

Interview of (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
28 July 2006

Not interviewed by NCIS; CPT (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JA, present during questioning on Porter's behalf.

Describe your role on the night of the suicides, 9-10 June.

Camp duty officer---an overwatch; thinks he had Camps 1, 2, 3, 4; duties include confirming all guards present, watches are running normally. Typically varied his routine to keep guards on their toes. Doesn't remember exactly the details of that night. When he received the news about the crisis, he had inspected Camp 4 once, none of the remainder.

He was in Bldg 3 when (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) phoned with the news. Could barely understand him--out of breath, plus accent, excited. (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reported Code (b)(2) on A Block, with detainee unresponsive.

Porter ran to Camp 1, people running around; a team was moving the last detainee out of the sally port as Porter came in. Didn't talk to any of the A Block personnel. Stood on the causeway on the outer sally, could see straight down the tier. MAs were going cell to cell, making sure detainees were awake.

What are the rules on hanging things in cells?

OK as long as guards could see movement.

How was word passed regarding changes in procedures?

Word was passed in the daily Battle Update Brief, 0900, conducted by (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Day OICs or other camp reps would attend & each report info/activities for the last 24 hours, including Form 508s, Codes (b)(2) medical alerts, significant activity, unusual behavior, anything out of the ordinary. (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) would ask about ISNs, pass word on changes in procedures.

AOIC then would go into camp & tell the Platoon Leader. PLs maintain passdown log.

Porter had no role in generating Guard Mount Messages; if he thought something need to be passed via GMM, he'd ask OIC or DOC to put out a GMM.

GMMs were available via DIMS. If block NCO was good, he'd check for new procedures at the start of shift; PL & SOG should check at start of shift. Porter doesn't know whether this was being done or not.

What was your understanding of the level of threat of suicide in the weeks before 9-10 June?

(b)(3) didn't receive any info that detainees were planning anything like that. If there had been an increased threat, it would've been in ((b)(3) (b)(6)) daily BUB, and the OIC would've passed straight to PL, and been logged in PL's passdown log for transmission to reliefs. (b)(3) doesn't know who reviewed the passdown log; he would check it every once in a while to be nosy--helped him stay updated because he wasn't in camp all the time like operational guard force.

Why do you think it took the Alpha Block guards so long to find the bodies?

(b)(3) doesn't know; he believes they just weren't paying attention, they were not vigilant; there's a difference between standing post and being vigilant--standing post just to be there.

What were the procedures for a random headcount?

(b)(2)

What sort of guidance were you given by your superior officers regarding enforcement of rules?

Before (b)(3) started working nights, the XO told him to make sure guards weren't sleeping on watch, and if something happens, to make sure it's handled right. XO also told (b)(3) to cover all the camps. (b)(3) characterized the XO's guidance as vague.

Describe typical turnovers with day-shift AOIC.

Usually there was no physical relief--day AOIC usually left about (b)(2) (b)(3) usually arrived around (b)(2). Occasionally (b)(3) would call PLs with questions about recent events, but usually consulted DIMS instead. Occasionally the day-shift AOIC would send email reminders for specific tasks, e.g., making sure weigh-ins were complete.

Describe typical watch duties.

Usually do a circuit of all Camps 1, 2, 3, & 4 after assuming the watch. Read emails & DIMS. Walk around the camps; 9 out of 10 times, the block NCOs would accompany him while on block. Toward the end of watch, work on BUB slides for use by day shift. Characterized pace of work as slow. If he saw something out of the ordinary he would correct it, and would ask SOG or PL about issues.

What sort of guidance did you give the guard force about enforcing the SOPs?

(b)(3) had no detention background in Navy brig, and no training at Fort Lewis. Emphasis throughout Camp 1 was on compliance, but in the sense of detainees not acting up too much, rather than in the sense of complying on first request to return water bottles

or chow. Detainees hated guards transferring from Camps 2/3, where compliance meant prompt response to guard orders. Numerous guards felt like detainees were running the camp, doing just about anything they wanted. In places like smoking area, (b)(3) would hear guards complain they're just waiters serving the detainees. Higher authorities didn't back up guards' requests for disciplining detainees--no reprimand for bad behavior.

Example: If guards took a sheet away from a detainee for unraveling an end, detainee wouldn't like it, higher ups saw this as a quality of life issue for detainees, set up a cell for detainees to sew in.

Did compliance mean more relaxed enforcement of rules?

Yes. The notion prevailed that "A compliant camp is a good camp." (b)(3) noted that frequently when guards wrote up a detainee and sent the report to (b)(3) (b)(6) or (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) nothing happened.

How did higher authorities measure the degree of detainee compliance?

Numerous sources: number of disciplinary reports to (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the disciplinary SNCO; comments from cultural advisor; comments from AOIC in BUB, which was (b)(3) (b)(6); comments from Camp 1 (b)(3) (b)(6) & then days before suicides (b)(3) (b)(6)

Day OICs would explain changes as happening for various reasons, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross was down on (b)(3) (b)(6)

What sort of guidance were you given by your superior officers regarding enforcement of rules?

What sort of guidance did you give the guard force about enforcing the SOPs?

Did you find it necessary to tell guards to ease up on enforcement?