TOP SECRET

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-307-67

1 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memorandum for the President on Future Actions in Vietnam (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-218-67, dated 20 April 1967, subject: "Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)"; JCSM-286-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Operations Against North Vietnam (U)"; and JCSM-288-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."

b. Draft memorandum for the President (DPM), dated 19 May 1967, subject: "Future Actions in Vietnam," which was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the DPM. The DPM addresses two basic courses of action: Course A - adds a minimum of 200,000 men to the Southeast Asia commitment and includes major ground operations and intensified air and naval actions outside South Vietnam, especially against North Vietnam; Course B - limits force increases to no more than 30,000 men, avoids extending the ground conflict beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and concentrates the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°. The DPM generally implies that Course A reflects the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Course A is an extrapolation of a number of proposals which were recommended separately but not in combination or as interpreted in the DPM. The combination force levels, deployments, and military actions of Course A do not accurately reflect the positions or recommendations of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provide a better basis against which to compare other alternatives, are set forth in JCSM-218-67, JCSM-286-67, and JCSM-288-67. Five major areas of concern have been identified in the DPM. They are discussed under the following headings:

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a. Objectives (Part I, Appendix A).

b. Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North) (Part II, Appendix A).

c. Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North (Part III, Appendix A).

d. Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part IV, Appendix A).

e. International Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part V, Appendix A).

3. ([redacted]) Objectives. The preferred course of action addressed in the DPM (Course B) is not consistent with NSAM 288 or with the explicit public statements of US policy and objectives enumerated in Part I, Appendix A, and in Appendix B. The DPM would, in effect, limit US objectives to merely guaranteeing the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future on the one hand and offsetting the effect of North Vietnam's application of force in South Vietnam on the other. The United States would remain committed to these two objectives only so long as the South Vietnamese continue to help themselves. It is also noted that the DPM contains no statement of military objectives to be achieved and that current US national, military, and political objectives are far more comprehensive and far-reaching (Appendix B). Thus:

a. The DPM fails to appreciate the full implications for the Free World of failure to achieve a successful resolution of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

b. Modification of present US objectives, as called for in the DPM, would undermine and no longer provide a complete rationale for our presence in South Vietnam or much of our effort over the past two years.

c. The positions of the more than 35 nations supporting the Government of Vietnam might be rendered untenable by such drastic changes in US policy.

4. ([redacted]) Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North). The DPM favors Course B with inadequate analysis of its implications for conduct of the war in Vietnam. The strategy embodied in this alternative - largely designed to "make do" with military resources currently

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approved for Southeast Asia - would not permit early termination of hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States, supporting Free World nations, and the Government of Vietnam. The force structure envisaged provides little capability for initiative action and insufficient resources to maintain momentum required for expeditious prosecution of the war. Further, this approach would result in a significant downgrading of the Revolutionary Development Program considered so essential to the realization of our goals in Vietnam. It would also result in the abandonment of the important delta region on the basis of its being primarily a problem for the Republic of Vietnam to solve without additional external assistance. (See Part II, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

5. (TS) Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North. The DPM stresses a policy which would concentrate air operations in the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°. The concept of a "funnel" is misleading, since in fact the communists are supplying their forces in South Vietnam from all sides, through the demilitarized zone, Laos, the coast, Cambodia, and the rivers in the Delta. According to the DPM, limiting the bombing to south of 20° might result in increased negotiation opportunities with Hanoi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such a new self-imposed restraint resulting from this major change in strategy would most likely have the opposite effect. The relative immunity granted to the LOCs and distribution system outside the Panhandle would permit: (a) a rapid recovery from the damage sustained to date; (b) an increase in movement capability; (c) a reduced requirement for total supplies in the pipeline; (d) a concentration of air defenses into the Panhandle; and (e) a release of personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. Also, it would relieve the Hanoi leadership from experiencing at first hand the pressures of recent air operations which foreign observers have reported. Any possible political advantages gained by confining our interdiction campaign to the Panhandle would be offset decisively by allowing North Vietnam to continue an unobstructed importation of war materiel. Further, it is believed that such a drastic reduction in the scale of air operations against North Vietnam could only result in the strengthening of the enemy's resolve to continue the war. No doubt the reduction in scope of air operations would also be considered by many as a weakening of US determination and a North Vietnamese victory in the air war over northern North Vietnam. The combination of reduced military pressures against North Vietnam with stringent limitations of our operations in South Vietnam, as suggested in Course B, appears even more questionable conceptually. It would most likely strengthen the enemy's ultimate hope of victory and lead to a redoubling of his efforts. (See Part III, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

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6. (S) Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions. The DPM presents an assessment of US public attitude and assumed reactions to several occurrences. Its orientation is toward the risks involved in Course A. The difficulty of making accurate judgments in the area of public response is acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concede that their appraisal is subject to the same degree of uncertainty that is inherent in the DPM. Nevertheless, they are unable to find due cause for the degree of pessimism expressed in the DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that the American people, when well informed about the issues at stake, expect their Government to uphold its commitments. History illustrates that they will, in turn, support their Government in its necessary actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is no significant sentiment for peace at any price. They believe also that despite some predictable debate a Reserve callup would be willingly accepted, and there would be no "irresistible" drive from any quarter for unnecessary escalation of the conflict. (See Part IV, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

7. (S) International Attitude and Predicted Reaction. There are several inconsistencies between the DPM and the published intelligence estimates. For example, from these intelligence estimates, there is no evidence that Hanoi is prepared to shun negotiation, regardless of the pressure brought to bear, until after the US elections. Also, it is estimated that US prestige will not decline appreciably if prompt military action is taken to bring the conflict to an early close. In the long term, US prestige would probably rise. The effect of signs of US irresolution on allies in Southeast Asia and other friendly countries threatened by communist insurgency could be most damaging to the credibility of US commitments. The DPM contains the view that there is strong likelihood of a confrontation between the United States and the CHICOMs or the USSR, as a result of intensification of air and naval operations against North Vietnam and/or a major increase in US forces in South Vietnam. Intelligence estimates do not support this contention. (See Part V, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

8. (S) Impact on US and Free World Armed Forces. Curtailment of air operations in North Vietnam (as proposed in Course B) will undoubtedly have an adverse effect upon US and Free World Armed Forces in the field.

9. (TS) Most of the foregoing divergencies between the DPM and the stated policies, objectives, and concepts are individually important and are reason for concern. However, when viewed collectively, an alarming pattern emerges which suggests a

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major realignment of US objectives and intentions in Southeast Asia without regard for the long-term consequences. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not aware of any decision to retract the policies and objectives which have been affirmed by responsible officials many times in recent years (Appendix B). Thus, the DPM lacks adequate foundation for further consideration.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The DPM does not support current US national policy and objectives in Vietnam and should not be considered further.

b. There is no basis for change in their views on the major issues in the DPM. These views are adequately stated in recent memorandums and reinforced herein.

c. The US national policy and objectives should be reaffirmed.

d. The US military objectives for Vietnam as restated in JCSM-218-67 support current US policy and objectives.

e. Implementation of Course B would serve to prolong the conflict, reinforce Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory, and probably add greatly to the ultimate cost in US lives and treasure.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The DPM NOT be forwarded to the President.

b. The US national objective as expressed in NSAM 288 be maintained, and the national policy and objectives for Vietnam as publicly stated by US officials be reaffirmed.

c. The military objective, concept, and strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam as stated in JCSM-218-67 be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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APPENDICES A AND B

TO JCSM-307-67

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APPENDIX A

DPM ISSUES

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM: (1) Proposed US objective is to permit South Vietnamese to choose own future; commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.
(2) No stated military objectives.
(3) No stated political objectives aside from the National objectives.

b. JCS: (1) Support US objective as stated in NSAM 288 - to guarantee independent noncommunist South Vietnam.
(2) Military objectives - make difficult NVN support of VC and cause NVN to cease direction of VC; defeat VC/NVA; extend GVN control over SVN; deter or be prepared to defeat CHICOM intervention.

NOTE: Bibliography on page A-8

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 US National objectives - commitments	Our minimum objective - commitment - in Vietnam is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future. This commitment ceases if the country ceases to help itself. Our commitment is NOT to: - expel South Vietnam regroupees from South Vietnam. - ensure that a particular person or group remains in power, nor that that power runs to every corner of the land. - guarantee that the self-chosen government is noncommunist. - insist that the independent South Vietnam remain separate from North Vietnam.	NSAM 288, 17 March 1964, states the US objective in South Vietnam as follows: "We seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam." The US National objective is to ensure an independent South Vietnam free of Communist subversion and able to determine its own government and national aspirations; ...	JCSM 652-65 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 792-66
2 Military objectives in Southeast Asia	Both courses of action are developed without benefit of any statement of military objectives. The implication is that the objective for Course A with the associated force augmentation is: - to bring additional military pressure to bear on the enemy in the South while continuing to carry out our present missions not directly related to combating enemy main force units. The implication is that the objectives for the associated bombing strategy are: - to retaliate and to lift the morale of the people in the South. - to add to the pressure on Hanoi to end the war. - to reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of infiltrating men and materiel from north to south. The implied military objectives for Course B are to improve the negotiating environment and to stop infiltration.	Military objectives are: - to make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause NVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency. - to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces. - to extend Government of South Vietnam dominion, direction, and control over South Vietnam. - to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs.	JCSM 218-67
3 Political Objectives for Southeast Asia	The political objectives stated are those subsumed within the statements above regarding national objectives plus the following inferred political objectives: - initiate a "cool" drive to settle war. - lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing. - seek possible compromise involving role in SVN for members of VC.	See Appendix B	

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II. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (Other than air/naval operations in the North)

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM: The preferred strategy is essentially that of a continuation of combat operations at the current level with forces currently approved. US combat troops will be removed from the Delta. Increase utilization of RVN and third-country forces in logistical support role in order to release additional US forces for combat role. US efforts will be shifted from the pacification/RD role with the ARVN assuming a greater responsibility in this area. Emphasis will be placed on seeking accommodation through reduction of pressures exerted in the North and possible future political role for the VC in the South.

b. JCS: The strategy recommended by the JCS envisions a significant and prompt increase in military pressure with which the enemy cannot cope; maintaining momentum and initiative which will result in the destruction of the enemy main and provincial forces and their bases; providing an adequate security environment in which RD can progress. Provide, through a selected callup of reserves, forces adequate to conclude the war in Vietnam and to provide a more flexible and responsive worldwide military posture.

2. Specific issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Strategic Concept	DPM preferred strategic concept: a. Continue ground operations with forces currently approved. b. Make more efficient use of US manpower by: (1) Army eschewing the Delta; (2) Marines ceasing pacification; (3) ARVN performance being "jacked up"; and (4) getting more support from Koreans or other third countries. c. Primary responsibility for pacification and RD rests with Vietnamese. d. Initiate a "cool" drive to settle war. e. Lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing. f. Seek possible compromise involving role in GVN for members of VC.	The JCS recommended strategic concept: a. Apply degree of pressure which is beyond enemy's capability to accommodate. b. Intensify operations so as to create a secure environment in which PD can progress, coupled with military civic action programs in coordination with GVN programs. c. Provide adequate forces to counter increased enemy pressure in vicinity of DMZ and to maintain the initiative throughout Vietnam by: (1) Destruction of the enemy main force. (2) Locate and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces.	JCSM 218-67
2 Reserve Callup	The DPM preferred concept of operations, course B, does not include the calling up of the Reserves.	The JCS have recommended a selective callup of Reserves in order to more effectively fulfill US worldwide commitments while conducting the war in Vietnam so as to terminate it at an early date on terms favorable to US interests.	JCSM 288-67
3 Strategic Flexibility	The DPM does not consider the requirement for strategic flexibility and therefore provides no option for further military pressure or influence in the event the conflict either continues at the present pace for a protracted period or takes a turn for the worse. Further, military operations in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam are specifically excluded. ..."if COURSE B is chosen, it must be made clear to political and military leaders alike that the troop limit is firm and, short of an imminent military defeat, will not be breached -- the objective will be to make progress, even though it be slow..."	The concept recommended by the JCS not only provides the resources for a prompt application of military pressure within South Vietnam but also provides forces to improve the US military capability to assume the strategic initiative elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the recommended posture would permit the reinforcement of Thailand in the event that nation was threatened or for operations elsewhere on the periphery of South Vietnam. More importantly, this posture provides the US with the essential capability of strategic flexibility.	JCSM 288-67
4 Progress of RD Efforts	"The National Liberation Front (NLF) continues to control large parts of South Vietnam, and there is little evidence that the revolutionary development program is gaining any momentum."	The fate of the RD program hinges on the degree of security which is offered to the population and expanding government apparatus. Without assurance of a secure environment the people will remain apathetic or even hostile to the entire effort, and no real progress can be achieved. Progress has been about as good as can be expected from a government which at the start was weak administratively, lacked popular support and has been deeply involved in a war throughout its existence and suffers from competing programs sponsored by various US/GVN agencies. Great expectations for more rapid progress are not realistic under these conditions. ARVN has been slow in assuming its role in direct support of the RD program. There are now indications of increasing acceptance of and willingness to perform this mission, and 53 battalions are now in place. ARVN requires a continuous screen of US/FW forces operations supplementing their own against main force and provincial force units in order to keep them from the RD areas. In this respect, the US/FW forces have been and are now conducting between 40 and 50 percent of their operations against these forces in areas adjacent to the RD effort. The need for this is graphically illustrated by the current enemy campaign directed against the RD effort throughout the country. The enemy in March alone directed 126 attacks against RD workers and teams which resulted in 231 workers being killed, wounded or missing. The RD program will continue to suffer until this situation is improved. The combination of enemy strength and capability with the expanding areas of the RD effort require increased US/FW forces in order to adequately secure the RD effort.	JCSM 288-67

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SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
5 Effectiveness of RVNAF Forces	"The Army [illegible] (ARV) is tired, passive and accommodation [illegible] too slowly if at all into pacification work." An additional reference to the ARVN included the appraisal "whose uninspired performance is exasperating."	While there is no single meaningful measure of the over-all effectiveness of the RVNAF, there are certain useful indicators which reflect a trend toward improved capability. A recent OSD (SA) comparative analysis covering a six-month period indicated that, when weighed by relative unit strengths, the ARVN was only about 25 percent less effective than US units in terms of enemy KIA/battalion day, weapons captured/battalion day and comparative enemy and friendly KIA figures. While reform measures will continue to improve effectiveness, the real benefit will be realized gradually, and will be essential both to successful conduct of the war and to a lasting peace in postwar Vietnam.	CM 2377-67
6 Significance of "cross-over point"	"... if we are now past the cross-over point" cannot the military job be done without the added forces. ... if the enemy can conduct his terror "from the bushes, can the military job be done even with them?"	There has been some speculation that the "cross-over point" has occurred. Figures on enemy losses, recruitment capability, infiltration rate, and infiltration capability are tenuous and are based on so many variables that a firm point cannot be established. The utility of an indicator as nebulous as "cross-over point" in the analysis of progress in warfare is highly questionable in the near term. While the trend in enemy losses versus input is important, relatively little significance can be attached to an apparent cross-over point and force requirements must continue to be determined by the tasks to be accomplished and the enemy residual capability.	
7 Distinction between "big" and "other" wars in Vietnam	"The 'big war' in the South between the US and the North Vietnamese military units is going well." and "Regrettably, the 'other war' against the VC is still not going well."	Exception is taken with the implied distinction that two wars are being pursued in Vietnam. This implied distinction is particularly germane in any discussion of effective utilization of forces. The interrelationship of the military, social, economic, psychological and political efforts is such that they can only be considered as integral and essential parts of the same war, whether they are pressed inside or outside of South Vietnam. This is especially true in the field of Revolutionary Development and nation-building which require military actions to provide the requisite security for a successful program.	
8 Utilization of Forces	In addressing a possibly more efficient utilization of forces, the DPM suggests that "one of the additional divisions could be eliminated if the Army eschewed the Delta, and certain of the other ground force requirements could be eliminated if the US Marines ceased grassroots pacification activities." In addressing the proposed employment of additional forces, the DPM footnotes: "The question arises whether US combat troops should be devoted to pacification or to the Delta. Are these not matters for the Vietnamese?"	This statement is again indicative of an effort to separate the war into "big war" and "other war" categories. Although some US Army and Marine combat units are directly participating in providing RD security at the village level, the preponderance of the American pacification effort is of an advisory, training and assistance character at the sector and subsector level. The increased requirement for US forces is based on recognition that a successful conclusion of the war requires the application of concurrent, sustained and unremitting military pressure on all three echelons of enemy forces: VC/NVA main forces; provincial and district forces; and local guerrilla forces.	

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III. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR AIR/NAVAL WAR IN THE NORTH

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM

(1) Further bombing in the North will be ineffective.
(2) A better plan would be to concentrate the bombing effort on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°.

b. JCS

(1) The US should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign designed to achieve well defined objectives.
(2) Concentration of bombing on the "funnel" would not be militarily advantageous.
(3) DPM represents a major change in US policy, reversing the trend of gradually increasing pressures in the North.
(4) The air/naval campaign can be controlled independently of other elements of the war, to permit most effective application of this power in order to achieve objectives.

2. Specific Issues:

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Relationship of Air/Naval War in the North to the Postulated Courses of Action.	Course A - Further expansion of the bombing program in the North, accompanied by buildup of forces and increased military activity on the ground, especially outside of South Vietnam. Course B - Limit force increases; confine ground conflict to within the borders of South Vietnam; and concentrate the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°.	The air/naval campaign against North Vietnam can be controlled independently of the other elements of the war. However, since all elements of the war are interdependent and complementary in their contribution toward attainment of the national objective, any reduction in the recommended force levels for South Vietnam would place an increasing premium on the pressures against North Vietnam. The direct linking of a reduced force level in South Vietnam with reduced air/naval actions outside South Vietnam, as discussed in Course B, appears doubly invalid as a concept.	CM 2377-67
2 Value of continued bombing in North Vietnam.	No major military targets remain to be struck in the North, excluding the port areas. . . . It now appears that no combination of actions against the North short of destruction of the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the flow of men and materiel below the relatively small amount needed by enemy forces to continue the war in the South. Our effort can and does have severe disruptive effects, which Hanoi can and does compensate for. . . . There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist.	The United States should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air campaign which will: (1) bring military pressure on his internal war-supporting resources; (2) effectively impede the importation of external resources; and (3) increase interdiction of infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Such an air campaign (1) should produce results which outweigh risks - political and military; (2) provides greater effectiveness, less cost in the long run, and clearer signal of US determination to Hanoi and the rest of the world; (3) should not cause CHICOM intervention; and (4) will cause snowballing pressures on North Vietnam's economy and military efforts. The most significant action yet to be accomplished that would have the greatest impact on the NVN ability to continue the war is to obstruct and reduce importation of war-supporting materials.	JCSM 288-67 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 286-67 CM 2377-67
3 Hanoi insensitivity to increased bombing pressures.	With respect to added pressure on the North, it is becoming apparent that Hanoi may already have "written off" all assets and lives that might be destroyed by US military actions short of occupation or annihilation. They can and will hold out so long as a prospect of winning the "war of attrition" in the South exists.	Granted that Hanoi has taken many measures to overcome the effects of the air campaign, nevertheless, an intensified campaign should make it difficult for Hanoi to continue the war. Their propaganda against the air campaign supports this judgment. The outcome of the war, whether by political settlement or otherwise, will depend upon the cumulative effects of all US actions in Southeast Asia and the North Vietnamese willingness to continue. It is highly questionable that North Vietnam is willing to "write off" all assets and lives that might be lost when they could be saved by a move toward negotiations. There is, however, no indication that the North Vietnamese regime would make any reciprocal military deescalation in return for a bombing reduction.	NIE 11-11-67; DIA/CIA DOC #8-2138/AP-4 NSAM 328
4 Military Value to COMUSMACV of Shift in Bombing Effort	The lowest "ceiling" on infiltration can probably be achieved by concentration on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20° and on the Trail in Laos . . . . This shift, despite possible increases in anti-aircraft capability in the area, should reduce the pilot and aircraft loss rates by more than 50 percent. The shift will, if anything, be of positive military value to General Westmoreland while taking some steam out of the popular effort in the North. This shift of bombing strategy can, to military advantage, be made at any time, but the shift should be time to maximize the chances of getting Hanoi to negotiate.	In recent months the majority of our bombing effort in North Vietnam has been directed at Route Packages I, II, and III. For example in March, about 7,000 sorties were flown in these areas as compared to about 1,500 sorties in the remainder of North Vietnam. A shift in bombing effort to southern North Vietnam would provide some increase in available sorties against the North Vietnamese forces infiltrating into South Vietnam. However, a complete shift of effort would permit North Vietnam to concentrate its air defense system in the areas being struck, thus increasing our losses in those areas. Buildup in the northern part of North Vietnam and stockpiles there would be immune from attack, thereby making his problem much easier and releasing personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. The additional sorties in southern part of North Vietnam might destroy more infiltrating targets, but there would be more of them reaching this area to be attacked. The net result would not be of positive military value to COMUSMACV. The shift in effort will reduce air losses, at least initially, until the relocation of enemy air defense systems into south North Vietnam.	CM 2377-67 DIA/CIA DOC #8-2034/AP-4 SNIE 10-1-66

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BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
5 Mining Operations in North Vietnam	The program they /CINCPAC & COMUSMACV/ propose. . . would involve the virtual certainty of irresistible pressures. . . for the blockage of rail, road, and sea imports. . . for mining of the harbors ageinst Soviet and other ships. Why not escalate the bombing and mine the harbors. . . on the gamble that it would constrict the flow, meaningfully limiting enemy action in the South, and that it would bend Hanoi? The answer is that the costs and risks of the actions must be considered. /These are cost in US lives; cost in domestic and world opinion; and most importantly, the likely Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese reaction./	The effectiveness of LOC interdiction cannot be greatly improved until deep-water ports are closed or neutralized. It will then be worthwile to intensify the interdiction effort against other LOC's in North Vietnam. Mining of NVN deep water ports will disrupt the major avenue of basic economic and military support and force the enemy to overload more vulnerable routes by rail, road, and shallow draft coastal and internal waterway shipping. Mining of internal waterways will create choke points, backup traffic and saturate alternate routes. (See also Section V, Paragraph 4, this column.)	CM 2377-67 JCSM 288-67

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IV. DOMESTIC ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM: (1) Escaletion makes war more unpopular and people want out of it one way or another.
(2) Reserve callup will be a divisive issue.
(3) Force buildup will create pressure for war expansion.

b. JCS: (1) The majority of the people, although frustrated with an apparently endless war, still want their country to honor its commitments.
(2) In the long-term, Reserve callup is more likely to be a consolidating force than a divisive one.
(3) The American people have learned to accommodate to selective application of military power.

2. Specific issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Dissatisfaction with progress of the war	The Vietnam war is unpopular, and becoming increasingly more so as it escalates. Most Americans do not understand the war. All of them want the war ended and expect their President to end it successfully. Or else.	The vocal but minor segment of the American people who oppose US policy in Vietnam, both those in public and private life, do not speak for the entire population. It is more probable that the vast majority of the population want to see their country fulfill its internstional obligations. An American characteristic is to face up to a job and get it over with as soon as possible. Accordingly, since no end can be seen to involvement in Southeast Asia, there is naturally a certain amount of frustration. However, the sense of frustration is not severe enough to support a "peace at any price" attitude.	CM 2377-67
2 Political difficulty of Reserve callup	Although increased force requirements will not lead to massive civil disobedience, a request for Congressional authority to call Reserves will lead to a divisive debate.	Callup of Reserves, a major increase in deployed forces, recommissioning of heavy gun ships, and an increase in air/naval pressures against North Vietnam would unquestionably evoke an immediate outburst from the vocal minority that already opposes US policy. However, in the long term, these actions should have a positive effect on the majority. National pride, spirit of unity, and patriotism should be aroused when the Government further demonstrates its resolve and determination to bring the war to an acceptable termination in the shortest feasible time.	CM 2377-67
3 Pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam	The "hawk" faction will almost certainly impose irresistible pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam.	President Johnson and other responsible officials have stated repeatedly that we want to avoid a wider war, and both the general public and Congress are well-conditioned to the policy of selective application of military power. Therefore, Reserve callup and/or controlled intensification of on-going actions (e.g., air/naval operations against North Vietnam) would not be expected to cause pressure for irresponsible escalation or for spreading the war beyond its current bounds. On the contrary, force buildup and graduated intensification of effort should quell the opinion held in some quarters that the United States is embarked on a "no-win" strategy. As a result, this should tend to discourage demands for higher levels of action than are militarily appropriate, or for withdrawal of US forces under less than honorable conditions.	CM 2377-67

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V. INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM: (1) Hanoi will not negotiate until after US elections.
(2) Intensified bombing will damage US image.
(3) Increased forces and actions will bring US closer to war with China and/or Russia.
(4) Mining Haiphong might cause severe reaction on part of China and/or Russia.
(5) The USSR is the most probable "peace midwife."
(6) A post hostilities role for the VC should be explored.

b. JCS: (1) Appropriate application of power might well bring about negotiations at any time.
(2) Intensified bombing will not qualitatively change US international image and position.
(3) Neither the Soviets nor China are likely to seek a major confrontation with the US over actions the JCS have recommended in SEA.
(-) Same as (3).
(5) The USSR might become a "peace midwife" but US should not place primary reliance on this scheme.
(6) The Vietcong, as such, should not be accommodated within the GVN, but only integrated into national life as rehabilitated SVN citizens.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Incentive for Hanoi to negotiate	Hanoi probably has decided not to negotiate until after the November 1968 US elections. Neither continuation of our current moderate policy nor increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to change their mind.	There is no factual basis for estimating a timetable nor of identifying the critical inducement concerning a North Vietnamese decision to negotiate. It is generally accepted in the intelligence community, however, that a combination of pressure - lack of successes in SVN, increasing loss of assets and imposition of burdens in NVN, and constant reminders of US power and determination - ultimately will force Hanoi to accept negotiation. Air/naval operations against NVN constitute important bargaining points, because this is where the US has best control of the intensity level. A large amount of force applied in a short period of time would be more likely to induce negotiation than would gradual escalation, since that would be much more difficult to accommodate.	JCSM 288-67 CM 2377-67 SNIE 10-12-65
2 International reaction to intensified bombing of NVN	The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.	World reaction would generally follow the pattern already established for past expansion of air operations over NVN. Those critical of US policy and what they regard as escalation of the war would be more vocal in their criticism; but overall reaction would not constitute a sharp departure from attitudes currently held concerning the bombing, unless we were to undertake massive destruction of civilian populations. Some nations, especially the Free World nations in Asia, would privately, if not publicly, laud our actions as an indication of determination. Depending upon the intensity of the bombing campaign, there might be a move to censure us in the UN or in some other international organization. Some nations may be moved to provide humanitarian assistance to NVN but, save for those powers now providing it, no additional military support is likely.	SNIE 10-12-65 CM 2377-67
3 Effect of increased US determination	Increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to get us in even deeper in Southeast Asia and into a serious confrontation, if not war, with China and Russia.	It is estimated that the Soviets are not prepared to resort to strong and direct threats of general war as a means to protect NVN or to preserve Soviet face. It seems likely that they will respond to the current expanded bombing program by providing additional quantities and perhaps new types of weapons and equipment. Beyond supplying equipment, they could take certain other actions to warn the US. For example, they might believe that the provision of limited numbers of volunteers, or of crews for defense equipment or possibly aircraft, would serve as a warning without leading to a serious confrontation. It is estimated that the Chinese communists would provide a major troop presence in NVN under these conditions: (1) If requested by NVN; (2) If there were a major ground invasion of NVN; and/or (3) If the Hanoi regime were in danger of collapse. Short of these conditions, the CHICOMS are expected to avoid a serious confrontation.	CM 2377-67 SNIE 11-11-67 CM 2377-67
4 Sino/Soviet reaction to mining Haiphong	Mining the harbors would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to preserve the Soviet position and prestige in such a disadvantageous place. They might, but probably would not force a confrontation in Southeast Asia; but they might consider some action in Korea, Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or, most likely, Berlin. China could be expected to seize upon the harbor-mining as the opportunity to discredit the USSR. They might read it as an indication that the US was going to apply pressure until NVN capitulated, or that there would be an eventual invasion. If so, they might decide to intervene with combat troops and air power.	The mining or blockade of the NVN coast would be most likely to create an atmosphere of heightened tension between the US and the USSR, since such action would constitute a direct challenge to the Soviets. At a minimum they would try to mobilize world opinion against the US, and, depending on the attitude of NVN, would consider taking the matter to the UN. There is little that they could do on the scene, since they do not have the strength in the area to force a blockade or to confront the US with a major military challenge. Although they might exert pressures on the US outside of Southeast Asia, it is considered unlikely that they would want to take the risk of provoking by such pressures a major and generalized crisis. If Communist China read the harbor-mining as falling under one of the conditions set forth in the foregoing issue, they might feel compelled to intervene. However, more likely they would not precipitate a confrontation solely on the basis of mining operations.	SNIE 10-12-65 SNIE 11-11-67 CM 2377-67

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SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
5 Soviets as peace negotiators	If we should decide to shift our bombing strategy, we should inform the Soviets quietly, make the shift without fanfare, then explain publicly that the northern targets had been destroyed. Moscow would almost certainly pass its information on to Hanoi, and might urge Hanoi to seize the opportunity to deescalate. Without having received an ultimatum, Hanoi would be in a better posture to answer favorably.	The genuineness of Soviet arbitration efforts would be determined by how they viewed their own interests at the time. On the one hand, the war is advantageous to them in many ways. It diverts US political and strategic attention away from areas of primary interest to the USSR; it imposes burdens on US military resources; it employs a substantial portion of US military forces-in-being; and it has been a divisive factor for the US, both domestically and with its allies. Yet the war has adverse aspects for the USSR as well. The bombing of NVN constitutes a continuing reproach to the USSR, since it is unable to protect a small ally; further, the US may undertake new courses of action which would force the Soviets to choose between a serious confrontation or backing down. On balance, the Soviets probably have more to gain by playing the peace-maker than not doing so. Since the Soviets can scarcely be considered unbiased arbiters, however, the US should use extreme caution in its reliance on this communication link with Hanoi.	SNIE 11-11-67
6 Post-hostilities accommodation of VC	"...to lay the groundwork by periodic peace probes, perhaps suggesting secret talks associated with limitation of bombing and with a view to finding a compromise involving, inter alia, a role in the South for members of the VC."	If we are to avoid the danger of winning the war and then losing the peace in SVN, we cannot realistically encourage accommodation to the VC which does not require their integration into the national life only on a rehabilitated basis. There are severe pitfalls in direct talks with the VC, including the following: (1) This would tend to reduce and degrade the stature and prestige of the GVN and, conversely, grant the VC stature and legitimacy; (2) It could lead to inclusion of a communist party in the political life of SVN, and possibly the early formation of a coalition or "Popular Front" government; (3) It would tend to take the onus off NVN as the aggressor; (4) It could result in a "freeze in place" with the communists left in sanctuaries from which they could continue their campaign; and (5) It would create the impression of weakness and lack of resolve on the part of the US.	JCSM 792-66

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94103-2/2

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF US OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

ABSTRACT

I. OBJECTIVES

A. DPM: The time has come for us to eliminate the ambiguities from our minimum objectives -- our commitments -- in Vietnam. Two principles must be articulated and policies and actions brought in line with them: (1) Our commitment is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future, (2) This commitment ceases if the country ceases to help itself.

B. NSAM 288: We seek an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. (16 March 1964)

C. JCSM 218-67: US military objectives are (1) to make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause NVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency, (2) to defeat the VC and North Vietnamese armed forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces, (3) to extend GVN dominion, direction, and control over SVN, (4) to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs.

II. CONCLUSION: The current US objectives in Vietnam, as reflected in the illustrative chronology below, are far more comprehensive than the objectives set forth in the DPM and have consistently set the direction for our massive commitment in that country. Implicit in those objectives is the realization of the important stakes that the United States and the Free World have in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The objectives in the DPM, on the other hand, are narrowly construed and dwell on what our commitment is not. They could hardly set the course for our effort in SVN. In short, they tend to place an undesirably incomplete rationale and a negative tone to our presence in SVN.

In general, JCS military objectives do support the large majority of pronounced political objectives. There is some difference between the JCS military objectives and the Secretary of Defense objectives in line items 13 and 17.

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to military objectives in JCSM 218-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
1. (U) US reply to 17-Nation Appeal on Vietnam - 8 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	a. The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In fulfillment of our long-standing commitments we have given such help. We will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security and peace of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam - security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others - free from outside interference - tied to no alliance - a military base for no other country.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	NA*
2. (U) Address by President Johnson at The Johns Hopkins University - 7 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	a. Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves - only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in that we believe that purpose requires.	X	X		X	Yes	NA	Yes	NA
	(1) We do this in order to slow down aggression.	X	X			Yes	NA	Yes	NA
	(2) We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.		X		X	Yes	NA	Yes	NA
	(3) And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam - and all who seek to share their conquest - of a simple fact:								
	(a) We will not be defeated.		X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(b) We will not grow tired.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	NA

* Not Applicable

84-1103-213

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 212-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	(c) We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
	(h) We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.	X	X			Yes	NA	Yes	NA
	e. I would hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations would use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.	X		X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
	d. For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress. The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.	X		X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
3. (U) Statement by President Johnson - 27 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965)	We have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. (U) Message to Congress from President Johnson - 1 June 1965 (H. Doc. 196, 89th Cong, First Session)	For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. I propose we start now to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the entire Southeast Asia region for the benefit of all its people. This must be an international venture.			X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
5. (U) Foreign Affairs Outline No. 13, entitled "The US Stake in Southeast Asia," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State - June 1965	a. The nations of Southeast Asia, as with all other Asian states, should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and toward increasingly democratic structures.	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	Yes
	b. The nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside nations.	X	X			NA	NA	NA	Yes
	c. No single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it.	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	d. The nations of the Far East should maintain and increase their ties with the West in trade and culture as a major means of knitting together a peaceful and stable world.	X		X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
6. (U) Letter from Ambassador Goldberg to the President of the Security Council - 30 July 1965 (US Mission to the UN Press Release 4610)	a. The United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. The United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.			X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA

94103-214

SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 218-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	c. The United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in Southeast Asia.	X				NA	NA	NA	Yes
	d. The United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.	X				NA	NA	NA	Yes
7. (U) State Department Press Release No. 4 - 7 January 1966	Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia:								
	(1) The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(2) We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof.	X	X			Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
	(3) We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it.	X	X			Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
	(4) We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it.	X	X			Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
	(5) A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.	X	X			Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
	(6) Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
	(7) We want no US bases in Southeast Asia.	X	X			NA	NA	Yes	Yes
	(8) We do not desire to retain US troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured.	X	X			NA	NA	Yes	Yes
	(9) We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice.	X				NA	NA	Yes	NA
	(10) The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision.	X				NA	NA	Yes	NA
	(11) The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option.	X	X			NA	NA	NA	Yes
	(12) We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.			X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
	(13) The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."	X				NA	NA	Yes	NA
	(14) We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.	X	X			Yes	NA	NA	NA
8. (U) State of the Union Message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of Congress - 12 January 1966	a. We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self-determination - that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification. This is all we want for South Vietnam.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

DA-1103-215

SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 218-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	b. We have also made it clear - from Hanoi to New York - that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals - 4 points or 14 or 40 - and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. And let me be absolutely clear: the days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
9. (U) Honolulu Declaration 8 Feb 1966	a. To prohibit independent VC role in future negotiations.	X				NA	NA	Yes	NA
	b. To induce maximum active international support for GVN war effort.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. To achieve a peaceful settlement as soon as possible.	X				Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
	d. To support self determination by free popular elections.	X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	e. To prevent aggression.		X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	f. To develop and expand handicraft and light industry.			X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
	g. To expand rural electrification programs.			X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
	h. To prevent inflation.			X		NA	Yes	Yes	NA
	i. To achieve a social revolution through rural construction.			X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
	j. To demonstrate humanitarianism through refugee relief.			X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
10. (U) Statement by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - 18 February 1966 (Department of State Publication 8054)	a. We are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. What we are seeking to achieve in South Vietnam is part of a process that has continued for a long time - a process of preventing the expansion and extension of communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of communist power.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. In South Vietnam we seek to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the Accords of 1954. We seek, in other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the communist forces under Ho Chi Minh. This settlement forms a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
11. (U) Public Testimony by Secretary McNamara before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - 20 April 1966 JCS IN 45329)	Our objective is not to destroy the communist government of North Vietnam. Our objective is not to develop a springboard for a preemptive war against Red China. Our objective is not even to so manipulate our relationships with South Vietnam as to obtain permanent base rights for US military forces in South Vietnam. It is not even to work toward a time when South Vietnam will be part of a military alliance in which the United States is a member. It is far more limited than any of those things. It is only to preserve for the Vietnamese people the right and the opportunity to shape their own destiny, to determine the form of their political institutions, to determine the form of their economic system, and in effect to run their own affairs. That is a very, very limited objective, and our military operations are directed solely to its attainment and to nothing more. That is true of both our long-run and short-run military operations.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

94-133-216

[redacted]

SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 218-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
12.(C) State Circular Telegram to all Diplomatic Posts (State 22658-JCS IN 35308) - 5 August 1966	Essential Points of US Policy:								
	(1) The United States is absolutely determined to continue its support of South Vietnam's resistance to communist aggression, and will not withdraw from this position until the aggression ceases and South Vietnam is left alone to determine its own future free of outside coercion.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(2) The US bombing of North Vietnam is restricted to military targets which are being used by Hanoi in support of the aggression against South Vietnam. The United States remains prepared to cease this bombing provided Hanoi takes reciprocal action.	X	X			Yes	NA	NA	Yes
	(3) The United States continues its offer for unconditional discussions toward a peaceful settlement, including the four points set forth by North Vietnam. The United States supports a settlement based on the essentials of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(4) The United States does not threaten the existence of the regime of North Vietnam. We hold no animosity toward the people of North Vietnam, and indeed the President has held out to their government the prospect of cooperation in economic development when peace has been restored.	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	NA	NA
	(5) The United States does not want to maintain bases in Southeast Asia, and we have repeatedly pledged to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam when its security and freedom of choice is assured.	X	X			NA	NA	Yes	Yes
	(6) The United States does not oppose the reunification of Vietnam. We support the right of self-determination through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the United States does not oppose the neutrality or non-alignment of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire.	X	X			NA	NA	Yes	Yes
	(7) Our policy is limited: the United States seeks only to stop communist aggression; it is not attacking communism itself. We are in Vietnam to demonstrate the unprofitability of aggression and to persuade the aggressor to seek peace in his own interests. We have come to the aid of South Vietnam, at its request and under the right of collective self-defense, in the face of a protracted aggression of a ruthless and relentless character. Without the application of US military strength to counter and contain North Vietnam's aggression against the South, there would be no chance of persuading Hanoi to leave its neighbor alone. The smaller nations throughout the world have a critical stake in this principle, and in the effort to maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
13. (C) Briefing by Secretary McNamara to the Cabinet - 25 August 1966	US military objectives are threefold:								
	a. To seek out and destroy the main units of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.		X			NA	Yes*	NA	Yes
	b. To interdict the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.	X	X			Yes**	NA	NA	Yes
	c. To provide a screen of security behind which the revolutionary development of South Vietnam can take place.		X	X	X	NA	NA	Yes***	Yes****

* JCS objective includes a task to defeat enemy armed forces in SVN rather than the SecDef "seek out and destroy" which, together with the JCS objective to force the withdrawal of NVA forces, is an apparent difference from the SecDef objective. SecDef objective does not include forcing the withdrawal of NVA forces.

** JCS objective supports the SecDef objective but goes beyond it with tasks that obstruct the movement of materials into NVN and indicates that the air/naval campaign will cause the NVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency. SecDef objective focuses on the more limited task of impeding the flow of men and material from NVN into SVN.

*** JCS objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have the prime responsibility for extending GVN control. However, the implementing tasks clearly indicate that the US forces assist the GVN in the R/D mission. SecDef objective limits the US force objective to providing security so that the GVN may accomplish R/D.

**** The SecDef objectives have no parallel for JCS Objective 4.

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SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM-218-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
14. (U) Statement by Secretary McNamara to the Press in Saigon - 14 October 1966	The United States is not fighting to overthrow the communist regime in North Vietnam nor to destroy its sovereignty but for the sole objective of allowing the South Vietnamese to shape their own political destiny.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15. (U) Manila Conference 25 Oct 1966	a. To restore peace in SVN and the rest of Asia.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. To preserve the territorial integrity of SVN.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. To reunify Vietnam by free choice of all Vietnamese.	X				NA	NA	Yes	Yes
	d. To reconciliate all elements of Vietnamese society.	X			X	NA	NA	Yes*	NA
	e. To withdraw all foreign forces as NVN military and subversive forces are withdrawn, infiltration ceases and level of violence subsides.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	f. To achieve end of hostilities settlement which incorporates effective guarantees against further aggression.	X	X			NA	Yes	Yes	Yes
	g. To force NVN to abandon aggression.		X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	h. To modernize agriculture.			X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
	i. To achieve desirable land reform and land tenure system.	X		X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
	j. To achieve economic prosperity through regional development.			X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
	k. To overcome poverty, disease, illiteracy, social injustice.				X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
	l. To create a GVN civil government based on honesty and justice.	X			X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
						* JCSM 792-66 recommends the reintegration of rehabilitated VC as individuals into the national life.			
16. (U) State of the Union message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of the Congress - 10 January 1967	a. We are in Vietnam because the United States and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common danger" of aggression in Southeast Asia.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia and the peace of the entire region.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. We are there because the people of South Vietnam have as much right to remain non-communist -- if that is what they choose -- as North Vietnam has to remain communist.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17. (U) Statement of Secretary McNamara before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget.	a. At the President's direction, the policies and objectives of the United States Government with regard to the conflict in Vietnam had been stated by Ambassador Goldberg at the United Nations last September. Among the points he made were the following:								
	(1) Ours is a strictly limited aim.	X	X	X	X	Yes*	NA	NA	Yes
	(2) We are not engaged in a "Holy War" against communism.	X	X			NA	NA	No	No
	(3) We do not seek to establish an American empire or a "sphere of influence" in Asia.	X	X			NA	NA	NA	No

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SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 218-67 above)			
		POLITICS	MILITARY	ECONOMICS	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	(4) We seek no military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Vietnam.		X			NA	NA	Yes**	NA
	(5) We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of North Vietnam.	X				Yes***	NA	NA	NA
	(6) We do not seek to threaten any legitimate interest of the people of China.	X	X			NA	NA	NA	Yes****
	(7) We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it; nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from participating by peaceful means in their country's future.	X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	Yes#	NA
	b. Let me say affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.								
	(1) We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. Similarly, we reject the idea that North Vietnam has a right to impose a military solution.	X	X			Yes##	No	No	Yes
	(2) We seek to assure the people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination -- to decide their own political destiny, free of force -- that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.	X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(3) And we believe that reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.	X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
						* SecDef objective providing for interdiction is more limited in scope and therefore more in consonance with Ambassador Goldberg's point than is JCS Objective 1.			
						** Both JCS and SecDef objectives support this point. However, SecDef emphasizes providing of a screen by US forces thus, by inference, deemphasizes the United States extending dominion and control.			
						*** Programs in support of JCS Objective 1 tend to obscure this point of Ambassador Goldberg. SecDef objective calling for interdiction is more limited, and supporting programs might make this point more evident.			
						**** JCS Objective 4 contemplates defeat of CHICOM aggression if necessary, while SecDef does not allude to this contingency. JCS objective is therefore broader in scope. However, the CHICOM contingency undoubtedly receives consideration though not mentioned by SecDef in unclassified testimony.			
						# JCSM-792-66 recommended reintegretion of rehabilitated VC as individuals into the national life.			
						## The broader JCS objective gives rise to courses of action which tend to obscure the political solution sought. SecDef corollary objective of interdiction is more limited.			
18. (S) Statement of Secretary McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations - Fiscal Year 1967 Supplemental for Southeast Asia - 23 January 1967	a. Our over-all policy objective in South Vietnam is a stable and independent government free of external control and externally inspired and supported violence.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. Our immediate objective is to influence the North Vietnamese to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table, or to compel them to desist in their aggression. The basic tasks which flow from these objectives are:	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(1) To support the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of South Vietnam over its territory.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes
	(2) To interdict the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.		X	X		Yes	NA	NA	NA
	(3) To exert pressure on the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of the insurrection in South Vietnam.	X	X			Yes	Yes	NA	NA**
						* The JCS objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have prime responsibility for extending GVN control. However, the implementing tasks indicate US forces assist the GVN in R/D. The SecDef objective emphasizes the US support role.			
						** The SecDef objectives do not include a parallel for JCS Objective 4, although they undoubtedly receive consideration.			

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SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 218-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
Department of Defense News Release [illegible]-67 - 24 February 1967	a. The communists once again are proposing that war material sent South to be used against the people of South Vietnam, the United States fighting men and our allies should be moved painlessly in the quantities desired by North Vietnam, in the manner chosen by North Vietnam and over the infiltration routes most advantageous to North Vietnam. Hanoi promises nothing in the position put forward by Mai Van Bo in Paris. It demands much: a permanent cessation of United States bombing. The United States will continue to make North Vietnam pay a price for aggression. This country will not stop the bombing and further endanger the lives of those who resist that aggression unless something is offered in return. It will stop the bombing in return for appropriate de-escalation of military action by the North Vietnamese.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. None of these is our objective. Our objective is limited to assuring for the people of South Vietnam the right to shape their own destiny, their right to choose the form of the political and economic institutions under which to do so without the threat, the pressure from external powers.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	c. Now, since that is a limited objective, we should seek to accomplish it at the lowest possible cost to this nation, not the lowest cost in terms of dollars, but the lowest cost in terms of lives. That, of course, means we should take steps to avoid widening the war, to minimize the risk of increasing the conflict and thereby increasing the cost to us in terms of American lives. And this is the foundation of our bombing policy.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
	d. Now since that is our objective, we sought to accomplish three things by the bombing.								
	(1) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.	X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	NA	NA
	(2) To either reduce the level of infiltration of men and equipment from North to South or to increase the cost of that infiltration.		X			Yes	Yes	NA	NA
	(3) To make clear to the political leaders of the North that they will pay a price so long as they continue to carry on in their aggression of the South.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	NA	NA
20. (U) Address by Ambassador Goldberg to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo - 26 February 1967	a. The United States will negotiate on Vietnam only with the objective of ending the war and not merely to de-escalate.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	b. The United States sincerely seeks a political settlement rather than unconditional surrender, although it is not interested in negotiations with less than a full settlement in mind.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
21. (U) News Conference by Secretary McNamara in Washington, D. C. - 24 February 1967	a. We have a very limited objective in Southeast Asia today - very, very limited. We are not seeking to destroy the Government of North Vietnam and certainly we are not seeking bases from which we can carry out attacks on Red China. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with South Vietnam in terms of which they will be our military ally, or in terms of which they will provide for us permanent military bases on the land mass of Southeast Asia.	X	X			Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
22. (U) News Conference by President Johnson in Washington, D. C. - 27 February 1967	Our principal objective in North Vietnam is to provide the maximum deterrent to people who believe aggression pays, with a minimum cost to us - and to them.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
[illegible]. (U) Address by President Johnson to the Tennessee State Legislature - 15 March 1967	a. Three basic US objectives:								
	(1) An honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(2) A Southeast Asia in which all countries - including a peaceful North Vietnam - apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance, and diseases.	X		X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
	(3) A concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objective in JCSM 2 18-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	b. Three purposes in selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam:								
	(1) To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary.	X	X		X	Yes	NA	NA	Yes
	(2) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.	X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	NA	NA
	(3) To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam.		X			Yes	NA	NA	NA
24. (U) Guam Communique - 21 March 1967	Defend freedom in South Vietnam and at the same time continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25. (U) Statement to the Press by President Johnson in Washington, D. C., upon his return from the Guam Conference (20-21 March 1967) - 22 March 1967	We shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, we shall of course continue to do our duty in Vietnam.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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