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Kissinger 8-5-11 5:45

MEMORANDUM


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 17, 1969

Dr. Kissinger:

Two copies of the attached memoranda are provided for your information.



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Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 2007

~~Reclassified to Secret~~
Date: ~~8/27/2005~~
Chief, Declassification Branch, WHS

DECLASSIFIED SEP 27 2006
Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec. WHS

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05-11-0573

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EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 3.4 (D) (5)
OSD F.S. 15 August 2002
Review/Declassify on: Dec 2027
Other Agency Equiv: TO



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

CM-4122-69
17 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Alternative Responses, EC-121 Shootdown

1. The attached draft memorandum for the President is forwarded in response to a request received from Dr. Kissinger.
2. It is recommended that the draft memorandum be forwarded to the President.

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED SEP 27 2006
Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec: WHS

OSD Rcy No. _____

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Date: 5/12/2005
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Concept and Estimates for Retaliatory
B-52 Air Strikes Against North Korean
Targets (TS)

1. This memorandum forwards a concept for employment of B-52 aircraft against either one of two North Korean airfields as a response to their shootdown of the US EC-121 on 15 April 1969.

2. The recommended targets for this concept are:

a.



OSD 3.3(b)(5)

b.



OSD 3.3(b)(5)

3. Advantages of using B-52 versus carrier-based aircraft or land-based tactical aircraft are as follows:

a. One B-52 delivers up to 108 bombs versus the 12 to 18 delivered by each tactical aircraft.

b. The smaller the number of aircraft, the better the chance for surprise.

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year
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DECLASSIFIED SEP 27 2006
Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec. WHS

~~Downgraded to Secret
Date: 31 July 2015
Chief, Declassification Branch, WHS~~

c. [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

d. [REDACTED]

e. The strike could be mounted more quickly by B-52s than by land or carrier-based aircraft.

f. The B-52 has a greater ECM capability than either of the other two forces.

g. The use of the B-52 as opposed to land-based tactical air permits a night, all-weather, low level attack, thus enhancing survivability.

h. Use of B-52s preserves land based tactical air in the area for defense of ROK.

4. Disadvantages of using the B-52:

a. B-52 is larger and less maneuverable than tactical aircraft and somewhat more vulnerable to barrage anti-aircraft fire.

b. Loss of a strategic bomber might have a more damaging effect on US image in this situation.

c. Use of the B-52 in relatively close proximity to the Soviet Union might elicit an adverse Soviet reaction.

5. Advantages/disadvantages of using 12 versus 24 B-52s are:

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

a. Attack by 12 B-52s [REDACTED] would be sufficient to achieve US objective.

b. The smaller attacking force would decrease the time and number of aircraft exposed and possibly reduce the risk of loss.

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
c. A 12 aircraft attack could be mounted slightly sooner.

d. A smaller force would have less mutual supporting capability (ECM and defense suppression).

e. Damage expectancy would be reduced using smaller force.

6. There are presently 102 B-52s deployed in the Pacific, with 52 of these at Guam. There are 85 KC-135s deployed, 35 of which are on Okinawa.

7. Concept of operations would be as follows;



OSD 3.3(b)(5)

8. CINCPAC and CINCSAC have been requested to prepare operation plans for B-52 attack on each target as soon as possible, addressing both the smaller and larger strike forces (12 to 24).