the area, some time ago. Additionally, debrief of pilots 26
 who flew visual recce revealed that letter constructed of 27
 growing elephant grass. Operation terminated on receipt 28
 of this information and interested agencies notified. 29
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d. Recovery Operations, 23-29 Jan 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP. No change.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. No change.

(3) Operation CANOPY SHADER. [REDACTED] was sighted from a photo readout by the 432 RTS, Udorn, 25 Jan, vic [REDACTED] NVN. 7th AF SOG was tasked 26 Jan for visual recce and additional photo recce of sightings. A SHINING BRASS team was alerted 26 Jan for possible infiltration into area of sighting. Necessary coordination made with ANEWS, Saigon, Vientiane, Bangkok to preposition team at Nahkon Phanom and stage through LIMA SITE 36. Negative results from photo and visual recce. Mission was refraged 28 Jan and readout of photos indicated object sighted was natural growth. Operation terminated 28 Jan.

(4) Operation TEAMSTER. [REDACTED] sighted 270618Z [REDACTED]. Fire sighted in vic code letter. PL, Udorn, Thai, alerted. JLG indicated they had assets in close proximity of sighting that could be used if photo/visual recce positive. Photo recce flown on 28 Jan produced negative results. Aircrews flying Neil aircraft made visual recce into target area on 28 Jan. They received ground fire and reported no sighting of code letter. Code letter apparently removed and enemy in area. Speculate that evadees captured. Operation terminated 29 Jan 67.

e. Recovery Operations, 30 Jan-5 Feb 1967**

(1) Operation SWAP. This operation remains at a standstill due to lack of suitable VC prisoners for possible exchange. The Senior Advisor to the 1st ARVN Infantry Division is of the opinion that this unit is perhaps not cooperating fully in the attempt to secure the VC prisoners. He reasons that this attitude may stem from the fact that certain 1st ARVN Division Officers may be resentful of the

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 476/310731Z Jan 67
** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 587/071039Z Feb 67

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fact that their counsel and aid were not solicited at the outset of this operation and that, in fact, all planning was taking place without their knowledge. He is of the further opinion, however, that disclosure of sufficient information to secure ARVN support would very probably result in a compromise of the Catholic priest acting as the go-between in these negotiations and place his life in jeopardy. In light of this, the Senior Advisor recommends that disclosure of information concerning the operation be withheld from 1st ARVN Division officials until such time as suitable VC prisoners become available. JPRC concurs in this recommendation. In view of the virtual impasse outlined above and the length of time which has elapsed since this operation began, JPRC sees little chance for success of this operation.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. No word has been received from Ngia, the original source of the information concerning this POW camp, or his wife, who departed Saigon on 7 Jan with the letter to the US POWs. There is no further progress to report on this operation.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE. Two separate intelligence reports dated 7 Jan 67 and 19 Jan 67 indicated the presence of a POW camp in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. Either two or three US POWs are allegedly being held in this camp. Aerial photography was flown on 29 Jan, but was not useful due to cloud cover of target area. The mission was re-flown on 2 Feb. Photo interpreter readout of this photography reveals a strong possibility of the fact that a camp of some sort had indeed existed at this locale, but that it has recently been abandoned. On 5 Feb, an intelligence report dated 2 Feb was received which indicated that the camp at [REDACTED] had been moved to [REDACTED] on 28 Jan. Aerial photography of this new location is on order. If the photography reveals a possible prison camp at the reported location, one of two courses of

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action will be taken: (a) If the photography readout reveals a strong probability that a camp exists at this location, a recommendation to launch an operation will be submitted; (b) if the photography is inconclusive, an attempt will be made to infiltrate an agent into the area to obtain more definite information. Both sites mentioned are very near the Cambodian border.

f. Recovery Operations, 6-12 Feb 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP No change.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. [redacted] the original source is having trouble with his leg and requested permission to turn the letter over to a friend, [redacted] for an attempted delivery to the US POWs. Permission was granted.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE. Additional aerial photography has been requested. Photography mentioned in last report was flown and readout reveals very promising area at extreme edge of strip covered which is several hundred meters west of location provided by source. Location of what appears to be POW camp is [redacted] This is approximately 150 meters into RVN from Cambodian border.

(4) Operation TOMAHAWK

(a) An O-1 was downed 061200H Feb vicinity [redacted] [redacted] Covering aircraft had good voice contact with downed airman; however, voice contact was terminated when airman advised he had to evade hostiles. Later voice contact was reestablished and SAR helo effected pick-up of downed airman and was immediately taken under intense ground fire. It exploded and crashed into karst at [redacted] One PJ was thrown clear by the blast and was able to deploy his chute. A second JOLLY GREEN picked up the PJ. There was no evidence of other survivors.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 687/141100Z Feb 67

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Appendix P

(b) [REDACTED]

Because of this plus extremely small likelihood of crash survivors request for search withdrawn. Operation was terminated.

(5) Operation CANNONBALL

(a) At 122220H JPRC was notified that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] through aerial photography. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED] Low level visual recon was requested for first light on 13 Feb. Concurrently 7/13 was prepared to drop one of the pre-positioned JPRC survival bundles.

(c) Visual recon at 200 feet reveals letter was formed by flare chute canopies and there was no evidence to indicate the the chute had been prepositioned by an evades. The area did not appear to be occupied and no emergency signals were observed. Operation was terminated.

g. Recovery Operations, 13-19 Feb 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP. No change.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. [REDACTED] the original source, returned to 135th MI Grp, Can Tho, on 17 Feb. He had with him an untranslated letter and a map of the suspected POW compound. These documents were dispatched to JPRC arriving 18 Feb. Documents given to OP-34 for translation.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE. On 14 Feb, Chief, JPRC, briefed MAC COG on operation and requested authority to contract IIFORCEV for planning purposes. JPRC representatives

* (IS) COMUSMACV Msg, 787/210820Z Feb 67

[REDACTED] for planning purposes. JPRC representatives

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briefed G-3, IIFORCEV on 15 Feb and were directed to contact 1
25th Infantry Division. Approximately 1700, 15 Feb intelli- 2
gence was received by JPRC which indicated the POW camp was 3
not in the area it was originally thought to be, but in 4
Cambodia. Aerial photography flown on 15 Feb verified a lack 5
of populace and livable huts in area of interest but did 6
indicate people that farm area live in a village just across 7
the Cambodian border. Further information revealed that a 8
friendly operation was scheduled to take place in the area on 9
19 and 20 Feb. FFVII and 25th Infantry Division were noti- 10
fied that the operation was temporarily suspended. Operation 11
will be suspended until further intelligence reports pinpoint 12
the location of the POWs. 13

(4) Operation ANGLER. On 9 Feb, JPRC received a Spot 14
Report on the location of a VC POW camp in vicinity of 15
[REDACTED] Two US prisoners are allegedly being held in the 16 ←
camp. Aerial photography of the target area was received on 17
10 Feb, and passed to the 149th MI Group, the originators of 18
the Spot Report, for attempted annotation by the source of 19
information. The 149th MI Group Special Agent returned to 20
Saigon on 19 Feb with detailed annotation of the aerial 21
photography. The source claims to have seen the US POWs as 22
recently as 5 Feb, and enjoys a reliability rating of C. The 23
information obtained has been rated 2. It should be noted 24
that these are field ratings, not official J-2 ratings. 25

(5) Operation WIGWAM. Sighting of approximately 200 26
US/ARVN prisoners was made in the vicinity of [REDACTED] on 27 ←
12 Feb. This sighting was unusual in that four separate 28
sources were involved. Coordination was made with MAC COC 29
on 18 Feb and a TWX dispatched to III MAF requesting that a 30
recon team be placed in the area to pinpoint the location of 31
the suspected POW camp. III MAF was requested to take medium 32
level photography of the area to identify if possible the 33
suspected POW camp as well as LZs and other pertinent data 34
necessary to mount a POW raid operation. 35

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~~TOP SECRET~~ suspected POW camp as well as LZs and other pertinent data 34

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(6) No name was assigned this operation as JPRC only 1
alerted forces. At approximately 1555H, 16 Feb, JSARC 2
called JPRC to inform them an F-100, call sign "Dusty 71" 3
was down [REDACTED] JSARC indicated rescue 4 ←
efforts had been in progress for some time, that one HH-3 5
pilot had been killed and another wounded. Although 6
rescue efforts were being continued JSARC requested JPRC 7
alert forces in the event a ground effort became necessary. 8

[REDACTED] 9
[REDACTED] OP-35 was 11
alerted and preliminary arrangements made to launch a HORNET 12
Force into the area as early as possible on 17 Feb. At 13
approximately 1730H, JSARC notified JPRC that the downed 14
pilot had been recovered. A few minutes later, JPRC 15
received a reply [REDACTED] 16
[REDACTED] at first 17
light 17 Feb. JPRC prepared a message [REDACTED] congratulating 18
them on the dispatch with which they had responded to the 19
situation and also on the timely notification to JPRC. 20
Operation terminated. 21

b. Recovery Operations, 20-26 Feb 1967* 22

(1) Operation SWAP. No change. 23

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. The letter and map have been 24
translated and provided no additional information to confirm 25
or refute data already in JPRC possession. They were pre- 26
pared by [REDACTED] Attempt is being made now to have a confron- 27 ←
tation with [REDACTED] was formerly the head guard on the prison 28 ←
sampan. The letter referred to above also indicates that 29
[REDACTED] the present head guard is giving serious thought to 30 ←
rallying. If this occurs, every effort will be made to 31
arrange a confrontation with him. 32

* (PS) COMUSMACV Msg, 880/211050Z Feb 67

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Appendix F

(3) Operation SICAMORE. Large scale friendly operations in area precluded additional progress. Upon completion of friendly operation an assessment of the area will be made and future action will be determined at that time.

(4) Operation WIGWAM. Four separate reports of prisoner sightings have emanated from vicinity [REDACTED] Sources were reinterviewed and the information did not appear as valid as initially assumed; however, III MAF had aerial photography flown in suspect area. It was inconclusive, due to the dense jungle canopy. III MAF will infiltrate a ground recce team in area to confirm or deny the alleged camp location.

(5) Operation ANGLER. After reviewing aerial photography of the suspected camp area as annotated by the source, a JPRC representative went to III MAF. Source was polygraphed and no deception was noted. Additional low level photography was flown and readout of the area failed to disclose any of the items previously annotated by the source on initial photography. This area is heavily forested; however, it did raise some doubt as to whether it was in fact the target area. Source will return to the area carrying a concealed radio beacon. If the prisoners are still in the area, the beacon will be left at a predetermined distance and direction from the camp. Electronic recce will be flown after source has had time to put the beacon in place.

(6) Operation BLUE ROPE. On 23 Feb JPRC received notification from 7/13 AF that the [REDACTED] was observed at [REDACTED] Visual and photo recce was flown and visual produced negative results. Photos revealed what appeared to be [REDACTED] [REDACTED] team was put into the area on 25 Feb and reported the letters were formed by logs which had fallen recently due to fires in the area. Additional recce at location of initial sighting has failed to confirm the letter in the area. Operation terminated.

area. Additional recce at location of initial sighting has

(7) On 23 Feb, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] former VC prisoners returned to friendly control. JPRC representative interview them ASAP; however, they were unable to furnish data concerning actual location of other prisoners. They were, however, knowledgeable on the condition of several other US prisoners they had encountered during captivity.

1. Recovery Operations, 27 Feb-5 Mar 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP. No change.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. [REDACTED] the original source, was interviewed on 27 Feb and the following was learned:

(a) The letter to the US PWs has been turned over to Toan who is a camp guard. [REDACTED] does not have access to PW and doubts if he can get the letter to the PWs.

(b) [REDACTED] is hiding out in the vicinity of Phnon Penh. His wife knows his location and will attempt to contact him so he may be brought to Saigon for a detailed debrief.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

(4) Operation WIGWAM. Two recon patrols have been in the area with negative results. CG III MAF plans to continue the search.

(5) Operation ANGLER. No change

(6) Operation GEYSER. On 28 Feb 67, JPRC was notified that an O-1 was down [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Aircraft were in voice contact but SAR forces were unable to reach the pilot due to weather. JPRC requested III MAF to effect a ground rescue. A BRIGHT LIGHT Recovery Team was also alerted as an alternate force. On 2 Mar 67, the weather cleared and the pilot was picked up by SAR aircraft.

J. Recovery Operations, 6-12 Mar 1967**

(1) Operation SWAP. No change.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 963/070217Z M 67
** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 1061/141026Z Mar 67

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(2) Operation RIP TIDE. Attempts to contact [redacted] the original head guard of the prison sampan, and arrange for him to come to Saigon for detailed debriefing are still in progress.

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(3) Operation SYCAMORE

(a) On 5 Mar 67, a returnee, [redacted] was interrogated by Special Forces Unit B-32 in the vicinity of Tay Ninh. During the initial interrogation the source claimed to have been assigned to the security force of the camp which is the objective of this operation. He confirmed previous reports of 25 ARVN prisoners and the general location of the camp.

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(b) The source was brought to Saigon on 9 Mar for more comprehensive interrogation. During this interrogation, the source stated that the only US PWs he had ever seen were a group of 10 US PWs being moved into Cambodia for eventual return to US control.

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(c) Because the information concerning US PWs conflicts sharply with previous information, both the interrogator and the JPRC representative were of the opinion that the source might very possibly be telling less than all he knows. In an effort to refute or confirm this opinion, the source was polygraphed on 12 Mar. Results of the polygraph indicate no attempted deception on the part of the source.

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(d) Preparation are underway to insert indigenous agent resources of the 5th Special Forces Group to recheck the suspected area.

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(4) Operation WIGWAM

(a) A new intelligence report, received 10 Mar, indicated that a debrief of two Vietnamese nationals released by the VC in December 1966 tied in very closely with the original intelligence which gave rise to this operation. The new report places the PW camp approximately

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one kilometer south of the original location, but agrees 1
with the original report in other particulars. This most 2
recent report contains a detailed sketch of the camp 3
complex as well as the route followed by the sources as 4
they left the camp. The sources have agreed to lead 5
friendly forces to the camp area. 6

(b) A call was placed to G-2, III MAF, on 11 Mar and 7
attention was invited to this latest intelligence report. 8
G-2, III MAF indicated that the report would be evaluated 9
for possible action. 10

(5) Operation ANGLER. A homer beacon has been procured 11
and will be concealed in a walking stick to be carried into 12
the camp area by the original source of the information on 13
the camp. The beacon has a battery life of eight days and 14
will not be activated until source has reconfirmed the 15
presence of the US PWs in the camp. 16

(6) Operation CHINOOK 17

(a) On 10 Mar, a message was received from G-2, US 18
Army Ryukyus. The message stated that the debrief of 19
[REDACTED] had narrowed the location of the 20
prison camp from which they were released to five possible 21
locations. All locations lie within a six square 22
kilometer area. The message also stated that a detailed 23
overlay and summary would be forwarded as soon as possible. 24

(b) JPRC has ordered aerial photography of the 25
suspected camp site area and hopes to have this on hand 26
for immediate collation when the overlay and summary 27
arrive. 28

x. Recovery Operations, 13-19 Mar 1967* 29

(1) Operation SWAP. No change. In light of lack of 30
progress on this operation over a protracted period of time, 31
it is being placed in the inactive files and will not be 32

~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Hsg, 1169/210933Z Mar 67

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Appendix F

mentioned in future reports unless significant developments
warrant its inclusion.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) The original source of information on this PW
camp, [redacted] returned to Chau Doc and reported through the
Sector Intel analyst. He complained that he had not been
paid recently.

(b) This was the first indication received by JPRC
that [redacted] was receiving pay for supplying information.
A check with the VN Army officer who had been acting as
go-between with [redacted] indicated that he had indeed been
receiving pay, and in rather amiable amounts. This places
the validity of his information in an entirely different
light.

(c) The VN Army officer and the 135th MI Group were
both contacted and mutual agreement was reached that con-
trol of [redacted] would be passed to the 135th MI Gp. The
first order of business now will be to attempt to persuade
[redacted] to submit to a polygraph examination.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE

(a) Arrangements were made with Det B-57, 5th Special
Forces Group, to infiltrate two of their indigenous agent
assets into the area in an attempt to relocate the POW
camp.

(b) All indications are that the camp has been moved
into Cambodia due to close proximity of US military opera-
tions to the originally suspected camp site.

(4) Operation WIGWAM

(a) On 18 Mar, JPRC received a report from G-2 III
MAF. The report indicated that two recon teams, one from
5th Special Forces Group and one from III MAF, had com-
pleted a thorough search of all target areas. Though
there were many well-used trails in the area, no evidence
of a POW camp was discovered.

(b) The teams have successfully exfiltrated, and this operation is terminated. 1
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(5) Operation ANGLER 3

(a) The homer beacon device was concealed within a section of bamboo of the sort which a Montagnard might logically carry. It was turned over to the case officer on 17 March. 4
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(b) The case officer estimates that it will take two days to get the device to the source and an additional eight days for the source to walk into the POW camp area. An additional two days will be allowed to elapse before electronic reconnaissance will begin. 8
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(6) Operation CHINOOK 13

(a) Aerial photography of the suspected camp site areas has been received. Preliminary readout is inconclusive. 14
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(b) Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) is in the process of preparing a complete study of the target area to include enemy OB. 17
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(c) The overlay and summary of the [redacted] debriefing are expected momentarily. 20 ←
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1. Recovery Operations, 20-26 Mar 1967* 22

(1) Operation RIP TIDE 23

(a) [redacted] the original source of the PW information, has been turned over to the 135th MI Group. He is currently being interviewed in detail and is scheduled to be polygraphed on 3 Apr. 24 ←
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(b) Unconfirmed data learned by JPRC representative while at Can Tho indicates some discrepancy around [redacted] original injury. It is anticipated that the current interviews and polygraph exam will dictate how and if [redacted] will be retained. 28
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~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 1315/280726Z Mar 67

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(2) Operation SYCAMORE

(a) Two indigenous agents were infiltrated by helo vicinity [redacted] at last light on 20 Mar. After limited recce they were discovered and moved into a heavily forested area.

(b) They spent the night in the forest and moved into a large elephant grass field adjacent to the forest. They were taken under hostile fire and requested exfiltration. Successful exfiltration was effected approximately 211800 Mar under heavy hostile fire.

(c) Currently, the situation is being reevaluated and a new plan will be developed which will reinsert indigenous personnel in the alleged PW camp area.

(3) Operation ANGLER. An unexpected delay was encountered when the Montagnard carrying the walking stick, with the homing beacon, was bitten by a snake. He is recovering but a delay has been incurred. It is anticipated the source will not arrive in the target area until approximately 2 April. His determination of PWs in the area should be completed about 4 April, at which time he will depart the area.

(4) Operation CHINOOK

(a) Aerial photography readout reveals some of the debriefing information from [redacted] correlates well; however, the jungle canopy is quite dense and precludes more complete location of the camp area.

(b) A representative from 441st MI Det, Okinawa who was in on the debriefings at Okinawa is enroute RVN. He is intimately familiar with the area and situation. After his arrival, the overall situation will be evaluated with a view toward launching a recovery type operation.

(5) Operation CHEYENNE

(a) [redacted] report was received which indicated approximately 100 US POWs located vicinity [redacted] [redacted] Although there is no confirming

data available, action has been taken to attempt to debrief source in detail. Signal electronic agencies have been alerted to maintain a listening watch for traffic concerning the suspect area.

(b) Since the reliability of the source and validity of the information has not yet been determined, the next action will be contingent upon the results of the source's detailed debriefing and the signal intelligence agencies.

m. Recovery Operations, 27 Mar-2 Apr 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] the original source of the PW camp information, was polygraphed earlier than initially anticipated. The results of the exam were inconclusive; however, there did appear to be some validity in [redacted] statement concerning the PWs.

(b) Plans are being made to bring [redacted] to Saigon for additional detailed debriefings and another polygraph examination. Time frame for these confirming checks has not been determined.

(2) Operation SYCAMORE. Planning is underway to insert indigenous agents in the area at night by parachute when an agent team is available.

(3) Operation ANGLER. The Montagnard carrying the walking stick containing the homing beacon departed for the PW camp on 27 Mar. It was anticipated he would be in the PW camp area about 2 Apr. The electronic surveillance of the beacon will be flown for the first time on 3 Apr.

(4) Operation GREY BULL (Previously Reported as CHINOOK)

(a) Representative from 441st MI Det, Okinawa, arrived 28 Mar.

(b) Aerial photography of the area confirms some of the details furnished by [redacted] while some items such as trails and location of huts are not confirmed. This may

be due to the heavy foliage in the area or possibly
confusion by [REDACTED]

(c) IIFPV was briefed on 29 Mar. They designated
5th SFG to conduct a raid on the camp provided additional
confirming data could be obtained. A SF indigenous agent
was inserted and returned with the information that
hostiles were in the area. He was not able to confirm
the presence of the US PWs.

(d) Based upon the information from the SF agent and
other evaluations, a recommendation will be made to IIFPV
that a personnel recovery operation be attempted.

(5) Operation CHEYENNE. No change.

n. Recovery Operations, 3-9 Apr 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE. [REDACTED] the original source of the
PW camp information, will be flown to Saigon 10 Apr. He will
be debriefed in detail and another polygraph examination will
be administered. Further operational planning, if appropriate,
will be based on results of the debriefing.

(2) Operation SYCAMORE

(a) Two indigenous agents from Special Forces assets
were infiltrated by parachute from a helo on 3 Apr. Helo
was radar vectored to the DZ.

(b) The agents encountered no difficulties and accom-
plished the ground recce; however, it was subsequently
determined they were infiltrated in the wrong area. On
5 Apr, they were exfiltrated. Further efforts to insert
indigenous agents in the area are being planned.

(3) Operation ANGLER

(a) The Montagnard carrying the walking stick con-
taining the homing beacon learned through inquiries in
the suspected camp area that the PWs were moved from
[REDACTED] to an unknown location.

(b) Further attempts to find the PWs, utilizing the same source, will continue. This operation will no longer be considered active unless additional information is obtained.

(4) Operation GREY BULL. A raid was conducted on the suspected PW camp on 6 Apr by 5th SPF. A thorough sweep of the area revealed nothing. Obviously, this was not the camp although the raid did occur at the location as derived from map back-tracking based upon debriefings of [redacted]. This operation is suspended pending receipt of further information.

(5) Operation CHEYENNE. No change.

o. Recovery Operations, 10-16 Apr 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] the original source of the PW information, has been debriefed in detail and polygraphed. There was no evidence of deception noted during the polygraph and the agent handler is of the opinion that [redacted] is sincere in his efforts. [redacted] motivation appears to be the desire to assure his financial future.

(b) [redacted] has never observed the PWs nor has he been inside the camp. He believes that [redacted] who is currently assumed to be in charge of the VC prison guards, would be willing to assist in recovering the PWs. [redacted] has no legitimate reason to be away from the camp in excess of 24 hours without his absence arousing suspicion.

(c) [redacted] former VC squad leader, is thought to be in Phnom Penh; however, his wife is living in a Cambodian village near the RVN border. Current plans call for [redacted] to learn [redacted] actual location, through [redacted] wife, and attempt to bring [redacted] to Saigon for a detailed debriefing. At this time, [redacted] cannot furnish adequate information for purposes of planning a recovery operation.

* (PS) COMUSMACV Msg, 1690/1807422 Apr 67

(2) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

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(3) Operation CHEYENNE. No change.

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P. Recovery Operations, 17-23 Apr 1967*

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(1) Operation SWAP

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(a) [redacted] revealed that during his last contact with VC, they indicated a willingness to accept VC officer PWs from areas other than I CTZ. Screening for appropriate PWs, under the new criteria, continues.

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(b) [redacted] will attempt to determine current VC attitude toward a prisoner exchange.

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(2) Operation RIP TIDE

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(a) [redacted], the original source of the PW information, is preparing to travel to Phnom Penh. He will attempt to bring [redacted] the former VC guard squad leader, to Saigon for debriefing. Currently, documentation is being prepared for [redacted] so he may travel to Saigon from Phnom Penh. Upon return from Phnom Penh, [redacted] will stop at the village of [redacted] uncle. His uncle will be asked to query [redacted] concerning the US PWs.

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(b) Aerial photography reveals occupied heavy weapons emplacements and huts in suspected target area.

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(3) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

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(4) Operation CHEYENNE. No change

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(5) Operation HAVANA

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(a) A sighting of two US and 30 ARVN PWs by an ARVN coded source in vicinity [redacted] was received on 21 Apr. This report coincided with previous similar reports in the area East of Tay Ninh city.

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(b) The 1st Infantry Division is currently conducting Operation MANHATTAN in the vicinity and have been requested to confirm or deny accuracy of information. If information appears accurate, a recovery operation will be effected.

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
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q. Recovery Operations, 24 - 30 April 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP

(a) MACV ACoFS, J2 was contacted and appraised that VC had indicated a willingness to accept VC prisoners from any CTZ for the exchange. J2 has notified all CTZ commanders to be on the lookout for prisoners suitable for exchange.

(b) No word has been received from [REDACTED] concerning current VC attitude toward the exchange.



(3) Operation SYCAMORE

(a) A coded agent of Det B-57, 5th SF Gp was infiltrated into the general target area. He did not, however, succeed in checking on the prime suspect locations.

(b) Although the agent did not personally see any US PWs during the course of his reconnaissance, he was told of a VC hospital in the general vicinity of his search which is used to treat wounded US PWs. The US PWs are reportedly held at the hospital only until sufficiently recovered to travel at which time they are moved to a permanent PW camp in Cambodia. Location of the Cambodian PW camp was not specified.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 1836/021158Z May 67

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(4) Operation CHEYENNE. No change. 1

(5) Operation HAVANA 2

(a) Elements of the US 1st Division conducted a thorough 3
sweep through the target area. No evidence of recent 4
occupancy, inhabitants or activity was discovered in the 5
target area or the immediate vicinity thereof. 6

(b) This operation is terminated. 7

(6) Operation DEEP SIX 8

(a) Just before midnight on 24 April, JPRC received a 9
message from Commander, Task Group 77.0 indicating that an 10
A6A was down at [REDACTED] The crew of two had successfully 11 ←
ejected, were seen on the ground and had been in voice 12
contact with their wingman. They were last seen making 13
their way to an area of good cover and concealment located 14
approximately 1/2 mile from the point at which they landed. 15
CTG 77.0 indicated that when and if voice contact with the 16
downed crew was reestablished, he would request activation 17
of a BRIGHT LIGHT team. 18

(b) A BRIGHT LIGHT team was placed on alert at Hue Phu 19
Bai, and a Navy CIA aircraft and crew were standing by at 20
Tan Son Nhut to transport the team to the carrier Kitty Hawk. 21

(c) Because of extensive enemy OB in the area of the 22
downed crew, plus the fact that it appeared to be beyond the 23
range of SAR helos, JPRC recommended to CTG 77.0 that a more 24
realistic plan would be to attempt the recovery with the 25
Fulton Recovery System (SKYHOOK) equipped HC-130. A Combat 26
Spear crew was placed on alert at Nha Trang, and 7 AF placed 27
two F4Cs on alert at Danang to effect a high speed drop of 28
the Fulton kit which had been packed in an M4A container. 29

(d) At the suggestion of Combat Spear crewmen, the 30
operation was planned as follows: 31

1. After voice contact was established, a Fulton kit would be dropped to the downed crew at last light of that day. The delivery aircraft would notify the downed crew to expect pickup at a predesignated time during that night.

2. At the predesignated time, the Combat Spear aircraft would make their pickup run. They would be covered by appropriate MIG CAP, and coordinated strike missions would be flown in the area at the pickup time.

(e) No further electronic contact could be re-established with the downed crew and, upon receipt of CINCPAC message prohibiting use of EC-130 due to the high risk area, the operation was terminated.

(f) This operation is thought to have been quite worthwhile as it provided a realistic exercise in mission planning and of the alerting system.

r. Recovery Operations, 1-7 May 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP. III MAF indicates they have captured a VC Warrant Officer who may be suitable to use in the prisoner exchange. They have been instructed to keep him in custody until [redacted] reports on the VC attitude regarding the exchange.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] the original source, returned to [redacted] to attend to one of his children who is sick. He will return to Saigon on 11 May.

(b) Upon return to Saigon, [redacted] will be interrogated concerning some irregularities which arose in connection with his old Cambodian documents. If the interrogation does not reveal that [redacted] has been using this situation only as a vehicle to obtain valid Cambodian travel papers, new

* (PS) COMUSMACV Msg, 1955/090807Z May 67

Cambodian documents will be prepared and he will be
dispatched to Phnom Penh. Document preparation can be
accomplished in 48 hours.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

(4) Operation CHEYENNE. No change.

a. Recovery Operations, 8-14 May 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP

(a) [redacted] was contacted and advised that the
two US PWs which he hoped to negotiate for escaped in
early May. This is the first indication of any such escape.
Attempts are being made to confirm or deny the alleged
escape. Attempts are being made to confirm or deny the
alleged escape. [redacted] are the PWs
assumed to have escaped. If this is true, the operation
will be terminated inasmuch as they were the only US- PWs
of which Dong possessed any knowledge.

(b) Prior to learning of the alleged escape, AMEMB,
Saigon was contacted concerning the possibility of
exchanging VC personnel captured and/or held by GVN.
AMEMB is now willing to intercede with GVN in an attempt
to obtain GVN controlled VC PWs.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] the original source of the information,
returned to Saigon and was interrogated on the irregularities
which arose with his old Cambodian documents. He was
polygraphed and no evidence of deception was noted.

(b) [redacted] departed Saigon on 13 May for Phnom Penh.
It is anticipated he will return about 20 May. He has
documentation for [redacted] the original camp guard commander,
to return to Saigon provided [redacted] consents.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV MSG, 2023/161005Z May 67

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- (3) Operation SYCAMORE. No change. 1
- (4) Operation CHEYENNE. No change 2
- (5) Operation NEARLY 3
- (a) In early May, a Revolutionary Development (RD) 4
Cadre Advisor, stated one of his personnel had made 5
contact, through several cut-outs, with a VC officer 6
who wished to rally to the GVN with 13 US PWs. Further 7
that he desired to be rewarded for the returned US 8
personnel. All contacts were made in IV CTZ. 9
- (b) A meeting with the wife of the VC officer was 10
arranged for 6 May but she did not show up. On 9 May, 11
she appeared and stated she would be at Chau Dpc on 12
13 May with proof of the identities of the PWs. Further, 13
she was to have her husband's plan which would reveal 14
the details concerning the release. She did not know 15
where the release would take place, nor was it known if 16
it would be necessary to engage a hostile force to effect 17
the release. 18
- (c) MACV tasked SA IV CTZ to effect a recovery operation, 19
upon obtaining the information from the wife of the 20
VC, if it looked feasible. 21
- (d) On 12 May, the female source arrived, one day 22
early, without any evidence of the US PWs allegedly being 23
held by her husband. She stated attempts were made to 24
contact her husband for the information, and details of 25
the release, but due to the amount of activity on the 26
SVN/Cambodian border she was unable to make contact. 27
- (e) Although this operation is considered terminated, 28
the female source was advised how to contact representa- 29
tives from the 135th MI Group but that she should only 30
make contact when she possesses evidence of the PWs. 31
- (6) Other Activities. During interrogation of a captured 32
VC on 12 May, information was obtained concerning the loca- 33
tion of an alleged, deceased US soldier currently MIA. 34

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Appendix F

tion of an alleged, deceased US soldier currently MIA.

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Acting on this information, a body search was conducted 1
and the remains of what appears to be a Caucasian dressed 2
in deteriorated fatigues was recovered. Remains were 3
evacuated and attempts to identify the deceased are being 4
made. Although not a specific mission of the JPEC, it 5
has, on several occasions, coordinated and requested body 6
searches. 7

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t. Recovery Operations, 15-21 May 1967*

(1) Operation SWAP

(a) Absolutely no evidence can be located which would indicate that two US PWs have recently escaped VC control. Barring the extremely unlikely possibility that the two have been in evasion status since early May without making contact with friendly forces, it must be concluded that the reported escape was spurious information.

(b) If the above is true, some credence is lent to the hypothesis that this may be [redacted] way of terminating his contacts with US personnel.

(c) In light of the above, this operation is being dropped from the active list pending receipt of further information which would warrant its reactivation.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. No change.

(3) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

(4) Operation CHEYENNE. Since no progress has been made on this operation since it was begun in mid-March, it is being dropped from the active list pending further developments which would warrant its reactivation.

(5) Operation GAMBLER

(a) In the late morning hours of 19 May (190311Z) an A6A from the carrier ENTERPRISE, call sign Raygun 502, was shot down 30NM SW of Hanoi. Both crewmen ejected successfully, landing at [redacted] Their point of landing was near the center of [redacted] but while this is excellent terrain for evasion, it lies well within the SAM envelope and is considered a high threat area.

(b) Voice contact was made with the downed crewmen. It was discovered that the pilot was uninjured, but that the bombardier/navigator (B/N) had suffered a badly broken

* (TS) COMUSMACV MsS, 2178/231010Z May 67

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leg. No rescue operation was attempted from the east 1
utilizing Navy SAR resources due to the existence of the 2
high threat area all the way from the coast to the target 3
area. Assistance from JPRC was requested. 4

(c) JPRC notified the Joint Search and Rescue Center 5
(JSARC) at Tan Son Nhut, and asked that feasibility for 6
launch of a SAR effort from the west utilizing USAF-SAR 7
resources be studied. A plan for launch of SAR assets to 8
be covered by multiple air strikes taking place simultaneously 9
in the same area was devised. Commander 7AF, vetoed this 10
plan on grounds that the area was too well defended to risk 11
SAR assets. 12

(d) JPRC presented a plan which called for the drop of 13
Fulton Recovery System (SKYHOOK) kits by high performance 14
aircraft. If the drop was made successfully, an attempt 15
would be made for a SKYHOOK pick up at a pre-determined time 16
the night following the drop. The plan was approved for 17
execution late in the evening of 20 May. A JPRC representa- 18
tive was dispatched to DaNang, the base from which the drop 19
mission would launch, to act as operation coordinator. 20

(e) A flight of AF F4Cs was launched on the morning of 21
21 May to effect the drop. Contact was established with 22
the B/N of the downed crew, and a successful drop accomplished 23
at approx 210320Z. A total of three M4A containers were 24
dropped. Two containers carried a two man Fulton ground 25
station and the third, survival equipment. The two M4As 26
containing the Fulton gear landed approx 100 yds from the 27
downed crewman. The survival container landed approx 200 28
yds from his position. The downed man indicated that although 29
he was injured, he thought he would be able to make his way 30
to the Fulton gear. 31

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(f) The Combat Spear aircraft which would attempt the pick up was launched on schedule at 211141Z. The plan called for high performance aircraft to make a final flight over the target area a few hours prior to the scheduled pick up time, make a last minute check on the situation of the downed crewmen, and inform them of the precise time the pick up would be attempted. A flight of F4C's was launched for this purpose, and upon contacting the B/N of the downed crew, were informed that all three of the containers had been recovered earlier by North Vietnamese. The Combat Spear aircraft was notified of this development, and aborted at 211337Z. Before departing the area, an F4C aircraft dropped a container of survival equipment in the vicinity of where he had last seen one of the downed crewmen's strobe light.

(g) Meetings were held on the night of 21 May and again on the morning of 22 May with representatives of JPRC, 7AF and 7th Fleet present, in an effort to determine what further action could be taken. Consensus was that no further recovery action seemed feasible at this time, due proximity hostile forces.

(h) A total of three flights were flown over the area of the downed aircrew on 22 May. Negative contact of any sort was made. This operation is terminated.

(6) Other Activities. The body reported recovered in last week's report has been positively identified through dental records as that of [redacted] carried as missing since 12 May 66.

u. Recovery Operations, 22-28 May 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] the principle source, returned from Phnom Penh, reporting that he had succeeded in contacting KY, the former prison guard commander. He reports that KY

* (TS) COMUSMACV msg, 2298/300148Z May 67

refuses to come back to VN as he is doing well financially in Phnom Penh and he fears the VC will assassinate him if he returns.

(b) On his return trip, [redacted] again stopped at the home of the uncle of [redacted] the man who replaced [redacted] as prison guard commander. He was told that [redacted] has been transferred to a VC munitions factory a few kilometers from the alleged PW camp but on the VN side of the border. [redacted] contends that the US PWs are still at the original location.

(c) [redacted] agreed, according to his uncle, to draw a map of the route into the PW camp. [redacted] has been dispatched to [redacted] to pick up the map.

(2) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

(3) Operation OLD BLUE

(a) This operation began with a very completed intelligence report of a PW camp at [redacted]. The report was obtained from a newly recruited source of the 149th MI Gp.

(b) Field Activities Branch (FAB) of MACV J-2 tasked the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) to procure and annotate aerial photography and complete a study of the PW camp area.

(c) The CICV photo readout revealed an unusually close correlation with the intelligence report, particularly with regard to location of PW camp buildings.

(d) At this point, FAB contacted JPRC and the operation was named. Concurrently FAB instructed 149 MI Gp to reinsert the agent into the area to reconfirm the presence of US PWs.

(e) The agent returned from the area on 25 May, and a polygraph operator was flown to Rach Gia to examine the agent. JPRC provided the EEI for the examination.

(f) Preliminary outcome of the polygraph examination 1
casts some doubt on the presence of US PWs at this location. 2
As it appears now, the source actually has not seen US PWs 3
there since 1965. 4

(g) If it appears worthwhile after the present 5
debriefing is completed, the agent will again be sent 6
into the target area. 7

(h) This operation does not appear very promising and 8
will not be reported further unless future developments 9
warrant. 10

v. Recovery Operations, 29 May - 4 Jun 1967* 11

(1) Operation RIP TIDE 12

(a) [redacted] the original source of the information, 13 ←
returned to Saigon with a detailed sketch of the PW camp 14
allegedly drawn by [redacted] the VC who formerly was in charge 15 ←
of guarding the US PWs. [redacted] remains in the general area 16 ←
and is able to elicit info out of the camp. 17

(b) When shown oblique aerial photography of the area 18
taken from the Vietnamese side of the border, he identified 19
police posts, border check points, mine fields and other 20
items which he has consistently reported in the past. PI 21
personnel assisted in the debrief and confirmed [redacted] 22 ←
findings. 23

(c) [redacted] advised the camp was located further inside 24 ←
the Cambodian border in an area not covered by the photography. 25
On 4 June a request was forwarded to CINCPAC for permission 26
to fly medium level photography. 27

(2) Operation SYCAMORE. No change. 28

(3) Operation ANGLER. Reference is made to BRIGHT LIGHT 29
report for the period 3-9 Apr; dated 11 Apr 67. Report advised 30
the operation was no longer considered active, however, further 31

~~(PS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 2423/060940Z Jun 67

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attempts to locate the PWs, utilizing the same source, would
continue.

(a) The source, a Montagnard, has again located the
US PW camp, vic [REDACTED] and personally observed two US.
He furnished sketches which indicate the camp is well
defended.

(b) To obtain the precise location of the camp, the
source has been re-dispatched to the area carrying the
walking stick containing the homing beacon. The beacon
will be monitored by tactical aircraft.

w. Recovery Operations, 5-11 Jun 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) Due to JCS disapproval of the request for medium
level photograph, this operation is at a standstill.

(b) Nghia the original source has advised that the
area will be flooded by 1 July. At that time the prisoners
will most likely be returned to the sampan.

(c) The collection effort continues and will be
monitored for favorable changes.

(2) Operation SYCAMORE. No change.

(3) Operation ANGLER. The source was delayed and should
have been redispached by 9 June. No confirming data has been
received.

(4) Operation CHEYENNE

(a) Reference is made to BRIGHT LIGHT report for the
period of 15 - 21 May 67 DTG 231010Z Ref BRIGHT LIGHT
report dropped this operation from the active list pending
further developments.

[REDACTED]

(c) This operation is terminated.

* (PS) COMUSMACV Msg, 2562/131250Z Jun 67

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Appendix F

(5) Operation SWAP

(a) A source who wishes his identity to remain unknown, has reported that [REDACTED] (the presumed PWs) are dead and he knows of no escape attempts whatever. The bodies are reportedly located near Hue.

(b) Followup is being made to determine the details of the deaths and location of the bodies with a view toward recovery action.

(6) Operation GRENADE

(a) Information was received on 10 June from the 135th MI Group at Can Tho that two US PWs were being held vicinity of [REDACTED]. The source of the information was captured by the VC on 3 Jan 1967 and escaped at 1900 on 6 June 1967. The source stated the two US were brought into the camp on 3 June 67 and were there at the time of his escape.

(b) Aerial photography was flown on the afternoon of 9 June and the sources description of the camp was verified by the photo interpreter. It was still inhabited at that time.

(c) A JPRC representative was dispatched to Can Tho on 10 June for additional debriefing of the source and to obtain the photography.

(d) MAC COC was briefed on 11 June and the Senior Advisor IV CTZ was tasked by COC to determine the feasibility of an operation.

(e) If an operation is feasible it is anticipated that it will be conducted on 12 or 13 June.

x. Recovery Operations, 12-18 Jun 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE. No change.

(2) Operation SYCAMORE. Since no progress has been made on this operation since 30 April, it is being dropped from the active list pending further developments which warrant its reactivation.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 2703/200955Z Jun 67

(3) Operation ANGLER. Source was not dispatched on 9 June 1
as planned. Unknown to JPRC, III MAF was awaiting instructions 2
from MACV to proceed with the operation. Instructions have been 3
issued to evaluate and determine the feasibility of the operation 4
in the new area and this is in process at the present time. 5
The source will not be dispatched until a concept of action 6
has been determined which can be acted on expeditiously. 7

(4) Operation SWAP. No change. 8

(5) Operation GRENADE 9

(a) The operation was deemed feasible and the Senior 10
Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) elected to conduct the 11
operation the night of 12 June. The concept was to insert 12
a Seal Team by helicopter during the hours of darkness, 13
conduct the raid at first light, then exfiltrate by helicopter. 14
The 9th ARVN Recon Company was the standby reaction force 15
with the 43rd ARVN Battalion on one hour alert. 16

(b) During a last visual reconnaissance the afternoon 17
of 12 June a discrepancy was noted in the area described by 18
the source and that which was photographed. Another area 19
was determined to be the correct target area. A 24 hour 20
delay was called to permit photography and re-planning. 21

(c) The concept remained the same and the plan was 22
executed on 13 June with the insertion of the Seal Team at 23
2359 hours. The team made contact at 0630 hours with 5 VC. 24
Results - 1 VC KIA, 2 WIA. No friendly casualties. Several 25
huts were destroyed, one resulting in a secondary explosion. 26
The search disclosed no US or ARVN PWs. The Team successfully 27
exfiltrated at 140708 Jun 67. 28

(d) The source accompanied the raid force and, after 29
getting into the target area, determined that this was not 30
the location where he had been held. 31

(e) On 16 June the source reported that he has now learned that the camp was moved on 7 June, the day following his escape. He has learned of the possible relocation site and is attempting to determine if the US PWs are there.

y. Recovery Operations, 19-25 Jun 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE. Additional low level oblique photography of the area was obtained. [redacted] was confronted with this photography and picked out the same area for the PW camp that had been previously picked by photo interpreters. The area is very heavily vegetated and no man made construction is visible. [redacted] will return to [redacted] on 27 June to obtain precise measurements from landmarks to the huts allegedly containing the PWs.

(2) Operation ANGLER. The source was redispached on 23 June with the UHF homer. Electronic surveillance will commence on 2 or 3 July.

(3) Operation SWAP. No change.

(4) Operation GRENADE. No change.

z. Recovery Operations, 26 Jun - 2 July 1967**

(1) Operation RIP TIDE. No change.

(2) Operation ANGLER. No change.

(3) Operation SWAP. No change.

(4) Operation GRENADE. No change.

(5) Operation QUICK TIME

(a) This operation commenced to develop 10 June 67 when JPRC received information through 5th SFG that four US PWs were being held just inside Cambodia at coordinates [redacted]. Source is a FRU reconnaissance unit member who poses as a trader along the border. The information was provided by several Cambodian traders who stated that there

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 2853/270750Z Jun 67
** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 2977/040715Z Jul 67

had been seven US PWs but three had been taken away to an
unknown destination. The PRU source personally observed
the house (known as [redacted] house) from a distance of
300 yards but did not see the US PWs due to a high fence
around the house.

(b) This information tallied with previous information
furnished by CRD, Reg IV in March and April from another
source that this same house is used as a temporary detention
point and way station. It is also alleged that the house
is used for high level VC briefings. This source is a
Cambodian businessman who lives in the area. On 7 April
the source saw four US PWs at [redacted]. They were
being displayed in the area for propaganda purposes.

(c) Another sighting reported two US PWs kept in this
vicinity for several hours and then moved to an unknown
destination.

(d) CRD, Reg IV and 5th SFG were requested to continue
the collection effort. Their combined effort, using the
PRU agent, disclosed that the four US PWs reported on
10 June were seen by a trader to be taken into the house
on 6 or 7 June and they were moved by vehicle north on
Route 93 at 0600 hours, 11 Jun 67. They had been detained
there approximately five days.

(e) Current status is as follows:

1. A detailed description of the house and
surrounding vicinity has been received.

2. Oblique photography has been flown but not as
yet received by JPRC.

3. Surveillance has been increased to permit the
earliest possible report of the renewed presence of
US PWs in order to be able to launch a recovery operation
within the detention pattern time frame of one to four
days.

(6) Operation BANDITO

(a) On 27 Jun 67, JPRC received information that a platoon of the HOA HAO reinforced by 400 Khmer Serai fought a VC unit in Cambodia on 20 and 21 Jun 67. The VC lost and the Khmer Serai gained custody of nine US PWs; five Caucasian and four Negros. They are being held approximately 20 km inside Cambodia opposite Tinh Bien District, Chau Doc Province.

(b) The source departed on 27 Jun to obtain photographs and identities of the PWs with the suggestion that if data proves satisfactory he can arrange a meeting along the border.

(c) Information has been furnished CRD, Reg IV, as to the amount of money that may be paid for each returned PW and, upon the return of the source, a JPRC representative will go to Chau Doc to assist in negotiating the details of the release.

(7) Operation STIFF JOINT

(a) Pintail 02, an F-105, was reported down [REDACTED] CAP aircraft remained on scene with SAR aircraft, JOLLY GREEN and AEs, to arrive 1855H. Pintail 01 had reported a good chute and strong beeper. Aircraft on scene did not have pilot in sight but hold a strong beeper.

(b) SAR aircraft arrived on scene 1908H and had difficulty establishing electronic contact. AEs reported receiving ground fire from valley to west of site. At 1950H JOLLY GREEN established voice contact with Pintail 02 and also reported receiving ground fire. JOLLY GREEN was unable to localize the downed pilot and at 2021H all forces departed area to resume SAR effort at first light.

(c) 7th AF contacted JPRC and requested a BRIGHT LIGHT Team be made available for a joint rescue effort to be launched from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB on morning 3 July if pilot

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location could not be pinpointed. The BRIGHT LIGHT Team 1
closed at NKP at 0326H. Additionally, a Combat Spear 2
aircraft with M4A container was deployed to Danang to be 3
on station there available to effect a highperformance 4
drop by F4C of Fulton Ground Station and subsequent HC-130 5
pickup if needed. 6

(d) ALEs returned to area after first light 3 July and 7
established voice contact with Pintail 02. RESCAP flights 8
sterilized the area and JOLLY GREEN 09 moved in for the 9
pickup at 0855H. This time JOLLY GREEN was able to pinpoint 10
downed pilot's location and, although receiving ground fire, 11
was able to make an ARRS combat save. Survivor was in good 12
condition. 13

(e) BRIGHT LIGHT assets were returned to base after SAR
effort successfully terminated.

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Appendix F

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F 86

aa. Recovery Operations, 3-9 Jul 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) Late on 7 July, [redacted] the source, was returned to Saigon. On 8 July, the following information was passed to JPRC: [redacted] the former prison guard commander, has now been transferred from the munitions factory back to guard duty at the PW camp. The camp has been moved some 1,000 meters north of its previous location. There are now six US PWs in the camp, all in relatively good health. [redacted] is most anxious to return to GVN control as a Chieu Hoi and wishes to bring the six US PWs with him.

(b) [redacted] is currently performing duty from 2,200 to 2,400 as guard over PWs. There are two other guards. The only other force in the vicinity is a local force VC Platoon some distance away. [redacted] will dispose of the two guards, cut the chains which secure the PWs during the hours of darkness and lead them over land to the MeKong River (a distance of three to four kilometers) where [redacted] will be waiting with a seven-meter sampan to move them all down river to the border.

(c) Preliminary planning is being conducted with a view to use of USN River Patrol Boats in conjunction with helicopter gunships to rendezvous with [redacted] at the border, off-load the US PWs, [redacted] from the sampan which would then be sunk, and return to [redacted] which is the staging area for the patrol.

(d) Detailed planning and coordination will be conducted early next week with a view toward execution late in the week. In the meantime, a pistol with silencer and chain cutting tools capable of being smuggled by [redacted] into the camp are being obtained.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 3106/110855Z Jul 67

(2) Operation ANGLER. III MAF surveillance for the UHF homer on 4 July. As of the end of the reporting period it had not been detected.

(3) Operation SWAP. No change.

(4) Operation GRENADE. No change.

(5) Operation QUICK TIME. Three different attempts have been made to gain usable photography of the area of interest. None of the photography received has been satisfactory and efforts continue to obtain higher quality photography in order to pin point the house and surroundings for planning purposes.

(6) Operation BANDITO

Reference: COMUSMACV message (S) MACSOG CITE 3023, dtg 070700Z Jul 67. It is understood that the RVNAF chain of command is working out details of the letter of agreement that will grant permission for the three Khmer Serai Companies to enter SVN. The CG, IV CTZ is hopeful of receiving it or further instructions prior to a meeting scheduled for 11 July with the Hoa Hao negotiator. The Senior Advisor, IV CTZ will have an observer at this meeting.

bb. Recovery Operations, 10-16 Jul 1967*

(1) Operation RIPTIDE

(a) The recovery plan remained as reported previously with two minor changes; (1) Due to [redacted] duty period the operation was slipped 24 hours so that he had the 2200-2400 watch, and (2) [redacted] would accompany [redacted] to the edge of the camp and backup [redacted] while he killed the guards, at which time [redacted] would then go into the camp to assist [redacted] in freeing the prisoners.

(b) The JPRC field team met with [redacted] on the morning of 13 July. [redacted] then informed the team that he had been in the camp on the previous day and that the silenced 22 pistol and the hacksaw had been buried in the camp.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 3234/181122Z July 67

(c) The operation was activated on 14 July with the PBRs on station in the Mekong River just below the border by 2230H. The boats remained on station until first light waiting for the Sampan. Neither the Sampan, [redacted] or [redacted] appeared and surveillance was terminated.

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(d) On the contingency that [redacted] and the Prisoners had been able to excapt, but were unable to reach the river and were forced to hide during the day due to the presence of hostile forces, the operation was set up to run again on the night of the 15 July. No contact was made this night, and the operation was terminated.

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(e) The 135th MI Gp personnel are making every effort to determine the events which precluded the successful recovery of six US prisoners.

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(2) Operation ANGLER. The source should report back about 22-23 July with information on the location of the camp and the status of the UHF homer. Electronic surveillance was maintained through 16 July with negative results.

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(3) Operation SWAP. As no progress has been made on this operation since 9 June, it is dropped from the active list pending further developments which warrant it's activation.

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(4) Operation GRENADE. As no progress has been made on this operation since 16 June, it is being dropped from the active list pending further developments which warrant it's activation.

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(5) Operation QUICK TIME. No change.

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(6) Operation BANDITO.

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(a) The meeting listed in the last report took place at 1035 hours on 11 July at Can Tho.

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(b) [redacted] Chief MSS, and [redacted] ARVN S-2, Kien Phong Province conducted the meeting with [redacted] CO, [redacted] CRD, Region IV, represented S/A, IV CTZ.

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(c) [redacted] told [redacted] that he would begin negotiations to return the Khmer Serai to GVN once proof of the nine PWs is received. [redacted] agreed to arrange a meeting with [redacted] as quickly as possible and believes he can bring the proof of possession to Can Tho about 18 July. Proof is to consist of a group photo of the nine US PWs and a list of their names, ranks and service numbers.

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cc. Recovery Operations, 17-23 Jul 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) No further information has been received which would indicate [redacted] fate. [redacted] wife has queried the Chau Doc CRD representative several times as to [redacted] whereabouts.

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(b) Efforts are continuing to determine why the operation failed.

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(2) Operation ANGLER

(a) The source returned to Tra Bong District Headquarters on 14 July and was debriefed on 17 July.

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(b) The source arrived in the camp on 2 July, found the prisoners were gone and did not activate the UHF homer.

22

(c) The source stated that the US prisoners departed the camp on 30 June accompanied by 500 VC headed towards Laos.

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(d) This operation will not be reported on unless future developments warrant reactivation.

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(3) Operation QUICK TIME. The PW way station in Cambodia known as [redacted] was moved to [redacted] on 1 July. photography of the new location (approx 18 kilometers East South East of the old location) has been requested. Periodic surveillance of this location will be initiated as soon as possible.

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(4) Operation BANDITO.

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(a) [redacted] departed Can Tho late in the afternoon on 12 July. His original estimate of returning by 18 July with proof of the U.S. PWs was slipped by CRD Can Tho to 19 or 20 July.

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(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3367/251212Z Jul 67

(b) [redacted] has not surfaced as of this date.

(5) Other activities.

(a) On 18 July MAGIC STONE 404 (Oriskany A4E) was downed in the vicinity of [redacted] SAR effort was suspended until first light on the morning of 19 July due heavy automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of the downed pilot. JPRC was queried at this time as to the availability of a Bright Light team or other possible JPRC assets. It was determined that the use of a Bright Light team was not feasible due to the hostile AAA environment, and the necessity to successfully exfiltrate the team by helo after the pilot had been located.

(b) At first on the 19th SAR was again activated on MAGIC STONE 404. The rescue helo was subsequently shot down while attempting to get in position for the pickup and SAR was again suspended.

(c) JPRC explored the feasibility of employing the Fulton Recovery equipped C-130 aircraft for a night pickup, and it was determined to be not feasible due to the heavy concentration of AW/AAA/SAM in the immediate vicinity.

(d) Contact was maintained with the downed pilot through the 19th and on the morning of the 20th. Two A4s picked up two JPRC M4-A survival kits at DaNang and delivered them to the site of MAGIC STONE 404 at 210015H.

(e) There has been no further information on MAGIC STONE 404.

dd. Recovery Operations, 24-30 Jul 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] wife made an unannounced trip to an undisclosed place for three days on 27 July. Indications are that she could very possibly have some information on the whereabouts of [redacted]

(b) She will be debriefed on her trip and knowledge of her husbands activities in the immediate future.

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(2) Operation EANDITU

(a) [redacted] returned to the 135th MI group on 25 July. Tam stated that he ran into "difficulties" and was unable to obtain the identifying data on the US PWs.

(b) [redacted] was redispached on 28 July and instructed to get the identifying information and report back not later than 3 August.

ee. Recovery Operations, 31 Jul - 6 Aug 1967*

(1) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [redacted] wife was debriefed by the 135th MI GP with no further knowledge of [redacted] whereabouts determined.

(2) Operation QUICK TIME. No change

(3) Operation BANDITO

(a) [redacted] has not reported back as directed.

(b) The sincerity of [redacted] is seriously doubted, and he is rated as a very poor source.

(c) Collection efforts are continuing.

(4) Operation SAHARA

(a) This operation was initiated upon receipt of a debriefing of a PRU member who was a VC prisoner for a year. He was imprisoned in the vicinity of WQ 02 77.

(b) During the first six months of his imprisonment he was kept in the same hut with six US PWs. These six were two Negroes and four caucasians. One of the negroes told the PRU member that he was a medic and had been captured at Hai Yen.

(c) In January the camp was moved with the VN and US PWs placed in two different camps. The PRU member spent the rest of his 6 months imprisonment rowing a boat daily from the Vietnamese camp to the US camp carrying food for the US PWs.

(d) A detailed list of EEI has been furnished the 135th MI Group for use in a more detailed debriefing.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3525/0110122 Aug 67

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(e) Photo and visual recon will be flown on the suspected area. 1
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(5) Operation SHAMROCK SEVEN 3

(a) Since Jun 67 there have been an increasing number of US PW sightings in the BS grid zone west of Quang Ngai. 4
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(b) CG TF Oregon has been advised and JPRC has offered to send a representative in order to bring available intelligence into focus and to discuss potential operations. 6
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(c) Intelligence agencies in the area have been tasked to increase their efforts in this area in order that PW camp locations may be pinpointed. 9
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(6) Other Activities 12

(a) Agent reports have indicated up to nine US PWs being held by elements of the B-3 Front in Cambodia vicinity YA 54 504 13
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(b) Liason trip between JPRC and representatives of the CG 4th INF DIV have been accomplished. 15
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(c) CG 4th INF DIV has been granted authority to attempt a battle field prisoner exchange. 17
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(d) The 135th MI CP has furnished the CG 4th ID an experienced agent handler who is familiar with JPRC and third country operations. The agent from the 135th will advise CG 4th INF DIV of the most suitable method to contact the B-3 Front Commander. 19
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ff. Recovery Operations, 7-13 Aug 1967* 24

(1) Operation RIP TIDE. No information has been received as to [redacted] fate or location. As no progress has been made on this operation since 15 July it is dropped from the list pending further developments which would warrant its reactivation. 25
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(2) Operation QUICK TIME. Photography received did not cover the target area due to camera malfunction. The mission has been re-fragged. 29
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* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 3722/081142Z Aug 67

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P-93

Appendix F

(3) Operation BANDITO. During the reporting period it was learned that the Deputy Commander of the Hoang Hao unit, [REDACTED] was dispatched on 5 Aug 67 with a camera to get pictures of the nine US PWs. As of the close of the period he has not returned.

(4) Operation SAHARA. It has been discovered that the source, a prisoner released by the VC, is not a member of the PRU as alleged. Attempts to verify his story continue as does a search for a second source of information.

(5) Operation SHAMROCK SEVEN.

(a) A JPRC representative spent the period 8-10 Aug 67 with Task Force Oregon. Much of the information collated by JPRC was not known to that headquarters. The G-2 was given a thorough briefing on the accumulated sighting data and the TF collection effort has been intensified.

(b) Documents that have been recently captured in the TAOR were sent to CDEC for expedited translation. The initial screening indicates some disclosure of names, possible locations, and cadres of PW camps.

(6) Other Activities: On 11 Aug 67 a JPRC representative visited Headquarters, 4th Inf Div, to confer with the CG and G-2. Their plan of action to contact the B-3 Front Commander to negotiate a prisoner exchange was to be presented to the CG for approval on 12 Aug. JPRC assistance was offered to locate NVA prisoners from that Front or funds to pay for release, should either of these be the exchange price. Recruiting continues for a suitable individual(s) to establish contact.

gS. Recovery Operations, 14-20 Aug 1967*

(1) Operation QUICK TIME

(a) Photography flown was again not suitable and is being re-flown. It is expected to be available on or about 23 Aug 67.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 3895/151145Z Aug 67

(b) Although no new information has been received concerning the new location of the suspected way station several reports have been received indicating PW camp locations at [redacted] Two Caucasian PWs are alleged to be held along with 40 to 50 Vietnamese, Cambodian and Chinese PWs at the latter location. Another source has reported a PW camp in tree houses at [redacted] No US were reported held here.

(c) In view of all of this activity in the general vicinity the collection effort continues.

(2) Operation BANDITO

(a) [redacted] deputy, met with [redacted] (the leader of the Khmer Serai) on 5 August. [redacted] refused to furnish any proof of the US PWs as he did not believe [redacted] written statement that his Khmer Serai unit would be accepted into the GVN with [redacted] Hoa Hao unit. [redacted] will not release any US PWs until he sees [redacted] Hoa Hao cross the border into Vietnam. If the Hoa Hao are allowed in, [redacted] will follow with the Khmer and the US PWs.

(b) [redacted] was detained by [redacted] in Cambodia for a short period of time due to [redacted] distrust of [redacted]. During [redacted] detention he observed two US PW's, the descriptions were passed to [redacted] who in turn informed the CRD Can Tho. The descriptions included one negro and one caucasian, one of whom repaired radios for [redacted].

(c) If the GVN will not allow the Hoa Hao and Khmer Serai into SVN without proof of the US PWs, [redacted] will terminate negotiations with [redacted]. If negotiations are terminated, [redacted] has suggested that his forces can effect the release of the PWs if furnished ammunition for Bren guns, BARs, Thompson submachine guns and hand grenades.

~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 4041/221406Z Aug 67

(d) As of the close of the period [redacted] had not arrived 1 ←
at Can Tho to pass the above information to [redacted] 2 ←
the negotiator for CG, IV CTZ. JPRC believes that the 3
CG, IV CTZ, is not disposed to continue negotiations 4
without some proof of possession being furnished by [redacted] 5 ←
and [redacted], although from our standpoint there is little 6 ←
to be lost and possible much to be gained by going along 7
with [redacted] demands. 8 ←

(3) Operation SAHARA. An erroneous translation of the 9
original Vietnamese debrief of [redacted] described him as a PRU. When 10 ←
re-checked, it was found that he was a Popular Forces soldier. 11
The collection effort continues. 12

(4) Operation SHAMROCK SEVEN. No change 13

(5) Other Activities. There has been no change in the 14
status of the PW Exchange negotiation effort being initiated 15
by CG, 4th Inf Div. 16

- hh. Recovery Operations, 21-27-August 1967* 1
- (1) Operation QUICK TIME. Photography flown on 23 August 2
was unsuitable. Pertinent personnel have been briefed on 3
the photography required and suitable photography is 4
expected shortly. 5
- (2) Operation BANDITO. No change. 6
- (3) Operation SAHARA. A photographic mosaic of the area 7
of interest has been constructed. If the source is able to 8
identify the camp, raid planning with SA IV CTZ will commence. 10
- (4) Operation SHAMROCK SEVEN. JPRC received additional 11
intelligence on the area from III MAF. A JPRC representative 12
was dispatched to CG III MAF to brief selected personnel 13
on information which JPRC has collated in the area. Aerial 14
photography and infra-red imagery failed to confirm the 15
location of two alleged camps. III MAF intends to pass 16
existing intelligence to CG-Task Force Oregon for further 17
evaluation and study. 18
- (5) Operation LUCKY LEAP 19
- (a) JPRC received an abbreviated debriefing report of 20
PW soldier who was captured by the VC in 1962, and escaped 21
on 9 August 1967. Two U.S. personnel were brought to 22
the camp during April of 1965. One of the US was a negro 23
Master Sergeant, the other being a caucasian Captain. 24
- (b) In February 1967, the source was detailed to camp 25
work parties which obtained fish and cut wood. He was 26
able to escape from his guard while fishing. 27
- (c) Photography of the area was shown to the source and 28
he was able to identify work and fishing sites. Subsequently, 29
he was flown over the area by a PAC, and was able to 30
localize the camp location by tree patterns to within 31
200 meters. 32

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV T1sg, 4183/2911312 Aug 67

(d) Source was polygraphed with no deception noted. 1

(e) On the basis of the source being able to 2

localize the camp, with corroborating information, 3

raid planning was initiated. Planning for this mission 4

continues with a target date for execution approximately 5

13 September 1967. 6

(6) Other Activities. 4th Infantry Division Exchange Program. No further information. 7
8

ii. Recovery Operations, 28 August-3 September 1967* 9

(1) Operation QUICK TIME. No change. 10

(2) Operation BANDITO. No change. 11

(3) Operation SAHARA 12

[REDACTED] 13
14
15

(b) The source stated that he was willing to contact a friend who was the camp commander in an effort to persuade him to rally with the three US PWs allegedly held. 16
17
18

(c) The source was polygraphed with questionable results. 19

(d) Debrief of the source is continuing. 20

(4) Operation SHAMROCK SEVEN. 21

(a) On 1 September, the 2nd Bn, 502nd, Airborne Infantry of Task Force OREGON raided PW camps at [REDACTED] 22
23

[REDACTED] Twenty-two indigenous personnel were removed from the camp at [REDACTED] The breakdown of 24
25 ←

the personnel is as follows: One VC 26
One RF PVT 27
One CIDG PVT 28
Three Civil Defendants 29
Sixteen Innocent Civilians 30

(b) The camp at [REDACTED] did not contain any prisoners, 31 ←
however, the raid force reported evidence that US PWs had 32
been held in that location. Battlefield interrogation 33

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 4299/051140Z Sep 67

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of the individuals recovered at [REDACTED] indicated 1
that US PWs had been in the camp, but evacuated 2
approximately 30 days previously. 3

(c) All recovered VNs have been turned over to the 4
135th MI GP to determine their knowledge of US PWs, and 5
camp procedures. 6

(d) The SHAMROCK SEVEN area remains an area of intense 7
interest to JPRC and information concerning US PWs in 8
this vicinity will continue to be actively pursued. 9

(5) Operation LUCKY LEAF. JPRC is attempting to move 10
the raid target date from 15 September to 9 September in 11
an effort to execute the raid as soon as practical. 12

(6) Other Activities. 4th Infantry Division Exchange 13
Program. No change. 14

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Appendix F

11. Recovery Operations, 4-10 September 1967* 1

(1) Operation QUICK TIME 2

(a) Suitable photography of this area has been obtained. 3
Initial readout failed to verify the location of the sus- 4
pected way station. - - - 5

(b) A detail analysis of the photographs will be made. 6

(2) Operation BANDITO 7

(a) No contact has been made with [redacted] of Hoa Hao or [redacted] 8 ←
of the Khmer Serai since 5 August. 9

(b) CO, Region IV 135th MI GP has been requested to 10
develop new sources or means of communicating with the Hoa Hao 11
and Khmer Serai units who allegedly hold the US prisoners. 12

(3) Operation LUCKY LEAF 13

(a) This operation is scheduled to be conducted on 14
1 October under control of SA IV CTZ. The postponement 15
from the previously scheduled date of 13 September was 16
made to permit additional time for planning and rehearsal 17
by personnel who will conduct the operation. 18

(b) The tentative plan is to use Special Forces personnel 19
to assault and secure the camp while a reserve force is kept 20
in position to react immediately to the needs of the 21
situation. 22

(4) Operation SAHARA 23

(a) The source, [redacted] was unable to locate the PW camp 24 ←
on a photographic mosaic of the area. 25

(b) [redacted] will be flown on an aerial reconnaissance of the 26 ←
area. 27

(5) Operation SHAMROCK VII. No further information. 28

(6) Other Activities. 4th Infantry Division Exchange Program. 29
The unit is still trying to develop a suitable source to 30
contact the B-3 Front Commander. 31

* (S) COMUSMACV msg, 4435/121211Z Sep 67

kk. Recovery Operations, 11-17 September 1967*

(1) Operation QUICK TIME

(a) Detailed readout of photography failed to indicate the location of the suspected way station.

(b) Because information has not been developed as expected, this operation is being dropped from the active list of projects.

(2) Operation BANDITO. No new developments.

(3) Operation LUCKY LEAF

(a) Planning continues.

(b) JPRC furnished SA IV CTZ with area analysis charts obtained for them from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam.

(4) Operation SAHARA. [redacted] was flown on a VR on 16 September. He pointed out, as the camp location, an area 20 KM SW of the area originally claimed. JPRC requested Region IV, 135th MI Gp, to attempt to reconcile this discrepancy.

(5) Operation SHAMROCK VII. No further information.

(6) Other Activities. 4th Infantry Division Exchange. No change.

ll. Recovery Operations 18-24 September 1967**

(1) Operation BANDITO

(a) No contact has been made with the original source, [redacted]

(b) Region IV, 135th MI GP, has been unable to develop a new source to contact the Roa Hao or Khmer Serai. Unless recruiting efforts are successful by 30 September 1967, this operation will be dropped from the active list of projects.

(2) Operation LUCKY LEAF

(a) Planning continues.

(b) US 25th Infantry Division will provide a battalion sized reaction force for this operation.

(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4603/1912322 Sep 67
(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4776/2612182 Sep 67

- (c) Schedule of events: 1
1. 1 October - Infiltration by Special Forces personnel. 2 3
 2. 1-5 October - Movement to and reconnaissance of target. A determination will be made 24 to 36 hours after infiltration as to recommended movement time of the reaction force. 4 5 6 7
 3. 4-6 October - Movement of reaction force to staging area and deployment. Linkup of reaction and recovery force and extraction of POWs. 8 9 10
 4. 6-8 October - Debriefing of recovery force and preparation of after action report. 11 12
- (3) Operation SAHARA. No new developments. 13
- (4) Operation SHAMROCK VII. 14
- (a) Recapitulation. This nickname was assigned to an area in which a large number of POW sightings had been made. A raid conducted in this area on 1 September resulted in the recovery of 20 VN personnel held captive by the VC. Interrogation of returnees has not revealed any new information on US PWs or VC camp procedures. 15 16 17 18 19 20
- (b) Reference to this area as SHAMROCK VII area is no longer considered useful and will be discontinued with this report. Future operations in the area will be assigned individual nicknames. 21 22 23 24
- (5) Operation BATON ARROW 25
- (a) On 22 September, the JPRC received a report indicating that two US POWs were being exhibited by a VC force in Vinh Binh Province. This information was received from two separate sources who believed that they knew where additional exhibits were to be held. 26 27 28 29 30
- (b) Acting upon this information, a JPRC representative visited Can Tho to determine if a recovery operation was feasible. 31 32 33

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(c) At present, there is insufficient intelligence 1
to launch an operation; however, all available resources 2
are being utilized in an attempt to discover the location 3
of the POWs. 4

(d) The nickname BATON ARROW has been assigned to this 5
activity. - - - 6

(6) Other Activities. 4th Infantry Division, Exchange. 7
No change. 8

mm. Recovery Operations, 25 September-1 October 1967* 9

(1) Operation LUCKY LEAF. 10

(a) Operations began as scheduled with the infiltration 11
of Special Forces personnel into the area on the night of 12
1-2 October. 13

(b) The reaction force for this operation is a battalion 14
from the US 9th Infantry Division. The BRIGHT LIGHT report 15
for the period 18 through 24 September 1967 erroneously 16
reported this unit as a battalion from the 25th US Infantry 17
Division. 18

(2) Operation SAHARA. No new developments. 19

(3) Operation BATON ARROW. 20

(a) There has been no sighting of the US POWs since the 21
ones reported to JPRC on 22 September. 22

(b) No information has been received from the original 23
sources since 21 September. 24

(c) A messenger has been dispatched to re-establish 25
contact with the original sources. 26

(4) Operation BANDITO 27

(a) No contact with the original source [REDACTED] Region IV, 28
135th MI GP, has been unable to recruit a source to 29
contact the Hoa Hao or Khmer Serai. 30

(b) This project is being dropped from the active list 31
of projects. 32

(8) COMUSMACV Msg, 4919/0311472 Oct 67

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(5) 4th Infantry Division



na. Recovery Operations, 2-8 October 1967


(1) Operation LUCKY LEAF

(a) The USSF team was infiltrated into the area early in the morning of 2 October. The team remained in the area for 36 hours searching for signs of the camp. The team was exfiltrated at 1700 on 3 October without finding evidence of a camp and without contact with hostile forces.

(b) The Vietnamese source was returned to Can Tho and turned over to the Vietnamese Special Forces S-2 for interrogation. During this interrogation it became apparent that the source had falsified several statements. He had been previously polygraphed with no adverse reactions.

(c) This operation was terminated on 3 October without committing reaction forces.

(2) Operation SAHARA



(3) Operation BATON ARROW. The messenger has not returned, and no further information is available.

(4) 4th Infantry Division. No change.

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(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5039/101108Z Oct 67

5039/101108Z Oct 67

oo. Recovery Operations, 9-15 October 1967*

(1) Operation LUCKY LEAP. This operation terminated on 3 October 1967. Subsequent interrogation of source failed to reveal any new information. This report is being dropped from the active list.

(2) Operation SARARA. [REDACTED]

(3) Operation BATON ARROW. No new developments.

(4) Operation RIP TIDE. This operation was closed out on 13 August 1967; however, the source of the operation, [REDACTED] has been arrested by the MSS and being interrogated by them.

(a) Operation RIP TIDE was executed on 14 and 15 July 1967, with negative results.

(b) The concept of the operation was as follows:

1. [REDACTED] was to proceed to the camp [REDACTED] join up with [REDACTED] a camp guard who wanted to rally, kill the three remaining guards and release the six US POWs.

2. Upon the release of the POWs, [REDACTED] and the POWs were to travel [REDACTED] pick up a sampan that had been hidden there, and bring the POWs [REDACTED]

3. The sampan was to be met just below the border by six PBRs, the people taken off and the sampan destroyed.

(c) The PBRs were on [REDACTED] just below the border on the night of the 14/15th until first light with no contact. The forces were returned to the surveillance area the night of the 15/16th in the hope that the release had been delayed 24 hours by [REDACTED] for an unknown reason.

(TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 5207/171324Z Oct 67

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(d) Preliminary interrogation of [redacted] by the 135th MI GP indicates:

1. The POWs probably were there during July.


2. That [redacted] did not carry out his part of the operation due to fear of being unsuccessful.

(e) [redacted] has been turned over to the MSS for a thorough interrogation.

(5) 4th Infantry Division. 149th MI GP has been directed to recruit and develop a source to contact the B-3 front commander.

pp. Recovery Operations, 16-23 October 1967*

(1) Operation SAHARA



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(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5348/241414Z Oct 67

(e) This project is closed.

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(2) Special Recovery

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(a) On 181120 October 1967, a villager from [redacted]

3



[redacted] reported that two

4

Americans were trying to get into South Vietnam from

5

Cambodia. The information was passed through Special

6

Forces and CRD channels. Representatives of both

7

these organizations took actions to recover the personnel.

8

(b) On 200600 October, [redacted] who claims to be a

9



Hungarian, managed to elude Cambodian authorities, crossed

10

the border into SVN, and turned himself in at a PF outpost

11

in Chau Doc Province [redacted]. [redacted] was taken to the

12



24th EVAC Hospital, Long Binh.

13

(c) Initial interrogation reveals that he has no know-

14

ledge of US POWs. [redacted] claims that he voluntarily

15



entered Cambodia, and that he was being held by Cambodians

16

PHNOM PENH for deportation to Hungary. [redacted] elected to

17



escape from Cambodia and attempt entry into SVN. He was

18

accompanied in his escape by an individual, one of twelve,

19

who claims to have been working for the US in SVN. [redacted]

20



and this man parted company at the Cambodian/SVN border when

21

they were taken under fire by a Cambodian outpost. Subse-

22

quent information indicated that this man has been

23

recaptured by the VC. The twelve individuals mentioned

24

above were dressed in camouflage suits of the same type

25

worn by CIDG personnel.

26

(d) [redacted] physical condition is considered to be good.

27



He was initially interrogated by members of the 135th MI GP,

28

[redacted]

29

(e) The AMEMB, Saigon, is aware of [redacted] and is taking

30



action to determine his status.

31

(f) This is a one time report.

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qq. Recovery Operations 24-30 October 1967*

(1) Operation BANDITO

(a) This operation was dropped from the active list of projects on 3 October 1967 because no contact could be made with the original source, [redacted] and a suitable source could not be recruited to re-establish contact with the Hoa Hao or Khmer Serai units in Cambodia.

(b) On 23 October 1967, a new source came to the attention of JPRC. [redacted] states that he was sent to Saigon to contact representatives of the Vietnamese government for the purpose of negotiating an agreement to return a 620 man Hoa Hao Unit, now located in Cambodia, to government control. [redacted] has been at this effort in Saigon since 15 May 1967.

(c) The documents carried by [redacted] appear authentic. [redacted] alleges that the Hoa Hao unit holds eight US personnel. For this reason, and because of the similarity between this and the past history of BANDITO, this development will be explored further by JPRC.

(2) Operation WAYFARER

(a) Since 9 September 1967, there have been 11 reports of US POWs being sighted in Dinh Tuong Province.

(b) Each report refers to two or three US POWs being escorted by a heavily armed VC force.

(c) In an attempt to increase the collection effort, and fix the location of the POWs, a JPRC representative will brief representatives of the intelligence collection agencies operating in the area of the reported sightings.

(d) The code name WAYFARER has been assigned to this operation.

(3) 4th Infantry Division Neogitations. No new developments.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5542/011338Z Nov 67

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rr. Recovery Operations, 31 October-6 November 1967*

(1) Operation BANDITO

(a) Several meetings have been held with [REDACTED] to discuss the situation and conditions for release of the US personnel being held by the Hoa_Hao. There have been no new developments.

(b) Investigation of [REDACTED] background leads to doubts concerning the validity of his statements; however, the character of the VN individuals who are sponsoring [REDACTED] is such that a certain amount of credence must be given to his story.

(c) JPRC will continue to develop this situation.

(2) Operation WAYFARER. No new developments.

(3) 4th Infantry Division. No new developments.

(4) Other Activities. Radio Hanoi has announced that three US Army sergeants, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are to be released by the NLF of VN. JPRC is monitoring the actions being taken to receive these individuals if and when they are released.

ss. Recovery Operations, 7-13 November 1967**

(1) Operation BANDITO

(a) Continued interviews and investigations of [REDACTED] the new source, revealed him to be a prevaricator who had fabricated his bona fides.

(b) This operation will be held in abeyance until a new source is found.

(2) Operation WAYFARER. No new developments.

(3) 4th Infantry Division. No new developments.

(4) Prisoner Release

~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5698/071255Z Nov 67
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5822/141307Z Nov 67~~

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Appendix F

(a) JPRC coordinated and planned with other agencies to arrange for immediate care and debriefing of the three US POWs released in Cambodia by the VC. These efforts were negated due to the circumstances of release.

(b) The three sergeants will be debriefed in CONUS by members of the 525th MI GP, USARV, who are familiar with and responsive to JPRC requirements.

(5) Rescue of US Personnel. On 8 November, this organization coordinated a rescue effort in Laos that resulted in the recovery of four US personnel. SOG assets also located six US KIA in the area. These six had previously been listed as MIA as a result of the same incident.

tt. Recovery Operations, 14-20 November 1967* ...

(1) Operation WAYFARER. No new developments.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE.

(a) [redacted] the source of this operation, has been debriefed by the MSS. A recapitulation of the RIP TIDE operation is given in the BRIGHT LIGHT report for the period 9 October through 15 October 1967. Debriefing failed to reveal any reason for [redacted]'s failure to carry out his part of the operation other than that he was too scared.

(b) [redacted] the MSS captain who debriefed [redacted] believes that there is some validity to the basic story presented by [redacted]. The captain visited [redacted] and has made contact with another individual who has knowledge of the camp. [redacted] introduced this source to [redacted]

(c) [redacted] who states frankly that he is motivated by the possibility of the reward, believes that he can develop other sources of information on this camp location, and possibly carry off a recovery operation.

(G) COMUSMACV Msg, 5971/211044Z Nov 67

(d) [redacted] does not trust [redacted] and does not intend to have him associated with the operation [redacted] in coordination with a special agent of the 525th MI GP is developing a plan of operation.

(e) JPRC will monitor and assist.

(3) Operation DAMP ABBEY

(a) On 8 November, a walk-in source at Det B-55, 5th SFGA, Saigon stated that he knew of two US POWs who were being held in a tunnel under a pagoda near My Tho

[redacted]
(b) He stated that he would return to Det B-55 on 11 November with a friend from MY THO who had seen the POWs and would produce photographs of them and provide the exact location of the tunnel.

(c) Source failed to return on 11 November and it was subsequently learned that he had been arrested by the National Police on or about 14 November. He is being held in jail in Saigon, charge unknown.

(d) Military Intelligence (the Central Registry Detachment) is now handling the case and will attempt to contact the source or his wife in order to learn the identify of the individual in My Tho who is the actual source of information concerning the US POWs.

(e) The name DAMP ABBEY has been assigned to this operation.

(4) 4th Infantry Division. No new developments.

(5) JPRC submitted EEI to the USAINTC for debriefing of [redacted] JPRC is closely monitoring the debriefings of these individuals with a view toward determining the exact location of the camp or camps in which they were held.

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uu. Recovery Operations, 21-27 November 1967* 1

(1) Operation WAYFARER. 2

(a) On 22 November 1967, two reports were received 3
of sightings of US POWs in the WAYFARER area on 15 4
November 1967. Both sights were of US POWs-being 5
moved under VC guard. 6

(b) On 25 November 1967, a report was received of a 7
lone US POW being held in a cottage in a hamlet reported 8
to be protected by two VC companies. 9

(c) In both above instances it was not possible to 10
take action since the source's information was dated. 11

(d) Attempted recovery operation in the area would 12
be extremely difficult for the following reasons: 13

1. It is difficult to obtain detailed timely 14
information on US POWs in the area since the area is 15
under VC control. 16

2. The US POWs appear to be heavily guarded by the 17
VC. 18

3. It is difficult to fix the location of the US 19
POWs since a majority of the reports received since 20
9 September 1967 indicate they have been observed moving 21
under VC escort. They do not appear to be kept in the 22
same area for more than a few days and there is no 23
indication of a permanent POW camp in this area. 24

(2) Operation RIP TIDE 25

(a) [REDACTED] as been released by the MSS and is no longer 26
associated with the operation. 27

(b) [REDACTED] of the MSS in coordination with a 28
special agent of the 525th MI GP is attempting to develop 29
new sources in the CHAU DOC area. 30

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 6088/2813092 Nov 67

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(c) JPRC will monitor and assist. 1

(3) Operation DAMP ABBEY 2

(a) Special agents of military intelligence (the Central Registry Detachment) have been denied access to the walk-in source who is presently in jail in Saigon under VN control. 3 4 5 6

(b) They are now attempting to locate and contact the wife of the walk-in. She is reported to know the individual in MY THO who is the actual source of information concerning the US POWs. 7 8 9 10

(4) 4th Infantry Division Exchange 11

(a) The 4th Infantry Division proposes to dispatch a NVA prisoner, recently captured in DAK TO area, to the B-3 Front Commander with a message that proposes a Battlefield exchange of POWs. 12 13 14 15

(b) The letter, in both English and Vietnamese, would propose a one-for-one exchange of prisoners of comparable rank. The letter provides detailed information for the B-3 Front Commander as to methods by which he can communicate his acceptance or rejection of the proposal, or his willingness to negotiate the exchange. A suitable location in SVN, near the SE NAN River border with Cambodia will be proposed as the site of the exchange, or negotiations if required. The letter further stipulates that should he agree to the exchange or to negotiate the exchange, each delegation shall not exceed ten men; each delegation will display a white flag of truce, and the display of National Flags will be prohibited; the combat forces of either side may be no closer than 5 kilometers from the exchange site; that the exchange or negotiations will be without ceremony and that photography will not be permitted. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

(c) The plan envisions a one-for-one exchange as an initial proposal. However, the 4th Division will be prepared to negotiate for an increased ratio of NVA to US should they so request. Also, JPRC has indicated that a sum of up to \$5,000 may be offered during any initial negotiations for each 4th Div member now in the hands of the NVA.

(d) 4th Div has requested authority to dispatch the NVA prisoner with the letter proposing the exchange of the 4th Div prisoners now in the hands of the NVA for a like number of NVA prisoners captured by the 4th Div. Additionally, they have requested authority to negotiate the number and rank of prisoners to be exchanged for personnel now held by the NVA.

(e) Permission has been passed for 4th Div to initiate their proposed plan.

(5) [REDACTED]

(a) [REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

2. JPRC representatives will visit Can Tho on 28 Nov to pass available information to the IV CORPS G-2 and G-3 advisors and Company D, 5th SFGA. Possibilities of a recovery operation will also be discussed.

3. [REDACTED]

vv. Recovery Operations, 28 Nov-4 Dec 1967* . . .

(1) Operation WAYFARER. No new developments.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. JPRC has made arrangements to transport [REDACTED] of the MSS and a special agent of the 525 MI GP to Chau Doc to initiate a program to develop new sources of information on the camp location as proposed by [REDACTED] in mid-November.

(3) Operation DAMP ABBEY

(a) 525 MI GP has been unable to make contact with [REDACTED] the walk-in source of information for this operation, who is being held in jail in Saigon.

(b) Investigation of [REDACTED] police record indicates that in July 1957, he was dismissed by USOM, AMEMB, for illegal use of government equipment; and in August 1960, he was arrested for organizing the NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT and charged with plotting treason. There is no record of the action that was taken in either case.

(c) The 525 MI GP is attempting to contact with wife of [REDACTED] to determine whether or not she has knowledge of the information passed by [REDACTED].

(4) Operation DARK JUNGLE

(a) On 24 Nov, CI, III MAF received a report from the 3d Marine Division which indicated the possibility of a VC prison camp containing 100 prisoners located within the grid square [REDACTED].

(b) There have been three other reports of VC camps being located in that general area.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 6221/051253Z Dec 67

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 6221/051253Z Dec 67

(c) An aircraft on a photography mission over the area drew fire from positions estimated as [redacted] and [redacted]. An aircraft equipped with infra-red sensors flew a second mission over the area and also drew ground fire from unknown positions. This aircraft detected numerous heat emissions from this area.

(d) Additional photography of the area will be flown as soon as weather permits, and if the location of camp can be fixed, a recovery operation will be conducted.

(e) The name DARK JUNGLE has been assigned to this operation.

(5) 4th Infantry Division Exchange. No new developments.

(6) [redacted]

[redacted]

ww. Recovery Operations 5-11 Dec 1967*

(1) Operation WAYFARER. No new developments.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 6389/121300Z Dec 67

(2) Operation RIP TIDE. [redacted] of the MSS and a Special Agent of the 525 MI GP are presently in Chau Doc setting up a program to develop the new sources of information on the location of the PW camp in Cambodia.

(3) Operation DARK JUNGLE

(a) Aerial photography of the operational area flown on 7 Dec failed to confirm the location or existence of the suspected camp containing ARVN PWs.

(b) Enemy strength in the area prevents ground reconnaissance. The nearest point at which helicopters can land is five kilometers from the suspected camp site. A surprise airmobile assault against the camp would be impossible.

(c) Unless new information develops which would warrant committing a large force in a recovery operation, there is no plan to take immediate action against this alleged site.

(d) Activity in this area will be monitored, but no further reports on this operation will be made unless significant information develops.

(4) Operation TEAMSTER

(a) Since early Nov, JPRC has received three reports from the 525 MI GP indicating four possible PW camps along the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province border, northeast of Xuan Loc.

(b) On 8 Dec, a JPRC representative visited Zuan Loc and discussed the situation with intelligence personnel there. Since there are no other sources available with access to the area where the camps are allegedly located, it was decided to send a small reconnaissance team into the area.

(c) The team will be provided by the Long Khanh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), and is tentatively scheduled to infiltrate the area late next week. Its

mission is to determine if there are camps containing
US PWs in the area and obtain sufficient data to launch
a recovery operation.

(d) In order to assist in the reconnaissance, JPRC
will provide the Chief, Long Khanh PRU with all avail-
able data, to include aerial photography, information
reports, and EEI.

(e) This operation has been given the code name
TEAMSTER.

(5) Operation DAMP ABBEY

(a) A special agent of the 525 MI GP contacted the
wife of the walk-in. However, she was unable to provide
him with the identity of the individual in My Tho, who
allegedly knows the location of the two US PWs.

(b) It is believed that the walk-in, presently in
jail in Saigon, is the only person who can identify the
individual in My Tho. Thus far, the 525 MI GP has been
denied access to the walk-in by the National Police.


(c) Further attempts will be made to contact the
walk-in through an OSA liaison officer to the National
Police. If this is unsuccessful, the operation will be
terminated.

(6) 4th Infantry Division Negotiations


(a) JPRC representatives visited the headquarters of
the 4th Inf Div and were briefed on the status and progress
of this operation.

(b) A message will be dispatched within 10 days to the
B-3 Front Commander via a captured VC soldier.

(7)



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xx. Recovery Operations, 12-18 Dec 1967*

(1) Operation WAYFARER

(a) There have been no reported sightings from the
WAYFARER area since 24 Nov.

~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 6529/191241Z Dec 67~~

(b) This project is being dropped from the active
list pending further information which would warrant
its reactivation.

(2) Operation RIP TIDE

(a) [REDACTED] of the MSS and the Special Agent of the
525 MI GP returned from Chau Doc on 12 Dec.

(b) [REDACTED] has established contact with a number
of individuals who he believes will be able to provide
information on possible US prisoners being held in
Cambodia.

(3) Operation TEAMSTER. No new developments.


(4) Operation DAMP ABBEY

(a) US intelligence collection agencies have been
unable to gain access to the original source, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who we believe to be in the Saigon jail. On 14 Dec,
representatives of the National Police were queried as
to his status, and they denied that he had ever been
arrested. This is contrary to information received on
21 Nov from [REDACTED], Deputy Chief, Planning
Division, Special Police Branch of the National Police
who stated that [REDACTED] had been arrested for illegal
possession of false papers on or about 14 Nov.

(b) This conflicting information has been given to
the OSA Advisor to the Special Branch, Vietnamese National
Police who will use it to attempt to obtain access to DUC.

(5) 4th Infantry Division Negotiations. No new develop-
ments.

(6) [REDACTED]




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yy. Recovery Operations, 19-25 Dec 1967*

- (1) Operation WAYFARER. No new developments.
- (2) Operation RIP TIDE. No new developments.
- (3) Operation TEAMSTER. No new developments.
- (4) Operation DAMP ABBEY. No new developments
- (5) Operation BLACK KNIGHT



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zz. Recovery Operations, 26-31 Dec 1967*

- (1) Operation RIP TIDE. No new developments..
- (2) Operation TEAMSTER. No new developments.
- (3) Operation DAMP ABBEY. No new developments.
- (4) Operation BLACK KNIGHT

(a) JCS stated that unless additional intelligence dictates the requirement for an immediate response, the operation should not be executed until at least one week after the TET cease fire and then only with prior Washington approval.



~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 20/021256Z Jan 68

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g. (TS) JPRC EVALUATION, 1967

1. (TS) CINCPAC Joint Survey Team

a. In November 1967, a Joint Survey Team convened at CINCPAC Headquarters to undertake a comprehensive study of MACSOG programs. The team conducted a survey of the JPRC, its activities, plans and programs, and provided the following conclusions and recommendations concerning the Center:

"CONCLUSIONS

"(1) The new JTD, modified to retain the one O4 intelligence officer space, will be adequate to accomplish the JPRC mission.

"(2) The terms of reference provide adequate authority for the JPRC to perform its functions and discharge its responsibilities.

"(3) Sufficient communications facilities are available to the JPRC to permit the full scope of operations envisioned by the mission.

"(4)

"(5) The largest single problem in location and recovery of detained US/FWMAF personnel is the lack of timely and accurate intelligence data.

"(6) The JPRC is operating in accordance with the terms of reference issued by CINCPAC, as approved by JCS.

"(7) The present JPRC has very high potential, competent, well qualified leadership, and all personnel possess the required skills and are well motivated toward the mission.

"(8) Escape and Evasion programs conducted by the services in SEASIA are progressing in a satisfactory manner. JPRC is monitoring these program closely in an attempt to standardize casualty/MIA/detainee reporting procedures.

"(9) The JPRC post-hostilities plan (now in draft form) is adequate, and will fulfill the prisoner debriefing requirements.

"RECOMMENDATIONS

"(1) That the O4 intelligence officer's position be retained vice the O3 recommended in the new JTD.

"(2)

relating to confinement and movement of US/FWMAF detainees. To this end, MACSOG should coordinate with

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RELATING TO CONFINEMENT AND MOVEMENT OF US/FWMAF Appendix B

7AF to arrive at a mutual agreement on sorties, data to be collected, area of interest, etc. If required, a SICR should be issued to obtain this data.

"(3) That COMUSMACV design a standard procedure for casualty/MIA/detainee reporting and the maintenance of personal data files (photos, authentication systems, emergency addresses, etc.) for use by all services in SEASIA.

"(4) That the JPRC continue in its present line of endeavor. It serves an extremely useful purpose in that no other organization or agency provides a central point or focal point for data on MIA/detainees in SEASIA.

"(5) That MACSOG explore the feasibility of developing singleton agent assets specially qualified and trained for introduction into NVN for the purpose of penetrating POW camps for intelligence purposes and to persuade selected POW guards to defect with prisoners, or permit clandestine operations within the prison."

b. COMUSMACVs comments on the above recommendations were as follows:

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"(1) Recommendation: COMUSMACV should take action to:

Retain the O4 intelligence officer's position in the new JTD vice the recommended O3.

MACV Comment: Concur. A change request will be forwarded as soon as the proposed MACSOG JTD, dated 30 Oct '67, is approved.

"(2) Recommendation:

[REDACTED] relating to confinement/movement of U.S./ FWMAR detainees.

MACV Comment: Concur. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was forwarded from MACV to CINCPAC on 12 Jan 68, stating the requirement for increased intelligence collection relating to confinement or movement of prisoners of war.

"(3) Recommendation:

Design a standard procedure for casualty/MIA/detainee reporting and for the maintenance of personnel data files for use by all Services in Southeast Asia.

MACV Comment: MACV non-concurs in the CINCPAC/JCS Joint Survey Team recommendation that a standard procedure for casualty/MIA/detainee reporting and for the maintenance of personal data files for use by all services be established in Southeast Asia. Each military service has developed procedures and forms to satisfy their particular requirements. The information required by the JPRC is contained in all three formats; therefore, a standardized form is not required.

(TS) CINCPAC letter serial 0001 of 2 January 1968; Subject: Report of Review of MACSOG Programs (C)

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"(4) Recommendation:

Explore the feasibility of introducing singleton agents into POW camps in NVN to persuade guards to defect or permit clandestine operations within the prison.

MACV Comment: MACSOG has evaluated the feasibility of introducing singleton agents into POW camps in NVN. Such an operation is feasible if qualified personnel can be recruited. Existing TIMBERWORK(C) Teams are not considered capable of such operations/at this time."*

2. (TS) AD HOC Evaluation Group

a. COMUSMACV, in December 1967, formed an AD HOC Evaluation Group (AHEG) to examine the operations of MACSOG and determine whether the results achieved were commensurate with the resources committed to its support. The Evaluation Group's evaluation of the JPRC is contained in Tab 5.

b. Aware of the survey of MACSOG conducted in November 1967, the AHEG related their conclusions and recommendations to those of the CINCPAC Survey Team. Conclusions and recommendations of the AHEG which pertained to the JPRC are provided below:

"(1) Conclusions: The AHEG concludes that:

"(a) JPRC mission and terms of reference are appropriate and adequate.

"(b) The organization and manning level of JPRC as provided for in the JTD submitted for approval is adequate. Personnel assigned are highly qualified and motivated.

"(c) Procedures for obtaining resources for recovery operations and for conducting and coordinating operations are adequate.

"(d) Intelligence received by JPRC has not been adequate for successful recovery operations primarily because collection has not been sufficiently responsive.

"(e) The key element in recovery operations is timely and reliable intelligence. Further, that the absence of this element is at the heart of our lack of success to date. Analysis of the collection effort reveals three areas in which improvement may be possible.

"1. Emphasis on low-level agent potential to collect information on US PW locations within RVN.

"2. Increased emphasis on collection outside of RVN.

"3. Focusing of the total MACV effort through provision of an overall, coordinated PW information collection program.

* (TS) COMUSMACV Letter of 17 March 1968; Subject: Report of Review of MACSOG Programs (C)

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"(2) CINCPAC Conclusions/Recommendations:

"(a) The AHEB offers the following in consideration of the CINCPAC Joint Survey Team conclusions:

"1. Conclusion: The new JTD, modified to retain the one O-4 Intelligence Officer space, will be adequate to accomplish the JPRC mission.

"COMMENT: Concur

"2. Conclusion: The terms of reference provide adequate authority for JPRC to perform its functions and discharge its responsibilities.

"COMMENT: Concur

"3. Conclusion: Sufficient communication facilities are available to the JPRC to permit full scope of operations envisioned by the mission.

"COMMENT: Concur

"4. Conclusion: [REDACTED]

Use an additional source of information on prisoners/MIA personnel. Systems should be used in suspect areas in SVN and LAOS to locate prisoners and to gather information on prisoner movements.

"COMMENT: All systems with a capability to collect against known potential sources of US PW information are appropriately tasked. No diversion or concentration of any specific system is considered useful. The present effort is productive and rapid (38 significant reports in the period October-December 67). Responsible personnel are alert to the criticality of this problem and accord it all the emphasis possible.

"5. Conclusion: The largest single problem in location and recovery of detained US/FWMAF personnel is the lack of timely and accurate intelligence data.

"COMMENT: Concur

"6. Conclusion: The JPRC is operating in accordance with the terms of reference issued by CINCPAC, as approved by JCS.

"COMMENT: Concur

"7. Conclusion: The present JPRC has very high potential, competent well qualified leadership, and all personnel possess the required skills and are well motivated toward the mission.

"COMMENT: Concur

"8. Conclusion: Escape and Evasion program conducted by the services in SEASIA are progressing in a satisfactory manner. JPRC is monitoring these programs closely in an attempt to standardize casualty, MIA/detainee reporting procedures.

"COMMENT: Concur

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"a. Conclusion: The JPRC post-hostilities plan (now in draft form) is adequate and will fulfill the prisoner debriefing requirements.

"COMMENT: Concur

"(b) The AHEG offers the following in consideration of the CINCPAC Joint Survey Team Recommendations:

"10. Recommendation: That the O-4 intelligence officer's position be retained vice the O-3 recommended in the new JTD.

"COMMENT: Concur. A field grade officer is required for an advisory and coordination role on a recovery operation. Three officers are needed for necessary flexibility

"11. Recommendation: [REDACTED] suspect areas to collect intelligence data relating to confinement and movement of US/FWMAF detainees. To this end, MACSOG should coordinate with 7AF to arrive at a mutual agreement on sorties, data to be collected, area of interest, etc. If required, a SICR should be issued to obtain this data.

"COMMENT: Concur. See comment on conclusion above.

"12. Recommendation: That COMUSMACV design a standard procedure for casualty/MIA/detainee reporting and the maintenance of personal data files (photos, authentication systems, emergency addresses, etc.) for use by all services in SEASIA.

"COMMENT: The desirability of such a program should be examined carefully before implementation to be sure that the gains that might accrue are worth the cost of the effort.

"13. Recommendation: That the JPRC continue in its present line of endeavor. It serves an extremely useful purpose in that no other organization or agency provides a central point of contact or focal point for data on MIA/detainees in SEASIA.

"COMMENT: Concur. However, the provision of a focal point for information is secondary to its potential as a recovery agency.

"14. Recommendation: That MACSOG explore the feasibility of developing singleton agent assets specially qualified and trained for introduction into NVN for the purpose of penetrating POW camps for intelligence purposes and to persuade selected POW guards to defect with prisoners, or permit clandestine operations within the prison.

"COMMENT: Concur.

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"(3) AHEG Recommendations: It is recommended that:

"(a) CINCPAC Joint Survey Team recommendations as concurred in by this group be approved.

"(b) Steps be taken to focus ARVN attention on the collecting of information on US PWs; that this collection effort be given priority over all but the most urgent tactical requirements; that US advisors to ARVN intelligence officers at Corps level and below be directed to press this program, and that they be provided the means to induce aggressive agent and agent penetration operations to recover PWs within RVN.

"(c) A conference be conducted by COMUSMACV involving all potential collectors of US PW information in LAOS, CAMBODIA and NVN to determine improved means and coordination on measures required for developing greater emphasis on this program.

"(d) MACV J2 prepare an overall, coordinated collection plan or program of overriding priority for PW information."

~~(PS) AC of S, J3, COMUSMACV ltr, dtd 14 February 1968:
Subj: AD HOC Evaluation Group~~

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Appendix F

PART V. JPRC HISTORY - 1968 ()

A. (TS) ORGANIZATION

1. (TS) Based on the previous years' experience in operations, the Center's JTD was revised in 1968. It downgraded the Chief, JPRC billet from an O6 to an O5 grade; and upgraded the Operations/Plans position from O4 to O5. Further, a stenographer (E5) and a yeoman (E5) were added to the Staff.

2. (TS) The JTD, in December 1968, was as follows:

<u>Title</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Chief	AF	O5
Opns/Plans Officer	AF	O5
[REDACTED]	A	O3
[REDACTED]	N	O4
[REDACTED]	A	O4
[REDACTED]	A	E8
[REDACTED]	A	E7
[REDACTED]	A	E6*

B. (TS) EVASION AND ESCAPE

1. (TS) Survival Kits. As the result of lessons learned from after action reports, the survival kits were modified to provide the evader with all essential items of equipment consistent with his capability to carry it. Those items which could be pre-packed into a rucksack without increasing the possibility of damage were packed to enable the evader to quickly recover the items and leave the vicinity of the drop.*

2. (TS) [REDACTED]

3. (TS) Briefings. In 1968, JPRC representatives continued to present briefings on the JPRC mission, organization and personnel recovery capabilities to aircrews and E&E personnel of the 7th Air Force, 7th Fleet, and Army Aviation Groups. Live demonstrations of the Fulton Recovery System were included in the briefings.*

* (TS) Appendix XI to Annex F, COMUSMACV 1968 Command History

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C. (TS) REWARD PROGRAM

1. (TS) North Vietnam

a. As part of the continuing program to publicize the Reward Program for the recovery and return of missing US personnel, 4.65 million reward leaflets were wind drifted into the coastal plain of NVN on the night of 25 January 1968. The area covered was from Phu Dien to Dong Hoi and along Highway 7 between Muong Sen and Cua Rao. Plans were made to drop an additional 14 million in these same areas during the following month utilizing C-130 aircraft based at Ubon, Thailand.

b. In July 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested comments and recommendations from CINCPAC on the desirability of continuing the reward Leaflet Program in NVN. This request was generated in view of the negative results, up to that time, and the fact communist films on US PWs had made extensive propoganda use of the unsuccessful efforts on the part of the US to buy freedom for downed aircrews through the Reward Program.*

c. CINCPAC, in reply to the request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended that the reward leaflet program in NVN be continued, and based this recommendation on the following rationale:

(1) Dissemination of the Reward Program to US combatants provides each man with the knowledge that efforts are being made to assist him should he become an evadee or PW. Additionally, it ensures that the NVN populace is aware of the program.

" (2) The leaflet drops in NVN will probably not aid significantly the return of downed pilots because of the internal security and population control exercised by the Government of North Vietnam (GNVN). However, the fact that the GNVN finds it necessary to counter the leaflet drops with a psychological program of their own, attests to their concern on the attempts on the part of the United States to convert their population.

(TS) JCS Msg, 262159Z Jul 1969

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"(3) Discontinuance of the program would have an adverse effect on the morale of US pilots held in NVN since propaganda films indicate they are aware of the program. If the Reward Program were stopped, Hanoi would impart this fact to US prisoners in an effort to create a feeling of hopelessness."*

2. (TS) South Vietnam. As a means of stimulating the Reward Program in SVN, the JPRC, in March 1968, determined that leaflet drops should be made in target areas where intelligence indicated PW camps might be located.** Subsequently, leaflets were delivered over selected targets in SVN in 1968.

3. (TS) Cambodia. In order to enlist the assistance of the Cambodian people living along the SVN border in rescuing allied personnel from enemy detention camps, the JPRC instituted a Cambodian leaflet program. The leaflet drops were conducted from within SVN by wind drifting leaflets along target tracks that ran through populated areas and communication routes in Cambodia.***

4. (TS) Laos

a. A psychological program to advertise the JPRC Reward Program in Laos was initiated in October 1968. It was determined that the basic media would be a series of leaflets targeted on segments of infiltration trails in Laos.****

b. The US Mission in Vientiane, in November 1968, disapproved the leaflet program in Laos and stated that:

"For a variety of internal political reasons and the probability of increasing the jeopardy of the downed U.S. pilots in Laos, we do not want any reward leaflets addressed to the problem of U.S. captured personnel in Laos produced or dropped at this time."#

5. (TS) Reward Payments. A review of the weekly BRIGHT LIGHT message reports indicates that the following rewards were distributed in 1968:

- * (S) CINCPAC Msg, 191741Z Aug 68
- ** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 261055Z Mar 68
- *** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 050905Z Aug 68
- **** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 221037Z Oct 68
- # (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 031106Z Dec 1968

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- a. A Montagnard source was rewarded \$153 for providing information as to the location of a VC PW camp. 1
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- b. A SVN national, who helped return [redacted] to US control, was rewarded \$153. 3
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- c. A \$200 reward was paid to [redacted] team who recovered the body of [redacted] missing in Laos since 1967. 5
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- d. A Vietnamese source was rewarded \$30 for valid information on the location of a PW camp which was raided in Operation MILWAUKEE ROAD in July 1968. 8
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- e. The crew of a SVN fishing boat, who rescued an RF 101 pilot off the Vietnam coast was paid \$100. 11
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- f. A SVN soldier, who escaped the VC, was paid \$300 for providing information on the status of two US civilian prisoners captured by the VC. 13
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- g. Two SVN sources were paid \$400 for helping recover the body of [redacted] 16
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(TS) INTELLIGENCE 18

Collection Requirements 19

1. (TS) Mindful of the requirement to continuously publicize the need for information relative to the identification, location, and recovery of missing and captured personnel, COMUSMACV, in March 1968, published a more comprehensive Prisoner of War Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR D-7CX-20000) which superseded SICR D-1E6-14883. So that the JPRC could receive intelligence information rapidly enough to react to it, collectors, under MACV control, were tasked by the new SICR to report PW intelligence information directly to the Center by the most expeditious means consistent with security and the value of the information. 20
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2. (TS) When the new SICR was developed, information requirements 1
relative to places of confinement, camp accessibility, camp 2
security, and identification of prisoners were extracted from 3
the SICR and published as a Significant Information 4
Requirement (SIR). The SIR, in turn, was translated into 5
Vietnamese for distribution within the Republic of Vietnam 6
Armed Forces.* A copy of the SIR is contained in Tab 6. 7

E. (TS) LAOS JOINT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 8

1. (TS) Operation TEXAS CREST. 9

a. On 27 February 1968, nine crewmen bailed out of a Navy 10
aircraft that was shot down over Laos. During the search and 11
rescue (SAR) operations (TEXAS CREST) being conducted by 12
JSARC, seven of the crewmen were rescued by helicopter. An 13
eighth crewman was contacted by voice radio, but could not be 14
picked up because of helicopter hoist problems and impending 15
darkness. The ninth man was not contacted. 16

b. JSARC launched another recovery force at first light on 17
28 February; however, no contact was made with the eighth crewman, 18
and it was assumed he had broken or lost his radio during the 19
pickup attempt on the previous day. JSARC decided that a 20
limited ground search would be required, and requested the 21
JPRC provide them a BRIGHT LIGHT team for this purpose. 22

c. Because of the delay encountered in obtaining clearance 23

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Initially, the team was landed in a secondary SAR area because of 25
bad weather at the bailout site. Due to heavy fire, the team was 26
extracted. In the afternoon of the 29th, the team was 27
again launched but returned to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand when 28
the area where the survivor had been seen on the previous day 29
could not be accurately relocated. The SAR was subsequently 30
terminated due to the lack of an objective. 31
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(S) COMUSMACV ltr of 25 Jul 68, Subj: Recovery of Missing and 33
Captured Personnel (U)

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2. (TS) Revision of Agreement

a. As a result of Operation TEXAS CREST, the JPRC initiated a proposal that the Joint Memorandum of Agreement with the 7th Air Force and the American Embassy, Vientiane be revised. The JPRC pointed out that the agreement overlooked the operational situation where the JSARC had to employ ground search teams to carry out its rescue mission. It was recommended that the agreement be rewritten to permit the JPRC to furnish ground search teams to the JSARC on an emergency basis without further clearance but with the understanding that close coordination would be established as soon as possible.*

b. Following working level discussions, the Joint Memorandum of Agreement was modified to permit the JPRC to furnish a ground search team for SAR employment in Laos, on request, prior to termination of SAR efforts.**

* (TS) MACSOQ ltr of 9 Mar 68, Subj: Improved Reaction Time for SAR in Laos (U)
** (S) JPRC ltr of 12 Apr 68, Subj: Vientiane-JPRC Joint Memorandum of Agreement (U)

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F. (TS) OPERATIONS - 1968

1. (TS) Operational Procedures. MACSOQ, in January 1968, by means of an internal directive, updated SOG branch and section responsibilities and procedures for implementing personnel recovery actions. The directive is found in TAB 7 and is provided for purposes of future analysis. In accordance with the MACSOQ internal organization, and as listed in the directive, the JPRC is OP-80, the Operations and Training Division is OP-30, and the Ground Studies Group is OP-35.

2. (TS) Field Operations

(a). Subsequent to the tasking of intelligence collectors in the field to provide the JPRC with PW information by the most expeditious means, the center began to receive a great volume of tenuous information on PW sightings within a few hours after it had occurred. This brought to light the problems of rapid operational reaction required to exploit this type of training information. Formerly each operation was carefully planned with confirmed intelligence along traditional lines, and no PW operations could be conducted without JPRC coordination and approval. This type of exercise yielded virtually no results. Analysis showed that the enemy was taking advantage of planning delays, and was moving prisoners whenever a security leak was suspected.

(b). In April 1968, COMUSMACV issued a new policy ^{change} encouraging field commanders to be alert to the possibility of taking immediate action to recover captured U. S. personnel when sufficient information was available. The fact ^{that} escaped PWs might be able to lead the first forces they contacted to the location where other PWs were being held, was sighted as an example of perishable information, since a situation of this kind offered

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the best, and sometimes, the only possibility of recovery. 1
As an additional means of encouraging rapid reaction to 2
highly perishable PW intelligence, COMUSMACV, in April 1968, 3
cancelled the requirement which required prior approval of 4
the JPRC before recovery operations could be conducted. * 5

(c). Encouraged by several very successful recovery 6
operations following the policy change in April, COMUSMACV, 7
in September 1968, re-emphasized the importance of field 8
forces to take immediate action to recover PWs whenever 9
sufficient evidence was available. ** 10

3. (TS) Review of Operations. In a review of operations con- 11
ducted prior to, and during 1968, MACSOG concluded that: 12

"a. Prior to 1968, JPRC had conducted 16 PW recovery opera-
tions with only one success wherein 20 Vietnamese prisoners were
recovered. 13 additional raids were cancelled because intelli-
gence could not be sufficiently developed. It was evident
that information reporting was too slow and inaccurate, and
operational response was even poorer. Too much time was spent
in trying to develop a classical intelligence case and a tradi-
tional operation with detailed planning and rehearsal. In
the spring of 1968, the JPRC policy was redirected toward
faster inputs and immediate local exploitation of the informa-
tion acquired. The intelligence collection effort was signi-
ficantly increased and broadened to include all agencies in
SEA. The result has been that in 1968 JPRC has conducted
32 PW recovery operations with 8 successes yielding a total of
155 SVN military and political prisoners. Only one operation
was cancelled for lack of intelligence development.

"b. In the field of post-SAR operations for the recovery of
evading aircrewmembers, JPRC opportunities have continued to decline
with the increase in SAR capabilities. Prior to 1968, JPRC had
executed 13 post-SAR missions with 5 partial successes. 5 live
aircrewmembers and 13 bodies were recovered. In 1968, air activity
over hostile territory was sharply curtailed and SAR forces
achieved an in-flight refueling capability. The result has been
that in 1968 JPRC had only 5 post-SAR alerts and completed but
two missions. Although 5 bodies were recovered from a downed
helo in Cambodia, restrictions against launching recovery
missions against known PW camps in Cambodia remained in effect."***

4. (TS) Chronology of Operations - 1968. Following is the 13
weekly chronology of recovery operations as reported by the JPRC 14
during 1968. 15

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 210455Z Apr 1968
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 141210Z Sept 1968
*** (TS) MACSOG Year-End Review 1968

- a. Recovery Operations, 1-7 January 1968* 1
4th Infantry Division Negotiations 2
- (1) A JPRC representative visited the 4th Infantry 3
Division at Pleiku and was briefed on the status of this 4
activity. 5
- (2) A NVN soldier captured approximately two months 6
ago has agreed to carry a message to the B-3 Front Commander. 7
A suitable backup courier is on hand, and all documents 8
and plans have been prepared to carry out the operation. 9
However, CG, 4th Infantry Division considers it advisable 10
to wait until after TET to release the messenger. JPRC 11
concur. 12
- b. Recovery Operations, 8-15 January 1968** 13
[REDACTED] 14
- (1) On 031300H Jan 68, [REDACTED] 15
Co, 3/60 Infantry, 9th Division, disappeared from his guard 16
post in the vicinity of [REDACTED] 17
- (2) On 081400H Jan 68, [REDACTED] was sighted in VC hands 18
in the vicinity of [REDACTED] 19
- (3) Intelligence agencies in the Dong Tam - My Tho area 20
intensified their collection efforts. 2nd Brigade, 9th 21
Division, at Dong Tam was briefed on the available information 22
and agreed to conduct a recovery operation if a suitable 23
opportunity arose. 24
- (4) On 10 Jan 68 a JPRC representative, [REDACTED] departed 25
for Dong Tam to act as liaison between JPRC and 9th Division. 26
- (5) The situation did not develop to the point that an 27
operation could be conducted. 28
- (6) At 121115H Jan 68, an armed helicopter from the 114 29
Assault Helicopter Company attacked a sampan at coordinates 30
[REDACTED] that contained [REDACTED] and two VC guards. 31
[REDACTED] was recovered, one of the guards was killed, and the 32
other guard probably escaped. 33

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 137/091245Z Jan 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 272/161852Z Jan 68

(7) [REDACTED] was taken to the 24th EVAC hospital at Long Binh. He did not receive any wounds or injuries and his present health and welfare is good. He is being debriefed by agents of the 525th MI Group.

c. Recovery Operations, 16-22 January 1968*

(1) Operation OLD CROW

(a) This is an opening and closing report.

(b) At 141759H an EB 66 [REDACTED] was shot down at approximately [REDACTED]. Four EWO crewmembers ejected from the bomb bay, followed by three crew members from the pilots compartment. Weather precluded immediate recovery attempts.

(c) A SAR helicopter, [REDACTED] crashed at 151727H while en route to the area in which [REDACTED] crew members were suspected to be downed. By 171440H Jan 68 all five crewmen of [REDACTED] and three of the seven crewmen of [REDACTED] had been recovered. SAR efforts continued, but were hampered because of weather.

(d) At 191200H Jan 68, Chief, SOG, approved proposal to use two BRIGHT LIGHT teams to search the areas in which the [REDACTED] crewmen were downed. [REDACTED] 7th AF, was briefed on the proposal and approved the allocation of air assets to support the operation.

(e) At 200910H two CH-3 helicopters with BRIGHT LIGHT teams aboard, departed Nakhon Phanom (NKP) for the insertion area. While en route, one helicopter was forced down by mechanical difficulties. Landing was made at [REDACTED] (THAILAND), and the other aircraft set down nearby. A spare helicopter arrived and both teams proceeded on their mission. After landing for fuel at LIMA SITE 36 (L-36) in Laos, the helicopter continued. Teams were unable to find suitable landing site in the target area. Fuel supply and approaching darkness forced the helicopters to return to NKP via L-36. Mission was to be attempted again on the 21st.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 427/2313012 Jan 68

[REDACTED] mission was to be attempted again

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(f) Mission was not executed on 21 January because of bad weather and additional planning necessitated by lack of landing site and hostile fire encountered the previous day. At 211700G a meeting was held by JPRC task force commander at NKP to determine if all elements involved in the operation could support the proposed concept. The representatives of the helicopter unit, who were responsible for insertion of the teams into the target area, could not support the concept as proposed because of hoist limitations of CH-3 helicopters. Since no suitable alternatives were available, a decision was made to cancel operations.

(g) On 22 January a strong radio signal was received from the target area and a rescue helicopter was sent to investigate. As the JOLLY GREEN made its approach to the area, it came under extremely heavy ground fire. It is suspected that the area is now under positive enemy control, and that the remaining crewmen of PREVIEW 01 are in their hands.

(2) Operation BLACK KNIGHT. Phase I of this operation (Intelligence collection) is continuing. Several promising contacts have been established with local fishermen and businessmen who operate in the area in which CPT Rowe is suspected to be held. This effort is being conducted with as much caution as possible so as not to disclose the special interest involved.

(3) Operation TEAMSTER

(a) The suspected PW campsite at [REDACTED] was kept under surveillance during the period 17-19 January by a PRU unit. No enemy activity was observed.

(b) This operation is being dropped from the active list of projects.

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(4) Operation DAMP ABBEY. There have been no new developments in this operation, and it is being dropped from the active list of projects.

(5) Return of [redacted]

(a) At the time of this report we have unconfirmed and incomplete information that two U.S. personnel, [redacted] USMC, and [redacted] US Army have been returned to U.S. control. [redacted] was captured on 14 May 1967 in the vicinity of [redacted] and [redacted] on 28 December 1966 in the vicinity of [redacted]. Both individuals are reported to be undergoing medical treatment in the 2nd Surgical Hospital, Chu Lai.

(b) The individuals were recovered in the vicinity of Tam Ky. Whether or not they were released voluntarily by the VC, or recaptured by U.S. action has not been determined.

(6) Return of [redacted]

(a) On 22 January 1968, [redacted] previously reported KIA on 7 January 1968, and [redacted] reported MIA on 7 January 1968 were returned to USMC control at Danang.

(b) The men allegedly escaped when their VCA guard fell asleep.

(c) Both men are in good physical condition and are undergoing debriefing at Headquarters, III MAF, Danang.

d. Recovery Operations, 23-30 January 1968*

(1) Return of [redacted]

(a) At 231130H Jan 68, [redacted] LCPL, USMC, and [redacted] USA, were returned to U.S. control after being released by their VC captors about 230700H Jan, 15km west of Tam Ky [redacted]

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 545/301417Z Jan 68

(b) [redacted] was captured 14 May 1967, and [redacted] 28 December 1966. After initial medical examination and an overnight stay at Chu Lai where they were interrogated for tactical information, [redacted] was transferred to III MAF, Danang, and [redacted] to 24th Army Evac Hospital at Long Binh. Both were under MI escort.

(c) Initial debrief indicated that both men had been led away from their prison camp and walked for eight days before being released. They stated that they knew nothing of other U.S. PWs or the location of their camp. However, about 25200H under detailed examination, [redacted] changed his story and admitted walking only four days from the camp, and stated 10 other U.S. PWs were in the camp. He could identify three, and confirm the death of another.

(d) At 262100H, when confronted with this evidence, [redacted] also changed his story. He produced a written list naming 10 U.S. PWs alive in the camp, confirmed the death of another (same man as [redacted] named), and gave information which may lead to identification of a caucasian living with the VC guards at the camp.

(e) Efforts are continuing to determine the location of this camp.

(2) Proposed Release of Pilots by NVN. A meeting was held at Tan Son Nhut AB at 291530H Jan 68, to discuss plans for handling [redacted] who allegedly will be released by NVN in the immediate future. Participants included representatives from JPRC, 7th AF EAE Office, 7th AF Information Office, NAVFORV, and Det 5, 6499th SAG.

(3) Operation NINE LIVES (4th Infantry Division Negotiation.) This operation was initiated on 30 Jan 68, with the release of a NVA prisoner with a message for the B-3 Front Commander from CG, 4th Division suggesting a battlefield exchange of PWs.

e. Recovery Operations, 31 January - 5 February 1968* 1

Operation NINE LIVES 2

(1) A PW, PVT Nguyen Van Be, 3rd Battalion, 174th NVA 3
Regiment, captured on 15 November 1967, in the battle for 4
Dak To, was released at 0850 hours, 30 January 1968, at 5
coordinates [REDACTED] The PW carried a letter from the 6
CG 4th Infantry Division to Commander B-3 Front. 7

(2) The letter stated that the CG 4th Infantry Division 8
was prepared to execute a direct exchange of one NVA officer 9
and eight NVA enlisted men for one U.S. Warrant Officer and 10
eight enlisted men held captive by the B-3 Front. Also the 11
CG 4th Infantry Division stated he would be prepared to 12
negotiate. The CG B-3 Front could communicate his reply by 13
either messenger or radio. Radio frequencies, dates (1 Mar 14
to 7 Mar 68) and time for communications were included 15

(3) The PW was instructed to deliver the letter personally 16
to the CG B-3 Front. When last observed the PW was walking 17
at a quick pace west on Highway 512 towards the Cambodian 18
border. 19

f. Recovery Operations, 6-12 February 1968** 20

(1) Operation BLACK KNIGHT. (Attempt to release [REDACTED]) 21
Phase I (intelligence collection) is continuing. 22

(2) Recovery Operation at Song Be 23

(a) On 11 February 1968, JPRC received a report from 24
1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, Song Be, that a PW 25
camp containing 30 US PWs is located along the Song Be River 26
at approximately [REDACTED] 27

(b) A JPRC representative was dispatched to Song Be 28
to verify the information, and start coordination of 29
recovery plan. It was learned that further contact with 30
information source was to be made 12 February to obtain 31
precise location of the camp and identity of PWs. 32

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 645/061248Z Feb 68
** (S) CINCPAC Msg, 160209Z Feb 68

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(c) On 15 February, a VC defector from the camp is 1
due to report to 1st Brigade Headquarters, and may be 2
willing to lead a recovery force to the camp site. 3

(d) Coordination is being effected with MACV COC and 1/101 4
Airborne to mount a recovery operation if information is 5
confirmed. 6

8. Recovery Operations, 13-19 February 1968 7

(1) Operation RIVER SPIKE (Recovery Operation at Song Be) 8

(a) See BRIGHT LIGHT report for 6-12 February 1968. 9

(b) Further contact with the source was made on 12 10
February, and a description and drawing of the camp was 12
obtained including alleged disposition of PWs, defensive 13
measures and tentative location at [REDACTED] An alleged 14
VC interrogator was scheduled to come out between 15 and 15
18 February, and provide additional information. 16

(c) Source was again contacted at 170900, but the VC 17
interrogator had not come out. A recovery operation was 18
launched at 171015 using U.S. Special Forces Det. B-56 19
SIGMA assets and air support from II PFV. 20

(d) The objective area was thoroughly searched by 21
ground forces and helicopters, employing source as guide. 22
No evidence of the PW camp was found. Forces were extracted 23
at 171630. 24

(e) Source is being intensively debriefed. This is 25
the closing report. 26

(2) Operation LINCOLN LIGHT (Recovery operation at Ban Me Thuot) 27

(a) JPRC received information on 18 February of PW camp 28
vicinity [REDACTED]. Camp was reported by escapee, and 29
allegedly contains nine U.S., 29 VN and 32 Montagnard PWs. 30
Source has given names of important VN PWs, and 31
has identified area of camp from air on visual recce. 32

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC Msg, 210100Z Feb 68

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(b) JPRC representative was dispatched to Ban Me Thuot 1
20 February to evaluate information and coordinate potential 2
recovery operation. Tactical forces will be US Special 3
Forces Det B-50 OMEGA assets and 173rd Airborne Brigade. 4

(c) B-50 reconnaissance team was infiltrated at 5
200900L to verify report and camp location. Operation for 6
PW recovery planned if reconnaissance warrants. 7

h. Recovery Operations, 20-26 February 1968 8

(1) Operation LINCOLN LIGHT 9

(a) JPRC received information on 18 February of PW 10
camp vicinity [redacted] Camp was reported by escapee, and 11
allegedly contained nine U.S., 29 VN and 32 Montagnard PWs. 12

(b) New information gained from other releases 13
same PW camp indicated camp moved to [redacted] Reconnaissance 14
team moved south to new location. Team made contact 15
211300H with six VC 1,000 meters from PW camp site. 16
Team extracted under cover air strike. 17

(c) One ARVN NCO escaped from PW camp during confusion 18
caused by air strike. He returned to friendly control on 19
23 February and verified presence of 31 SVN PWs. 20

(d) Two companies 173rd Airborne landed 220930H to 21
sweep area. Third company landed 231500H to block escape 22
to east. Five reconnaissance teams inserted around area to 23
watch exit trails. 24

(e) At 231640H abandoned PW camp located [redacted] 25
Had been vacated 24 to 48 hours. Elements of 173rd Airborne 26
completed sweep 24 February with no contact, and were 27
extracted 25 February. 28

(f) At 241045H trail watch team found blood trail at 29
[redacted] Trail followed to [redacted] where lost at 30
1630H. Teams unable to relocate trail and were exfiltrated 31
on 25 February. 32

(S) CINCPAC Msg, 280026Z Feb 68

(g) This is closing report.

(2) Operation DUVAL SANDS (Recovery operation in Hue area)

(a) On 23 February, two US PWs escaped from group of 21 PWs in transit vicinity [redacted] These escapees were members of 525th MI GP captured on 1 February at Hue and were able to account for whereabouts and condition of 25 other US PWs.

(b) Five PWs in poor physical condition held in fortified NVA camp vicinity [redacted] as of 19 February. One PW separated from rest in South Hue 4 February. Remaining 19 PWs proceeding west from [redacted] on foot with four guards. Stated destination permanent camp seven days walk west.

(c) JPRC representation in Danang planned to insert two BRIGHT LIGHT teams to intercept PW party on 26 February. Reaction force, First Air Cavalry, standing by to effect rescue if contact is made. Insertion delayed because of zero zero weather. As of 271600H unable to insert.

1. Recovery Operations, 27 February-5 March 1968*

(1) Operation DUVAL SANDS. Insertion of the BRIGHT LIGHT teams was delayed until 281100H because of bad weather in objective area. Two teams moved into ambush positions. No contact with PW group established and teams extracted 011300H March. This is closing report.

(2) Operation TEXAS CREST (Recovery of Navy OP2E Crew Members in Laos)

(a) On 27 February 1968, nine crewmen bailed out of a Navy OP2E aircraft that was shot down over Laos. Seven were rescued by SAR helicopters. The eighth crewman was located but contact was lost at sunset before rescue was effected. On 28 February, Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) requested JPRC provide BRIGHT LIGHT team for SAR employment.

* (S) CINCPAC Msg, 060247Z Mar 68

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(b) The plan was to insert the team at the location of the known downed crewman on 28 February to conduct a limited area ground search and extract the team the same day. A delay was encountered in obtaining permission from AMEMB Vientiane and permission was finally granted for operations on 29 February.

(c) A team was inserted briefly in the morning of 29 February at a secondary landing zone because of bad weather in the prime search area. They were extracted because of heavy fire in the LZ. The primary area was searched for three hours from the air in the afternoon but the survivor's location could not be pinpointed sufficiently to warrant insertion of the team.

(d) The SAR effort was terminated at 1700H on 29 February because of lack of objective (no contact since 27 February). The BRIGHT LIGHT teams were returned to Danang 292230H.

(e) Special reconnaissance will be flown over the area continuing through 6 March in order to detect evidence of survivors. JPRC is prepared to immediately launch teams to the area if the crewmen are located. Steps are being taken to streamline procedures with Vientiane in order to expedite such emergency assistance to JSARC.

(3) Operation BLACK KNIGHT. This operation is still active and intelligence collection as to [REDACTED] location is proceeding slowly.

J. Recovery Operations, 6-12 March 1968*

Operation TEXAS CREST

- (1) See weekly BRIGHT LIGHT report for 27 February-5 March 1968
- (2) Special reconnaissance was flown over the TEXAS CREST area during the period 2-7 March. No signs of activity associated with possible survivors were observed.
- (3) This is closing report.

* (S) CINCPAC Msg, 122353Z Mar 68

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* (S) CINCPAC Msg, 122353Z Mar 68

k. Recovery Operations, 13-19 March 1968* 1

Operation NINE LIVES. There has been no contact with 2
the B-3 Front Commander by radio or letter. This operation 3
dropped from active list pending further developments. 4

l. Recovery Operations, 20-26 March 1968** 5

(1) ARVN Recovery Operation in Di Linh Area. On 21 March 6
the 23rd ARVN Ranger Bn received a report from one of their 7
agents indicating that two US advisors were being detained 8
vicinity [redacted] The advisors, [redacted] 9
[redacted] from 525th MI GP, were captured 181200H March 10
1968. At present, the 23rd ARVN Ranger Bn is searching for 11
the PW camp. 12

(2) SEAL Operation in Rach Gia Area. On 13 March prior 13
to conducting an operation at [redacted] the SEAL unit at 14
Can Tho requested a photo recce. The photos showed what 15
appeared to be occupied PW cages. Their operation was post- 16
poned and coordination for possible PW recovery operation 17
was accomplished with JPRC. The SEAL unit has tentatively 18
planned a raid in this area on or about 1 April. 19

m. Recovery Operations, 27 March-2 April 1968*** 20

(1) ARVN Recovery Operation in Di Linh Area. The 23rd ARVN 21
Ranger Bn has conducted a thorough search of the area in which 22
[redacted] were reported to be held. 23
They found no evidence of prisoners being held in or near the 24
suspected area. This operation has been terminated. 25

(2) SEAL Operations in Rach Gia Area. No developments as 26
of closing time of this report. 27

(3) Operation MAPLE SUGAR 28

[redacted] 29
[redacted] 30
[redacted] 31
[redacted] 32

* (S) CINCPAC Msg, 192043Z Mar 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 1636/261055Z Mar 68
*** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 1779/021159Z Apr 68

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(b) The VC Security Chief of Phu Long District, who is also deputy camp commander of a detention camp, wants to defect and bring four US PWs with him. ROIC sources are in contact with representatives of the security chief, and have been told that they will be provided the names of the US PWs. The validity of the story will be confirmed if the names of the US PWs are received.

JPRC will provide assistance as required.

(4) Operation DADE BEACH

(a) On 28 March, JPRC received information that an RF soldier had escaped from a PW camp in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. The RF soldier stated that he had seen two US soldiers at the camp and was willing to lead a recovery force to the camp site.

(b) A JPRC representative went to Danang to coordinate a BRIGHT LIGHT operation. SOG forces were alerted, and were moved to an area from which they could be launched into the target area. Planning continued through 29-30 March. The source made an aerial reconnaissance and confirmed the general location of the alleged camp. Insert of a BRIGHT LIGHT team was scheduled for 31 March with appropriate reaction forces standing by.

(c) On 29 March, a US Marine patrol was operating approximately 4-5 kilometers north of the suspected camp site. Enemy activity forced them to deviate from their planned patrol route, and they traversed the area which the BRIGHT LIGHT team was scheduled to search. At the suspected site they found an abandoned bivouac site.

(d) The Marine patrol conducted a thorough search of the area in which the camp was suspected to be, further search was considered unnecessary and this operation was terminated.

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n. Recovery Operations, 3-9 April 1968*

(1) SEAL Operations in Rach Gia Area. The SEAL team was inserted on April 1 but has not yet reached the building and cage shown in pre-strike photograph. The investigation of this area is a secondary mission and will be accomplished when feasible.

(2) Operation MAPLE SUGAR.

[REDACTED]

(3) 9th Division Operation in Long An Province. On 26 March

a source of the 9th MID reported two US PWs in transit vicinity [REDACTED] By 5 April after several transient sightings, it was concluded that sufficient information was available for the 9th Division to conduct sweep vicinity

[REDACTED] Operation was conducted with three companies on 5 April. No indications of US PWs were found in the area.

(4) PRU Operation near Ban Me Thuot. On 6 April JPRC was

informed that a Montagnard had escaped from PW camp vicinity [REDACTED] on 3 April. Held at this camp were three US civilians captured during Tet: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The camp was found but apparently had been abandoned soon after the Montagnard escaped.

a. Recovery Operations 10-16 April 1968**

(1) PRU Operation near Ban Me Thuot (RECAPITULATION)

(a) On 6 April 68 JPRC was informed that a Montagnard had escaped from a VC PW camp in the vicinity of [REDACTED] on 3 April. Held at this camp were three US civilians captured 3:

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 1913/091212Z Apr 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 2034/161209Z Apr 68

during TET: [REDACTED]

(b) The Montagnard source guided the assault. There was a brief contact with a VC element as the force was landed by helicopter. The camp was entered, but found recently abandoned. Pigs and chickens were found caged, and a large rice stock was located. PW buildings were open, and the layout was as described by the source. The force was exfiltrated on the morning of 8 April.

(c) The source provided outstanding service, and was rewarded 18,000 \$VN (\$153 US) as provided for under MACV Reward Program. He plans on returning to the area to search for the new location of the PW camp as soon as he is able (he is currently suffering from Tuberculosis).

(2) Intelligence Collection Effort in the Cambodian Border Area

(a) On 11 April JPRC received a report from the 25th Infantry Division that a VC PW camp containing 24 US PWs was located in the vicinity of [REDACTED] several hundred meters from the Cambodian border. This is a VC stronghold.

(b) In an attempt to fix the location of the camp the following steps are being taken:

1. The source who was allegedly a prisoner at the camp will be flown over the area.
2. Photo reconnaissance will be flown.
3. An indigenous source of the 525th MI Gp was scheduled to be sent into the area on 14 April.

(3) Return of [REDACTED] A Co,
326 Engr Bn, 1st Bde, 101 Abn Div, APO San Francisco, 96347

(a) On the afternoon of 15 April 68 [REDACTED] 1
returned to US control in Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province, RVN. 2

(b) [REDACTED] who had been captured on 2 March 1968 in the 3
vicinity of Phan Thiet, RVN, escaped on 1 April while being 4
moved to an area his guards identified as the Liberation 5
Army Headquarters. In making good his escape [REDACTED] 6
killed two of his five guards. The other three were 7
asleep. [REDACTED] evaded in the area northwest of Bao Loc 8
until the morning of 15 April when he reached Hwy 20 about 9
7 km southwest of Bao Loc. A Vietnamese civilian aided him 10
in reaching Bao Loc and US Advisory Team 38. 11

(c) [REDACTED] claimed not to have seen any other PWs; 12
however, on the afternoon of 27 or 28 March he was told 13
that he was 1000 to 2000 meters from a hospital where two 14
wounded US PWs, a lieutenant and a PFC were being held. 15
(Probably [REDACTED] captured 16
east of Bao Loc on 18 March 1968.) 17

(d) On the morning of 16 April, [REDACTED] was flown on a 18
visual reconnaissance and estimated his position on 27-28 19
March to be vicinity [REDACTED]. An attempt will be made to 20
locate the hospital near this position in which the two 21
wounded US are held. 22

(e) [REDACTED] is being debriefed at the 24th Evac Hospital, 23
Long Binh, RVN. 24

p. Recovery Operations, 17-23 April 1968. 25

(1) Recovery Operation near Sa Dec 26

(a) On 19 April the Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer 27
(NILO) at Sa Dec reported that a Vietnamese had escaped 28
from a PW camp vicinity [REDACTED]. The escapee believed two 29
US PWs were held in a pagoda at that location, and had 30
heard their voices. He had not seen the US captives, but had 31
heard the guards talking about them. 32


(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 2145/231230Z Apr 68

(b) Later on 19 April, a second escapee confirmed the report of the location of the PW camp; however, the second source had no knowledge of US PWs.

(c) As a result of this information, the US advisor at Sa Dec conducted an airmobile assault on the BW camp using Vietnamese Regional Forces. The force was landed at 221530H and extracted at 221830H. The initial report claims eight enemy KIA, three captured, and some munitions captured. No PW prisoners found. No friendly casualties.

(2) SEAL Operations in Rach Gia Area. SEAL operations were terminated in this area without reaching the secondary objective. This objective was to investigate a building found on pre-mission photography which resembled a PW cage. The reconnaissance team was pinned down by heavy fire and forced to exfiltrate on 13 April. Since there is no evidence of PW being held in this area and no indication the buildings seen in the photograph were in use, this target is not considered worth further expenditure of resources.

(3) Operation MAPLE SUGAR.



(4) Return of Further attempts are being made to locate the alleged VC hospital in the Bao Loc area. Aerial infra-red reconnaissance and camouflage detection photography are being flown this week. The general area pointed out by in his visual reconnaissance on 16 April was vicinity A JPRC representative will arrive in Bao Loc 24 April to collate results of reconnaissance and recommend further action.

q. Recovery Operations, 24-30 April 1968*

(1) Operation MAPLE SUGAR.

(2) Return of [redacted] n

(a) Attempts to locate the alleged VC hospital identified by Martin in his debrief have not produced sufficient information to launch a recovery operation. JPRC will continue attempts to localize the facility where [redacted] and [redacted] may be held.

(b) [redacted], the South Vietnamese national who helped return [redacted] to US control, has been paid an 18,000 piaster reward (\$153). Local publicity was given to stimulate reporting on the location of [redacted]

r. Recovery Operations, 1-7 May 1968**

(1) Recovery of [redacted]

(a) On 6 May, [redacted] USA, was recovered during a helicopter gunship raid on a VC base camp area in Kien Giang Province. (VS grid square). [redacted] made a break from his captors as the gunships attacked and was picked up by helicopter.

(b) [redacted] was taken to 24th Med Evac hospital in Long Binh for medical treatment and debriefing. He had been MIA since 20 March 68 when his O-1 birdog was overdue from a recce flight out of Chau Lang vicinity [redacted]. Initial debriefing indicates the O-1 pilot was killed in the crash. He has no knowledge of other US PW.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 2279/301258Z Apr 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 2400/071113Z May 68

(2) Operation DAYTON INDIAN

(a) 11th ACR (BLACK HORSE) received information during week 22 April that three caucasian PWs were held by VC vicinity [redacted] They conducted intensive recce but did not locate PW.

(b) French director of Ong Que rubber plantation confirmed three caucasian PWs alleged held in vicinity and offered to set up negotiations with VC.

(c) JPRC received this information 3 May and authorized 11th ACR to continue to establish negotiations with payment up to \$5000 for each US PW recovered IAW current MACV directive.

(d) On 4 May 11th ACR contacted the plantation director, but he was unable to establish contact with the VC because of the renewed fighting. Further attempts will be made when current operations subside.

a. Recovery Operations, 8-14 May 1968*

(1) Operation DAYTON INDIAN

(a) The 11 ACR S-5 contacted [redacted] the plantation director, on 10 May 1968. He said that the VC told him they had 30 PWs whose nationalities and status are unknown. The enemy wants us to supply names of the PWs they are to return, and have requested one million piasters for each PW released. [redacted] suspects that the VC want to get money for the PWs before the Paris negotiations cause their release.

(b) On 11 May, JPRC asked 11 ACR to continue negotiations with a monetary limit of 600,000 piasters, (\$5000) per PW released, but not to give names to the VC. They were asked to exploit the VC fears that they would get no money after the Paris talks, and try to get the PWs now.

~~(S) COMUSMACV~~ Msg, 2518/141150Z May 68

(c) ARPA was contacted, and asked to modify their word of mouth program for spreading the reward payment rumor. They will not include the possibility that the rewards would be stopped if there is a cease fire.

(2) Operation RAYBURN CANE

(a) On 13 May JPRC received information from CI team Ban Me Thuot that two Montagnards had escaped a VC PW camp at [REDACTED] on 5 May. They confirmed that three US civilians, [REDACTED] were being held in a cave at [REDACTED]. The prisoners had been moved 7 April from the camp at [REDACTED] which was raided by the PRU on 8 April.

(b) A recovery operation using PRU teams has been set up to infiltrate to the cave from a distant landing zone on 14 May. The VN prisoners had occasionally carried food to the cave where the Americans are held, and will accompany the raiding force. There are alleged to be only two guards at the cave.

(c) A JPRC representative was sent to Ban Me Thuot on 14 May to coordinate the operation.

t. Recovery Operations, 15-21 May 1968*

(1) Operation DAYTON INDIAN. No new developments.

(2) Operation RAYBURN CANE

(a) The operation was scheduled to begin on 14 May, but was delayed because of the physical condition of one of the two escapees who was to accompany the recovery force.

(b) During the delay the escapees were interrogated in greater detail on their knowledge of the exact location of the cave in which [REDACTED] were alleged to be held. The escapees admitted that they had never actually seen the cave as they had claimed earlier. They had been told about the cave, but they knew its general location. They were positive that the three civilians were there, and that they could lead a recovery force to the site.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 2663/2111412 May 68

that they could lead a recovery force to the site.

(c) At approximately 191000H May 68, a six man team 1
(4 PRUs, one escapee, and one PF soldier) was inserted at 2
coordinates [REDACTED] Their mission was to infiltrate 3
to the cave, neutralize the guards, and call for helicopters 4
to evacuate themselves and the recovered prisoners to safety. 5
A reaction force was available to assist as needed. 6
All team members were dressed as VC to facilitate their move- 7
ment in the area. It was estimated that the infiltration 8
would take six or seven days. 9

(d) The teams movements were restricted from the outset 10
because of extensive enemy activity in the area. The team 11
made contact with an enemy unit on the night of May 20. Because 12
the team's presence in the area had been compromised, and 13
their movements so restricted, they requested that they be 14
withdrawn. The team was exfiltrated at 210915H May. 15

(e) Alternative approaches to the problem are being 16
examined. 17

u. Recovery Operations 22-28 May 1968 18

(1) Operation DAYTON INDIAN. The 11 AGR contacted [REDACTED] 19
the plantation director, on 24 May. He had not been able to 20
recontact the VC during the past week because of enemy 21
activity. He will continue efforts at negotiations for PW 22
release. 23

(2) Operation RAYBURN CANE. 24

(a) The PRU team inserted at [REDACTED] on 191600H May 25
1968 to infiltrate to the cave in which the civilians 26
[REDACTED] were alleged to be held was 27
exfiltrated on 210915H May because of enemy activity in 28
the area. 29

(b) The team and the ex-PW were extensively debriefed. 30
Intelligence personnel concluded that the three UW PWs had 31
been moved in April from the camp at [REDACTED] Their route 32
of movement was along the stream between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 33
[REDACTED] Additionally, the cave in which the three were supposed to 34
be held was in the vicinity of [REDACTED] rather than at BP 35
[REDACTED] 36

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(c) On 250900H May, two Special Forces (CIDG) recon teams, led by US personnel, were inserted in a landing zone at [REDACTED]. Their mission: reconnoiter the stream from [REDACTED]. One of the teams will recon the cave site at [REDACTED]. A reaction force is available if needed.

(d) Both teams have made frequent sightings of enemy forces. On the afternoon of 28 May, one of the recon teams became heavily engaged with an enemy unit. A platoon-size reaction force is being committed to assist them in breaking contact. The other team continues its mission.

(3) Recovery Operation near My Tho

(a) On 24 May, information was received that an unknown number of US personnel were being detained by a VC unit in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. On 25 May, a VN source reported that he could lead a force to a location at [REDACTED] where several US and VN personnel were being held prisoner.

(b) The 9th Infantry Division conducted a recovery operation in the vicinity of the above coordinates. The VN source accompanied the force. The operation was terminated on the evening of the 25th with negative results.

V. Recovery Operations, 29 May - 4 Jun 1968*

(1) Operation RAYBURN CANE

(a) On 29 May, the reaction force that had been committed to replace one recon team recovered two VN PW on a trail, vicinity [REDACTED]. On 30 May, these individuals led the force to a PW camp at [REDACTED] where two VN PW were recovered and one VC guard was KIA. The force was then led to a deserted PW camp, vicinity

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 2885/041300Z Jun 68

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Appendix F

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 2885/041300Z Jun 68

[redacted] Later in the afternoon while searching the area, two more individuals who were identified as VN PW were recovered and another PW was found hiding in a cave. Finally, on 31 May, three more PW were recovered as the team prepared for extraction from an LZ at [redacted]

The force and PW were extracted on 31 May.

(b) After debriefing at Ban Me Thuot, it was determined that the recovered PW had not seen [redacted] since shortly after the PRU raid on 8 April when the Americans were moved to another camp. All of the PW were employed as farm laborers by the VC and had been held at the camp at [redacted] until they fled during the attack by the reaction force on 30 May. The PW had been afraid to escape because the VC told them they would be killed by the Americans.

(c) On 30 May, the second recon team was exfiltrated after six days on the ground. It was replaced by a platoon-size force accompanied by one of the original ex-PW sources. Shortly after the force left an LZ at [redacted] they recovered a PW who was recognized by the source. These two individuals then led the reaction force to a PW camp, vicinity [redacted] and a cave used as a PW camp at [redacted]. Both were deserted, but the camp had been recently occupied and had three buildings still under construction. The force was extracted on 31 May.

(d) As a result of the operation, 11 PW were recovered, two VC were KIA and one weapon taken. Five of the recovered PW had been village officials. Two of the PW camps at [redacted] and [redacted] were destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

(e) This area remains of intense interest to the JPRC. It is a known VC PW detention area and the VC are unlikely to leave the area since the valley running from

[redacted] to [redacted] is a major source of food and water. Although the American PW were not recovered, it is felt that they are still in the area since at last report, they were in poor physical condition, and the VC will probably keep them near the food and water supply. Efforts will continue to localize PW camps within the area.

(2) Recovery Operation by 173d ABN BDE

(a) On 24 May, JPRC received information that on 19 May, two US negro PW were seen at [redacted]. On 28 May, a company of the 173d ABN BDE conducted an assault into the area. No PW were found, but 11 detainees were taken. One of them stated that one US PW had been there, but had been moved to [redacted] 10 days ago.

(b) On 30 May at 1200H, two companies of the 173d ABN BDE made a combat assault on An Do. No US personnel were found, nor was any evidence located that would verify the reported information.

(c) Although this operation was fruitless, the quick response by the 173d ABN BDE to this perishable information was laudable. Such operations in accordance with recent MACV PW recovery instructions will insure a higher probability of success in future recovery efforts.

(3) Return of [redacted]

(a) [redacted] and [redacted] USMC, were captured by the VC on 301045H May 68 in the vicinity of [redacted]. They were moved to an area in the vicinity of [redacted]. The men escaped at about 010900H June 68 under cover of an ARVN attack, and made their way to the ARVN unit who returned them to US control.

(b) [redacted] were told by the VC that five
other Americans had been captured and were being held
nearby. However, the location of the captured Americans
could not be fixed with enough accuracy to warrant making
a recovery attempt.

(c) Debriefing of [redacted] whose physical
condition is good, continues.

w. Recovery Operations, 5-11 Jun 1968*

(1) Operation DAYTON INDIAN. No new developments. This
operation will be placed in inactive files until the VC
contact the plantation director again.

(2) Operation PREBLE RID E

(a) There have been repeated reports of US PW being
held in several camps along the Song Giang River, west
of Quang Ngai. Up to 18 US may be held between
[redacted] and [redacted]

(b) A JPRC representative is in Danang coordinating
plans for the insertion of recon teams into this area.
These SOG teams will be supported by reaction forces from
the American Division when required. Tentative insertion
date is 13 June.

x. Recovery Operations, 12-18 Jun 1968**

Operation PREBLE RIDGE

(1) Four recon teams were inserted in separate AO vicinity
[redacted] on 15 June. All four
came under enemy attack on 16 June and were extracted.
Friendly 1 WIA, enemy 2 KIA. No evidence of PW camps located.

(2) Since area appears to be enemy base camp, Americal
Division is planning to sweep area. They will have secondary
mission to recover US PW. JPRC representative is participating
in planning for operations

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3021/110818Z Jun 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3147/181303Z Jun 68

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y. Recovery Operations, 18-25 Jun 1968 1

Operation PREBLE RIDGE. The Americal Division is 2
sweeping the area. Thus far, they have experienced light 3
contact with the enemy and have not found any PW camps. 4

z. Recovery Operations, 26 Jul - 2 Jul 1968** 5

Operation PREBLE RIDGE 6

(1) The Americal Division is conducting a battalion- 7
sized operation through the PREBLE RIDGE AO. Known as 8
VANCE CANYON, the operation commenced at the east side of 9
the area on 21 June and will last as long as operations 10
in the area are productive. 11

(2) During the first week's operations, there was 12
light enemy contact. An arms cache was captured at 13
[REDACTED] on 26 June. Total results for the week were: 14
friendly - 5 WIA; enemy - 6 NVA KIA, 46 individual 15
weapons and nine crew-served weapons were captured. No 16
PW camps were located.

~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3276/251305Z Jun 68
(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3408/021333Z Jul 68~~

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Appendix F

aa. Recovery Operations, 3-9 Jul 1968* 1

Operation PREBLE RIDGE. The Bn operation conducted by 2
the American Division in the PREBLE RIDGE AO was terminated 3
this week with no further significant contact. No signs of 4
recent PW activity were found, and this area has been 5
removed from the high probability PW camp areas. 6

bb. Recovery Operations, 10-16 Jul 1968** 7

(1) [REDACTED] Operation. On 9 July an element of the 8
5th Special Forces Group conducted an operation against a PW 9
camp alleged to hold 26 PW including an ARVN officer. The 10
position of the camp [REDACTED] was reported by an alleged 11
escapee on 7 July and was confirmed by a US FAC. The PW 12
camp was found as described; however, it had been abandoned. 13

(2) 25th Division Operation 14

(a) On 9 July, the JPRC received reports concerning 15
an underground bunker at [REDACTED] alleged to hold 16
20-40 US and GVN PW, and coordinated the planning of a 17
recovery operation with the 25th Division. 18

(b) Operation commenced at 161200H July with 4/23D 19
Mech attacking from the road in the vicinity of [REDACTED] 20
[REDACTED] to seize the PW camp. 21

(c) The source who provided the information is 22
accompanying the attacking force. At the time of this 23
report, the force had not located the alleged came site. 24

cc. Recovery Operations, 17-23 Jul 1968*** 25

(1) 25th Division Operation 26

(a) The operation by 4/23D Mech to locate an alleged 27
underground PW bunker was conducted on 16-July in the 28
vicinity of [REDACTED] with negative results. The 29
source accompanied the APCs but was unable to locate the 30
bunker. He stated that he believed the PW camp to be 2 31
km further NE. 32

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3544/091255Z July 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3697/161301Z July 68
*** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 3830/231320Z July 68

(b) Another sweep was conducted on 20 July in the vicinity of [REDACTED] with negative results. The 25th Division is conducting other operations in this AO and will be alert to recover the PW if located.

(2) Operation MILWAUKEE ROAD

(a) On 21 July, the JPRC received a report of two separate sightings of three Caucasian PW in the vicinity of Quan Loi [REDACTED]. A JPRC representative arrived at Quan Loi on 22 July, and it was decided to launch a recovery operation on 23 July using a platoon of PRU and a platoon from SOG assets. The 1st Bde, 1st Inf would provide a company, reaction force, and artillery, and air support.

(b) The operation commenced at 230630H, with two platoons landed by helo at [REDACTED]. A Montagnard source accompanied the force, which proceeded with light enemy contact toward the objective. At 231330H the force located an enemy base camp at [REDACTED] consisting of 14 buildings and 15 to 20 bunkers with blankets, tools and medical supplies. The camp contained no PW and only a two or three-man guard force.

(c) As of the time of this report, preparations are being made to extract the forces.

dd. Recovery Operations, 24-30 Jul 1968*

(1) Operation MILWAUKEE ROAD

(a) The base camp located at [REDACTED] had been abandoned within the hour. The PRU and SOG teams were extracted by 231700H and the base camp was destroyed by artillery fire.

(b) The Montagnard source and guide was debriefed on the evening of 23 July. He was very frightened by the helo ride and shooting, but affirmed that they had reached the base camp where the PW had been sighted five days previously.

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(2) 173d ABN Operation

(a) On 28 July, the JPRC received information that sources of the 173d ABN BDE had reported the presence of four US POW in the Cay Giap Mountains [REDACTED]. The 173d ABN BDE has planned and started an operation to recover the PW.

(b) At 290300H two seven-man long-range patrols (LRP) were inserted by boat at [REDACTED]. The teams are to infiltrate to two camps reported at [REDACTED] respectively. As of the time of this report, the LRP are proceeding normally and have made no contacts.

(c) Artillery, gunships, FAC and a company reaction force are available for support. If the LRP operation fails to locate the PW, it is planned to insert two PRU for additional reconnaissance.

ee. Recovery Operations, 31 Jul - 6 Aug 1968*

(1) 173d ABN BDE Operation

(a) The first LRP completed its mission to investigate alleged PW activity at [REDACTED] on 3 Aug with negative results, and was extracted.

(b) The second LRP located an occupied enemy camp at [REDACTED] on 2 Aug. One VC who awoke and discovered the LRP was silently killed. The team investigated their target at [REDACTED] with negative results. On 3 Aug the team returned to the camp at [REDACTED] finding it just abandoned. A building was found that had been used to house PW. GI socks and a web belt were found indicating presence of US PW. A list of 99 VN PW and other documents were taken.

(c) On 4 Aug a BN cordon and search operation was conducted at Kuan Vinh village with negative results.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV MsR, 4136/061315Z Aug 68

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Appendix 5

(d) Additional agent reports located possible PW activity at [redacted] These sites will be investigated during the next few days. The abandoned PW camp will be placed under surveillance by 7 Aug. A JPRC representative is at Bong Song to assist in planning further recovery operations in this area.

(2) 11th LT INF BDE Operations

(a) JPRC received information on 2 Aug that an agent had reported a PW camp on 31 July alleged to contain 30 US and 25 ARVN PW at [redacted] The camp was reported to have been active about one month, and the source was willing to guide a recovery operation.

(b) The 11th LT INF BDE conducted a company airmobile assault on 4 Aug, landing at [redacted] The source led them down several trails, but became disoriented and lost. The company searched the entire valley to the south without enemy contact, and was extracted at 041600H at BS 5864.

ff. Recovery Operations, 7-13 Aug 1968*

Operation CUSTER LANCE (Formerly 173d ABN BDE Operation)

(1) Company cordon and search operations were conducted on villages at [redacted] on 7 - 11 Aug. No prisoners were found, and detainees questioned provided no new information on PW locations.

(2) Five LRP are engaged in searching for reported PW camps throughout the mountain area. The abandoned PW camp at [redacted] was placed under surveillance on 7 Aug. Two Sandia seismic detection devices were emplaced near the camp on 12 Aug.

(3) The 173d ABN BDE forces were augmented by two BRIGHT LIGHT teams of 12 men each on 9 Aug. One team is attempting a military prisoner snatch in an AO vicinity [redacted] and

(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4303/131226Z Aug 68

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will investigate a cave at [REDACTED] reported to contain
three PW on 9 Aug. The second team is employed with the
Sandia devices to monitor the abandoned PW camp and search
another AO.

(4) Many enemy have been sighted by the recon teams,
and some light contact has been made. Operations are planned
in this area for two more weeks in attempts to locate the
four alleged US PW.

gg. Recovery Operations, 14-20 Aug 1968*

Operation CUSTER LANCE. The two BRIGHT LIGHT teams were
extracted 16 Aug upon completion of their missions and
returned to Danang on 17 Aug. The 173d ABN BDE continues to
monitor the Sandia devices, and to keep the PW camp at
[REDACTED] under surveillance. Operations in and around the
Cay Ciep Mountain area will continue for another week in
attempts to localize any US PW.

hh. Recovery Operations, 21-27 Aug 1968**

Operation CUSTER LANCE. The 173d ABN BDE has thoroughly
searched the area and believes the enemy forces and PW have
moved out. The PW camp located at [REDACTED] was the only
evidence of US PW found. All forces have been removed from
the Cay Ciep Mountain area because of other operational
commitments. However, the Sandia devices near the abandoned
PW camp are being monitored from the air, and a reaction
force is available if the enemy returns.

ii. Recovery Operations 28 Aug - 3 Sep 1968***

Operation CRANBERRY BOG

(1) On 28 Aug, JPRC received a report from Can Tho that
two Vietnamese escaped from a PW camp at [REDACTED] on
27 Aug, and alleged that the camp contained 35 VN prisoners
and eight US PW. The camp was guarded by only eight VC. A
JPRC representative was flown to Can Tho.

~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4476/201304Z Aug 68
(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4635/271158Z A 68
(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4790/031122Z Sep 68~~

~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 4476/201304Z Aug 68~~

(2) A Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) raid was 1
planned for the night of 30-31 Aug. The raiding party con- 2
sisted of one US SEAL PRU Advisor, the two escapees, and 3
ning PRU. Special equipment was provided by JPRC including 4
radios, IR strobe lights, a small life-raft, explosive bolt 5
cutters and starlight scopes. The team was inserted at 6
1800 in an ARVN outpost at [REDACTED] about 3000 meters from 7
the PW camp. At midnight, they began their infiltration to 8
the camp under cover of a US PAC employing the starlight 9
scopes. The raft was used to transport the radios and 10
weapons across the river to the PW camp. 11

(3) At dawn, a reaction force of 60 PRU was airborne in 12
helos near the camp site, and was supported by four gunships. 13
The raiding party attacked the guards and killed two VC 14
while the others ran. The reaction force landed and cordoned 15
off the area. A total of 49 VN prisoners, mostly ARVN and 16
RF-PF, were found shackled and standing in trenches filled 17
with water chest deep. They were liberated, and interro- 18
gated immediately regarding the US PW. There were no 19
friendly casualties. 20

(4) It was determined that the US PW has been removed 21
from the camp on 28 Aug by an estimated enemy Bn, and taken 22
in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed no 23
clue as to the fate of the eight US. Detailed interrogation 24
of the VN prisoners is continuing. The two sources were 25
rewarded by CORDS for their services. 26

jj. Recovery Operations, 4-10 Sep 1968* 27

Operation CRANBERRY BOG 28

(1) Debriefing and colation of information gained in 29
this operation continues. 30

(2) 15 million leaflets in the following mix are to be 31
disseminated into the area bounded by [REDACTED] 32
[REDACTED]; 5 million # 73B reward for return 33

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of captured allied personnel, 4 million weapons reward, 4 million Chieu Hoi, and 2 million safe conduct leaflets.
kk. Recovery Operations, 11-17 Sep 1968*

Operation DOGWOOD KNOT

(1) On 13 Sep, JPRC received information that two US PW were being held at [REDACTED]. They are kept in a hut at night along the RVN side of a stream that is the border between Cambodia and RVN. In daylight hours, they are dispersed in sampans on the river.

(2) Reportedly, one of the VC guards wants to defect with the PW, but is unable to get them away from the village. The source was returned to the area to gain further intelligence.

(3) Planning is underway for a recovery operation in the early morning hours of 19 Sep whether the source returns or not. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A company-sized CIDG unit will be landed immediately by helo to search the huts along the stream. Suitable air assets and reaction forces are available to support the mission.

ll. Recovery Operations, 18-24 Sep 1968**

(1) Operation DOGWOOD KNOT

(a) The operation planned for 19 Sep was canceled because of dated intelligence, inundated landing zones making an airmobile assault marginal, and the likelihood of enemy fire support from and PW removal to the Cambodian side of the stream.

(b) On 21 Sep, new intelligence was received when the agent returned from the village at [REDACTED]. The two US PW have been moved to the vicinity of a Cambodian outpost 1000 meters into Cambodia at [REDACTED].

~~* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5073/171036Z Sep 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5235/241140Z Sep 68~~

(c) The agent has returned to the area and was 1
instructed to try to have the sympathetic guard bring 2
the US PW out for the reward money. The agent is due 3
to report out on 24 Sep. 4

(d) Attempts are being made to confirm the presence 5
and obtain the identity of the two US alleged prisoners. 6
The area is under close surveillance in the event the 7
prisoners are returned to RVN, and plans have been 8
formulated for a recovery operation. Because of the 9
thin intelligence and the 11 Americans still detained in 10
Phnom Penh, no clearance for an operation into Cambodia 11
is sought at this time. 12

(2) Operation AZALEA CREEK 13

(a) A female prisoner escaped from a VC prison camp 14
vicinity [REDACTED] on 17 Sep. The camp was alleged to hold 15
70-100 VN prisoners and two US PW. The source was willing 16
to guide a recovery operation. 17

(b) A JPRE representative was sent to Can Tho, Bac 18
Lieu, and Ca Mau to coordinate the operation. After 19
necessary coordination with SA IV Corps, 21st ARVN Div, 20
SA An Xuyen Province and the Province Chief, an operation 21
was launched at first light 21 Sep. 22

(c) A RF Company with US advisors and command element 23
was landed by helo. Tactical air and naval gunfire 24
support were available but not required. The camp was 25
located, but had been abandoned. Further ground search 26
located 25 Vietnamese prisoners hidden in elephant 27
grass and guarded by one female VC. 28

(d) The guard and three VC suspects were captured, 29
and the prisoners liberated. Debrief of the prisoners 30
reveals that the operation was compromised. The VC 31
removed the prisoners at midnight before the operation 32
in two groups. The second group of about 20 VN PW was 33

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moved toward the U-Minh forest, and was not found. The prisoners had heard of two US PW being kept in the area, but had never seen them. There were no casualties.

(3) Operation CUSTER LANCE. The 173d ABN BDE continues patrol activity in the Bong Son area to investigate spot reports of US PW in the area. The Sandia devices which were planted at the abandoned PW camp at [REDACTED] on 10 Aug are still active and being periodically monitored from the air.

mm. Recovery Operations, 25 Sep - 1 Oct 1968*

Operation SAGINAW LAKE

(1) On 10 Sep, the 11th Armored CAV REG received information that a PW camp was located in an enemy base area vicinity [REDACTED]. Agents were sent to gain confirming information. On 27 Sep, additional information was reported from two different sources, alleging the presence of nine US PW, a hospital, ammo plant and supply area which is heavily defended.

(2) Detailed planning and coordination is underway for a multi-battalion cordon and search operation to recover the PW and destroy the base camp. JPRC is participating in the planning and will provide special teams and equipment to secure the PW if required.

mm. Recovery Operations, 2-8 Oct 1968**

(1) Operation SAGINAW LAKE

(a) Planning for this operation continues. On 2 Oct a JPRC representative visited the 11th Armored CAV REG to assist them in formulating a concept for the operation. The tentative plan envisions a multi-battalion cordon and reaction force to exploit intelligence of the target area obtained by Special Forces or PRU recon teams. A target date for execution of this operation has not been established at this time due to other tactical priority missions.

~~* (S) CO.USMACV Msg, 5395/011214Z Oct 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5532/081118Z Oct 68~~

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** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5532/081118Z Oct 68~~

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(b) Intelligence updating on the target area will continue until forces are available to conduct the operation.

(2) Unilateral Recovery Operations

(a) On 5 Oct, the Vinh Binh PRU conducted a unilateral prisoner recovery operation against a VC camp at [REDACTED]

(b) The camp location was provided by a woman who received a clandestine message from her husband who was being held in the camp. She reported the information to a PRU soldier who passed it to his US advisor.

(c) This operation resulted in the recovery/liberation of 27 VN prisoners. There were no friendly casualties.

(d) Detailed debriefing of the recovered prisoners is being conducted to determine possible knowledge of US PW in the area.

(e) This is the third successful recovery operation conducted in the Delta in little over a month.

oo. Recovery Operations, 9-15 Oct 1968*

(1) Operation SAGINAW LAKE. Planning responsibility has been shifted to CQ 1st INF DIV because of the scale of the required operation. Current concept calls for verification of PW camp positions by PRU recon teams followed immediately by cordon and search operations, extraction of any PW located, and destruction of the enemy base area. This target will not be struck until after 20 Oct due to prior commitments.

(2) Operation SAGE BRUSH

(a) On 15 Oct, JPRC received information that a VC PW camp was located at [REDACTED]. The source, the wife of a VC guard, alleged there were five US and 80 VN PW in the camp guarded by 40 VC. One of the US is reportedly a

(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5681/151312Z Oct 68

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Captain in poor health. The VC guard has agreed to protect the prisoners during a raid in return for a reward and his freedom. His wife must return to the camp on 16 Oct, as she was out on a 48-hour medical pass.

(b) A JPRC representative was flown immediately to Ca Mau where IV Corps representatives were planning for a recovery operation. The concept is not firm at this time, but will involve a PRU raiding force supplemented by other IV Corps assets. This operation will be conducted ASAP.

pp. Recovery Operations, 16-22 Oct 1968*

(1) Operation SAGINAW LAKE

(a) Since 17 Oct, three attempts have been made with PRU recon teams to confirm the location of the PW camps. In one case, the PRU team leader was killed, and the camps have not been confirmed.

(b) Further attempts are being made to insert recon teams in the area. CG 1st DIV is prepared to conduct the operation as soon as verification of the PW location is achieved.

(2) Operation SAGE BRUSH

(a) A recovery operation was conducted on 18 Oct at the alleged PW camp at [REDACTED]. A 120-man PRU force with US leadership searched the area for four hours without locating any PW or enemy activity. A VC village was located 2 km from the site with only women and children present. The village fortifications were destroyed, with no casualties on either side.

(b) Extensive debrief of sources, guides and village residents is being conducted in order to determine the causes and motives for the apparent deception and

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* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5831/221037Z Oct 68

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compromise. Preliminary investigation indicates that 1
a PW camp was widely rumored to be in the area, and 2
the sources and his female relative thought that a 3
large operation might locate and recover the PW and 4
they would get the reward. The elaborate details and 5
notes were fabricated in order to generate a recovery 6
operation. 7

(3) Operation CUSTER LANCE. No activity has taken 8
place in this 173d ABN BDE AO this month, and this operation 9
has terminated. 10

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99. Recovery Operations, 23-29 October 1968 * 1

(1) Operation SAGINAW LAKE 2

(a) The II FFV LRRP Company has been committed to 3
the recon mission for this operation. The operation 4
commenced on Oct with the insertion of four teams for an 5
estimated three day mission. An air cavalry reaction force 6
is available, and up to two battalions can be committed 7
from the 1st Division if recon results warrant exploitation. 8
A JPRC rep has been present at all planning meetings, and 9
the LRRP have been furnished silenced/weapons and chain 10
cutters. 11

(b) Two of the LRRP's made contact with enemy forces 12
of unknown size shortly after insertion and required 13
extraction. The other two teams are still on the ground 14
and are operational. The two extracted teams will be re- 15
inserted today. 16

(2) Operation JUNIPER BERRY 17

(a) On 27 Oct JPRC was advised that a woman had escaped 18
from a PW camp at [REDACTED] on 24 Oct. The camp was 19
alleged to contain 1 U.S., 56 ARVN, and 20 civ prisoners, 20
and to be guarded by 12 V.C. AJPRC rep was flown to Can 21
Tho, and a PRU operation planned for 28 Oct. 22

(b) The escapee, the wife of the Chief of Staff (ARVN) 23
for Ba Xuyen Province, would not accompany the raid. At 24
0800 on 28 Oct a force of 50 PRU was landed on the target 25
without opposition. Some bunkers were located, but it did 26
not appear to be a PW site. The force was moved to [REDACTED] 27
[REDACTED] a more likely looking area, and two VC were detained. 28
The area was searched from the air and ground until 1030 29
when all forces were extracted. A detailed debriefing is 30
underway. 31

~~TOP SECRET~~ (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 5969/291210A Oct 68

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rr. Recovery Operations, 30 October to 5 November 1968 * 1

(1) Operation SAGINAW LAKE 2

(a) Four LRRP teams were maintained on the ground in 3
the AO from 29 Oct through 3 Nov. They thoroughly searched 4
the area finding enemy patrols, fighting positions, and 5
other evidence of enemy occupation but no large camps of 6
facilities. 7

(b) A conventional battalion sweep of the area 8
commenced on 5 Nov and will be terminated on 6 Nov unless 9
results warrant a larger effort. 10

ss. Recovery Operations, 6-12 November 1968 ** 11

(1) Operation SAIGNAW LAKE. A battalion sweep through the 12
AO was completed on 6 Nov. A small abandoned enemy camp was 13
located, but no evidence of a PW camp was found. This operation 14
is terminated. 15

(2) Operation RAYBURN CANE III 16

(a) Further information has been gained from an escapee 17
from the camp complex in eastern Darlac Province. There are 18
three possible camp sites where three U.S. missionaries may 19
be held. An operation has been planned to search for the 20
camp in the vicinity of [REDACTED] 21

(b) A special leaflet has been produced designed to 22
encourage aid to the missionaries. These leaflets are mixed 23
with regular reward and Chieu Hoi leaflets, and are to be 24
dropped in the base area complex on 12 Nov. 25

(c) A special recon team of 15 men will be inserted on 26
16 Nov with a planned search mission of three days. Air 27
support and a company reaction force will be provided by I 28
FFV. URC-64 radios, M-79 pump guns, a silenced M-16 and 29
special signalling equipment were provided through JPRC.* 30

~~* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 33539/0513552 Nov 68~~
~~** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 34898/1213082 Nov 68~~

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tt. Recovery Operations, 13-19 November 1968 *

(1) Operation RAYBURN CANE III.

(a) Additional questioning of source and visual recon flown 15 Nov indicate source escaped from camp at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This is in the immediate area of three PW camps located on Operation RAYBURN CANE II in May 68, indicating that the PW camp complex has been reoccupied.

(b) A special recon team of three U.S. and 12 indigenous members was inserted at [REDACTED] at last light on 17 Nov. They are proceeding toward the objective area with no enemy contact during first 48 hours. The team is prepared to continue until PM 21 Nov and a company reaction force is standing by for insertion if an occupied PW site is located.

uu. Recovery Operations, 20-26 November 1968 **

(1) Operation RAYBURN CANE III.

(a) This operation was terminated 211150 Nov when the recon team was extracted after being compromised and tracked by enemy forces. While making the 201700 Nov radio contact the team had established a small perimeter vic [REDACTED] when two VC scouts walked up on the team and observed them. The two VC scouts turned and ran down the trail before the team could react. Shortly after they were compromised the team heard two shots which are normally used by the VC in that area to sound an alarm.

(b) The team had observed a large VC village approx one one kilometer west of their compromised location and they felt an enemy search force would soon saturate the area. An extraction was requested.

(c) The PAC on station selected an extraction LZ but the team was unable to reach the LZ before dark. They selected a secluded area to await first light and as soon as the morning haze lifted on 21 Nov the team was extracted from [REDACTED] without incident.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 36519/191305Z Nov 68
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 38104/261225Z Nov 68

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(d) A plan is being developed to infiltrate Montagnard scouts into the area to determine if the U.S. prisoners were moved as a result of the recon team being observed. When the PW camp location has been confirmed, a follow-up operation is planned.

(2) Operation NORFOLK TAR.

(a) An NVA rallier who turned himself in to the 1st Cav Div last week has disclosed the location of a PW camp at [REDACTED]. The camp is reported to contain two U.S. and at least eight ARVN prisoners. Polygraph tests indicate the source is probably telling the truth.

(b) Source believes he can guide a recovery to the camp and has volunteered to accompany U.S. forces on this operation.

(c) Co A, 5th Special Forces Group has developed a concept of operation and will execute a recovery attempt as soon as the concept is approved by II FFORCEV. The JPRC will continue to monitor this operation and will provide assistance as required.

v. Recovery Operations, 27 November - 3 December 1968*

(1) Operation NORFOLK TAR.

(a) The operation was approved and supported by II FFV. Co A, 5th SFQ was to conduct the raid on 1 Dec after infiltration of a recon team on the night of 30 Nov. There was a Bn from the 1st Cav Div and one Troop of Air Cav as reaction force.

(b) The recon team was inserted at 2300 on 30 Nov and was accompanied by the Hoi Chanh. After moving toward the objective for two hours, they observed a line of 25 to 30 flashlights moving abreast towards them. Artillery was called in and the lights went out. About 30 minutes after the artillery ceased the lights went on again and continued to

(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 39588/031106Z Dec 68

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close. The recon team returned to the LZ and was extracted, 1
and Spooky (AC-47) was called in on the search party. 2

(a) Because of the compromise and the OB indicating 3
two NVA regiments in the area, the assault was terminated. 4
The source refused to return to the area. Co A, 5th SFG 5
plans to redevelop the target area when enemy action 6
subsides. 7

(2) Operation SAGE BRUSH II. 8

(a) On 18 Oct 68 a PRU force raided an alleged PW camp 9
at [REDACTED] The source for this operation was reporting 10
hearsay evidence of a PW camp in the area, and had not actually 11
seen the camp. The camp was not found on the raid. 12

(b) On 1 Dec an escapee from the same camp was re- 13
covered by the PRU. He has been extensively interrogated 14
and polygraphed. He was in the camp at the time of the 15
October raid, and heard the loudspeaker aircraft which were 16
employed. He estimates the actual camp position about 1500 17
meters from the raided site (about [REDACTED]). This source 18
confirms that there are three U.S. prisoners in the camp. 19

(c) Planning is underway for a second recovery operation 20
in the next 72 hours. A JPRC representative is present, and 21
special equipment will be furnished. 22

(3) Recovery of Bodies from Helo Crash. 23

(a) On 27 Nov a UH-1 from the USAF 20th Helo squadron 24
was shot down in Cambodia at [REDACTED] with 10 persons on 25
board. Five men were rescued alive by another helo from 26
the 20th squadron. The remaining five were believed killed 27
in the fire. 28

(b) On 29 Nov a recovery team was inserted at the site. 29
After checking for booby traps and finding no sight of enemy 30
activity, the team recovered the remains of five persons. The 31
team was extracted without contact. 32

ww. Recovery Operations, 4-10 December 1968 *

(1) Operation SAGE BRUSH II

(a) The raid commenced at noon on 8 Dec with one PRU company and two mobile strike force companies from Co D, 5th SFG inserted by helo on the primary target. vic [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but had been

abandoned at least 24 hours earlier. The camp was exactly as the escapee had described it with the exception of two new structures built since his escape. Twenty pounds of documents and samples of leg stock leg irons and medicines were captured and the camp set on fire. 50 detainees were taken from a nearby VC hamlet for questioning.

(b) At 1400 hours a helo participating in the operation sighted another previously unknown camp and personnel at [REDACTED] and the reserve mobile strike force company was

[REDACTED] and the guards and

approximately 60 Vietnamese prisonere fled. Seven Vietnamese civilian prisoners were recovered. Near the extraction LZ a brief fire fight ensued with 2 VC captured and 4 VC KIA. A total of approximately 37 structures were destroyed in the camps and near by VC hamlets during the operation after which air strikes were called in to complete the destruction of the primary target PW camp, causing one secondary explosion. There were no friendly casualties.

(c) Battlefield interrogation of the 7 prisonere re-covered revealed no knowledge of U.S. prisoners. Further interrogation of these returnees and the 50 detainees is underway, and the documents are being screened by CDEC for any information on U.S. prisoners.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 41173/101251Z Dec 68

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xx. Recovery Operations, 11-17 December 1968 *

(1) Operation ELM STREET

(a) ELM STREET is the code name which has been given to the pending operation being developed by IV Corps Hq and the Ministry of Chieu Hoi in Kien Giang Province.

(b) Information obtained on 16 Dec indicates there are probably six U.S. prisoners being held in the camp instead of the four prisoners previously reported.

(c) The VC platoon leader has been provided with a small camera and a note book with instructions to obtain pictures of and biographical data on the prisoners.

(d) Negotiations will continue in an attempt to effect their release.

(2) Operation SAGE BRUSH II

(a) Information is still filtering out of the area in which this operation was conducted. Local inhabitants have stated that seven VC cadre were killed by the gunships at [REDACTED]. They further stated that the prisoners were moved because of a planned naval operation in the area. They said they had no forewarning of the recovery operation.

(b) Documents captured during this operation consist of notebooks, memoranda, personal letters, interrogation reports and PW rosters as well as rosters of the VC Security Section in Cai Nouc District and other Security Agencies of Ca Mau Province, and VC MR-3. In addition, the PW camp SOP and regulations, interrogation instruction booklets and VC EEI were among the captured documents. Initial readout of these documents reveal there is a complex of six separate camps in the area containing 444 prisoners. A detailed readout of these documents is in progress.

(c) It is believed the prisoners will be moved to a new location as a result of this operation. PRU assets are

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 42682/171450Z Dec 68

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* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 42682/171450Z Dec 68

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attempting to determine where they will be moved in 1
order to conduct another recovery operation. 2

(d) Photographs taken in the PW camp will be for- 3
warded under separate cover. 4

yy. Recovery Operations, 18-24 December 1968 #. . . 5

(1) Operation ELM STREET 6

(a) Authorities of the Gia Dinh Chieu Hoi Center and 7
Mr Anh of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi have presented the KKK 8
terms of rally to President Thieu for consideration by 9
the Government of Vietnam. 10

(b) The KKK are reportedly willing to rally and return 11
the six U.S. PW two days after being informed of the GVN's 12
acceptance of them as Hoi Chan. 13

(c) At the last meeting between Chieu Hoi officials 14
and KKK representatives no mention was made of VC elements 15
being involved in the rally or of enemy held U.S. PW. 16

(2) Operation SEATTLE FAIR 17

(a) A 525 agent from Phan Thiet, who operates in the 18
vicinity of [REDACTED] reported 13 U.S., 16 ROX, 1 Filipino 19
and numerous VN PWs were located in the vicinity of Ong 20
Mountain [REDACTED] The 302 VC Bn is charged with security 21
of the enemy's installations in the area. Allegedly this 22
force was moved out of the area on 20 Dec till afternoon 23
of 22 Dec. NADPhan Thiet decided that they would react 24
to this information on 20 Dec. 25

(b) NAD initiated planning immediately and noticed the 26
JPRC with an intent message on 21 Dec. JPRC reps were 27
dispatched and attended a final mission briefing at 211600H 28
Dec. IFFV designated Task Force South as the Command element. 29
In order to accomplish the mission before the 302 VC Bn 30
returned to the area the action team had to be inserted, 31
fix the target and liberate the PW by 221200H Dec 68. 32

~~(S)~~ CONUSMACV Msg, 44164/241125Z De 68-

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(c) The action team was inserted at last light on 1
on 21 Dec. During the evening and night the team could 2
not find a high speed trail and had not reached their 3
objective by 221200H Dec. At this time the decosopm was 4
was made to abort the mission. . . . 5

(d) The JPRC has requested that an increased intelli- 6
gence collection effort be mounted in this area by both 7
I and IIPFV. When more information becomes available this 8
operation will be reinitiated. 9

(3) Unilateral Operation Conducted by ARVN in An Xuyen Province. 10

On 19 Dec the An XUYEN Province Chief directed a four company 11
unilateral prisoner recovery operation in Cai Nouc District 12
vic [REDACTED] This is in the same general area in which 13
Operation SAGE BRUSH II was conducted but was based on what 14
was thought to be more current intelligence. There was negative 15
enemy contact during instruction and very few people were 16
in the objective area. The reported camp was not found. 17
One VC hospital, completely stocked with medical supplies and 18
equipment was found. One cache consisting of an 82mm mortar 19
and seven rounds of mortar ammunition was also found in the 20
area. There were no friendly casualties. No personnel were 21
recovered. 22

(4) 25th Div Operation. 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, in coordi- 23
nation with a representative from the JPRC, has formulated 24
a tentative plan to conduct this recovery operation as soon 25
as forces are available. The Deputy CG, 25th Div was briefed 26
on the concept on 19 Dec and has approved it. No date has 27
been set for the conduct of this operation. 28

zz. Recovery Operations, 25-31 December 1968 *

(1)



(2) OPERATION ELM STREET. The GVN is considering conditions for the rally of the KKK. However, [redacted] an employee of USAID, is in contact with the KKK concerning the return of the U.S. PW. The JPRC is continuing to monitor these discussions.

(3) RECOVERY OF ARVN PRISONERS IN AN XUYEN PROVINCE. The ARVN 32nd Regiment recovered 83 ARVN PW during a search and clear operation north of CA-MAU in an XUYEN Province vicinity [redacted] on 23 Dec. Although this was not a Recovery Operation, elements of the ARVN 32nd Regiment discovered the PW camp in their AO, surprised the guard forces and released the 83 PW's.

(4) RELEASE OF 3 U.S. PW FROM EASTERN NAM BO. The enemy has stated they released the three men on 22 Dec 68. As yet they have not returned to U.S. CONTROL: Another discussion meeting with the enemy is scheduled for 0101007 Jan 69. The JPRC is continuing to monitor the progress of this release.

(5) 25TH INF DIV OPERATION. Delayed by the enemy threat to TAY NINH CITY.

(6) PRU OPERATIONS

(a) PRU conducted an operation in VINH BINH Province to recover 3 U.S. and 10 VN PW's. Allegedly held in the vicinity of [redacted]. The operation conducted on 27 Dec

(S) CINCPAC Msg, 010304Z Jan 69

resulted in capture of six enemy. Debriefing of the captured VC may reveal the validity of the information.

(b) The Baclieu PRU conducted an unilateral PW recovery operation on 27 December in the vicinity of [REDACTED] This raid resulted in recovery of 20 civilians and three ARVN PW and 23 enemy captured.

(7) F-105 PANDA 01, DOWN IN LAOS.

(a) 25 Dec JSARC reported an F-105, [REDACTED] was down at [REDACTED]. The pilot was observed hanging from his chute in the trees. JOLLY GREEN 17 went in for the pick up and a PJ was lowered to the ground where he was WIA. At this time JG-17 came under attack and was forced out of the area. During the course of his maneuvering the hoist cable was broken, dropping the aircrew member and negating any chance of recovering the PJ. JSARC notified JPRC and requested a bright light be initiated. JSARC also indicated that both men were possible KIA and only an electronic search would continue.

(b) 26 Dec: A1E's received strong beeper signals from the area where the PJ and pilot were lost [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A bright light team was positioned at NKP and placed in a hold status pending further word for JSARC. At 271200H Dec 7th AF determined that a rescue attempt would not be feasible and JSARC notified JPRC to cancel the bright light alert and return the team to its duty station.

(8) [REDACTED] SIGHTING IN LAOS. SAR reported a [REDACTED] sighting in Laos vicinity [REDACTED]. An A-1 SANDY PILOT reported he observed [REDACTED]

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PART VI. JPRC HISTORY, 1969

A. (TS) ORGANIZATION

JPRC Missions/Functions

1. (TS) In June 1969, MACSOG published an Organization and Functions Manual which set forth the mission and functions of the Center. The JPRC is identified within the MACSOG organization as Recovery Studies Group, MACSOG-80, and under JPRC Director is divided into Administrative, Intelligence and Operations Sections.

2. (TS) Tab 8 contains the mission of the Center and the functions of the Director and the Intelligence and Operations Division as prescribed in the manual.

B. (TS) EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E)

1. (TS) Survival Kits

a. The Seventh Air Force, in coordination with the JPRC, took steps, in 1969, to update and incorporate recommended changes in the E&E aerial delivery kits.

b. It was determined that two kits would be pre-positioned at both Danang AFB and Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. (TS) [REDACTED] Debriefing

a. On 31 December 1968, [REDACTED] escaped from the VC after having been a prisoner for five years. The information provided by [REDACTED] was determined to be invaluable in assisting the JPRC to develop guidance and procedures for future recovery operations.**

b. His debriefing contained the following information:

(1) [REDACTED]

* Seventh Air Force Regulation 67-23. 15 July 1969.
** (S) CINCPAC Msg. 091855Z Jan 69.

(2)

[REDACTED]

1

(3)

[REDACTED]

2

(4)

[REDACTED]

3

(5)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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C. (TS) REWARD PROGRAM

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1. (TS) Program Review. In conjunction with JUSPAO and the Psychological Directorate of J-3, COMUSMACV, the JPRC, in June 1969, began a long-range review of the PW psychological operations and reward program for the purpose of making the entire program more effective. Major areas to be reviewed were media, themes, target audience, and locale. It was expected that this review would take several months to accomplish and could produce a more comprehensive program.

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2. (TS) Reward Payments. JPRC records indicate that during the first six months of 1969, the following rewards were paid as part of the reward program.

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a. A Vietnamese farmer received \$400 for recovering the remains of [REDACTED], 1st Cavalry Division, who had been MIA since 1 April 1968.

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b. A Vietnamese farmer was paid \$400 for recovering the remains of [REDACTED], 9th Infantry Division, who had been MIA since 19 February 1968.

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c. A reward payment of \$100 was made to a Vietnamese civilian who located the remains of [REDACTED] US Navy.

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d. [REDACTED] who recovered the bodies of two Air Force officers found at an A-26 crash site were paid \$400.

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D. (TS) OPERATIONS

1. (TS) Field Procedures. In 1969, field force commanders promulgated standardized procedures in order that recovery operations for PWs could be launched with a minimum loss of time. These steps were initiated as the result of the COMUSMACV policy change which encouraged field commanders to be alert to the possibility of taking immediate action to recover PWs when sufficient information was available. Tab 10 is an example of a directive of this type which was published by Headquarters, I Field Force, Vietnam.

2. (TS) MACSOG Support of JPRC. Because of the continuing difficulties encountered in coordinating conventional force operations, MACSOG, in July 1969, tasked each of the three command and control (C&C) Detachments to be prepared to provide, on call, an exploitation force of up to one company of men to conduct PW recovery operations.* The TOR which established this additional support to the JPRC by MACSOG forces is contained in Tab 11.

3. (TS) Chronology of Operations, 1969. Following is a chronology of recovery operations and related activities during the period 1 January 1969 to 2 September 1969 as reported by the JPRC.

a. Operations, 1-7 Jan 1969**

(1) Operation ELM STREET

(a) [REDACTED] a USAID employee, was in contact with the alleged VC camp commander on 3 Jan and the defection of the VC guards with five US PWs was "arranged" for 041430 Jan. According to the information provided by [REDACTED] the PW camp was located in Kien Giang Province, near Ha Tien at [REDACTED] (approximately one kilometer south of the Cambodian border).

* (TS) MACSOG Msg, 310610Z Jul 69.

(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 1336/071121Z Jan 69.

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(b) The VC commander said he would ignite a yellow smoke grenade at 1430 hours to mark his and the PWs location. The C&C helicopter would land at that location, covered by gunships and LOHs, pick up the defectors and the PWs and take them to Ha Tien. . . .

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(c) To avoid an ambush and to provide a force to sweep the area once the pickup had been made, a reaction/recovery force of one CIDG company would be available from the Ha Tien Special Forces camp.

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(d) At 041430 Jan, the recovery helicopter was over the target area but there was no signal from the ground. At 1500 hours, the CIDG company was inserted, the area was sealed off and a thorough search of the area was conducted. The area is flat, relatively open with very little cover or concealment for a camp. The sweep revealed that there was no camp nor people in the target area.

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(e) [REDACTED] and his "assets" could not explain why there was nothing in the area or why the pre-arranged "defection" did not materialize.

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(2) 25th Infantry Division Operations. This operation is being delayed by the enemy threat to Tay Ninh City.

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(3) [REDACTED]

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(a) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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- 3. [REDACTED] 1
- 4. VC indoctrination techniques. 2
- 5. PSYWAR techniques used by the VC and recommendations for countermeasures by US forces. 3
- 6. Escape and evasion techniques. 4
- 7. Confinement procedures. 5
- 8. Camp locations and sketches of the main camp. 6

(b) The initial lesson learned from first debriefing session with Major ROWE indicate the accuracy of PW camp sightings reported in the intelligence collection effort known as Operation BLACK KNIGHT. Casual source and Hoi Chan reports of PW camp sites within the PW installation were very close to locations provided by Major ROWE. 7

(c) The information pertaining to camp locations provided by MSG FITZER who was released in Oct 67 was extremely accurate. 8

(d) The lessons learned from the initial debriefing are being collated by JPRC and forwarded to field units. 9

(4) Release of Three US PWs from Eastern Nam Bo 10

(a) On 1 Jan 69, the VC returned SP4 BRIGHAM, SP4 JONES and PFC SMITH to US control 11

(b) Initial debriefings by 525th MI Group and JPRC representatives disclosed the following: 12

1. During their detention, they observed or heard mentioned 10 other US prisoners. There is some confusion as to the names of these 10 PWs and the 525th MI Group is developing this list.

2. [REDACTED] appeared to be highly confused concerning dates, times and locations. Based on the initial debriefings, it appears they will have only limited knowledge or information that will assist the JPRC.

3. Even though they were detained for a relatively short period of time, they were not as alert or responsive as Major ROWE was during his debriefing.)



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b. Operations, 8-14 Jan 1969*

(1) Attempt to Recover Downed USAF O-1 Pilot in IV CTZ

(a) On 11 Jan 69 at approximately 1630 hours, the JPRC was notified by JSARC that O-1 BIRDDOG was either shot down or crashed in the IV CTZ at [REDACTED]. The crash site was approximately five kilometers NE of Cao Lanh. A JOLLY GREEN which was on the scene, inserted a PJ who reported that the pilot [REDACTED] and a Vietnamese backseat observer were not in the aircraft nor in the immediate area of the crash site. He reported the O-1 was not heavily damaged; there was no apparent battle damage and he did not see any blood in or around the aircraft. A recovery force of one RF/PF company was on the ground to guard the aircraft and to search the area for the missing crew.

(b) The JPRC took immediate action to notify NAVFORV of the situation to alert all Navy vessels in the area of the possibility that the O-1 crew might have been captured, in which case they would probably be moved by sampan. A reward leaflet drop was requested and flown over the search area. The ground search continued until dark.

(c) At approximately 1610 hours 12 Jan 69, LTC LONG, Deputy G-2, IV CTZ, telephoned JPRC and stated that contact had been made through friendly villagers by the captors of [REDACTED] and the ARVN observer and that they were willing to release them for three million piasters each. A representative from JPRC was sent to Cao Lanh to attempt a negotiation for the release. [REDACTED] JPRC, arrived at Cao Lanh at 121815 Jan and coordination was initiated. ARVN agents were sent out to establish contact with the

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* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 2745/141105Z Jan 69.

captors and to arrange details for a meeting. The 44th STZ planned an operation to seal off the area of interest in the event the negotiation failed. At 0900 hours 13 Jan 69, [redacted] and an ARVN interpreter flew to an outpost north of Cao Lanh to attempt to locate the enemy negotiator or a liaison party to establish contact. Upon landing at the outpost, the ARVN company commander of the outpost stated that two of his agents had spotted the body of an American in the vicinity of [redacted] and they were sure that it was [redacted] notified [redacted] PSA, of the situation. One company was inserted into the area and the body was recovered at 131050 Jan. Apparent cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. The ARVN Lt is MIA.

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(2) 25th Infantry Division Operation. The JPRC is dropping efforts to have an operation conducted in the 25th Division AO to recover five US and an unknown number of ARVN PWs reported at [redacted]. The initial intelligence on this target was obtained on 30 Nov, but the 25th Div has not been able to mount an operation due to the enemy threat to Tay Ninh City. Chances for a successful operation at this late date are remote.

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(3) US PW Sighting in III CTZ

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(a) On 9 Jan 69, the JPRC received a report from IFVV rated C-3 with information on a possible sighting of three US PWs in Bo Trenar Hamlet, Phouc Long Province at [redacted]. The source reports there are only six enemy guards with the prisoners.

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(b) The JPRC has recommended to II FFV that a recovery operation be conducted in that area using PRU or Special Forces assets. This target is within five kilometers of the Bu Dop Special Forces camp.

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c. Operations, 15-21 Jan 1969*

(1) Operational Planning for Recovery of US PWs in III CTZ. The JPRC received a message from USAINTC (Port Holabird) re: the debriefing of [redacted] who was released by the VC on 1 Jan 69. [redacted] stated that his first place of confinement was in a cave at the base of either Nui Ba Den or Nui Cau. This was the third unrelated report of a VC PW camp at one of the above locations. As many as five US PWs have been reported in the same general area at [redacted]. On 18 Jan, the JPRC sent a message to II FFV recommending a recovery operation be conducted against this target. Coordination has been effected between JPRC, II FFV and Co. A, 5th SFGA to conduct a recovery operation between the period 25-29 Jan.

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(2) US PW Sighting in III CTZ [redacted] G-2, II FFV reports that these PWs have been moved to an unknown location.

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(3) Movement of US PWs into Cambodia

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(a) Since the escape and recovery of [redacted] the JPRC has received several unconfirmed reports of US PWs being moved into Cambodia.

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(b) It is too early to verify these reports or to conclude that as a result of [redacted] escape, the enemy is attempting to preclude friendly recovery of US prisoners by moving them across the border. However, US field commanders are being alerted to this possibility.

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d. Operations, 22-28 Jan 1969**

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(1) NUI BA DEN Operation

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(1) On 24 Jan 69, the female Hoi Chanh knowledgeable of the PW cave at Nui Ba Den was escorted by JPRC personnel from the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon to Co. A, 5th SFGA in Bien Hoa. She was interrogated

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~~(3) COMUSMACV Msg, 4285/210915Z Jan 69..~~
~~(8) COMUSMACV Msg, 5815/281445Z Jan 9~~

~~COMUSMACV Msg, 4285/210915Z Jan 69..~~

by Co. A personnel and will stay there for several days. Co. A has conducted a visual reconnaissance (VR) with the male Hoi Chanh and plan to conduct a VR with the female Hoi Chanh as soon as possible.

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(b) Also on 24 Jan 69, JPRC personnel accompanied by personnel from Hq, 525th MI Group, visited the 3d Bn (Provisional), 525th MI Group and tasked their assets with the mission of determining if the cave installation in the Nui Ba Den area is still active.

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(2) Prisoner Sightings. Information has been received that on 23 Jan 69, a large group, exact number unknown, of ARVN and two US prisoners were in the vicinity of Tan Thanh(H) [redacted] Tan Hoa(V), Giong Trom(D), Kien Hoa(P). Reports have been received of a VC PW camp in the vicinity of [redacted] but this is the first report of US PWs in the vicinity. On the request of 4th Groups G-2, a JPRC representative departed on 28 Jan 69 to coordinate a rescue operation.

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e. Operations, 29 Jan-4 Feb 1969*

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(1) NUI BA DEN Operation

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(a) The recovery operation against the Nui Ba Den cave installation is planned for 8 Feb 69. It has been reported that there are six US PWs being held in the cave and they are guarded by an estimated force of 50 VC.

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(b) Co. A, 5th SFGA will attack this target with one reinforced mobile Strike Force Co. The 25th Inf Div will provide one battalion as a ready reaction backup force.

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(c) The insertion of the Special Forces recovery force will be preceded by a CS gas strike five minutes prior to target time.

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* (S) COMUSMACV Msg. 7205/041204Z Feb 69.

(d) It is anticipated that the majority of the enemy's early warning posts in the target area will be neutralized shortly before insertion of the recovery force.

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(e) Representatives from the JPRC will accompany the recovery force and the C&G element to assist in any was possible.

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(2) Recovery Operation in KIEN HOA Province. On 30 Jan, word was received from an agent in the vicinity of the reported PW camp [REDACTED] that the US prisoners had been moved to an unknown location. Planning for this operation was stopped pending further information on the new location of the US PWs. Intelligence collection effort on this target will continue.

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f. Operations, 5-11 Feb 1969*

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(1) NUI BA DEN Operation¹

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(a) On 4 Feb 69, Do Van Ba, the male source, was administered a polygraph examination at Co. A, 5th SFG. The test was conducted in the Vietnamese language with the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter. Source was tested to determine whether or not he has knowledge of five US PWs being held by the Viet Cong.

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(b) During the pre-test interview, source was required to cover his entire background, his story about his VC activities, and his story concerning the US PWs. After relating his story twice, he started changing minor details and later started changing major details. He was then interrogated and confessed that he had never been a VC and that he fabricated the entire story of the US PWs. He confessed that he had never seen any PWs and had never been to a cave on Nui Ba Den. He had heard rumors of five US PWs being held on Nui Ba Den and when he was turned over to the 25th Infantry Division, he embellished on the story

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* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 0688/111527Z Feb 69.

to please Americans because of the superior treatment
accorded him. He also stated that no one had directed
him to tell the story to try to lead U. S. troops into
a trap.

(c) The ARVN 81st Ranger Bn, presently operating
on Nui Ba Den, will move to the location of the cave
previously reported by a female Hoi Chanh. The informa-
tion reported by her is seven months old.

(2) Recovery of U.S. Army Air Crewmen from LOH Crash
in Kien Tuong Province

(a) At 051820H Feb, a 9th Aviation Battalion LOH
on a route reconnaissance mission crashed in the VAM CO TAY
River vicinity [redacted] Kien Tuong Province, IV CT2.
Members of the ARVN 216th Regional Force (RF) Company on a
security mission Vicinity [redacted] witnessed the crash
and immediately launched sampans in a rescue attempt.
[redacted] and [redacted] who
were in the rear seats were recovered alive and taken to
the Special Forces camp at Moo Hoa. [redacted]
and [redacted] who were in the front seats could
not be found immediately.

(b) The RF Company continued the search and on 7 Feb
69 recovered the bodies of [redacted] and [redacted]
some distance down stream from the crash site.

(3) Recovery of U S Remains in Vinh Binh Province

(a) On 7 Feb 69, [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] 9th Inf Div, fell into the Rach
Giãu Khau River vicinity [redacted], Vinh Binh Province,
IV CT2.. Attempts to recover the bodies were un-
successful and they were reported missing.

(b) On 9 Feb 69, popular Force soldiers from the
local area recovered the bodies and returned them to US
authorities.

g. Operations, 12-18 Feb 1969*

(1) Chuong Thien Operations. A representative of the JPRC has departed for the IV CTZ to investigate the reported sighting of three US prisoners on a canal at [redacted] and to assist in planning a recovery operation if investigation warrants.

(2) Release of GERMAN NURSE. Information presently available indicates that [redacted] will not be turned over to US or GVN authorities, but rather turned over to a nearby village chief in Kontum Province. Plans are being made to lend appropriate assistance to [redacted]

[redacted]

(3) Identification of Downed-Airmen. Captured enemy newspapers dated 24 and 26 Nov 68 [redacted] revealed that an RF-4C was shot down in Quang Binh Province, NVN at 231317 Local Nov 68, and the pilot captured. This is either [redacted]. Another news item revealed an F-4C shot down in Quang Binh Province at 251230 Local Nov 68 and the pilot captured. This is [redacted]. The enemy further claimed to have shot down an "A-3J" in Nghe An Province at 251030 Local Nov 68. This is believed to be an RA-5C with [redacted] on board. The article claimed capture of the "pilot." The Combined Document Exploitation Center has been requested to provide a full translation of these articles.

h. Operations, 19-25 Feb 1969*

(1) Recovery of Body by VN Fisherman in IV CTZ

(a) At 171330 Feb, [redacted] 1097th Boat Company, 9th Infantry Division fell from an LCM into

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 10257/1814072 Feb 69.
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 11691/2512262 Feb 69.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 11691/2512262 Feb 69.

the Vam Co River. Attempts to recover the body met with negative results.

(b) On 19 Feb the body of [redacted] was recovered vic [redacted] by two VN fishermen. The body was subsequently returned to 9th Div headquarters at Dong Tam.

(c) Reward Payment to the Two Fishermen is being coordinated.

(2) Capture of Four U.S. Aircrewmen Downed in Cambodia

(a) On 12 Feb 1969 a U-1A (OTTER) from the 146th AVN Co was downed in Cambodia by ground fire vic [redacted]. The U-1A carried the following crewmembers:

[redacted]

(b) A FAC in the area reported he saw the crewmen being captured but could not determine if the captors were Cambodian or VC/NVA.

(c) On 18 Feb the French Ambassador in Phnom Penh reported that according to an unidentified source all four crewmen were taken into custody by Cambodians and were being moved to Phnom Penh. According to the report, none of the crewmen were injured.

1. Operations, 26 Feb-4 Mar 1969*

(1) Recovery Operation in IV CTZ

(a) On 1 Mar 69 a Hoi Chanh reported to the US 9th Infantry Division that he could lead recovery forces to a VC PW camp where five U.S. and 30 ARVN prisoners were being held.

(b) On 2 Mar 69 elements of the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, two STRIKE FORCE companies from the 5th SFGA and KIEN PHONG PROVINCE PRUs conducted a recovery operation against this target vic [redacted]. The camp was located but was vacant. During subsequent

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 13474/051237Z Mar 69.

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search of the area contact was made with an estimated
VC company size force. Results: 13 VC KIA; three VC
captured; three suspects detained; two friendly MIA.

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(c) One of the detainees who cooked for the VC
reported she heard the VC say they were building a new
PW camp on "Canal 28." Another recovery operation is
being planned against the second target.

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(2) Information on U.S. PWs Detained in Cambodia. A
Cambodian smuggler from Chau Doc Province has reported to
a 525th MI source that for a price he can provide
biographical data on five U.S. prisoners being detained
by the VC in Cambodia. The 525th M.I. is attempting to
to contact the smuggler to determine what information he
may have

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J. Operations, 5-11 Mar 1969*

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(1) Recovery Operation in III CTZ

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(a) 1st Infantry Division received several reports that
the enemy had a PW camp site vicinity [redacted]. They worked
on developing this information on 4-6 Mar 69.

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(b) Combat response was taken to exploit this in-
formation on 6-8 Mar 69 through use of ambush and re-
connaissance in force. No evidence was found to suggest
that a PW camp was ever located near [redacted]

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(2) [redacted] a German
National captured by the enemy during the 1968 TET offensive
in Kontum City, was returned to Kontum City 9 March 1969.
She was accompanied by several Montagnards from the time of
her release in Kon So Bai, [redacted] until her re-
turn to Kontum City. She saw no US PWs but heard that a US
Negro had been held at one of her camp sites. She stated
she had been indoctrinated and had made releases for radio

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* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 14758/111125Z Mar 69.

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and TV broadcasts. An AMEMB Saigon representative indicates her comments to the press will not favor United States position. He also stated that a Military Intelligence session might prove counterproductive so a request for a formal debriefing was not pursued.

(3) Four US Aircrewmembers Held by Cambodia. A representative from the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh briefed AMEMB Saigon and selected MACV personnel on the status of [REDACTED]. He believes that these men will be released shortly after the Cambodian Government receives President Nixon's message.

K. Operations, 12-18 Mar 1969*

(1) [REDACTED] Sighting. A [REDACTED] was sighted in Laos in the vicinity of [REDACTED] by the AAIRA from Savannakat on 13 Mar 1969. Jprc notified 4802 JLD and JSARC to be alert for the [REDACTED] and to attempt to confirm and make contact with the evader. On 14 March an A1 was directed into the area. The pilot located the [REDACTED] and confirmed that there were several people in the area. On 16 March 4802 JLD identified the evaders as FAR personnel, soldiers and dependents gathered for evacuation.

(2) Possible US Prisoner Sighting by One of Four US Crewmen Released by Cambodia. While [REDACTED] was being led into what appeared to be a VC training camp, approximately 20-27 miles northwest of Go Dau Ha, he observed three persons of large build with sacks over their heads and their hands tied. Because of their size, [REDACTED] thought they might have been US PWs.

L. Operations, 19-25 March 1969**

(1) Unilateral PW Recovery by the Ninth Infantry Division

(a) At 231625H Mar 69 A/3-60th operating near [REDACTED] gained information from their Intelligence Civic Action Patrol that an enemy PW camp was in the vicinity.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg. 16431/181141Z Mar 69.
* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg. 18066/250925Z Mar 69

(b) Ten Vietnamese PWs were recovered from two locations. Included in the released were a GVN District Chief, three ARVN soldiers, and two ARVN Intelligence Agents.

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(2) IV Corps Tactical Zone Activities

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(a) On 19 Mar 69 IV Corps conducted a PW recovery operation vicinity [redacted] using a Navy flotilla of PBRs and LCVPs with a reaction force from the Vinh Binh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU). The camp was located and found empty but showed signs of recent occupancy. The PRU learned 40 PW, including two US, had been evacuated from the camp site earlier that morning.

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(b) At 240200H Mar 69 the enemy attacked and over-ran Mobil Advisory Team 49 vicinity [redacted] wounding and capturing two US advisors. A JPRC representative has been dispatched to coordinate on pending recovery attempt.

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(c) Province officials in Long Xuyen have been contacted by an individual claiming to be a spokesman for a VC who allegedly is a guard for one US and five VN PW's. The VC guard desires to rally and claims he can bring the PW's with him.

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(3) [redacted] Sighting in Laos. A [redacted] November was reported vicinity [redacted] by the 432nd RITS on 19 Mar 69. This [redacted] was confirmed by Misty 41 on 20 Mar 69. JPRC notified 7th AF who responded immediately and dispatched 366th TFW F4's into the area to deliver CTU-1/A survival kits. The kits were delivered on target at [redacted] 1470 three hours after confirmation of the letter. As of this date the kits have not been opened. JPRC has asked the 4802 JLD to consider diverting a team into this area to evaluate the situation and recover kit components.

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(4) Parachute Shelter and Mirror Flashes (C). On 20 Mar 69 a F100 FAC reported seeing a parachute shelter and receiving mirror flashes from vicinity [redacted] in Laos. JPRC asked 4802 JLD to investigate the sighting and requested 7th AF continue to fly VR's in the area. JLD is preparing a team for infiltration and has scheduled to launch the team on 27 Mar 69.

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m. Operations, 26 Mar 1969-1 Apr 69*

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Parachute Shelter and Mirror Flashes. The JLD Team that was to have been launched on 27 Mar to investigate parachute shelter and mirror flashes vicinity [redacted] Gray Charlie one two eight six has been delayed. Rescheduled for 31 Mar. No report at this time.

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n. Operations, 2-8 April 1969**

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(1) Unilateral PW Recovery by 21st ARVN Inf Div. On 3 Apr 69 the 21st ARVN Infantry Division reacted to information gained from two Hoi Chanhs and recovered 33 civilians and two ARVN soldiers from [redacted].

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(2) Parachute Shelter and Mirror Flashes. As of this date the JLD Team has not reported back on the results of the search vicinity [redacted].

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(3) A-26 Crash Site. On 4 Apr 69 a [redacted] team found a crash site, vicinity [redacted] of an A-26 tail number [redacted]. This would be the crash site of [redacted] missing 27 Aug 67. Remains of aircrew will be turned over to USAF for positive identification.

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(4) Unknown A/C Crash Site. On 7 Apr 69 USAF FAC, [redacted] observed A/C crash site vicinity [redacted]. A [redacted] is going to search this area in an attempt to locate the downed A/C.

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(C) COMUSMACV Msg, 19721/011223Z Apr 69.
(B) COMUSMACV Msg, 21144/081140Z Apr 69.

(4) Possible Evader. On 31 Mar 69 12th RIFTS notified JPRC of a sighting of a possible evader vicinity [redacted] 1
 [redacted] As this location is in North Vietnam [redacted] 2
 desired to obtain additional photo coverage before 3
 committing additional assets. Concurrently a contingency 4
 plan was developed by 7th AF and JPRC which called for an 5
 02 FAC to drop a small E&E kit containing two radios, 6
 water, and rations into the evader once the confirming 7
 photography was available. On 7 Apr 69 additional coverage 8
 was obtained and CDR 7th AF directed E&E kit drop. However, 9
 weather was below minimums on 8 Apr 69. 10

o. Operations, 9-15 Apr 1969* 11

(1) Unilateral Recovery Operations by 41st ARVN Ranger Battalion. On Apr 69, the 41st ARVN Rangers operating in 12
 Kien Tuong Province found a PQ camp vicinity [redacted] 13
 and freed 15 VN PW's and detainees. None of those freed 14
 had any knowledge of US PW's. 15
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(2) PW Recovery Operation Conducted by US 9th Infantry Division. Based on information provided by an ARVN escapee, 18
 the 1st Bde, 9th Infantry Division conducted an operation 19
 vicinity [redacted] on 9 Apr 69. The reported PW camp contained 20
 an unknown number of ARVN and U.S. prisoners. The alleged 21
 camp could not be found and no prisoners were recovered. 22
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(3) Sighting of Approximately 80 Former CIDG Soldiers. A 24
 montagnard Hoi Chan was captured by an unidentified Marine 25
 unit O/A 7 Apr. Marine interrogation revealed that the Hoi 26
 Chan knew of approximately 80 former CIDG soldiers being 27
 held at a camp vicinity [redacted] G-2 III MAF reports 28
 that XXIV Corps is planning to conduct an operation to 29
 recover the detained CIDG, target date TBA. 30

(4) Possible Evader North of DMZ. An E&E kit and a 31
 survival radio were dropped into the area [redacted] on 32

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 22695/151100Z Apr 69.

9 Apr 69. No visual or electronic contact has been established with the possible survivor. ARRs search suspended by JSARC at 110830Z Apr 69. If any further leads develop, this mission will be reopened.

(5) Crash of F-4 [redacted]. On 12 Apr 69, JSARC reported that an F-4 [redacted] had crashed at [redacted]. The navigator was picked up at approximately 121140Z Apr 69. One platoon 3d Bn, 503 Abn Inf was inserted 141130H Apr into the area to search for the aircraft commander. Due to the rugged terrain, the ground movement is very slow. One parachute was located by the ground troops, however, a check of the "peg number" revealed that the chute belonged to the navigator who was picked up. Search for the missing crewmember continues.

p. Operations, 16-22 April 1969*

(1) Escape/Recovery of U.S. PW in III CTZ

(a) At 170810H Apr [redacted] 362d Engr Gp, 79th Engr Gp was observed on the ground by an LOH crew at [redacted]. He was picked up and taken to the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div C.P.


(b) [redacted] stated that he had escaped from a VC prison camp vicinity [redacted] approximately 20 days ago. He was taken to 24th Evac Hospital where it was initially determined that he was suffering from malnutrition and dehydration.

(c) He was captured on 10 Feb 68 at [redacted] when the convoy he was in was ambushed by an estimated VC company.

(d) The initial debriefing revealed there were seven other U.S. PWs held in the camp from which he escaped. [redacted] could identify four of the seven prisoners and provided enough information to make a possible identification of one other prisoner. U.S. identified

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 24242/221130Z Apr 69.

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(2) Recovery Operation MONROE BAY in II CTZ

(a) On 3 Apr on C-1 recon aircraft with a two man crew from the 35th TFW, Phan Rang AB, was reported missing in II CTZ.

(b) On 15 Apr JPRC received a report that five or six VC platoons were camped at [redacted] and they had two U.S. prisoners with them who had been shot down vicinity [redacted] on 3 Apr. According to the report the Americans were wounded but still alive.

(c) Reacting to the above information JPRC requested a SOG BRIGHT LIGHT force with airlift and backup force from IPFV.

(d) At 170825 Apr the 25 man Bright Light force was inserted without incident vicinity [redacted]. The team conducted a thorough search of the area with negative enemy contact and negative sightings of enemy activity. After checking the reported enemy campsite and the reported crash site the team was extracted at 181305 Apr and the operation terminated.

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(3) Crash of RF-4C (Sage 13). On 17 Apr the ground search party reported they had reached the crash site and positively identified it as Sage 13, but there was no sign of the missing pilot [redacted]

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(4) Movement of U.S. PW's from Cambodia

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(a) The JPRC has received a report from GVN Military security Service dated 6 Apr 69 indicating the Cambodian Government is exerting pressure on the VC to move all US prisoners now held in Cambodia out of RCG territory. It is reported that some prisoners have already been moved into SVN and the VC have been given until the end of July 1969 to move the remaining PW's.

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(b) On 19 Apr 69 JPRC received an agent report from the 4th Riverine Intel Officer, IV CT2 reporting a dispute between a Cambodian Lieutenant and a VC Bn Commander over US PW's in Cambodia Vicinity [redacted]. The Cambodian officer demanded that the VC turn over all US PWs to Cambodian authorities. During the ensuing argument the VC commander was shot and killed.

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(c) While these two unconfirmed reports do not indicate a trend or RCG position, it could possible cause the VC to move US PW/s back into SVN where recovery operations would be possible.

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(d) The JPRC has alerted IFFV, IIFV and IV CTZ intelligence agencies to monitor any trend that would indicate large scale movement of US PW's from Cambodia into SVN.

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q. Operations, 23-29 April 1969*

(1) PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ

(a) On 25 APR 69 two Hoi Chanh's reported two U.S. PWs were being held by the VC at [REDACTED]. The Hoi Chanh's volunteered to lead PRU forces to the PW camp.

(b) A one hundred man PRU force was inserted 261358 APR 69 at [REDACTED]. Operation concluded at 261710 APR 69 with following results: three VC KIA [REDACTED] four VC captured. The PW camp had been abandoned. Est capacity 300 man. PW camp/base camp [REDACTED] abandoned.

(c) The camps showed signs of being recently occupied and cooking fires were still warm. The buildings were camouflaged and impossible to see from the air. No buildings were damaged or destroyed. This target will be checked again at a later date.

(2) [REDACTED] PW Camp Operation. Planning has been, completed and the JPRC concept approved for an operation to be conducted during the week 12-17 May. Although the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was tasked by IIFV to conduct the operation it appears as though MACSOG assets will be utilized with 1st Cavalry providing the reaction force and the air assets.

(3) CRASH OF RF-4C [REDACTED] The missing pilot [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 16th TAC RECON SQ) has been declared KIA by the 377th CMBT SPT GP, Tan Son Nhut.

(8) COMUSMACVmsg, 25752/2911217 Apr 69.

r. Recovery Operations, 30 Apr-6 May 1969*

(1) Operation Trojan. 1st Cav Div (AM) is continuing to plan a PW reconnaissance recovery operation into the area where [redacted] was imprisoned. The target is in the vicinity [redacted] . . .

(2) Planned PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ, NAVFORV is planning two joint Navy/Mobile Strike Force sweep operations between 5 and 6 May along the Song Bo De river in An Xuyen Province. During the conduct of these operations, this joint force plans to search for two reported PW camp sites at [redacted] and [redacted]. Two US PWs have been reported in this same area.

s. Operations, 7-13 May 1969**

(1) Operation TROJAN. Planning for this operation continued up to the target date of 12 May for commencing the operation. On that date the JPRC received a message from II FFV indicating the 1st NVA Division had moved into the target area thus precluding a recovery attempt at this time. Operation TROJAN has been postponed indefinitely until enemy forces in the target area are such that a reasonable chance of success is assured.

(2) PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ. During the period 5-8 May a joint Navy/Mobile Strike Force sweep operation was conducted along the Song Bo De river in An Xuyen Province. Two reported PW camp locations at [redacted] and [redacted] were searched with negative results. There was no indication camps had ever been located at these coordinates.

(3) PW Sighting in III CTZ (Bien Hoa Province)

(a) On 12 May 69 JPRC received a report that on 10 May three US.S. caucasian prisoners were brought to THAI HUNG VILLAGE [redacted] and displayed for propaganda purposes. The prisoners were then moved to an area vic [redacted].

~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 27147/061015Z May 69.
(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 28674/131150Z May 69.~~

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(b) These PWs are possible the three civilians captured near Long Thanh vicinity [redacted]

(c) JPHC has requested [redacted] further develop the information on this report.

t. Operations, 14-20 May 1969*

(1) Crash Site Investigation Laos. On 16 May report received from 7/13th AF UDORN that some villagers (Presumably refugees) arrived with some pieces of aircraft and equipment. Aircraft identified as C-47. These items included two (02) 38 Cal S/W USAF pistols SN K662356, and an aircraft check list with partial obliterated name on the cover: Letter [redacted] The serial numbers on the weapons correspond to two weapons listed as being aboard CAP-72, an EC 47 reported missing 5 Feb 69. The check list name and service number correspond with those of [redacted] Coordinates of crash site are [redacted]. A [redacted] and report has been received that portions of five bodies from the wreckage along with assorted small arms have been sent to UBON and arrived 1201H 19 May 69. Remains will be sent to TSN Nortuary to attempt positive identification.

(2) Recovery of [redacted]

(a) On 6 May 69, [redacted] was a crewmember of River Assult Craft ATC-152-6. He fell over the side of his boat at 2400 hours, vicinity [redacted] My Tho Anchorage. He reached the North bank in a state of shock and exhaustion and wandered along the bank in a westerly direction for four hours.

(b) At 0500 hours, 7 May 69, [redacted] encountered a sampan whose two occupants were fishing. Neither of the occupants could speak English. They took [redacted] to their home where a Vietnamese woman [redacted] spoke English. She gave [redacted] dry clothes and

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arranged for him to be returned to the PBR base at My
Tho, 0630 hours, 7 May 69.

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u. Operations, 21-27 May 1969*

(1) PW Recovery Operation in III CTZ. On 23 May 1969, the III Corps Mobile Strike Force conducted an operation against the reported position of the Binh Duong provincial committee detention center at [REDACTED]. The detention center was reported to be in two bunkers with 14 ARVN, one Caucasian American and 25 villagers detained by a security platoon of 40 men. The sweep revealed 30-40 bunkers but no signs of a detention center.

(2) PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ. 270630H May 1969, IV Corps conducted an operation in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. Agent source reported 3 U.S. and 30 ARVN PW's at site with 35-50 guards. Operation terminated 271230H May 69 with negative results.

(3) PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ. An agent led operation is planned for afternoon of 27 May 69 in the An Xuyen Sector [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PW camp with two U.S. prisoners (not verified). Agent who will lead the raid reported to be the chief guard in the camp. No further information at this time.

v. Operations, 28 May - 3 June 1969**.


PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ. The operation conducted 27 May 69 in the An Xuyen Sector [REDACTED] was completed with negative results.

w. Operations, 4-10 June 1969***

Recovery Operation in the Kien Hoa Province. On 2 June 1969 the Kien Hoa Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) launched a heliborne operation against a PW camp which a Hoi Chanh, [REDACTED] located in the coastal area Thanh Pho District, Kien Hoa Province. Camp was abandoned, however, seven suspects were detained. Initial interrogation revealed camp had been moved. PRUs were extracted and inserted at the new site with negative results. [REDACTED]

- * (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 271113Z May 69
- ** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 031109Z Jun 69
- *** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 101101Z Jun 69

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and four US advisors had been moved to a new location. The
ARVN 7th Division is preparing to respond to this information.

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x. Operations, 11-17 Jun 1969 * No operations during this period. 1
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y. Operations, 18-24 Jun 1969 ** No operations during this period. 3
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z. Operations, 25 Jun-1 Jul 1969 ***. 5

(1) Plans for PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ. Based on a study compiled by the JPRC of reported PW camps and sightings in the area bounded by coordinates [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the IV CTZ PRU advisor is planning a series of small recovery raids into this predominantly VC controlled area. Results of these raids will be reported as they occur. UP to four U.S. and 50-60 ARVN PWs have been reported in this general area in recent weeks. 6
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(2) Potential Hoi Chanh and 21 US PWs Held in Cambodia A Vietnamese civilian who claims to be a VC liaison agent in the Chau Doc area of IV CTZ has contacted the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon and reported that his brother is a PW camp commander in Cambodia. The agent stated that he and his brother desire to Chieu Hoi with seven (7) security guards and 21 U.S. PWs allegedly being held in the camp. Representatives from JPRC and the Chieu Hoi ministry met with the agent and he claims to be able to provide JPRC with a list of names of the prisoners to include date and place of capture. When and if the agent can provide the information, to establish his credibility, a firm plan will be formulated and a specific date selected for the rally attempt. IV CTZ G-2 advisor, IV CTZ Joint Intelligence Center and the C.O. Co D, 5th SFG were briefed on 26 June on the possible requirement to support a pickup operation. 14
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~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 35770/171057Z Jun 69
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 37103/241123Z Jun 69
*** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 38472/010935Z Jul 69~~

aa. Operations, 2-8 Jul 1969*

(1) Plans for PW Recovery Operation in IV CTV. Planning continues for possible recovery operations in Tan Phu District, Kien Hoa Province. Starting date for the series of raids against reported sites has not yet been assigned.

(2) ARVN Operation, Phong Dinh Province On 5 July 1969 an ARVN element discovered a PW Camp vic [REDACTED] and freed 9 ARVN and 27 civilian detainees. One VC was KIA. G-2 Advisor, IV CTZ has been advised that a source once reported three US PWs in that area, and the former detainees will be debriefed for knowledgeability on this subject.

(3) Potential Hoi Chanh and 21 US PWs Held in Cambodia Tentative plans continue to be formulated regarding the PW Camp commander in Cambodia who desires to rally with seven security guards and 21 US PWs. Difficulties are expected due to the mass return of KKK in the Chau Doc ([REDACTED]) area on 7 Jul 1969. A JRPC representative flew to Chau Doc on 8 July to ascertain if any of the KKK were knowledgeable concerning US PWs.

bb. Operations, 9-15 Jul 1969.**

(1) PW Recovery Operation in IV CTZ. The operation based on intelligence provided by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center and the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, was executed during the period 10-13 July 1969. Nicknamed "Magnolia Chair", the operation involved 25 daytime heli-borne insertions in the area of Thanh Phu District, Kien Hoa Province by the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) and a USN SEAL Team. Five separate PW camps were entered, resulting in five ARVN PWs liberated; five VC KIA; 23 VC KBA; 20 VC captured, 9 VC suspected detained; destroyed 102 sampans, 55 bunkers, nine structures; captured three kilograms of documents; partially destroyed one grenade factory and about 1000 hand grenades; and disposed of two

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 39942/081113Z Jul 69
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 41173/150943Z Jul 69

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82mm mortar rounds. An airstrike at [redacted] produced one large secondary explosion. The five liberated ARVN PWs had not seen or heard of US PWs in the area.

(2) US PW Freed in I CTZ. On 10 July 1969 a Hoi Chanh named [redacted] led a PW recovery operation into a VC hospital vicinity [redacted]. The heliborne assault was executed by a Quang Tin Province Task Force consisting of elements of regional forces, PRU and a recon Co of the 5th ARVN Regt supported by helicopter assets of 101st US Airborne Division. [redacted] led the forces into the hospital area where he had seen a US PW o/a 1 July 1969. The PW, [redacted] was found lying face down outside the hut where [redacted] had reported seeing him. [redacted] had a fresh head wound (not a gun shot wound) and has been in a coma since recovery. The Sector Intelligence Advisor, Quang Tin Province has recommended a reward of 120,000 \$VN for [redacted]. Psychological exploitation of this payment is planned.

(3) Potential Hoi Chanh and 21 US PWs Held in Cambodia Senior Intelligence Advisor, Chau Doc, recently provided information concerning the Phnom Ben Mountain area (VS 9071) where an alleged VC PW camp commander claimed to hold 21 US PWs. According to three separate agencies, this area is under control of strong KKK force which is very hostile toward VC. Further contacts with alleged VC camp commander and cohorts will have secondary mission of possible exposure of primary source.

cc. Operations, 16-22 Jul 1969.* No operations during this period.

dd. Operations, 23-29 Jul 1969.** No operations during this period.

* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 42529/221104Z Jul 69
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 43736/291020Z Jul 69

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ee. Operations, 30 Jul-5 Aug 1969*

Possible Sighting of Five German Nationals. Message received from CG III MAP states that two civil dependents captured by the 37th Ranger Bn gave information which may relate to the five (5) West German nationals (three female, two males) reported missing from West German hospital An Hoa, 27 Apr 69. First source reported two male and three female caucasians vic [REDACTED] on 15 Jun 69; second observation of similar group of five at roadside vicinity [REDACTED] on 25 Jun 69; and third observation 26 Jun vic [REDACTED] walking single file. Second source reported similar group vic [REDACTED] on 15 Jun. All sightings have the five under armed guard and in apparent good health. AMEMB Saigon JPRC liaison officer was briefed and later passed word that no repeat no recovery operation for third country civilian detainees to be conducted without prior approval AMEMB Saigon. This policy guidance passed separately by message to III MAP, and applies also to in-country info addressees.

ff. Operations, 6-12 Aug 1969**

PW Recovery Operation 199th Inf Bde. Agent reported an NVA Detention camp containing 20 PWs two of which were Americans in the [REDACTED]. On 8 and 9 Aug the 199th Inf Bde conducted an operation in the area and discovered an enemy base camp. The area of the camp showed no signs to indicate that PWs were being held there.

gg. Operations, 13-19 Aug 1969.*** No operations during this period.

hh. Operations, 20-26 Aug 1969.**** No operations during this period.

~~* (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 45103/051136Z Aug 69
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 46434/121049Z Aug 69
*** (S) COMUSMACV Msg, 47743/190805Z Aug 69
**** (U) COMUSMACV Msg, 49116/260932Z Aug 69~~

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11. Operations, 27 Aug-2 Sep 1969*

PW Recovery Operation II CTZ. On 24 Aug 69, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 381st Avn Co, Camp Holloway, was reportedly captured by three VC in Kontum. On 27 Aug he met a Montagnard who took him to [REDACTED]. The village called Dak To Dist Hq and a helicopter pickup was accomplished. The possibility of JPRC reward is being held in abeyance until further details are dispatched and investigation terminated.

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~~(S) COMUSMACV Msg, 50358/0210132 Sep 69~~

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
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1. Classification

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Compatriots in the Republic of Vietnam

FROM

For many years the North Vietnamese authorities with the support of international communism have been plotting to dominate South Vietnam by force. The Army and people of South Vietnam, with the help of allies and friends, are fighting to defend their freedom.

Some soldiers of Vietnam's allies have sacrificed their lives in support of the people's struggle against communist totalitarianism. Some allied soldiers are held prisoners illegally by the communist Vietnamese forces. Friends, please help these allied soldiers, rescue them from enemy detention camps. Bring them or give information of their location to a district or provincial chief's office of the RVN, or to an ARVN or US military Post.

BACK

Your action will earn the gratitude of all freedom-loving people. Your action will also be richly rewarded, and your safety will be assured. 1. For rescuing allied personnel and returning them to safe bases you will be rewarded with 600,000\$VN. 2. For giving information enabling ARVN or US forces to free these men from communist detention camps you will be rewarded with 60,000\$VN. 3. For giving exact information of the location of allied prisoners held by the communists you will be rewarded with 18,000\$VN after your information is authenticated.

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JOINT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1. INTRODUCTION: Recent efforts to recover downed aircrewmembers in Laos point out the need for some standardization of procedures among Joint Personnel Recovery Center, U.S. Embassy Vientiane, and [REDACTED]. Although each rescue or recovery effort must be handled as the individual tactical situation requires, certain communications, control and support requirements remain the same.


2. PROCEDURES: In normal circumstances, SAR missions in Laos are accomplished by the air rescue resources of 7th/13th AF based in Thailand and deployed in forward areas of Laos. Coordination for the use of these assets in the case of aircrewmembers downed in Laos is effected between 7th/13th AF headquarters in Udorn and [REDACTED] Vientiane, acting for U.S. Embassy Vientiane. Occasionally, when special circumstances warrant, rescue is effected under [REDACTED] helicopters with air support assets either from Thailand or from Laos. It is only when these several resources are unable to accomplish rescue that the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) is brought into action.

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
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3. TASKS:



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[REDACTED] Experience thus far has shown an almost immediate need for three or four CH3C helicopters and a flight of A1E or A-26 escort aircraft. Such aircraft must be available on an alert basis and backed up with spares. Since operations of this nature inevitably last for several days, it will also be required that 7/13 AF make air support, including close air support, available as requested throughout the operation. Succeeding day's operations will be coordinated with 4802 JLD on a daily basis and resources should be allocated as required from Vietnam based aircraft as well as Thailand based aircraft.



4. Successful rescue or recovery operations are usually contingent upon rapid movement to secure necessary areas. A great deal depends on adequate USAF support and effective

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coordination [REDACTED] Therefore, request
this memorandum be given close attention by all concerned
officers.

Coordination:

U.S. Embassy Vientiane Amb Sullivan

[REDACTED]
JFRC

Hqs 7/13 AF

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2. (TSL) Organization:

a. The JPRC is a major element of MACSOG and the Chief of JPRC reports directly to Chief, SOG.

b. The JPRC is organized into three branches: Intelligence Branch, Operations and Plans Branch, and a Support Branch. The JPRC is currently authorized five officers and three enlisted men. A modified JTD has been submitted based on the past years' experience in operations. The currently authorized JTD and the proposed JTD are shown below:

TITLE	Present JTD			Proposed JTD		
	SVC	GR	NR	SVC	GR	NR
Chief	AF	O6	1	AF	O5	1
[REDACTED]	A	O4	1	A	O4	1
[REDACTED]	N	O4	1	N	O4	1
OPS/Plans O	AF	O4	1	AF	O4	1
Intel O	A	O4	1	A	O3	1
TOTAL OFFICERS:			5			5

TITLE	Present JTD			Proposed JTD		
	SVC	GR	NR	SVC	GR	NR
Opns Sgt	A	E8	1	A	E8	1
Sr eno			0	A	E5	1
[REDACTED]	A	E7	1	A	E6	1
[REDACTED]	A	E7	1	A	E7	1
Yeoman			0	N	E5	1
TOTAL EN:			3			5

The JPRC is presently organized and functions along the lines described above. JPRC is considering recommending that the proposed intelligence officer, O3, be upgraded to O4 in order to have three field grade officers so that at least one will be available to go to the scene of an operation to act as an advisor and coordinator. The Chief and one alternate are SI cleared and their freedom of travel is restricted. It is considered desirable to have a field grade officer as an advisor on an operation.

3. (TSL) Resources Available/used/needed:

a. No forces for recovery are assigned to or under the OPCON of JPRC. However, two reconnaissance teams from those used in SOG cross-border operations are maintained on alert status to provide a ready reaction element.

b. Forces under OPCON of MACSOG are used for operations whenever possible. When larger forces are required or the situation indicates,

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other MACV elements are tasked as appropriate through COC. Primary forces for recovery operations are those assigned to MACV. If additional forces beyond MACV capabilities are required, they may be requested from CINCPAC.

c. For recovery of US personnel in IV CTZ, II FFORCEV is tasked to provide forces since there are no US troop units under control of SA IV CTZ. An OPLAN 10-67 of 31 July 67, delineates tasks and responsibilities of CG II FFORCEV which include provision of up to one infantry battalion and two assault helicopter companies to be provided to OPCON of SA IV CTZ; one infantry company within 12 hours and one battalion within 24 hours.

d. Communications available to JPRC are adequate and include a secure voice telephone circuit between JPRC and the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) at Tan Son Nhut. The many and varied communications channels and points of contact available to MACSOG make SOG an ideal organization to control the JPRC.

e. The current arrangement for providing forces for JPRC operations appears logical and appropriate.

4. (TSL) Planning/Coordination:

a. Recognizing that each operation is unique, planning for a recovery action follows this general pattern:

(1) JPRC receives information or intelligence concerning location of a PW camp or other significant indicator. Information may be received as a spot report from a field unit or as the result of an interrogation of a captured VC or a CHIEU HOI rallier.

(2) An area study is conducted for other information about PWs in the immediate area of the alleged camp.

(3) If the source is available for interrogation, a polygraph is requested. This is coordinated through 525th MI Group.

(4) If necessary, REI are sent through MACV J2 to collection agencies operating in the vicinity of the suspected PW camp.

(5) Photograph and/or IR imagery is requested, normally through 7th AF.

(6) When sufficient information is available to indicate that a PW camp is located in a particular area, JPRC presents this information to MACV COC and recommends that the senior US tactical commander in the area be tasked to evaluate the information to determine if a raid is feasible. If a recovery operation is feasible, the commander in the area is tasked to conduct the recovery operation.

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b. Coordination and liaison is accomplished by JPRC as follows:

(1) Liaison/coordination is maintained with AMEMB, SAIGON. Through these agencies the JPRC is able to maintain the necessary in-country liaison with other agencies such as the National Police, COMUS, and USAID. Points of contact include the Political Office of the AMEMB; FVN, LAOS, and CAMBODIAN Affairs Office, JUSPAC; and the Office of Special Assistant, SOA. No contact is maintained with other country agencies in South Vietnam.

(2) No permanent liaison is maintained with out-of-country agencies; however, frequent contact is made with AMEMB in VIENTIANE and BANGKOK as well as CINCPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, 7AF, and 7th Fleet.

(3) A MACV letter of 14 January 1967, subject: Command Relationships, describes the in-country relationships between SOG and the senior US tactical commanders within the CTZs. As a matter of practice, JPRC keeps COC and key officers in each CTZ informed as possible operations within RVN become apparent. This liaison has served to permit senior US commanders to plan ahead as operations develop and to a large extent avoid sudden and disruptive drawdowns on their combat operations. MACV COC indicates this coordination has improved considerably in the past year.

(4) Areas of operation and agencies with which JPRC coordinates recovery operations are:

(a) South Vietnam: with AMEMB, SAIGON prior to initiation.

(b) LAOS: with AMEMB, SAIGON, and approved AMEMB, VIENTIANE and CINCPAC prior to initiation. If THAILAND based forces are involved, recovery operations will also be coordinated with AMEMB BANGKOK prior to initiation.

(c) North Vietnam and CAMBODIA: with AMEMB SAIGON and approved by CINCPAC prior to initiation. If overflight of LAOS is involved, coordination with AMEMB VIENTIANE is necessary.

(5) JPRC also monitors the Escape and Evasion (E&E) program in Southeast Asia on a careful and continuous basis. JPRC has influenced and made contributions to this program in the following areas:

(a) Monthly code letter. The JPRC is responsible for the selection and publication of the monthly code letter used as a recognition symbol by evading air crewmen without radio communication.

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(b) Survival Kits: Survival kits, capable of being delivered by either high or low performance aircraft, have been prepositioned in five locations in SVN and two locations in THAILAND. These kits contain items that would assist individuals in their evasion efforts. JPRC is responsible for designating the contents of these kits, recommending preposition sites, supervising packaging, and kit replacement, and for delivery of kits to the preposition sites.

(c) 

(d) Reward Leaflet Program: The Reward Leaflet Program is also a JPRC directed activity. Some 41.5 million leaflets have been dropped in RVN and LAOS. Plans are being made to expand this program to include a CAMBODIAN language leaflet. A leaflet program for the SVN/CAMBODIAN border area should commence sometime in February.

5. (ISL) Conduct of Operations/Coordination:

a. As pointed out earlier, operations are normally carried out under the operational control of the senior US tactical commander in the area.

b. Coordination with agencies outside the tactical commander's sphere of influence is accomplished by JPRC. Such coordination may include:

(1) Requesting assets from MACV or CINCPAC that are not available to the local commander, such as naval support, special type weapons, and specially trained personnel.

(2) Coordination with other agencies such as AMEMB SAIGON, or VIENTIANE, JCS and CINCPAC.

(3) Arrangement for evacuation and treatment of returnees. JPRC also coordinates hospitalization, evacuation and debriefing arrangements directly with the component commands.

c. After a raid has been conducted, plans call for evacuation of returnees to a point designated by the component command, where they undergo preparations for evacuation to CONUS. Returnees are debriefed by intelligence personnel from their service. A team, usually consisting of two men, will usually accompany returnees to CONUS. A JPRC representative is present at the initial debriefing to determine returnee knowledge of other PWs.

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a. Throughout the conduct of these operations, JPRC is responsible for keeping higher headquarters informed.

6. (TSL) Results Obtained:

Since activation, the JPRC has been involved in 53 individual operations. These have included six raids against PW camp sites, five reconnaissance patrols against suspected PW camp sites, and four search operations to recover downed pilots. The raids and reconnaissance patrols have recovered no US personnel, but the four search operations resulted in the recovery of the bodies of two pilots and the recovery of five downed airmen. Twenty GVN nationals held prisoner by the VC were recovered during raids against two of the camp sites. On 8 November 1967, JPRC coordinated a rescue effort in LAOS that resulted in the recovery of four US personnel. Six US KIA were also located in the area. These six had previously been listed MIA as a result of the same incident (Missing and Captured Personnel in SEA are at Inclosure 1).

7. (TSL) Losses/Cont:

a. The essential nature of the JPRC operation makes cost a secondary consideration. Actually the cost has been negligible unless the forces used in the several rescue operations are considered. In some instances battalion sized forces with helicopter support were employed with no results. This will undoubtedly happen again in the future because of the nature of the targets.

b. Operational expenses of JPRC less the forces committed have been insignificant. \$253.75 has been paid under the reward program. Small incidental expenses for special items such as bolt cutters, hacksaws, and weapon silencers have been incurred.

8. (TSL) PSYOPS: The JPRC is supported in its reward leaflet program by JUSPAO who designs the leaflets, by MACVDP who is responsible for delivering the leaflets, by 7th PSYOPS Group who prints them, in coordination with 4th PSYOPS Group who is responsible for final packing of leaflets before they are delivered by 7AF. JPRC coordinates its PSYOP program primarily with MACVDP and JUSPAO.

9. (TSL) 

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d. JPRC is in close daily contact with the most important sources of intelligence: MACJ2, the Joint Search and Rescue Center (with whom a secure telephone link has been established), CAS in SAIGON and VIENTIANE, 525th MI Group, Detachment 6, 6499th Special Activity Group, MACV COC, 7AF IACC, 7th Fleet CIC's, and US Embassies in Southeast Asia. Close coordination is maintained with all components of MACV both in gaining information and in keeping the components informed of PH intelligence in their areas.

10. (TSL) Future Plans:



11. (TSL) Discussions:

a. The mission and objectives of JPRC appear to be adequately stated and complete. Terms of reference provided by CINCPAC provide sufficient authority for JPRC to conduct its mission. The priority that

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has been afforded to JPRC efforts, to include the provision of forces i.e., as indicated by operations conducted, been sufficient. Whenever an operation has been indicated the response by all concerned has been rapid and marked by thorough cooperation even to the point of standing down combat operations to permit use of essential resources.

b. The organization of JPRC and its location within MACSOG appears appropriate to the nature of the operations and the availability of communications and liaison facilities afforded. The proposed JTD changes will improve the capability of JPRC to perform its mission.

c. The resources available appear to be adequate in that virtually any resources within MACV can be provided as required and are furnished on the highest priority basis.

d. Planning and coordination procedures appear to have been worked out over the time since formation of JPRC to a point where the operations can be conducted with relative smoothness and a minimum of turbulence in other combat operations. Coordination with MACV COC and the components has reached a point where JPRC keeps all concerned informed of possible pending recovery operations so that preparations can be phased rather than to present a last minute disruption of other activities.

e. Results obtained have been low. However, this is not an indication of weakness in the system. Rather it can be traced primarily to the lack of timely, accurate intelligence due in large part to the precautions taken by the enemy for security of PWs.



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(2) The second area in collection outside of SVN. Here again, the problem appears to be emphasis and motivation. Means to achieve emphasis and motivation among potential collectors in LAOS, CAMBODIA, and RVN need to be found.

(3) Third in this area is the apparent need for an overall coordinated collection plan or program established by MACV J2 which would tie together all possible collectors of PW information, establish appropriate priorities and wide-range effort on this problem.

12. (TSM) Conclusions: The AREG concludes that:

a. JPRC mission and terms of reference are appropriate and adequate.

b. The organization and manning level of JPRC as provided for in the JTD submitted for approval is adequate. Personnel assigned are highly qualified and motivated.

c. Procedures for obtaining resources for recovery operations and for conducting and coordinating operations are adequate.

d. Intelligence received by JPRC has not been adequate for successful recovery operations primarily because collection has not been sufficiently responsive.

e. The key element in recovery operations is timely and reliable intelligence. Further, that the absence of this element is at the heart of our lack of success to date. Analysis of the collection effort reveals three areas in which improvement may be possible.

(1) Emphasis on low-level agent potential to collect information on US PW locations within RVN.

(2) Increased emphasis on collection outside of RVN.

(3) Focusing of the total MACV effort through provision of an overall, coordinated PW information collection program.

13. (TSL) CINCPAC Conclusions/Recommendations:

a. The AREG offers the following in consideration of the CINCPAC Joint Survey Team conclusions:

Conclusion: The new JTD, modified to retain the one O-4 Intelligence Officer space, will be adequate to accomplish the JPRC mission.

COMMENT: Concur.

Conclusion: The terms of reference provide adequate authority for JPRC to perform its functions and discharge its responsibilities.

COMMENT: Concur

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Conclusion: Sufficient communication facilities are available to the JPRC to permit full scope of operations envisioned by the mission.

COMMENT: Concur.

Conclusion: [REDACTED]

COMMENT: All systems with a capability to collect against known potential sources of US PW information are appropriately tasked. No diversion or concentration of any specific system is considered useful. The present effort is productive and rapid (38 significant reports in the period October-December 67). Responsible personnel are alert to the criticality of this problem and accord it all the emphasis possible.

Conclusion: The largest single problem in location and recovery of detained US/FMMAF personnel is the lack of timely and accurate intelligence data.

COMMENT: Concur.

Conclusion: The JPRC is operating in accordance with the terms of reference issued by CINCPAC, as approved by JCS.

COMMENT: Concur.

Conclusion: The present JPRC has very high potential, competent well qualified leadership, and all personnel possess the required skills and are well motivated toward the mission.

COMMENT: Concur.

Conclusion: Escape and Evasion programs conducted by the services in SEASIA are progressing in a satisfactory manner. JPRC is monitoring these programs closely in an attempt to standardize casualty, MIA/detainee reporting procedures.

COMMENT: Concur.

Conclusion: The JPRC post-hostilities plan (now in draft form) is adequate and will fulfill the prisoner debriefing requirements.

COMMENT: Concur.

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b. The ANIG offers the following in consideration of the CINCPAC Joint Survey Team Recommendations:

Recommendation: That the O-4 intelligence officer's position be retained vice the O-3 recommended in the new JTD.

COMMENT: Concur. A field grade officer is required for an advisory and coordination role on a recovery operation. Three officers are needed for necessary flexibility.

Recommendation: [REDACTED]

ment and movement of US/USIAF detainees. To this end, MACSOG should coordinate with 7AF to arrive at a mutual agreement on sorties, data to be collected, areas of interest, etc. If required, a SICR should be issued to obtain this data.

COMMENT: Concur. See comment on conclusion above.

Recommendation: That COMUSMACV design a standard procedure for casualty/MIA/detainee reporting and the maintenance of personal data files (photos, authentication systems, emergency addresses, etc.) for use by all services in SEASIA.

COMMENT: The desirability of such a program should be examined carefully before implementation to be sure that the gains that might accrue are worth the cost of the effort.

Recommendation: That the JPRC continue in its present line of endeavor. It serves an extremely useful purpose in that no other organization or agency provides a central point of contact or focal point for data on MIA/detainees in SEASIA.

COMMENT: Concur. However, the provision of a focal point for information is secondary to its potential as a recovery agency.

Recommendation: That MACSOG explore the feasibility of developing singleton agent assets specially qualified and trained for introduction into NVN for the purpose of penetrating POW camps for intelligence purposes and to persuade selected POW guards to defect with prisoners, or permit clandestine operations within the prison.

COMMENT: Concur.

14. (TSL) AHEG Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. CINCPAC Joint Survey Team recommendations as concurred in by this group be approved (see para 13b above).

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b. Steps be taken to focus ARVN attention on the collecting of information on US PW's; that this collection effort be given priority over all but the most urgent tactical requirements; that US advisors to ARVN intelligence officers at Corps level and below be directed to press this program, and that they be provided the means to induce aggressive agent and agent penetration operations to recover PW's within RVN.

c. A conference be conducted by COMUSMACV involving all potential collectors of US PW information in LAOS, CAMBODIA and RVN to determine improved means and coordination on measures required for developing greater emphasis on this program.

d. MACV J2 prepare an overall, coordinated collection plan or program of overriding priority for PW information.


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
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
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
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
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SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION REQUIREMENT (SIR)

Prisoner of War Data (U)



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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 500-1

23 January 1968
(SOG - OP-80)

ACTIONS TO SUPPORT OP-80 REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To develop responsive procedures for implementing personnel recovery actions.

2. (S) GENERAL:

a. It must be realized that the facts and circumstances associated with each recovery operation may and probably will be different than the previous or next recovery operation. Therefore the instructions in this directive are general in nature and will have to be tailored to each specific recovery operation. It is imperative that all personnel involved in a recovery action be aware of the necessity for an expeditious, well planned response. Advance preparation, insofar as possible, should be taken to preclude time consuming delays at critical times to insure proper coordination and supervision of actions taken.

b. OP-80 will provide command and control for the operation, OP-30 will provide or arrange for required air support, and OP-35 will provide ground forces. Other sections will provide support as required.

3. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES: The following responsibilities are listed to provide all concerned with the tasks each Branch/Section will be expected to execute.

a. OP-80.

(1) Alert OP-30 (Operation and Training Division) and OP-35 (Ground Studies Group) to pending recovery operations as soon as the requirement is known.

(2) Coordinate with OP-30 and OP-35 in formulating the proposed recovery plan.

(3) Provide task force commander for execution of approved recovery plans, and advise OP-30 of additional requirements or changes in plans. Central control point will be established at SOG CCC.

(4) Conduct briefing of approved plan for all task force elements assigned.

(5) Provide guidance to all concerned regarding procedures for processing recovered personnel.

* This directive supersedes MACSOG Directive 500-1, 10 January 1967.

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IMCSO3 DIR 500-1
23 January 1968

(6) Coordinate and establish liaison with U.S. and Allied departments and agencies to insure additional supporting forces are obtained when required.

(7) Insure that appropriate embassies have approved BRIGHT LIGHT team staging through their areas of interest when required, and necessary notification and coordination is accomplished.

(8) Insure that adequate quantities of emergency equipment/supplies rigged for paradrop to personnel to be recovered are prepositioned at designated locations.

b. OP-30:

(1) Provide direction to the appropriate operations sections as to actions to be taken.

(a) Establish liaison with appropriate agencies to insure that correct lines of communications are established for expeditious response to air support requirements. The following procedures pertaining to the Seventh Air Force have been established:

1. Out-of-Country Support:

a. Call 7AF Commander Operations Center (AUTOSEVCCG 3405 or Talk Quick 412) and ask for the Senior Controller. Inform the Senior Controller that a BRIGHT LIGHT requirement follows, outline the situation and inform him when air support is required.


2. In-Country Support: For immediate action requests, call 7AF TACC Command Post (Talk Quick 416) and ask for the Senior Controller. Outline the situation and inform him what air support is required.

(2) Monitor actions taken to insure they are executed properly and expeditiously.

(a) Upon notification that a recovery operation is to be executed, OP-32 will take the following actions:

1. Assign an Air Liaison Officer to OP-30 to monitor, advise, supervise, and respond to air support requirements.

2. Submit air support requests to Seventh Air Force Command Post which may include but are not limited to:

a. Transport (fixed wing/helicopter)

b. Forward Air Control

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- c. CAP
- d. Strike
- e. Command and Control
- f. Resupply

3. Provide transportation for OP-80 task force control party and airlift of OP-35 forces as required.

4. When required, provide a tactical air liaison representative for support to C & C Detachment during the conduct of recovery operations.

c. OP-35:

(1) Train reconnaissance teams and command and control party to qualify for execution of personnel recovery missions.

(2) Upon receipt of order to execute a recovery mission execute the following actions:

(a) Alert C & C Detachment to designate forces to execute the mission.

(b) Insure that the designated forces are equipped with identifying bands and English language cards.

(c) Request that the Intelligence Division provide available maps, order of battle, and current intelligence in mission area.

(d) Provide OP-30 with air support requirements.

(e) If required, request that OP-30 provide a tactical air liaison representative to assist the C & C element.

(f) Designate a mission project officer and advise all concerned.

(g) Request that OP-80 conduct the necessary coordination and arrange necessary clearance for personnel and/or equipment into other countries concerned.

(h) Coordinate with Chief, Communications Branch and insure that required communications equipment accompanies reconnaissance team or will be available at the launch site.

(i) Deploy team as expeditiously as possible.

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d. Intelligence: Provide available maps, order of battle, and current intelligence as requested by OP-30, OP-35, and OP-80. Coordinate requests for aerial reconnaissance.

e. Communications: Provide communications equipment and facilities as requested by OP-30, OP-35, and OP-30.

4. (B) REPORTS: It is the responsibility of the senior OP-80 representative to insure that periodic reports are submitted through available communications channels, to the Chief, SOG. Reporting times or frequency are not specified; however, reports should be submitted on a timely basis to keep all concerned apprised of the current status of operations.

FOR THE CHIEF, SOG:

/s/

IVAN C. ELAND
LTC, USA
Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:

L.S. YOUNG, JR.
CPT, USA
Admin Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

OP-80	(1)
OP-30	(1)
Intel	(1)
OP-32	(1)
OP-33	(1)
OP-34	(1)
OP-35	(1)
Comm	(1)
C&G Det	(1)
SALT	(1)
Admin	(1)

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RECOVERY STUDIES GROUP (MACSOQ-80)

MISSION

1. (S) To act as the staff cognizant agency and joint coordinating authority within MACSOQ for post-search and rescue personnel recovery operations and as such develop requirements for collection of intelligence and other data necessary concerning detained and missing personnel.
2. (S) To assist in providing guidelines for debriefing of recovered personnel.
3. (S) To provide E&E briefing data to component commands and interested agencies.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (S) Advises the Chief on all matters pertaining to the recovery of US and allied personnel.
2. (S) Supervises the operations of the Recovery Studies Division.
3. (S) Develops plans and procedures for search and recovery operations and Escape and Evasion programs within the theater of operations.
4. (S) Acts as coordinator during recovery operations involving air, ground and naval recovery forces.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. (S) Develops requirements for collection of timely and accurate intelligence and other data required for personnel recovery operations.
2. (S) Collates, analyzes, evaluates and maintains intelligence files concerning detained and missing personnel.
3. (S) Develops operational intelligence and prepares studies of areas of interest to the Recovery Studies Division to determine the feasibility of initiating

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personnel recovery operations.

4. (S) Briefs other intelligence agencies on the mission, operations and intelligence requirements of the Recovery Studies Division.

5. (S) Provides DIA with requirements for the collection of intelligence and other data in excess of local capabilities and provides DIA with information developed, relative to captured and missing personnel.

6. (S) Maintains close and continuous liaison with other US intelligence agencies to stimulate the flow of information and intelligence pertaining to captured or missing personnel.

OPERATIONS SECTION

1. (S) Formulates, coordinates and supervises operational procedures and plans for the recovery of captured US or allied personnel.

2. (S) Coordinates and established liaison with US and allied departments and agencies to ensure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve maximum reaction time for launching recovery operations.

3. (S) Acts as coordinator/liaison to US and allied forces conducting recovery operations.

4. (S) Studies and evaluates E&E equipment, survival equipment and related items. In conjunction with air and Naval Forces make recommendations for the procurement and use of new equipment or the modification of existing equipment.

5. (S) Briefs tactical unit Commanders and operations personnel on the mission and operation of the Recovery Studies Division and advises them on the feasibility and techniques of prisoner recovery operations.

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6. (S) Develops and exploits new tactics and techniques applicable to prisoner recovery operations.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

REGULATION
NUMBER 381-3

27 February 1969

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Procedures for Recovery of FVMAF Prisoners of War (POWs)

1. (C) PURPOSE: To standardize procedures in order that recovery operations for FVMAF POWs can be launched with a minimum loss of time.

2. (C) BACKGROUND: Experience gained from conducting POW recovery operations indicates that Viet Cong POW camps are vulnerable to swift, well planned airborne raids wherein complete tactical surprise is achieved. Viet Cong POW camps are generally guarded by a very small force, but achieve their security by virtue of their positioning, usually deep within VC base areas. The VC normally rotate POW camps through pre-selected positions at about thirty-day intervals, or whenever they believe the camp location has been compromised by an escapee, HqI-Chanh or VR flight.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Definitions:

(1) Perishable intelligence is that intelligence which must be reacted to immediately or its value is lost.

(2) Non-perishable intelligence is that type of intelligence to which reaction operations are not inhibited by restrictive time frames.

b. The best intelligence is that intelligence which is derived from someone who has had access to the camp; e.g. escapees, guards or laborers who are willing to lead a reaction force back into the area.

4. (C) 

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Reg No 331-3, HQ I PFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96350, 27 Feb 69 (Cont'd)

e. A comprehensive interrogation/debriefing guide is recommended for use to interrogate HOI CHADHs and POWs and to debrief escapees. Such a guide is attached at inclosure I.

5. (C) GUIDANCE: All substantive intelligence reports of POW camp locations will be reported by Flash message to addresses indicated:

a. COMUSMACV (ATTN: JPRG)

b. CG, I PFORCEV

c. DSA, II CTZ

d. 525th MI Group

e. [REDACTED]

f. If U.S. prisoners are involved, the subject of the message will be "BRIGHT LIGHT". The urgency of expeditiously reporting perishable intelligence, such as information obtained from escapees, cannot be over-emphasized.

g. [REDACTED] USA representatives should be informed immediately to determine whether they have additional information or have assets that can confirm or procure more information.

h. Follow-up action should be initiated immediately to fully develop the SST. Extreme caution must be exercised from the outset to prevent compromising the operation. U. S. unilateral action at this stage is recommended.

i. G2 will notify JPRG, MACV, and arrange for JPRG representation as required.

6. (C) NOFORN OPERATIONS:

a. Based on the intelligence generated, immediate operational planning is initiated unilaterally by the designated tactical commander or Province Senior Advisor, in coordination with U. S. military advisory staffs [REDACTED]. Primary reaction forces to be considered are U. S. troop units or [REDACTED] because of inherent rapid reaction capabilities and their ability to preserve the security of the operation. Camp and Mobile Strike Force units (CSF/MSF) from Company B, 5th Special Forces Group Airborne should also be considered as a ready reaction force.

Internal routing instructions will be included as follows: COMUSMACV for JPRG, MACJ21, MACJ22, CG, I PFORCEV for G2; 525th MI Group for M/CPIB. Note: Recovery proposals should NOT be included in intelligence messages. Messages pertaining to proposed operations should be forwarded to CG, I PFORCEV only.

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Reg No 341-3, HQ IFFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96350 27 Feb 69 (Cont'd)

b. The major tactical unit commanders, or the Province Senior Advisors in the province where U. S. forces are not present will appoint a Task Force and U. S. commander to serve as the overall coordinator and to initiate tactical planning.

c. The recovery task force commander and the air mission commander will conduct a joint aerial reconnaissance of the area to select the landing zone. Extreme caution must be exercised to prevent compromising the operation.

7. (C/NORDAN) I FFORCEV/II CTZ SUBJECT:

a. Upon receipt of substantive intelligence reports of POW camp locations by the O2, I FFORCEV, the major unit commander or Province Senior Advisor will be alerted by HQ, IFFORCEV of an impending operation. A JPRC representative will be requested, through MACV-TOC, to come to Headquarters, IFFORCEV.

b. The I FFORCEV TOC will monitor the operation.

c. An After-Action Report will be prepared by the Task Force Commander upon completion of the operation. (AVPA-GB)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

Arthur B. Busbey Jr.
ARTHUR B. BUSBEY JR.
Colonel, AGG
Adjutant General

JAMES G. KALEGIS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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Terms of Reference for Additional Support of the JPRC (U)

1. (TS) Terms of Reference are established to provide the JPRC with SOG Forces for PW recovery operations.

2. (TS) PURPOSE:

a. Provide the JPRC (Joint Personnel Recovery Center) an increased capability to its theater PW recovery programs.

b. Provide an experienced exploitation force, up to company size, for immediate reaction to perishable intelligence information on PW locations, primarily U.S. PWs.

c. Provide in-country reaction capability in addition to established C&C AOs.

d. To establish a minimum requirement for additional specialized training.

3. (TS) FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

a.

b.

c.

d.

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employed to the maximum degree.

e. MACSOG-35 will identify the force to be employed and the external fire support assets required.

f. MACSOG-32 will identify air asset requirements based on MACSOG-35 force input; lift to launch points will normally be from SOG assets, while raid lift will be provided from field force assets.

g. The C&C Commander will provide an operations officer to JPRC for planning and coordination when an operation is pending.

h. JPRC will designate the TF Commander.

i. Coordination and liaison with external forces will be the responsibility of JPRC.

4. ~~(TS)~~ FORCES: Primary forces for PW recovery operations are one Exploitation Company at each C&C, to be designated by each C&C Commander. This force may be composite and formed from platoons available at any given time. All C&C Exploitation Forces will be trained and prepared to conduct PW recovery missions on call.

a. The PW recovery role will be in addition to other responsibilities.

b. Forces will operate as presently constituted and equipped.

c. PW recovery force assets will be drawn from more than one C&C if the situation dictates.

d. When forces in addition to those under MACSOG operational control are required for PW recovery, supporting forces will be requested from COMUSMACV resources.

5. (U) Command Relationships will remain as currently established.

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6. (U) Areas of operation and appropriate coordinating agencies will be as currently in effect and as additionally detailed above (para 3., Functional Responsibility).

7. (S) MACSOG-35 will prepare implementing instructions immediately upon receipt.

Text copied from MACSOG Ltr, subj: Terms of Reference for Additional Support of the JPRC (U), dtd 25 July 1969, signed by Col S.E. Cavanaugh, USA, Chief SOG

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