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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List

Subject: Draft MACSOG Documentation Study (U)

1. (U) The enclosed draft MACSOG Documentation Study (U), dated 10 July 1970, is being distributed to afford COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the Services, the Joint Staff and DIA an opportunity for informal review and comment prior to final publication and formal review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Central Intelligence Agency will also be afforded an opportunity to comment after informal comments have been received from military agencies and before formal review.

2. (U) This study is to be handled on a CLOSE HOLD basis with access limited to personnel authorized access to MACSOG information.

3. (TS) The purpose of this study is to produce a documentation/data base for future analysis of MACSOG and related programs. Analysis of this documentation/data base would facilitate future Joint Staff planning and would provide a basis for Joint Staff recommendations to improve the military capability to support Unconventional Warfare operations. JCS Point of Contact is Special Operations Division, J-3 (SACSA), OX 55805.

4. (U) The enclosed draft Study includes a Table of Contents ten Appendices (A-J) each bound separately to facilitate handli Appendix B is bound in two parts and twenty-one Annexes (A-U) bound singly or in groups. Appendix C has four Annexes bound singly. Appendix A is a 58-page summary of the entire draft Study.

5. (U) The cut-off date for information in this study was 30 June 1969 and comments should be based accordingly. The documentation/data base for the subsequent period is being compiled by MACV as a separate and continuing action.

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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

CONTENTS

Appendix	Page
A. Summary of MACSOG Documentation Study	A-1
Part I. Introduction	A-1
A. Basic Directive	A-1
B. Background	A-1
C. Approach	A-4
Part II. Summaries of Appendices	
A. Summary of Appendix B: MACSOG and the SID: Inception, Organization, Evolution.	A-6
1. Basic Policy Documents/Decisions Concerning Covert/PM Activities During the Pre-MACSOG Period	A-6
2. Basic Agreements Between DOD and CIA.	A-11
3. DOD Support of CIA (Covert/PM Operations)	A-11
4. DOD Organization for Covert/PM Actions	A-11
5. [redacted]	A-13
6. OPLAN 34A	A-14
7. MACSOG: Inception, Evolution, External Relationships	A-18
a. Activation of MACSOG	A-18
b. Mission and Objectives	A-18
c. MACSOG Organizational Development	A-21
d. [redacted]	A-25
e. Command and Control	A-28
f. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence	A-34
g. Contingency Planning	A-30
h. Personnel and Training	A-40
i. Counterpart Relationships--The Strategic Technical Directorate	A-45
B. Summary of Appendix C: MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam	A-46
C. Summary of Appendix D: Cross-Border Operations in Laos	A-47
D. Summary of Appendix E: Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia	A-49
E. Summary of Appendix F: Joint Personnel Recover, Center (JPRC)	A-51
F. Summary of Appendix : MACSOG Communications	A-53
G. Summary of Appendix H Security, Cover, and Deception	A-55
H. Summary of Appendix I: MACSOG Intelligence	A-56
I. Summary of Appendix J Logistics	A-57

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DOC 1

SECRET

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		Page
Annex B.	Military Assistance Command Studies	B-1
	Observation Group and the Strategic Technical Directorate Inception, Organization, Evolution	
Part I.	General	B-1
Part II.	Covert/Paramilitary Activities	B-3
Part III.	[redacted]	B-57 (b)(1)
Part IV.	OPLAN 34A	B-85
Part V.	MACSOG: Inception, Evolution, External Relationships	B-175
A.	[redacted]	B-175 (b)(1)
B.	[redacted]	B-175 (b)(3)
C.	[redacted]	B-177
D.	[redacted]	B-185
E.	[redacted]	B-227 (b)(1)
F.	[redacted]	B-275 (b)(3)
G.	[redacted]	B-295
H.	Contingency Planning	B-337
I.	Personnel and Training	B-346
J.	Logistics	B-400
K.	Counterpart Relationships - The Strategic Technical Directorate	B-409
Annex A.	List of CAS NVN Operations	B-a-1
Annex B.	Example of CAS Long-Term Team Targetted Against Railroad	B-b-1
Annex C.	Examples of two CAS Maritime Hit-and-Run Operational Plans	B-c-1
Annex D.	Example of CAS PsyOps Plan	B-d-1
Annex E.	CIA Memorandum, Subject: Two Maritime Operations Against North Vietnam, dated 16 January 1964	B-e-1
Annex F.	Operational Plan-CAS Marops-1(Quang Khe)	B-f-1
Annex G.	Operational Plan- CAS Marops-11 (Yen Phy)	B-g-1
Annex H.	Analysis and Recommendations Regarding the Present System of Out-of-Country Operations from South Vietnam	B-h-1
Annex I.	Comments on MACSOG's Mission	B-i-1
Annex J.	Organization & Functions Manual	B-j-1
Annex K.	Comments on MACSOG's Organizational Development	B-k-1
Annex L.	[redacted]	B-l-1 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Annex M.	Comments on Command and Control	B-m-1
Annex N.	Comments on MACSOG's Operations and Intelligence	B-n-1
Annex O.	Documentaries	B-o-1
Annex P.	Comments on Contingency Planning	B-p-1
Annex Q.	Comments on Personnel and Training	B-q-1
Annex R.	Illustrative Indigenous Civilian Personnel Regulations	B-r-1
Annex S.	Comments on Logistics	B-s-1
Annex T.	Counterpart Relationships Strategic Technical Directorate (STD)	B-t-1
Annex U.	Comments on Counterpart Relationships - The STD	B-u-1

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~ TT

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Appendix — Page

C. MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam

Part I. Introduction C-1
- A. Scope C-1
- B. Background C-2

Part II. 34A FOOTBOY (C) Program C-5
- A. General C-5
- B. Rationale for the Program C-8
- C. Policy Evolution C-11
- D. Post-Hostilities Planning C-31

Part III. Resources C-32
- A. Introduction C-32
- B. Organization C-32
- C. Facilities C-33
- D. Contracts C-33

Part IV. Operations Summary C-36
- A. Introduction C-36
- B. Phase I and II C-36
- C. Overall 1964- Operation C-38
- D. 1965 Operations C-44
- E. 1966 Operations C-46
- F. 1967 Operations C-48
- G. 1968 Operations C-50
- H. Other Summaries C-53

Part V. Evaluations C-55
- A. Introduction C-55
- B. Early Evaluations C-55
- C. DIA Evaluations C-60
- D. SACSA Evaluations C-61
- E. MACSOG Evaluations C-65
- F. CINCPAC Evaluations C-65
- G. Chairman Evaluations C-76

Annex A. Psychological Operations

Part I. Background C-a-1
- A. Introduction C-a-1
- B. Policy Guidance C-a-1
  - 1. OPLAN 34A C-a-1
  - 2. Presentation of Program C-a-2
  - 3. Second Presentation C-a-4
  - 4. JCS CPAC Objective C-a-5
  - 5. Brownfield Report C-a-5
  - 6. Mission - 1967 . . . . . C-a-6
  - 7. Bending Halt Limitations C-a-7
- C. Resistance Movement C-a-7
  - 1. Tempo and Scope Proposals - 1965 . . C-a-7
  - 2. Front Organization Proposal - 1966 . C-a-9
  - 3. Final Proposal for Resistance Group - 1967 . . . . . C-a-13
- D. Sacred Sword Patriots League (SSPL) . . C-a-14
  - 1. History and Philosophy C-a-14
  - 2. Key Personnel C-a-15
  - 3. SSPL Proposals C-a-16
  - 4. Summary C-a-21

Part II. Resources
- A. Organization and Facilities C-a-21
  - 1. Early Organization C-a-21
  - 2. Later Period Locations C-a-22
  - 3. Present Organization C-a-23
  - 4. Command and Control C-a-24
  - 5. Facilities C-a-24

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Appendix C (Cont)
Annex A, Part II (Cont)

	Page
B. Personnel/Training	C-a-42
1. Headquarters, Radio and Leaflet Personnel - 1964	C-a-42
2. Recent Training/Personnel	C-a-42
3. PARADISE ISLAND Personnel	C-a-50
Part III. Operations	
A. General	C-a-54
B. Early Operations and Problems	C-a-54
1. R and A Section	C-a-54
2. Radio Operations	C-a-55
3. Early Leaflet and Letter Operation	C-a-57
C. Later Operations 1965-1967	C-a-59
1. General	C-a-59
2. Concepts of Operations	C-a-59
3. White Radio 1965-1967	C-a-63
4. Black Radio 1965-1967	C-a-65
5. Leaflet and Mail Operations 1965-1967	C-a-68
D. PARADISE ISLAND Operations	C-a-72
1. General History	C-a-72
2. Operations	C-a-73
3. Special Operations	C-a-74
4. Defection Operations	C-a-75
5. Deception Methods at PARADISE	C-a-77
6. Interrogation Methods	C-a-77
7. Indoctrination	C-a-78
E. 1968-69 Operations	C-a-81
1. Printed Media	C-a-81
2. VOF	C-a-81
3. Black Radio	C-a-81
4. Black Letter Operations	C-a-86
5. Other Operations and Proposals	C-a-86
F. POLE BEAN	C-a-91
1. General	C-a-91
2. Background	C-a-91
3. Policy	C-a-91
4. Psychological Operations in Support of POLE BEAN	C-a-93
5. Operations	C-a-94
G. [redacted]	C-a-95
	C-a-95
	C-a-96
3. Printed Media	C-a-96
Part IV. Reaction and Evaluation	
A. General	C-a-97
B. Reactions	C-a-97
1. VOF/BBC Listeners	C-a-97
2. Request for Reaction Information	C-a-98
3. SACSA Memo	C-a-99
4. Recent Report	C-a-102
C. Evaluations	C-a-112
1. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV AD HOC Reports	C-a-112
2. Burroughs Report	C-a-119
3. PARADISE ISLAND Evaluation	C-a-125
4. SACSA Evaluation	C-a-129
5. Recent SACSA Evaluation	C-a-133
Annex B. Airborne Operations	
Part I. Background	C-b-1
A. Introduction	C-b-1
B. Initial Policy	C-b-1
1. [redacted]	C-b-1
2. Mission	C-b-1
1. [redacted]	C-b-1

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Appendix C (Cont)
Annex B, Part I (Cont)

	Page
C. Evolution of Mission and Objectives	C-b-2
1. General	C-b-2
2. 1965 Developments	C-b-2
3. 1966 Policy	C-b-3
4. 1967 Developments	C-b-5
5. 1968 Mission and Restrictions	C-b-7
Part II. Resources	C-b-9
A. General	C-b-9
B. Organization	C-b-9
1. Diagram	C-b-9
2. Counterpart Organization	C-b-10
3. Function of the Organization	C-b-10
4. Reorganization - 1968	C-b-10
C. Resources Available	C-b-11
1. Personnel	C-b-11
2. Physical	C-b-11
3. Major Items of Equipment	C-b-12
4. Vehicles	C-b-12
D. Agent Clearances	C-b-12
E. Agent Pay and Allowances	C-b-12
1. General	C-b-12
2. Method of Payment	C-b-12
3. Pay Scales	C-b-13
F. Training	C-b-14
1. General	C-b-14
2. Recruiting	C-b-14
3. Training - Camp Long Thanh	C-b-17a
4. STRATA Team Training - 1968	C-b-33
G. Communications	C-b-33
1. [redacted]	C-b-33
2. Resupply Communications	C-b-34
Part III. Operations	C-b-35
A. Introduction	C-b-35
B. Background	C-b-35
C. General Conduct of Operations	C-b-35
1. Mission	C-b-37
2. Exfiltration	C-b-37
3. Resupply	C-b-37
D. Long-Term Agent Team Operations	C-b-38
1. Operations - 1964	C-b-38
2. Operations 1965 - 1967	C-b-41
3. Operations 1968 - 1969	C-b-49
4. Long-Term Agent Team Chronology	C-b-52
E. STRATA Team Operations	C-b-62
1. General Conduct of Operations	C-b-62
2. Mission Narratives 1967 - 1968	C-b-67
3. Mission Summary	C-b-76
4. STRATA Targets	C-b-76
5. Target Locations	C-b-76
F. Singleton Operations	C-b-83
1. Policy	C-b-83
2. GOLDFISH and PERGOLA	C-b-83
3. Gray Singleton Operations	C-b-83
G. Diversionary Operations	C-b-85
1. Project OODLES (C)	C-b-85
2 Project URGENCY (C)	C-b-85
3. Project BORDER (C)	C-b-[illegible]
H. EARTH ANGEL	C-b-[illegible]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Appendix C (Cont)

Annex B (Cont)

	Page
Part IV. Problem Area	C-b-90
A. Problem Areas - Airborne Operations	C-b-92
B. Chronology	C-b-93
Part V. Evaluation	C-b-96
A. SACSA Evaluation - 1964	C-b-96
B. COMUSMACV Evaluation - 1966	C-b-97
C. Brownfield Report 1967 - 1968	C-b-101
D. Security Reviews	C-b-103
E. CINCPAC STRATA Team Evaluation	C-b-106
Annex C. Air Operations	C-c-1
Part I. Background	C-c-1
A. Introduction	C-c-1
B. Mission and Objectives	C-c-1
Part II. Resources	C-c-10
A. Organization and Procedures	C-c-10
Part III. Operations	C-c-42
A. General	C-c-42
B. Air Operations - 1964	C-c-46
C. 1965 Operations	C-c-47
D. 1966 Operations	C-c-53
E. Operations - 1967	C-c-61
F. Air Operations - 1968-1969	C-c-67
G. Cover Stories	C-c-68
Part V. Evaluation	C-c-89
A. General	C-c-89
B. Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report	C-c-89
C. Cover-Story Study	C-c-91
Annex D. Maritime Operations	C-d-1
Part I. General	C-d-1
A. [redacted]	C-d-1
B. Implementation of OPLAN-34A	C-d-2
C. MAROPS - Tasks	C-d-6
D. Command and Control	C-d-7
E. Concept of Operations	C-d-13
Part II. Resources	C-d-20
A. Organization	C-d-20
B. Facilities	C-d-28
C. Training	C-d-32
Part III. Operations	C-d-35
A. Operations - 1964	C-d-35
B. Operations - 1965	C-d-38
C. Operations - 1966	C-d-43
D. Operations - 1967	C-d-47
E. Operations - 1968	C-d-52
F. Operations - 1969	C-d-59
G. Enemy Coastal Defense	C-d-64
Part IV. Evaluations	C-d-68
A. General	C-d-68
B. Ad Hoc Evaluation Group	C-d-68
D. Cross-Border Operations in Laos	D-1
Part I. Introduction	D-1
A. Background	D-1
B. Scope	D-1
Part II Initial Planning and Operations	D-2
A. [redacted]	D-2
B. Transfer of Responsibility	D-3
C. Removal of Restrictions	D-6
D. Operation LEAN [illegible]	D-7
E. SALTING BRASS Planning	D-10
F. CO/US Relationships	D-13
G. Training	D-14
H. Facilities	D-14
I. Operations	D-15

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

F. CO/US Relationships D-13

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Appendix D (Cont)

	Page
Part III. 1966 History	D-17
A. Mission and Objectives	D-17
B. Resources	D-25
C. Operational Procedures	D-23
D. Operations	D-25
Part IV. 1967 History	D-28
A. Mission and Objectives	D-28
B. Resources	D-32
C. Operations	D-32
D. PRAIRIE FIRE Evaluation	D-33
Part V. 1968 History	D-47
A. Mission and Objectives	D-47
B. Resources	D-50
C. Operations	D-52
D. Evaluation	D-53
Part VI. 1969 History	D-54
A. Mission and Objectives	D-54
B. Resources	D-54
C. Operations	D-57
E. Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia	E-1
Part I. Introduction	E-1
A. Background	E-1
B. Scope	E-1
Part II. Initial Planning	E-2
A. COMUSMACV Operational Proposals	E-2
B. JCS Planning	E-4
Part III. 1967 History	E-8
A. Mission and Objectives	E-8
B. Resources	E-14
C. Operations	E-15
D. DANIEL BOONE Evaluation	E-15
Part IV. 1968 History	E-20
A. Mission and Objectives	E-20
B. Resources	E-23
C. Operations	E-24
Part V. 1969 History	E-28
A. Nickname Change	E-28
B. Mission and Objectives	E-28
C. Resources	E-30
D. Operations	E-30
F. Joint Personnel Recovery Center	F-1
Part I. Introduction	F-1
Part II. Inception of JPRC	F-2
A. Committee on Prisoners and Detainees	F-2
B. Joint Recovery Center	F-2
C. Joint Personnel Recovery Center	F-3
D. JPRC Activation	F-8
Part III. JPRC History - 1966	F-10
A. JPRC Activation	F-10
B. Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities	F-11
C. Collection of Intelligence	F-12
D. Evasion and Escape Procedures	F-14
E. Safe Area Activation Teams	F-17
E. Political Restrictions and Recovery Operations	F-18
F. Operations 1966	F-20
Part IV. JPRC History - 1967	F-41
A. JPRC Organization	F-41
B. Evasion and Escape Program	F-41
C. Safe area program	F-42
D. Fulton Recovery System	F-42
E. Recovery Procedures in Laos	F-43
F. Operations - 1967	F-46
G. JPRC Evaluation - 1967	F-1[illegible]
F. Recovery Procedures in Laos	F-4[illegible]

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

MORI DocID: 570381

Appendix F (Cont)

	Page
Part V. JPRC History - 1968	F-130
A. Organization	F-130
B. Evasion and Escape	F-130
C. Reward Program	F-131
D. Intelligence	F-133
E. Laos Joint Memorandum of Agreement	F-134
F. Operations - 1968	F-136
Part VI. JPRC History - 1969	F-187
A. Organization	F-187
B. Evasion and Escape	F-187
C. Reward Program	F-188
D. Operations - 1969	F-189
G. MACSOG Communications	G-1
Part I. Introduction	G-1
A. Background	G-1
B. Scope	G-1
Part II. 1964 History	G-2
A. Operations	G-2
B. Circuitry	G-3
C. Signal Plans	G-3
D. Cryptography	G-4
E. Personnel	G-4
Part III. 1965 History	G-5
A. Operations	G-5
B. Circuitry	G-7
C. Facilities	G-7
D. Maintenance	G-8
E. Signal Plans	G-8
F. Cryptography	G-9
G. Personnel	G-9
Part IV. 1966 History	G-11
A. Operations	G-11
B. Facilities and Circuitry	G-11
C. Equipment	G-12
D. Signal Plans	G-12
E. Cryptography	G-13
F. Training	G-13
Part V. 1967 History	G-14
A. Operations	G-14
B. Facilities and Circuitry	G-14
C. Equipment	G-14
D. Signal Plans	G-15
E. Cryptography	G-15
F. Communications Security	G-16
Part VI. 1968 History	G-17
A. Operations	G-17
B. Facilities and Circuitry	G-17
C. Equipment	G-18
D. Signal Plans	G-18
E. Cryptography	G-18
F. Wire Tapping	G-19
Part VII. 1969 History	G-20
A. General	G-20
B. Communications Concept	G-20
C. Personnel	G-21
D. Codes	G-23
E. Telephone Systems	G-23
F. Secure Voice Systems	G-24
G. Frequencies	G-24
H. Code Words	G-25
I. Call Signs	G-26
J. Logistics	G-26
K. Special Training	G-27
L. Countermeasure Communications	G-27
M. Communications Sound	G-28
N. Tactical Radio Equipment	G-28
J. Logistics	G-26
K. Special Training	G-27

MORI DocID: 570381

Appendix — Page

H. Security, Cover and Deception
- Part I. Background H-1
  - A. General H-1
  - B. Defination of Terms H-1
- Part II. Security H-4
  - A. Directives H-4
  - B. Responsibility H-4
  - C. Clearances H-4
  - D. Access H-7
  - E. Briefings and Debriefings H-7
  - F. Operational Security Surveys H-8
  - G. Physical Security H-9
- Part III. Deception (Cover) Stories and Documentation H-10
  - A. See Definition of Terms H-10
  - B. MACSOG Directive 380-11 . . . . . H-10
  - C. Cover Stories H-12
- Part IV. Equipment H-19
  - A. Non-Attributability H-19
  - B. Communications H-19
  - C. Aircraft Mounted Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) Equipment H-21
  - D. The NIGHTINGALE Device H-21
- Part V. Codes and Code Words H-22
  - A. Coding Systems H-22
  - B. Code Words, Nicknames and SOG Words . . . H-22
- Part VI. Techniques H-24
  - A. Techniques H-24
  - B. Ground Elements H-24
  - C. Helicopter Insertion/Extraction Techniques H-29

I. MACSOG Intelligence
- Part I. Introduction I-1
  - A. Background I-1
  - B. Scope I-1
- Part II. 1964 History I-2
  - A. Intelligence Organization I-2
- Part III. 1965 History I-3
  - PLOWMAN (C) Operations I-3
  - B. OPLAN 34- Operations I-3
  - C. SHINING BRASS Operations I-4
  - D. Aerial Photography I-4
- Part IV. 1966 History I-5
  - A. Intelligence Organization I-5
  - B. PLOWMAN (C) Operations I-5
  - C. SHINING BRASS Operations I-5
  - D. Airborne Operations I-7
  - E. Daniel Boone Operations I-7
  - F. Air/antiair Intelligence I-7
- Part V. 1967 History I-8
  - A. PRAIRIE FIRE Operations I-8
  - B. DANIEL BOONE Operations I-8
  - C. MACSOG Intelligence Evaluation I-9
- Part VI. 1968 History I-24
  - A. Organization I-24
  - B. MACSOG-MACV Intelligence Relationships . I-26
  - C. Intelligence Targeting Panel I-27
  - D. Intelligence Activities I-27
- Part VII. [illegible] I-29
  - A. Intelligence Introduction I-29
  - B. Operation [illegible] I-32
  - C. PPDB Evaluation I-33

MORI DocID 570381

Appendix Page

J. Logistics

Part I. Background J-1

A. General J-1

B. Overview of Logistics J-4

Part II. Chronological Summary J-15

A. General J-15

B. Calendar Year 1964 . . . . . J-15

C. Calendar Year 1965 . . . . . J-27

D. Calendar Year 1966 . . . . . J-36

E. Calendar Year 1967 . . . . . J-41

F. Calendar Year 1968 . . . . . J-48

MORI DocID: 570355

Downgraded to SECRET

TOP SECRET - SPECIAL VE

COPY NO. 26

DRAFT

MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY

Page

Part I. Introduction A-1
A. Basic Objective A-1
B. Background A-1
C. Approach A-4
Part II. Summaries of Appendices
A. Summary of Appendix B: MACSOG and the STD: Inception, Organization, Evolution. A-6
1. Basic Policy Documents/Decisions Concerning Covert PM Activities During the Pre-MACSOG Period . . . A-6
2. [Basic Agreements Between DOD and CIA.] A-11
3. [DOD Support of CIA (Covert/PM Operations)] A-11
4. DOD Organization for Covert/PM Actions A-11
5. [redacted] A-13
6. OPLAN 34A A-14
7. MACSOG: Inception, Evolution, External Relationships. A-18
a. Activation of MACSOG A-18
b. Mission and Objectives. A-18
c. MACSOG Organizational Development A-21
d. [redacted] . . . A-25
e. Command and Control A-28
f. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence A-34
g. Contingency Planning. A-30
h. Personnel and Training A-40
i. Counterpart Relationships--The Strategic Technical Directorate . A-45
B. Summary of Appendix C: MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam A-46
C. Summary of Appendix D. Cross-Border Operations in Laos. A-47
D. Summary of Appendix E. Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia A-49
E. Summary of Appendix F. Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). A-51
F. Summary of Appendix . MACSOG Communications. A-53
G. Summary of Appendix H: Security, Cover, and Deception A-55
H. Summary of Appendix I: MACSOG Intelligence. A-56
I. Summary of Appendix J. Logistics A-57

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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY

PART I: INTRODUCTION

A. (S) BASIC DIRECTIVE

This study:

1. (TS) Embodies a comprehensive history of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), a subordinate organization of the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV). That designation, hereafter abbreviated as SOG or MACSOG, is a cover for an organization established to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations in Southeast Asia.

2. (S) Is responsive to the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 January 1969* that such a study be prepared which would

> establish a data base for future analysis of MACSOG to improve the military capability to support future UW operations.

B. (TS) BACKGROUND

1. (TS) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), beginning in 1961, conducted limited covert programs for purposes of intelligence, sabotage, and propaganda in North Vietnam (NVN) and Laos. The agent teams and singletons (single agents) were infiltrated into NVN largely by air and sea.

2. (TS) Following the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, major policy decisions were made concerning Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA responsibilities for the planning and conduct of covert/paramilitary(PM) operations. Basic to these decisions

* JCS 2-72/407

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was National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 57 in June 1961. In this NSAM, the President directed that

a. The responsibility for wholly covert or disavowable operations may be assigned to CIA provided they are within its normal capabilities.

b. The responsibility for "any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks, and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the DOD with the CIA in a supporting role."

3. (TS) The above decisions, in conjunction with NVN's intensified aggression against SVN, resulted in meetings between high US officials in Saigon and Honolulu during the fall of 1963. Stemming from these meetings was a decision to prepare a combined DOD-CIA 12-month covert actions program directed against NVN. That program, in concert with other military and diplomatic actions, would be designed to influence the NVN leadership to cease their continued direction and support of insurgent activities in NVN and Laos. It would include these actions against NVN: harassment, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of intelligence, generation of propaganda, all contributing to the diversion of NVN's resources.

4. (S) DOD and CIA representatives then met in Saigon and drafted a UW plan which became known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A** in DOD and TIGER in CIA. In view of the scope and nature of the plan, DOD and CIA agreed that the executive authority for its implementation should be in DOD, with CIA in a supporting role.

* JCS 1969/217
** On file in J-3, SACSA, OJCS

** On file in J-3, SACSA, OJCS

5. (S) The President, in January 1964:

a. Approved certain portions of OPLAN 34A for execution starting on 1 February.

b. Authorized the activation of a joint task force to carry out the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. This task force would be manned with personnel from DOD and CIA, be under the operational control of COMUSMACV, and be commanded by a military officer.

6. (S) Accordingly, MACSOG was activated on 24 January 1964. Its South Vietnamese counterpart organization, now known as the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), was formed on 12 February.

7. (TS) As noted in paragraph 3, above, OPLAN 34A was designed originally to cover a 12-month period. With the escalation of hostilities in SEAsia, however, operations against NVN were continued until 1 November 1968; subsequent to that date, operations have been limited to those of a psychological nature. Meanwhile, MACSOG's responsibilities were expanded to carry out cross-border operations into Laos (beginning in October 1965) and Cambodia (beginning in June 1967). Those operations are continuing. Thus, MACSOG was ultimately responsible for out-of-country operations in three countries: NVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

8. (S) Recognizing the paramount need to analyze thoroughly MACSOG's activities in order to provide a basis for improving the military capability to conduct or to support UW operations in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed,** on 7 January 1969, that the above comprehensive data base be prepared. That effort would be under the sponsorship of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with SACSA as the project monitor for the Chairman.

* Joint State-DOD-CAS message [redacted]
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C. (S) APPROACH

1. (S) SACSA formed a documentation team, under the immediate supervision of the Chief of his Special Operations Division, to carry out the extensive effort of compiling a data base. In effect, this effort would entail the preparation of a detailed history of MACSOG and of those relevant events and decisions, during the pre-MACSOG period, having application to MACSOG. Ultimately, the work effort included:

a. The screening and collection of material in: OSACSA, Headquarters, Pacific Area Command; Headquarters, USMACV; Headquarters, MACSOG and its field organizations in Danang, Kontum, and Camp Long Thanh; Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Nha Trang); and 14th Special Operations Wing (Nha Trang). In addition, Headquarters, CIA provided limited material covering its program in NVN during the pre-MACSOG period.

b. Interviews of some fifty personnel formerly or then currently associated with MACSOG. These interviews, conducted both in OSACSA and the field, provide a candid insight into MACSOG's activities not necessarily presented in formalized reports.

2. (S) To facilitate the analysis of the Study, the Documenta- Team has prepared it in the form of ten appendices (A-J). Each of them covers a single program or subject area except Appendix B which treats MACSOG as a whole. In preparing these appendices, both the historical, or vertical in-depth, and the functional, or horizontal across-the-board, approaches were adopted. Appendix B, e.g., details the important events and decisions leading up to the establishment of MACSOG and, upon its establishment, sets forth many of MACSOG's activities which apply to more than one of its programs. Appendix C, on the

MORI DocID. 570355

on the other hand, treats solely and in-depth MACSOG's operations against NVN. The functional approach is used to portray subject areas which lend themselves to an across-the-board approach, e.g., intelligence and logistics which pertain to more than one MACSOG program. A listing of the above appendices follows:

Appendix	Title
A	Summary of MACSOG Documentation Study
B	MACSOG and the STD: Inception, Organization, Evolution
C	Operations Against NVN
D	Cross-Border Operations in Laos
E	Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia
F	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
G	MACSOG Communications
H	Security, Cover, and Deception
I	MACSOG Intelligence
J	Logistics

3. (Ø) Summaries of each of the Appendices B through J are [redacted] Appendix.

4. (Ø) The reader should bear in mind that the basic job of the Documentation Team was to collect the pertinent historical data and, then, to present these data in a usable form, i.e., in a form to facilitate analysis. In the vital collection process, the Team had to depend upon the agencies it visited to make available all relevant documents on MACSOG. Should gaps exist in these historical data, they may be attributed to one or more of the following:

a. The stringent need-to-know requirements inherent in covert/PM operations, and the resultant tendency of the operators, especially in the early days of MACSOG, to

carry out attendant administrative/historical matters on an informal, and in some cases, undocumented basis.

b. The compartmentation involved in covert/PM operations which militates against centralized files and, thus, adds to the difficulty in collection.

c. The disposal or destruction of records after prescribed periods of time, e.g., three years.

d. The 12-month rotation cycle and its impact on personnel continuity.

PART II: SUMMARIES OF APPENDICES

A. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX B: MACSOG AND THE STD: INCEPTION, ORGANIZATION, EVOLUTION

1. (TS) Basic Policy Documents/Decisions Concerning Covert/PM Activities During the Pre-MACSOG Period

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* On file in J-3, OJCS

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b. Presidential Decisions

(1) On 20 April 1961, the President asked* the Deputy SECDEF to:

(a) Appraise the status and future prospects of the communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.

(b) Recommend a series of actions which, in the opinion of the Deputy SECDEF, would prevent communist domination of South Vietnam.

[redacted]

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* SECDEF Memorandum for the Deputy SECDEF, 20 April 1961

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c. NSAM 55 (28 June 1961)

In this NSAM, the President outlined to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his views as to their relations to him in cold war operations. In substance, those views were:

(1) The advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as his principal military advisor, was to come to him (the President) direct and unfiltered.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for defense of the nation in cold war similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the DOD, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement.

(3) The President looks to the Chiefs to provide dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and PM aspects of cold war programs.

+ (TS) Deputy SECDEF Memorandum for the Presidential Task Force, "Program of Action for Vietnam," 1 May 1961

MORI DocID: 570355

d. NSAM 56 (28 June 1961)

In this NSAM the President:

(1) Stated the need to anticipate possible US future requirements in the field of UW and military operations; further, that a first step would be to inventory the PM assets in the US armed forces, and to consider various areas of the world where the implementation of US policy may require indigenous PM forces, and thus to arrive at a determination of the goals which the United States should set in this field.

(2) Requested that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and the CIA, make an estimate of these requirements and to recommend ways and means of meeting them.

e. NSAM 57 (28 June 1961).

(1) This directive promulgated key policy intended to maximize the effectiveness and flexibility of operations within the context of the cold war. It provided the basis for the assignment to DOD of the responsibility for conducting covert/PM operations against North Vietnam. Key prohibitions of NSAM 57 are cited in paragraph B2, above.

(2) NSAM 57 has been the subject of considerable comment, particularly by CIA, as to its application and validity. In February 1963, the Deputy SECDEF and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) "agreed that, rather than undertaking a revision of NSAM 57 to eliminate the questions that have arisen as to to the interpretation, the conduct of future paramilitary operations, as between Defense and CIA, would be considered on a case-by-case basis and approved where necessary by the Special Group."

f. NSAM 162 (19 June 1962)

Basically, this NSAM embodied a program to remedy deficiencies in the US capability to support both the training and active operations of indigenous PM forces. DOD, in collaboration with the Department of State and the CIA, was to undertake a study to determine, on a selective basis, the feasibility of the concept of increased use of third country personnel in PM operations. On a selective basis, DOD and CIA would make studies of specific groups where there was reason to believe there existed an exploitable minority PM capability.

g. NSAM 273 (26 November 1963)

This memorandum sets forth guidance from the President resulting from his review of the discussions concerning South Vietnam which took place in Honolulu on 20 November 1963. For MACSOG purposes, the essence of this guidance follows:

(1) Planning for actions directed against North Vietnam should include different levels of possible increased activity and, in each instance, there should be estimates of such factors as the plausibility of denial.

(2) A plan should be developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to 50 kilometers inside Laos. [redacted]

(3) The situation in Cambodia was of first importance for South Vietnam, and it was, therefore, urgent that the United States should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon Cambodia.

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* CJCS Memorandum, CM 560-62

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6. (~~TS~~) OPLAN 34A

a. The primary bases for OPLAN 34A lie in:

(1) The Presidential and supporting positions to prevent the communist domination of South Vietnam and to expand and intensify allied actions, including covert/PM ones, against North Vietnam.

(2) The need for a concerted, joint effort against North Vietnam in the field of covert/PM actions.

(3) The relative ineffectiveness of the CIA covert/PM program against North Vietnam

b. The application of military measures against North Vietnam was a subject, beginning in August 1961, of continuing importance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Numerous plans, both overt and covert, were developed in which air and maritime actions were considered. The Study covers in detail these and other events which led up to the development of OPLAN 34A. Basic to the presentation of such background information was the trip in January 1963 by a Joint Chiefs of Staff team of senior Service and Joint Staff representatives to South Vietnam and the trip report+ of that team. The report covered the situation in South Vietnam in terms of the military, political, and economic factors. The team recommended, among other things, that air and ground reconnaissance missions be conducted in Laos, and that South Vietnamese military forces be subjected to intensified unconventional warfare training with a view toward their execution of raids and sabotage missions in North Vietnam. This unconventional warfare effort would be coordinated with the CIA/CAS.

c. Meanwhile, the Department of the Army, as a contribution to implementing the recommendations of the JCS team prepared a document entitled "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam."** In effect, this study became the forerunner both of OPLAN 34A and of later intensified cross-border operations into Laos and, finally, to such operations into Cambodia.

d. The special meeting on South Vietnam held in Headquarters, PACOM on 20 November 1963 was instrumental in setting the stage for the development of OPLAN 34A. Attendance included State, Defense, and CIA representation. Among other things, the meeting dealt with important matters concerning CAS-MACV relationships and operations against North Vietnam and Laos.

+ CSM memo to CJCS, "Trip Report," 1 February 1963.
** Attachment to CSAM 120-63, 19 March 1963.

It was concluded that these CAS covert programs for sabotage, propaganda, and intelligence in North Vietnam had been limited in their scope and relatively limited in their accomplishment. The principals directed that an optimum twelve months' program for intensified operations against North Vietnam, including sabotage, propaganda incursions, intelligence, and commando hit-and-run raids be developed in concert by COMUSMACV and CAS Saigon. The plan would envision utilization of South Vietnamese military and PM resources fully supported by the United States and would clearly exhibit what could be done with the means then available as well as the additional means that would be required for carrying out the optimum program.

e. Accordingly, in a joint DOD-CIA message to the field on 26 November 1963, a MACV-CAS plan would be developed for a 12-month intensified program of actions against North Vietnam and submitted to Washington by 20 December 1969. Such planning would be conducted without concern at the time as to which elements of the program would be assigned to DOD or CIA; this was intended to avoid delay due to possible jurisdictional problems.

f. Prepared jointly by the J-5 division of Headquarters, MACV and CAS, OPLAN 34A* was submitted on 15 December 1963.

g. OPLAN 34A was briefed to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence during their visit to South Vietnam on 19-20 December 1963. They directed that the substance of the plan be presented to the Special Group (5-12). In addition, the Secretary of Defense directed that certain personnel and equipment needed for the support of OPLAN 34A be arranged for immediately and said that DOD would pay the cost.

*On file in J-3 SACSA, OJCS.

h. The SECDEF and DCI discussed OPLAN 34A with the President on 21 December 1963. At their recommendation, the President created an interdepartmental committee (State, Defense, CIA) to select from the plan those operations which were most feasible and which promised the greatest return for the least risk. Meanwhile, on 21 December 1963, the Secretary of Defense directed that the personnel and equipment needed to implement OPLAN 34A be moved to Saigon.

i. In a joint message to the field on 16 January 1964, State-DOD-CAS indicated that the recommendations of the interdepartmental committee had been approved by the President; further, that the approval embodied the execution, in a four month period commencing on 1 February 1964, of specified elements of OPLAN 34A. To carry out the approved actions in the plan, a joint task force, consisting of personnel from DOD and CIA, was authorized for establishment. The chief of the task force would be a colonel-level military officer selected by COMUSMACV, the deputy chief of the task force would be a CAS officer [redacted] COMUSMACV would exercise operational control. Other personnel for the task force would be contributed by MACV and CAS as required and agreed upon.

j. The OPLAN 34A program of actions comprised these categories of actions: intelligence collection, psychological operations, physical destruction, aerial attack. The program contained a total of 72 actions which, if implemented over a 12-month period, would produce a total of 2,062 separate operations. Out of the 72 actions proposed in OPLAN 34A, 33 were ultimately approved for implementation during Phase I (1 February - 1 June 1964).

k. The South Vietnamese authorities approved OPLAN 34A in concept and promised full support.

7. (S) MACSOG: Inception, Evolution, External Relationships

a. Activation of MACSOG

COMUSMACV activated MACSOG on 24 January 1964, with an initial military personnel strength of six officers and two enlisted men. At that time, the Chief of Staff, MACV, exercised direct supervision over MACSOG; the J-5, MACV exercised special cognizance of actions accomplished.

b. Mission and Objectives

(1) As stated in OPLAN 34A, the overall mission of MACSOG was as follows:

> COMUSMACV/[redacted] will provide necessary advice, assistance, training and materiel support to enable the RVN to conduct a graduated and intensified program of actions against the DRV which, in conjunction with other military and diplomatic actions in Southeast Asia, will lead to a judgment on the part of the DRV leadership that the direction and support of insurgent activities in RVN and Laos should cease.

(2) From the above overall mission, MACV/MACSOG arrived at these objectives:

(a) Divert North Vietnam military resources to defense and internal security missions.

(b) Produce an adverse effect on the North Vietnamese economy.

(c) Impede the infiltration of the military resources to RVN.

(d) Foment disrespect for the government policies of the NVN.

(e) Create the impression that an active, unified, internal opposition exists in North Vietnam.

(3) In November 1965, CINCPAC/COMUSMACV changed the MACSOG mission statement to read as follows:

MORI DocID 570355

As Directed by CC USMACV and with the concurrence of the US Embassy, SOG will advise, train, and support counterpart forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare operations.

SOG will conduct unilateral planning for unconventional warfare activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be prepared to activate and command the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Southeast Asia.

(4) With the approval of the revised mission statement as reflected above, CINCPAC considered that the assignment of additional approved operations, such as SHINING BRASS* and psychological warfare missions, to MACSOG by COMUSMACV was appropriate in view of the transition of SOG at a later date to the status of Joint UW Task Force, as stated in the current contingency plans.

(5) Current publications** cite the MACSOG mission as follows:

Exercise operational control over US forces and personnel assigned or attached to MACSOG to execute such missions as may be directed by COMUSMACV or competent higher authority.

Advise, assist and support the GVN and RVNAF in planning, coordinating, and implementing such missions as may be mutually agreed upon between the US and GVN and as directed by COMUSMACV.

Coordinate activities of MACSOG with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern and in consonance with policies prescribed by COMUSMACV.

Prepare unilateral US and coordinated US/GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; develop GVN capabilities to provide support for US forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency or general emergency operations.

Act as Commander (designate), JUWTF for SEASIA. Develop for implementation, upon order, plans for UW warfare in SEASIA

(S) Former code word for PRAIRIE FIRE (MACSOG cross-border operations in Laos).
(S) HQ US MACV Directive 10-11 "Organization and Functions - Command Relationships and Terms of Reference for USMACV (U)", 1 Nov 68
(S) HQ MACSOG Organization and Functions Manual, to June 1969

Provide intelligence and counter-intelligence support to COMUS, ACV.

Coordinate post-CAR personnel recovery matters in SEASIA.

(6) The scope of the MACSOG mission was expanded with the initiation of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia in 1965 and 1967, respectively. Though influenced by political restrictions and/or evolving requirements, the broad overall mission of MACSOG has continued unchanged since 1967. The current abbreviated mission* of MACSOG is:

> To plan and conduct covert/clandestine operations in NVN, Laos, and Cambodia and special operations in SVN, as directed, in such a manner that operations can be plausibly denied by the US and RVN governments. These operations are planned and conducted in coordination with various other US agencies and with the RVNAF STD.

(7) <u>Inter-Relationship of the 5th Special Forces Group and MACSOG Missions</u>

The question as to whether there has been a duplication or lack of economy of effort by MACSOG, with its mission of out-of-country operations and the 5th SFG, with its mission of in-country operations, has surfaced on several occasions. These two types of operations, however, have been kept separated primarily for reason of deniability for out-of-country operations.

(8) <u>Views Concerning the MACSOG Missions</u>

Of the approximately 50 individuals, formerly associated with MACSOG's activities, who were interviewed in connection with this Study, many of them had definite views concerning the MACSOG mission. These views are covered specifically and in detail in the Study. Generally, however, a number of these views were not complimentary, namely the MACSOG mission was not

* HQ MACSOG Year-End Review Vietnam 1968, p.7.

completely clear because it was interpreted in different ways by the various agencies that were to provide support to MACSOG; the mission should have been more specifically stated because, as stated, it led to a shotgun approach to the listing of objectives; it was not clear what MACSOG operations were expected to accomplish; the whole concept was not well thought out.

c. MACSOG Organizational Development

(1) MACSOG initially depended largely upon TDY personnel augmentations to execute the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. Since its inception, MACSOG has:

(a) Developed and operated three major programs involving operations in three countries -- North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

(b) Prepared and operated under five JTDs in order to meet the organizational and personnel needs generated by evolving missions and objectives. Personnel strengths authorized in the initial (1964) and current (1969) JTDs are:

Officers	54	128
Enlisted Men	60	265
Civilians	30	11
Total	144	404

(2) This section of the Study traces the organizational evolution of MACSOG from its initial JTD to its current one. In tracing this evolution, organizational changes are set forth in this context:

(a) MACSOG's missions, objectives, and functions, and its headquarters and field organizations needed to accomplish them.

(b) The external relationships which influenced the MACSOG organizational setup, for example, the Headquarters, USMACV.

(c) MACSOG's counterpart relationships with the South Vietnamese STD.

(3) Basic to the conduct of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia, currently the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE Programs, respectively, are the MACSOG command and control (C&C) detachments. Personnel assets for that purpose are organized into three such detachments: C&C North at Danang; C&C Center at Kontum; and C&C South at Ban Me Thuot. Each of these detachments is organized along battalion lines and consists of: a headquarters element, a reconnaissance company, two reaction or exploitation companies, and a security company. The reconnaissance company is authorized 30 teams, each generally composed of three US and nine indigenous personnel.

(4) Views Concerning the MACSOG Organizational Development

(a) Persons interviewed in connection with their association with MACSOG expressed many diverse views on the organizational development of MACSOG. Representative of those views are the following:

1. A SOG must be tailored especially to the situation or theater in which it will be operating. No two SOGs will be the same. The organization has to be flexible and adaptable to changing situations, in order to be able to assume new missions and to operate under new concepts.

2. MACSOG should have been organized as a JUSTIF. It would have operated more efficiently had it been organized along those lines.

3. If the military is to be involved in SOG-type operations, an organization with the necessary personnel should be set up before hand. One example of an organization for this purpose is JUWTF.

4. A SOG-type organization should have been set up exactly as it was, that is, on the basis of task elements that could be added like building blocks, based upon the nature of the operations to be conducted.

5. The application of the true JUWTF operational concept to MACSOG would have enabled us to produce better results than we did.

6. The JUWTF provides a command structure far more suited for special operations than that of MACSOG.

7. The JUWTF organization, as taught in our Service schools, is not necessarily the most efficient way of performing UW missions. Service components should not be retained within the JUWTF concept. UW should be conducted as a national effort, in which the Services lose their identity. There should be a task force tailored in each case for the particular area of operations. This task force should include those Service personnel of the appropriate skill but not Service components representing the concepts and doctrines of a particular Service. MACSOG is really a joint task force.

8. The JUWTF organization is an extension of conventional military organizational concepts and of Service parochialism. We should organize functionally, with resources assigned to enable the

carrying out of functions regardless of Service. The organization should be completely integrated or, if it is compartmented, it should be compartmented along functional and not Service lines.

9. If MACSOG and the 5th Special Forces Group were placed under one central command, administrative and logistical systems could be streamlined, with savings in personnel and other resources.

10. Chief, MACSOG was responsible for so many operations of varied scopes that his span of control far exceeded his capabilities. Limiting his responsibilities to operations against North Vietnam would have been a practical approach to the span of control problem.

11. The proposal to create two Special Forces groups in South Vietnam -- one for in-country operations and the other for out-of-country operations -- had considerable merit.

12. MACSOG grew like topsy. The MACSOG-5th Special Forces Group relationship, considering the fact that the 5th Special Forces Group had a separate mission of its own and had to furnish personnel to MACSOG on an operational control basis, had built-in problems which caused some friction. The conduct of operations was along personal lines and not organizational lines. The 5th Special Forces Group should be divorced from MACSOG.

13. MACSOG should be provided with its own organic reconnaissance capabilities. Helicopter assets, both troop and gunships, should be organically assigned and dedicated to the MACSOG

mission. The lack of dedicated aircraft resulted in numerous aircraft accidents and losses of gear members. 1 2 3

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e. Command and Control

(1) Due largely to political sensitivities, MACSOG operations have been subject to tight Washington controls. According to various authorities in the field, that control, especially in the early days, handicapped the effective conduct of MACSOG's operations.

(2) MACSOG's activities have been subject to CINCPAC's review and recommendations as to approval or disapproval. With the passage of time, higher authority was granted to CINCPAC approval authorities for certain operations.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed and recommended to higher authorities disposition to be made on MACSOG's proposed concepts, plans, and operations. Within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSACSA, in particular the Special Operations Division, has served as the action agent. Generally, the channel through which the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtain the requisite authorities for MACSOG activities has been the Deputy SECDEF. The latter is a member of the 303 Committee, the interdepartmental agency (State, DOD, CIA, and DIA) which monitors and, where appropriate, recommends to the White House the disposition to be made on proposals involving MACSOG concepts, plans, and operations.

(4) With respect to the approval of maritime operations:

(a) During Phase I (1 February - 1 June 1964), COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority approved each proposed individual operation.

(b) During the period 1 June to 1 October 1964, it was planned that proposed maritime operations would be approved, in principle, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the SECDEF, DIA, DCI, and the Secretary of State; then, CINCPAC would prepare a program of actions using the approved listing. This procedure continued until 4 August 1964, when all MACSOG maritime operations were halted incident to the North Vietnamese attack on US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

(c) Maritime operations were resumed in October 1964 and the above procedure for approval of MACSOG's operations was continued with the added requirement that each individual operation be approved just prior to its execution.

(5) Ultimately, these procedures governed the planning for and conduct of maritime operations.

(a) A maritime operation package would normally contain increments to cover a 30-day period of operations. Each increment might contain from three to five missions. COMUSMACV would submit to CINCPAC a package and/or increments of maritime missions in response to JCS request.

(b) CINCPAC would comment on the proposed package and/or increments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit the proposed package and/or increments to higher authority for approval and would transmit to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV approval of the package and/or increments as obtained. The approval would specify missions approved for execution at the discretion of COMUSMACV and any conditions imposed by higher authority.

(d) Subsequent to receipt of the package and/or increments approved for execution, and prior to execution of the missions, COMUSMACV would transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and other such commands that CINCPAC might direct, detailed mission information.

(e) Prior to launching the maritime (and air) missions approved for execution, COMUSMACV might make minor route changes that did not substantively change

the concept of a mission, and he might change departure times as dictated by operational conditions provided that he notified the proper persons by FLASH message.

(f) As the Maritime Operations Program against North Vietnam evolved, CINCPAC was given greater latitude in the approval and execution of such type missions. These missions included psychological operations as distribution of gifts, etc., and harassment/interdiction missions against designated targets.

(6) With regard to the approval of air operations:

(a) As already noted, prior to 14 October 1964, CIA handled the routing and approval of OPLAN 34A air operations. On that date, DOD assumed the responsibility and the following approval procedure became effective.

1. COMUSMACV would submit a monthly schedule.

2. This schedule, incorporating CINCPAC's comments, would be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval by higher authority.

3. When obtained, this approval would represent final Washington authority for executing missions. However, COMUSMACV would obtain a political clearance for each mission, 24 hours prior to the mission, from the American Ambassador, Saigon and, concurrently, would provide notification of intent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would so inform the SECDEF, DCI, and SECSTATE.

4. MACV would continue to submit launch, recovery, abort, and spot reports.

(b) Later, in October 1964, approval was granted for a reduction in time from 24 to 12 hours for the notification of intent to execute individual air operations.

(c) As in the case of maritime operations, in January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "codified" air operations procedures essentially as follows.

1. Approximately ten days prior to the estimated completion of the air operations package then approved for execution, COMUSMACV would submit to CINCPAC an air operations package planned for a 30-day period of operations.

2. CINCPAC would comment on the proposed package and forward it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter would review the package and handle the requisite approvals and coordination in the Washington area.

3. The approval message by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the field would specify those missions approved for execution at the discretion of COMUSMACV and any conditions imposed by higher authority.

4. At least 12 hours prior to the intended execution of missions, COMUSMACV would obtain political clearance from the American Embassy, Saigon and would transmit to all concerned detailed mission information.

5. CINCPAC would retain authority for the tactical conduct of missions.

(d) In February 1966, CINCPAC was delegated the authority to approve and execute specific OPLAN 34A air missions which were in consorance with concepts and objectives that had been approved at the Washington level.

(7) As to diverse views concerning command and control expressed by persons interviewed in connection with MACSOG association, the following are representative.

(a) In the early days of MACSOG, by the time an action program had been staffed and finally approved, MACSOG had little time to implement the program and the constraints were prohibitive.

(b) The actual planning of MACSOG-type operations can be accomplished more effectively in the field. There should be a Washington-level organization consisting primarily of agencies needed to insure the requisite coordination with other operations and to obtain necessary approval for conducting a particular covert operation.

(c) The long extended chain of command for obtaining approval of small maritime operations caused extreme frustration to personnel in the Naval Advisory Detachment in Danang. It resulted in a lack of motivation and a loss of incentive to plan in detail.

(d) Tight control in Washington "hamstrung" MACSOG operations. The control affected the timeliness of the operations.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

(f) There should be a completely integrated organization at the national level for handling covert actions.

(Ø) The Special [illegible] of [illegible] charged with handling covert matters at the DOD level is [illegible] is considered to be understaffed. The staffing of a covert action is extensive since it requires complete coordination with the conventional Joint Staff members. As a result of the inadequate organizational machinery within DOD for handling covert matters, there is virtually no link between the Special Operations Division and the 303 Committee.

f. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence

(1) An Overview of the MACSOG Principal Programs

(a) MACSOG's principal programs and a brief description are outlined below.

1. FOOTBOY (Ø)

This is the code word for MACSOG's operations in North Vietnam. Initially, that program was simply referred to as the 34A Program. FOOTBOY(Ø) consists of these four sub-programs:

(a) PARBOIL - maritime operations

(b) HUMIDOR - psychological operations

(c) TIMBERWORK - airborne operations

(d) MIDRIFF - air operations

2. PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE

(a) These two programs involve cross-border operations and are conducted by MACSOG's three command and control detachments, namely: C&C North in Danang, C&C Center in Kontum, and C&C South in Ban Me Thuot

(b) PRAIRIE FIRE, formerly SHINING BRASS, is the code word for MACSOG cross-border operations

in Laos. These operations are conducted by teams consisting of both Laotian and American personnel or Laotian teams alone, for the purpose of locating and interdicting VC/NVA concentrations and routes of infiltration.

(c) SALEM HOUSE, formerly DANIEL BOONE, is the code word for MACSOG cross-border operations into Cambodia. As in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE operations are conducted by teams, organized as in paragraph (b) above, for the purpose of locating and interdicting VC/NVA concentration and routes of infiltration.

(2) Views Concerning MACSOG's Operations and Intelligence

(a) On the subject of MACSOG's operations and intelligence, representative diverse views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association follow:

1. A big mistake in OPLAN 34A was the assumption that MACSOG would take over assets in being. Unfortunately, the assets did not exist in the sense we thought they existed and as we had been briefed by CIA. A big disappointment to MACSOG was that a resistance movement could not be started in North Vietnam. The United States fails to appreciate the value of guerrilla warfare, which constitutes one of the most effective measures that the communists have employed against us.

2. Had we employed maritime operations more effectively than we did, we could have had complete control of the North Vietnamese coastline up to a depth of three or four miles.

(b) CINCPAC did not prepare a 34- Plan which tasked the components to support the MACSOG operation. Consequently, MACSOG operated from a MACV plan which did not provide the clear statement of responsibilities, functions, and missions of the components toward the 34A operations.

(c) Many of MACSOG's organizational problems were created by the haste to become operational. Had MACSOG been given more time to organize before initiating operations, it could have properly established its organization with the necessary trained and experienced personnel. This would have enabled more effective operations.

(d) The full capability of our US forces was never used. For example, we could have used US paratroop operations to good advantage but never did.

(e) The 34A operations became unrealistic once the United States commenced overt air operations in North Vietnam. The program was then no longer covert.

(f) By curtailing MACSOG operations during the periods of bombing halts, we divulged the fact that it was the United States which was behind covert operations against North Vietnam.

(g) MACSOG's air operations were extremely limited because of the shortcomings of the C-123 aircraft. Eventually we were successful in obtaining the C-130 aircraft as a replacement for the C-123.

(h) Though the air operations were categorized as being covert in support of covert ground operations, the aircraft were not sanitized to the extent that they could be plausibly denied as being US government aircraft.

(i) There must be an acceptance at the national level that if we are going to use covert operations to influence our national policy objectives, that is, if we are going to employ covert operations in the same way that the enemy uses them against us, we must accept the idea that such operations have to be conducted in a manner that they will be denied. The policy need not necessarily conform to our publicly announced national objectives and national policies.

(j) MACSOG agent operations were inept and unproductive. The CAS operation, which MACSOG inherited in 1964, was no more successful.

(k) The entire agent team program was ill-conceived.

(l) A lot of hardware items can, and should, be developed for covert operations. In general, these items should be smaller and lighter and, in the case of communications equipment, have greater range and reliability.

(m) With respect to air operations, one of MACSOG's biggest problems was that it did not own their aircraft.

(n) With regard to maritime operations, the imposition of restrictions specifying the distance north of the 17th parallel to which these operations could be conducted resulted in the enemy being able to ascertain our area of operations and to intercept our boats relatively easily. These same sort of restrictions also applied to the depth of penetration into Laos and Cambodia and had the same effect on the operations of our cross-border forces.

(o) The PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE operations became more of an overt combat/intelligence type of exercise than perhaps had been originally intended. Thus, we were inserting teams in a fashion which was more overt than covert.

(p) Our helicopters and/or the pilots have proven to be incapable either because of design limitation or of pilot training to land teams after dark in denied areas.

g. Contingency Planning

(1) JUWTF 1-67

(a) In the event of general war and/or when activated by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV becomes Commander, US Forces

MORI DocID: 570355

Southeast Asia (COMUSSEASIA). COMUSSEASIA is tasked to establish a JUWTF to conduct UW in Southeast Asia. MACSOG becomes the JUWTF headquarters and is augmented with an Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA component. The general mission of MACSOG in relation to the JUWTF is to:

1. Prepare plans for the conduct of UW operations.

2. Maintain continuing estimates of the resistance potential available in UW operational areas.

3. Plan for the operation of a personnel recovery and escape and evasion program in SEASIA.

(b) JUWTF OPLAN 1-67* provides for the conduct of UW operations in coordination with other military and political actions in the defense of SEASIA. The JUWTF is commanded by Chief, MACSOG. MACSOG would assume control over all of the Service component elements engaged in the implementation of this OPLAN.

(2) Post-Hostilities. MACSOG, pursuant to MACV directives, has planned extensively for the post-hostilities period. Basically, however, MACSOG contemplates that the functions to be carried on by a MACSOG type organization would fall into two broad categories, both of an intelligence nature: verification, and reconnaissance and surveillance. The extent of these activities will depend, of course, upon whatever cease-fire settlement, if any, and supporting agreement are arranged.

* [illegible] 1-67 was approved by MACV in March 1968 and promulgated by MACSOG in April 1968.

n. Personnel and Training

(1) General

(a) The 5th Special Forces Group provides MACSOG with US personnel to man the C&C detachments, which include the reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces. Assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, these personnel are under the operational control of MACSOG and under the administrative control of the Group. This arrangement has provoked a considerable amount of unfavorable comment from both organizations.

(b) MACSOG employs a large number of civilians from different ethnic groups, including Vietnamese Montagnards, Chinese, Cambodians, and Filipinos. In this connection, MACSOG has developed a wealth of civilian personnel regulations, and pay structures for both administrative and field operation personnel.

(2) C&C Detachments

Emphasis is placed on maintaining the C&C detachments at 100 percent strength in US personnel. Of particular importance in this regard is the availability of qualified key leaders for the reconnaissance teams, which are basic to the conduct of MACSOG's cross-border operations. The continuing shortage of key leaders got to be one of the most serious personnel difficulties in MACSOG.

(3) Recruiting of Indigenous Personnel

(a) The recruiting of indigenous personnel is accomplished through the Liaison Service STD and the Liaison Bureau of MACSOG Operations-35. The C&C detachments requisition through both ARVN and US channels for personnel to fill vacancies.

(c) Generally, the dependability of good results has been a limiting factor in PhuCOC's operations.

(4) Morale and Welfare

(a) Both US and indigenous personnel on duty with the command and control detachments receive a wide range of privileges and benefits, including additional monetary compensation, for morale and welfare purposes.

(b) In the case of indigenous personnel, medical support is provided for troops and to their families. In addition, schools have been established to give a basic education to the dependents. Instruction is conducted about two hours each day. The standard Tet bonus for all indigenous personnel is one months pay; thus these personnel receive 13 months pay per year.

(5) Discipline, Law and Order

The STD Liaison Service provides each C&C detachment commander with an ARVN cadre to assist him in handling matters better concerning indigenous personnel. Matters involving the hiring and firing of these personnel are usually referred to the senior member of the ARVN cadre.

(6) Training

(a) Emphasis is placed on developing leadership qualities in all personnel, especially those filling leader/command positions.

(b) The initial training of all indigenous members is given at Camp Long Thanh.

(c) Further training and integration into a reconnaissance team or an exploitation force is accomplished at the C&C detachment. US members accompany and participate in all training. This training encompasses all of the essential combat skills.

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(7) [illegible]

(a) [illegible] views concerning personnel and [illegible] persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG associations are outlined below.

1. The South Vietnamese Navy cooperated fully in furnishing MACSOG with the required number of Naval personnel. Generally, these personnel were well trained and adapted to the Maritime Operations Program rapidly. The South Vietnamese Army was not forthcoming in providing personnel for the MAROPS programs.

2. The South Vietnamese personnel for the PSYOPS Program were recruited from the universities and through ads placed in various newspapers. The response was good and coming from an educational standpoint, MACSOG was able to recruit all of the PSYOPS personnel needed.

3. Depending upon the time when the various comments were made, the ratings of the Chinese pilots ranged from outstanding to poor. Later, however, MACSOG personnel rated them as true professionals.

4. Generally, from the beginning of MACSOG's operations until 1 November 1968, the date on which operations against North Vietnam stopped, the agent assets were considered to be of questionable capability.

5. Initially, the selection of US personnel for assignment to MACSOG seemed to be based more on their availability than qualifications for MACSOG-type operations.

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6. The ideal US reconnaissance team leader would be of E-6 or E-7 grade, with approximately [illegible] years' service, and not over 30 years of age. High weapons infantryman or an operations specialist would be preferred.

7. A major problem confronting MACSOG was its competition with the 5th Special Forces Group for suitable personnel.

8. One of the serious problems confronting MACSOG in the MAROPS field was the decision that members of the SEAL teams responsible for training and preparing the Vietnamese in this activity would be on a six months rotational basis. The SEAL teams, therefore, were handicapped in producing results with the Vietnamese.

9. MACSOG's problems have been aggravated by the continued assignment to it of US personnel whose qualifications for the particular job in MACSOG have been questionable.

10. MACSOG should be exempt for short tour assignments in the case of certain key personnel.

11. The training of US personnel for assignment to a MACSOG-type organization must include that of a joint specialized nature and there should be established facilities where this training could be conducted.

12. The Nungs who were in the SHINING BRASS Program during its early days were much better qualified than the Chinese who followed them. The latter, "Cholon Cowboys," lacked motivation and their principal incentives for joining MACSOG

seems to be regarding the enlistment oath and evading the draft in the Vietnamese army.

12. The average Montagnard demonstrated more compassion than did the Chinese, that is, the Montagnard was more concerned as to what happened to his teammates and would be more apt than the Chinese to carry a wounded man under fire back to the safety of a covered position or to a waiting helicopter.

14. There was a glaring lack of professional background and professional training of both the US and South Vietnamese personnel in intelligence operations.

15. The awards and decorations system for MACSOG was poor. This had an adverse effect on morale. Chief, MACSOG should be delegated the authority for awards and decorations up to and including the Silver Star. The entire awards and decorations system should be streamlined.

16. The personnel who engage in cross-border operations do not need to be Special Forces. These operations are no more than those of a reconnaissance or combat patrol type.

17. MACSOG personnel shortages have existed in all the command and control detachments. The most serious aspect of this problem, however, is not the shortage of personnel as such but the shortage of qualified and experienced personnel. The TOE for a reconnaissance team calls for an E-7. In most instances, MACSOG has had a shortage of at least 50 percent of the proper MOS and grade.

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1. Country Relationships - The Strategic Technical Directorate

(1) Activation of the STD

(a) The MTAP, on 12 February 1964, organized a MACSOG counterpart organization known as the Strategic Exploitation Service (SES). In common with OPLAN 34A, the objectives of SES included: aerial reconnaissance, beach reconnaissance, communications and electronics intelligence, tactical unit reconnaissance probes, psychological operations and physical destruction operations.

(b) MACSOG has prepared a history of the STD and its precessors. That history, incorporated in Annex T to this Study, presents the evolution of the organization and its tie-in with MACSOG.

(2) Views Concerning the STD

On the subject of the STD, representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below.

(a) One of the greatest assets which Col. Ho (the Commander) and his senior personnel possessed was their apolitical nature. Most of them had maneged to remain aloof from any single political party or any single group of military officers and, thus, they survived the various coups. The majority of the STD personnel were patriotic in the highest meaning of that word. Their greatest limitation was their lack of experience in the covert operations field.

(b) To some extent, the MACSOG-STD relationship was complicated by feelings that the STD has been penetrated. However, we had no clear cut evidence that such was the case.

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(c) Organizationally, MACSOG and STD did not get very well. In the field, there was a great deal of cooperation in working together. At the MACSOG-STD level, the organizations did not lend themselves to close coordination in terms of staff set ups and the physical separation further complicated this problem. For example, one MACSOG staff officer might have to deal with perhaps three STD staff officers to get one job coordinated. MACSOG and STD should have been generally organized along the same lines.

B. (~~TS~~) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX C: MACSOG OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

1. (~~TS~~) General

a. As already noted, the raison d'etre for the activation of MACSOG was to execute the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. That OPLAN, of course, covered a period of twelve months. With the continuation of operations against North Vietnam beyond the 12-month period, such operations assumed the code name FOOTBOY (~~C~~).

b. Operations against North Vietnam were basically of five types: intelligence collection, psychological, political pressure, dissidence and physical destruction. It should be pointed out, however, that while OPLAN 34A called for a resistance movement in North Vietnam, US national policy prohibited it.

c. The Study treats these operations very comprehensively. In this connection, Appendix C (MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam) is presented in five parts, namely: The Overview of These Operations and four Annexes which present in detail the four sub-programs to FOOTBOY (~~C~~). Those sub-programs are as follows:

(1) [illegible] - [illegible] land operations

(2) [illegible] - [illegible] against land operations.

(3) MIDRIFF - air operations.

(4) PARBOIL - maritime operations

Of the above four sub-programs, HUMIDOR is credited with being the most successful; TIMBERWORK was regarded as unsuccessful. PARBOIL met with considerable success but the view of many SOG personnel was that the United States did not go far enough in this program and did not employ certain means, such as submarines, which would have proved to be very effective. MIDRIFF, of course, within the context of MACSOG, was supportive of the other programs.

2. (TS) Cessation of Operations

Except for certain psychological operations, the FOOTBOY (C) Program was discontinued effective 1 November 1968, with the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

C. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX D: CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN LAOS

1. (TS) Concept of Operations

a. In March 1965, COMUSMACV assigned* the responsibility to MACSOG for conducting cross-border operations into Laos. Operations commenced in October 1965. The concept of operations envisioned that MACSOG operations would be directed against VC/PL/NVN bases and infiltration routes associated with enemy movement from Laos into South Vietnam. The initial operations would be conducted by RVN forces with US support and would be expanded to include participation and support of Laotian military and indigenous personnel.

b. The Operations Plan provided for operations to be conducted in three phases beginning with short-stay tactical intelligence missions. Operations would then progress to longer-stay intelligence and sabotage missions. Finally,

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 270428Z Mar 1965

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 270428Z Mar 1965

the operations could culminate in long-duration [illegible] to develop resistance across [illegible] operations could be staged from secure bases in Laos and South Vietnam, and infiltration/exfiltration would be conducted via overland routes and by air employing US, VNAF, and MACSOG aircraft. Air strikes and ground operations, the latter by exploitation forces, would be conducted against targets developed by the MACSOG cross-border forces and in support of in-place teams.

2. (TS) Formation of Cross-Border Units

a. In carrying out the cross-border operations, MACSOG organized reconnaissance teams consisting of three US and up to nine Vietnamese personnel. Members of these teams were equipped and received their initial training at Camp Long Thanh. That training was conducted at the forward operating base and the teams executed in-country training missions from that base prior to executing cross-border operations into Laos.

b. The first command and control facility for conducting cross-border operations into Laos was established at Danang. Subsequently, it was designated as Command and Control North. Later, another detachment known as Command and Control Center was established at Kontum under the control and direction of Headquarters MACSOG. These detachments planned for and conducted operations under the code names of SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE (for Laos) and DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE (for Cambodia).

3. (TS) Operations

a. The PRAIRIE FIRE Program had been subjected to considerable political constraints, particularly during the early days of the program. In particular, these constraints were related to the depth of penetration into Laos, the

size of the exploitation forces, the curtailment of [illegible] the reconnaissance exploitation forces in Laos, and the use of air power in support of the ground effort.

b. SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE Operations have resulted in the acquisition of considerable intelligence, mostly of a tactical nature, of enemy activities. This intelligence, in turn, provided a basis for employing exploitation forces and air and artillery attacks against lucrative targets in the SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations.

D. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX E CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

1. (TS) Concept of Operations

a. With concurrence of the State Department, approval was granted* in May 1967 to conduct cross-border operations into Cambodia. These operations were conducted under the code name of DANIEL BOONE; later, under the code name SALEM HOUSE. Basically, these operations were oriented toward ground troop reconnaissance and intelligence collection primarily, in the tri-border area. These operations were intended to provide early warning of enemy movement toward the isolated friendly camps in the area and to enable the timely deployment of friendly forces to counter the enemy movement. The constraints were many. These included.

(1) Restrictions as to area of operations.

(2) Reconnaissance teams could not exceed overall strength of twelve men, to include not more than three US advisors.

(3) Tactical air strikes and/or exploitation forces were not authorized for use in Cambodia.

* (TS) JCS SC 2202584 [illegible] 67

(4) Infiltration and exfiltration could be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter was authorized in emergency situations only.

(5) The reconnaissance teams would take all precautions to avoid confrontation with Cambodian military forces or civilian population.

(6) The teams engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture.

(7) No more than three reconnaissance teams might be committed at any one time.

(8) The total number of missions would not exceed ten in any one 30-day period.

Actual operations were begun in June 1967.

2. (TS) Formation of Cross-Border Units

a. Cross-border forces for use in the DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE operation were located at the base camps in Kontum (C&C Detachment Center) and Ban Me Thuot (C&C Detachment South). The basic reconnaissance team had the same organization as that employed in the SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE operations. Due to the cross-border mission for Cambodia, that is, reconnaissance and verification, operations were generally conducted using a split team composed of two US and four Vietnamese/Montagnard personnel on each team.

b. As already noted, exploitation forces were not authorized for deployment into Cambodia. However, these forces were used to secure the forward launch sites.

3. (TS) Operations

a. With the passage of time, operations instructions governing the conduct of the cross-border teams were modified to include the following

(2) The teams were authorized to capture [illegible], if [illegible] scouting, he would be evacuated immediately to South Vietnam for interrogation and disposition.

(2) The use of helicopter gunships to escort helicopter troop ships was authorized as required. The gunships would engage the enemy only when necessary for their own defense or that of the team.

(3) The teams were authorized to destroy significant enemy caches found during reconnaissance operations.

(4) The restrictions on the number of US personnel on the reconnaissance team were removed.

(5) Authority was granted for FAC type aircraft to overfly the DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE area on minimum duration, mission controlled flights.

b. DOD/COMUSMACV attempts to remove prohibitions on the use of small exploitation forces and tactical air in support of the reconnaissance team operations have been unsuccessful. The State Department has nonconcurred in the removal of these prohibitions because of what it considers to be political sensitivities relating to the possible resumption of US/Cambodian diplomatic relations.

c. In general, the military authorities have considered the DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE operations as productive. The State Department, however, has questioned the value of these operations in view of the "political risks" involved.

E. (~~TS~~) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX F: JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC)

1. Activation of the JPRC

a. The JPRC was activated on 17 September 1966. As a separate staff element of MACSOG, the JPRC was responsible for collation, evaluation, and dissemination of all data concerning missing and detained personnel and post-SAR recovery operations. Basically, the

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JPRC would include the coordination of all JPRC resources and capabilities in Southeast recovery efforts in Southeast Asia upon termination of the S-R effort. In this capacity, the JPRC would be the coordination authority and focal point for all post-S-R recovery matters.

b. In furtherance of the above responsibilities, the JPRC was to establish, on a continuing basis, the flow of necessary intelligence into the Center. In addition, it would serve as the central repository for the names of detained and missing personnel.

2. (~~TS~~) Operations

a. Tied in to JPRC activities was the establishment of evasion and escape procedures, which were disseminated to all aircrews. These procedures further involved the establishment of Safe Areas and pick-up points. To complement the Safe Area Program plans for the recovery of air crews downed in North Vietnam, the JPRC established Safe Area Activation Teams (SAATs).

b. The JPRC recovery operations generally took one of two forms. One form was the raid-type operation against known or suspected enemy POW camps. The other form involved the search of an area where personnel who were evading, or who had escaped, were known or strongly suspected to be hiding.

c. In its actual operations, the JPRC has received an abundance of information and intelligence relating to captured, detained, missing, or evading personnel in the Southeast Asia area of operations. Based upon this information, the Center has coordinated recovery operations. The JPRC has had no forces under its operational control. Whenever possible, the forces under the operational control of MACSOG have been used in recovery operations. For that

purpose, two reconnaissance teams from the forces employed in MACSOG's cross-border operations have been maintained on alert status to provide a ready reaction element.

d. In terms of actual recovery, the JPRC operations have not been highly productive. There are cogent reasons, not the least of which is psychological, for maintaining and improving the JPRC capability. From experience factors, the Center has developed invaluable procedures for recovery operations. The essential nature of the JPRC operations makes cost a secondary consideration. It should be pointed out, however, that the cost has been relatively small.

F. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX G: MACSOG COMMUNICATIONS

1. (TS) General

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

2. (TS) Operations

Generally, communications support was provided to MACSOG as follows:

a. The military provided for:

(1) Operational/administrative circuits for MACSOG's use from COMUSMACV Headquarters to the Naval Advisory Detachment in Danang, the Training Center at Camp Long

Thanh, the American Embassy in Saigon, and Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon.

(2) Maintenance of maritime operations equipment and radio operations' proficiency.

(3) Cryptographic support.

(4) Personnel to train and brief agent teams.

(5) The mission briefing of maritime operations and flight crew communicators.

[redacted]

(7) Communications logistics support.

[redacted]

c. The success of the agent team operations and maritime operations depended to a large degree on the ability of those elements to communicate effectively with MACSOG Headquarters. [redacted]

[b][1]
[b][3]
(S)

d. Ultimately, MACSOG was able to install the secure circuits needed for direct communications with Clark Air Base, the command and control detachments and their forward operating bases, Camp Long Thanh, the First Flight Detachment at Nha Trang, and the Naval Advisory Detachment in Danang.

e. As documented in the Study, the general feeling in MACSOG was that the agent teams and the cross-border operations teams should be equipped with lighter and more reliable communications equipment.

f. As a means of enhancing the intelligence collection effort, [redacted] were introduced into MACSOG

[b][1]
[b][3]

MORI DocID: 570355

programs in 1968. Appendix G (MACSOG Communications) to the Study provides information concerning the technical procedures and the various types of equipment used by MACSOG. In addition, in that Appendix the details concerning personnel and communications nets are presented.

G. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX H: SECURITY, COVER, AND DECEPTION

1. (S) General

a. The extremely sensitive nature of MACSOG's operations necessitate stringent security procedures and policies for the control and safeguarding of classified information. Appendix H (Security, Cover, and Deception) sets forth the many security considerations, passive and active, as well as the cover and deception techniques attendant to MACSOG's operations.

b. Pursuant to the above, CINCPAC conducts periodic operational security surveys of MACSOG. In addition, those surveys are conducted under the auspices of both COMUSMACV and Chief, MACSOG.

2. Operations

a. In terms of physical security, each element within or supporting MACSOG has prepared an SOP setting forth its installation defense plans.

b. Of special importance are the cover stories pertinent to the various MACSOG activities in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. For example, the cover story for operations in Cambodia is that the team is conducting anti-infiltration patrols on the South Vietnam side of the border. No acknowledgement of conduct of cross-border operations into Cambodia will be made.

MORI DocID: 570355

c. It is difficult for the US Government to plausibly deny involvement in any air operation unless aircrews and air assets are thoroughly sterilized with respect to identity, origin and sponsorship. Accordingly, cover stories must be designed to reinforce the deniability position rather than to explain the presence of an aircraft and/or crew in a given geographical location.

H. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX I: MACSOG INTELLIGENCE

1. (TS) General

One of MACSOG's basic missions is the acquisition of intelligence. Appendix I (MACSOG Intelligence) sets forth the results obtained by MACSOG in this field and traces the development of MACSOG's internal intelligence organization.

2. (TS) Operations

a. The intelligence derived from the PARBOIL Program (maritime operations) provided practically the only human intelligence coming from the coastal areas of North Vietnam. For the most part, this intelligence was obtained through debriefings of the boat crews and from interrogations of prisoners captured from fishing boats and during cross-beach operations in North Vietnam.

b. The intelligence emanating from the TIMBERWORK Program (agent teams) in North Vietnam was collected by the agent teams from the local area in which the team operated. Generally, the information reported to MACSOG was limited to visual reconnaissance only. The teams might remain in their safe areas or operate far afield, depending upon the environment in which the individual team operated. In short, the agent team reports revealed no information of great significance to MACV. In view of the consensus that most of these agent teams had been compromised, the nature of

MORI DocID. 570355

of information produced by the TIMBERWORK Program was highly questionable.

c. The PRAIRIE FIRE Program has been highly productive These cross-border operations have provided the only ground reconnaissance into Laos by MACV. And, in addition to the intelligence produced, the exploitation forces in the program have enabled MACV to counter enemy infiltration into South Vietnam.

d. As in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, the SALEM HOUSE Program, has provided an important source of intelligence for MACV. Through reconnaissance and verification efforts considerable enemy activity has been observed in the SALEM HOUSE area of operations and reported to MACV. Such intelligence includes such matters as enemy installations, enemy activity of any size, as well as information of the terrain.

e. Basically, the intelligence produced by the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE Programs has been of a technical nature. In Laos, of course, this intelligence was subject to exploitation by MACSOG forces. In Cambodia, however, the use of exploitation forces has been prohibited.

f. MACSOG submits detailed reports of the results of each reconnaissance team operation to the MACV Intelligence Data handling facility. Personnel at that facility store this information which, upon the development of a retrieval program, can be retrieved rapidly.

I. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX J: LOGISTICS

1. (TS) General

Logistic support for COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A was to have been derived basically from in-country resources. These resources were estimated as adequate to satisfy most requirements for planned actions. Assets transferred to MACSOG in

January 1964, and during the transition period following, have been valued at $5,500,000.

2. (TS) Overview of Logistics

a. The original 34A Program was for a 12-month period. The extension of that period beyond 12 months, combined with several changes and expansions to the original mission, influenced changes in size, scope, equipage and funding requirements of MACSOG. The annual operating budget in FY 1965 (excluding support provided by individual military Services [redacted] was authorized by DOD at $5,102,000; by FY 1970 due to broadening of program scope the annual budget was estimated at $25,778,400 (confidential funds) and approximately $450,000 (appropriated funds).

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b. Security precautions attendant to MACSOG operations restricted much of the assistance routinely available within the military Services, and caused delays in construction and base development; e.g., fuel storage, piers, berthing, and support facilities for PTFs; communications equipment, non-attributable US weaponry; command and control facilities, recruitment, training and outfitting of personnel.

MORI DocID. 570357

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		Page	
PART I	General	B-1	
PART II	Covert/Paramilitary Activities	B-4	
PART III	[redacted]	B-57	(b)(1) (b)(3)
PART IV	CPLA I 34A	B-88	

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GROUP 1
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Parts I - IV
[illegible] B
of Appendix B

Doc 3

tc 792 (73-265)

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

B-175

B-176
B-176
B-177
D. MACSOG Organizational Development B-188
[redacted] B-227 (b)(1)
B-278 (b)(3)
G. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence B-295
H. Contingency Planning B-337
I. Personnel and Training B-348
J. Logistics B-400
K. Counterpart Relationships - B-409
The Strategic Technical Directorate

Annex A. [redacted] B-a-1 (b)(1)
Annex B. B-b-1 (b)(3)

Annex C. B-c-1

Annex D. B-d-1
Annex E. B-e-1

Annex F. B-f-1
Annex G. B-g-1

Annex H. Analysis and Recommendations Regarding the Present System of Out-of-Country Operations from South Vietnam B-h-1
Annex I. Comments on MACSOG's Mission B-i-1
Annex J. Organization & Functions Manual B-j-1
Annex K. Comments on MACSOG's Organizational Development . . B-k-1
Annex L. [redacted] . . . . . B-l-1 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Annex M. Comments on Command and Control B-m-1
Annex N. Comments on MACSOG's Operations and Intelligence B-n-1
Annex O. Documentaries B-o-1
Annex P. Comments on Contingency Planning . . . B-p-1
Annex Q. Comments on Personnel and Training . . B-q-1
Annex R. Illustrative Indigenous Civilian Personnel Regulations . . . B-r-1
Annex S. Comments on Logistics B-s-1
Annex T. Counterpart Relationships Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) B-t-1
Annex U. Comments on Counterpart Relationships - The STD B-u-1

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND STUDIES AND OBSERVATION GROUP AND THE VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS DIVISION

INTERNAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

PART I. (U) GENERAL

A. (TS) INTRODUCTION

1. (TS) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), beginning in 1961, conducted limited covert programs for purposes of intelligence, sabotage, and propaganda against North Vietnam (NVN). Agent teams and singletons* were infiltrated largely by air and sea.

2. (TS) Following the Bay of Pigs, major policy decisions** were made concerning responsibilities for the planning and conduct of covert/paramilitary (PM) operations. These decisions, in conjunction with NVN's intensified aggression against South Vietnam (SVN), resulted in meetings between high US officials in Saigon and Honolulu during the fall of 1963. Stemming from these meetings was a decision to prepare a combined Department of Defense-CIA 12-month covert program for the intensification of action against NVN. That program, in concert with other military and diplomatic actions, would be designed to convince the NVN leadership that their continued direction and support of insurgent activities in NVN and Laos should cease. It would include these actions against NVN: harassment, political pressures, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of intelligence, generation of propaganda, all contributing to the diversion of NVN's resources.***

3. (S) Following the above decision, DOD and CIA representatives met in Saigon and drafted a plan which became known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A in DOD and TIGER in CIA. In view of the scope and nature of the plan, DOD and CIA agreed that

* Single agents.
** These policy decisions were embodied in National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM's) 55, 56, 57, 162, 182.
*** (TS) JCS Msg 3697, DTG 261437Z Nov 63.

** These policy decisions were embodied in National Security

MORI DocID 570357

the executive authority for its implementation should be in DOD, with CIA in a supporting role. As a result, the Special Operations Group (SOG), later changed to Studies and Observations Group (SOG), a joint Military Assistance Command Vietnam(MACV)/CIA group, was established on 24 January 1964 to carry out OPLAN 34A. MACSOG would be under MACV and commanded by a military officer.

B. (S) SCOPE AND APPROACH

1. (S) This volume traces the organizational development and role of the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG) and its South Vietnamese counterpart, the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The former is placed in historical context through the exposition of:

a. The pre-MACSOG period (July 1947-January 1964), including:

(1) Basic policy documents/decisions governing covert/PM matters.

(2) Basic matters agreements between DOD and CIA for the planning and conduct of covert/PM operations.

(3) DOD support of CIA in the field of covert/PM operations.

(4) The evolution of a DOD organization for staff cognizance of covert/PM operations.

(5) The development of OPLAN 34A (background, approval, provisions).

(6) The transition of the responsibility for the planning and conduct of covert/PM operations against NVN from CIA to DOD.

(7) Results of CIA covert/PM operations against NVN.

2. (S) Generally, a functional approach is used to depict the major documents, decisions, and events leading up to the

establishment of MACSOG in January 1964 (Parts I - IV). Therefore, rather than presenting each of the foregoing chronologically and as separate entities, they are grouped collectively under the pertinent subject heading to enable the reader to focus on the particular subject.

3. (C) In presenting the inception and evolution of MACSOG (Part V), generally a chronological approach is used. The reader is reminded that the MACSOG programs (FOOTBOY, PRAIRIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE, etc.) are presented in detail in succeeding appendices.

PART II. COVERT/PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PRE-NACSOG PERIOD (JULY 1947-JANUARY 1954)

A. (U) BASIC POLICY DOCUMENTS/DIRECTIVES

The basic policy documents governing covert/PA operations during the pre-NACSOG period were:

1. (U) National Security Act of 1947 (26 July 1947) as amended. This Act established the CIA as an independent agency under the National Security Council (NSC).* Though the Act makes no mention of covert/PA operations, the following provision thereof permits the NSC to exercise wide latitude in the assignment of responsibilities to CIA.

> To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.**

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* (U) Section 102(a), National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, 26 July 1947.
** (U) Ibid., Section (d)(5).
*** (TS) NSC 10/2 was modified by NSC 10/5 (23 Oct 51) and rescinded by NSC 5412 (19 August 1954). See paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, below. An extract of NSC 10/2 is on file in OSACSA (Special Operations Division).

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET E-7 Appendix B

MORI DocID: 570357

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6. (TS) Presidential Decisions: Plan to Prevent Communist Domination of SVN

a. On 20 April 1961, the President asked the Deputy SECDEF to.*

(1) Appraise the status and future prospects of the communist drive to dominate SVN.

(2) Recommend a series of actions (military, political and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which, in the opinion of the Deputy SECDEF, would prevent communist domination of SVN.

b. On 29 April 1961, acting on the report of the Deputy SECDEF and his task force, the President approved a "Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam."** In this program were the following:

(1) An authorization to expand positive and counter-intelligence operations against the communist forces in SVN and against NVN. These operations included dispatch of agents to NVN and use of civilian aircrews of American and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese in operations against NVN. In this regard, US Army Security Agency Teams, numbering a total of 78 personnel, could be sent to Vietnam for direct operations;

* (TS) SECDEF Memorandum for the Deputy SECDEF, 20 April 1961.
** (TS) Deputy SECDEF Memorandum for the Presidential Task Force, "Program of Action for Vietnam," 1 May 1961.

further, an additional 40 personnel for the CIA station were authorized to support an expanded program of covert actions.

(2) Actions to assist the GVN in meeting the increased security threat along the SVN-Laos border. Among other things, the United States would assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to increase the border patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by establishing an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by instituting regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier area, and by applying modern technological area-denial techniques to close the roads and trails along the border.

7. (S) National Security Action Memorandum 55 (NSAM) (28 June 1961).* The President set forth to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his views as to their relations with him in cold war operations. In substance, those views were.

a. The advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as his principal military advisor, was to come to him direct and unfiltered.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for defense of the nation in the cold war similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and PM forces and resources available to the DOD, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement.

c. The president looked to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and PM aspects of cold war programs.

* The rationale from NSAM 55, and for NSAMs 56 and 57 addressed in succeeding paragraphs, stemmed from experiences in the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961. These three NSAM's were issued on the same date, 28 Jun 61.

TOP SECRET

8. (C) NSAM 56 (28 June 1961)

a. The President approved the following:

It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and military operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the US Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we would set in this field. Having determined assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit.

b. In addition, the President requested that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with, the Department of State and the CIA, make an estimate of the above requirements and to recommend ways and means of meeting them.

9. (TS) NSAM 57 (28 June 1961)

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c. NSAM 57 was the subject of considerable comment as to its application and validity during the pre-MACSOG period. Representative of that comment are the following:

(1) In several countries, problems could be solved by turning over to DOD the training of unconventional forces, with CIA providing assistance. The primary question should be, "What is the best way to do the job?" In most instances, this is a question for the Ambassador to answer. There should be two steps involved in the assignment of responsibility for training and support to indigenous paramilitary forces. First, the Ambassador should produce a country plan pointing out the problems which require action and suggesting the governmental agency best equipped to do the job. Jurisdictional responsibilities could be sorted out in Washington, bearing in mind the Ambassador's recommendation.* (Comment in DOD)

(2) In Vietnam there are three types of operations, each of which poses the question as to which governmental agency could best do the given job, namely:

* Memorandum for Record, by Lt. Col. S. V. Wilson, Office of the Assistant SECDEF (SO), "Discussion of Defense Report on Paramilitary Requirements," 20 Apr 62.

(a) Ranger operations along the border.

(b) Military battalions crossing into Laos.

(c) Infiltration operations into VN.

The first two operations should have been handled by DOD, the third by CIA. Further, if the expansion which has taken place in the Neo Operation could have been foreseen in the beginning, it, too, should have assigned at the outset to DOD.* (Comment in DOD)

(3) Paramilitary operations should be assigned jointly to DOD and CIA, with DOD in charge and CIA in a supporting role, and with the necessary funds made a part of the CIA budget.**

(4) CIA's covert paramilitary facility should be kept intact and this would be impossible under the concept cited in paragraph (3) above. (Comment in CIA)**

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* Ibid.

** Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick, from BG Lansdale, "Paramilitary Operations," 8 Feb 63, p.1.

* Ibid.

[redacted]

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4. DOD has been unable to obtain estimates of total DOD expenditures for PM activities, since many of the cost items are an integral part of the regular military establishment and not susceptible to meaningful break out. However, the DOD Comptroller estimates (mostly of personnel costs) show, in millions of dollars:

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(6) DOD has shown great skill in managing its PM men, money, and materiel in support of conventional operations, just as CIA has shown skill in managing its resources for

UW operations. It is when DOD gets into UW operations, such as Vietnam, that there is a need for considerable improvement. Neither CIA CPB nor MACV has the effective, flexible management control of PM operations enjoyed by the CIA station in Saigon. Some of this is a straight military management problem, such as setting a truly joint Army-Air Force SF effort in Vietnam and senior command understanding of the role of psychological operations in CI. Some of this is a Washington-level problem, such as flexible funding procedures, a practical chain-of-command structure, and a legal basis for UW operations in the gray areas).*

(7) NSAM 57 is basically sound (Comment in DOD):**

(a) It makes a distinction between large and small PM operations. As a result of the Bay of Pigs, it was concluded that the CIA did not have the capability to *mount, manage, and support more than small covert* activities, and that operations of predominantly military character are best done by the DOD. Concern over these issues arose mainly from the complex problems of transferring command responsibility from a civilian agency to a military command, in mid-stream, when such an operation began to exceed the capability of the Agency.

(b) With this area clarified, NSAM 57 adds that "a wholly covert or disavowable" activity "may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency." When NSAM 57 uses this

* Ibid.

** (S) SACSA Memorandum for the DEPSECDEF, "NSAM-57 -- Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations," 31 Jul 63. SACSA-M427-63. This memo was occasioned by a DOD understanding that the DCI was concerned with the language in NSAM 57 which states: "Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable it may be assigned to the CIA." (underlining added) More specifically, it was understood that, in the DCI's view, the words "may be" rendered CIA planning difficult.,

able it may be assigned to the CIA." (underlining added)

language, it is following a course which has been pursued consistently by the US government in not assigning the responsibility for covert activities to any single organization on a permanent or full-time basis. Thus, the use of the term "may be assigned," which the CIA finds an impediment to planning, actually derives from the National Security Act of 1947. This Act spells out the intelligence mission of the CIA and then adds that the Agency is also created "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

(c) It can be seen, therefore, that NSAM 57 derives from an evolutionary process which began with the National Security Act of 1947, followed by NSC 5412/2, with which it is fully in accord in its action to fix responsibility for the full spectrum of PM operations. Reflecting on the Bay of Pigs experience, the NSAM is realistic in assigning covert PM operations of large size or great complexity to DOD, whether wholly or partially covert. In the same vein, it concludes that "a wholly covert [operation] may be assigned to the CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency." The converse of this - that covert operations which exceed the normal capabilities of the Agency should be assigned to the DOD - would seem to be the real basis for the Agency's concern, although this is certainly the prime lesson of the Bay of Pigs.

(d) NSAM 57 appears to be responsive to the [illegible] and spirit of the National Security Act of 1947 [illegible] which derives from it. If the NSC contents are cause for planning difficulties in CIA, the criticism would have to be levelled not so much at NSAM 57 but at NSC 5412/2, which preserves freedom of action in task assignment to the NSC and, perhaps, even at the National Security Act, where the assignment of duties on a "from time to time" basis is prescribed specifically.

(e) PM operations which are not covert have no place in the CIA.

d. On 27 February 1963, the Deputy SECDEF and the DCI "agreed that, rather than undertaking a revision of NSAM 57 to eliminate the questions that have arisen as to its interpretation, the conduct of future paramilitary operations, as between Defense and CIA, would be considered on a case-by-case basis and approved where necessary by the Special Group." The Office of the Deputy Secretary was to be informed before any PM training of foreign nationals or other PM operations were taken by any elements of the US military establishment in order that the DCI might be so advised and a determination made whether review by the Special Group (5412) was necessary.*

e. The current status of NSAM 57 is uncertain.

(1) Soon after taking office, the present Administration issued a memorandum placing the NSAMs in three groups:**

* Deputy SECDEF memo for Gen. Taylor, "Paramilitary Operations--NSAM 57," 27 Feb 63. This agreement was in response to an earlier proposal by CIA that NSAM 57 be rescinded; further, that direct quotations from NSAM 57 appearing in NSAMs 162 (paragraph 11, below) and 182 (Annex A) be rescinded. That CIA proposal would have made CIA responsible for the planning and execution of all covert PM action programs; DOD would have been responsible for the provision of personnel and logistical support, including funding, to CIA covert PM action programs.

** (S) NSDM 3, 3 February 1969.

TOP SECRET

(a) To be retained.

(b) To be reviewed.

[illegible] would be made by the NSC group [illegible] department concerned to determine whether the NSAM: remained the authority for active programs and should be confirmed as written, could be considered inactive because it had been subsumed in established programs; should be updated or consolidated with other guidance and reissued.

(c) To be considered inactive as of 3 February (date of the memorandum).

These NSAMs would have fulfilled their initial purpose, been subsumed in subsequent programs, been overtaken by events, or been rescinded already.

(2) In response to the above memorandum, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:*

(a) Stated that some NSAMs on the inactive list and actually the genesis of certain existing policies and should not be relegated to inactive status without further review.

(b) Recommended that NSAM 57 be reviewed, updated, and reissued.

(3) Further, in response to the above memorandum, the Deputy SecDef:**

(a) Concurred in the above recommendation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Suggested that NSAM 57 be reviewed by the NSC - Interdepartmental Group/Politico-Military Group.

(4) Action on the above recommendation remains in abeyance.

* (S) CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "Disposition of National Security Action Memorandum, 25 February 1969, CM-3960-69.

** (S) Deputy SecDef Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "Disposition of National Security Action Memoranda," 14 March 1969.

* (S) CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "Disposition of National

TOP SECRET

10. (S) NSAM 182 (16 Dec 1961)

a. This NSAM established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). In essence, that Group is a means to bring to unity of effort and to use all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.

b. The Group consists of these members:

Military Representative of the President, Chairman

The Attorney General

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of Central Intelligence

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Administrator, Agency for International Development

Other department and agency representatives, as deemed necessary (on invitation)

11. (TS) NSAM 162 (19 June 1962)*

a. Basically, NSAM 162 reflected the President's approval on:

(1) A program to remedy certain deficiencies in the US capability to support both the training and active operations of indigenous paramilitary forces.

(2) The assignment of responsibilities to various departments and agencies for accomplishing that program.

b. This NSAM was designed to unify and orchestrate US internal defense programs and activities in friendly countries facing a threat of subversive insurgency, and to provide strategic guidance for assisting such countries to maintain their internal security. Plans for this purpose would

* (TS) NSAM 162 was forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al, by DEPSECDEF Memorandum, "Development of US Military and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary, and Military Resources," 10 Jul 62.

* (TS) NSAM 162 was forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

include military, police, intelligence and psychological measures comprising a well-rounded internal defense plan. In addition, these plans would be consistent with the military, economic, political and social measures constituting the overall country plan. The plans would be completed and in the hands of the Department of State by 1 September 1963, available for review by the Special Group (CI). From then on, the Special Group would keep these country internal defense plans under periodic review, and ensure prompt resolution of interdepartmental problems arising in connection with their implementation.

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12. (TS) NSAM 273 (26 November 1963). This memorandum set forth guidance from the President which resulted from his review of the discussions of SVN occurring in Honolulu on 20 November 1963. For MACSOG purposes, the essence of such guidance follows:

a. It remains the central object of the United States in SVN to assist the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy. The test of all U.S. decisions and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.

b. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be

MORI DocID: 570357

estimates of such factors as (Action was assigned to State, DOD, and CIA)

(1) Resulting damage to VC.

(2) The plausibility of denial.

(3) Possible North Vietnamese retaliation.

(4) Other international reaction.

c. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to 50 kilometers inside Laos. In addition, political plans should be developed for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined method of political guidance for such operations, inasmuch as their timing and character can have a definite relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos. (Action was assigned to State, DOD, and CIA)

d. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for SVN, and it is therefore urgent that the United States should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon Cambodia. In particular, a plan should be developed using all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the Cambodians that the recent charges against us, the U.S., are groundless. (Action was assigned to State)

e. It was desired that the United States develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the VC is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. (Action was assigned to State and to other agencies as necessary)

13. (Ø) Operations Plans (OPLAN) 34A (15 December 1963). This OPLAN, its provisions, and the main decisions and events leading to its development and approval are set forth in Part IV, below.

leading to its development and approval are set forth in Part IV, below.

TOP SECRET

2. (TS) BASIC AGREEMENTS [illegible] DOD AND CIA

The basic agreements between DOD and CIA for the planning and conduct of covert/[illegible] operations during the pre-ASCOD period are

1. (TS) Logistical Support (6 October 1949)*

a. The SECDEF, referring to a DCI request of 11 Dec 1948 for supply bases, set forth four basic principles governing DOD's support of CIA's covert operations. In essence, these principles were:

(1) DOD would expect reimbursement from CIA for the costs of supplies and of their storage and transportation when additional or extraordinary costs to DOD were involved, unless such expenses were unmistakeably associated with particular operations requested or embraced by DOD in covert support of specific military missions.

(2) Operations should be consistent with US military policies and approved by DOD prior to implementation in time of peace. Support details would be arranged with the local US military commander concerned.

(3) Precautions should be taken to insure against identification of DOD operations in process.

(4) Those operations planned to be conducted in military theaters in time of war should be in accordance with war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should have local coordination and agreement in the theater concerned.

b. In connection with the above principles, the SECDEF elaborated that:

(1) He recognized the importance of covert operations under the then present world conditions and that he intended to take measures to support such operations.

* (TS) SECDEF Memo for DCI, 6 Oct 49.

Further, these operations, effectively conducted, constituted one of the best [illegible] of supporting the national defense in time of peace. Since the contribute importantly to success in war, the SECDEF would outline the reasonable conditions on which DOD would cooperate in the planning and conduct of covert operations.

(2) He had great concern regarding the proper location of administrative responsibility for covert operations and, pending further study, reserved his position with respect to whether the responsibility should reside in CIA.

(3) The principles would generally apply regardless of the particular form of the organization for conducting various covert operations and were without reference to present or future organizational structures.

(4) There were two very important factors which had to be emphasized as the organization for covert operations developed. First, the organization must assume such autonomous responsibility and be so effectively obscured as to assure that neither the President nor the Secretaries of State and Defense would be placed in a position of having to answer publicly for its activities. The second factor concerned financial support of covert operations. As indicated in NSC 10/2, operational funds would be provided out of the CIA budget.

2. (TS) Logistical Support (18 October 1949).* The DCI stated that the four basic principles outlined in paragraph 1, above, were generally agreeable to CIA, and that they were accepted subject to:

a. Any deviations which might be directed by the President or the NSC.

* (TS) DCI Memorandum to SECDEF, 18 Oct 49.

b. Any modifications agreed to in specific instances between DOE and CIA.

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(7) A Joint Intelligence Operations Task Force (JIOTF) is a joint force composed of assigned or attached elements of CIA, the Army, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or of any two or more of the above, which is constituted and so designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commander of a specified command, by the commander of a unified command, or by the commander of an existing Joint Task Force.

(8) Certain of the indigenous assets controlled by CIA would, at varying stages of their development and employment, require support from and close coordination with military forces. A JIOTF with CIA participation should be established when the mission to be accomplished so required.

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5. (~~TS~~) Logistical Support (Project [illegible] to Contingency [illegible]

a. In his memorandum of 14 January 1956 to the Secretary of Defense, the DCI stated that:

(1) CIA had completed its initial logistical mission and that it was apparent there were many areas and tasks requiring joint discussion and resolution.

(2) A need existed for a more complete understanding of the respective logistical roles of DOD and CIA.

(3) In order to ensure refinement and complete understanding in the assumption of responsibilities, a joint DOD/CIA logistics task force should be established to accomplish these objectives.

(a) To make recommendations concerning the exact responsibilities of DOD and CIA in the provision of the necessary logistical support for wartime UW activities.

(b) To make recommendations concerning the implementation of the jointly agreed logistic support and guidance necessary to generate logistic requirements from the JCS field commanders to support wartime activities.

(c) To make recommendations concerning the status of UW logistics planning and stockpiling objectives.

b. On 23 January 1956, the SECDEF concurred in the DCI's proposal that a joint DOD/CIA logistics task force be established (paragraph 5, above).**

c. On 26 October 1956, the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the report

* (~~TS~~) DCI Memorandum for SECDEF, "Establishment of a Joint DOD/CIA Logistics Task Force," 14 Jan 56.

** Efforts to locate the SECDEF memorandum have been unsuccessful. A memorandum for the SECDEF from Gen. G. B. Erskin, USMC (Ret.), 19 Jan 56, recommended approval of the DCI proposal.

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of the Joint Defense/CIA Logistics Task Force, renamed a committee (p. 2 paragraphs c and d), and noted that:*

(1) The objectives of the committee had been met largely by the inclusion of its recommendations in Appendices E and F (Unconventional Warfare) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1956-30 June 1957.

(2) Service UW logistics planning was current or under revision and was contained in the above appendices as well as in their current publications.

(3) Guidance was sufficient so that stockpiling objectives could be determined.

(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to review and comment on the logistics committee report as to whether DOD should publish it as a collation of DOD/CIA logistical responsibilities.

d. On 24 January 1957, in a memorandum to the SECDEF, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

(1) Stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the Logistics Committee report and, for reasons of clarity and coherence, recommended only minor changes in it.

(2) Recommended that the SECDEF approve the substance of the report and that it be disseminated in order to assist subordinate commanders in coordinating logistic support for UW activities with CIA.

e. On 16 March 1957, the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) forwarded to the DCI the report of the Joint Defense/CIA Logistics Committee for his consideration as to the feasibility of publishing the document as a DOD/CIA UW logistics

* (~~TS~~) Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Defense-CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 26 Oct 56.

** (~~TS~~) JCS Memorandum for the SECDEF, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 24 Jan 57.

agreement." That agreement would supersede multiple and partial [illegible] agreements [illegible]. Further, the Assistant to the [illegible] indicated that the document as coordinated by the Assistant SECDEF for Supply and Logistics.

f. On 23 April 1957, the Deputy DCI.**

(1) Returned to the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) the report of the Joint Defense/CIA Logistical Committee.

(2) Indicated that CIA concurred in the report subject to the acceptance of several suggested changes. Two of the changes were:

(a) The title of the document would read, "Defense-CIA Logistical Responsibilities."

(b) Paragraph 1 would read as follows:

> This document is an agreement between the Department of Defense and the CIA. It has been compiled to provide a summary of the major features of CIA-Defense logistic relations, for use by appropriate planning agencies.

g. On 20 June 1957, the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO).***

(1) Forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the changes in the Defense-CIA logistical responsibilities as recommended by the Deputy DCI.

(2) Requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the proposed changes.

h. On 9 August 1957, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to the SECDEF, stated that.****

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the Deputy DCI's suggested changes.

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* (TS) Assistant to the SECDEF(SO) Memorandum for DCI, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 16 March 1957.

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*** (TS) Assistant to the SECDEF(SO) Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 20 Jun 57.

**** (TS) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for SECDEF, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 9 Aug 57.

(2) Recommended that they be incorporated in the draft statement.

1. On 11 September 1957, the Deputy SECDEF forwarded to the Deputy DCI the approved version of the statement of Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities which incorporated the changes proposed by the latter.* On this date, the Deputy SECDEF also forwarded the document to the Service Secretaries for dissemination to the subordinate commanders for their guidance.**

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- (TS) DEPSECDEF Memorandum for the Deputy DCI, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 11 Sep 57.

** (TS) DEPSECDEF Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 11 Sep 57.

*** (TS) DEPSECDEF letter to the DCI, 17 Jan 1964, with Enclosure, also dtd 17 Jan 1964. The Enclosure was a proposed "Agreement between the SECDEF and the DCI on Responsibility for Equipment on Loan."

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(3) The effective date of the agreement was 1 July 1963.

b. On 19 March 1964, the requisite staffing on it having been completed, the above agreement was signed by the Deputy SECDEF and forwarded to the DCI.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the agreement and, in a memorandum to the SECDEF, dated 11 May 1964, they commented in substance as follows:*

(1) The agreement, properly employed, was an acceptable understanding of the manner in which reimbursement was to be made in the event of loss of major items of equipment on loan.

(2) When a proposed PM operation or covert program was presented by the CIA to the Special Group (5412) with a request for specific DOD support, the SECDEF was urged to:

(a) Give the Service an opportunity to present its views, particularly with respect to the impact on military operations of the loan in question, before the resources of the Service were committed.

(b) Give the Joint Chiefs of Staff an opportunity to review the proposed program (or individual operation if appropriate), to include the level of DOD resources required, and to advise whether the operation was within the parameters of NSAM 57.

* ~~(TS)~~ JCS memorandum for the SECDEF, "Agreement on Responsibility for Equipment on Loan (U)," 11 May 1964. JCSM-401-64.

[illegible]

[illegible] Section [illegible] contains [illegible] specially [illegible] in [illegible] DCI [illegible] the field of covert/[illegible] operations during the pre-[illegible] period.

1. (U/S) Air Supply and Brown Beret

a. The DCI, in his memorandum to the SECDEF on 20 April 1949, states that, to enable the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), CIA, to carry out effectively its covert operations responsibilities under NSC 10/2 (Part II, paragraph A2, above), assistance from the National Military Establishment was needed in several fields. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

(U/S) [illegible] Memorandum for the SECDEF, 20 Apr 49. To clarify terminologies:

The OPC was formerly known as the Office of Special Projects. The latter became the repository (personnel, files, agents, etc.) of what remained of the Office of Strategic Services upon its discontinuance in 1946. The OPC was created by NSC 10/2 to handle secret operations; meanwhile, the Office of Special Operations (OSO) handled secret intelligence. The two operated as entirely separate offices until 1949 when they were put under the single direction of CIA Operations Division.

-- "National Military Establishment," as so entitled in the National Security Act of 1947, was changed to "Department of Defense" in the Amendments to the National Security Act, enacted in 1949.

Information concerning the action taken by DCD in the foregoing DCI memorandum is not available to the Documentation Team. Inquiry to the Air Force Special Operations Office (x-73797) on 17 October 1967 revealed that the Air Force has such information. According to Colonel Brown of that office, however, the Deputy Director for Plans and Policy (BG Designate James Allen) considered that the information was not germane to the terms of reference of the study effort at hand and should not be released to the Team. A number of Air Force officers, previously assigned to or otherwise associated with AOSOG, were selected for interview. The results of some of those interviews are incorporated in various parts of this study. The views of these Air Force officers are sometimes critical of the policies and procedures used by CIA in its conduct of air operations against [illegible] during the pre-AOSOG period. Since the documentation effort must provide a data base for possible later analysis and since doctrine/tactics/training/equipment are all important factors to be considered, the foregoing data in the Air Force files should be [illegible] procedures used by CIA in its conduct of [illegible] operations [illegible] study effort. If the data are relevant, they should be reflected in this study.

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c. The DCI further requested, in order to make minimum preparations in emergency in the near future required clandestine operations, that interim procedures based primarily on the then existing equipment be established not later than 1 July 1949. Fully perfected systems, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) would be developed as soon thereafter as possible. The DCI added that the OPC and the OSO were prepared, on request, to assign one officer each to work with the National Military Establishment in connection with the foregoing.

2. (TS) Responsibilities for Covert Operations/UW. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 and 27 March 1952, promulgated these responsibilities for cover operations/UW:*

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

* 1. (TS) JCS Memorandum for the Chiefs of Services and the Commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Responsibility of Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff with Respect to Covert Operations," 26 Mar 52. SM-792-52. Amended by SM-865-52, 7 April 52.
2. (TS) JCS Memorandum for DCI, "Responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Unconventional Warfare," 27 Mar 52. SM-796-52. Amended by SM-865-52, 7 April 52.
3. (TS) JCS Memorandum to Joint Strategic Plans Committee, "Preparation of Unconventional Warfare Annexes in Support of War Plans," 27 Mar 52. SM-797-52.

3. (TS) JCS Memorandum to Joint Strategic Plans Committee, "Preparation

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[redacted], "Memorandum for [redacted], Chief of Staff for Unconventional Warfare," 27 March 1952. SM-607-52.

[illegible] on 5 [illegible] military personnel to [illegible]. In essence, [illegible] personnel [illegible] to the [illegible] to provide [illegible] military participation and support at appropriate levels of the [illegible]. Such personnel would be the best qualified and most [illegible] available, with a well-founded understanding of their own Service policies, programs, and requirements.

b. On 6 April 1960, the DOD, CIA, and Bureau of the Budget (BOB) reached an understanding that CIA would budget for and reimburse DOD for:**

(1) All military personnel formally assigned to CIA for a normal tour of duty under the Agency's administration, command and control.

(2) The services of those military personnel who were detailed in continuing and substantially full-time support of operational requirements of CIA but who, for reasons of efficiency, were not under the command of CIA but remained under the command control of the military commander concerned.

c. In addition to the above

(1) CIA would include in its budget military personnel not under CIA command and control who, as such, were not reflected as part of its regular personnel strength.

(2) In the event of a situation wherein substantial numbers of military personnel were required by CIA as temporary expedients (less than six months), they would be made available without reimbursement for salary.

5. (TS) Establishment of the Special Activities Division (SAD)

a. In a memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 March 1961, the SECDEF directed the establishment [illegible] the Joint Staff of a small, secure staff element [illegible] the Assistant to the SECDEF (Brigadier General [illegible] and [illegible]) in discharging his

* Directive 5-131b.3, "Policies Governing Assignment of Military Personnel to the Central Intelligence Agency," 5 Dec 57.
** [illegible] of understanding by DOD, CIA and BOB, "Military Personnel Support for the CIA," 6 Apr 60.

* Directive 5-131b.3, "Policies Governing Assignment of Military Personnel to the Central Intelligence Agency," 5 Dec 57.

[illegible] operations of [illegible] to the [illegible] relationships with [illegible] operations. [illegible] requirements would be staffed, [illegible] coordination normal to Joint Staff [illegible].

b. In response to the above SECDEF directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established in the Joint Staff (Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5) the SAD.** This staff element would provide staff support to the ASTD (SO) and be responsible for the overall coordination of requests for the support of peacetime special operations of the CI Further, this staff element would ensure that:

(1) [illegible] requirements for support were properly processed and received secure and expeditious handling from all Services.

(2) All such support activities had been approved by the Office of the SECDEF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff when required.

c. The above authority further set forth the procedures for handling such requests for support and asked the Services to:

(1) Forward to the Joint Staff the designation of the focal point office and the name of the individual responsible for such matters.

(2) Review their current system for supporting CIA operations and begin an inventory of support being furnished to the CIA.

* SECDEF Memorandum for the [illegible], Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Special Operations" 26 March 1961. Although the Joint Staff had, in a general sense, participated in a large number of covert peacetime operations, nearly always in support of CIA special operations, no formal continuing plan, facility, or method of operation had been in existence for such action, except on a case basis.

** JCS Memorandum for the SECDEF, "Military Support of the Peacetime Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency," 1 August 1961. SM-318-61.

[illegible]

[illegible] and Joint [illegible]

[illegible] to CIA [illegible]

[illegible] to all activities [illegible] and provision of military [illegible] of the peacetime operations of CIA]

e. Further details on S-2 and other organizational matters involving Joint Staff support to both CIA and OSD are set forth in Section [illegible], below.

6. (~~TS~~) Provision of C-123 Aircraft. On 20 November 1961, the ASTD *

a. Stated that the Deputy SECDEF had favorably considered the request of CIA for augmentation of the airlift capability in support of US operations in SE Asia.**

b. Authorized the Air Force to furnish CIA with five C-123 aircraft and initial support as requested, on condition that CIA have a satisfactory cover plan and sensible arrangement for the maintenance of the planes.

7. (~~S~~) USAF Air Operations in SE Asia. An OSD Memorandum for record of 16 February 1962 sets forth in general the various USAF air operations in SE Asia.*** These operations included covert support of the South Vietnamese Air Force both in its training mission and in combat operations/air strikes, and photo reconnaissance.

8. (~~TS~~) Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in SVN. During the Sixth SECDEF Conference, Pacific Area, 23 July 1962, the SECDEF announced that the DOD would assume responsibility for certain activities in SVN which had been developed under the auspices of the

* (~~TS~~) OSD Memorandum, "Military Support of Peacetime Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (S)," 29 July 1961.

** (~~TS~~) Memorandum from the ASTD (Col Lansdale) to the Vice Chief of Staff, US Air Force, "Requirement for C-123 Aircraft," 20 November 1961

** (~~TS~~) CIA Memorandum to SG Lansdale, "Requirement for C-123 Aircraft," 20 October 1961.

*** (~~S~~) OSD Memorandum for Record, "Meeting with State, Air Force, and DOD Representatives on Jungle Gym Operations," 16 February 62.

[illegible] avoidance in [illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] military [illegible] of the GVN [illegible] should be so coordinated [illegible] of all resources which contributed directly to the [illegible] defense posture and strength of that country be put under one control. Therefore, in conformance with national policy that military and military-type cold war operations be placed under military responsibility and control, CO US MACV should integrate into his command the training, operational assistance and logistical support responsibility for the essentially overt military and military-type elements, which had been developed in SVN under CIA sponsorship with US military assistance. This should be done as rapidly as his command could work out effective transfers.

b. This action would be taken with due regard for the sensitivity of certain matters involved and for the basic requirement to certain secret intelligence which resided with the CIA. Such action would be accomplished promptly and in a manner which would keep in motion the operational momentum and effectiveness of the then current programs. Certain of these more highly specialized activities might have required some phasing in the transfer of political responsibility in order to preserve well established relationships with GVN officials in Saigon and at the provincial level. However, such delay as might have been necessary to sustain these detailed relationships would not be permitted to impede the early assumption of this over-all responsibility and the development of a closely knit total GVN military capability.

c. In considering this action, all components of CIA activities should be considered. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

* (S) JCS Memorandum for CINCPAC, "Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in South Vietnam," 15 August 1962. SM-901-62.

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[illegible] of the [illegible] distinguishing the [illegible] of [illegible] of each of the foregoing activities [illegible] Chief of Station might be assured that he would receive the fullest support from all elements of DOD in this endeavor, further, that required CIA resources would continue to be available to assist him as necessary, just as his obligation to support CIA in its continuing functions would be unchanged. Funds, including special authorization to meet unusual requirements, could be made available upon receipt of firm requirements. Whenever possible, these requirements should be arrived at between COMUSMACV, the Ambassador, the CIA representative and the GVN. However, it was recommended that every effort be made to integrate this new responsibility into existing programs and to treat it as regular business to be supported through the joint efforts of all US military resources and those of the GVN. If possible this should all be done outside of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in order that there would be no problem concerning transfer or withdrawal from the GVN of any items required for these activities from the regular MAP. It was desired that these activities be supported in such a manner that they were completely acceptable to the Ambassador and to the GVN. In so doing, it should be made plain that, although such activities might have embodied some element of hazard with respect to the loyalty of the nationals involved, this integration of all military and military-type activities into one coordinated whole should serve to reduce that factor, while increasing over-all effectiveness of the total South Vietnamese military capability in the future.

[illegible] and 57, on 25 [illegible]

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7 (U) Deputy [illegible] memorandum for the DCI, 21 Oct 63.

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D. (~~TS~~) [illegible] ACTIONS

1. General

a. This section traces the evolution within DOD of the major organizational arrangements for handling covert/PM actions during the pre-MACSOG period.

(1) Such arrangements focus on those pertinent to SE Asia in general and Vietnam in particular at the Washington level.

(2) As reflected in Part II, paragraphs B-5 and B-10 above, the two agencies comprising the interdepartmental covert/PM planning agencies at the highest level were: the Special Group (5412) established pursuant to NSC 5412/2 (28 December 1955) and subsequently redesignated the "303 Committee"; and the Special Group (CI) established pursuant to NSAM 124 (18 January 1962).

(3) Except for the formation of the Special Group (5412)/303 Committee, as set forth above, the Washington-level organizational process largely began with the advent of the Kennedy Administration (1961) and the organizational machinery it considered necessary for implementing the President's policies on Vietnam.

2. (~~S~~) Establishment of the Office of the Assistant to Secretary of Defense (OASD) (February-March 1961)

a. On 24 February 1961, the Deputy SECDEF in his memorandum to the CJCS, stated that:*

* (~~S~~) SECDEF Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al, 24 February 1961.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

( ) Special Group (5412) matters.

(b) Special Defense activities as approved by the SECDEF.

(c) CIA relationships of special interest to the SECDEF.

(3) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff would designate officers of general/flag rank from the Joint Staff to provide military advice and support to General Lansdale in the performance of his duties.

b. (C) In amplification of the above, on 2 March 1961, the Deputy SECDEF informed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that:*

(1) General Lansdale, as ASID, would provide staff support for all matters related to Special Group (5412) actions.

(2) Immediately following the Special Group meetings, the members of the Group would be joined by the Director, USIA and the Director, Bureau of the Budget for an informal luncheon meeting. At this meeting, the members would discuss such subjects as they considered appropriate.

(3) General Lansdale would provide the SECDEF and the Deputy SECDEF with staff support for the luncheon meetings. In that capacity, General Lansdale would recommend appropriate items for discussion and monitor the necessary follow-through actions required as a result of the meeting. Further, he would provide details on implementation.

* (C) Deputy SECDEF Memorandum for the [illegible] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Inter-Agency Coordination on Special Group Matters," 2 March 1961.

[illegible]

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[illegible] the Director, Joint Staff (DJS) [illegible] the JCSSP that Brigadier General David W. Gray, [illegible] been designated [illegible] General Gray, Chief of the Special Activities Division, J-5 would be General Lansdale's point of contact for the Joint Staff for Special Group (5-12) matters and special defense activities.

4. (TS) Organization and Functions of a Small Secure Staff in the Joint Staff (Jan - 1961)

a. On 1 March 1961, Brigadier General Lansdale, ATSD, in his memorandum for Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, DJS, set forth his understanding of the way the two, on 28 February 1961, had conceived as the most effective means of having the Joint Staff render support for his mission.* General Lansdale said that he and General Wheeler, if the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, could start to work along these lines:

(1) A small team in the Joint Staff would be activated under Brigadier General David W. Gray, USA, Chief Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5. Members of the team, while responsible to their superiors, would be in a position to work directly and fully with General Lansdale's office. These officers would be expected to function as his secure and effective link for support by the appropriate Service and overseas command on approved actions.

* (TS) DJS memorandum, for the Deputy SECDEF, "Joint Staff Point of Contact for Brig/Gen E. G. Lansdale, USAF, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense," 27 February 1961. DJSM 217-61.

** (TS) ATSD memorandum for General Wheeler, "Staffing of Special Actions for the Secretary," 1 March 1961

[illegible] Office of Special Operations [illegible]

[illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] to curtail the Office of Special Operations [illegible].

b. On 14 March 1961, in his memorandum for the SECDEF, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that -

(1) The Joint Staff, certainly and feasibly, should assume the responsibility for processing CIA requests for peacetime military support of covert operations as set forth in General Lansdale's memorandum (paragraph a above).

(2) To implement that responsibility, an increase in the OJCS personnel authorization of two officers and one civilian stenographer would be necessary.

c. In furtherance of the above concepts for the activation of a team in the Joint Staff (paragraph a and b above)

(1) General Lansdale, in a memorandum for record on 27 March 1961, stated that -

(a) He and General Wheeler had agreed upon the concept of providing the Joint Staff staffing support for him in in the discharge of his responsibilities as ASTD.

(b) The following afforded guidance for some of the more sensitive work under the arrangement:

1. A small, secure staff element in the Joint Staff would be established to furnish such support. This "special operations" element would be quickly responsive to the ASTD as required in connection with his responsibility for special activities and operations of interest to the SECDEF particularly DOD relationships with CIA covert operations.

* OJCS memorandum for the SECDEF, "Processing Peacetime Military Support Requirements for Covert Operations (S)" 14 March 1961.

** (S) [illegible] the record by Lansdale, "Special Operations", 27 Mar 61.

(S) [illegible] the record by Lansdale, "Special Operations", 27 Mar 61.

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(b) A small, secure staff element in the Joint Staff would be established in order to provide such support. This staff would carry out its special support of CIA operations and related actions in coordination with existing counterpart staff sections then handling this work in the individual Services as well as certain elements of OSD and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Requirements staffed by this Joint Staff element were authorized for transmittal directly to appropriate Services or commands, as required, without the intra-Service coordination normal to the Joint Staff function.

(c) In accordance with the agreement that experienced personnel would man the new staff element, these two officers would be assigned to the Joint Staff: Captain Burns W. Spore, USN, and Colonel LeRoy F. Prouty, USAF.

(d) The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be authorized an increase of two officers and one civilian stenographer.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandums of 29 July 1961, informed the SECDEF** and the DCI*** that:

(a) A Special Operations Division in the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff had been activated.

(b) Procedures incorporating the instructions contained in the SECDEF memorandum of 28 March 1961 (paragraph 4c(2), above) had been put into effect; further, that these procedures would be more effective if Chief, Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5, were kept informed of the matters pertaining to the subjects under consideration by the Special Group (5412).

(*) SECDEF memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Processing Peacetime Military [illegible] (5)," [illegible]

(**) JCS memorandum for the SECDEF, "Military Support of Peacetime [illegible] of the Central Intelligence Agency," 29 Jul 61 [illegible]

(***) [illegible] 29, by the Secretary, "Military Support of Peacetime [illegible] of the Central Intelligence Agency, 29 Jul 61 [illegible]

[illegible]

(4) [illegible] Central Operations [illegible] Joint Staff (hereinafter [illegible]), the SECDEF [illegible], stated that [illegible] for the division in support of the [illegible] SECDEF stated further that:

(a) He had assigned [illegible] responsibility for handling the sensitive type of activity involved to the ASTD, General Lansdale.

(b) All communications between the CIA and the DOD with respect to special military support of CIA peacetime activity would be handled between the CIA and the ASTD, unless the latter specifically made an exception for the handling of a category of CIA requests for support.

(c) He did not agree with the JCS proposal to keep the Chief, Special Operations Division, J-5, fully informed on Special Group (5412) actions under consideration; further, that he did expect the ASTD to inform the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Chief, Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5 of Special Group matters as the SECDEF needed advice upon policy matters or as military planning needs were involved.

(5) The ASTD, on 12 September 1961, as a follow-up to the SECDEF memorandum of 7 August 1961 (paragraph (4), above)

(a) Stated that:

1. All matters involving DOD peacetime support of CIA operations would be monitored directly by the OASTD

2. Matters of a routine nature would be handled directly between CIA and established points of contact within the military Services. Other CIA peacetime support requirements would be channeled through the OASTD directly to the appropriate Service or to the Joint Staff point of contact, depending upon the nature of the request.

(5) (b) [illegible] Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Military Support of Peacetime Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (S)," 7 Aug 61.

[illegible]

[illegible] of the Joint Staff [illegible] and [illegible] are not in consonance with the [illegible]

[illegible]

a. [illegible] of the increased emphasis and scope of counter-insurgency operations and subsidiary activities, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the establishment of OS/CSA directly responsible to the DCS effective 23 February 1962. The transfer of the Subsidiary Activities Division of the Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, complete with personnel, personnel spaces and functions, to the S/CSA.

b. This action stemmed from the President's desire for emphasis in organization on counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare matters.

6. (~~TS~~) Disestablishment of S CTD Transfer of Functions to DIA and OS OS

a. In his memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of 30 September 1963, the DEPSECDEF stated that, effective on that date, STD was disestablished. Its functions which must be continued would be divided between DIA and OSACSA. The OATSD files and records would be transferred to DIA and OSACSA. Further, pursuant to the DEPSECDEF memorandum,

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(d) [illegible]

(a) Assume OSD staff responsibility for the [illegible] level planning and direction of those special activities and special operations, not primarily intelligence in nature, in which DOD participates.

(b) Provide staff support, with assistance as required from other DOD components, direct to the Secretary and DEPSECDEF and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for their Special Group (5412) and Special Group (CI) responsibilities.

(c) Provide DOD representation on interdepartmental and interagency special operations and special activities committees.

b. On 2 November 1963, the DEPSECDEF, referring to the recent disestablishment of the OATSD, stated that *

(1) SACSA had been charged with providing staff support to the Secretary and the DEPSECDEF, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their Special Group (CI) responsibilities.

(2) SACSA would supply copies of all Special Group (CI) briefing materials prepared for the Secretary and DEPSECDEF to the latter's alternate on the Group.

(3) All DOD components having responsibilities in the CI field would provide SACSA with full and timely support as required. For example, the ASD/ISA would provide SACSA appropriate political/military inputs in such form as SACSA might require.

(4) The responsibility of various DOD components for carrying out approved Special Group (CI) actions would continue unaltered.

* (8) Deputy SECDEF [illegible] Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al, 'Organizational [illegible]', 2 Nov 63.

of Staff, et al, 'Organizational [illegible]'

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* (S) Memorandum for Capt Cady, from LTC William J. Ryan, SACSA/Exec. Officer and Mil. Secretary, "MACSOG Documentation," 14 Nov 1969. SACSA-906-69S. (This memorandum forwards CIA inputs to the Documentation Project.)

** A singleton is a single agent.

*** (U) The agreement on the cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, referred to as the Geneva Accords of 1954, was attended by the delegations of: Cambodia, Communist China, France, Great Britain, Laos, United States, USSR, Vietnam, and [illegible]. This agreement, effective 21 July 1954, ended the war in [illegible], Laos, and Cambodia between the French and the Vietminh. Among other things, the agreement: established a provisional military demarcation line at the 17th parallel provided that agency forces would be grouped on either side of this line, banned the introduction of troop reinforcements and additional military personnel, laid down conditions governing the rotation of military units, prohibited the establishment of new military bases. Neither the United States nor [illegible] signed the Agreement.

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1. (S) Memorandum for Capt. Cady, "MACSOG Documentation," op cit
2. (TS) MACV Special Assistant Memorandum for General Harkins, "CAS Operations Against North Vietnam," 16 August 1962. A-591.

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[1], The Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, referred to as the Geneva Accords of 1962 was attended by the delegations of fourteen nations. Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Communist China, France, Great Britain, India, Laos (3 delegations: PL, Neutralist Pro-Government), NVN, Poland, SVN, Thailand, United States, USSR. Signed on 23 July 1962, the se Accords neutralized Laos by, among other things: providing for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos; prohibiting the introduction of foreign troops into Laos; prohibiting the introduction of munitions into Laos, except as the Royal Laotian Government might consider necessary for its national defense.

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FIGURE B-[illegible] ([illegible])

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* Colonel [illegible] E. Moore, USAF, Deputy Chief, MACSOG Operations Branch, Jun 1965 to Jun 1966, stated in an interview (page 2) that out of any single moon phase period there were only about four days in which aircraft could be operated during light-of-the-moon periods. Further, that if bad weather forced cancellation of a mission, it would generally have to be re-scheduled in the next moon period.

** (TS) Interview of Col William P. Becker, USAF, Chief of MACSOG Air Operations from January 1964 to December 1964, pp. 4-5.

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* Ibid. pp. 3-4

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[illegible] The reefer line retains the parachute to capsule only partially until the last moment before it reaches the ground. This line is a long cord tied around the skirt of the parachute and joined or tied together at the end with a small piece of primer cord. On the primer cord is placed a small, explosive timing device. The device is actually initiating a chain of events. The explosive goes off, detonating the primer cord, which, in turn, cuts the reefer line in two, the reefer line departs and allows the parachute to become fully inflated. The full inflation of the parachute since it is already partially inflated occurs quickly. Thus, the drop, which up to this time has fallen rapidly to minimize wind drift, is slow enough to protect it from hitting the ground too hard.

[illegible] pp. 8-10.

[illegible] is now it is already partially inflated, occurs quickly.

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Ibid.
Ibid. p. 10.
Ibid. pp. 7, 14, 15.
Interview of Colonel John M. Simpson, USA, Chief of [illegible] 1 to September 1968, p. 49.

Ibid. p. 10.

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(U) Interview of LTC Ernest T. Hayes, Jr., USA, MACSOG Plans Officer from October 1965 to November 1965, MACSOG SOD Planner Officer from September 1966 to June 1969, and MACSOG Chief Ops and JTD Liaison Officer from 1969 to date of interview; [illegible], pp. 2-3

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-- [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].
-- (TS) [illegible] J-3, "Trip Report, [illegible], 20 April-[illegible], 19[illegible]," [illegible] dated, p.3.
-- S[illegible], op. cit., p. 9.

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12.

*** Unsigned document "Cross-Border Operations into [illegible] Laos," 12 March 1[illegible] in OSA/CSD File "Cross-Border [illegible] - Nov 1963 - Aug 1965.

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* (~~S~~) According to SACSA, as of 12 July 1963, eight shallow penetrations (to a depth of approximately 15 kilometers) had been made with RVN border surveillance forces. This information is contained in SACSA talking paper for the JCS for the SECDEF-JCS meeting of 16 July 1963, Military Operations in Southeast Asia 12 September 1963, SACSA T-1-63 (Part).

* (~~S~~) According to SACSA, as of 12 July 1963, eight shallow

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[redacted] for LTC Lattle, op. cit.

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Memorandum For LCC Little, [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] Appendix I

[illegible] For LCC Little, [illegible] [illegible].

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a. [illegible] decision to permit [illegible] of [illegible] and to expand and intensify allied actions, including covert/[illegible] ones, against NVN.

b. The need for a concerted, joint effort against NVN in the field of covert/[illegible] actions.

c. The relative ineffectiveness of the CIA covert/PM program against NVN.

2. (~~TS~~) The application of overt maritime control measures and varying degrees of interdiction of air and sea against NVN was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1961.* The action was undertaken in response to a request from the Acting Assistant SECDEF/ISA for a military evaluation of those activities.** The Joint Chiefs concluded that

a. The cost and consequences of the United States blockading the DRV greatly outweighed the profitable gains from that belligerent act at this time.

b. SVN should be encouraged to take the initiative in air and coastal water patrols and interdiction actions against the DRV. The United States should provide SVN with all required support in such operations.

3. (~~TS~~) Subsequently, Senator Stuart Symington explored with President [illegible] the possibility of US air and naval bombardment of targets in NVN as a countermeasure to force NVN to desist

* (~~TS~~) [illegible] 4774, DTG 291307Z Aug 62.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "North Vietnam," 19 July 1961. I-18753/61.

[illegible]

[illegible] contingency [illegible] staff to [illegible] military actions, [illegible] responsive to the special situation when [illegible] of these actions could be retaliatory, in response to similar actions by PW against SVN or Laos.*

* (TS) JCS Msg 4174, op cit.
** 1. (TS) CINCPAC Msg, DTG 310030Z May 62.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Memorandum for Dr. W. W. Rostow, 2 November 1961. Serial 003202.

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(S) SIMP 3 SE DDC 2505012 April 62.

[illegible]

[illegible] the Director [illegible] operations (Paragraph [illegible]), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [illegible] message to CINCPAC on [illegible]

a. Noted that the United States possesses substantial resources for [illegible] of the varied clandestine tasks [illegible] CINCPAC's message.

b. Indicated that the initiation of all such tasks would have to be preceded by high level approval in Washington, further, that the first step in obtaining such approval would be a reasonably detailed presentation of CINCPAC's concept by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on data provided by CINCPAC.

c. Requested that CINCPAC forward specific proposals, in outline form as a minimum, for any of the clandestine activities CINCPAC considered as profitable. These proposals should include sufficient detail for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support them on higher levels, including evaluations of

(1) Magnitude of the US investment.

(2) Likelihood of disclosure.

(3) Return to US personnel

(4) Benefits to be realized.

[illegible] 7181, DTG 281[illegible] April 62.

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* (TS) CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62. This plan was submitted in response to a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. a. (TS) JCS Msg 4774, DTG 251307Z May 62, b. (TS) JCS Msg 4870, DTG 020011Z June 62.

** (S) JCS Msg 5559, DTG 172145Z July 62.

*** 1. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 300247Z Sep 63.
2. (TS) JCS Memorandum for CINCPAC, "Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in South Vietnam," 15 Aug 62, [illegible]
3. (TS) SECDEF Memorandum for the JCS, "Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in South Vietnam," 10 Aug 62, SACSA-M 378-62.

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13. (S) At their meetings on 7-8 January 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a recommendation by the Chairman, agreed that a senior officer should lead a team of senior Service and Joint Staff representatives to SVN. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, US Army, was designated to lead the team, which was to:**

a. Obtain information for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making an assessment of the CI program in SVN.

b. Form a military judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of the conflict in a reasonable period of time.

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* (S) [illegible] for the JCS, "Clandestine Activities in North Vietnam," 29 [illegible] 1962, [illegible]-62.

** (S) DJS Memorandum for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CIA Operations Against North Vietnam," 10 September 1962.

* Memorandum [illegible] 14 September 1962 to reflect [illegible] (S-[illegible])

*** (S) Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Team to South Vietnam, January 1963. [illegible] Chief of Staff, US Army [illegible], Trip Report, [illegible] January 1963.

* [illegible] 18 September 1962 [illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible] 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided General [illegible] should visit SVN. After a discussion of various conclusions and recommendations to be contained in General Heaslip's written report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that General Heaslip should present a similar debriefing to the President on 1 February.

15. (S) On 1 February 1963, General Heaslip submitted the trip report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his forwarding memorandum, General Heaslip stated that he was scheduled to brief the President on that date.* The trip report covered the situation in SVN in terms of the military, political, and economic factors. Table to the Documentation Study at hand are these recommendations.

a. Procure authority for air and ground reconnaissance missions in Laos.**

b. Intensify the unconventional warfare training of the Vietnamese military forces and encourage their execution of raids and sabotage missions in NVN, coordinated with other military operations. The purpose of this effort is to consume communist resources and prevent the North Vietnamese from giving unimpeded attention and support to the insurgency in

* (S) Chief of Staff, US Army, Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Trip Report," 1 February 1963. (Regraded Unclassified when separated from Top Secret enclosure.)

** (TS) Report of Visit of Joint Chiefs of Staff Team to South Vietnam, op. cit., p. 28.

[illegible]

[illegible] This [illegible]

[illegible]

16. [illegible]

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as a [illegible]

17. [illegible] On 22 [illegible] 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [illegible] considered the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] of the JCS. [illegible] such conclusions pertaining to the recommendations of the Team [illegible] in paragraph 13, above [illegible]

a. Both aerial and photo reconnaissance within the borders of Laos are required to provide essential intelligence regarding [illegible] activities on the border of the Republic of Vietnam.

b. The Republic of Vietnam armed forces possess a substantial potential for the conduct of unconventional warfare in North Vietnam, [illegible] be exploited. The Joint Staff, in collaboration with the services, should be directed to develop detailed proposals in this regard for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

18. (TS) Meanwhile, the Department of the Army, as a contribution to implementing the recommendations of the JCS Team and conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (paragraphs 15 and 16, above), prepared a document entitled "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam." The Chief of Staff, US Army, forwarded the study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 March 1963. Salient concepts of the study included that [illegible]

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* [illegible], p. 29

** (TS) Contained in a JCS paper dated 4 March 1963. The Joint [illegible] considered the paper on 6 [illegible] 1963 but agreed to defer [illegible] action on it pending the outcome of conferences [illegible] and [illegible]

*** (TS) "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam," [illegible] 1963, Department of the Army, [illegible], Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations [illegible] 19 March 1963.

[illegible]

[illegible] ,000 [illegible] number [illegible] catalog by CI[illegible] C. C (CI[illegible]), and considered suitable for special [illegible] the most essential to the economy and security of [illegible] fell into five categories. POL storage complexes, power plants, railway bridges, shipping and harbor facilities, and selected military targets.

c. The use of the overland route to NVN through Laos was not considered as a principal route of access because of the Laotian settlement, and the fact that the Laotian border was coming under increasing communist control. Land infiltration across the 17th parallel was deemed infeasible.

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g. It would be impossible to assess with any accuracy the effect covert raiding operations might have on NVN and on the war in SVN. NVN would not be crippled or perhaps even severely damaged. The psychological effects, however, might be very great. By means of these operations, NVN would be on notice that the United States and the RVN were prepared:

(1) To accept the risks inherent in taking the initiative and in expanding the scope of operations in NVN.

(2) To retaliate against NVN then on a modest scale and later perhaps in other more decisive ways.

(3) To increase the scope of their operations in NVN if the communists intensified the conflict in RVN.

g. Political and military risks were evaluated as follows:

(1) The risk of CHICOM reinforcement and escalation was acceptable. DRV authorities apparently desired to rely on subversion and guerrilla warfare in SVN and would probably be reluctant to draw more U.S. military power into the conflict. At the same time they would probably recognize these covert operations as less than an attempt to conquer NVN. The risk probability of these actions drawing CHICOM

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[illegible]

(3) The [illegible] covert effort [illegible] under [illegible] in RVN was judged to be an acceptable risk.

(4) The [illegible] of premature unrest in RVN was considered impossible, and the study envisaged no effort to promote widespread resistance to the DRV regime.

10 (S) On 5 April 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally concurred in the intent of the operations contemplated in the Army study but expressed concern as to whether these proposed operations would accomplish effectively the desired objectives. The Chiefs referred the study to the Joint Staff for comment and recommendations. The views of commanders and agencies concerned were requested. Those of CIA and CINCPAC are outlined below.

a. CIA

(1) Initially, in a discussion with the Chief of Staff, US Army on 27 March 1963, the DCI indicated general concurrence in the Army study.[*]

(2) Subsequently, on 14 May 1963, the Deputy DCI, in response to the above request, somewhat modified his views. Those views, in essence, are presented below, under the

[*] The views of two of the principally interested parties, were requested by:
1. (S) JCS Memorandum for CINCPAC, "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam," 10 April 1963. JCSM-61-63.
2. (S) JCS Memorandum for the DCI, same subject, 30 April 1963. JCSM-723-63.

** JCS Memorandum for the SECDEF, "Military Operations in North Vietnam (S)," 25 [illegible] 1963. JCSM-393-63.

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b. CINCPAC

(1) On 30 April 1963, in response to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),* CINCPAC expressed these views on the Army Study:

(a) The study complements CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62, a plan for the unilateral overt employment of US forces in retaliatory attacks against DRV, but is sufficiently flexible to provide for other overt or covert actions employing US forces and/or ARVN special forces and ranger or other military or [illegible] forces. Detailed supporting plans are being developed by CINCPAC's subordinate commanders.

* (S) JCS Memorandum for CINCPAC, "Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited [illegible] Operations in North Vietnam (S)," 30 Apr 1963. TOP-[illegible].
** (S) CINCPAC Msg [illegible] 230427Z April 63.

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[illegible] that CIA/OAC prepare [illegible] for 12 [illegible], to include certain additional [illegible] previously discussed with the President.

b. [illegible] terms in VII. The CIA/OAC staff offered these reservations:

(1) The practicability of getting President Diem to establish another field headquarters for the direction of the operations envisaged in the Army study is dubious.

(2) The Army concept is deficient in that it does not integrate offensive air operations with the other activities involved.

(3) The targets and actions envisaged in the Army concept would not result in an adequate crippling of the DRV.

(4) In no event should a decision be made which would place the military in the covert operations area until the full CIA capability is known.

c. The last three of the above reservations were addressed by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

(1) He agreed that air operations should be contemplated as a part of the program to weaken the DRV, but pointed out that the Army concept was not intended to be all-encompassing nor to represent the full scale of measures which the United States might adopt.

[illegible]

(2) With respect to the US military and covert operations, he stated that the tasks envisaged in the Army concept were not covert operations by the US military, but operations by the GVN military, executed under US advice but not with US participation. Further, to do the task correctly, as envisaged in the Army concept, would require considerably more resources than then presently under CIA's control. It would demand both the dedication of purely military means - air, sea and ground - and the coordination with ground operations conducted by the GVN.

d. CINCPAC raised the point that it was illogical to propose that COMUSMACV be put in charge of operations such as those described in the Army concept when he was not in charge of operations in Vietnam. The Chief of Staff, US Army, responded that it was not contemplated that these operations should be directed by any authority other than the GVN, further, that COMUSMACV and his resources should only support and advise in the same manner as for operations within the confines of the GVN.

e. The CIA representative [redacted] Chief of Station, Saigon): (b)(1) (b)(3)

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* (U) JCS msg 9996, DTG 232226Z May 1963.

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[illegible] conference on 6 May 1968 at Fu PACOM, the [illegible] proposed the overflying of Laos and [illegible]

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26. (~~TS~~) Relating indirectly to the development of OPLAN 34A was the Presidential approval on 25 June 1963 to expand the use of highly mobile South Vietnamese border patrols in Laos to interdict entry into SVN and to gather intelligence.** According to SACSA, efforts toward that end, as of 10 December 1963,

* Deputy DOD Memorandum for Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director, Joint Staff, "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam," 14 May 1963.
** NSAM 246, 25 June 1963.

[illegible]

27. (~~S~~) On 6 July 1963, [illegible] SECDEF/JCS [illegible] Laos situation, the SECDEF [illegible] that:*

a. There should be an increase in the size and frequency of cross-border operations from RVN into Laos in order to:

(1) Interdict supply routes in the Laos corridor.

(2) Acquire on-the-spot intelligence.

(3) Exhibit strengthening of the Free World resolve to impede communist expansion in Laos and the RVN.

b. These operations should:

(1) Involve penetrations into Laos deeper than the present current intelligence patrols.

(2) Be in the form of overt military incursions conducted by RVN forces under CINCPAC guidance, with the intelligence task integrated for other functions as necessary. [redacted]

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28. (~~TS~~) On 9 July 1963, in a message to CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

a. Outlined the SECDEF views as set forth in paragraph 27, above.

b. Pointed out that those views, which contemplated [illegible] [redacted]

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* Staff Briefing Paper for the SG Steering Group Meeting of 22 Dec 1963, "Laos: Cross Border Operations," 10 Dec 63. SECRET 14-63.

** (~~TS~~) JCS Msg 1874, DTG 092[illegible] Jul 63.

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B. (TS) OPLAN 34A: DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR PROVISIONS, APPROVAL

1. (TS) General

a. The plan was jointly prepared in the J-5 Division of Headquarters MACV by MACV and CAS representatives. Three of the participating MACV officers were among those initial military personnel assigned to MACSOG. They were:

Colonel Clyde R. Ryssell	Chief, MACSOG
LTC Robert H. Bartlett	Chief, Operations Branch
Major Hans Manz	Logistics Officer

b. OPLAN 34A was completed on 15 December 1963. It fulfilled the requirement levied jointly upon COMUSMACV and the CIA Station Chief, Saigon to produce a program of actions against NVN, as set forth in Section A, paragraph 36, above, covering a twelve-month period.

c. The Program of Operations, outlined in Annex C to the OPLAN, contained 72 principal actions which, if fully implemented, would require a total of 2,062 separate

operations: 13 air strikes, 3 amphibious/airborne raids of company size or greater, 4 harassment operations by air demonstrations or naval feint and demonstration, and 2,042 operations either involving raids of less than platoon size or consisting of psychological and intelligence operations of varying degree and magnitude.* In this regard, CINCPAC considered that meaningful hard damage to the DRV could only be accomplished by either air strikes or small raids/sabotage missions involving forces of less than platoon size.

d. In paragraphs 2 and 3, below, are presented the salient features of OPLAN 34A.

2. (TS) Basic Provisions of OPLAN 34A

a. Mission

COMUSMACV/[redacted] will provide necessary advice, assistance, training and material support to enable the RVN to conduct a graduated and intensified program of actions against the DRV which, in conjunction with other military and diplomatic action in Southeast Asia, will lead to a judgement on the part of the DRV leadership that continued direction and support of insurgent activities in RVN and Laos should cease. ** (b)(1) (b)(3)

b. Concept of Operations***

(1) Operations against the DRV would consist of selective actions in four categories or levels of activities, all of which were envisaged as special actions under conditions short of limited war:

(a) Category I - Harassing. These operations included small unspectacular demolition operations, moderate level psychological operations, small-scale intelligence collection actions, including tactical

* (TS) CINCPAC Ltr to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Combined MACV-CAS Saigon Plan for Actions Against North Vietnam," 19 Dec 1963. Serial 00465. (This letter transmitted OPLAN 34A from CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

**(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64, p. 3. Serial MACV TS 000806-63.

*** (TS) Ibid., pp. 4-7.

reconnaissance probes by small military units to obtain visual ground intelligence, capture of prisoners, documents and equipment, creation of general harassment, and temporary interdiction of lines of communication.

(b) Category II - Attritional. Included were small-scale resistance operations, airborne and seaborne raids by small forces on important military and civil installations, and demolition of important facilities.

(c) Category III - Punitive

1. This category of operations comprised covert/overt resistance/physical destruction actions designed to cause damage and/or destruction to facilities or installations critical to the enemy, to industrial development, and to security of the DRV. They would be designed to cause both large-scale internal redeployment of DRV resources and the commitment of DRV forces in reaction. Where possible, these actions would be covert. It was recognized, however, that the increased size of the forces required and the duration of some operations might result in their becoming basically overt acts. In such cases, they would be attributable to the RVN but not directly to the United States.

2. Included in these actions were raids by company or battalion size military or PM forces, airborne or seaborne, sabotage by small teams to destroy major DRV resources and the active organization, recruitment and employment of

resistance within NVN. The resistance movements might require more than the 12-month scope of the OPLAN to reach a stage of significant development.

(d) Category IV - Aerial Attacks. Such attacks consisted of those conducted against critical DRV installations or facilities, industrial and/or military, such as POL storage areas, thermal power and steel plants the loss of which would result in a crippling effect on the DRV potential to maintain a stable economy and program in industrial development.

(2) In consonance with the above levels of activities, OPLAN 34A provided for these five types of operations:*

(a) Intelligence Collections Operations. Such operations would be conducted with the primary objective of intelligence collection in support of other actions in OPLAN 34A.

(b) Psychological operations. [redacted] The latter instance would include a buildup to support the resistance movement operations (both real and notional efforts) and the physical destruction actions which, in turn, would reinforce the effect of the overall operations upon the DRV.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(c) Political Pressure Operations. Such operations were to be selective, highly specialized and sensitive actions specifically designed to impart to and impress upon the DRV leaders that the con-

* (TS) Ibid., pp. B-1 to B-3.

MORI DocID: 570357

tinued direction and support of aggression in RVN and Laos would result in further and more damaging retaliatory actions against the DRV.

(d) Resistance Operations. It was recognized that successful development of resistance movements in NVN as an integral part of OPLAN 34A could help bring sufficient pressure to bear on the DRV to cause its leadership to reevaluate and cease its aggressive policy.

(e) Physical Destruction Operations. OPLAN 34A embodied two types of physical destruction operations: hit-and-run, and aerial attacks.

c. Command and Control*

(1) An implementing agency would be designated/organized to effect US coordination, planning, control,

* (TS) Ibid., pp. E-1 to E-2

and support of RVN operations conducted under the plan. As the scope and intensity of operations increased, it would be necessary either to expand the present organizations or to organize and activate an organization which would exercise command and control of scheduled operations.

(2) Upon implementation of OPLAN 34A, MACV [redacted] would assist the GVN in the organization of an appropriate command and control structure within the RVNAF. Establishment of a permanent RVN operational or joint task force was considered necessary. (b)(1) (b)(3)

(3) The program could be implemented in one of three ways:

(a) Either by [redacted] or COMUSMACV, with the second party providing the required support.

(b) A joint MACV/[redacted] command.

(c) The program could be divided [redacted]. (b)(1) (b)(3)

3. (~~TS~~) Review and Approval of OPLAN 34A

a. CINCPAC, on 19 December 1963, concurred in general with OPLAN 34A, and pointed out that the next step was the selection and approval of the various actions proposed. He commented that the United States should be prepared to commit US forces in the event the reaction from NVN and Communist China escalated to a magnitude beyond South Vietnamese capabilities. Also, CINCPAC expressed doubt that the proposed harassment and attritional actions alone would have a lasting or serious effect on the North Vietnamese leadership.*

* (~~TS~~) CINCPAC Letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op cit.

b. The SECDEF and DCI were briefed on OPLAN 34A during their visit to SVN* on 19-20 December 1963.

(1) It was decided to present these matters for study by the Special Group (5412).**

(a) Whether, or to what extent, there should be cross-border operations from SVN into Laos, to include ground reconnaissance patrols, ground combat patrols, air resupply, tactical air support and air photography -- either singly or in combination. The DOD would prepare the presentation.

(b) Whether, or to what extent, there should be an intensification of pressures on NVN through covert and military means. The DOD and the CIA would prepare the presentation.

(c) In connection with (b) above, what should be the authorities for overflight of Laos and the transit use of Laotian territory. The DOD and the CIA would prepare the presentation.

(d) A proposal for U-2 photography of the Cambodia-Laos - SVN border.

(2) The SECDEF directed that the personnel and equipment listed below be arranged for immediately, and that DOD pay the costs. He wanted to achieve maximum readiness whether OPLAN 34A was approved or not and, in this regard, directed that the personnel and equipment be moved to Saigon on a priority basis.***

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* (TS) Joint State-DOD-CAS Msg, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

** (TS) Undated paper in OSACSA, entitled "Report on the Visit of the Secretary of Defense to South Vietnam 19-20 December 1963."

*** (S) [redacted]

(a) Four new NASTY's to be procured by the Navy. In addition, check on the availability of two NASTYs under DOD control on the East Coast for transfer to VN. Any reasons to the contrary would be submitted to SECDEF by 27 December 1963.

(b) Six additional C-123 aircraft with ECM, radar detection and pinpoint navigational equipment.

(c) One aircraft training crew to train Vietnamese in aerial, mine laying and aerial mines.

(d) Two portable navigational beacons, one boat mountable, and one both groundmobile and air transportable.

(e) One psychological warfare-augmentation detachment of 20 personnel with one Harris 17" x 20" high speed offset press, with a printing capability less photo reproduction.

(f) Two radio broadcast studios and transmitter equipment for black radio operations.

(g) Three radio broadcast studios complete for white radio operations.

(h) Twelve aerial flare dispensers for A-1H aircraft.

(3) Representative of the continuing follow-up actions on personnel and equipment needed for the execution of OPLAN 34A were these:*

(a) Four NASTY's: On 23 January 1963, the Norwegian Government approved purchase from Norwegian Navy. The ship to transport them departed CONUS on 18 January, arrived in Bergen on 31 January, and departed there on 1 February for Subic. The NASTY's would require

* (TS) Intra-OSACSA memorandum from the Chief, PD&R Division (Colonel H. J. Chisholm, USAF) for General Anthis (the SACSA), "Status of Materiel Actions for Operations in North Vietnam," 3 February 1964.

SACSA), "Status of Materiel Actions for Operations in

modification to include additional fuel tanks and armament and communications equipment. They could be operationally ready in May or June 1963.

(b) Two Nasty's. These were in the Far East and were being modified at Subic. Modification should be complete by 14 - 21 February 1963, respectively. They should arrive at Danang prior to 1 March which is the anticipated readiness date of the support facilities. In the meantime, the training of crews had started.

(c) Two PTF's. These boats were different from the NASTY's. They were World War II torpedo boats and had operational limitations. They were shipped from Norfolk on 18 January 1963, and had an ETA at Subic of 11 February. They, too, would require modification.*

(d) Six C-123's. These aircraft were being modified by Lockheed and modification to the first aircraft would be completed by 5 March 1964. However, the first ECM "black box" would not be available until later, so that the first aircraft would not be available in an ECM configuration until 15 April. The expected ready date of all six aircraft was 15 July. It was estimated the four configured C-123's then in country could carry the program for the first two months of operations.

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

MORI DocID: 570357

(e) Aerial Mine Laying Training Team. On 21 June 1962, CINCPAC ordered CINCPACFLT to assemble the team at Pearl Harbor for country orientation and further preparation for onward travel, subject to call from COMUSMACV. The mines were allocated but would remain at Subic/Guam in readiness for shipment to Vietnam when required.

(f) [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(g) Three Radios for White Operations. These were not in stock. The Army contracted to have them placed in Saigon by 1 March 1963. No problem was anticipated.

(h) Two Portable Navigational Beacons. PACAF had two VOR beacons and four mobile low frequency beacons on hand. In the absence of information to the contrary, it was assumed that these were acceptable.

(i) [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(j) Psychological Warfare Augmentation Detachment. This detachment was ordered from Okinawa. It arrived in Saigon on 13 January 1963, as requested by COMUSMACV.

(k) Twelve Aerial Flare Dispensers. The Navy modified 12 practice bomb racks and shipped them to COMUSMACV in early January 1963. On 24 January, CINCPAC advised that COMUSMACV reported that the Mark 5 flares, which did not require special bomb racks, were better than the Mark 24 and that he did not foresee an additional requirement for aerial flare dispensing equipment.

c. The SECDEF and DCI discussed OPLAN 34A with the President on 21 December 1963. At their recommendation, the President created an interdepartmental committee (State, Defense, CIA) to select from the plan those operations which were most feasible and which promised the greatest return for the least risk.* Chaired by Major General Victor H. Krulak, the SACSA, the committee was formed on 21 December 1963 and completed its task on 2 January 1964. The substance of its report follows:**

(1) General

(a) An array of intelligence, psychological, and unconventional warfare actions had been selected for phased implementation as direct retaliation for North Vietnamese participation in the VC insurgency in the RVN. The actions selected were designed to inflict increasing punishment upon NVN and to create pressures which may convince the North Vietnamese leadership, in its own self interest, to desist from its aggressive policies.

(b) The selection of targets was heavily influenced by Hanoi's strategy of seeking to support the VC insurgency at little cost to itself and to its industrial complex, while countering for victory upon US and South Vietnamese war weariness and the corrosive effects of time.

(c) The importance attached by Hanoi's leaders to the development of North Vietnam's economy suggested that progressive damage of its industrial projects, attrition of its resources and dislocation of its economy might induce a decision to call off its physical support of the VC

* (TS) Joint State-DOD-CAS Msg, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

** Except for the breakout of the phases of operations and the recommendations, the committee report represented essentially a summary of OPLAN 34A and of CINCPAC's views concerning it. In OSACSA, the report is appended to OPLAN 34A.

This reaction might be intensified by the traditional Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination, where expanded operations by our side could arouse concern in Hanoi over the likelihood of direct Chinese Communist (CHICOM) intervention in North Vietnamese affairs.

(d) It was desirable to gain as much information as possible regarding the enemy, and to intensify the then psychological warfare, deception and resistance operations in order to weaken Hanoi's control of the population and to involve the regime in costly countermeasures.

(e) It was far from clear whether even the successful conduct of these operations would induce Hanoi's leaders to cease and desist. Toughened, as they were by long years of hardship and struggle, they would not easily be persuaded by a punitive program to halt their support of the VC insurgency, unless the damage visited upon them was of great magnitude. (Both CINCPAC and MACV voiced the same opinion.)

(2) Limitations and Risks

(a) Operations against NVN were subject to the following main limitations and risks (varying according to covertness, deniability, and scope of operations):

1. Initially, it would be necessary to obtain the approval and cooperation of the GVN. The requirement for optimum use of limited South Vietnamese resources may be a factor influencing Saigon's judgment, especially with respect to any sizable operations.

2. The uneasy political and military balance in Laos could be upset, either by accelerated North Vietnamese military operations in Laos or adverse Lao or international reaction to South Vietnamese use of Lao territory for operations against NVN. However, conduct of the more intensive

Lao territory for operations against NVN. However, conduct of the more intensive

operations would be influenced by the success achieved in establishing arrangements with friendly elements in Laos and with the Thai Government for base facilities, and for the transit rights needed for maximum level operations.

3. NVN might retaliate by stepped-up activity against SVN. If NVN retaliated with major overt actions, SVN could suffer more damage than NVN unless the United States intervened directly.

4. Overt or non-deniable operations against NVN might evoke a strong international reaction, and increase pressures for neutralization of SVN.

5. The US record in covert operations against NVN forbade optimistic speculation as to what could be achieved through a limited approach.

(b) The above risks were outweighed by the potential benefits of the actions recommended below. In any event, until more vigorous measures were taken than then underway, the United States would not know whether physical, propaganda, and economic pressures on Hanoi were likely to produce the desired result. The specific actions selected were chosen in the light of US general policy objectives in SE Asia, and in realization of the fact that improved military and political measures against the VC in SVN were a prerequisite to the success of the program.

(3) Scope of Operations. The program envisaged entailed three types of complementary operations in the fields of intelligence collection, psychological warfare, and physical destruction, all complemented by political action designed to signal to the North Vietnamese leadership the US intention to continue damaging retaliatory actions of increasing magnitude unless and until their support of the aggression in SVN was halted.

intention to continue damaging retaliatory actions of

(a) Intelligence Collection Operations. These operations would provide intelligence support for all the other actions to be taken against NVN. They would include:

1. Intensification of aerial reconnaissance, with emphasis on targets to be attacked in the physical destruction program.

2. Expansion of communications and other electronic intelligence operations.

3. Expansion of tactical ground reconnaissance probes by the Vietnamese Armed Forces into NVN, with emphasis on the capture of prisoners, documents, and equipment.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(c) Physical Destruction Operations. Physical destruction operations would encompass offensive commando raids and harassments designed to damage or destroy facilities and resources critical to the economy, industrial development and security of North Vietnam. In these hit-and-run attacks, commando units would be introduced into the target area, and withdrawn, by sea and air or overland, immediately after accomplishment of their mission. In the final phase of maximum intensity, destruction of targets by aerial bombardment would

of targets by aerial bombardment would

be an available option for consideration. Of all three complementary operations, physical destruction efforts were likely to be most effective in bringing about a re-orientation of North Vietnamese policy, since they would operate directly counter to Hanoi's strategy of supporting the war in SVN at little cost to itself.

(4) Resources to be Employed

(a) The RVN would be requested to assume responsibility for actual conduct of operations in all respects except political action, while the United States would provide advisory and logistical support.

(b) Existing in-country resources, both Vietnamese and US, were generally adequate for initiation of the program, although certain equipment would be required for optimum effort. Action was being taken to provide these additional resources.

(c) The intensified operations would involve the military and PM forces of the RVN, as well as US training assistance, operational direction, and logistical support. US personnel and forces would not engage in operations within NVN, its territorial waters, or its air space. They would continue, as at that time, to serve as air-crews on certain air reconnaissance missions.

(5) Operations to be Conducted

(a) General

1. The total array of feasible operations against NVN, as developed by USMACV and CAS, had been studied from the viewpoint of achieving the greatest return at the least risk, while emphasizing the concept of progressively escalating pressure as time went on and as the Vietnamese capability increased.

2. In order to provide for close control of the conduct of operations, as well as to ensure progress evaluation of results obtained and risks involved, the proposed program was divided for planning purposes into three general time phases, of about four months each.

a. This time phasing was governed by two factors. first, the actual capability of the South Vietnamese to execute the contemplated operations in the stipulated time period; and, second, the desire to give the North Vietnamese substantial hurt in the early phases, while preserving deniability, at least in the beginning.

b. Thus, Phase I encompassed operations which the Vietnamese were then or would soon be capable of executing, including several destruction operations of high deniability but offering prospects of high impact.

c. Phases II and III were geared to a growing Vietnamese capability in the intelligence, psychological and destruction areas. The last capability moved up the scale of violence, with consequent growth in risk, as the deniability factor dimished. Discreet planning for these later phases would proceed during the execution of Phase I, but execution would be dependent upon specific Washington-level approval.

3. Psychological and intelligence collection operations, essentially covert in nature would continue through all three phases on a rapidly ascending scale of effort. Political actions would support all phases of the program by ensuring that NVN was informed correctly of US intentions.

TOP SECRET

Concurrently, and to justify the actions against NVN, there would be an intensified effort to assemble as much evidence as possible of Hanoi's physical support of the war in SVN.

(b) Phases of Operations

1. Phase I (about four months)

a. Execution of Phase I could commence about 1 February 1964. This phase included about 20 destructive undertakings, all within current or early prospective capabilities. These operations were considered by the US representation in Saigon to be feasible within the contemplated time frame. (listings of these targets and a related map were the committee report.) For the most part, the targets were located south of Vinh in the southern part of NVN.

b. Meanwhile, psychological and intelligence operations would be accelerated as preparations were made to commence the intensified destruction program. During Phase I, these operations would increase from 64 separate actions in the first month to about 125 in the fourth month, and would cover the entire spectrum of black and white radio broadcasts, leaflet drops and propaganda kit drops. (Tab C to the report was a listing of the planned activities.)

c. From an intelligence viewpoint, the Office of National Estimates considered that appreciable international reaction to Phase I destruction operations was improbable, although accusations might emanate from the communist bloc. They estimated that the North Vietnamese reaction would be limited to propaganda complaints to the International Control Commission and to

measures for improving security and defense of vital installations. The Office noted, however, that NVN might retaliate by intensifying VC attacks against LOCs, petroleum storage facilities, and other such targets in SVN. Direct involvement of CHICOM forces was not likely to result from Phase I operations. (A detailed assessment by the Board of National Estimates of the possible reaction to attack on the targets selected for Phase I was appended as Tab D to the committee report.)

d. Responsibility for Phase I operations would be plausibly deniable by the United States, but not necessarily by the RVN. [redacted] However, in the interest of achieving a favorable psychological effect, it might prove desirable for SVN to acknowledge publicly its responsibility for certain of the retaliatory acts taken against the aggressor, accompanying such acknowledgement with publication of concrete evidence of North Vietnamese involvement in South Vietnam.*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

2. Phase I (about four months). During this phase, all operations would increase in tempo and magnitude as more resources were made available, and as training and other preparations for attacks against the larger or more difficult targets were completed.

* In this regard, the State Department representative commented substantively as follows: In view of the risks and the uncertainty as to whether operations against NVN will materially contribute to the US objective of ending the war, such operations should, pending further decision, remain within the scope of and be conducted by means which are covert and deniable by both the GVN and the United States. Intensification of the operations beyond these limits would depend upon the future actions of NVN against SVN and/or Laos.

a. Psychological actions would increase from about 132 separate efforts in the first month to about 195 in the fourth month.

b. Selection of specific destruction targets would follow a progressive evaluation of Phase I results.

c. Interdiction and harassing operations could continue, and additional targets identified with NVN's economic and industrial well-being could be destroyed.

d. Intelligence evaluations of North Vietnamese reactions and political gyrations would be of major importance during this phase.

e. The intensified effort to assemble evidence of Hanoi's participation of the war would continue.

3. Phase III (about four months). This phase would be a continuation, at still higher intensity, of intelligence psychological and destruction operations similar to those conducted in Phase II.

a. Psychological actions would grow from about 202 in the first month to 244 in the final month of the phase.

b. Actual destruction targets would be chosen based on a continuing evaluation of Phase II actions while in progress.

c. Planning would provide for direct aerial destruction of selected targets during this phase, should such a decision be reached.

(6) Recommendations. That policy approval be granted for:

(a) Execution of Phase I of the program, to commence on or about 1 February 1964.

(b) Negotiation by the Country Team in Saigon to procure participation by the GVN in these operations.

d. Meanwhile, on 21 December 1963, the SECDEF directed that the personnel and equipment needed to implement OPLAN 34A be moved to Saigon. To achieve maximum readiness, this movement would be accomplished on a priority basis whether the plan was approved or not.* In that connection, the SECDEF requested the movement of a psychological warfare augmentation detachment of 20 personnel capable of operating a Harris press.

e. On 3 January 1964, the SECDEF forwarded to the CJCS for review a Draft Memorandum for the President embodying salient views of the interdepartmental committee (paragraph c, above). As presented in the Draft Memorandum, the program would be of four months duration and would begin on 1 February 1969. The SECDEF indicated that he would like to receive the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on the proposed program during a meeting on 6 January 1964. The substance of the Deaft Memorandum follows:**

(1) The Committee had proposed the following four-month program to begin February 1.

(a) Expansion of intelligence collection operations to include:

1. Nineteen U-2 photographic missions.

2. Four aerial communications/electronics intelligence missions.

(b) Expansion of psychological operations. There was then in progress a limited leaflet and deception program as well as a small subversive radio program of six 15-minute broadcasts per week. These operations would be expanded to provide, during the four-month period, for: 56 leaflet drops, delivery of 18

* (TS) JCS Msg 4120, DTG 211951Z, December 1963.

** (TS) SECDEF Memorandum for the CJCS, 3 January 1964. Enclosed was a Draft Memorandum for the President, "Covert Operations Against North Vietnam." The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if any, as requested by the SECDEF have not been found.

propaganda kits, 67 harassment and deception operations (phantom resupply, phantom personnel delivery, feints), 120 15-minute black radio broadcasts, and 60 white radio broadcasts of from 6 to 12 hours duration each.

(c) Sabotage operations. During the past 18 months there have been five successful sabotage operations. This program would be intensified by execution, within the four-month period, of about 18 operations. (Those operations along with a map, were presented in a Tab.) (Such information as presented in the Draft Memorandum, is contained in Annex A to this Appendix.)

(2) Responsibility for the program would be plausibly deniable by the United States, and SVN would be requested to assume responsibility for the entire project. The United States would provide advisory and logistical support, but US personnel and forces would not engage in operations within NVN, its territorial waters or its air space. They would continue, as at that time, to serve as air crews on certain air reconnaissance missions.

(3) During the four-month period of the program, the progress and the operations for the immediate future would be reviewed each week by the 5412 Group, and any changes which appeared appropriate would be brought to the President's attention. Meanwhile, planning would proceed for a further intensification of the program, should that prove desirable.

(4) The proposed program had been designed to help convince the North Vietnamese leadership, in its own self-interest, to desist from its aggressive policies.

(5) Aside from the impace of a physical destruction program on North Vietnam's economy and morale, it was desirable to gain more information regarding the enemy as well

as to intensify the then current psychological warfare, deception and resistance operations in order to weaken Hanoi's control of the population and to involve the regime in costly countermeasures.

(6) To assist in evaluating the effects of the program, the Committee called upon the Board of National Estimates for an appraisal of "probable reactions to various courses of action with respect to North Vietnam." The Board stated that:*

(a) Communist reactions to most of these operations would be slight.

(b) Communist reactions would be sharper in the cases of operations against Haiphong and the railroads near the borders of China. The reactions would be felt primarily in SVN and Laos, but would not be so extreme as to change the character of hostilities in those countries.

(c) The operations would not be likely to lead to appreciably increased Chinese Communist involvement in the area. Neither would the operations lead the Soviets to believe that the United States had made a significant change in its policies.

(d) The proposed sabotage operations, taken by themselves, even if all were successful, would not convince the DRV leadership that their continued direction and support of insurgent activities in SVN and Laos should cease.

(e) It was possible, however, that the North Vietnamese government might see these operations as representing a significant increase in the vigor of

* (TS) [redacted]

(b)(1)
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[redacted]

US policy, potentially dangerous to them. If so, they would probably wish to halt the new developments at an early date and would, therefore, try to arouse international pressures for a conference to settle the problem of Vietnam before it expanded into a more general conflict in the Far East. In such a case, the US could probably expect little political support from its major allies.

(f) The principal determinant of DRV prosecution of the war would not be the damage suffered from such small scale operations, but the course of the war in the South and the risk Hanoi believes would be involved in its prosecution.

(7) The Committee, while more sanguine than the Board, agreed that it was far from clear whether even the successful conduct of the proposed operations would induce Hanoi's leaders to diminish their support of the VC. However, the Committee concluded that the risks associated with the operations were outweighed by the potential damage to the North Vietnamese economy and morale; further, that, in any case, until more vigorous measures were taken than those then underway, the United States would not know whether the physical, propaganda, and economic pressures on Hanoi would be likely to influence their conduct. The members of the Committee, therefore, recommended the President's approval of the program outlined above. The Secretaries of State and Defense, and the DCI concurred in that recommendation.

f. State-DOD-CAS, in a joint message of 16 January 1964, indicated that the recommendations of the interdepartmental committee had been approved by the President;* further, that the

* [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

approval embodied the execution, in a four-month period commencing on 1 February 1964, of specified elements of OPLAN 34A (those elements were listed in the message).

(1) Other key provisions of the message follow:

(a) The above four-month program was to be accompanied by further detailed planning for continuation and intensification of the program, if so directed.

(b) The United States could plausibly deny the actions selected.

(c) There should be no ground reconnaissance action into the DMZ.

(d) Overflights of Laos in support of physical destruction actions were prohibited.

(e) The following structure for execution of the operations listed in paragraph 2 had been approved by all agencies in Washington, subject to any comments from the Ambassador, COMUSMACV, or CAS Chief, Saigon:

1. Overall political control in Saigon - Ambassador.

2. Overall operational control - COMUSMACV.

3. Planning, liaison, logistics, training and advice - Joint MACV-CAS Task Force, reporting directly to COMUSMACV. Chief of Task Force to be a colonel level military officer selected by COMUSMACV; Deputy Chief of Task Force to be a CAS officer [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

4. Other personnel for the Task Force would be contributed by MACV and CAS as required and agreed locally.

(f) All operations against NVN would be under the Task Force and all in-country resources of the US military and CAS would be available for support of approved operations. It was assumed the Ambassador would monitor the program on a continuing basis.

(g) Additional actions required in Saigon to implement this program were

1. To bring the GVN into the planning process, on a most discreet basis, since covert use of the best of their regular forces as well as some of their military resources, would be required. This might be done at once, in the manner considered by Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins to be most secure.

2. To create security and cover arrangements to support the expanded training requirements.

(h) Assembly of the required materiel had proceeded at high priority.

(2) As already noted, the OPLAN 34A Program of Actions comprised these categories of actions: intelligence collection, psychological operations, physical destruction, aerial attack; further, the Program contained a total of 72 actions which if implemented over a 12-month period, would produce a total of 2,062 separate operations. Out of the 72 actions proposed in OPLAN 34A, 33 were ultimately approved for implementation during Phase I. A breakdown follows:

Category of Action	No in OPLAN 34A*	No. Approved for Phase I-*
Intelligence Colle-tion	4	4
Psychological Operations	24	15
Physical Destruction	33	14
Aerial Attack	11	0
Total	72	33

(3) With regard to the responsibility for the execution of OPLAN 34A, CIA agreed that the executive authority should be the DOD.*** That authority is reflected in the implementing message which assigns overall operational control to COMUSMACV.* Subsequently, with respect to OPLAN 34A, CINCPAC stated that:

> There should be no doubt as to COMUSMACV overall authority for the program in Vietnam. We understand that chain of command is from SECDEF through the JCS and the Unified Commander (CINCPAC) to COMUSMACV.

g. In forwarding OPLAN 34A for approval, COMUSMACV stated that "whether or not the plan is acceptable to the GVN has yet to be determined. Informal discussions on broad conceptual terms indicate a willingness to consider undertaking increased operations in NVN.**** The State-DOD-CAS implementing message (paragraph f (1) above) pointed out "the need for the GVN to be brought into the planning process, on a discreet basis, since covert use of the best of their regular forces, as well as some of their military resources will be required." Pursuant to those instructions, Ambassador Lodge, on 21 January 1964, presented to high GVN officials a sanitized concept of the operations envisaged in OPLAN 34A.

* (TS) CINCPAC OPLAN 34A, Appendices 1-4 to Annex C.

** [redacted]

*** [redacted]

**** (TS) OPLAN 34A, paragraph 8, p. 11.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

He then initiated arrangements for GVN support.* In addition, arrangements were made for discussion of certain military details of the plan with high military officials on 23 January 1964 Subsequently:

(1) On 30 January 1964, in a coup d'etat, General Khanh replaced General Minh as Premier. A number of other high GVN officials who had been given information on OPLAN 34A were also deposed. According to CINCPAC, however, the information to deposed officials did not include specifics as to targets in NVN or the tactical plan, except for two destruction action targets (33 and 35)** which had been used as examples during the oral presentation to GVN officials on 21 January 1963.

(2) The high GVN officials, remaining in the GVN power structure and who had been familiarized with OPLAN 34A, recommended that it be implemented on schedule (beginning 1 February 1964), subject to approval of the concept by General Khanh, the new Premier. CINCPAC, nevertheless, considered that the information possessed by these deposed officials could cause serious repercussions if it were passed to neutralists or communists. Consequently, CINCPAC recommended that all reconnaissance and physical destruction actions be postponed until a complete assessment of the material and information known or possessed by the deposed RVN nationals could be reviewed by Headquarters PACOM and Washington levels.*** In a subsequent evaluation, CINCPAC recommended that action against the two destruction action

* 1 (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 0842, DTG 02072Z February 64.
2. (TS) [redacted]

** Target 33 was a SEAL team strike on barges and the buoy tender in the Haiphong Channel. Target 35 was SEAL team strike on the Ben Thuy petroleum storage.

*** (TS) 1. CINCPAC Msg DTG 312340Z January 64.
(TS) 2. CINCPAC Msg DTG 012314Z February 64.
[redacted]

(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

targets be held in abeyance, that other selected actions should go on, and that preparations should be continued for executing plans against the foregoing two targets.*

(3) General Khanh was briefed on OPLAN 34A on 3 February 1964. He approved the plan in concept and promised full support of it.** (On 12 March 1963, in a conversation with Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Lodge and General Taylor (CJCS), General Khanh agreed that actions designed to exert increased pressure on NVN could be a helpful assist to his effort but that they would be no substitute for successful actions in SVN against the VC. Further, General Khanh said that his "base in SVN was not strong enough for overt operations against NVN but that he would like to 'redouble' covert operations right away.")***

* (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 030529Z February 64.
** [redacted]
*** (TS) Saigon Msg 1740, DTG 130450Z March 64

(b)(1)
(b)(3)