MORI DocID. 570371

Downgraded to SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

10 July 1970

DRAFT

Copy 26

MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)
ANNEX O

TO

APPENDIX B

DOCUMENTARIES

Subject	By	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Maritime Operations	Commander Normal C. Olson, USN	Commander, Maritime Operations Group, MACSOG July 1967--July 1968	A
Representative Agent Team Insertion into North Vietnam	Lt Colonel Ernest T. Hayes, Jr., USA	Plans Officer and Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) Liaison Officer, MACSOG Oct. 1965 - Nov 1965 STD Liaison Officer, MACSOG Sept 1968 - June 1969 Chief, Operations-34 and STD Liaison Officer, MACSOG June 1969 - to date July 1969	B
Representative Air Operations Missions in North Vietnam	Lt Colonel James R. McCarthy USAF	Commander, 1st Flight Detachment - under MACSOG operational control (May 1968 - May 1969)	C
Standing Operating Procedures for Command and Control Detachment North	Detachment Commander		D
Standing Operating Procedures for Command and Control Detachment Center	Detachment Commander		E
MACSOG Reconnaissance Team Techniques	MACSOG		F
Initial Mission of a SHINING BRASS Reconnaissance Team	Master Sergeant David K. Kauhaahaa, USA	Assistant Team Leader and Team Leader of Team 1 at Kham Duc, CCN	G

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Downgraded to SECRET

JS-791 (J3-270)

Downgraded to

DOC 8

MORI DocID: 570371

Subject	By	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Operations of Command and Control Detachment Center	Major Frank Jaks, USA	S-3, FOB 2, Kontum June 1966-March 1967 ExO, FOB 2, Komtum March 1967-May 1967 S-3, FOB 3, Khe Sanh May 1968-June 1968 S-3, FOB 1, Phu Bai July 1968-Dec 1968 ExO, CCC, Kontum Dec 1968-March 1969 DCSO, CCC, Kontum March 1969-May 1969 S-3, CCC, Kontum June 1969-date: July 1969	H
Operations of a Reconnaissance Company in Command and Control Detachment Center	Captain Thomas W. Stanton, USA	Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company, Command and Control Center July 1968-July 1969	I
Operations of an Exploitation Company in Command and Control Detachment Center	Captain Barry R. McClelland, USA	Commanding Officer, Company A, Command and Control Center Nov. 1968-to date: July 1969	J
Operations of Command and Control Detachment South	Lt Colonel Ralph C. Thomas, USA	Deputy Commanding Officer, Command and Control South Jan 1969-Jun 1969	K

MORI DocID: 570371

MARITIME OPERATIONS

BY

COMMANDER NORMAL C. OLSON, USN*

The Naval Advisory Detachment's (NAD) primary mission was to train its Vietnamese counterpart organization -- the Coastal Security Service (CSS) -- to conduct operations north of the 17th parallel. It was located in Danang.

Basically, there were two types of MAROPS missions: across-the-beach, CADO, and the boat missions. Within the boat missions were MINT and LOKI. LOKI was a mission where you left Danang on a fixed track and went up into the northernmost area of Vietnam. You stayed on a fixed track so that the Seventh Fleet forces knew where you were in case you had to call for help. These were unsuccessful. When on a fixed track, you go up, turn around and come back on a fixed track. The MINT mission, however, was one where you left on a fixed track and then entered the colored area (operating area) through a gate. We had several gates and the missions were varied every time. They went into this colored area; they were free to maneuver in the area, and to do anything they wanted to do. They could attack anything or capture anything they wanted in that given time frame. Usually, they stayed in that area six to eight hours and then came out.

The LOKI missions, we felt, were generally unsuccessful because of the additional coordination that was required; the fact that they were locked into a fixed track when they went

* This entire documentary is constructed from a taped interview of Commander Normal C. Olson, USN. Except for minor editing, the documentary is a verbatim account of Commander Olson's extemporaneous discussion of MACSOG's maritime operations.

Tab A to

up north. It is conceivable that, if able to operate freely in those northernmost areas, they may have had more success, but this would have created far more problems in coordination. It was generally concluded that the LOKIs were a waste of time and we should stick strictly to the MINT missions in the areas where we had previously acquired the most prisoners, or had the most contact. There were several of those areas not in the southernmost part of NVN but in the central part.

The MINT mission was a simple one. You run a track up to an area and determine what gate the boat will go in. We developed MINT tracks and always had a bag full of them. We always had 30 or 40 of them down in Saigon for approval. We were always a month ahead, or a couple of months ahead. They were numbered. We changed the tracks, we changed the gates, etc. Saigon approved all of our proposed MINT missions but they also had to be approved at the CINCPAC level. When they came back approved, that meant we had many to choose from. We varied them. The variance of these operations had a lot to do with down time on boats and programming of boat crews; certain operations were longer than other ones. This is why the operational people had to be on top of this every minute of the day.

The pounding away at the beach by the US forces from air and sea increased. This forced the North Vietnamese to harden up their coast. They had radar, all types of guns, and we were forced many times to stay out beyond 12 miles. Our boats were getting hit 10 and 12 miles out.

CADO missions were across-the-beach missions. In these, we inserted SEAL-trained Vietnanese to go in to either capture prisoners or to hit targets and come out.

The latter was generally unsuccessful to a point where they decided to discontinue them. When I arrived at NAD in July 1967, most CADO operations were completely out of the picture. Saigon had decided they were not getting adequate results and stopped them.

Prior to my arrival, there were lax periods during the winter months when operations came to a halt, particularly across-the-beach operations. We had trained people doing nothing for four or five months out of the year. An idea was developed to use them on the boats during the boat operations to handle prisoners. This way they would be able to get their pay bonuses and everybody would be happy. Once this was started, the Vietnamese people in the teams realized that they could get the same amount of money for riding the boats and acting as prisoner handlers as they would if they had to go across the beach. When the beach operations were resumed, they just didn't realize any success. The mission would abort for all types of ridiculous reasons. I think money had a great deal to do with it; the Vietnamese got the same amount of money for doing less.

For years, in Danang, when the winter monsoon comes in, all operations stopped from November until March because of the weather. We had all these supposedly talented people sitting around doing nothing. We made recommendations to Saigon to maintain the expertise, particularly with the action teams, and also we had an in-house motive. We wanted to put out US advisors in the field with the Vietnamese teams and really find out if they could operate or not. We requested that for that four-month period we be sent to some other area where the weather was good,

preferably in SVN, to conduct small unit operations just to see how the people would work. There was a lot of politics in this thing.

We ended up working for CTF 117, Commander Mobile Riverine Force. He had no reconnaissance capability (vital to any type of operation he was running). The assets weren't available to him. We went down and had a difficult beginning with the man in charge who wanted us to be able to slip in through five miles of rice paddy and capture the head of the Viet Cong (which isn't really the way it works). Anyway, we got our foot in the door and established a fairly good rapport. We had four action teams at that time and we tried to rotate one a month. They were home-based at Dong Tam, the home of the Mobile Riverine Force and we pretty much ran our own operation. We worked directly with CTF 117 intelligence people, set up our own targets, laid on helicopters to look at the areas beforehand, and then ran the Ops.

Generally speaking, they were successful and we found, partly to our surprise, that our men were excellent operators. In fact, our US SEAL advisors who had previously been in the Rung Sat zone of the Delta operating a SEAL platoon came back and said they would have liked to have these people in the field with them. Our US people went in with them, two with every Vietnamese squad, mainly to handle the radios. If they got in a jam, the Mobile Riverine Force wouldn't respond to anything that was Vietnamese

On occasion, in an effort to develop better leadership on the Vietnamese side, we would send them in alone. I recall one specific instance in which they went in for

MORI DocID: 570371

three days and did a reconnaissance of a bridge. They did an excellent job and came back. There were reasons why they did a good job: first, US personnel were there to monitor what they were doing; secondly, the Vietnamese had pressure on them because there was serious consideration being given to disbanding the CADO teams. There was a lot of politics on the Vietnamese side and the word got down that they better produce or they might not have a job next year. They also had backup in an operation like this, with aircraft, artillery and boat support which they don't have when they go up north. The Mobile Riverine Force went to General Westmoreland and asked to keep these people, but they were turned back to us for our own operations.

When we went back to the northern area. CADO operations were, because of tides, currents, etc., pretty much restricted to a period of time in the month you could operate. It gets down to maybe a week per month when, taking all factors into consideration, you can run a reasonably successful across-the-beach operation. Again, to keep the people occupied for the other three weeks, we received authority to run operations, code name BIFROST, in I Corps, in support of conventional I Corps people. We had a great deal of initial coordination problems with I Corps.

In across-the-beach operations, when I got there the targets were picked in Saigon, in my opinion, with very little thought to things that a maritime oriented person would look at, such as current, tide, surf, things of this nature. The targets were pretty much picked by intelligence people, or the intelligence community in Saigon. We resented this, we felt there had to be some operational input to this

and we fought it. We finally got to a point where the head-
quarters would give us several targets. I'd send an operations
officer and usually an intelligence officer down there; SOG
would give them maybe two, three or four targets. We'd take
them back to Danang and work them over. We would work with
our Vietnamese counterparts on this and then we would select
targets to attack. Possibly all of them were good; maybe
only one was good. Maybe there were some things wrong with
the approach that we'd like to consider going up half a mile,
hitting it that way. Then we'd go back to Saigon and we'd
make a formal presentation and the Chief, MACSOG would
personally put his approval on one or the other. In my
opinion, the Navy didn't have the right people in SOG Head-
quarters.

Any proposed operation north of the 17th was a long
process. First, it went to Saigon for approval. They
checked our tracks and all details. Then the proposal
went to CINCPAC, and depending upon the type of operation,
maybe it went to JCS. We may be talking 30, 40 days or
maybe 10 or 15 days, but the system wasn't designed to
immediate response. Everything was controlled by higher
authority. We were the tools with which to get the job
done. They might say to launch the boats at 1745. Once
they were launched, we lost control; OpCon went to Saigon
through the communications station in the Philippines. We
had no control over what happened from that point.

We could have done more based on immediate intelligence.
A specific instance involved TIGER Island which is just
north of the 17th parallel. We knew the North Vietnamese
were building it up. Everybody wanted information on this

island. The obvious way was not to send a team onto the beach to get shot up in seizing a prisoner, but more simply to set PT boats up in the lane and after the TIGER Island force resupply boat came out; you snagged it and went home with the prisoners and boat. We couldn't do this because of failures in coordination with MARKET TIME forces. MARKET TIME forces, bordering the 17th, could actually observe movement between the NVN and TIGER Island. We could have used this information, responded immediately, gone up with PTFs to capture traffic there, and come back with valuable intelligence and military prisoners.

Coordination with the Seventh Fleet was handled on the Saigon level. They had a Seventh Fleet desk in Saigon. There was some resentment on the part of the Seventh Fleet because when we went into an operating area, they had to pull out completely. They fought this but I don't think they had a very logical argument, and we ended up winning. If I recall correctly, we were able to get our desired segment of time during the month to operate in these various areas. We could be in an operating area anywhere from six to eight hours on a mission and averaged overall about 15 missions a month.

Another area that we at NAD considered a problem was lack of clear-cut guidance from headquarters. At one time, the beginning of 1968, when we started our operations against running boats, we were among the few people to successfully go north and get people back (even though they were ignorant fishermen they were still people). The PsyOps were confusing. You don't go up and sink a fisherman's junk and then hand him a rice bowl. He isn't very happy with you.

In addition, another section, OP-34, handled agents. They were recruiting agents from the prisoners on the island. But, this was all being done without our knowledge. At any one given time we might be going up north to shoot up junks, pass out rice bowls, and insert agents. These were actions conflicting with each other, because of a compartmentation in the headquarters. I think compartmentation should stop at the headquarters level.

In my opinion, the Logistics Section of Hq, MACSOG was probably the most screwed up thing that I have ever been around. I was fortunate that I had two Navy supply officers with me in Danang and we were able to set up separate agreements with the I Corps Logistics people and we really didn't have to deal too much with Saigon. We had a direct liaison with Naval Support Activity (NSA) Danang and the Marine Corps in certain areas, particularly when it came to automotive parts and things of this nature. We had separate support agreements that were worked out at the Saigon level, and we had direct liaison with Subic. We tried to stay away from Saigon; however, you're locked into certain things on non-attributable equipment, you had to go through them because there was no other way to get the required weapons, etc. I made a broad comment about the logistics support; however, our day-to-day needs were met through these various agreements in I Corps, so we didn't have a problem there. The majority of the boat support was direct from Subic through Navy channels so we had no problem there. But occasionally we had to go through Saigon. An example was for procurement of Boston Whalers. We wanted to try a new concept. We wanted some Boston

Tab A to

Whalers (small boats). We could have gotten the whalers directly from Sears & Roebuck in probably two weeks. This thing dragged on and on; it was unbelievable. It was months and months, there were follow-ups, and I don't know in what channels it bogged down, but we couldn't get the boats. I think it was maybe three to five months later when we got a few Boston Whalers. Because of this situation we never got a chance to really test the concept. But here was something non-attributable that our logistics people couldn't respond to; something we needed in a week or two to do something a month from that time, and they couldn't respond.

We were trying to track down some Swedish "Ks" (silenced automatic weapons) that had been ordered for quite some time--in fact, before I got there. There had been several hundred of these that came in-country via Navy BACKDROP channels but we never got our hands on them. They were diverted to other people and other groups working within MACSOG, so we never got a handle on these particular weapons. I say never--I think we ultimately got about 20 or 30 but that was only after a lot of screaming.

The bulk of the major maintenance was done in Subic. If we had an engine problem, we jerked the entire engine out, replaced it on site, and sent the other back to Subic for overhaul. Little major maintenance was done at the site. We had seven PTFs assigned most of the time. At any one time we had one in Subic Bay undergoing overhaul. During the winter months, we kept two and at one time three over there. This was the opportune time to get the boats overhauled and be ready to fly during the spring season.

Many times I've briefed people and they ask "How successful are your operations?" My answer generally was, "I don't know." I wasn't in a position to measure success. If we captured one prisoner or 100 prisoners, how do I know how successful that is? It depends on what you get out of them. If they wanted 100 prisoners, we could go up and get 100 prisoners any time -- this was no problem -- but what would you have? We finally started to do a little more selective capturing. We started interrogating on the spot to screen prisoners, to try to get the more educated, which, in the fishing communities, was practically nil. We tried to get people with some kind of knowledge, for example military people. But, we seldom could get them. We tried to get young people; we tried to get healthy people. We tried to bring selective prisoners back. We got all kinds of feedback that we were successful but to what degree, I don't know.

We were strapped many times to prove statistically how successful we were and I am not convinced that we ever can prove the success of this type of operation. If they want a lot of prisoners, we can get a lot of them. At one time we had a boat captain who was told to go out and get as many prisoners as he could and he brought back 130. This presented a few problems. Numbers aren't the answer in this type of an operation. If you want to measure statistics by the number of junks you shoot, fine.

There was much contention within MACSOG that we needed more PTFs, that with more boats we could increase, or even double, the number of missions per month. There was considerable pressure to play the "numbers game" and consistently increase the operations. There was a long-standing MACSOG

goal that we have 14 PTFs (twice the number, seven, that we normally had) and that 30 missions per month could be accomplished with that number.

Statistics again got into the act when we were talking about doubling our operations. We were getting more boats so it was expected that we should increase our operations proportionately. There are a lot of factors bearing on this; weather is the biggest factor and it related to most of our aborts or mechanical failures. Coordination with other operations, e.g., Seventh Fleet and 7th AF operations, presented problems to us on several occasions when our CADO people were going in and the Air Force was dropping illumination rounds in the same area. A lot of nasty messages went back and forth from the Saigon level to the various forces concerned. This frequently could be traced to coordination at the highest level. There was something missing.

Weather was our biggest problem. I think you will find the biggest part of our aborts were due to weather. Relatively few were due to mechanical problems. However, with high performance boats, you still have to have a minimum amount of down time when they come back and we only had so many boat crews. So, to have more boats or to double the number of boats didn't necessarily mean you could run double the number of missions. We had a rather lengthy report that went to Saigon on this and proved it pretty well statistically. We were put under a great deal of pressure to speed up our tempo.

I was there at the first Tet offensive. At this time, the complexion of things changed considerably. We had been geared up in the fall and felt we had the Vietnamese better

motivated. After the winter monsoon period started breaking around March the Vietnamese were stoked up - we were ready to go. We had changed some of the bonus systems, we had had the CADO teams in the Delta working with our US advisors and we knew they had the capability. The motivation was there down south because they had the US going in with them, and they also knew the US could bring aircraft and gunfire, and everything else to bear if they got into a problem. I think another thing that played on this was loss of face. The Vietnamese wanted to go down south and do a good job, and they were pretty much under the gun, because if they didn't do a good job, Saigon (VNN) certainly would know about it. The STS counterparts were taking a specific interest in this because of the slack season and they personally made people from the Saigon headquarters make trips down there, etc. It was sort of a political game in that respect.

The Tet offensive came and our operations really started slacking off. We were restricted as to what we could do. Personally, I think this was a tremendous mistake because this was a covert operation. For many years it had been developed as one and they had the cover. When you stop an operation like that because of an overt move by the US, you immediately tie it in with the US. It was obvious and I had many lengthy discussions with my counterpart concerning the action. He told me that he just couldn't understand what the US was doing. He was a true patriot. This was a problem throughout his organization. He had developed a pretty good group. He held their respect but he had difficulty convincing them that what we were doing was the right thing. In fact, they knew damn well that it wasn't

right. Anyway, our operations tapered off considerably. I felt that we should have continued this operation. Why it was stopped, I have no idea. I know it was beyond the Saigon level, a higher level than that. The Vietnamese had spent five years developing the Sacred Sword Patriot League and, from feedbacks that we had, there were people in NVN who believed it. I thought the thing was really rolling, then, we blew it! I don't think we could ever go back to it and have it even come close to any type of success.

As to attributability to the United States, I don't think it would take very long to figure that out. We knew that the North Vietnamese knew where the boats were coming from, but they couldn't prove it. At least, we didn't think they could. We knew that our boats were being tracked as soon as they crossed the border. They had us locked in all the way. But, this is what it means to run a covert operation, as far as I am concerned.

Do I think the operation should or did shift from covert to conventional? I don't know when you shift. I think this covert operation should have continued up north; however, as time went on and, with the Seventh Fleet forces banging away at the coast, NVN put in bigger and better radar, bigger and better guns to defend against the Seventh Fleet. This affected us considerably. This pushed us out. We couldn't get into the lucrative fishing areas where the people were, so that we could capture them.

The other thing that we were faced with was the change of our mission. There was a shift: more selectivity in getting prisoners; don't sink junks; pass out PsyOps material. However, our MAROPS charter never changed. This

business came out of Saigon and we had to do it, but in many cases it conflicted with what we (and the Viets) believed we were supposed to be doing. We could do anything they wanted us to do but I felt they should have changed our charter. All of a sudden you change from sinking junks and turn to passing out PsyOps material. This presented a problem with the Vietnamese because they, in my opinion, didn't believe in this PsyOps business. Their attitude about PsyOps was, "Cut their heads off and send them back. That's the greatest PsyOps you've ever had." Passing out rice bowls and things like this didn't really go over very well with these guys. I can tell an example of one situation where our people went up there and they got hit with a suicide junk; they had a shoot-out and they captured these people off the junk. These prisoners were militiamen. The Vietnamese brought them back to the island and interrogated them there. I don't know what they did out there, but my counterpart said -- ". . . . it will come time for sending them back up north, after they've fattened them up, given them gifts, and had a big ceremony to exonerate them." My counterpart and his organization said this was the worst thing they could do. They said if they had to send them back, to send their heads back in a basket boat. Whether this is the right way to do it or not, I think maybe we should have been listening to the Vietnamese a little more than we did. Who knows Vietnamese better than Vietnamese? When it came time to send these prisoners back, the very boat captain that got shot up was programmed to take them back. They took the very three boats that got shot up and from which they had lost a few men. They took these prisoners back, but I don't

know if the prisoners ever did get on shore. I think basically you have to be honest and you also have to listen to them a little more.

We train people to go over there. This training includes about six weeks of language but if you're going to learn the language, six weeks isn't enough. You are now running into a period where every Vietnamese wants to speak English. This tends to deter from what you are trying to do - you learn the language to hopefully establish a better rapport with your counterpart. If we had had a better language capability at the beginning, things may have gotten off to a better start. This is another thing you can't measure. I think it natural if you go into a foreign country and can say "Hello" to a man the first time you see him, in his language, you automatically establish something. He realizes you have enough concern to want to learn his side of it, his language, and this helps. An oriental language is particularly difficult for a Caucasian, but I think that in an advisory role, when you are as small as a mobile training team, a couple of dozen people, it is worthwhile to provide them intensive language training before they do go.

There was not a chain of command on the Vietnamese side that worked. The counterpart organization to SOG did not have a Navy organization. This was because of in-house conflict between the Vietnamese Army and the Navy. The man running the Vietnamese SOG was an Army colonel and he disliked the Navy very much. The few Navy officers he had there at one time, he ultimately got rid of. In effect, we didn't have a parallel organization. The Vietnamese counterpart that I had in Danang had no one to go to at

STS Headquarters. He was constantly under the gun. This went into other areas; the boat people, the Navy people that were assigned to run the boats on contract were still under control of the Navy. They were assigned to Commander Twi, my counterpart. He could do what he wanted with them. He could come back to the Navy, get new people if he wanted. He had a close rapport with the CNO. The Army pretty much stayed out of this. However, the action teams were originally formed from various Services; at one time they had a Marine team, a Navy team, a civilian team, an Army team, a Nung team, all kinds, and they were segmented. As time went on, we tried to reduce the numbers of people, we cleaned out a lot of people and we had to amalgamate many of the teams. We finally ended up with three teams. They were of various Services. The man in charge of the SEAL camp was an RVN Army officer. That Army officer wasn't really responsive to my counterpart who was a Navy commander. He was in the charter as the Navy commander's XO and, in addition, camp commander for the action team. He had a direct link with the man in Saigon because they were both Army officers. This presented a problem. Anything that my counterpart wanted to do always filtered back and he got hammered by Saigon.

The mission of the NAD was to train the counterpart organization so that at some future date it would be able to run the operation. First, you can't superimpose our way of thinking on them. However, it appeared to me that the previous solution had been to completely ignore the problem and to not give them any responsibility: "Don't try to make a counterpart organization; it's too much trouble.

We only have a year here. It's a lot easier for me to do it in 10 minutes than it is to train this guy to do it in a year, so we'll just do it ourselves." When I first arrived, all briefings were given by the United States. I contended that we had a counterpart setup, that we should work on these plans jointly and then turn them over to the Vietnamese to write a comparable Op order in Vietnamese, and that the Vietnamese should then give their own briefing to their own men. We started that and found there developed a lot better relationship between the two peoples. There was a better relationship between the staffs and the operations were more successful. I felt that with all this business of security, we tended to overplay it, and you have to trust somebody. If you're sending these people up north on missions, you have to trust them. You have to be honest with them on all levels and they know when you are not honest. They're not stupid. I think this is a very important thing in the rapport between the US and the Vietnamese to ultimately produce better results.

I think one of the keys to success is the rapport you gain with your counterpart. With an Oriental more than anyone, it takes close to a year to gain this rapport and by the time you have gained it and are working well, you're changed, you leave. My counterpart told me that he had had in his naval career, probably about 14 years, some 16 or 17 counterparts, and he jokingly said he had to sing the same old song again every year. Of course, this puts them in a position where they can take advantage of the next man, too, because what they lost with the previous advisor, they try to bend this next fellow on and it takes him six months

to figure out what they are doing; it is back and forth all the time. You don't seem to progress, you are always fighting the same little battle but you never get beyond that point. Possibly a solution is to program the people in, on a staggered basis where the XO or the assistant to the officer-in-charge would be there a half year and then fleet up and have a cycle in which you do maintain continuity. Continuity is the most important thing for the US and obviously, it is important to the Vietnamese, too. They get tired of this. When I left, Colonel Rice left at the same time, the two of us who kept a handle on things. This hurts the other side. They have to live with the problem every day.

One of the basic problems was that MACSOG accepted a man as a patriot and then tried to convert him or to use him as a mercenary. I think it has to be one or the other. When we were trying to get these people to operate and they didn't want to operate, they put on their "military hat." When they saw a good operation or one that could be lucrative moneywise, they put on their "mercenary hat." I refer specifically to across-the-beach type operations where a VN operator had to go in with the knowledge he may not come out. There's a great difference between the boat operations and the across-the-beach operations. The boat operations naturally gave people security. They had something they could put their foot on; they had weaponry, they could fight. When you go into a hostile environment in a small group(across the beach), there is no support at all, there is no help, nobody you can call on to pull you out of there. That is, naturally, a shaky operation no matter how

you look at it. In their case, they were getting the same money for going north, whether they went on the beach or not. We had a lot of money problems.

When it got down to developing the Op order for the boat crew for each specific mission, we worked very closely with the Vietnamese. We tried to develop a counterpart operations section which they previously never had. They didn't have any counterpart sections, as a matter of fact. This is our own fault, so I forced the hand into developing counterpart organizations even though they only had one man. They got together with our Ops people and they basically bought everything that we did because they were lazy, and they didn't particularly want to do a lot of work. They would translate these plans into Vietnamese and then we would have briefings which they, in turn, would give in Vietnamese. The Vietnamese weren't about to ask a question of an American if there was any doubt in their minds on intelligence information or anything else that may have been presented at the briefing. So it was a lot more effective when presented by the Vietnamese.

There were 11 Vietnamese crews--complete crews. As to their ability, I think they did quite well. I was impressed by several of the crews. They're really tough and I think many of them wanted to get in the middle of a fight, but they were somewhat limited by restrictions imposed on us, what we could do, what we couldn't do. We couldn't attack certain type boats; they had to be a certain size. They had many limitations placed on them, but I think most of the crews really wanted to get up there and fight. They were excellent boat handlers. Maintenance was a big

problem for us. This was, in part, our own fault. We had never really worked to develop a counterpart maintenance program. Everybody took the attitude that, "This guy just came out of a tree; he'll never learn." We instituted a program while I was there to send selected Vietnamese to Subic Bay for an engineering course for about six weeks. Upon their return, we established a counterpart mobile support team. They are just not geared for this type of thing at this point. You can't compare a VNN first class engineman with a USN first class engineman that has been working on diesel engines for 16 years. The first time this VNN guy saw one was two years ago. His culture is just not geared for this and we have to move into it slowly. It may take 50 years. But, at least, we tried to develop some sort of a counterpart maintenance program.

I think we expected a little too much out of the Vietnamese, thinking they should step immediately into this. We have been in the Philippines since the 1800s and when you go over there, they are not much further ahead than the Vietnamese are in many areas. I think it is a matter of time. We're not patient enough with them, so we end up doing it ourselves; we destroy the very reason why we're there. It's going to be many years before the Vietnamese are able to run these boats and to maintain them on an equivalent part of the USN. I think we're always going to have to have some type of advisory people there. Obviously, we could reduce the number of boats and put more responsibility on the Vietnamese, but if the boats are going to continue to run (they are sophisticated pieces of gear - $1 1/2M boats) they are going to require continued support from

Subic Bay, and continued training and advisory support from the US. I think if we pull out entirely and turn those boats over to the Vietnamese, we're in trouble. Go back a half year later and you'll find everything but the kitchen sink stripped and it will probably never get underway.

In view of an obvious US pullout or ceasing of operations and based on the results of our actions after the Tet offensive in early 1968, in my opinion, to go back to this type of operation would be difficult, at best. I don't think we would be able to convince the NVN that this was the third party, because it's so tied in to the obvious acts of the United States. With lack of further intelligence and a new cover story, I think we would be wasting our time to continue the operation as it has been running. I don't think you could just pick it up and start up again. However, I believe the boats could be used effectively as a conventional force south, possibly directly under the Navy to provide a fast reaction capability which the VNN really does not have.

It was our basic cover story that we were part of the Vietnamese Navy. We could fill the gap for the Vietnamese Navy in giving them a fast reaction to be able to get at infiltration forces that are beyond the capability of SWIFT boats and coastal craft. I believe it is the only way to utilize the boats effectively now. If we do turn them over to VNN, they still will require a strong advisory training US staffs with those boats. They are too sophisticated to turn completely over to the Vietnamese. I don't think they can hack them. I think if the boats are turned over to a conventional force or are used in a conventional role, they should be run as a part of the US/Vietnamese Navy to take

care of their responsibilities. I don't see any advantage of using them in a joint or clandestine role.

Recruiting was a problem in general. First, the boat drivers, the crews who operate the boats, came directly from the Navy. The VNN officer-in-charge of the NAD had a very good rapport with VNN CNO and was able to get pretty much what he wanted. However, his predecessor was an Army major and this was probably the root of many of the problems that occurred during the previous years. Also, this organization within the Navy was looked upon as the elite; they tried to get the best people. Cdr Twi had a unique recruiting system in which he gave various tests and was rather selective as to whom he would take. However, the Vietnamese Navy had a basic problem that they were purposely kept small. In every coup in VN, the Navy has been at the bottom in some way or a part of it. Because of this, they have not a Navy admiral; the one Navy admiral is now in charge of the National War College or something, and the CNO is a captain. They have deliberately kept the Navy small. So, for Cdr Twi to get more people was always difficult because he was trying to get the best out of the Navy. Because of his personal rapport with the CNO, he was able to do pretty well as far as the Navy recruiting was going.

Recruiting for the action teams or the CADO teams is another thing. The majority of these recruits did not come out of the Navy; they came out of the Army, the Marine Corps, civilians, recruits from any source. We had a difficult time flushing out a lot of the people who had been there for years and riding on the gravy train. The man in charge (ARVN) had been there for four or five years; he was always

MORI DocID: 570371

in conflict with Cdr Twi, who was in charge of the overall program. He had a direct line to Saigon and wanted to keep his little empire of old buddies. As a result, about half of the people in the teams were ineffective. This was part of the problem with the action teams. To recruit, Cdr Twi had to go to the I Corps commander to personally go to various units and see what he could do to recruit people. On the lower levels it was considered a good idea but when it started passing up through the Vietnamese chain of command, it always bogged down. It was a Vietnamese problem and this was told to Cdr Twi. When he complained he didn't get people, I emphasized that this problem was unresolvable by the United States, that he would have to straighten it out with Saigon. He was looking for the best men for this organization and they (VNN/ARVN) are not about to give them up or they are reserved about giving them up. I'm not convinced that building the CADO teams up would have been the answer.

I think what we needed was QUALITY but the Vietnamese side wanted QUANTITY to justify their existence. They had a good thing going; they had a nice new camp that was built for them, they had a lot of facilities, and they just wanted to build up an empire as far as I was concerned. We tried to screen people and tried to get the dead wood out; we got a lot of it out but not all of it. This had a definite detrimental effect on the ability of the teams to operate. I'm convinced of that.

I think when people don't see immediate success with indigenous types, they want to blame it on something and they figure if they get a better piece of equipment, this

will solve the problem. When you take a Vietnamese that is many years behind us, you can't cram too much sophistication down their throats. We found this on the PT boats. We had a lot of fancy gear on them, and finally jerked it all off. It wasn't of value for VN purposes. A lot of times a new piece of equipment would come out or they'd want a piece of equipment. This was the latest gimmick. If they got it they thought that would solve their problem, but it didn't because it takes knowledgable people to run the gimmick. Another significant place when this happened was when we got the new PT boats, a couple of which were air-conditioned primarily for the protection of the electronic equipment. We knew as soon as these boats arrived that you wouldn't find a boat crew that would ride on the old boats. And damned if it didn't happen. They are very impressed by gimmickery.

I think you are better off trying to keep as unsophisticated as you can when dealing with the indigenous. I talked with a British type during the SAS operation in England the other day and he commented, "As soon as the natives start wearing the same kind of shoes you've got--you are in trouble." Their philosophy is to keep them just as native as possible and let them run that way.

B-o-26

Tab A to

TOP SECRET

REPRESENTATIVE AGENT TEAM INSERTION

INTO NORTH VIETNAM

BY

LT. COLONEL ERNEST T. HAYES, JR., USA

. . . . . .

. . . procedures we went through for launch. This goes back to the 1964-65 time period. At that time (and still) STD was located in Saigon. The launch site was Camp Long Thanh, the training center and the isolation area - holding area for teams that were being prepared for infiltration. Camp Long Thanh is approximately one hour by road from Saigon and about 20 minutes from Saigon by air.

Starting out with the decision to reinforce or resupply a particular team being made about 0730 in the morning, the Air Operations Section would send this information to the 1st Flight Detachment at Nha Trang where the crew that would be flying the mission would be briefed starting early in the morning. Concurrently, as soon as this information was received, the operations officer in charge of that team would prepare a message to the team telling them the time that the aircraft would arrive and, if at that time we knew, which route the aircraft would fly. We would tell them how many bundles they would receive and what the bundles contained. . .*

. . . the message would then be sent to the team [redacted] Often this would be a blind broadcast and we would have no way of knowing whether or not the team had received the message until later in the afternoon, sometimes only one or two hours before take-off time for the actual mission. At that time the team would have a two-way contact

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* (TS) Interview by Lt. Colonel Ernest T. Hayes, Jr., USA, p. 9.

and could acknowledge the fact they had received the instructions and set up the drop zone and that they had, in fact, executed the preparation.*

At the same time that the message was being prepared for transmission to the team in North Vietnam, we had a brevity code, on a one-time basis, which used false subtraction on times. We would send the arrival time of the aircraft to Camp Long Thanh and identify which team would be prepared for launch that day or which supply bundles would have to be ready. This presented no big problem to Long Thanh as it was our policy to keep one of the operations officers at Camp Long Thanh during each moon phase when we would be conducting resupply or reinforcement operations.*

The officer at Camp Long Thanh would immediately alert the Vietnamese counterparts there and if the case officer in charge of the team was not there, nothing would be done until the case officer arrived from Saigon to commence briefing the team. Most often, we would manage to have either a helicopter or the chartered China Air Lines C-45 to fly us out to Camp Long Thanh. However, if for any reason we didn't have air transport, we could drive out to Camp Long Thanh. I don't believe the American personnel ever had to do this but on several occasions, the Vietnamese counterpart case officers arrived by vehicle. This was occasioned for the most part from failing to follow an SOP and we would find that maps or some other documents had been left in Saigon and it would be necessary to send them out at the last moment. An SOP was developed which eliminated errors such as this and later we

* Ibid., p. 10

MORI DocID: 570371

always kept a double set of maps at Camp Long Thanh so we could provide any map coverage of the operational areas for the teams.*

When the case officer who would handle the particular reinforcement mission would arrive, he would personally check the issue of equipment. We would collect any items which the agents were required to leave behind and give them detailed instruction which they were required to brief back. We always had a communications officer present to make sure that the agent radio operator understood his signal plan and knew exactly what the safety signals, the duress signals and the give away signals would be. The agents would be outfitted in clothing that was native to the operational area. I can recall that they had blue berets and either black or brown pajamas whichever was characteristic of their operations. Equipment carried included flash lights, weapons, (the Swedish K, 9mm pistol, Browning 25 cal. pistol for the radio operator) extra ammunition, web equipment, and a pack. They were given indigenous type rations, matches, cigarettes, and even chewing tobacco in some cases. Wool sweaters were included in the equipment that went with the agents along with any particular map coverage that was desired or special instructions for any type of equipment that had been sent along. For example, when we first infiltrated the rocket rounds that were to be fired in the Dien Bien Phu area, we had to send in specific instructions with one of the individuals who had also been trained in the technique of setting up and firing these rockets. The issue of the equipment and the briefing of the team was

* Ibid., pp. 10-11.

B-o-29

Tab B to

handled almost entirely by the Vietnamese case officer; however, we would stay in the background and from time to time check to make sure that little details had been covered in full - all magazines in the Swedish Ks fully loaded, etc.*

One of the interesting facets of this would be that if the team was not highly motivated, they would find numerous excuses for not going. For instance, if the communications officer was not present, they would state that they had not been given the correct duress or danger signals in the signal plan. The solution to this was having an operations officer there completely familiar with the signal plan who could supply the missing items, eliminating that excuse. One of the more amusing excuses would be the absence of a suitable wristwatch for the radio operator and, of course, the Japanese Seiko watch was the normal issue item but most often they would demand a Swiss movement. This occasioned some last minute trading.**

. . . . . .

. . . the resupply bundles . . . were palletized. I think they weighed about 450 pounds. When completely rigged they were tied onto a thick plywood base that was about 3 to 3 1/2 feet on each side and had a projection equipped with a roller in the bottom center to guide it off the roller conveyer system. Inside the bundle, there were numerous individual cans. These cans were about 10 inches on each edge of the base and some 20 inches high. We packed all supplies inside these tin containers using a Chinese canning machine. This would waterproof the supplies, protecting them from moisture. They could

* Ibid., pp. 11-12.
** Ibid., p. 12.

B-o-30

Tab B to

be cached in this condition. As a rule the cans were put inside a canvas bag with carrying straps attached. This would enable the reception team to break open the bundle and then have individually man-portable sized bundles inside.*

There were many reports on actual resupply drops that the bundles were widely scattered or that the personnel were widely separated from the bundles and, consequently, . . . in-place teams . . . would take three, four or five days to locate all bundles and personnel. To check this out, we decided to run a few test drops at Camp Long Thanh and found that the bundles could be kept within a small dispersion pattern. I would say that it averaged out to be, roughly, more elliptical than circular, with the long axis being some 100-150 meters and the short axis being 75-100 meters. Of course, this was based on everything functioning perfectly. From time to time a bundle would hang on the ramp of the aircraft and this would spread the bundles out quite a bit more and increase the difficulty in finding them. As I pointed out, we used a 100 foot extended riser on the bundle chutes so that in case the parachute were tangled in the jungle canopy, the pallet would dangle down some 100 feet below the canopy and at least touch the ground or be near it. The beacon on the marker bundle, as we called it, would have an antenna of bare cooper wire taped to one of the 100 foot risers and this would serve as the antenna for the beacon system to mark the bundle. Then the ground reception party could use their small transister radios to find the bundle. . .**

. . . . . .

* Ibid., pp. 14-15.
** Ibid., p. 15.

Preparation for the loading of the aircraft and the personnel aboard the aircraft took place concurrently with the briefings. The C-123s which were flown by either Chinese crews or in some cases Vietnamese crews would arrive sometime around noon as a rule. The procedures were well enough developed that in early 1965, one aircraft could be received, loaded and on its way in approximately 20 minutes. Bundles were loaded onto the aircraft from a vehicle that had been equipped with roller conveyers and could be manhandled right into the C-123; the ramp would be lowered so it was even with the truck bed. We had no problem on this. As the bundles were loaded into the aircraft, the case officer would always attach the perishable food items that would be sent to the team. The perishable food items would be attached to the bundles, either before the aircraft took off for Nha Trang or could be attached while the aircraft was en route. The agents would normally be wearing sterile fatigues at this time and would not actually be wearing the uniforms or the native clothing they would be wearing when they were actually infiltrated later that night. The Vietnamese case officer and one American operations officer would always accompany the team to Da Nang.*

The first stop after departing Long Thanh would be Nha Trang. At Nha Trang, the crew would be exchanged on the aircraft. Normally, the crew that ferried the aircraft to Long Thanh to pick up the resupply bundles or the agent personnel would not be the same crew that would be flying the mission that night. I believe this was both to save crew fatigue and to enable the mission crew to complete all of its

* Ibid., p. 12.

B-o-32

Tab B to

detailed briefing. At Nha Trang, the stop would be very short. The crews would be exchanged, the plane refueled, if necessary, and then departure would take place for Danang.*

The plane would arrive at Danang some one or two hours prior to planned take-off time for the actual mission and the agent personnel could either remain on the aircraft or move into a shelter of some type where they were kept out of sight. While the aircraft was at Danang, all fuel tanks would be filled and the aircraft would be checked. Particular checks would be made on the beacon receiver equipment in the aircraft to insure that it was on the correct frequency for the beacon that would be on the drop zone. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

As I understand it, there was a complete double installation of all the required items so that, if one malfunctioned, the other would work. On more than one occasion, there were substitutions made right at Danang so that both systems would be fully operational when the aircraft departed.**

As take-off time approached, one of the last things to be done would be for the ground crew to take the US markings off of the aircraft. The familiar USAF type insignia was attached to the aircraft on large metal sheets which could be removed when two or three screws were loosened. This would leave the aircraft unmarked. I might add at this time that with regard to the equipment or the supplies that accompanied either individuals or resupply bundles, we attempted to have complete sterility . . . I really can't say on the part of the aircraft as I wasn't completely familiar with the procedures.**

* Ibid., pp. 12-13.
** Ibid., p. 13.

B-o-33

Tab B to

I believe I have covered all of the sequence of events up to the time the plane took off on the mission. At the time the aircraft took off, we would make a notification back to SOG in Saigon either by telephone or by teletype, and also the aircraft had a signal plan that would be activated once it started on its mission.*

We had a normal set of instructions on when to turn on the beacon, which was 10 minutes before drop time as I recall, and when to light the fires on the drop zone. If flash lights and batteries were available, they were used; if not, fires would be lit which had been set in a hole dug in the ground. These would normally be lighted some two minutes before drop time and both the beacon and the fires would continue burning until the aircraft made the drop or until some five or 10 minutes after drop time.**

. . . . . .

The Vietnamese case officer and the US operations officer would remain at Danang until the aircraft returned at the completion of the flight. It was not until this time that the case officer or the operations officer would learn whether or not the mission had been successful; whether the bundles had been dropped or the personnel actually infiltrated. If the aircraft returned to Danang in the very early hours of the morning, say 0100 or 0200 hours, we would normally remain there for an hour or so and then fly directly to Camp Long Thanh to arrive there after first light as the air strip was not lighted and we could only land during daylight hours. This would be true mainly if we had had an unsuccessful mission and

* Ibid., pp. 13-14.
** Ibid., p. 10.

it would be necessary to send the bundles or the personnel back to Camp Long Thanh. If the mission had been successful, we would normally go to Nha Trang where the operations officer and the case officer would be sent back to Saigon or Camp Long Thanh on a different aircraft.*

Many times, there would be another mission the next night and the operations officer and the case officer would merely return to Camp Long Thanh on the aircraft that would be flying the next mission. . .*

. . . . . .

On first arriving in SOG in 1964, we did not have these procedures reduced to writing and one of our big projects was to develop a detailed SOP both for communications with the teams, the handling of the messages, and also the launch procedures for sending a team or a resupply, or combination thereof, to one of the in-place teams.**

* Ibid., p. 14.
** Ibid., p. 16.

B-o-35

Tab B to

TOP SECRET

REPRESENTATIVE AIR OPERATIONS MISSIONS

IN NORTH VIETNAM

BY

LT. COLONEL JAMES R. MCCARTHY, USAF

. . . . . .

. . . a typical mission. We would get a series of targets to plan for. They would come from SOG. We would then make a plan based on the best information we had available. We would submit it to SOG for review which, I was told, submitted it to CINCPAC and JCS for final approval. At that time we would get a mission. We would get an intent message in approximately 24 hours from SOG saying execute mission 501 or whatever the number was. We would then go back and make any last minute changes in the mission; for example, if the VC or communists had moved in a new gun position, we would bring in the latest planning factors that we had available. At that time we would resubmit the plan to SOG with our recommended changes. They bought off on it and we would propose the mission to the Chinese. Under their contract, they had the right to refuse to fly the mission. The time I was there, they had never refused. They might ask to go around a gun position to the left because the last time they flew that mission, they went to the right and got shot at. Where we could, we would modify the mission to suit them. But, basically, they would fly the mission as briefed.*

Approximately 12 hours prior to the mission execution, we received an execute message from SOG. The mission would usually launch at about 2300 at night. We would then start

* (TS) Interview of Lt. Colonel James R. McCarthy, USAF, pp. 3-4.

the maintenance generation on the aircraft and, seven hours prior to the mission take-off, we would brief the mission [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) Then we would appoint a staging officer who was really the mission commander. His job was to insure that the aircraft was generated as required in the Ops Plan and to sterilize the aircraft, if required, so that we could plausibly deny knowledge of the aircraft. He also insured that the load was properly rigged and followed the mission from the time it was started until it was finally debriefed.*

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) The aircraft was required to report in at certain points, and, if it did not have radio contact, it would abort. As the plane progressed to the normal turning point, the crew was required to send out a Q code message with results. This way we could thoroughly monitor the mission. Once they returned from flight, we would debrief the crew and send the reports in to SOG.*

This was how the major missions ran. We could run the same missions the C-130s ran; the only problem was that if they were going in to resupply a team up in the northern part of NVN, we would have to refuel or restage out or [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

* Ibid., p. 4

. 1

The agent team insertions were of several types. One 2
was a sort-of semi-notional type. We would take four agents, 3
for example, train them, send them up to NVN and brief them 4
that all four would jump in. We only let the first guy go and 5
then after he went, we would hold the other three and probably 6
a minute later, we would drop an ice block in a chute with 7
some blood on it in the same general location. It would indi- 8
cate if someone found it that there was another jumper, he's 9
wounded, he's got to be around here somewhere. The idea was 10
that the North Vietnamese would tie up quite a few forces 11
looking for people who weren't really there. The agent that 12
they captured would swear up and down that there were three 13
or four others and that they were in the immediate area.* 14

We ran several other types where we would not drop 15
agents per se but would drop what we called notional bundles. 16
We would drop bundles of things you would normally resupply a 17
team with, like clothes, food, maybe some weapons that we had 18
spiked or bent up prior to being dropped so that they couldn't 19
be of any useful value but they had no way of telling once 20
they got on the ground whether it was done intentionally or 21
what had happened when the chute mal-functioned. Occasionally, 22
we would drop weapons and munitions but they were fixed so 23
that they were either duds or they would not fire. So the 24
enemy did not get any useful weapons from us. However, the 25
object of all these drops was to let the North Vietnamese 26
think that there were forces assigned, were in the area, a team 27
was operating and they would spend untold time and manpower 28
29
30
31

* Ibid., p. 5.

trying to round these teams up. We would also send fake radio messages to these teams. It added credence to the whole story. This operation was part of the SSPL (Sacred Sword Patriot League). In addition, we did actually supply long-range teams that were in there. . .*

* Ibid., pp. 5-6.

B-o-39

Tab C to

MORI DocID: 570371

SOG(CCC) S3
APO US Forces 96499
221055h April 1969

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

OPERATIONS

1. General. (TSLD)

a. Purpose: This SOP establishes procedures standardizing routine recurring operations within CCC and complies with all procedures directed by higher headquarters.

b. Conformity: Command and Control S3 is responsible for insuring all personnel assigned and/or attached to S3 section read and understand this SOP.

c. Organization: Organization will consist of the basic S3 staff and two ASTs as indicated below:

(1) The basic S3 staff:

(a) Operations Officer	Major	One ea
(b) Ass't Operations Officer	Captain	Two ea
(c) Air/Arty Liaison Officer	Captain	One ea
(d) Operations NCO	SSM	One ea
(e) Ass't Operations NCO	MSG	Two ea
(f) Air Liaison NCO	SFC	One ea
(g) Draftsman	SGT	One ea
(h) Clerk Typist	SP4	One ea

(2) The ASTs (Area Specialist Teams):

(a) Responsibilities: An AST is responsible for the briefing, preparation, insertion, monitoring, extraction, and debriefing of all RTs and/or EFs to be employed in the AST's area of interest. Areas of interest are assigned the two ASTs as follows:

1. AST#1: Responsible for all CCC targets in Cambodia, and for CCC targets in Laos north of the horizontal YB35 grid.

2. AST#2: Responsible for all CCC targets in Laos from the Laos/Cambodia border in the South, north to the horizontal YB35 grid.

Tab D to
Annex O to
Appendix B

B-o-40

(b) Composition of individual ASTs: Each of the two ASTs is composed of four individuals, with individual responsibilities as follows:

1. S3 Representative (Ass't Operations Officer):

a. Briefs team on all aspects of team mission.

b. Monitors team in field.

c. Keeps Operations Officer advised of progress of teams in the field.

2. S2 Representative:

a. Briefs team on enemy and friendly situation, and on weather and terrain conditions in and around target area.

b. Coordinates and issues instruction in use or employment of special items of equipment such as cameras, tape recorders, wire-tap devices, Pole Bean, and soap chips.

c. Prepares Advance Intell Report on return of team to CCC.

d. Conducts detailed debriefing of team and prepares final after action report.

3. Launch Site Representative:

a. Assists team in drawing necessary equipment.

b. Conducts team/pilot briefing, formulates loading plan for insert ships, and escorts team members to ships, supervising loading.

c. Insures coordination between team and launch site concerning all aspects of insertion/extraction.

d. Insures thorough briefing of team regarding employment of TAC Air.

e. Insures proper preparation/rigging of insert/extract ships.

4. Communications Section Representative:

a. Prepares and issues necessary codes, SOIs, and all communications equipment and information to team as required.

b. Thoroughly briefs team on the use of communications equipment, SOI, codes, etc.

2. OPERATIONS (C)

The following is a chronological sequence of events and reports that are necessary to conduct and complete an operation as generally conducted by this organization:

a. The target priorities list is received from higher headquarters.

(1) This list is received o/a the 25th of each month to cover projected targets for the following month.

(2) This list states the order of priority in which higher headquarters desires the targets to be conducted, the Air Force code names of the target areas, and the lower left no bomb lines (LLNBLs) of the targets.

(3) This list may be deviated from when tactical considerations cause another target to be placed in a higher priority and higher headquarters directs it be conducted ASAP.

b. A target is programmed by the S3. In turn the responsible AST is alerted. At the same time CCC Reconnaissance Company is alerted, and tasks a team against the target. At this time the targeted team becomes OPCON to the responsible AST.

c. AST issues the team a warning order (Annex "A", appendix 1). Ideally a team should have five or six days preparation time.

d. The team leader makes a visual reconnaissance of his assigned target area.

(1) VR is coordinated between team leader and the launch site representative of the AST.

(2) After completion of VR, the team leader coordinates his selection of landing zones with the launch site, and an LZ report is submitted by S3 (annex "A", appendix 2)

e. The team receives a complete OPORD from AST (Annex "A", appendix 3).

f. The team receives required supplies from the S2/S4 (Annex "A", appendix 4).

g. The team leader presents a briefback to the Commander CCC, or his representative (Annex "A", appendix 5). The briefback is normally presented three days after the warning order is issued to the team. The team can be inserted any time after completion of the briefback.

TOP SECRET

h. The team will submit a team roster to the AST launch site representative ASAP after briefback (Annex "A", appendix 6). The launch site will submit the team roster (Annex "A", appendix 7) to higher hq.

i. On the day of insert a pilot/team briefing (Annex "A", appendix 8) will be conducted by a launch site representative, after which the team will be escorted to an aircraft and loaded for the move to the forward launch site/ target area.

j. On insert of the team CCC S3 submits insertion report (Annex "A", appendix 9).

k. While conducting operations, the committed team will submit reports through the launch site to S3 as required, but a minimum of three daily reports will be submitted (Annex "A", appendix 10).

l. Extraction of team:

(1) Normal extraction: After completion of a mission, the team will be extracted. S3 will submit extraction report (Annex "A", appendix 11).

(2) Emergency extraction:

(a) Prairie Fire Emergency: Defined as a situation in which a team is in immediate contact with a superior enemy force and is unable to break contact without suffering casualties or faced with being overrun. TEAM ACTION: Report "PRAIRIE FIRE EMERGENCY" (The exact words must be used). All required/ available assets are diverted to support reinforcement and/or extraction of team (In a PF Emerg, the team will be extracted if the team leader so requests).

(b) Tactical Emergency: Defined as a situation in which enemy activity in the target area is such that the team cannot continue or complete its mission without coming in contact or compromising mission. TEAM ACTION: State "TACTICAL EMERGENCY". Be prepared to employ artillery, TAC Air, or gunships as directed. Keep the commander/S3 informed of situation using key word S-A-L-U-T-E. REACTION: Assets will be diverted to area as required. Commander CCC or his representative will make final decision as to whether situation warrants extraction of team.

(c) Team Emergency: Defined as a situation in which problems within the team itself preclude continuation of a mission. Examples: sickness, team revolt, etc. TEAM ACTION: Advise S3 of situation, giving all details. REACTION: Commander CCC or S3 will make final decision as to whether or not extraction is to take place. If the situation warrants extraction, a replacement team may be inserted prior to the extraction in order to continue the mission.

m. After extraction:

(1) The team returned from FLS to CCC at earliest convenience.

(2) The AST informs Reconnaissance Company of ETA of team in order that the team be met at landing pad.

TOP SECRET

B-o-43

MORI DocID. 570371

(3) The AST will inform the mess sergeant of DEA of the team at CCC.

(4) The AST arranges for debriefing and conducts same ASAP after return of team. Advance intell report and after action report are prepared and submitted by S2 representative of the AST.

(5) After debriefing of team, OPCON of team reverts to CO, Reconnaissance Company.

3. COORDINATION. See Annex "B"

4. MESSAGE PREPARATION, ROUTING, AND RETENTION. See Annex "C"

AST
LTC

ANNEXES: "A" - Formats
"B" - Coordination
"C" - Message Prep, Routing, Retention
"D" - Terminology to CCC Operations SOP

OFFICIAL:

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID: 570371

TOP SECRET

Annex "A" (Formats) to CCC Operations SOP dtd 22 April 1969

1. GENERAL. (TSLD)

The enclosed appendices list formats used in the preparation of teams for missions and the formats used in standard messages sent during preparation and deployment of teams deployed.

2. APPENDICES:
1 - Warning Order Format
2 - Landing Zone Report Format
3 - OPORD Format
4 - Supply List
5 - Briefback Format
6 - Team Roster Format (Team to Launch Site)
7 - Team Roster Format (To Higher hq)
8 - Team/Pilot Briefing Format
9 - Insertion Report Format
10 - Spot Report Format
11 - Extraction Report Format
12 - Daily Wrap-up Format
13 - Air Strike Report Format
14 - Aircraft Status Report Format
15 - VNAF Border Penetration Report Format
16 - Downed/Damaged Aircraft Report

MAXWELL
S3

Incl - Appendices 1-16 as shown

TOP SECRET

B-o-45

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 1 (Warning Order Format) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General (U)

Attached is the format used in issuing the warning order to targeted teams.

2. Applications:

The warning order is issued to the team LO as early as possible after the team is targeted.

3. Distribution.

The completed format, after warning order is issued to the team LO, and is placed in the team message file and retained until completion of the assigned mission.

MAXWELL
S3

Incl - 1 a/s

MORI DocID 570371

PATROL WARNING ORDER

A. BRIEF STATEMENT OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION: (S-2)(S-3)

B. MISSION (S-3).

C. GENERAL INSTRUCTION (S-3)

1. TARGET:

2. A/F CODE NAME:

3. LLNBL:

4. PLANNED INSERT DATE:

5. ISSUE EQUIPMENT LIST:

D. TIME SCHEDULE

1. STUDY TGT FOLDER (S-2)

2. VR (LS)

3. RECEIVED OPORD (S-2, S-3, COMMO, LS)

4. DRAW EQUIPMENT (S-4)

5. BRIEF BACK (S-3, S-2, CO, CCC, COMMO)

B-o-47

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 2 (LZ Report Format) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

The LZ report is submitted by the team 10 to S3 ASAP after conduct of a visual reconnaissance of the target area. It lists the landing zones for insertion that the 10 has selected, in conjunction with the launch site representative of the AST.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

SUBJECT: LZ REPORT
PRI LZ - XX751908 (Location of primary LZ)
MOV - SW (Proposed direction of movement from LZ)
ALT LZ - XX763897 (Location of alternate LZ)
MOV - NE
ALT LZ - XX765901
MOV - NW

3. Classification.

The LZ report is classified Top Secret/LIMDIS when out-of-country area is indicated; Secret if in-country.

4. Precedence.

Precedence is Priority.

MARRELL
S3

B-o-48

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 3 (OPORD Format) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

The Operation Order is issued to the team by the AST as scheduled, usually ASAP after conduct of VR by the team IO.

2. Distribution.

The OPORD format is not retained after briefing of team, since it reflects info extracted from intell reports, previous target files, and the current OPORD frag received from higher headquarters.

3. Application.

The attached format shows the outline normally used by the AST members in conducting the detailed briefing of the team.

MAXWELL
S3

1 Incl - a/s

TOP SECRET

OPERATION ORDER (C)

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces: S-2
      (1) Summary of recent events, sightings and contact in target area.
      (2) Requirement for special equipment; SC, IG, camera, Etc.
      (3) Handbook identification of enemy wpns, and equipment,
      (4) ARI require for each mission.
   b. Friendly Forces: S-3
      (1) Location of friendly elements/unit which are capable of rendering assistance to include L/L and stand by exploitation force.

   c. Attachments and detachment S-3.

2. MISSION (S-3)
   a. Primary (as stated in OPORD)
   b. Supplemental (POW)
   c. Additional (as stated by Co CCC)

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of operation
   b. Fire support available
      (1) Arty
      (2) TAC Air
   c. Coordinating Instruction (S-3)
      (1) Tgt
      (2) A/F code name
      (3) NEAR
      (4) Estimated length of mission
      (5) Date/Time of insertion
      (6) Availability of tear drop, stinger, and hornet
      (7) Rules of engagement FF/DB
      (8) Cover story
      (9) Launch procedures L/S

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS (S-3)
   a. Administration
      (1) TM roster
      (2) LZ report
      (3) Brief back/rehearsal
      (4) Required reports, formats and time
   b. Logistics
      (1) Special equipment
      (2) Re-supply
      (3) Rations

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal
      (1) TM call sign and freq.
      (2) Arty freq.
      (3) Air. Freq.
      (4) how high freq.
      (5) Abn CP freq.
      (6) Abn relay
      (7) Shackle code
      (8) Spelling Code .
      (9) Explain use of KAC 199
      (10) Commanders Code - Butler
      (11) Survial letter and Alt.

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 4 (Supply List) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

This list provides the team with a basic guide to the items normally available for issue, plus allowance for additional extra items.

2. Application.

Two copies issued to team at issue of OPORD. 10 checks items requested, adds additional items, turns one copy in to S4 through AST launch site representatives, and turns other copy in to CO, Recon Co.

3. Distribution.

One copy maintained in S4 files until after completion of mission. One copy is maintained in Recon Co files until completion of mission.

MAXWELL
S3

1 Incl - a/s

TO: MS-4
FROM: RT _____

MISSION SUPPLY REQUEST

DATE REQUESTED _____
NAME OF TEAM LDR _____

ITEM	QTY REQ	ISSUED	REMARKS
AMMO			
5.56MM			
45 CAL			
22 CAL			
40 MM HE			
40 MM CS			
40 MM FLARE			
AK 47			
7M SK			
ZRO JET AMMO			
MAGAZINES TYPE			
GRENADES			
M 26			
M 33			
WP			
CS			
SMOKE			
CS POWDER			
MINES			
M18 CLAYMORE			
M 7A2 ANTI VEC			
M 14 PERSONNEL			
OBJ TRAP DEVICES			
M 1 PULL TYPE			
M 1A1 PRESSURE			
M 3 PULL RELEASE			
M5 PRESSURE RELEASE			
M 1A1 & M3 ARE HM			
RATIONS			
C-RATIONS NO OF MLS			
RP'S NO OF MEALS			
IR'S NO OF MEALS			
DRDRY PACKS			

ITEM	QTY REQ	ISSUED	REMARKS
DEMOLITIONS			
C-4 BLOCKS			
CAPS, NON-ELEC			
CAPS, ELEC			
DET CORD			
FUSE, TIME			
FUSE, IGNITER			
TIME PENCILS			
WEAPONS			
22 CAL W/SILENCER			
STEN GUN W/SILENCER			
M-3 SUB MG W/SILENCER			
RIFLE, AK-47			
SWEDISH PISTOL			
GYROSET PISTOL			
LAW, M-72			
M-16 3-X SCOPE			
INDIVIDUAL ITEMS			
COMPASS			
BINOCULARS			
PROTECTIVE MASK			
RAPPELLING GLOVES			
SURVIVAL KIT			
SNAP LINK			
RANSON RIG			
MISC ITEMS			
HEAT TABLETS			
WATER PURIF TABLETS			
LEECH REPELLENT			
INSECT REPELLENT			
SALT TABLETS			

ITEM	QTY REQ	ISSUED	REMARKS
SIGNAL DEVICES			
STARCLUSTER HL			
STROBE LIGHT			
SIGNAL MIRROR			
PEN FLARES			
PANELS, EMERG			
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ITEMS MUST AVAIL FROM SIGNAL AND THE S-2			
SIGNAL			
PRC-25			
URC-10			
HANDSET H-138/U			
S-2			
HAND CUFFS			
CAMERA, PEN-EE			
SOAP CHIPS			
ITALIAN GREEN			
FILE			
ITEMS NOT LISTED			

B-0-52

MORI DocID: 570371

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 5 (Briefback Format) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

The attached format provides the RT/platoon leader with a complete guide for preparation of a briefback to be presented to CO, CCC prior to deployment.

2. Application.

This format is issued to the RT/platoon leader at issue of the OPORD.

3. Distribution.

For use by the RT/platoon leader only. Destroyed after conduct of briefback.

HARWELL
S3

1 Incl - a/s

MORI DocID 570371

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION (SOA)
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96499

NAME OF LDR:_____ RT/PLT/CO NAME:_____

TARGET NUMBER:_____ TARGET CODE NAME:_____

WHEN ARRIVED FOR DEBRIEF?____ RECEIPT OF ORDER:_____

INITIAL REPORT:_____ WR CONDUCTED: _____

I. SITUATION
a. Enemy: Assume all known enemy information to include size, location, type unit, activity, weapons and equipment in your AO.

b. Friendly: Friendly units operating within 10 km of your unit. Friendly RAS, FSDs, Airfields, Mobile Launch Sites. Include Artillery, TAC Air, Gunships and Troop support available.

II. MISSION: (Who? What? Where? When?)

III. EXECUTION: (How?)
a. Concept of operation: Insert LZ:_____ 1st Alt LZ:___ 2nd Alt LZ:_____. Team composition and method of loading. Contingencies for enemy contact on or near LZ. Initial direction of movement.

b. Pre-planned Fire Support: (Concentrations)

c. Type Emergencies: RF: TAC E: Team Emergency.

d. E and E plan.

e. Special Instructions: Use of 1-14 lines. Insertion of Classified materials. Reference points, Special EEI.

IV. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
a. Logistics
(1) Weapons: (Types, number and Ammo).
(2) Demolitions: Claymores, mines, grenades (smoke, HE and CS), time fuse, time pencils.
(3) Survival Equipment: (panels, pen flares, mirrors, strobe lights).
(4) Comm Equipment: (VR and UHF: Batteries and antennas, hand sets).
(5) Rations and Water: (number and days)
(6) Medical Equipment: (morphine, cough medicine, anti-malaria pills)
(7) Special Equipment: (camera and film, wire tap device, protective masks, CS powders and puffs, hanson ring or rope, snap links, classified material and equipment.

b. Administration.
(1) Team roster/code names submitted.
(2) Serial number of equipment submitted.
(3) Field Intell, booklet.

V. COMMAND AND SIGNALS
a. Signals
(1) SOI: (call signs, frequencies, reporting contractions).
(2) Survival letters
b. Chain of command.

c. Time hack.

ARE QUESTIONS????????????

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 6 (Basic Team Roster) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

The attached format is used by the RT/platoon leader to show members to be deployed with team, also lists equipment, particularly serial numbered items, to be carried by team.

2. Application.

The team leader prepares two copies of this roster. One copy is turned in to the Recon Co, the other to the launch site 48 hours prior to deployment of team.

3. Distribution.

One copy is retained by the Recon Co until after completion of mission. One copy is retained in S3 files until completion of mission.

MAXWELL
S3

1 Incl - n/s

CODE NAME US ONLY	DEMO C-4/TIME FUZE TNT/BLASTING CAPS CLAYMORES	FUZE LIGHTER	CANTEEN PER MAN	HARNESS RIG	SWISS SEAT	RATIONS # OF DAYS	SHAPELESS PER MAN	FROG MASKS	CS GREN H/H CS CS POWDER	GRENADES M26, M33, M34	SMOKE RED YELLOW VIOLET	HAND COMM W/KL	SPECIAL OPERATIONS EQUIPMENT

BRIEFBACK: DATE _____ TIME _____

INFO: 1. All classified material will be returned to S-2 as soon as operation is over.
2. All issue of ONE basis only equipment will be turned in to S-4 as soon as operation is over, to include excess rations.
3. All commo equipment will be returned to Commo as soon as operation is over.
4. Combat Loss Statements should be included in S-2 Debriefing and turned in to S-4.
5. The simplest matters are sometimes the most important. THINK. AM I COMPLETE?

MORI DocID: 570371

TOP SECRET

TEAM DATA

TEAM NAME _____ TGT NAME _____ INSERT DTG _____ LZ PRI _____ LZ ALT _____

ROUTES TO FOLLOW: PRI _____ ALT _____

	FULL NAME	SHOULDER WEAPONS	RDS	PISTOLS	RADIOS	CAMERA	BINOCULARS	STROBE LIGHT	COMPASS	MIRROR	FLARE GUN	PANEL	MAP	MINARDS
10	10													
11	11													
12	12													
01	01													
02	02													
03	03													
04	04													
05	05													
06	06													
07	07													
08	08													
09	09													

LIST OTHER SPECIAL ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

DISTRIBUTION: Original - S3
Copy - Target Folder Recon Company

DATE: _____ 10 ___

SIGNATURE: _____

B-o-56

MORI DocID: 570371

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 7 (Team Roster Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (S)

The team roster is prepared by the launch site from the team roster submitted by the RT/platoon leader. It is then submitted by the launch site to higher hq 48 hours prior to deployment.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

SUBJECT: TEAM ROSTER
1. NEW YORK (TEAM NAME)
2. D-76 (TGT NR)
3. 10 - SMITH, J.D., SFC (This paragraph lists US and ARVN personnel by job assignment, and shows nr of SCU)
   11 - JONES, H.T., PFC
   12 - ELLIOTT, J.E., SSG
   01 - ARVN - THIEU, J., SGT
   SCU - 7
4. KAC 176/ABC (KAC or other code to be used)
5. HOT DOG (Call-sign of team - if call-signs change daily, show all call-signs in sequence)
5A. HOT DOG (Air Force code-name of TGT)
6. 65.20/45.90/34.70 etc. (Frequencies to be used each day in sequence)
6A. 47.55 (Alternate new high freq)
7. 52.40 (Emergency FM freq)
8. 246.00 (Emergency VHF freq)
9. Additional info, if required.

3. Classification.
Report classified TOP SECRET LIMDIS

4. Precedence.

Priority

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 6 (Team/Pilot Briefing Format) to annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

This format is a general outline of the major points covered by the launch site representative of the AST in the pre-launch briefing.

FORMAT

1. Situation.
   a. Friendly elements in and around target area.
   b. Enemy elements and activities in area of operations, including AAA.

II. Mission. (of Air Support element)
   a. Insert_____Tgt Area_____LLNBL_____NR PAX_____
   b. Extract_____Tgt Area_____LLNBL_____NR PAX_____
   c. Support_____Tgt Area_____LLNBL_____PAX/EQUIP_____
   d. Other_____Tgt Area_____LCC_____PAX/EQUIP_____

III. Execution.
   a. Concept:
      (1) Mission Priority:
      (2) Primary Insert A/C:_____Lead call-sign_____
      (3) Primary guns_____Lead call sign_____
      (4) Chase A/C_____Chase Medic_____
   b. Coordinating Instructions:
      (1) Movement to FLS:
      (2) Loc of selected LZs:
      (3) Route to target area:
         (a) Check points:
         (b) Rendezvous point:
         (c) Orbit areas:
         (d) Recommended approaches/exits:
         (e) Holding areas: Slicks/CH-34s_____C-guns_____Cobras_____
      (4) Ground-fire SOP
      (5) Exiting helicopters by troops:

IV. Admin & Logistics
   a. Administration:
      (1) Code names, nature of wounds
      (2) Casualties disposition
   b. Logistics:
      (1) Rations for crews
      (2) Rearming/refueling locations

V. Command & Signal.
   a. Signal:
      (1) Frequencies:
      (2) Call-signs:
   b. Command:
      (1) Chain of command:
      (2) Operational control:

2. Distribution
   N/A - Format for oral briefing only.

TOP SECRET B-o-59

~~TOP SECRET~~

Appendix 9 (Insertion Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

The insertion report is submitted to the launch site by the CCC air controller ASAP after insertion is complete. S3 submits report to higher hq within 30 minutes after insertion of team, if possible. This report is submitted to higher hq via SSB radio.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

605 (line nr for insertion report)
D-76 (TGT designator)
TMOT (tm condition after insert)
INSERTED 091245H APR 69 (DTG of insert)
LZ LOC - XG573804 (LZ location)
NEGATIVE CONTACT (on insert, indicates enemy contact or no)
SPARE 11 (indicates no TAC Air employed, if it was employed, SPARE 12 would be used, and an Air-strike report must follow)

*NOTE - If additional info is required to explain the insert report, it is sent via RTT/TTT, referencing the basic report, the Target, the Team, and the general location within the A/O:

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

SUBJECT: ADDED INFO TO INSERTION REPORT, D-76, RT ARIZONA, CENTRAL BA-694
1. TM RECEIVED GROUND FIRE FROM EST ENEMY PLATOON APPROX FIVE MINUTES AFTER INSERT RESULTING IN NEGATIVE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. CONTACT BROKEN 091405H APR.
2. 10 FRELS TM CAN CONTINUE MISSION.
3. ETC., ETC.

3. Classification
Insertion reports are classified TOP SECRET LIMDIS when out-of-country. For in-country operations SECRET classification is used. Highest classification for SSB traffic is SECRET.
4. Precedence.
Insertion reports and added info to insertion reports are sent Operational Immediate.

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 10 (Spot Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

Spot reports are submitted by committed teams through the launch site to CCC S3 as required, at least three times daily. 0730-0830, 1130-1230, and 1630-1730. S3 in turn submits spot reports to higher hq via SSB radio.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

601 (line nr for spot report)
D-76 (TGT designator)
TWO SICK SCU (tm condition)
LOC XC503467 (tm location)
MOV - NE (intended direction of movement)
SPARE 11 (TAC Air not used)

*NOTE - If additional info must be sent, same procedure is used as with insertion report, Appendix 9.

3. Classification.

Though out -of-country info is TOP SECRET, the highest classification that can be given to a SSB MSG is SECRET. Therefore spot reports are SECRET. Added info is sent TOP SECRET via RTT/TTY.

4. Precedence.

Spot reports are given a precedence of Priority. Added info is sent operational immediate.

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID. 570371

Appendix 11 (Extraction Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (S)

The extraction report is submitted by the abn controller through the launch site to S3 CCC ASAP after extraction of a team is complete. S3 submits extraction report to higher hq within thrity minutes after extraction. Report is submitted via SSB radio.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

SEVEN UP (Code name for extraction report)
1. H RD CORE (AF code name of TGT)
2. 091748H APR 69 (DTG of extraction)
3A. ALL OK (condition of US team members)
B. TWO WIA (condition of SCU team members)
4. XC689341 (LZ location)
5. YES (in contact with enemy - YES OR NO)
6. ONE PLATOON (est size enemy force)
7. YES (extracted under fire - YES OR NO)
8A. TWO (nr TAC aircraft employed)
B. 0 (nr helicopter gun-ships employed)

*NOTE - If added info is required, use same procedure as with Insertion Report, Appendix 9.

3. Classification:

Same as with Spot Report, Appendix 10.

4. Precedence.

Same as Spot Report, Appendix 10.

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 12 (Daily Wrap-up) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

A Daily wrap-up is submitted daily by S3 CCC to higher hq. Report is due by 2000H hrs daily.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34 (also SUPPFAC, NKP and/or CO, CCN when info contained applies)

SUBJECT: DAILY WRAP-UP
PERIOD: 092000-102000 APR 69
1. PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE OPERATIONS:
   A. INSERTIONS: (TGT, TEAM, TIME, LZ LOC, LAST LOC, TM CONDITION, REMARKS)
   B. EXTRACTIONS: (TGT, TEAM, TIME, LZ LOC, REMARKS)
   C. MISSION ABORTS: (TGT, REASON)
   D. SITREPS: (TGT, TEAM LOC, REMARKS)
   E. INTENTIONS FOR 10 APR 69: (TGT, MISSION)
2. RADIO RELAY SITES:
3. IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS:
4. COMMAND INFORMATION:
5. DAILY RT STATUS REPORT:
   A. RTS AUTHORIZED:
   B. RTS ASSIGNED:
   C. RTS ATTACHED:
   D. RTS DETACHED:
   E. OPERATIONALLY READY:
      (1) DEPLOYED:
      (2) MISSION PREPARATION
      (3) STAND DOWN:
   F. NON-OPERATIONAL:
      (1) TRAINING:
      (2) OTHER:
   G. US PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IN RTS:

*NOTE - Each Thursday evening the wrap-up carries the weekly statistics. See S3 Policy file for format.

3. Classification.

The Daily wrap-up is classified TOP SECRET LIMDIS. Individual paragraphs are classified as to their contents.

4. Precedence.

Precedence of the wrap-up is Operational immediate.

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 13 (Airstrike Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

An airstrike report is submitted by the abn controller through launch site to S3 CCC ASAP after use of TAC Air or helicopter gun-ships. S3 in turn submits the report to higher hq. Report is submitted via RTT/TTX.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP
INFO: OP-34

SUBJECT: AIRSTRIKE REPORT
TGT D-76, RT ARIZONA
2 AFLE, 2 COBRAS, 5000 LB BOMBS, ROCKETS, 40MM, CBU 35, 0901746H APR, XCB90634, PLATOON EN OPEN, ONE SECONDARY EXPLO, TEN EN KIA.

*EXPLANATION - Type & nr of A/C, type ordnance used, DTG used, location, tgt description, results.

3. Classification.

Airstrike reports are classified TOP SECRET LIMDIS when out-of-country; SECRET when in-country.

4. Procedures.

Airstrike report is sent operational immediate.

MAYNELL

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 14 (Aircraft Status Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

Aircraft status is reported daily by 1500H hrs by the launch site to higher hq, using the attached format. Sent via SSB radio.

2. Classification.

Classification is SECRET.

3. Precedence.

Precedence is Priority.

MAXWELL,
P3

1 Incl - a/s

DAILY ASSET STATUS REPORT

CCN	DATE	COMMAND AND CONTROL NORTH					COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRAL				COMMAND AND CONTROL SOUTH					
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
AS OF TIME 0730 DAILY	AS OF TIME 1600H DAILY	DANANG	QUANG TRI	HAMPON PHAN-RANG	PHU BAI		BAN TO	DAKPEK	KONTUM		BAN ME THUOT	DUC CO	SONG BE	QUAN LOI	TAY NINH	
KING 33A ONLY	TROOP CARRIER CH-34 (VNAF) X															
A/C INCH	UH-1D/H/F H															
	CH-46 S															
A/C READY FOR FCF	CH-3 A															
	GUNSHIPS G															
A/C COMPL FCF	UH-1B/C/E/F R															
	AH-1G F															
A/C SCHED TODAY	OBSERVATION Y															
	O-1 (ARMY) D															
A/C USED YESTERDAY	U-17 E															
	SAC O-1 (USAF) P															
	O-2 O															

MORI DocID. 570371

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 15 (VNAF Border Penetration Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

The VNAF border penetration report is submitted daily to CO, CCN, since VNAF assets are requested and supplied through CCN. A negative report is required. Sent via RTT/TTY.

2. Format.

FROM: CO, CCC
TO: CO, CCN
ATTN: S3/ALO

SUBJECT: BORDER PENETRATION REPORT FOR VNAF A/C FOR 09 APR 69.
1. ONE U-17/888/ONE PENETRATION.
2. THREE CH-34S/777/872/879/ONE PENETRATION EACH.
3. ONE CH-34/999/FOUR PENETRATIONS.
4. ONE CH-34/555/NEGATIVE PENETRATIONS, UNPLEASABLE.

*EXPLANATION - NR OF A/C/TAIL NUMBERS/NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS.

3. Classification.

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

4. Precedence.

PRIORITY

MAXWELL
83

TOP SECRET B-o-67

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 16 (Downed/Damaged Aircraft Report) to Annex "A", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

This report is used primarily for VHAF aircraft, since local assets can be handled through local communications, i.e. telephone. The report is submitted via RTT/TTY ASAP after aircraft crashes or is shot down or damaged by ground fire. The attached format shows information usually pertinent.

2. Classification.

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

3. Precedence.

Operational Immediate.

MAXWELL
53

1 Incl - a/s

TOP SECRET B-o-68

MORI DocID: 570371

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

PRECEDENCE: OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FM: CO, CCC

TO: CHIEF SOO/CO GRD STUDIES OP
CO, CCN ATTN: S-3 ALO

INFO: OP-34/32

TOP SECRET LIMDIS CITE _____

SUBJ: DOWNED/DAMAGED AIRCRAFT, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

1. DATE AND TIME OF OCCURRENCE: _____.
2. TYPE AIRCRAFT _____, SERIAL NO. _____.
   UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT: _____.
3. EXTENT OF DAMAGE AND LOCATION ON AIRCRAFT: _____.
   _____.
   _____.
4. WHERE DAMAGE OCCURRED (GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES) _____.
5. TYPE ARMAMENT INFLICTING DAMAGE: _____.
6. PERSONNEL INJURED: _____.
7. AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY AT TIME OF DAMAGE/LOSS (i.e., APPROACH, LANDING, TAKE-OFF, ETC. _____.
8. REMARKS/DISPOSITION OF AIRCRAFT: _____.

TOP SECRET LIMDIS (WHEN COMPLETED)

TOP SECRET B-0-69

MORI DocID: 570371

Annex "B" (Coordination) to CCC Operations SOP dtd 22 Apr 69

1. General. (S)

MACSOG provides broad operational support/liaison base through coordination with 7th Air Force and MACV. CCC, within the guidelines established by MACSOG effects detailed coordination with Air Force and Army units rendering operational support; or requiring intelligence information. The procedures/relationships described herein are current as of 22 Apr 69, but are subjected to change.

2. CCC Coordinates with:

a.	IFFV	Appendix 1
b.	4th Inf Div	" 2
c.	52nd Arty Gp	" 3
d.	52nd Avn Bn	" 4
e.	20th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS)	" 5
f.	6th Special Operations Squadron	" 6
g.	S4, 24th Special Tactical Zone, AS Kontum Sector	" 7
h.	B-24, 5th SFGA (Kontum)	" 8
i.	Peacock	" 9
j.	219th VNAF Helicopter Squadron	" 10
k.	219th Reconnaissance Airplane Co	" 11
l.	110th VNAF Squadron	" 12

MAXWELL
B3

Incl - Appendices 1-12 a/s

TOP SECRET

B-o-70

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 1 (IFFV) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

The direct relationship between IFFV and CCC is limited to the "CORRAL" program. All other matters are coordinated through MACSOG, represented at IFFV Hq by a LNO. The LNO is permanently stationed in Nha Trang and is physically located in the G-3 plans section. CCC does not pass intelligence information directly to IFFV.

2. "CORRAL" Program.

The term "CORRAL" is the army code word for the employment of 175mm gun fires in Laos. Air Force uses the code word "CORRAMDO FADE". FSCC at IFFV Hq schedules some of the targets, based on intelligence received from CCC via MACSOG. Prior to firing the targets, however, the battery must obtain ground clearance from CCC (CCC coordinates all air clearance through ABCCC). The target requests are forwarded to the FDC of 1/92 Arty, the Bn having OPCON of the firing battery at Ben Het either through the 4th Inf Div or through 52nd Arty Gp. Another Hq at the Field Force level directly associated with the program is the IFFV Artillery, the control Hqs of the 52nd Arty Gp. The CG, G3, and Ass't G3 (operations) are cognizant of the activities of MACSOG. CCC effects liaison directly with Ass't G3.

NOTE: "CORRAL" Program is classified TOP SECRET LIMDIS.

3. Communications.

a. Telephone.

b. Secure voice radio.

c. IFFV RTT net.

d. Safe hands.

MAXWELL
83

MORI DocID. 570371

Appendix 2 (4th Inf Div) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLD)

The close proximity of CCC's main camp, Yard camp, local training area and some areas of operations for elements of 4th Inf Div makes close and continuous coordination mandatory. CCC effects direct liaison with G3 plans, 4th Div Hq at Camp Enari.

2. Matters requiring coordination.

a. In-country NBIs. If a target area extends into SVN the in-country portion must be disseminated to all units as a no-bomb, no-fire, no-entry zone. Upon notification, 4th Div G3 plans will assign a "Foxtrot" number to such area and effects dissemination. 4th Div G3 must be notified when the area is activated and deactivated. Clearance is granted only when division operations are not scheduled in the area in question.

b. Artillery Support. This is coordinated only if artillery organic to the 4th Inf Div is to be used, either in support of committed teams or in defense of CCC installations. On occasions 4th Div G3 plans will make the arrangements for defense of CCC installations or fires in CCC's local training area; however it is usually more convenient to coordinate these through 24th STZ.

c. Exchange of intell info of mutual interest. This refers to intell info affecting security of either or both units and is immediate in nature. It may include, and on occasion will, info developed by SOG across-border operations. Routinely, however, intelligence developed by MACSOG elements will be disseminated to conventional units by Hq, SOG.

d. Use of local training areas. The area referred to as CCC's local training area is still a part of A/O Macarthur, the A/O for 4th Div, therefore its use and occupation must be correlated with the current tactical situation in the Kontum area. Normally, CCC will patrol areas of likely enemy movement and provide surveillance of strategic hilltops, but during periods of high threat a tactical unit organic to the 4th Inf Div may take over responsibility for the area. Again, the initial coordination will be made through 4th Div G3 plans, with subsequent daily contact with the unit involved. Experience indicates that the best and quickest results are obtained when coordination is made directly with G3 plans.

e. In-country targets in support of 4th Inf Div/IFFV. CCC is no longer responsive to either hq although the requirement has not been officially rescinded. The requirement was terminated by CCC, with the implied approval of MACSOG, when the daily helicopter assets were reduced from 8 slicks and 8 guns daily to 4 and 4, respectively, intended exclusively for out-of-country operations. If in-country operations are desired, however, the minimum number of helicopters is 3 slicks and 2 guns, on standby in CCC, and provided by the 4th InfDiv. The in-country targets are referred to as Kontum targets, and carry a control

MORI DocID 570371

number assigned by G3 plans. Procedure which has been followed in the past in coordination of targets: G3 plans submits request to CCC, simultaneously notifying IFFV. CCC ascertains availability of a team, assigns same to target, establishes tentative insert date, commences team preparation, and requests formal approval from SOG. Info copy of request forwarded to G3 plans. NOTE: MACSOG automatically approves. NOTE 2: This procedure is followed in case of targets requested by 4th Inf Div; targets desired by IFFV are coordinated through MACSOG. Once team has been inserted, all reports, to include AAR will be forwarded to both G3 plans and MACSOG.

f. Requests for MACSOG briefings. A requirement for certain key personnel in Hq 4th Inf Div and on Brigade staffs to be cognizant of SOG activity does exist. Arrangements for briefings will be handled by 4th Div G3 plans; CCC determines the need-to-know.

3. Communications.

a. Hot-line from CCC to G3 plans.

b. Telephone.

c. Safe hands from CCC to G3 plans.

d. 4th Div INO at 24th STZ, Kontum.

MAXWELL
B3

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 3 (52nd Arty Gp) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General (TSLD)

CCC effects direct liaison with 1/92 Arty and 6/14 Arty, both organic to 52nd Arty Gp. Both are responsive to in-country fire support requests. "B" Btry, 6/14th Arty located in Ban Het and OPCON to 1/92 Arty, provides out-of-country 175mm gun fires. Current call-signs and frequencies are obtained from SOI of 52nd Arty Gp.

2. 6/14 Arty. Fire missions are coordinated through FSCC, Kontum, or directly with units capable of delivering the desired fire support in-country.

3. 1/92 Arty. Coordination is effected with the Bn Fwd CP located in Dak To. Calls for 175mm fire are initially directed to the CP; thereafter directly to "B" Btry 6/14 Arty at Ban Het. Bn Fwd CP is in direct receipt of CCC's monthly shackle code and all current FM frequencies. Radio is the primary means of communication, although telephone can be used as a back-up. Switchboard sequence: Kontum-Dak To. This unit is readily responsive to CCC needs - its primary mission are fires into Laos.

a. Ground clearance of fires into Laos: CCC grants clearance for all fire missions. It is immaterial whether the target is requested by IPTV or 1/92 Arty, CCC must give final approval on intended impact areas. If fires are called for by an element of CCC, automatic ground clearance is granted.

b. Air advisory/air clearance. Air clearance is granted by ABCCC. Air advisory is disseminated by "Tollhouse L" in Dak To, using the guard frequency, to all aircraft flying west of Ban Het. Contact with ABCCC is effected either by CCC from Kontum, using SSB/FM or, if this channel is ineffective, by FAC/Covey acting as airborne forward observer. ABCCC declares "COMMANDO FADE" as either "HOT" or "COLD". Air clearance must be obtained in all cases (no exceptions). Request for this clearance may be initiated by either 1/92 Arty through CCC or by CCC directly.

MAXWELL
53

MORI DocID. 570371

Appendix 4 (52nd Cbt Avn Bn) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (S)

The 52nd CAB in Pleiku (Camp Holloway) provides four slicks and four guns to CCC daily. The support requirement is rotated among the following aviation companies: 57th (Kontum), 119th, 170th, 189th (Pleiku) for slick and C-model gun support; 361st (Pleiku) for Cobra support. The companies usually retain the support mission for a period of 45-60 days. CCC coordinates directly with the Bn S3.

2. Additional Support. The 52nd CAB has the capability of providing CH-47 helicopter and "crane" support. This is arranged as needed, informally and directly through 52nd S3.

3. Procedures presently in effect. Helicopter support is requested by MACSOG through MACV. MACV tasks IFFV aviation (1st Bde), thereafter missions for four slicks and four guns is passed to 52nd Bn. The Bn is obligated to maintain the strength at CCC at 4 & 4. By special request (for extraordinary short duration missions only), 52nd Bn will provide assets over and above the required 4 & 4, provided requirement is submitted to IFFV (through Hq SOG) 24 hours in advance.

4. Reporting and release time for helicopter support for a normal operational day is 0730-1730 respectively. Earlier reporting time and/or release time extension will be coordinated by CCC and 52nd Bn S3.

MAXWELL
S3

MORI DocID. 570371

Appendix 5 (20th TASS) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (C)

The 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron (Pleiku Detachment) is tasked by 7th Air Force to support CCC with two O-2 aircraft daily. On special target arrangements (UBON launches) the frag order calls for three. The O-2 aircraft are referred to as "Coveys".

2. Required coordination.

a. NBLs of scheduled targets. 20th TASS will not insert a team if the Army and AF NBLs do not agree. On special occasions they will insert a team outside the established and coordinated NBLs, and then extend same through coordination with ABCCC, but this is an exception rather than modus operandi.

b. Arrival in Kontum of aircraft. CCC advises 20th TASS by FM radio or telephone of desired arrival time. An alternate method is to have an O-2 which is already in the air call its base and arrange for another plane and arrange arrival/pick-up time for FAC rider from CCC.

c. Desired ordnance and type of tactical aircraft. Two methods:

(1) "Covey" orders through ABCCC prior to employment (same day)

(2) Arranged the day prior by "Covey" base.

d. Tactical emergencies. Request for aircraft are handled in normal manner. To expedite the coverage of a team in trouble, the Prairie Fire radio relay site or Dak To launch site should contact any covey in the PFAO and divert it over the team. It will be released when the scheduled "Covey" arrives.

MAXWELL
83

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 6 (6th STOS) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (S)

6th Special Tactical Operations Squadron, located in Pleiku, provides A-1E support for SOG operations. The aircraft are on "strip alert" from 0800-1600 hrs daily. After 1600 hrs they will support "tactical emergencies" only (7th AF Reg).

2. Procedure.

CCC requests A-1Es through ABCCC. Normally, the request is made by the FAC rider in the O-2. NOTE: O-1 FACs can request TAC Air, but are not permitted (AF Reg) to adjust TAC Air out of country.

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 7 (SA, 24th STZ) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (TSLB)

SA, 24th STZ, or SA, Kontum Sector do not exercise control or command over CCC. Operational relationships are confined to exchange of local intell info and coordination of defense of Kontum and surrounding areas. In some instances (North of YB09 grid) in-country portions of HBIs must be cleared with 24th STZ. Coordination is same as with 4th Inf Div, and is effected through Zone liaison officer in Dak To.

2. CCC is assigned a defensive sector in the Kontum defensive perimeter. In the case of a general attack, the SA, 24th STZ, as the senior US officer in Kontum, assumes command of all defensive efforts; CCC responds as appropriate. See Kontum Defense Plan.

MAXWELL
S3

TOP SECRET IS FOOTNOTED TO BE ALIGNED

B-o-78

MORI DocID: 570371

Appendix 8 (B-24, 5th SFGA) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (U)

No operational relationship exists over and above the exchange of information of intelligence value.

2. Dak Pek and Dak Seang SF camps, both controlled by B-24, have been considered and in some instances used as forward launch sites. Both need refueling and rearming facilities. B-24 has continuous radio contact with both sites.

3. Targets whose in-country ERLs extend into the operational area of B-24 are cleared through B-24 after being cleared through 24th ST2. Communication for this clearance is usually telephone or personal visit. Map reference points are established with B-24 to ease this procedure.

MAXWELL
83

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 9 ("Peacock") to Annex "B", CCC Operational SOP

1. General. (S)

"Peacock" is the code name for the Air Force installation which controls radar-controlled bombing ("SKYSPOT") operations. The facility is located in Pleiku.

2. CCC is authorized to request skyspots directly from "PEACOCK". An alternate method is coordination through 20th TASS. The primary method by personal liaison, is preferred.

MAXWELL
83

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 10 (219th VNAF Squadron) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (C)

The 219th VNAF Helicopter Squadron at Da Nang supports CCC with a minimum of three CH-34s daily. The number can increase to five depending on operational commitments and status of maintenance at 219th. The aircraft normally remain at CCC and are rotated on a weekly basis.

2. Coordination.

Matters concerning the support provided by the 219th are coordinated through ALO at CCN. This includes requests for maintenance, etc. The alternate channel is direct liaison with CO, 219th VNAF Sq, telephone Da Nang 2500. This is the most expedient and operationally desirable method.

MAXWELL
83

[illegible]

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 11 (219th Recon Airplane Co) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (S)

The 219th RAC in Plaiku supports CCC with four O-1 aircraft, four pilots, and three crew chiefs. Assets are dedicated to CCC exclusively.

2. Coordination.

Replacement of pilots/aircraft/crew chiefs is automatic on an available basis. To retain the four pilots and four aircraft, however, an average of 100 flying hours per month for each is mandatory. CCC has OPCON of assets, the 219th RAC retains and exercises administrative control through its 2nd platoon, located in Kontum. The CCC pilots and aircraft form the 2nd section of the 2nd platoon - the 1st section generally supports 24th STZ.

MAXWELL
83

MORI DocID 570371

Appendix 12 (110th VNAF Sq) to Annex "B", CCC Operations SOP

1. General. (S)

The 110th VNAF Squadron in Da Nang supports CCC with one U-17 utility aircraft on a weekly basis.

2. Coordination.

Coordination for U-17 is through 83 ALO at CCN.

MAXWELL
83

MORI DocID 570371

Annex "C" (Message Preparation, Routing, and Retention) to CCC Operations SOP dtd 22 April 69

1. General. (S)

The following procedures will establish a guide for use in the preparation, routing, and retention period of messages/reports.

2. Preparation.
a. All messages are addressed to: CHIEF SOG/COMMANDER GROUND STUDIES GROUP. The INFO/ATTN line will state OP-32, 24, 35, etc. as applicable. Messages reference VNAF aircraft are addressed to CO, CCN, ATTN: S3/ALO.
b. Personnel assigned to S3 section are all authorized to release messages.
c. Code names will not be used in RIT/TTY messages.
d. For further guidance, see AR 105-31.

3. Routing.
a. All incoming/outgoing messages will initially be filed in the S3 daily reading file; at the close of the business day they are refiled in appropriate files for retention.
b. S3 personnel and launch site OICs and NCOICs will read and initial reading file daily.
c. Messages requiring action will be retained in the S3 working file until the requirement is fulfilled, then filed in appropriate retention file.

4. Retention.
a. All messages will be retained in S3 files 30 days. Files up-dates daily, at close of day.
b. Messages are filed by date of origin - not date of receipt.
c. Messages establishing policy will be retained in policy file until rescinded or superceded - then destroyed.
d. Target schedules are retained for current and coming month only.
e. Come-back copies of SSB messages will be retained for current month only.

MAXWELL
S3

TOP SECRET

(0) Annex "D" (Terminology) to CCC Operations SOP dtd 22 Apr 1969

1.	Army FAC O-1 Aircraft	SPAF
2.	Air Force FAC O-2 Aircraft	COVEY
3.	A-1E aircraft	SPAD
4.	Jet Aircraft	FASTMOVER
5.	CH-34 VNAF	KINGBEE
6.	CH-34 US	SHAKEIE
7.	UH1-H Troopship (Army)	GNAT
8.	UH1-H Air Force	YANKEE CLIPPER
9.	CH-46 (MC)	LEOPARD SKIN
10.	UH1 Gunship (Army)	DRAGON FLY
11.	UH1 Gunship (AF)	STING RAY
12.	HUEY Cobra	BLACK WIDOW
13.	U-17 VNAF	KANGAROO
14.	C-45	CHIEFTAIN
15.	C-46	RAINBOW
16.	C-47	SMOKEY BEAR
17.	C-123	BOOMERANG
18.	C-130	MULE TEAM
19.	Abn CP (Day)	HILLSBORO
20.	Abn CP (Night)	MOONBEAM
21.	AIRCAP	CREAMPUFF
22.	Airsea Rescue	TADPOLE
23.	Flareship	BLIND BAT
24.	Flareship with Minigun	SPOOKY
25.	Radar Controlled ACFT	SKYSPOT
26.	CH-3	ANGEL

MORI DocID: 570371

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AUGMENTATION (CCN)
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
Drawer 22, APO San Francisco 96337

Copy 2 of 8 Copies
C & C Detachment
APO San Francisco 96337

29 May 1969

I. GENERAL:

A. (U) PURPOSE: This SOP prescribes procedures for use within this command and in dealing with higher and outside agencies and command. The SOP outlines standard procedures to be put into effect both at Command and Control Detachment and MLT's.

1. SCOPE: The SOP includes Administration and Headquarters Commandant Section, Intelligence and Security Section, Operations, Plans and Training Section, Logistics Section, Communications Section, and Air Operations Section.

2. REVISIONS: Users may submit comments and suggested revisions in writing to this headquarters at any time.

B. (U) CONFORMITY: Instructions contained herein will be followed unless changed by an operation order for a specific mission or a particular deviation is authorized by the commander.

C. (TS) ORGANIZATION:

Task organization

Command and Control Det/Liaison Bureau (C & C)

Reconnaissance Teams (RT)

Exploitation Forces (EF)

110 VNAF Sqd (U-17)

219 VNAF Sqd (H-34)

20th TASS USAF (O-2)

D. (TS) COMBAT ORDERS, REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION:

1. Reporting and Recording Reports:

a. C & C to Chief SOG:

(1) Daily Intent of Targets to be run (Data)

(2) Operations Order

(3) Team Roster Report

MORI DocID. 570371

(4) Landing Zone Report

(5) Pre-Launch Report (H-Hour - 2 hrs)

(6) Insertion and Extraction Report

(7) Subsequent Spot Reports

(8) Air Strike Report

(9) Advance Action Report

(10) Advance Intell Report

(11) Weather Report

(12) Resupply LZ/DZ Report

b. C & C to MLT's:

(1) Daily Intent

(2) Operation Order

(3) Intell Report

(4) Daily Wrap-Up

c. MLT's to C & C:

(1) Pre-Launch Report (H-Hour - 2 hrs)

(2) Landing Zone Report

(3) Insertion and Extraction Report

(4) Subsequent Spot Report

(5) Air Strike/Artillery Strike Reports

(6) Advance Intell Report

(7) Weather Report

(8) Resupply LZ/DZ Report

d. Recon Teams and Exploitation Force to C & C:

(1) Spot Report: Report intelligence information that requires immediate reaction (S-A-L-U-T-E).

(2) Casualty Report: Victim, extent of injury, disposition, emergency evacuation instructions, if required.

(3) Exfiltration LZ: Report selection.

(4) Damage Assessment Report: Submit when practicable.

(5) Resupply LZ/DZ Report

MORI DocID 570371

2. Distribution: (1 ea)

C & C Det

MLT-1

MLT-2

MLT-3

Co A

Co B

Recon Co

II. COORDINATION OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

A. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Command Relationship and Responsibilities:

a. General: Chief SOG controls operations through the Commander Ground Operations Group (OP-35), and Command and Control Detachment North (CCN). CCN has three (3) Mobile Launch Teams under its control. Helicopter support of CCN operations is provided by the VNAF 219th Helicopter Squadron and various U.S. Army, Air Force and Marine units as tasked by MACV on a monthly basis. Fixed wing aircraft support is provided by the VNAF 110th Squadron (U-17's) and Forward Air Controllers (FAC) are provided by 20th TASS on a daily basis from 7th Air Force. Tactical Aircraft are provided on call or preplanned through MACVSOG Air Operations Group (OP-32). Logistical Air Support is provided by MACVSOG C-123 and C-130 aircraft and USAF-25th Aerial Port Squadron, Danang Air Force Base. Under certain conditions such as multiple Prairie Fire Emergencies being declared simultaneously, CCN may request additional helicopter support through the supported unit or III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) G-3 Air. Emergency TAC Air is obtained from the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) through the assigned FAC or directly from MLT on an as required basis. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) rescue helicopters may be requested from 7th AF through the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) in Danang only in an extreme emergency for a team extraction, but armed fixed wing or rotary wing escort must be provided in hostile areas.

b. Mission: Under operational control of Hq MACV the Command and Control Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group, has the primary mission of performing long range reconnaissance for the purpose of collecting immediate and strategic intelligence; conducting exploitation missions against known or suspected enemy installations, material and infiltration routes; emplacing electronic detection devices and munitions in selected areas of enemy traffic or concentration; engaging detected enemy forces with organic weapons, tactical air strikes, and supporting artillery fire, and performing special SAR, guerrilla warfare and psychological operations as directed.

c. Concept:

(1) Phase I: Conduct ground reconnaissance missions to gain intelligence and initiate air strikes to harass and interdict enemy lines of communications.

(2) Phase II: Expand Phase I operations to deploy up to battalion sized exploitation forces and make deeper penetrations.

TOP SECRET B-o-88

(3) Phase III: Conduct guerrilla warfare in enemy controlled or contested areas outside the Republic of Vietnam as directed by Chief SOG.

d. Command and Control Detachment:

(1) Mission of C & C Detachment is to command and control Mobile Launch Sites. Additionally, to coordinate administrative and logistical support for MLT's, Recon Teams and Exploitation Forces.

(2) The unit is authorized 30 recon teams, each composed of 3 US and 9 indigenous personnel. These teams are extensively trained on reconnaissance techniques and they work independently of each other. Teams are kept in a high state of readiness to permit deployment on short notice. Deployment of more than 3 US members on a recon team requires the specific approval of the Commanding Officer, CCN.

(3) In addition C & C Det is authorized two exploitation companies and one security company of indigenous troops for use in exploitation roles against targets located by the reconnaissance teams or on targets designated by higher headquarters, and camp security. Exploitation companies are organized with 3 rifle platoons each. The Security Company is organized with 4 platoons. (Annex D). US personnel exercise command and control of the tactical units in operations.

(4) Prepare operation orders for RT and EF missions.

(5) Provide operational information and guidance to MLT.

(6) Schedule through Air Liaison Officer, all aircraft for operations.

(7) Relay to Chief SOG, all pertinent information developed by or having an effect upon any operations, missions, or forces.

e. Mobile Launch Team:

(1) Mission of the Mobile Launch Team is to brief, stage, insert, control operations and extract recon teams and exploitation forces. Provide immediate limited administration and logistical support for RT's and EF's.

(2) Supervise EF and RT training while at launch site.

(3) Prepare and maintain detailed operations SOP and checklist of all actions to be taken prior to, during and after RT/EF missions.

(4) Perform advance intell debriefing of RT/EF after completion of mission.

(5) Render reports per SOP and as directed.

(6) Report personnel status to CCN as appropriate.

f. Reconnaissance Teams:

(1) The mission of Reconnaissance Teams (RT) is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of selected targets or target areas; locate and destroy enemy installations and troop concentrations using friendly ground and TAC Air units; conduct bomb damage assessment; collect information of intelligence value, capture enemy personnel and conduct other missions as directed.

MORI DocID: 570371

(2) RT's will consist of up to nine (9) indigenous and three (3) US personnel. The US personnel will consist of a leader, radio operator and an operations/intelligence sergeant. Only three US personnel will accompany the RT on operational missions unless otherwise specified.

(3) Training under supervision of US and VN team leaders.

(4) Be prepared to conduct, as directed, the following:

(a) Infiltration into selected target areas.

(b) Reconnaissance and surveillance of target areas and enemy installations, activities and personnel.

(c) Location and destruction of enemy personnel and targets using available ground forces and tactical air strikes.

(d) Bomb damage assessment.

(e) Capture of prisoners.

(f) Emplacement of mines.

(g) Selection, reporting and securing of landing zones.

(h) RT extraction from target area.

(i) Special operations as may be directed.

g. Exploitation Forces:

(1) The mission of Exploitation Forces is to conduct tactical combat operations to include raid, ambush, search, and seizure, target destruction, mining, bomb damage assessment and exploitations, psychological operations, capture of enemy personnel and other missions as directed by CO, C & C Detachment. Further, to provide security for CCN and its facilities.

(2) Each company is authorized 150 personnel. Companies consist of Hqs Section and three (3) rifle platoons each. (Annex D).

(3) Train under supervision of US commanders and VN leaders.

TOP SECRET

(4) Provide security to CCN to include camp defense, surveillance and patrolling.

(5) Be prepared to conduct, as directed, the following:

(a) Infiltration into selected target areas.

(b) Raid, ambush, combat and reconnaissance patrols, search and seizure operations.

(c) Target destruction and emplacement of mines.

(d) Direct combat support and immediate reaction missions.

(e) Capture of enemy personnel, arms and equipment.

(f) Exfiltration from target area.

h. Security Company:

(1) The mission of the Security Company is to provide continuous external and internal security for CCN and it's facilities, and maintain proper camp defense as directed by the Commanding Officer, CCN.

(2) Security Company is composed of a Hqs Section and four (4) platoons, each platoon composed of 6 US and 42 indigenous personnel.

2. Liaison and Coordination:

a. Targeting is a joint effort of the C & C Detachment and MACVSOG, based on CCN's knowledge of the area and information gathered from FAC pilots. MACVSOG will forward a list of targets to be run by CCN monthly. C & C Detachment will screen these and submit recommendations, delete or add to this list. Then submit recommendations to MACVSOG by the 5th of the month. MACVSOG reviews and determines the final target list and will return the approved list to C & C Detachment as soon as possible. C & C then prepares an operation order for each target and will forward it to the CO Recon Company so as to arrive a minimum of eight days before the date of execution.

b. Air support is requested from 7th AF by MACVSOG 24-72 hours prior to the scheduled insertion time and includes an air cap of at least two fighter or attached aircraft. Two to four gunships are used for direct support. FAC support is also scheduled 24-72 hours prior to TOT and is provided by 20th TASS through 7th AF. MACVSOG will establish no bomb lines and coordinate with 7th AF.

B. INTELLIGENCE. TBP (TS)

C. (TS) COORDINATION AGENCIES:

1. 7th AF (Tigerhound) provides TAC Air support through airborne CP (Hillsboro-daytime)(Moonboom-night time).

2. III MAF provides in-country TAC Air support on certain in-country missions in I Corps.

D. (TS) C & C Det:

1. Upon receipt of the monthly operations scheduled from OP-35 or upon receipt of an unscheduled mission or requirement, C & C Det will:

a. Schedule, through air liaison officer, all necessary air support.

b. Prepare necessary orders and overlays and forward to the appropriate companies and MLT's.

c. Coordinate with appropriate staff sections to insure proper support to the operation and operational sites.

d. Update scheduled target list as necessary.

e. Coordinate with each MLT to insure that all necessary actions relevant to MLT support of operations and attachment of units and/or equipment will be effected.

f. Insure coordination with appropriate agencies within operational areas.

g. Supervise MOT's and insure completion of necessary preparations, activities and reports on a timely basis.

2. Mobile Launch Sites:

a. Upon receipt of monthly operations schedule, target priority list, or assigned mission CCN will:

(1) Provide warning order to RT/EF Company Commander as appropriate.

(2) Insure adequate coordination by the MLT staff to plan and provide the support required.

(3) Initiate those actions required to insure that launch site personnel, facilities and equipment are prepared to support operations.

b. Upon receipt of operation order or associated documents CCN will:

(1) Insure that appropriate members of CCN staff, companies and MLT are made aware of OPORD contents on a "need to know," timely basis.

(2) Specify the strength to be deployed of the RT/EF reconnaissance missions.

(3) Initiate and maintain full communications, particularly communications with C & C Detachment and 20th TASS.

(4) Insure proper preparation and distribution of maps, aerial photos, overlays and other documents required for support of the MLT, and RT/EF.

(5) Insure that the RT and/or EF has all required information, documents and necessary equipment to properly conduct the operation.

(6) Insure that operational personnel will be made available to fly with covey FAC to control and/or contact RT/EF ground units.

(7) Prior to date of insertion insure that the senior US member and 20th TASS FAC fly a visual reconnaissance (VR) of the target area and select landing zones for insertion. The FAC and senior US member will mutually agree on a primary and alternate LZ. FAC will make the final decision of LZ selection.

(8) The Company Commander will insure that the RT/EF is inspected and properly prepared for the mission. (Rations, equipment, etc.)

MORI DocID: 570371

(9) Insure that the indigenous members of the RT/ER are not briefed until twenty-four (24) hours prior to scheduled insertion. The briefing will be conducted by the AST. The personnel to be briefed will be the VN team senior member, US team members, and FAC personnel. The VN senior member will then brief the indigenous members.

c. Upon initiation and during the operation the MLT will:

(1) Coordinate closely with FAC to cause helicopters to arrive in the target area as close as possible to TOT of TAC Air.

(2) Utilize FAC aircraft and helicopters for insertion/extraction. Personnel will be equally distributed on helicopters with one (1) additional helicopter flying per each two (2) personnel helicopters for possible emergency rescue.

(3) After the unit has been inserted all aircraft will go to a predesignated area and orbit until they are off the LZ, physically fit, and in no trouble. At the same radio contact the FAC will relay to the unit the exact grid coordinates of the location where they were inserted. If the team is inserted outside of the target area NBL FAC will remain on station and adjust NBL around team through ABCCC. FAC will remain on station until ABCCC acknowledges adjusted NBL. The MLT will notify this Hq of adjusted NBL ASAP.

(4) Make radio contacts with the unit, utilizing FAC overflights to do so if necessary. Radio contacts should, as a minimum, require notification to FAC Officer:

(a) Status of the unit.

(b) Grid coordinates location of targets located.

(c) Direction of intended movement.

(d) Spot reports of way stations, major trails, and other items of intelligence value noted.

(e) Any contact made with enemy force.

(f) Major activities completed or intended, and air strikes requested.

(g) Any additional information relayed by or requested by FAC, i.e., visibility, cloud cover, extraction information, etc.

(5) Insure that all reports and requests rendered are complete. Further, relay these reports/requests to C & C Detachment immediately.

(6) Insure that all communication facilities remain operational until all aircraft flights, reports, etc., are completed and relayed properly.

(7) When air strikes are requested insure that air strikes (Golden Ear Rings) report is submitted and relayed with full available information. Further, insure that prior to releasing aircraft to make air strikes the exact unit location is known by the FAC.

(8) Insure that information on extraction is obtained, that all necessary actions are initiated, and that a report thereof is rendered to C & C Detachment. MLT will insure that extraction and support capability is maintained on an immediate reaction, stand-by basis during all periods in which a unit is in a target area.

(9) Conduct extraction in the same manner as insertion to include full aircraft and communications support necessary.

d. Upon completion of extraction the HLT will:

(1) Cause the FAC to notify ABCCC to cancel the no bomb lines.

(2) Be prepared to debrief the unit for immediate intell information and to send the RT/EF to C & C Detachment for debriefing as soon as possible after extraction. RT/EF will hand carry equipment and documents of intelligence value and film exposed during the operation.

e. Throughout all planning and all phases of the operation CCN will insure, through direct control and supervision that:

(1) The executing unit receives all support necessary to complete the assigned mission.

(2) All required action by the unit and support personnel are completed in a thorough manner and on a timely basis.

3. Recon Team:

a. Upon receipt of warning order for operation the RT will:

(1) Initiate appropriate preparations to insure maximum preparedness to complete the assigned mission.

(2) Initiate request for all operational, intelligence, and logistical support required to assure successful completion of mission.

b. Upon receipt of operation order and/or associated documents the senior US RT member will:

(1) Begin detailed pre-mission planning and map and aerial photo reconnaissance.

(2) Coordinate with CCN staff to obtain the required support.

c. Upon receipt of operational briefing and prior to initiation of the operation the senior US RT member will (through AST):

(1) Insure that all required operational information, documents and necessary equipment is procured or ready to be made available as needed.

(2) Prior to insertion, fly a VR of the target area and in conjunction with FAC select the insertion landing zones. Selected primary and alternate landing zones should, if terrain permits, be at least two kilometers apart to preclude mission aborts as a result of ground fire from a single location and to provide an emergency extraction LZ not in a proximity of insertion LZ.

(3) Prior to RT departure for launch site insure that all equipment is serviceable and that all weapons have been test fired.

(4) Upon departing for launch site RT will have in their possession all required equipment and documents to include the SOI.

(5) Insure that all members are briefed within twenty-four (24) hours of insertion. Further insure that a senior indigenous member briefs the other indigenous RT members.

d. Upon insertion and during the operation the RT will:

(1) Evenly split team among helicopters for insertion.

(2) Upon departing helicopters, check all personnel to determine injuries sustained on insertion.

(3) Rapidly move off the LZ making an initial estimate of situation and location, and notify the FAC when the LZ is cleared, of any conditions adversely affecting the mission and any possibility of a security compromise. A guide for maximum time element for this initial report is approximately ten (10) minutes after insertion.

(4) In accordance with the SOI, make the following radio contacts:

(a) Situation report to FAC/radio relay site three times daily: 0700, 1300 and 1800 hours.

(b) Request air strikes as required, appropriate or deemed necessary.

(5) On reconnaissance missions, remain in the target area for five to seven days after I-day unless emergency is necessary or other orders are received from CCN or MLT. If reconnaissance of target area is completed in less than five days the RT will initiate and conduct surveillance of a trail, target, or location that would be a likely source of intelligence.

(6) While in the target area, in addition to conducting reconnaissance and surveillance, make extensive written notes to insure accurate reporting during the debriefing and make extensive photo coverage of the target area to insure best possible visual record of anything of intelligence value. Each photo, if possible should have in it a piece of equipment of known dimensions, i.e., weapon, radio, grenade, etc., to allow proper prespective of item or place photographed. Notes should be compiled on each photo taken to provide the what, where, who, and when of the photo to debriefing personnel. Also, collect samples of rice or other food stuffs.

(7) If captured or taken into custody, have the indigenous members claim to be a lost CIDG patrol based at the Launch Site Special Forces Camp. US personnel will offer only name, rank, serial number and date of birth.

(8) If an EF is to be employed into target area:

(a) Select and report of the specific target area and potential mission of the EF.

(b) Select, report and secure the EF insertion LZ.

(c) Guide and assist in the accomplishment of the EF mission. While EF is in the target area command will be with the senior US Officer/NCO on the ground.

(9) When requesting the use of tactical aircraft:

(a) Select and report the location and nature of the target.

(b) Submit recommendations on ordnance, if any.

(c) Insure that the FAC is made aware of the exact location of the RT.

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID: 570371

6. Training:

a. The CCN commander is responsible for the training of RT's and EF.

b. The training of the RT's and EF's will be under the direct supervision of the company commander of the company concerned.

c. General guidance to be applied to training will be as follows:

(1) US members will accompany all training.

(2) Training will be thoroughly planned, prepared, and conducted in a most realistic manner.

(3) Training will include all elements of combat essential skills, with particular emphasis upon those skill and capabilities most likely to be required in operations.

(4) Additional emphasis will be placed upon developing appropriate leadership qualities in those indigenous personnel filling leader/commander positions. In camp training stress leadership training to include simulation of Tm Ldr and Tm Sgt being injured on insert and cause each indigenous member to assume these positions to continue the mission. This should reduce refusals to be deployed when those key personnel are not available.

d. CCN will coordinate training with local headquarters to insure the proper ranges and areas are utilized, safety rules are inforced, training does not interfere with or be affected by local combat operations, and that training will favorably influence the US and VN governments images within the local area.

e. Company Commanders will insure that C & C Detachment is kept informed, through formal reports, of the training conducted and training status of RT's and EF elements. Additionally, each company will prepare and maintain detailed POI for all phases of RT/EF training.

E. (TS) TECHNIQUES:

1. All reports will be rendered on a timely basis. Reports will be as thorough as possible to properly and fully reflect the status, situation, required information, and changes thereto, inherent in the report requirement.

2. Report requirements by type, date due, and rendering agency will be as listed in reports schedule.

F. (TS) SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

1. Regular Operations:

a. Landing zones (LZ selection. Selection should include alternate LZ's. If enemy action prevents insert on the primary LZ, attempts should be made on alternates.

b. Cancellations/postponements:

(1) Every effort must be made to run a target scheduled.

(2) If a VR had not been made, attempt it in the morning for afternoon targets.

(3) If weather is zero zero cancel the target at least two (2) hours prior to launch to allow for air cap cancellation, submitting a recommendation for a DTG when it can earliest be rescheduled.

recommendation for a DTG when it can earliest be rescheduled.

MORI DocID. 570371

c. An EF or any combination that resembles one will not be inserted without permission of Commander Ground Operations Group.

d. SOG SLAM Concept: (Search, locate, annihilate and monitor), meant to exploit targets located by recon teams, utilizing TAC air and appropriate EF's not just TAC air alone, with the EF destroying that which TAC Air doesn't. Encourage aggressiveness in those operations. Lack of TAC air, helicopter life or weather conditions are the only reasons we may not take advantage of appropriate targets. If the target has not fully been exploited when an RT/EF is extracted, insert another force on the assets used in the extraction.

2. TACTICAL COVER AND DECEPTION:

a. Tactical cover will normally consit of helicopter gunships, TAC Air and/or artillery/Lorter support when possible.

b. LZ's will not normally be hit with preparatory fires which might cause enemy interest in an area of insertion. When LZ's are required to be blown with preparatory fires other deception techniques should be employed to reduce the possibility of compromise, and insertion follow prep fire immediately or delay a few days while showing interest in other areas by aircraft (ACFT) activity.

c. Helicopter Cover/Deception Techniques:

(1) Leap frog method: (For small unit/Tm insertion), i.e., Using two (2) helicopters to carry troops with one (1) additional chase ship. Simultaneously as one ACFT drops down the low ACFT rises. In mountainous terrain the down ACFT drops below ridge lines, in open terrain nearly touching the ground, with sufficient delay to allow a dummy insertion. To avoid a pattern this game can be started prior to or upon insertion, continuing until enough areas have been included to confuse enemy search units attempting to locate the team. This can be used in conjunction with gunships which also can participate or just join the lowest chopper.

(2) High CPM/low level flying: AC & C ship high in the sky directs contour flying ACFT to the LZ. Upon insertion this is continued to other areas and delays are made in areas to simulate insertion.

(3) Low Level/High level pop-up: Requires more helicopters as one set of three ACFT fly low (NR 1) and another set of three ACFT fly high and to the rear (NR 2). NR 2 drops to join NR 1 for a time inducting possible insertion. NR 1 then flies high while NR 2 continues low, inserts, and the method is continued in other areas.

(4) Extract/insert change over: Upon extraction of a unit the replacement unit arrives on the ACFT that will extract the departing unit which secures the LZ. The unit arriving may go on to another mission or set up an ambush. In the event an ambush is planned one (1) US member might be retained from the initial unit to advise on the most suitable location and deployment.

(5) Combination of one (1) and three (3)/four (4) above.

(6) Use of nightingale devices (Simulated fire fight mechanism and/or smoke screens with above methods on dummy LZ's.

(7) High level drop of nightingale devices on previously used LZ's.

d. Ground Cover/Deception:

(1) Constantly changing direction leaving an obvious trail, then concealing the trail as another base direction is followed.

(2) Stay behind force at extraction site to ambush.

(3) Breaking contact:

(a) Use of nightingale devices.

(b) At night, move in the direction of an exploded claymore, (Often expected to move in the opposite direction).

(c) Throwing grenades in the rear of the movement then to the front as far as possible as direction is changed.

(d) Use of gas grenades.

(4) Employment of mines, M14 or timed claymores to cover withdrawal.

(5) Timed white phosphorous grenades.

e. Radio Deception:

(1) Hold radio use to a minimum.

(2) If dummy inserts are made, after team insertion, a high degree of dummy radio traffic maybe employed on one (1) dummy insert a considerable distance from the team area of operations (AO).

f. Visual Reconnaissance (VR) Deception: When possible, VR's should be accomplished using FAC O2A aircraft to allow both the unit/team Cmdr and helicopter unit Cmdr to reconnoiter the landing zone (LZ). VR aircraft should not orbit in the target area bringing attention to it. FAC aircraft are a frequent, normal sight to the enemy and offer less possibility of compromise.

3. Aviation:

a. VNAF H-34 Helicopters:

(1) These aircraft are requested by letter from Chief SOG to VNAF Hqs on a monthly basis and are extremely limited with only minimum replacements due in. Therefore, while continuing to escalate activity we must be especially prudent in their employment.

(2) Their primary mission is to support operational commitment. They may be used to carry men and materials to the MLT's only when proceeding there to support an operation. Transport flights, unless of an emergency nature, are to be held to a minimum.

(3) For safety and security H-34's will not be dispatched out of the launch site controlling them unless two (2) or more are in a flight.

(4) During periods of reduced activity, they should be released to Danang for maintenance and pilot/crew ground training.

TOP SECRET

b. Air assets:

(1) Will not be shifted by MLT's without approval of CCN.

(2) Will not arbitrarily be released. If doubtful about their purpose on arrival, question C & C Det.

4. Night Operations:

a. Ambush: Conducted during a period of darkness, confusion is added to the enemy control problem enhancing a successful operation provided the initiating unit has prepared a successful operation eliminating personnel with colds, poor discipline, etc. Enemy movements are often conducted after dark which require this type of operation. Pre-mission physicals will be conducted to eliminate Team members with illnesses.

5. Chemical and Biological Warfare:

a. CS gas and mask should be standard equipment for all forces deployed, giving the opportunity to take advantage of the situation.

b. RT/EF's on the ground can call for aerial employment of gas on a known enemy in missions such as capture of POW's. Specific approval from this Hqs must be obtained prior to employment except to effect emergency extractions.

6. Combat Surveillance:

a. Missions of this nature require close inspection and evaluation of each member regarding his health and discipline in respect to his ability to maintain a clandestine posture throughout the operation.

b. Reports to include size, activity, location, uniform, time and equipment.

7. Barrier and Denial Operations:

a. All mines will be reported to this headquarters. Not more than two M14 mines will be emplaced in a cluster and will be recorded and reported by eight digit coordinates.

b. Mines will not be placed in Cambodia.

c. In RT/EF operations, M14's employed and claymore mines with short fuzes can slow down a pursuing force.

d. In defense of installations claymore mines are considered more effective as opposed to M14's and add considerable safety to the local populace if wired to detonate electrically by command detonation.

8. Electronic warfare: All enemy attempts to jam radio frequencies will be noted in the communications paragraph of all after action reports (AAR's). Indications of direction finding systems will also be included.

9. Unconventional Warfare:

a. Guerilla Warfare: In preparation for phase III operations, selected RT's will be given missions of longer duration, and when practicable, in potential areas of operation.

b. Escape and Evasion: Routes and actions will be as planned by the RT/EF leader.

MORI DocID: 570371

TOP SECRET

10. Psychological Operat. :

a. Psychological operations in preparation for and in support of Phase III should be developed in appropriate themes by the Psy Ops Section of MACV50G and conducted upon order.

b. Psychological operations in support of Phase II will be conducted as da directed:-

(1) Soapchips (PsyWar Booklets): To be deposited when feasible in each target area when an operation is conducted there. Not more than one booklet will be placed within any one target area each month. Procedure and techniques of deposits will be as outlined in Ltr, Subj: Cadre Policy (Special PsyOps Booklets), this Hqs, dtd 24 Aug 67.

(2) Pole Bean: As prescribed in Ltr, Hqs C&C, Subj: Eldest Son, dtd 30 Nov 67, TS LEEDIS, No Form.

11. Special Operations:

a. Wire tap missions: All missions into areas where wire is suspected will include a wire tap device. This is a most important intelligence gathering method and must be emphasized.

b. Sandia Device/Handsid missions:

(1) Normally will be limited to emplanting the devices to avoid enemy detection. Additional missions should be distant enough from device locations as to preclude searches by the enemy in the future as devices are discovered and related to RT/EF activity in the area.

(2) Sandia devices will be monitored by aircraft. Insure that sets are on the same frequencies. Implant in sets of up to eight (8) devices. Aminimum to be emplaced is three (3). The more emplaced the better the readout. Each of the detectors will be set on a different indicator setting (A through H). If less than eight (8) are emplaced spread the indicator settings, i.e., A, C, E, H, if only four (4) are put in. Bury the geophons between six (6) and twelve (12) inches in the ground to avoid false emissions due to heavy rain, with a minimum of two inches of earth covering it. Do not emplace within 50 meters of any stream, a single extremely high tree (taller than others), or a large structure. Once completed they will remain in place and will not be retrieved. In vicinity of trails for foot traffic they should be set up approximately 500 to 1000 meters apart about 15 meters off the trail, staggered if practicable. In vicinity of motorable roads set up for vehicular pickup, about 25 to 100 meters from the road and approximately 5 miles apart, staggered if practicable. Frequency should be recorded prior to departure on mission.

c. Bright Light (Personnel Recovery): Recon Company will maintain one RT on standby for 30 minutes deployment in personnel recovery missions. Do not plan on using a team that is scheduled for a target within seven days, or if that becomes necessary, use the team that is furthest away from target insertion date. Planned this way, when air assets permit, scheduled missions will be accomplished while retaining a Bright Light capability.

12. Rehearsals and Inspections: Success requires thourough inspection of personnel to determine that they have all required items and are physically prepared for the mission. Rehearsals will be habitually conducted to develop maximum proficiency and insure mission effectiveness.

Annexes:
A-Commo
B-Admin
C-Logistics
D-Intel
E-Base Def Plan

JACK J. ISIER
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

MORI DocID: 570371

TOP SECRET

C&CN DETACHMENT
5th SFGA, 1st SF
APO US FORCES 96337
29 MAY 1969

ANNEX L-SIGNAL

I (U) GENERAL:

A. Purpose: This document is published to establish broad procedures governing the operation of Command and Control detachment's communications system.

B. Objective: To insure that all personnel concerned with the assigned mission and operations of the Command and Control Detachment are familiar with the communications system in Command and Control North Detachment.

II (U) MISSION:

A. To provide complete communication coverage on a 24 hour basis to all substations subordinate to the Headquarters, Command and Control North Detachment.

B. To provide complete communications coverage from Headquarters, Command and Control North Detachment to higher headquarters and attached supporting units.

C. To provide current SOI, SSI items and codes to all substations.

D. To insure that approved and assigned crypto systems are utilized in accordance with current security regulations.

E. To provide second echelon maintainance of all communications equipment utilized in the Command and Control North Detachment.

F. To provide guidance to all substations on all communications matters.

III (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

A. MACV SOG NET CONTROL STATION:
1. MACV SOG is the net control station for the single side band voice net and on line teletype circuit.
2. MACV SOG commo prescribes all procedures and designates regulations to be followed for the on line teletype circuit as well as the single side band net.

B. The C & CN Detachment communications section is the net control station for the units radio teletype net, SSB operations net and FM voice net. C & CN Detachment's communications section is responsible for establishing and maintaining these nets. The communication section also insures that all nets are operated in accordance with appropriate ACP's and security regulations. It is further responsible for the publication and distribution of current SOI, SSI items and all crypto material utilized in operations. The communications section also plans and coordinates the communication requirements of all special Command and Control North Detachment operations.

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID 570371

C. The tel type circuit to higher headquar utilizes the AN/TGC-25 t to Da Nang control. This it then goes by way of off shore cable to Cholon, where it is relayed to Saigon by microwave circuit. Security is provided by the KW-7 on line system. The single side band voice net utilizes the Collins AN/FRC-93, to provide 24 hour voice communications with all stations in the net. Security on this net is provided by use of the KAC-140 and USKAC-199. The AN/GRC-26 and AN/VSC-2 are used in the CCN RTT net with security provided by the KW-7. Secure voice FM communication will be used between each Mobile Launch Team and its radio relay sites. The deployed teams utilize the AN/PRC-25 as their primary means of communications in addition to the AN/PRC-4, AN/PRC-9, AN/VRC-10, and HT-1. The teams have adequate communication coverage with their relay sites and forward air control aircraft. Security is provided through use of the USKAC-199. Ground relay sites utilize the AN/PRC-25 and the AN/PRC-74 for relaying purposes.

IV (C) MAINTENANCE:

The Signal Section of the Command and Control North Detachment is responsible for the operation of a second echelon electronic maintenance facility. This facility establishes and maintains a prescribed load list of second echelon repair parts. All signal equipment requiring repair will be tagged and carried by "SAFEHANDS" to this repair facility. All items which are irrepairable at the second echelon level will be evacuated as expeditiously as possible to the 85th Maintenance Battalion in Da Nang. If irrepairable there the inoperative equipment is shipped to the 554th Light Maintenance Company in Qui Nhon. All sensitive radio equipment will be sent to Saigon for repair. Coordination will be effected through this unit's S-4 Officer prior to shipment. The field repair team will make frequent trips to all sites.

V (C) RADIO RELAY SITES:

A. Radio Relay sites will monitor the primary frequency of the day and the Admin/Secure Voice net 24 hours a day.

B. Radio Relay sites will transmit to the units in the AO on the primary frequency of the day. All transmissions to other radio relay sites, Covey, and to the MLT will be made on the Admin/Secure Voice Net utilizing Secure Voice.

C. The senior man at the Radio Relay site will sign for all keying material for the KY-38 and insure that the hand receipt is returned to the CCN Signal Officer. He will also insure that all used keying material is destroyed on the day following the day of use and that the destruction certificate is returned to the CCN Signal Officer.

TOP SECRET B-o-102

MORI DocID: 570371

D. All messages relayed by Radio Relay sites will be first copied word by word and then relayed exactly as copied.

E. CCN will be notified immediately of equipment failure and the faulty equipment will be returned to CCN as soon as possible for replacement.

Isler
Col Inf

Appendixes:
1- SOI's and Operations Codes
2- Safehands Procedures
3- Signal Diagrams

OFFICIAL:
Hardy
Hardy
Signal Officer

MORI DocID: 570371

MACSOG RECONNAISSANCE TEAM*

III. OPERATIONS AND RESULTS.

A. General.

1. Weekly and monthly target panel meetings are conducted between MACSOG Intelligence and MACV J2 representatives. Many different sources of intelligence information contribute to those meetings and from this, target lists and EEI are developed. These target lists are sent to the C & C Dets about the 25th of each month and cover the projected targets for the following month The lists establish order of priority which higher headquarters desires reconnaissance be conducted, designates Air Force nick names of target areas, and the lower left no bomb lines (LLNBLs) of the target areas. The monthly target list can be deviated from when tactical considerations cause another target to be placed in a higher priority and higher headquarters directs it be conducted ASAP.

2. The C & C Det receives the target list, evaluates and begins immediate planning to conduct the missions. The C & C Dets are not unique organizations. They closely resemble a separate battalion headquarters; with a complete staff, subordinate line and support elements. All infantry units in Vietnam have Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols that perform and must be controlled and supported as do the RTs and EFs of the C & C Dets. The unique facet is written into the mission of these elements which requires them, and only them, to cross international boundries to perform their mission.

3. Deception, cover and security techniques for all elements of MACSOG, including RT/EF operations, are included in Appendix K.

B. Preparation.

1. Upon receipt of the target list, the C & C Det S3 programs the target. In turn, the responsible Area Specialist Team (AST) is alerted. At the same time, the Recon and/or Exploitation Company is alerted and that element designates a team or platoon against the target. The targeted element (team) then comes under operational control of the responsible AST.

* This tab is extracted from a MACSOG document entitled "MACSOG Reconnaissance Team Techniques," 1 July 1969.

III-1

* This tab is extracted from a MACSOG document entitled

2. The AST prepares and issues a warning order *** Ideally, the designated team will have five or six days preparation time.

3. Assignment to an RT or EF is considered hazardous duty. The unit operates in enemy controlled territory isolated from friendly ground support. The mission of teams (other than in Cambodia) is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of selected targets or target areas; locate and destroy enemy installations and troop concentrations using friendly artillery and tactical air units; conduct bomb damage assessment; collect information of intelligence value, capture enemy personnel; and conduct other missions as directed.* Missions in Cambodia are the same except that teams will not engage in combat actions against the VC/NVA except for self-preservation or, when specifically directed to attempt a prisoner capture.

4. It is essential that each operation be preceded by extremely detailed planning and thorough coordination. Upon receipt of the warning order, the senior U.S. team member will initiate appropriate preparation to insure maximum readiness for the assigned mission. Each C & C Det maintains target folders containing comprehensive information on the targets within their area of responsibility. Maps, high and low altitude aerial photos, some ground photos, and narrative description of the land form in each target area is contained in these folders. Maps and aerial photos are annotated with known details of enemy information and prominent ground features. Coupled with and complementing study of the information contained in the target folders is detailed knowledge of the area of operations resulting from numerous overflights and other ground reconnaissance missions in that vicinity. An analysis of the terrain in conjunction with available enemy information and previous enemy tactics permits development of a fairly accurate picture of the ~~enemy~~ situation in the target area.

---

* CCN SOP, para II A 1 f, dtd 29 May 69

5. The above mentioned preparation and issuance of warning and operation orders may be handled through a Mobile Launch Team (MLT). In these cases, the MLT is responsible to brief, stage, insert and control operations and extract the team. The MLT can also provide limited administrative and logistic support.

6. The team leader coordinates with the C & C and/or MLT staff for all operational intelligence and logistic support required. AST representatives remain ready to lend any assistance requested by the team.

7. The senior US team member, Forward Air Controller (FAC), and insertion flight leader (when possible), will fly a visual reconnaissance (VR) of the target area. Primary, alternate and sometimes supplimentary landing zones (LZs), initial direction of movement away from the LZ; and base direction to the target area is selected. LZs selected must be at least two km apart to preclude mission aborts as a result of ground fire from a single gun position. The VR allows update and verification of the map study and facilitates development of the operation order. Because of technical requirements, the flight leader is the final authority on LZ selection.

8. The information recorded as a result of the VR is coordinated btween the team leader, insertion flight leader and the launch site representative of AST. An LZ report is prepared and submitted to the S3. Touch down LZs are not always available. In such cases, plans are made to infiltrate using the jungle penetrator, roppelling or rope ladder; or a request may be made to have an LZ blown by TAC air using 2000 pound bombs. In the latter case, several LZs are blown to deceive the enemy as to which one will be used. A newly blown LZ will not be used immediately in that the enemy will keep it under surveillance for a period of time.

9. When the mission requires special equipment, the team leader will include the required training during the preparatory phase. This training is conducted under the most realistic conditions pos-

sible with efforts to include all foreseeable contingencies. Emphasis is placed on hasty ambushes, immediate action drills, counter-ambush, movement, and security.

10. A detailed operation order is then prepared. Simultaneously, coordination is effected with all units, forces and services that will or may become involved in the operation. Inter-service cooperation has been one of the highlights of these operations.

11. One of the major planning requirements involves air support. Several factors govern airlift. Since helicopters are used for troop transport; temperature and altitude in the target area and range and fuel requirements must be considered to determine aircraft capacity. When capacity is determined, the number of aircraft for the mission can be ascertained and the requirement levied on the supporting helicopter unit. Arrangements must be made for reporting times, rations, quarters, and security while the aircraft remain with the launch element. Armed helicopters will also be attached to support the operation and coordination will be effected at the same time arrangements are made for troop lift support. Another important consideration is preparation for night illumination and for sky spot bombing to support the ground elements in the event weather necessitates withdrawal of tactical air. Final arrangements cannot be made, but the necessary ground work is accomplished to permit rapid response should this support be required.

12. All team personnel are briefed on the operation within 24 hours of insertion, after they have been placed in isolation.

Counterpart C & C personnel and senior VN team members brief the other indigenous personnel to insure understanding of the mission.

13. Supplies and equipment required for the mission are requested and received from S4 and S2. A check list is used to aid in this request. All equipment is inspected for completeness and serviceability and all weapons are test fired prior to departure for the launch site.

parture for the launch site.

14. The mission team leader prepares and presents a briefback to the C & C Commander and selected staff personnel. This is accomplished after the team leader determines the team to be ready for its mission. The team may be inserted any time after completion of the briefback. A complete team roster is submitted to the AST launch representative as soon as possible after the briefback.

15. On the day of insert, a pilot/team briefing is conducted by a launch site representative after which the team will be escorted to their aircraft and loaded for movement to the forward launch site or target area.

C. Insertion.

1. Teams may be inserted via helicopter, which is the primary method, by walking into the operational area from friendly installations; or by parachuting into the area.

a. The helicopter insert will be fully discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

b. During the month of August 1969, 25 of 79 missions were foot infiltrations. This method of entry substantially reduces exposure of helicopter assets. Walk-in teams normally do not penetrate as deeply as helicopter inserts, on the other hand, they allow teams to get into areas undetected and have increased stay-time in some cases. RTs are covertly delivered to the Golf-5 Radio Relay Site in the Lao Panhandle under cover of a normal overt helicopter resupply mission. After a period of time the RT infiltrates by foot into its assigned area of operation. Teams may also be directed to exfiltrate to the Golf-5 Site and the site stands as a rally point for teams who become separated in the vicinity. In the majority of cases, exfiltration is by helicopter as described in paragraph III E below. Planning may indicate foot exfiltration to a specific site in "friendly territory" within a certain time frame. Air assets remain alert during the entire patrol and will pick the team up from their termination point shortly after they arrive.

c. Few parachute infiltrations have been conducted. The technique brings room long exposure, therefore detailed pin-pointing of the team's location by the enemy, if conducted during daylight hours. An

the team's location by the enemy, if conducted during daylight hours. An

added problem is concealing the air items until exfiltration can be accomplished. At least one night parachute infiltration has been conducted with a prisoner capture mission. Exfiltration by helicopter was planned in advance for a specific time. No enemy contact was made during this mission. The parachute drop, assembly, establishment of ambush, and subsequent exfiltration were highly successful

2. Prior to launch time the FAC and observer take off for the target area. They determine if weather conditions will permit continuous support of the troops when they get on the ground and then contact the Airborne Combat Control Center (ABCCC) to confirm that tactical aircraft are available to support the insertion. ABCCC is a specially configured C-130 aircraft which controls all aircraft going into the Laos area. Tactical air support requests are submitted through the ABCCC. When the FAC is given a time on target for TAC air by ABCCC, he will call for launch of the troop carrying and escort helicopters.

3. Ground team members are evenly divided; in numbers, leaderships and firepower; among helicopters for the insertion.

4. On receipt of notification from the FAC that conditions in the target area are satisfactory, the helicopters carrying the team are launched with gunship escorts and a chase ship.

5. All personnel are checked on the LZ for injuries received during insertion. The team moves rapidly off the LZ making an initial estimate of the situation and their location as they go. FM radio contact is established to notify the FAC that the LZ is clear, any condition adversely affecting the mission, and any possible security compromise. This initial situation report is given within approximately 20 minutes of insertion.

6. The FAC will hold all helicopters, troop carriers and gunships, at an orbit point until he has received notification from the team leader that his force is assembled and secure. The helicopters are then released to return to base but the FAC remains airborne within FM range of the team. Tactical aircraft will remain on station until fuel limits are reached. The FAC will normally have them

expend their ordnance on targets of opportunity before returning to base. Arrangements will have been made for TAC air to remain on strip alert during the remainder of the mission.

7. In event of an injury on insertion, the injured individual(s) may be extracted immediately at the discretion of the team leader. If the team is compromised on the LZ and is under fire; the team leader, through the FAC, will call in and receive helicopter gunship and TAC air support. Depending on the existing situation, the team will either attempt to evade or request extraction.

8. Upon successful insertion and subsequent release of the helicopter assets, the team is on its own. The C & C S3 submits an insertion report to higher headquarters. Required radio contacts vary, with minimum being one to three times daily, depending upon the C & C Det from which the team is working. RON positions will always be reported. A FAC is kept airborne within FM range of the team during most daylight hours. Teams are informed of one of the frequencies which the ABCCC will monitor. Further, the ABCCC is informed of the frequency which the team will monitor. This affords two way contact with teams on a 24 hour a day basis as required. The initial RON position is at least one km away from the insert LZ. At night, unless otherwise directed, the team secures a perimeter and remains stationary until first light. Helicopters remain on strip alert at the launch site during the time the team is on the ground.

D. <u>During the Mission</u>.

1. A team will normally remain in the target area for five to seven days. The team leader makes extensive written notes during surveillance to insure accurate reporting during debriefings.

2. Teams are equipped with one or more Pen EE (Half frame) cameras and several rolls of black and white film. Numerous photos of the target area are taken to insure the best possible visual record of anything of intelligence value. Each photo, if possible, will include an item of known dimensions such as a person, weapon, radio, grenade, etc.; to allow proper prospective of the subject item or place photographed. Notes are compiled on each photo taken to provide the what, when, where, and who of the photo to debriefing personnel.

MORI DocID: 570371

3. Procedures are established for actions to be taken upon location of an enemy cache. Pictures are taken just as the cache is found, still camouflaged. Additional photos are taken after the camouflage has been removed and of various items within the cache. A rough inventory is taken of all material noting manufacturers and dates where possible. A report of the finding and the inventory is radioed to the C & C Det and samples are taken as directed. These samples may be in case lots to enhance identification of manufacture. Examples of communications equipment, food caches, unfamiliar or modified equipment are almost always extracted. The cache is then generally destroyed by demolition or fire or it may be marked for air strike. In cases where the cache is small; it may be destroyed, left intact, or partially destroyed. In the latter two cases, insertion of contaminated ammunition is often accomplished.

4. RTs and EFs have the capability to call in artillery and/or air strikes against targets they observe or develop. Coordination for such support was made during the initial preparation for the mission. Most targets are outside friendly artillery range, therefore, teams are heavily dependent on helicopter gunships from the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force and tactical aircraft fire support. Consequently, the FAC plays a key role in the planning and execution of operations.

5. The FAC is accompanied by a representative from C & C Det who maintains FM radio contact with the troops on the ground and with the launch site or C & C Det. This permits positive control, allowing the FAC to devote all his attention to the aircraft while the observer concentrates on the ground team. When the team makes contact or observes a target for an air strike, the FAC and observer work together in getting air support on the target.

6. The FAC can get fighters that are available in the area and can also cause TAC air, waiting on strip alert, to scramble through the ABCCC depending on urgency of the situation. Gunships may be scrambled and troopships alerted for exfiltration. The team leader directs air strikes through the observer to the FAC until the target is destroyed,

strikes through the observer to the FAC until the target is destroyed,

enemy fire suppressed or forced exfiltration has been accomplished. Only the FAC supporting the mission is authorized to bring air strikes within the No Bomb Line (NBL).

7. Depending upon the nature of the assigned mission, the team may avoid or evade contact, continue its reconnaissance, continue to develop targets or prepare and be extracted.

a. Reconnaissance. RTs and EFs conduct point and area recon, road and river watch and recon in force missions. Reconnaissance is basically information seeking and in all but the recon in force, avoidance of discovery by enemy forces is highly desirable. Normal scouting and patrolling procedures are adherred to during movement. Increased vigilance is applied as the team approaches their target area.

(1) Point and linear targets are observed from a distance prior to a more close-up detailed recon taking place at the target proper. Ground photography is used extensively to add to and confirm sightings by reconnaissance patrols. Guidance to better field photography is issued in the RT Leader's Handbook.

(2) When a team is programmed to conduct bomb damage assessment (BDA), efforts are made to have them on the ground within half an hour of the bombing. The VC/NVA are known also to make BDA of our raids.

(3) Another mission which can be included in the broad category of reconnaissance is the hand emplacement of electronic sensing devices. Experience has shown that accuracy of placement is very desirable and important. Various sensors are capable of detecting personnel, vehicles (loaded and unloaded), determining direction of movement, counting their targets, and relaying this information back to a receiving station/recorder.

(4) Reconnaissance in Force is characterized by the RT or EF seeking out the enemy to exploit that target with artillery, air support, and/or additional ground forces. The recon in force also indicates a limited ground combat capability of RTs and EFs....

Team members remain alert to spot enemy caches. When discovered, the caches are handled as described in paragraph III D 3 above.

b. Interdiction and Area Denial.

(1) The AAR was a test vehicle and proved highly successful. It involved three platoons from CCC and outstanding air and artillery support. These forces were able to restrict traffic on the heavily used Highway 96/110 near the Tri-border Area of Laos for nine days. The platoons occupied a piece of high ground beside the road; cratered the road, adjusted long range artillery and called in day and night air strikes to accomplish their mission. Through this mission, the EF displayed its capability at limited ground combat, short term area denial and route interdiction.

(2) Route interdiction is often accomplished using mines. This device is used to discourage pursuit of a team as well as a casualty producer. The Claymore and M-14 mines are used.

(3) Personnel on patrol remain alert to spot enemy wire communication lines. Wire lines have been spotted from the air also. These sightings are reported and guidance is issued as to action to be taken. The team may be told to cut out a large section of the wire and continue its assigned mission. They may be instructed to interdict the line and establish an ambush/prisoner capture effort for the wire repair team that will be sent out. Another possibility is for a wiretap device to be sent the team or a new team inserted with the device to gain enemy intelligence information by listening and recording conversations overheard on that wire.

c. Raids and Ambushes. The primary characteristics of the raid and ambush are surprise, fire power, shock action, sudden break off, and rapid departure from the scene of action. Typical raid missions are the SLAM operations conducted in the PF area of operation.

(2) Ambushes are established primarily to destroy enemy personnel or to capture a prisoner and/or equipment. A great deal of study and discussion have taken place on the subject of Prisoner Snatch Ambushes. General opinion is that the prisoner snatch should be conducted by a team formed and trained specifically for that purpose and should have no other mission.

d. Patrol Base. Utilizing one or more EF Platoons and several RTs, establishment of a patrol base has proven to be an effective method for detailed area or point reconnaissance. The base is given sufficient strength to defend itself against known or suspected enemy elements in the area. RT patrols are dispatched from the patrol base to conduct the assigned mission. The base is normally capable of accepting helicopters for insert, resupply, reinforcement and extract support.

B. Extraction.

1. The purpose of an extraction is to remove friendly forces from enemy or enemy controlled territory. There are two basic reasons for extraction, as a result of mission completion and as a result of enemy action. As in the case of infiltration by foot, teams may be programed to exfiltrate to a friendly installation by foot movement. Weather conditions may require exfiltration by foot also.

2. FAC support during a helicopter extraction is extremely important. He will normally direct the entire operation. He confirms the location of the team, directs them to the best available LZ as the situation permits, directs the gunships to the target area, and requests close air support through the ABCCC when necessary. Fire support is controlled and directed by the team leader through the FAC. Where no adequate LZ is available, the FAC will guide the extract slick ships over the team and Jungle Penetrator, McGuire or STABO rigs, or rope ladders will be lowered.

3. Normal Extraction.

a. A normal extraction occurs when the team is ready to be extracted and is not in contact with enemy forces. Under these conditions the team will normally be at a "sit-down" LZ. Even though there is no

MORI DocID: 570371

enemy contact, gunships will arrive shortly before the slicks. The gunships will orbit in vicinity but not directly over the planned extraction point. Immediately prior to the extract slicks arrival, FAC will cause the gunships to check out or clear the LZ.

b. The extract pilot(s) will positively identify location of the team to preclude any delay between clearance into the LZ and start of his approach. The extract pilot lands or hovers his aircraft as near the team as safety permits to save time on the LZ.

c. The team remains alert for loading of the aircraft through contact with FAC. Training and established procedures afford rapid loading and minimum ground time for the extraction helicopters.

d. After the team is aboard the aircraft, departure from the LZ will normally be vertical to treetop level, then close to the treetops using a moderately zigzag course for approximately two km. When the aircraft is well away from the extract LZ, a maximum performance climb to altitude is made for return to base.

4. Emergency Extraction.

a. An emergency extract is defined as a situation in which a team is in immediate contact with a superior enemy force and is unable to break contact without suffering casualties or are faced with being overrun. Team action in this case is to make radio contact and report "PRAIRIE FIRE EMERGENCY" or "SALEM HOUSE EMERGENCY". The exact words must be used to properly alert the FAC or ground radio relay that the team is in an emergency situation. Upon this declaration, all required or available assets are diverted to support reinforcement and/or extraction of the team. When PF or SH EMERGENCY is declared, the team will be extracted if the team leader so requests.

b. Two additional situations have been described with correspondingly less reaction when the circumstance is declared by the team leader.

(1) Tactical Emergency. This is defined as a situation in which enemy activity in the target area is such that the team cannot

in which enemy activity in the target area is such that the team cannot

continue or complete its mission without coming in contact or compromising the mission. Team action: report "TACTICAL EMERGENCY." The team leader must remain prepared to employ artillery, TAC air or helicopter gunships as are available. He must keep the commander/S-3 informed of the situation using the facets of the keyword S-A-L-U-T-E (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) Base reaction to this declaration is that assets will be diverted to the area as required. The Commander of the C & C Det or his representative will make the final decision as to whether the situation warrants extraction of the team based on information furnished by the team leader.

(2) Team Emergency. Defined as a situation in which problems within the team preclude continuation of the mission. Examples are sickness, injury, team revolt, etc. The team leader will advise the S-3 of the situation, giving all details. The Commander of the C & C Det or the S-3 will make the decision as to whether or not extraction will take place. In a team emergency situation, the whole team or individuals within that team may be replaced and the operation continued or the whole team may be extracted.

c. Tactics used to initially locate the team in an emergency situation are the same as outlined under the Normal Extraction. The team may be defending itself and the LZ as the extraction efforts begin. Gunships will be launched immediately. They will aid in securing the LZ or at least hold the enemy off. When the LZ is secure or enemy fire has been suppressed, extract aircraft will attempt to pick up the team.

d. Extract pilots may lay smoke or attempt to use battle smoke to screen their approach. Pilots avoid flying over known enemy positions. Door gunners must remain alert not to fire on friendly forces. No firing is allowed until the gunner has located the team. Gunships provide covering fire while the extract helicopters are on the LZ picking up the team. Extract pilots announce their departure from the LZ prior to lift out.

from the LZ prior to lift out

e. Team personnel move to and rapidly load the extraction ships as they touch down. When extraction by penetrator, STABO, McGuire or rope ladder is required, the team is prepared (through numerous rehearsals) to outload using any of these devices. Gunships support the extraction under control of the FAC.

f. Standard procedure dictates the last man off an LZ throw a smoke grenade. This notifies the FAC that the LZ is clear of friendly forces and that he can direct gunships and TAC air to deliver their ordnance loads on any enemy forces which may now be occupying the LZ.

g. The team leader may be returned to the target area via FAC aircraft to aid in directing strikes on fleeting type targets he observed during his ground time.

5. There will normally be one extra helicopter accompany the extract formation. It is known as the "chase ship" and will carry the "chase medic." The mission of this aircraft is to recover passengers and crew from any other aircraft which has gone down for any reason. In advent of a critically wounded or ill person, the chase ship will pick that person up for immediate aid by the medic. If the chase ship is not required for its primary mission and the medic deems it necessary, the wounded individual may be delivered directly to an adequate medical facility within the helicopters flight range.

F. Debriefing.

1. Immediately upon completion of a mission, the team is debriefed by experienced personnel. The sooner the debriefing takes place, the more detailed information is apt to be gained.

2. Two separate debriefs are conducted.

a. An immediate debrief is conducted at the launch site to recover and put to use perishable information.

b. The detailed debrief is conducted at the C & C Det, often by the Area Specialist Team (AST) representative responsible for the area in which the team has been operating.

area in which the team has been operating.

3. Various elements have developed their own outlines attempting to extract maximum information from returning teams. [Examples of these formats may be seen at inclosure 21 and included in the RT Leader's handbook.] In most cases these debriefing sessions are tape recorded to insure a detailed written AAR can be prepared. Interested command and staff personnel attend and contribute to the debrief by asking pertinent leading questions which may not be covered in the debrief format.

4. Air crews are also debriefed to glean knowledge they have gained during the operations and over flights.

5. The Operations Section (S-3) of the C & C Det is responsible for preparation of the AAR subsequent to the debrief. An advanced intelligence report may be submitted with information believed to be perishable. [Examples of AAR messages are included at inclosures 16 through 20.]

G. Recovery.

1. Upon completion of the debriefs, teams revert from AST control back to the company to which they are assigned. Adequate time will be allotted for care and maintenance of equipment. All team equipment will be returned to an immediate state of readiness and lost or unserviceable items are replaced.

2. When all equipment has received adequate maintenance the team will normally be given approximately as much free time as the time they spent on operation.

3. A period of retraining, replacement and preparation will begin for the next mission. Emphasis is placed on correcting problem areas and mistakes observed during preceding operations.

TOP SECRET

INITIAL MISSION OF A SHINING BRASS

RECONNAISSANCE TEAM

BY

MASTER SERGEANT DAVID K. KAUHAAHAA, JR., USA*

I arrived at Kham Due about 21 September 1965. I had been briefed at Long Thanh . . . upon arrival from Okinawa. At Long Thanh M/SGT Richard Warren and I had been selected as team members for Team 1 on the SHINING BRASS operation. Also with us were SFC Comerford and SFC James H. Smith. All four of us had been issued equipment at Long Thanh and briefed in reference to the SHINING BRASS operation. After two days of issuing of equipment and briefings at Long Thanh, we were flown to Kham Duc in I Corps. There we picked up our reconnaissance teams. Sgt Warren and I had Team 1. The teams were comprised of Vietnamese civilians. We had about eight civilians, all Vietnamese, who were hand picked from Long Thanh as the best reconnaissance members in the project. At Kham Duc we were met by Captain Torney who was selected as our team leader and operations officer. Along with him was M/Sgt Voter who also came from Okinawa. He acted as our operations sergeant.

We were informed that we had approximately two weeks to prepare ourselves. Sgt Warren and I prepared a plan of training exercises with our reconnaissance teams, i.e., to get to know each other's habits and also to see how efficient we could work together in the field on reconnaissance missions. After organizing the team and assigning duties to the members, we prepared a training cycle. First, we worked on ranges

* This entire documentary is constructed from a taped interview of Master Sergeant David K. Kauhaahaa, USA. Except for editing, the documentary is a verbatim account of Sergeant Kauhaahaa's extemporaneous discussion of the initial mission of his RT on 3 November 1965.

using Swedish Ks. The weapons on the team consisted of nothing but Swedish Ks. The training in the firing of weapons included quick firing exercises and emphasis on accuracy from hip and shoulder firing. This went on throughout the two weeks of training, which also included practice in loading and unloading of the H-34 helicopter, infiltration with the helicopter, and reconnaissance techniques using all arm and hand signals, no voice.

We had three helicopters at our disposal which the two reconnaissance teams used. We had one helicopter for exfiltration and infiltration exercises at close proximity to the Kham Duc area.

Our training paid off. We learned each other's habits and had a well organized reconnaissance team. Some of the techniques that we learned to use were taken from the jungle Malayasian handbook.

SOG Headquarters informed as of our forthcoming operation on 3 November 1965. This was done through aerial photographs and by a courier from SOG headquarters to brief the operations officer, the operations sergeant, the two American team leaders, and the Vietnamese team leader. We put together the aerial photographs and studied the operations order. We made a map and aerial photograph reconnaissance, selecting good air avenues of approach and LZs, not only the primary but also possibly two alternates, i.e., if the terrain permitted.

During this preparation time after we had studied the maps, we prepared the team for deployment. I, as the assistant team leader on Team 1, prepared the equipment, the type and quantity of rations we would take, the batteries and radios. We had one PRC-25, two HT-1s, and the AN/GRC 109. The HT-1 was used for communication between two portions, ALPHA and

Tab G to

BRAVO, of the team and for ground-to-air communication. The PRC-25 was used for ground-to-air communication and possibly from ground to our FOB. At this early stage, we used the AN/GRC 109 mainly for contact from our location to our FOB. This was our only CW means to the FOB. In later operations, the PRC 64s were used in place of the AN/GRC 109. The PRC 64 had CW and voice capabilities and was much easier to carry. We have made contact using the PRC 64 from our operation area as far as Danang and also back to our FOB.

During our preparation period, the two Americans, myself and Sgt Warren, and the Vietnamese team leader made a VR by bird dog aircraft of our operation area. There was a flight pattern that the FACs used to disrupt any suspicious enemy force on the ground that they used over the operational area, making it look like he was just looking around in another area but we were looking in the opposite direction. By this we had the opportunity of reconning or making a VR of our operational area.

In preparing the team for the operation, we did not tell them the exact time that we were deploying or the day. We just prepared them as far as equipment, weapons firing and conditioning were concerned. The Americans and Vietnamese team leaders decided not to brief the teams until six hours prior to infiltration. That time was used for: getting the equipment, ammunition, and weapons in position; preparing personnel on such matters as uniform, individual camouflage, and last minute checks. The only people who knew about our target area from the time we received the order and aerial photos were the operations officer, the operations sergeant, the two American team leaders and the Vietnamese team leader. We didn't inform the rest of the team because of the isolation

problem we had at Kham Duc. We had no place to isolate the whole team in that area so we decided to wait until approximately one hour before infiltration to give the rest of the team members a breakdown as far as the targets and the means and what action we were going to take in the operational area. This was done through our interpretor to the Vietnamese and it was done very slowly so each man on the team would understand our mission. As far as methods that we would use throughout our operation, this we took into consideration during our training phase.

At one hour prior to infiltration, we gave a detailed briefing to the rest of the team members. We had them all in an isolated briefing area with Captain Torney and a sergeant doing the intial briefing as to the target area. Sgt Warren and I following it up with the detailed reconnaissance procedures to be employed in the target area. We made sure that each man on the team understood what the mission was, and that it was a reconnaissance type and not a fighting type operation.

After final briefing of the team, we made sure that the Vietnamese team members were confined to one building and under close supervision by either Sgt Warren or myself prior to infiltration. It was decided that our infiltration would be done before dark.

We deployed using three H-34s, all manned by Vietnamese helicopter pilots well experienced in this type of operation. These people worked initially with Project DELTA. These three pilots were among the most experienced helicopter pilots I have ever worked with. The team was split in half. (ALPHA and BRAVO) with MSgt Warren taking ALPHA on one H-34 and I taking BRAVO on another. The other American team member, SFC Donaldson, who was acting as our medic, was with me. The Third H-34 was used as a tail ship (recovery ship). We infiltrated into our operational area just before dark.

Tab G to

Upon arrival on our LZ, there was no activity. We infiltrated in the elephant grass LZ area and regrouped with the ALPHA team two minutes after we were on the ground. We had a little problem as far as infiltration in the LZ. The exhaust of the second ship, which I was on, ignited the elephant grass. For about 45 seconds, we were stomping out the fire. Then we pushed on and closed in with the ALPHA team under MSgt Warren. Prior to leaving my location, I was missing Sgt Donaldson. The only people with me at that time were my two Vietnamese. We whispered the code name but he didn't answer. I waited 15 seconds and moved out. We rendezvoused with ALPHA team and I informed Sgt Warren that Sgt Donaldson was missing. We took a head count and came up with the correct count, and discovered that Sgt Donaldson was at the tail end of Sgt Warren's team.

We moved approximately 350 meters from the LZ area. After making a visual surveillance of the area, we decided to bed down for the night. Our method of security at night was to have 50 percent on guard and 50 percent sleeping, but being the first night in the operational area, it seems that we had a 100 percent alert all night.

The target area was approximately 1,200 meters from the LZ. The mission at the target area was to locate automatic weapon positions that were spotted by the aerial photos and a large concentration of enemy troops. On the second day we headed toward our target area. The underbrush was a thick canopy and in some areas we couldn't see daylight. It seemed like we were traveling in the dark but it was during the day. There was no noticeable enemy activity on the second day so the team was very cautious in its movements.

On the third day, we broke camp. We packed up and moved, without eating, for a distance of about 300-400 meters. Then we settled-down and had breakfast which consisted, in part, of a can of fruit or a can of meat. Most of the team members tried to have fruit. At approximately 1000 hours on the third day, we ran into a trail. You could walk about three people side by side on the trail and we could see by the ground and shubbery that it was well used. We decided to make our contact and this was approximately 1000 hours. We made contact with our FAC and informed him of our last location and what we had spotted. We gave the information to the FAC ship, told him all was quiet and that we would continue on with our mission. Our next contact we reminded them would be at about 1500 hours. We then moved out, crossed the main trail and headed toward our objective. We traveled about 12 minutes along the ridge line toward our target area when our point men ran into the enemy point men. I'd like to point out at this time that our two point men had silencers on their Swedish Ks. I was the fifth man in back of Sgt Warren when we ran into the point of the enemy patrol. These two men were killed by our point men. We signaled to return to our rally point and we broke contact. Upon arrival at our rally point, I took a head count of all personnel while Sgt Warren was looking over an area for return withdrawal. Sgt Warren and I and Sgt Donaldson decided at that time that we would withdraw to a higher location and request for exfiltration with our contact or try to make contact on our PRC-64. We could hear the enemy beating the bush in the rear of us and we kept moving on through the elephant grass to a high point in the area, looking for a fairly decent LZ. We traveled about four hours to the highest point in that operational area looking for an LZ. We did find a fairly good LZ area and we settled down until contact was made.

At approximately 1430 or 1500 hours our FAC ship came in contact with us. We requested exfiltration and we were given 20 minutes-on target for the H-34s at our location. We planned the exfiltration action within our team and we already had the panel symbol that we would use in alerting the H-34 pickup. We also had smoke violet to use just in case we had to but on this exfiltration we didn't need to use any smoke. We were exfiltrated with no firing at the aircraft at the pickup point area but there was firing at the FAC ship as it flew over the operational area. We were exfiltrated with no one hurt and exfiltration went real smooth.

Upon arrival at our FOB, Kham Duc, we were informed by the FAC ship members that had we gone farther toward the target we would have run into a large concentration of troops and also uncovered automatic weapon positions.

Sgt Warren and I were immediately dispatched, after a quick debriefing there at Kham Duc, to Danang for debriefing by the S2 and S3 and CO of CC Detachment. After debriefing, Sgt Warren was returned back to Kham Duc. Sorties would be flown in the operational area. I was flown from Danang to Saigon for a debriefing by the Chief, SOG, and Assistant Chief, SOG.

The lessons learned in this operation included these:

a. There must be responsive recovery and fire support of the team.

b. A good radio operator who knows his PRC-64 is essential.

c. Members of the team must be in good physical condition and adept at patrolling. The basic fundamentals that we teach on patrolling are sound.

e. We couldn't break the smoking habits of the team

members. We had to take cigarettes away from the indigenous personnel. This didn't work during the training phase so we decided to tell them the smoking time; they could only smoke at that time.

f. We learned from experience to keep your equipment on; i.e., your rucksack on yourself, your web gear on and weapon at your side or on you.

g. It was real helpful to have rations, e.g., LRP rations, which didn't require any cooking - no fires would be started, etc. We did have some C rations at an early stage and we still didn't require any fire or warming of the food. Everything was eaten cold and as we progressed at a later date we just used LRP rations.

h. As we progressed throughout the project, the Swedish K was limited as far as teams were concerned. Some of the teams decided to take all M-16s and some of the teams took M-16s and M-79s. This was left up to the team leaders prerogative.

Tab G to

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL DETACHMENT CENTER

BY

MAJOR FRANK JAKS, USA*

. . . . . .

. . . We receive a monthly target list from SOG Headquarters which has approximately 25 to 40 approved targets per month. They are listed in order of priority. Once we receive this approved list, we select teams to engage the targets. The S3 levies reconnaissance company or directs reconnaissance company to provide a team with qualifications for the mission; i.e., if we want a wire tap team, a wire tap team is selected. The team leader is then informed when to report to the S3. There he receives his initial briefing which consists of a warning order in which we only give him the confines of the no bomb line and what his mission. He then picks up maps and aerial photographs, and studies a target folder. After he has studied his target folder, which takes approximately two days, he will then be programmed for a visual reconnaissance (VR). This is done with a U-17 type aircraft or an O1, whichever is available. After the VR, he has another two days before he receives his final briefing. The final briefing is conducted by the S2 and deals with the target area and the flight route. Active antiaircraft sites and enemy concentrations or locations are pinpointed where possible.

After the final briefing, the team leader is given one day to present a brief back to the commander. This is to assure the commander that the team is fully prepared to carry out the mission.

* With minor deletions and edited, this documentary is a verbatim account of a taped interview of Major Frank Jaks, USA, in which he discussed extemporaneously the operation of CCC.

Tab H to

In this preparation phase and after the VR, the team leader selects the equipment to be taken with him. We have an SOP which dictates the minimum amount of equipment to be taken and he has an option to take more if he so desires. Most reconnaissance team members prefer the CAR-15 as their primary weapon. It is shorter than the M-16; it does not get tangled up in vines and jungles and can be carried and fired easily with one hand if necessary. The M-16 is the second choice. We have some team members who still carry the Swedish K primarily because of the silencer; some of our teams prefer this type of weapon for ambushes on small units where silence is of particular importance. The M-79 is also carried. There is a minimum of two M-79s per reconnaissance team. Team members will carry ammunition for each of these various weapons as follows: CAR-15 and M-16 - anywhere from 350 to 450 rounds; The M-79 - anywhere from 40 to 50 rounds with HE comprising at least two-thirds and the remainder of either CS or cannister, plus one or two flares. Each team member carries two to three fragmentation hand grenades, one CS grenade, and a mimimum of two smoke grenades per man. The US member carries URC-10 survival radios and one PRC-25. Each remaining member of the team carries the following survival equipment: panel, signaling mirror and strobe light, and a pin flare.

One item of equipment with which we have the most problem is the jungle boot. Our jungle boot is the best boot on the market; however, it leaves an identifiable print which assists NVA and also other enemy trackers in tracking down our teams. This is especially true in the rainy season or when the trails or jungle floor is wet. We are now sending in the indigenous personnel with black Bata boots. They are undesirable because they cause the feet to sweat excessively. Then we have

another new OD rubber-sole boot which was manufactured for CAS in Laos but it only comes in small sizes and, therefore, cannot be worn by all personnel. We have started a program to insert worn out US jungle boots into the target area hoping that the enemy will police up some and wear them and thereby confuse trackers in getting leads on our teams.

During the rainy season, our second worse enemy is leeches. The entire target area is infested with them. The only deterrent which we have is leech repellant; however, it is only effective for two to three hours and then you need to reapply it on your entire uniform. One bottle of repellant will last roughly one day in this area. Our teams stay out in the field anywhere from five to ten days. We had the longest stay, 16 days, during the rainy season because we could not get in the area with aircraft to extract the team.

A typical insert of a reconnaissance team is carried out as follows:

All air assets, US HUEYs, UH-1Ds, two CHARLIE model gun ships and two COBRAs and anywhere from three to five VNAF H-34s are assigned as assets to this control detachment on a daily basis. Reconnaissance teams are alerted for their missions the day before as to the exact departure time. This is normally at 0800 in the morning. The reconnaissance team is then moved aboard these aircraft to Dak To, our forward launch site. There aircraft are refueled and teams loaded on the insert aircraft. The insert aircraft will then consist of three HUEYs, four gun ships and one O2 Air Force FAC aircraft. We will normally have two SKY RAIDERs from Pleiku on station orbiting some 10 kilometers from the target area. If SKY RAIDERs are not available, we have F4s or other jet type aircraft on call responsive in 20 minutes through HILLSBORO, the airborne

command post in Laos. Once the FAC aircraft (this is the first aircraft to go over a target area) goes over the target area, he will verify the selected LZ and also confirm the weather within the target area. Once the FAC reports that the weather is favorable or workable and that an aircraft is on station, he will direct the launch site to launch the team. The team will then come out in the configuration as outlined. The FAC will brief the incoming aircraft on UHF as to the configuration of the LZ, if it is a different one than the initial selected one, and describe the terrain on it. As the aircraft approach, the troop carrying ships will be held in an orbit approximately five kilometers from the LZ and two gun ships will make a low sweep over the LZ in an effort to draw fire. If no fire is drawn, the troop carrying ships will come in one at a time flanked by the two gun ships and offload the team. They will then take off from the LZ, move to a preselected orbiting point (approximately 15 kilometers away from the LZ) and wait for a team okay from the team on the ground. This team okay from the team is normally received after 10 to 15 minutes. They are insuring the FAC that no one got injured on the insert and the team can go on in carrying out its mission. At that time, all aircraft, the helicopter gun ships and troop carriers are returned to Dak To, refueled and stand by for the next mission. The SKY RAIDERs (A10) aircraft are kept in the area for a little longer. Most of the time they are used for another insert. The ideal aircraft is a SKY RAIDER. It has the longest loitering time over the target area, up to four hours, and we normally use them for inserts of more than one team.

The insert technique that we favor the most, of course, is a set down LZ for a HUEY. A second insert method is deciding on a ladder. We have ladders secured on HUEY aircraft

or H-34s. A third method is repelling from a HUEY. A fourth method is walking in from a launch site or any one of our forward radio-relay sites. We have also used another technique by inserting two reconnaissance teams on one LZ and they move then in opposite directions to two different target areas. We sometimes employ a stay-behind technique. By which I mean one reconnaissance team is exfiltrated and the new one infiltrated or when we work with a platoon or company size unit, we exfiltrate the company and bring a fresh reconnaissance team in in order to observe the enemies reaction as he is coming back into the area.

. . . . . .

The ideal reconnaissance team leader should be an E6 or E7 with 10 years of service and an MOS of 11B, 11C or 11 F. He should be less than 30 years of age and in top physical condition. He should be a graduate of the Airborne School, Ranger School, if possible, be Special Forces cross trained and a previous Vietnam tour. He must be a volunteer. That is primarily because the individual if he didn't want to come into the program doesn't know what he is getting into because of the high classification and the administrative headquarters in Nha Trang, the 5th Special Forces, is in no position to brief them either as they don't have any need to know. Personnel coming in get scared at times that everything is highly classified and they do not know what they are getting into. Once a man learns what the unit's mission is, he will normally go ahead and stay in the reconnaissance team or exploitation company, whichever the case may be. We have a drop-out rate of less than five percent after the individual is fully briefed on what the unit's mission is.

What could make this program better and perhaps more effective would be dedicated air assets. What I mean is organic air assets, if possible, or at least permanently attached ones. Right now we are supported by four O1G Army aircraft. All of the pilots are billeted with us and they are dedicated. They are part of the unit. We are supported with HUEY troop carrier aircraft from the 52nd Battalion from Pleiku. We receive four troop carriers per day. Crews rotate every other day which means that a lot of personnel are exposted to our operations. Furthermore, they are not as dedicated as our O1G pilots and also the O2 Air Force pilots. We work very closely with these air assets. The AlEs (SKY RAIDERs) are just about part of the family, also. We have quite numerous personnel contacts and therefore they work better. I have found that as far as aviators are concerned (helicopter pilots), there is a better quality when they are organic to a tactical unit; i.e., in the northern area in I Corps, I have worked with air assets from the 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division. They seem to be made up of a better calibre than these unattached or independent aviation battalions where the tactical commanders don't have as strong an influence on them as in the organic units, the 101st or 1st Cavalry. Problems we run into is that a lead pilot may refuse to fly a mission and quote some regulation which we are not familiar with; i.e., "I will not fly this mission if I do not have tactical air on station." This is clearly a decision to be made by a tactical commander not by a helicopter pilot. We have experienced problems with the mixture of gun ships; i.e., COBRAs and HUEY/CHARLIE model gun ships. The aviators maintain that they are incompatible and that they cannot work together as teams. We would rather see one of either type rather than both of them mixed together.

We can work and live with three COBRAs as escorts as opposed to two COBRAs and two CHARLIE models. The CHARLIE models - the primary problem is that they are slow, cannot keep up with troop carrying aircraft and, therefore, we have to reduce the infiltration speed. They have more frequent breakdown primarily because of their age. They need longer runways for takeoffs and carry less ordnance than the COBRA. They, further, cannot be used fully out of one of our launch sites; for example, Dak Pek which lies on a valley floor surrounded by steep ridge lines. From that area, our CHARLIE model can only take off with half an ordnance load. He has to either go with a full load of ordnance and a half load of fuel or a half load of ordnance and a full load of fuel which does not make it an ideal aircraft and reduces their effective range considerably. On an average month, we lose anywhere from 10 to 20 missions because of breakdowns of CHARLIE model gun ships.

The POLE BEAN program in which this organization is also engaged in should be carried out in the following manner: 7.62 or AK-47 ammunition should be inserted, loaded in magazines rather than loose. This is to say that the NVA soldier is just as lazy as our soldier at times and will not pick up loose rounds, but he will pick up a loaded magazine if provided. We have found in recent months an abundance of ammunition laying around loosely on the battlefield, along trails or in their temporary shelter. The 12.7 variety we feel is a poor copy. By placing the POLE BEAN round next to our normal round, it has a different shade and if someone knows about it, he will be able to tell by just looking at the round that it is an imposter. Furthermore, the 12.7 should be inserted in belts rather than in loose rounds. This is saying again that loose rounds are not going to be picked up. The 82 ammunition

(82 mortar round) we find is best when it is packaged in cases of three or six rounds as opposed to loose rounds. When a cache or abandoned bunker along a trail or road is found, it can be inserted in that area. One should take a close look where this 82 ammunition is inserted to. What I mean is when you know that there are enemy units with an 82 gun in the area, then it should be inserted.

On all of our reconnaissance or exploitation missions when this headquarters receives a frag order it will state the mission; i.e., area or points reconnaissance, secondary mission - insert POLE BEAN, and third mission - insert SOAP CHIP. The exact location as to where to implace the POLE BEAN rests with the reconnaissance team leader or exploitation force commander. On exploitation platoons - when they go in they carry a mission to find suitable caches and we normally like to implace 82s into areas where they come out of or where they find suitable caches.

One nice item for us to have would be some agent with which to contaminate rice. An experience in early 1967, when our exploitation forces located a storage area of 700 tons of rice. They were packed in 100 kilo sacks, nice rows, and about 10 tons per row. We, first of all, tried to exfiltrate this rice by aircraft but since this was in the dry season, at extreme temperatures, our aircraft at that time (H-34s) could only carry three sacks per lift. We were at that time working with Nung Chinese and it took five personnel to move one of those sacks to an LZ, which made it impractical. We then tried to destroy the rice by cutting the sack with knives or machetes, spreading it out so that it could be seen from the air. We then used hard ordnance, high explosive bombs to open it up some more. After which, we attacked it with napalm. The napalm

would only burn a layer approximately two inches and after you removed that, the rest of the rice was good. We repeated the procedure by dropping more high explosives and then experimented with WP bombs with the same result - it would not burn. We then infiltrated plane mogas (in drums) with helicopters and spilled it over as we were flying. All this time, we kept two companies on the ground to secure the operation. It took us three weeks plus and an untold number of aircraft sorties and ordnance in an effort to destroy this rice in which we still did not succeed. We need a small agent, a compact agent, which could be spread over this rice in order to make it unusable for the enemy.

I feel very strongly that after the war in Vietnam comes to a conclusion that a small Army unit should be maintained and continue to train in the techniques and procedures of this organization. I was one of the few originals when we first came into this program and we had to start and stumble and learn through mistakes which can be prevented if a unit like this is kept on hand. Ideally a unit like this perhaps could be a part of the 8th Special Forces in Panama or part of the 1st Special Forces in Okinawa. It should be a unit who is an expert in jungle warfare primarily to learn how to navigate in jungle, how to survive in jungle, and how to work with the various necessary air assets at all times.

OPERATIONS OF A RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

IN COMMAND AND CONTROL DETACHMENT CENTER

BY

CAPTAIN THOMAS W. STANTON, USA*

First of all, I would like to talk about the operation here at Command and Control Central and the reconnaissance company. I am authorized 30 reconnaissance teams but I have never had that many and I never expect to have that many due to rotations, casualties, leaves, R&Rs, etc. I am authorized 95 US personnel and 277 SCU or indigenous personnel. At present, I have 80 US (I am 15 short), 215 SCU or indigenous personnel (I am 62 short). Of the 30 authorized teams, I have 26. I have 21 American-Montagnard teams and 5 all Vietnamese teams.

Since January of 1969, we have been putting more emphasis on the forming of Vietnamese teams: 1 in January, 1 in March and 2 in June and so far they have been doing fairly well. We are trying to get about 10 Vietnamese teams and 20 US-Montagnard teams by the end of September and start working with the Vietnamese more closely so they can eventually possibly take over this program.

Some of the missions that we are called upon to undertake are area reconnaissance, roadwatch, road interdiction, POW snatch, wire tapping, and the insertion of classified materials. As to the mission requirements themselves, they are issued to us (S3) by MACV SOG; in turn, S3 will issue the order to the reconnaissance company. It is then my job to pick a reconnaissance team for the particular mission, the one that I think is the best qualified, has knowledge of the area, etc.

* This entire documentary is constructed from a taped interview of Captain Thomas W. Stanton, USA. Except for minor editing, the documentary is a verbatim account of Captain Stanton's discussion of the operations of his company.

I then alert the team and have it report to S3 who issues a warning order. At this time, they are given the date and times for their visual reconnaissance by aircraft over the target area and their operational briefing which includes day, time, and other information concerning the mission. Then the team starts preparing for the operation. Various forms have to be filled out as to the serial numbered items of equipment that will be carried. The supply request has to be turned in to S4. We start on their briefings, etc., for the operation. The team will report on the date and time specified for an operational briefing to be given by the S3 personnel. The launch team, communication section, and artillery officer will also be present during the briefing in order to assist in covering the details of their respective functions. Finally, the team will receive a detailed briefing by the S2 of all the intelligence in the area of operations.

Generally the teams consist of about 3 Americans and about 10 SCU or indigenous personnel. It is left up to the one zero (the team leader) as to the number of personnel that he'll carry in on the mission. Generally speaking, we always carry 3 US. Some of the other FOBs, CCS and CCN, carry only 2, but we have a requirement here that we put a minimum of 3 US on the team. It is left up to the team leader as to the composition and umber. Generally speaking, the reconnaissance teams have about 10 men on at minimum but no less than 6.

Let's take a look for a minute at a typical operation. Once the team members have received all their briefings, made their VRs, etc., and are prepared to go, they assemble on the helicopter pad on the morning of the launch and they are transported to our operational launch base. It is located about 40 or 50 kilometers north of our area. There they wait on call

until a command and control aircraft or the FAC pilot can get out and look over the area to make sure the weather is okay and tactical air is on call and that the conditions are suitable for an insert. As soon as the FAC pilot gives the word that it is okay for the operation, the helicopters will launch with the teams. Generally we insert with 2 helicopters. It doesn't make any difference if we have 10 people or 6, we usually insert with 2 helicopters to give the idea that we have more per-- sonnel than we usually do. The helicopters are directed into the area by the FAC pilot. They will circle in as low as possible and at a high a speed as possible; in other words, high speed and low approach. We try occasionally dummy inserts, i.e., we will go down in one area and fake an insert and then come up and put the team into another area. We also have false inserts in that we throw off demolitions and nightingale devices. These are devices that simulate a fire fight which is intended to deceive the enemy. In order to give us time to get on the ground and get moving, this deception may be effective for a few minutes or a few hours, or even a day or so. It has worked very effectively.

When the first helicopter lands and discharges the team members, they engage in immediate action drills, etc. If they come under fire, they radio the FAC pilot and let him know the situation. Also they ward off the other helicopter coming in. In that way we won't have any more troops on the ground than are necessary, thus enabling us to break contact and to be extracted from the landing zone. When both helicopters are on the ground, the personnel formed up and move out. Then they quickly form a tight perimeter in the event contact is made. If contact is made, they will try to break it and move back as quickly as possible to be lifted off the same LZ.

Tab I to

Generally, the missions run for 6 days. Formerly they were 5 days but we increased it one.

The personnel are generally heavily loaded down with equipment. The biggest items of equipment that really are weight bearing on us are the PRC 25 and things that have to be carried with it; in addition, our basic load of ammunition, our mines and any other material that may be required for security. I think we should place more emphasis on possibly trying to acquire a smaller and lighter radio than the PRC 25 but with the same range. Also, the Army is starting to come out with nylon webb gear but it is not in our supply channels yet. Once the webb gear that we presently have gets wet, it adds considerable weight to the soldier in the field.

These are some of the problem areas we have now. Once a team has completed its mission, they will radio headquarters stating that the mission has been completed and it will get further word from the S3 whether to continue on with the mission or to undertake a new mission. Generally, the team stays in for 6 days and then is pulled.

When the team is extracted, it is brought back to Kontum. There the S2 has them undergo an impact debrief. This is a debriefing of intelligence of immediate value which is sent to MACSOG. The next day they spend a better part of the day completing an after action report which is a detailed report step-by-step hour-by-hour of the operation itself. Once the team leader and his team members complete the after action report, they report to the reconnaissance company commander or the 1st sergeant and receive a one zero (team leader) critique sheet. They fill out the critique sheet, and then attend a conference with the reconnaissance company commander and the 1st sergeant in which they talk about problem areas.

Once we have determined all of the problem areas, the reconnaissance company commander reports to and goes over his report with S3. About one-fourth or one-half of our team leaders are senior NCOs (E-6s and E-7s); we even have one E-8 who is a team leader. We run on the average of about 20-21 operations a month. Our casualty rate has only been 6 for the year since I have been here. I think this is mainly due to the fact that we have senior NCOs with a lot of experience. They are dedicated individuals and they devote a great deal of time to training.

As to training, I think this is one of the big letdowns that we have in this program. I have been in Special Forces since 1962. I was an enlisted man until I was commissioned in 1966. I have seen the downfall in a number of ways in our training program. We are presently getting into our program a number of low ranking enlisted men, mainly SP-4s and E-5s who have little or no knowledge of what is going on. They went through their MOS training and branch training but outside of any real Special Forces training they have been deprived of this. Consequently, once they get into country we have to send them to a one zero school, which is a team leader's course, and the C&C course. I think this could be avoided if we would properly train the people in Fort Bragg at the Special Warfare Center, and then once they are assigned to their groups, continue with a good cross training program which we have let down on since 1964. I don't think that we are properly utilizing some of the outstanding training areas which we do have. I am talking specifically about Panama and Okinawa and the training group back at Fort Bragg. The jungle operations course in Panama is an outstanding chance for a man to get oriented toward jungle living prior to coming to Vietnam

but little or no Special Forces personnel, except those assigned to the 8th Special Forces (they are in Panama), get to go to the course. The personnel assigned to the 1st in Okinawa are the only ones to get to utilize the training facilities in that particular region.

The Special Forces Training Group at Fort Bragg has turned into more of a detail unit than an actual training unit. It is kind of discouraging to walk into the area, talk to a few personnel and find out that they are pulling more details than actual training. I personally believe that this is one of our big letdowns. I know this has been my biggest problem area in Vietnam or in any other unit I have been in, i.e., having to train the personnel once I get them. This should not be the case. We spend about one-fourth or one-half of our time on young personnel in Vietnam training.

These are some of the training areas that we are extremely weak in: immediate action drills, ambush techniques, repelling (specifically, repelling from aircraft), a good knowledge of aircraft, the capabilities of each, the loading of each, the ordnance capability, etc. Communications is one of our weakest areas especially if I have a young team. This is a constant problem area that we have to work on and this could be taken care of if we have a proper training program and training group or one of the groups prior to getting to Vietnam. It is surprising also the lack of knowledge that young personnel in the Army have of weapons. I presently have a training program here on various types of weapons to include nomenclature, care and cleaning, break down, field stripping, etc. This again reflects on our training program. Just about all of them know their basic weapon, which is their M-16, but I am referring to all the other types. Demolitions is another area in which we

Tab I to

need training. The SOG reconnaissance man should have a thorough knowledge of demolitions because these are used in the event we have a downed helicopter that we have to go in and destroy or in the event we would like to set up a demolition ambush or we have found a large cache that needs to be destroyed by demolitions. There are a thousand and one uses of demolitions. I have to train the personnel once they get here in the majority of these techniques.

Also, with regard to training, very few groups when they are training back in the States or training in one of the groups will train with full combat gear on. Consequently, if we don't watch the teams here when they go out for training, they will just go out with their web gear and with a weapon. A team should train with full combat gear. Get the personnel used to the weight they will be carrying in the field, approximately 50 to 60 pounds per man. If they train with this gear on, then they can better operate in the field with it.

Some of the problem areas outside of our own company have been with the FAC pilots. We have a critical shortage of qualified covey riders, FAC riders, etc. They generally come to the reconnaissance company and ask for old team leaders. When I talk about old team leaders, I refer to those who have eight, nine or 10 months on reconnaissance and are about ready to stand down. Generally, we let a man run reconnaissance until he has 11 months in country. The last 30 days he stands down. Getting back to the FAC riders. They usually come over and ask the reconnaissance company for one. I don't think just because a man can operate on the ground that he can fly FAC. Consequently, we have run into some problems on that. Problems such as the FAC giving the reconnaissance team on the ground a wrong fix. What I mean by fix is the wrong

coordinants. Also, in directing them to LZs, insert and extraction LZs, they have been off. We should place more emphasis on covey schools and FAC schools back in the States for Special Forces personnel or anyone else who would be involved in this activity.

As to the equipment, etc., that the reconnaissance team members carry, it will not vary considerably from that of an EF Company. Once the reconnaissance team goes into the operational area, if they find a target that is too large for them or that would merit a EF Company coming in, we can give a quick call to them. It is not very hard for a reconnaissance company to marry right in there since we are carrying basically the same gear. The EF Company is carrying approximately 50 or 60 pounds of gear also and they are basically the same items: their basic load of rations for five or six days, and their basic load of ammunition, mines, smoke grenades, etc.

Once the reconnaissance team finds a target that would merit a company or platoon coming in, we have a reaction time of 30 minutes to approximately two hours, according to the size of the force. We have a platoon on 30 minute standby back here and they generally are in target area married up with the reconnaissance team within 45 minutes. This has been done on one occasion that I was engaged in. When the reconnaissance team called for a platoon, the platoon was in after only 25 minutes from the time they were called. They captured a big cache and a field hospital fully supplied.

Getting back to training for a moment. We try to leave it up to the team leader himself the type of training he deems necessary for his team. To assist the team leader, my staff, the 1st sergeant and the operations sergeant, and I hold periodic chalk talks on training. We get all of the team

Tab I to

leaders in for an exchange of ideas. We spend three hours a week, one hour each on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. A different subject is discussed each day and we have an exchange of ideas on it. We try to have as many training areas available to the team leader as possible. We are restricted in that there is a number of US and Vietnamese units in our area and only one range. But we do have some local training areas that we coordinate with the other American units and Vietnamese units. There we send personnel on training missions (in-country missions). We try to send a team on at least one, sometimes two, training missions in-country prior to sending them against a PRAIRIE FIRE or SALEM HOUSE target.

During this past year in which I have been the reconnaissance company commander, about 90 or 95 percent of our target areas have been within the PRAIRIE FIRE area. The remainder, 5 to 10 percent, are in the SALEM HOUSE area. We have about 20 or 21 missions monthly. The better portion of these, around 15, are successful missions. I would like to discuss what I mean by "successful." If we have an area reconnaissance mission or a roadwatch mission, the teams are deployed into the area to specifically get some intelligence information. If we make contact or if we don't make contact, just see the enemy, we have completed our mission there. We have failed in our mission in a number of respects, such as a POW snatch. We have been trying for the past year to capture a POW. Recently, we finally captured one. This is a target opportunity which is hard for MACSOG and higher echelons to understand. A team can train hard for POW snatch but until they get a target of opportunity, they will never get a POW. Another problem area has been road interdiction where we have to place mines in the roads. This is extremely difficult

because the NVA have road security units deployed approximately every 100-200 meters up and down the roads and they patrol them regularly. More than once our teams have been caught in the roads placing the mines. Generally speaking, I'd say 60 or 70 percent of our missions in this regard are successful. Going against the SALEM HOUSE targets is extremely difficult in that we cannot support the teams like we can in the PRAIRIE FIRE. That is we can't give them proper artillery or enough artillery. Air support there is also a problem because of the distance we have to fly. Generally, our teams are just given an area reconnaissance mission or a roadwatch mission in a particular area.

I'd like to say a word about the personnel we are working with. The majority of the personnel in Reconnaissance Company are Montagnards. As I mentioned before, we do have the five Vietnamese teams and the rest of the teams are US and Montagnard. We have four Chinese Nungs who are on one of the teams. We have no race problems whatsoever with the Vietnamese, Montagnards, and Chinese. There is almost blind obedience to the Americans. This is reflected in that if a team has a good leader, the Americans have faith in him and the Montagnards do also. This faith breeds a good team. If you have one or two members, either US or Montagnard, who don't have this trust then you don't have a team, you have a group. I think this has been one real good thing that has helped make this organization highly successful, i.e., the relationship between the US personnel and the indigenous personnel. The other thing that we emphasize is giving the indigenous personnel as much meat as possible. Basically, they like to eat a lot of rice and soups. Without meat, after several days (three, four or five) in the field you start noticing a decrease in their energy and

efficiency. They start getting lax and the next thing you know, if you get hit, that second or so it takes them to react could mean the death of that individual or possible annihilation of the entire team. So, we should stress more meat in the diet of the indigenous personnel.

MORI DocID: 570371

OPERATIONS OF AN EXPLOITATION COMPANY

IN COMMAND AND CONTROL DETACHMENT CENTER

BY

CAPTAIN BARRY R. McCLELLAND, USA*

. . . . . .

As a commander of A Company which is one of the two exploitation force companies in our organization, I'll explain briefly the structure of the company. Our company, according to our TD, is organized into three or four platoons with 132 SCU or Montagnard soldiers. We are authorized 21 Americans in the company. During my tenure as company commander, we have had our ups and downs all the way from eight Americans with 90 SCU up to a full complement of 21 Americans and 132 SCU.

. . . we have a small casualty rate; sometimes not so small but we lose people predominantly from AWOLs, the SCU who change their minds to move or go to work with the MIKE force. We lose people who are deserters from the Armed Forces. We lose them due to sickness. I have found that generally we lose about five men every two weeks due to non-battle reasons. I might mention briefly that one of the greatest causes for injuries to our people is the fact that most of them can afford Hondas on their soldier salaries and they buy Hondas and they drive them and many of them bust themselves up on them.

When Americans are newly assigned to C&C organizations, they are usually further assigned to the reconnaissance company, which gets the majority of the Americans, or to one of the EF companies, or, of course, into the staff sections. When men

* This entire documentary is constructed from a taped interview of Captain Barry R. McClelland, USA. Except for minor deletions and editing, the documentary is a verbatim account of Captain McClelland's extemporaneous discussion of the operations of his company.

are assigned to the EF companies, they, of course, receive a standard staff briefing before we get them on the nature of mission here, what they will be doing and I believe that they are given a chance to decline any duty with this organization if they so desire. Our experience is that maybe one or two percent decline any further duty.

When they come to A Company, we brief them and, of course, they have many questions, particularly on the operations. They hear a lot of things during their first nights on recent casualties possibly, on enemy contacts. I have found that most (about 75 percent) of American enlisted men and lieutenants who come into the exploitation company stay for about six or eight months and then usually shift into one of the staff sections - one of the non-field jobs. Some men come to the organization with a particular desire to be in reconnaissance and, for one reason or another, usually because the EF companies are low on personnel, they are put into the EF companies instead. We always try to get them back into the reconnaissance company when this is feasible. Some men come in and after one or two missions it is determined by myself and the platoon leaders and the C&C commander that they really don't belong in the field, and that they didn't do as good a job as we had hoped they would. They are then shifted into a staff section where they can perform well. In some rare cases, men decide they don't want anything more to do with this program after a couple of operations and they leave and go back to the 5th Special Forces Group for reassignment.

We'll talk a minute about the structure of the platoon. Our three platoons in A Company are built around a four-squad concept of nine Montagnards in each squad. The platoon is advised by one American lieutenant, one platoon sergeant,

ideally grade E7 with an MOS of 11B, and four American squad leaders, usually grades SP 4 through E6. As to the Montagnards, each platoon, in addition to four nine-man squads, is authorized two interpreters. This is an important point because the Americans find it very hard to function without interpreters and qualified interpreters are difficult to get. My experience has been that we have had unusually good luck with our interpreters in A Company. They have stayed with us and, of course, I might point out right here that they make the equivalent of about $200 per month which is, I think, more than a lieutenant in the Vietnamese Army makes. This is some inducement.

We found that it is a great help and almost a necessity to keep enough Americans in the companies so that we can actually assign one American squad leader to each squad to supervise his Montagnards. The Montagnards have all been trained in an eight-week basic training course and many of them have been around the organization for a year or longer and have been on a great many operations and are competent soldiers. They need direct supervision in garrison when it comes to details and training. Of course, they are mercurial mercenary type people. They really have no sense of responsibility to the organization, to the goals of this effort, and I think that we have all seen it here that if they have Americans working with them together that there aren't many things they can't do but when left to their own devices, they are like the rest of us - they would rather sit around the barracks and smoke and play cards.

The question of relationships between the Americans and the Montagnards. - I found that most of the Americans get along very well with the Montagnards and they develop quickly a sense of comradeship toward one another, a mutual feeling of

respect and trust. The Montagnards look up to the Americans and expect certain things of them, such as they expect Americans to help them in many of their little problems. They expect Americans to be with them on operations, to be with them in garrison, and to be with them in spirit. There are cases of friction between Montagnards and Americans. It seems to involve American reluctance to engage in what you might call parties or festivities with the Montagnards. The Montagnards, of course, drink a great deal (many of them) and if they are given the opportunity while in garrison, they like nothing better than to get all the Americans good and drunk. The professional relationship we found between Montagnards and Americans during either training or conduct of operations is very good. We have never had any disciplinary problems. One of the companies had one case of the Montagnards trying to kill one of the Americans with land mines. I have heard of other cases of this happening but I haven't experienced it in my company. I might make one observation here that many of the Americans regard the Montagnards possibly as children and refer to them as the "little people." This is an affectionate name. Of course, there are many reasons for this, I imagine. The Montagnards are little people and many of them in disposition and manner appear to be children. They smile a great deal, they are very active, they are light on their feet and physically they seem to be children. I think this is one of the main reasons that a lot of them are treated that way. Many of the Montagnards who have shown their medal on combat operations are regarded with a great deal of respect by some Americans who have been with them. Some Americans are very attached to the Montagnards and spend a lot of their free time with them whereas others don't. Others go to great lengths to avoid them when they are off duty and when they don't have to be with them.

Tab J to

At this point I'd like to discuss a typical EF company operation. I will use a specific example. In this way we can bring up all the pertinent points. I'll take an operation of last February (1969). When a company is alerted for an operation, they usually receive word from the Operations shop about eight or 10 days in advance that they have been fragged for a certain operation and that they should begin thinking about it, and getting ready for it. I might point out that usually EF operations are directed from Chief, SOG, in Saigon and he sends us a message indicating that he would like us to run or that we will run an operation into a certain area with a certain mission. Approximately five days before the operation, the Operations shop gives us an operations order which names our target, lists the no-bomb lines, the lower left boundaries, reference points, times of infiltration, time for the ground commander of the operation to present a brief back to the CCC commander and to the staff sections, and various dates and times for coordination to pick up logistical equipment, special equipment, etc. When this happens, the team leader goes and makes liaison with each of the different sections in the S4. He will submit a list of various rations, ammunition, etc., equipment that he needs to take out with him. They get this stuff together in about 12 hours and he can go and pick it up and distribute it to his people. The team leader also goes over to the S2 shop and draws maps. We always draw one map for every American since we think it is necessary that every American have a map in case of an emergency. We draw radios. In the case of a one platoon operation, we will draw two PRC-25 radios and often we'll draw squad radios. In the case of a company operation, we will draw one PRC-25 for each platoon, then two PRC-25s for the operation commander. In addition,

Tab J to

Americans carry URC-10 survival radios when they are available. However, I should say that a sufficient quantity of these radios is never available for us here.

Once the commander of the operation, be it the platoon leader or the company commander, knows what the operation is going to be, he holds a meeting with the Americans who are going to go with him and explains to them what the operation will be. In some instances, there will be a week lead time in which case the company can go through some special training in anticipation of the operation, for instance: ambush tactics or methods of wire tapping, use of wire tapping devices, quick reaction drills -- things of this nature that can be rehearsed just before going out to the field and that will stick in the people's minds. The breakdown of chow, ammunition, and equipment usually takes place about one or two days before going into the field. We found that if we give the Montagnards their food too early before an operation (let's say five or six days days before), they are likely to eat a good portion of it before they actually go out into the field. Our operations are usually fragged for an initial duration of from six to eight days and we carry six to eight days chow. This is a mixed bag of C rations, indigenous PIR rations and long-range patrol rations. I think that the average eight-day ration load for a man weighs about 15 pounds. Additionally, we issue ammunition.

I'll describe briefly what each man carries in the platoon. When we issue ammunition, we require all of our riflemen who carry the M-16 rifle to have at least 25 magazines of ammunition. Some men, by preference, will carry 35. The magazines are loaded with 18 rounds each. This keeps the spring pretty good on the inside. In addition, each rifleman will carry at least six fragmentary grenades (M-26 or M-33), and two smoke grenades

(violet or yellow). He may carry, on some operations, a CS grenade or two. Each rifleman and each Montagnard will carry a one pound block of C4 if it is available or if we only have two pound blocks, we'll have a two pound block for every other man. Every other man will carry a Claymore mine. Every man carries 100 rounds of machine gun ammunition. Within each platoon, we carry usually 40 blasting caps in two boxes. We carry about 50 feet of time fuze and usually a small spool split up into four or five different loads of det cord. Within the platoon, we also have six M-79 grenadiers. These men carry a minimum of 50 and some of them all the way up to 65 rounds of 40mm HE for their M-79 grenade launchers. The men who carry grenade launchers do not carry Claymore mines; however, they do carry machine gun ammunition. Instead of using a weapons squad within the platoons, we have split our machine guns up and we have one machine gun in each squad. The machine gunner, of course, has a pretty good load with an M-60; it weighs about 24 pounds empty. The machine gunner carries his machine gun and 200 rounds of machine gun ammunition but he is not burdened down with any Claymore mines or other special equipment. Within the platoon, we also carry anywhere from six to 10 M-72 light anti-tank weapons or LAWs. These are given out to men who seem to have lighter loads than other ones. Additionally, a platoon often carries M-7A road mines. We do not now carry toe poppers but use grenade booby traps instead. We carry sometimes wire tap devices. We carry POLE BEAN and other special equipment such as handcuffs, cameras, panels, mirrors. Each American carries a compass, of course, a map, a signal mirror, a panel or a portion of a panel. We found that you don't need a whole panel - a portion of it can be seen just as easily.

Before an operation, the team leader usually manages to go out on a visual reconnaissance (VR) by aircraft of the target area. This is a great help because it enables him to select landing zones of which there are precious few in our area of operations. Most of the landing zones have been used a number of times before and by reading after action reports (AARs) of previous operations the platoon leader or company commander can decide on which landing zone he wants to use. He bears in mind, of course, its distance from his target area or its relation to the entire target area - whether its north of it or south of it, in the middle, and what sort of deception he wants to create when he goes in. The evening or the day before the team is deployed into the field, the commander will present a brief back to Colonel Abt, the C&C commander here. This brief back is usually about a 15-minute operation where he gives the commander a brief idea, mainly his concept of the operation, tells the commander what his mission will be, how he plans to accomplish it and what special equipment he is carrying. This is more or less a safeguard and anyone who cares to attend the brief back is welcome to do it. A commander can usually get the best out of a lot of heads there and if he has forgotten anything or he can get suggestions. It is a great help and it is a good idea.

On a day that a team is to be deployed, we usually get people up around 0700 and we are ready to go by 0730 in the morning. The problem that is usually encountered during employment is waiting for the air assets to get into Kontum so that they can be briefed on the day's operations. I think someone has covered the organization of our air assets so I won't go through that here.

Our launch site is usually from Dak To and, as soon as

Tab J to

possible, a platoon which is going into the field is ferried up to Dak To in any manner possible and once up there, they wait for the right weather conditions for the assets, tactical air, ALEs, etc., to get on station. Before a platoon goes into the field, the commander must break it down into helicopter loads for infiltration. This is done after discussion with the helicopter pilots where they indicate how many individuals they can take on each ship, which ship will be the first one into the LZ, and what the order of infiltration will be. At this time, the commander also indicates to the COBRA or gun ship pilots whether he wants the LZ prepped prior to infiltration. We have found that in some cases it is wise to prep the LZ especially if there are signs of enemy activity there, but, of course, when you prep it, you give it away and you let Charlie know that you are going to go in there. Usually in the case of a platoon or company, we have the COBRAs nail the LZ with fleshette rockets before we go in. The commander of a platoon or company always goes in on the first helicopter. He usually takes with him a radio.

I might explain one thing here. In A Company, we require the ground commander to carry his own radio instead of using the RTOs. We have RTOs but we found that during periods of contact with the enemy that it is unsatisfactory to have a radio operator with a radio. The best idea is to have the commander have a radio right with him because, often in the past, he has become separated from his radio operator when people were pinned down and he had a lot of difficulty getting back to his radio.

On the first chopper we will have the commander and the platoon medic and four or five other Montagnards. Usually the helicopters will carry no more than six on the first ship infiltration until they find out whether the LZ is hot or not. Once the assets are on station, we load the helicopters up by loads which have already been predetermined, six or seven, and no more than one American on each helicopter if possible. Then we go out to the target area.

Infiltration is usually accomplished without enemy fire. About 20 percent of the time the ships receive fire on the LZ or from the vicinity of the LZ. Once the first helicopter load hits the ground, the men on the ground have a system of signaling the other helicopters if everything is okay and if they are ready for the others to come in and they put a panel out as quickly as they can. This panel indicates to the other ships that they can come on in and that there is no fire on the LZ and that they are not experiencing any trouble. If they are taking fire, they pop a red smoke immediately and make radio contact with the FAC rider who is in turn in contact with the gun ships and make him aware of what the situation is -- where the fire is coming from, what kind of fire, what is the estimate of the situation. In this case, the gun ships try to suppress the fire and usually succeed in bringing the rest of the team in. Once a team is all on the ground in the case of a one-platoon operation, the team leader will make a quick check to see if he has all his people and that no one is injured. As often happens, I think it has happened to me on every operation, at least one man badly sprains an ankle or breaks a leg getting off helicopters. This is due partly to the fact that our LZs are usually shrubbed and wooded to some extent and it it necessary to jump out of the helicopters anywhere from a height of 10 to six feet up.

Once the team leader has checked his people on the ground and determined that they are all there, they are all okay and that they can march on, he moves off the LZ immediately in a predetermined direction, sometimes toward his ultimate objectives and sometimes in an opposite direction as a decoy measure. The helicopter gun ships remain in the area orbitting a few miles away for approximately 20 minutes after a team is on the ground. This gives the team an opportunity to get off of the LZ, to get a little bit better grasp of what the tactical situation is there at the moment and to get started. As often happens, if contact is going to be made, it is made right off of the LZ, on the fringes of the LZ. If this is the case, then the helicopters and gun ships are available for support. When the team leader has moved off the LZ and is satisfied that he can begin his mission, he gives the FAC rider a good day and this means that as far as he is concerned, the assets can return to the launch site at Dak To or to Kontum and that he is ready to carry on with his mission.

In reference to infiltrations by helicopter for exploitation forces, this organization (CCC) only has enough air assets for troop carrying helicopters to infiltrate at a maximum of about 45 people or one platoon on a lift. This means that if we want to put in two or three platoons we are obliged to go separately. Therefore, the first platoon on the ground has to wait approximately 1-1/2 hours on the LZ for the second platoon and if a third is coming in, they have to wait another 1-1/2 hours for it to arrive. Tactically, this isn't of much consequence except for the fact that infiltrations are inevitably late in the day because of holdups and breakdowns with the aircraft mostly. If we are obliged to put in three platoons, it is often the case that the third platoon doesn't

get in on the ground until 1700 or 1800 and this really doesn't leave the unit enough time to move off the LZ and to find a good tactical RON position.

I have been in A Company for the past 10 months during which period we have had basically three different kinds of EF missions. The one we have more often than others is a route reconnaissance-in-force mission with the added mission of exploiting any targets of opportunity with our ground forces and/or tactical air and 175mm artillery. This kind of a mission involves moving each day. I will describe the usual routine that we follow, more or less.

Once we are on the ground, at approximately 1630 or 1700, we try to find an RON position. It is a night perimeter. This is always established on high ground of some sort; a geographical feature to give us a tactical advantage and to give us a good defensive position. A platoon always digs in at night and we dig two-or three-man foxholes, usually in a circular perimeter, about four or five feet deep; in other words, we dig a very good, deep foxhole. We found that this is good protection against rifle grenade attacks. It has been our experience that a rifle grenade is one of the most potent weapons that the NVA have, and the weapon they use most successfully in small night attacks against platoons and companies in a perimeter posture.

In the morning we conduct a stand-to and get moving about 0700 hours. Usually, if the tactical situation permits and there are no enemy in the area, we have a cup of coffee and everyone eats something before we move out. Before moving, we outline our planned route for the day. We estimate how much distance we can cover, taking into account terrain features, watering points, possible cache sites, bunker

MORI DocID: 570371

complexes or anything of interest that we might find. The difficult terrain and vegetation in our area of operations makes it impossible to move more than about two kilometers a day. In some places, the bamboo, vines and trees are so dense that it is literally impossible to move through them, and you have to crawl on your hands and knees and/or hack your way through. We usually prefer when this happens to detour instead of hacking because this makes a lot of noise and quietness itself is one of one main tactical advantages in this sort of operation.

When moving during the day with a platoon, we use a three or four-man point element and we try to keep it at least 25 meters in front of the main body of the platoon. Sometimes, ideally, the point element should be farther out but, in order to maintain visual contact, 25 meters is just about the maximum in this sort of terrain. When the going is very rough, we use a file with point and rear security and a couple of men on each flank, possibly five to eight meters out from the flanks. We move slowly and fairly quietly and we, of course, never move on trails. If we are moving in the direction of a trail, we move parallel to the trail on one side or the other. Trails are, in our experience, one of the most lucrative targets in the area of operations. I feel, and I'm sure a lot of others do too, that the enemy feels more or less secure in the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas and that they confine their travels almost exclusively to trails and the few existing roads. This gives us a great tactical advantage because it enables us to pinpoint them and narrow down the area where we will find them so that trails, when we find them and there is evidence that they have recently been used, are probably the best targets we have for setting up ambushes, attempting prisoner snatches, etc.

When we find a trail while on a platoon reconnaissance force mission, we usually set up an ambush if the trail shows indications of having been recently used. The Montagnards are very helpful in identifying footprints or signals (bent twigs, broken leaves, dead vegetation) or things that point to the use of a trail. Some trails which we classify as high-speed trails are well beaten and well cleared and enable the enemy to make up to perhaps three or four kilometers an hour on them. We find other less distinct and small trails which usually have markers on them because they are hard to recognize. In addition, the enemy uses many elephant trails. There are a lot of elephants in this area and they make some beautiful big trails. When we find a trail with a platoon, if it seems to have been recently used, we attempt to ambush the enemy on it. If an ambush doesn't occur within a day, we usually move on parallel to the trail in one direction or the other. We found that trails inevitably lead to way stations or cache sites or old bunker areas and sometimes to active bunker areas.

On a reconnaissance-in-force mission, we usually end up either having an ambush on the enemy or finding some sort of a way station or a bunker complex. Whenever we find any sort of an inactive complex, we search it, of course, by setting out security on all sides of it, reconning the area around it, and then searching it. Sometimes we find graves and we dig these up to see what is in them.

Another good target we have found is communications wire. All of the communications wire we have seen is strung in trees and is not laying on the ground. On a high speed trail when we find good wire that seems to be active and we don't have a wire tap device, we send a message and request to be advised whether they want to send us a wire tap and to have us tap it or whether they want us to continue on our reconnaissance mission.

One of the interesting features of our operations is that, in many instances, the NVA have staked out many of the existent LZs in the area and are in the habit of tracking a team once it hits the ground. This tracking may be done with one or two people and a maximum of five. My theory is that possibly they are just trying to keep abreast of the activities of the team and as long as the team doesn't go where they don't want them to go, they are happy with that - just keeping track and knowing where they are and when they leave. This may be wrong. Of course, trackers can bring in other forces but trackers usually don't appear to have communication equipment with them. One of the most successful counter-tactics we have employed is the use of a squad of the platoon as a stay behind force to try to grab trackers who are tracking the platoon. In two instances that I an think of right now, we have done this.

In one instance, we left a squad back on a large elephant trail, approximately 300 meters behind our main body and the two platoons set up in a night perimeter about 1700. At approximately 1800, the stay-behind squad observed seven NVA coming very stealthily up the trail toward the company's position and they were able to kill two of them in a brief contact. The trackers are always carrying their rucksacks and seem to be prepared to stay on the move for possibly a week at a time. They usually have six or seven days' rations in their rucksacks consisting of a ball of rice which looks something like a softball and that's about it.

On another occasion, a platoon was to be exfiltrated from an LZ. They had risen only a short time before and had been moving toward the LZ. At the time, they were sitting on a bluff overlooking this LZ. One of the men who had been stationed out on security approximately 40 meters from the

platoon's perimeter observed two trackers approaching the platoon's position. These trackers when fired on left the scene. They also left behind their equipment and we found in their rucksacks a great many portions of rations, condiments, sugar, coffee, peppers and things like that that our men had left behind in RON positions during the previous week. Evidently, this indicates that these two trackers had been following the company for about a week and had been policing up things in the RON positions each day after the company left.

In the past, we have had opportunities to set up numerous ambushes and I'll just cover briefly how we do it. We always set up an ambush on a high-speed trail that indicates signs of recent use and we always use daytime ambushes. We have never exploited the possibility of a night ambush because we feel that the problems of control are just a little too difficult. In setting up ambushes, with a two-platoon force, for instance, we always use only one platoon as the ambush force and the second platoon to set up a rear base approximately 200 or 300 yards from the ambush site. We have usually employed a linear formation for our ambushes with two security elements at either end of our formation, approximately 100 meters or a little more down on each side of the trail to give us warning when enemy personnel approach. We emplace a great many Claymores when we set our ambushes because we have found that they are by far the most effective ambush weapon. We have found that using a system of overlapping Claymore mines very close to the trail pointing not at right angles to the trail but pointing up and down the trail so that we gain a maximum depth of fire with them is the most successful system for killing a lot of people in the ambush zone.

It has been my experience on about six successful ambushes where we have, with a one platoon and also with two platoons, killed approximately 65 enemy personnel and never suffered a casualty ourselves on ambushes. When we set ambushes, we attempt to set them in a fashion with a concussion zone in the middle in the attempt to get a prisoner. This has proved unsuccessful for us for possibly one main reason. the fact that once the ambush is sprung and the firing begins, the Montagnards and everyone else becomes so excited and fires so heavily for one or two minutes that anyone moving in the killing zone is repeatedly shot. We have trained and drummed it into the Montagnards that we want a prisoner. The concussion zone, set up between Claymore explosives, is designed and command detonated with a Claymore detonating device. The explosions knock the NVA in the zone down but inevitably they get up and begin to run.

We have found that it takes about two hours to set up an effective ambush, to get security parties in place, to get the Claymores set up and camouflaged as we want them, and to get people down. One of the important points or the most important point in the ambush is the early warning that the security elements on the two ends of a linear ambush can provide. It is almost impossible to put people in an ambush position and to have them be absolutely quiet for any period over half an hour. By putting security elements 100 or 200 yards out on each end to give an early warning when people approach, it is possible to put people in a relaxed posture near their actual firing position, and once warned, have approximately 20 or 30 seconds to get them down and ready to spring the ambush. On our ambushes, the ambush commander always uses a common athletic type whistle as the signal to spring the ambush.

We have only had one occasion where an ambush was prematurely sprung. On this occasion, a platoon had an ambush set up on a trail which, as it happened, was paralleled by another trail 20 meters further down the slope on a hill. The platoon set the ambush on the uphill trail but the enemy approached on the downhill trail so that they were a little bit too far away. As it happened, we were warned that an enemy platoon of approximately 40 men was approaching down the trail carrying a lot of heavy gear. As they approached, a large baboon or monkey of about 60 or 80 pounds came out of the bushes and jumped on one of the men in our ambush position. The man got up and began to beat this creature with his weapon but the monkey jumped on him again and the man was forced to shoot it. This alerted the NVA; however, they stopped and looked around and waited approximately five minutes and then, as if nothing had happened, proceeded into the killing zone and we successfully ambushed them.

On two occasions, these platoons were given the mission of establishing a road block on Highway 96/110, approximately 15 kilometers deep into the PRAIRIE FIRE area. On each of these road blocks, we utilized the full company or about 120 men. On the first road block, which took place in late March (1969) and lasted for 10 days, we infiltrated and marched to a position on a hill overlooking the highway. The hill was approximately 300 meters from the highway and, of course, very densely vegetated. Once we had dug in and set up a position, we began to attempt to cut down enough vegetation to gain visual observation of the road so that we could effectively cover it with machine gun, M-79 and mortar fire. We found that it took us three days to clear enough of the jungle with machetes and explosives to gain a visual observation on the road and

block it. During the first three days of the operation while we were cutting and establishing our position, we came under mortar and rifle grenade attack each night and suffered about five casualties each night from fragmentary wounds. By the second night, we were able to build good solid overhead cover and some fairly decent bunkers and after that, even though we received approximately 100 82 mortar rounds and hundreds of rifle grenades during the night (almost every night), we suffered only one casualty thereafter. The road block mission was a success partly because we were able to bring observed fire on the vehicles on the road. Had we not been able to do this, I am sure it would have been a failure. After about the fourth day, the enemy began to employ the tactic of launching small attacks on the road side portion of our perimeter in an effort through diversion by noise of firing with mortars, small arms and machine guns to conceal the noise made by trucks moving on the road down below us and to try to sneak them by. The road, of course, had been cratered by jets and high performance aircraft using 750 pound bombs with delayed fuzes. Each night the enemy was able to repair what were large and multiple bomb craters in the road. He was able to repair them within about four hours so that he could get his trucks back across. On about the fifth day of the operation, the team called for an infrared-scope and this was employed quite successfully during the rest of the operation so that we could observe, on at least two instances, groups of from 20 to 30 NVA with baskets and shovels come out of the woodline and attempt to repair the road under cover of darkness. We found, however, that the infrared-scope was rendered ineffective by fog and ground fog of which there was quite a bit during the second half of every night. This operation resulted in the

known destruction of at least four enemy 2-1/2 ton type trucks which were immobilized by machinegun fire from our perimeter as they tried to move by us on the road. I feel that though there were no large enemy units in the immediate area of our company position, there were a number of road maintenance platoons and/or vehicle maintenance driver organizations -- people of that nature. Had this operation encountered, let us say an enemy battalion or larger unit infiltrating at that moment along the road, it might have come out a great deal differently. On this operation, we required a practically constant resupply of ammunition, explosives for blowing our fields of fire and observation and other supplies. This created some problems and it was pointed out at this stage of our operation that we do not in this organization have quite enough air assets, that we need more helicopters and we need more gun ships.

It is my opinion that whereas we now have anywhere from six to eight troop carrying helicopters at any one time that we could perform our mission much better and more consistently if 16 troop carrying helicopters were made available to us on a permanent basis, and if at least four COBRA gun ships were permanently made available to us. Preferably, this should include the idea that the pilots for these aircraft would be here on some sort of a semi-permanent basis for at least two or three or ideally six months at a time so that they could know the people that they are working with and they could become more accustomed to our type of operation.

With regard to the use of tactical fighter aircraft, I'm speaking now of USAF high performance aircraft, both jet and prop A1E SKY RAIDER type, we use these continuously here especially on company size operations. For instance, in the

Tab J to

static road block position I described, we used approximately 1
30 high performance aircraft that delivered ordnance around 2
our position and on the road. In addition to this, we used the 3
Air Force AC-47 minigun ship, commonly known as SPOOKY, on 4
approximately three occasions at night. We found that SPOOKY is 5
a very good weapon for us because he can remain on station for 6
about four hours and give us continuous support. We have, in 7
addition, used Air Force BLIND BAT flare ships and, of course, 8
fighter aircraft all the way from F4s up to B-57 YELLOW BIRDs. 9
I think that a helicopter gun ship is a more effective weapon 10
for very close in-support when a team is actually in contact 11
but that the Air Force jet hard ordnance bombs are more 12
effective when a team is calling fire in on some objective a 13
little bit away from them and they are not actually in contact 14
at the time. 15

Normally when a team (platoon or company) is due for an 16
extraction, they will be told by higher headquarters (our 17
headquarters here in Kontum) that they are to move to an LZ 18
and prepare themselves for an extraction on a certain day. The 19
time, of course, is never mentioned because the aircraft don't 20
know when they will be ready and can perform the extraction. 21
When this is the case, the team will, when possible, move to 22
an existing LZ in order to avoid the problems of cutting or 23
making one. However, a platoon and a company can quite quickly 24
hack out an LZ in the jungle, blow down the trees and have an 25
LZ ready within one or two hours. This had been done many 26
times. When a company or a platoon finds an LZ, the standard 27
procedure is to secure that area by making a reconnaissance or 28
sweep completely around it and out into the jungle maybe 200 or 29
300 yards in each direction from the LZ to make sure there 30
aren't any enemy right around it. Once a company or platoon 31

has secured their LZ, they usually wait not on the LZ but around the LZ in a loose perimeter configuration until they get the word that aircraft are on the way to pick them up. Of course, existing LZs are often improved at the last minute. The practice is to get explosives and charges ready to blow a couple of trees that might be in the way but not to blow them until the ships are in the air and on the way. This gives the enemy less reaction time. Extractions are accomplished with a little prior planning, usually quite quickly.

The commander on the ground has to determine which people he wants to go out first on which ships. He usually groups his people in shiploads by six or seven or however many the ships are going to take. It is important to keep track of how many people have left the area while the extraction is in process. It is our practice that either the commander or his second in command will always be the last person off the ground. That person stays on the radio during an extraction so that he can talk to the pilots, bring the ships in, and keep track of how many people have left. We always try to bring everything out with us and, of course, never to leave anything on the LZ for the enemy.

Once an extraction has been accomplished and the team is completely off the ground, we say that we have a good day again and the assets move the individual back to the launch site at Dak To. Usually, we spend the rest of the day at the launch site while other ball games are being played, and are ferried back to Kontum in the evening. When a company comes back from the field, the extra ammunition, grenades, etc., are collected from the Montagnards and put into storage areas before we go on to a standdown posture. Additionally, the team commander or 10 goes through a spot debriefing with the S2 representative

within three hours of his return so that an advance report can be sent to our headquarters in Saigon. After ones, usually, the following day, the team leader and his other team members go in and provide the S2 with information to write up a complete AAR or a report on the entire operation to include almost everything from weather, terrain, all the way down to exactly what they saw, what happened, and what they saw each day.

Although we don't have a great many problem areas, there are some aspects of the operations that could be mentioned once again in passing to emphasize them. On the problem of relations with the Americans and the Montagnards while they are in the field on tactical operations, I think it should be stressed that the Americans must rely on the Montagnards to some extent for some of the intelligence they can pick up in the field. The Montagnards seem to be able to sense some things that indicate the enemy is in the area when Americans cannot. However, the Americans must still remain firmly in charge of the operation. It sometimes happens that Americans can let themselves be influenced too much by the Montagnards while they are in the field. Most Montagnards notoriously don't like to stay in the field any longer than they have to. I think this is a common human trait. I don't think anyone does really. Often, we experience Montagnards who claim to be sick with malaria, a headache, or some kind of ailment that probably isn't bona fide. When they discover that a resupply helicopter or medivac helicopter is coming in, they suddenly fall ill and want to leave. A careful determination has to be made and some sort of standards have to be adhered to and these people have to be made to stay with the team. The best way to do this we found is to insist that squad leaders work directly, and stay and live and sleep with their squads in the field. We

Tab J to

never allow two Americans, for instance, to be foxhole buddies together one night. We will insist that each American be with a Montagnard at night and this effects easier control. In the same manner, we insist, and it is our practice, that all the squad leaders be with their squads and know their squads during every phase of tactical operations.

In thinking about the training offered to Special Forces personnel and, of course, other Army personnel at Ft Bragg in the various special warfare schools and particularly at the Jungle Operations Course in Panama, there are certain disparities that seem evident to me. For instance, I feel that the committees at Ft Bragg and in Panama spent too much time on unrelated subjects such as climbing rope ladders and rapelling. The only instance in which we use rapelling here is out of helicopters and and not down cliffs. It is possible that we might use rapelling down cliffs but we never have. I also feel that there should be more training in tactical movement and squad maneuvers, in night type security operations, such as listening posts, and in navigation. Land navigation is one of the most critical points we have here and we repeatedly get people who, although they have been to all of the established land navigation courses and, theoretically, have learned to read a map, really can't go through any kind of terrain association to get a good idea as to what is around and as to exactly where they are.

MORI DocID: 570371

OPERATIONS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

DETACHMENT CENTER

BY

LT. COLONEL RALPH C. THOMAS, USA*

The organization of C&C South was similar to each of the other C&C detachments. C&C South consisted of a headquarters, a security company, two exploitation companies, a reconnaissance company, and two mobile launch sites.

The security company was commanded by a US captain, and had a cadre of US personnel. Its primary mission was to secure the base camp, provide local security in forms of patrols, outposts and ambushes.

The two exploitation companies were identical, commanded and cadred by US personnel. These exploitation companies were used in local operations to provide security for each of the mobile launch sites and to provide BRIGHT LIGHT teams. These teams normally consisted of 12 personnel and were used in the case of downed helicopters or of other missions that required a small element. With each exploitation company, we normally assigned one VN military. This individual, an officer, a warrant officer, and in some cases an NCO, acted as an advisor-liaison type. He had no authority and merely assisted the US commander.

The reconnaissance company, commanded by a US captain, was authorized 91 enlisted men and had 30 tesms consisting of one E7, two E6s and nine indigenous personnel. The reconnaissance teams, though authorized 12 personnel, normally were employed only as a six-man team, usually consisting of two US personnel and four indigenous personnel.

* This entire documentary is constructed from a taped interview of LTC Ralph C. Thomas, USA. Except for minor editing the documentary is a verbatim account of LTC Thomas' extemporaneous discussion of CCSs operations.

The remaining elements of C&C South were the two mobile launch sites. These consisted of a launch commander, an executive officer and an enlisted staff. These were in no sense mobile in the case of C&C South. These mobile launch sites were given general areas of responsibility: one worked the northern half of our operational area, one the southern half. I'll start with the northern half. Available assets to this launch site were the eight helicopters, four slick and four gun from the 20th SOS squadron, and the 202 black aircraft and 201 Army aircraft that were used as radio relay. The northern launch site normally launched from either Ban Me Thuot or Duc Co. When launching from the Duc Co Special Forces Camp, they also ran strip alert from that position. When launching from the Ban Me Thuot area, we normally ran the strip alert from the Duc Lap Special Forces Camp; Ban Dang was used on occasion.

To go through the normal launch and recovery of a team, I'll start with the arrival of the team at the launch site itself. On arrival of a team at the launch site, the one zero, who is the team leader, normally is taken on the VR the day prior to anticipated launch. In the northern area, the 02 aircraft was used as a command and control ship. Either the launch officer or an air controller would take the one zero on his VR. This same pilot and same air controller were normally used to make both the insert and exfiltration if possible. On the day of insert, a pre-mission briefing was conducted; participating in this briefing were the launch officer, the team leader, and the air mission commander. A complete briefing was given so that all personnel participating were thoroughly familiar with other members and the SOPs and procedures to be followed. After a check of the target area by the air controller aboard the 02, slicks and guns were

launched. These normally moved into the target area at approximately 5,000 feet. At a point selected by the air controller, the gun and the insert ships would descend to low level, making a low level approach vectored by the forward air controller. The second slick acted as a recovery ship and remained at altitude. After descending to low level, the insert ship, being covered by the guns, was vectored to the selected landing zone. If no ground fire was drawn, no personnel sighted, the insert was made. After insert all aircraft moved to an orbit point normally eight to ten kilometers from the target area. They would remain on station at this location until a team okay was given. This was normally 15 to 20 minutes after insert at a time when the team leader considered himself secure, not compromised, and ready to continue with his mission. He normally remained in a position approximately 100 to 500 meters from his landing zone until this report was given. After a team okay, all aircraft except the radio relay, returned to a strip alert position. The radio relay aircraft would remain airborne at all times during daylight hours. This is a routine insert.

Routine exfiltration is conducted when a team has accomplished his mission be it five, seven or ten days. The exfiltration was scheduled for a time and a location either the morning of and on some occasions the day prior to exfiltration. Normally the team leader would select the LZ that he desired to be extracted from. If the terrain was too difficult or if he had not located an LZ, the air controller would locate one and move the team to this LZ. For an extraction, normally the gun ships would make passes over the LZ once the team had been located and identified by use of radio, smoke or panels. Gun ships would normally make passes

over the area and if no ground fire was drawn, the slick would make the pickup after which all would return to the strip alert location. In the case of a hot exfiltration, when notification was received that a team was in contact and an exfiltration was possible, the airborne controller would immediately move to that area. If it was evident that an exfiltration was necessary, the team was guided and directed to a pickup LZ if possible. Guns were normally launched for notification of contact. The slicks remained on strip alert until called for.

When the team made contact, guns were launched as soon as possible and moved directly to the team. These were controlled by a forward air controller with instructions given him by the air controller (this is the US Army air controller). When it was evident that the team could be moved to a sit-down LZ and that it was in the close proximity of the LZ, the gun ships would suppress the area while the slicks were en route for pickup. Again, one slick would approach low level with the recovery ship remaining at altitude. While the pickup ship went into the LZ, gun ships would provide 360° coverage until exfiltration was complete, after which all aircraft would return to the strip alert position.

The southern launch site was organized in the same manner as the northern launch site; however, assets supporting it were a little different and methods of operation were a little different. The southern launch site was all helicopter company supported with five slicks and four guns. The reason for the fifth slick in the southern site was that a slick was used as the C&C ship there whereas an O2 was used in the northern site. FAC coverage was provided by O1 aircraft in the south as opposed to O2 in the north, and two O1Es provided air relay coverage. During the period that I was associated with CCS,

the southern launch site utilized three different bases: Song Bay, Dau Tieng and Quan Loi, with strip alert positions at Bu Prang, Bu Dop and Loc Ninh. The southern launch site essentially had the same equipment as the northern launch site with the exception of communications. The northern launch site did not need RTT because of relative ease of communication, physical and otherwise, between launch site and CCS headquarters. Due to the distance involved, RTT was maintained at the southern launch site. The preparation of launch and recovery of the teams from a southern launch site was essentially the same as in the north. There was some delay in returning a team from the southern launch site as opposed to the northern launch site; therefore, debrief of the team and the after-action report were normally sent by RTT from that location.

I'll cover the debrief and submission of an after action report at this time. At each launch site we had a debriefing NCO. As soon as a team was extracted and returned to the launch site the team leader (one zero) and the assistant team leader (one one) normally went directly to the debriefing NCO. All essentials were taken and a brief report was submitted immediately, after which a thorough debrief for purposes of the after action report was taken. If the team was to return that day or the following day from the southern launch site, this was normally hand-carried back to CCS. If not, it was written out complete and submitted by RTT. These after action reports were then reviewed and prepared for submission to OP 35 at CCS.

I'll cover the communications from the team on through CCS. Each team entering a target area carried a PRC 25 and URC 10 for emergency communication. Airborne during daylight hours was either a FAC aircraft or an Army air relay aircraft.

Daily situation reports from the teams were submitted in the morning usually around 0600 hours and at approximately 1200 hours, in addition, the RON position was given at about 1730 hours daily. These reports would be relayed through the air relay to the mobile launch site. From the launch site, these SITREPS were sent by single-side band to CCS. OP 35 monitored these SITREPS and spot reports; therefore, retransmission from CCS to OP 35 was not necessary.

To return to the subject of debriefing, at each launch site there was a debriefing NCO. During the period I was there these NCOs were on TDY from the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa. The initial debriefing was conducted by these personnel. Subsequently, the team members reported to the S-2 of CCS. Further debrief was conducted by S-2 personnel if deemed necessary. The S-2 section was organized to cover both northern and southern areas, with an officer and NCO to cover each area. The assistant S-2 officer, after receiving the debrief, would then write the after action report and prepare it for submission to OP 35.

With regard to the targets to be run by CCS, monthly we received a target list from OP 35. During the course of the month we would accumulate additional information on the targets and determine the specific day that each target should be run. Target selection designation and selection was handled at OP 35. CCS did not select or change targets. Based on local information and, on occasion, when the CCS commander took exception to a target for justifiable reason, requests were made to change dates and, in some cases, to delete targets. These requests then would go to OP 35 for action.

Regarding the exfiltration, it was Colonel Trabue's (the CCS commander) policy that the airborne controller would make

Tab K to

the decision to extract the team. However, it was understood that if a team leader requested extraction and that, after being queried as to the exact situation he continued to request extraction, it was made. Colonel Trabue's feelings were that the team leader on the ground was the most familiar with the situation and that extraction should be his choice. If he was extracted when, in fact, an extract was not necessary, it would be discussed later.

Depending on the mission of the team, it would normally carry sufficient rations and ammunition for the full period it was to be committed. Water was obtained from local sources within the target area. Resupply, as such, was not planned or conducted unless absolutely necessary. The only resupply that I can recall during the period I was there was in the case of water. On several occasions it was necessary to resupply water. Several methods were used. Our most successful was using artillery canisters; we placed canteens in the canister. Resupply was very limited and discouraged. In all cases we tried to anticipate the requirements and to have the team carry enough so that resupply was not necessary. Resupply subjected the team to compromise and had to be held to an absolute minimum.

In the area of equipment, I would say the one piece of equipment that would assist the team the most, both from a standpoint of weight and of possible compromise to the team, would be a smaller, lighter radio with a secure voice capability. We did not use the present secure voice system because it was too heavy and too bulky. A small, compact secure voice radio would be of considerable assistance. A second area, and this is one that work is being done on, is the development of a boot with other than normal tread on the jungle boot. The indigenous personnel on the team have worn footgear with other

Tab K to

than this tread; however, the US personnel wear it and leave trails which are very obvious

I would say the weakest area as far as I personally am concerned in CCS is the qualifications of the personnel being assigned to recon company. Authorized in recon company are 30 E-7s and 60 E-6s. During the period I was there, we had very few E-7s. Perhaps 1 to 5, and possibly 6 E-6s. The remainder were E-3s, mostly E-4s, and a few E-5s.

The entire cross-border program is built around three recon companies. Therefore, I feel that they should have the best qualified personnel available. Although the young PFCs, SP-4s, and E-5s did an outstanding job considering their service and grade, qualified, experienced older NCOs could have done the job much better, I'm firmly convinced.

During the period I was at CCS, normally we averaged about 24 operational teams in recon company, which was authorized 30 teams. The team consisted of an E-7 team leader, an E-6 assistant, an E-6 radio operator, and nine SCU personnel. Although we considered about 24 teams fully operational, this is really not a true reflection of the personnel status. A team was operational as far as we were concerned if it had two US personnel, regardless of their grade, and at least four SCU personnel. I do not recall any of the teams led by PFCs; however, a number of them were led by SP-4s. Some of these men, though young and inexperienced, did a fine job. Many of them had only slightly over a year's service; their background training was their basic training, airborne training, and schooling at Fort Bragg.

The selection of a team leader was based upon his performance in the field. After running several missions, if it was evident by his performance in the field that he was

capable of leading a team, one was given to him as soon as possible. Training of the team leaders as well as the entire team was conducted at CCS under the supervision of the reconnaissance company commander. As many as possible were sent to the RT leader school at Long Thanh as soon as possible after their arrival. Thereafter, individual and team training was conducted at CCS in the local training area. This consisted of training recognized as necessary by the recon company commander and then later team training itself. The team leader conducted the latter training to correct those deficiencies or to up-grade those areas of training that were found deficient, either through association with the team or on actual operations.

As to the replacement personnel for recon company, they were assigned as individual replacements although we were authorized the 11F and 05 COMMO MOS. In actuality, we received and were glad to get virtually any MOS. These replacements were all volunteers; the policy was that personnel going into the CC program would be volunteers. When these personnel arrived at CCS, it was up to them to volunteer for the recon company. At this time they were assigned to teams if a recon class at Long Thanh was not available or not scheduled to start in the near future. Any and all training was for the individual as a team leader and was conducted either in the recon company or at the recon leaders course in Long Thanh. We did not receive RT leaders as such from the replacement pipeline. If the replacement was an E-7 when he arrived, he was assigned to recon. He would be later reassigned as a team leader once he had been on the ground and his performance has been satisfactory.