

File 15
Ref - DSD
- DTA

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Cape Verde Technical Discussions, 22-23 July 1988

U.S./Cuba-Angola Bilateral, 1100, 22 July 1988

The U.S. Mediators proposed bilateral talks be held first with the Angolans at 1000, and then with the Cubans at 1100. The Angolan party agreed initially, but subsequently informed DASD Woods that both Angolans and Cubans would attend the first meeting at 1100. Bilaterals with Angolans and/or Cubans would be acceptable at a later time. The meeting was held in the (Cape Verdean) President's suite, which had been reserved for the U.S. delegation's use throughout the talks.

Participants

U.S.: DASD James L. Woods, LTC Charles S. Snyder, LTC Jean-Michel A. Beraud

Angola: LTG Antonio Franca NDalu, Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of FAPLA; LTG Francisco M. Paiva Nvunda, Chief of the FAPLA National Political Directorate; COL Antonio Jose Maria, Secretary of the President for Defense; LTC Mario Placido de Seta, Chief of the Reconnaissance and Information Office of the General Staff; Mr. Gilberto Verissimo, Office of the President; and Mr. Stone Carlos, Interpreter.

Cuba: Division General (MG) Ulises Rosales del Toro, First Vice Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR); Division General Rogelio Acevedo Gonzalez, Chief, Central Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces; Brigadier General Sesus (sic) Bermudez Cutino, Chief, Directorate of Military Intelligence; COL Eduardo Morejon Estevez, General Staff; COL Jose Garcia Yanez, General Staff; Alcibiades Hidalgo Basulto, Secretariat of the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Minutes

DASD Woods opened the meeting with a few words of welcome and reviewed past negotiations and their results, military incidents that had occurred since the New York talks, and the situation at the beginning of the current talks. He expressed the hope that these talks could be conducted in the same spirit of frankness as in previous rounds, and that their results could

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be useful in the overall resolution of the Angola/Namibia problem. He defined the objectives of the Cape Verde Technical Discussions as follows:

- 1) to reach an agreement to "quiet the front" so that incidents don't wreck the negotiations;
- 2) to move beyond discussion and (necessary) explanations of incidents in southern Angola since the Governor's Island talks, to work up a package including the setting of a definite date for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, with a measure of Angolan/Cuban reciprocity and mechanisms for a de facto cease fire, disengagement, verification and monitoring. Mr. Woods emphasized the need for General Geldenhuys to be able to take back some reciprocal Angolan/Cuban measures to enable him to "sell" negotiating progress to Minister of Defense Malan.

The goal is to reach some kind of informal agreement here, whether through the mediators or in face to face discussions.

The South Africans appear ready to leave Angola, but because of their psychological make-up, there is a very fine line between "encouraging" them and pushing too hard.

Proposed agenda:

- 1) the setting of a date for South African withdrawal from Angola;
- 2) the definition of measures of restraint on all sides, to include (as agreed in principle in New York), the establishment of direct means of communications at the operational and perhaps national levels;
- 3) monitoring and verification;
- 4) practical matters related to implementing UNSCR 435.

LTG NDalu brought up the incidents that occurred in southern Angola since the Governor's Island talks, acknowledging that bombardments at Cuito Cuanavale had stopped on 16 and 17 July, but that contrary to Gen Geldenhuys' assurances, had resumed on the 18th and 19th.

Mr. Woods replied that we too had received the reports of shelling, but that the South Africans were apologetic and that they felt it was indeed a mistake. Of course they would have to explain in the plenary session.

LTG NDalu said that his side intended to continue in the same (positive) spirit as in New York, that he did want to hear an explanation from the South Africans, and was also interested in hearing the guarantees they want from the Angolans/Cubans:

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-The Angolans/Cubans have not made public their successes in Calueque and Ruacana; nor have they issued daily communiques on (South African) bombings.

-Cuito Cuanavale is more preoccupying. Angolan/Cuban troops are not moving, and they cannot understand why the South Africans are continuing their bombardment.

-It would be "stupendous" if the South Africans were ready to set a date for their withdrawal from Angola, and that would serve as a preamble for everything else.

-The Angolans/Cubans understand that Gen Geldenhuys needs to have something in his hand, and that is why they are not pushing too hard. They are ready to discuss concrete issues connected with the principles agreed to in New York.

MG del Toro then said that the New York meeting had been a useful opportunity for all to present their position, and that all had now had time to consult with their leadership.

-The Angolans/Cubans have come to seek a solution.

-They understood in New York that South Africa was in a position to withdraw from Angola.

-The South Africans need to specify their requests for security measures as they withdraw.

-We are all military and therefore speak straight forward; it is thus important for Geldenhuys to come out and say whether he is ready to leave Angola, and to give the timeframe, and to specify the measures he deems appropriate.

-If an agreement (on South African withdrawal from Angola) can be reached quickly, the discussion can then turn to technical aspects, and the meeting can be useful for the preparation of future undertakings such as implementation of UNSCR 435 and the deployment of UNTAG. While agreement probably will not be reached here, we can discuss it here.

-The announcement of a date and a timeframe (for South African withdrawal from Angola) would be of great importance for Cuba/Angola, and guarantees cannot be provided indefinitely. So we must also have a timeframe with reference to implementation of (UNSCR) 435.

-Talks with South Africa should be concrete and direct to the problems we face.

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-It is not acceptable to us to wait until the end of 1988 for the withdrawal of South African troops. In reality they could withdraw in 24 hours.

-We accept technical measures, including verification, and we know that it takes time, but they should specify (when they will leave and how long it will take).

-We have shown patience and understand they need reciprocity.

-(A halt to the shelling at) Cuito would be proof of South African determination to reach a solution, and could lead to a real cease-fire. We have not fired our artillery while South Africa continues to shell Cuito.

-General Geldenhuys should explain and identify the problems he has so that we can continue to seek a solution.

-The mediators have a definite role in these discussions, and can be even more useful here than they were in New York.

Mr. Woods noted that the South African delegation had brought Mr. Derek Auret, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and asked whether there were any objections to his attending work sessions. There were none.

There are two possible approaches to deal with specific measures; these must be tied to a realistic time frame:

The Angolans/Cubans had introduced an "action plan" in New York. Dr. Crocker thought it was premature at that time to table the document, but as it turned out, stage 1 was started and step 3 is done. We are in fact working on aspects of the Angolan/Cuban action plan. I have no authority to introduce the action plan here, but you can introduce aspects of stages 1 and 2 of the plan because they deal in specifics. We can then ask the South Africans to present their own specific proposals and use all these ideas in our discussions. Dr. Crocker hopes to introduce a "road map" at Geneva. This road map would specify major steps and would follow a phased time line similar to your action plan. I told him we would focus on steps 1 and 2 of phase 1 so they are completed by the time the negotiators finish drafting the agreements.

We keep telling the South Africans that the Angolans/Cubans will not sign until South Africa withdraws from Angola. General Geldenhuys has no practical problems getting out of Angola by 29 September. The only question is one of reciprocity. He must tell us what specific measures would satisfy his minister. A matrix (what to do/not to do) of military actions would be

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useful, and can help us build (toward effective measures) if we can get past the question of bombardments.

LTG NDalu said that his side must listen to General Geldenhuys; that it was their intention to reach a solution, and that they had several proposals to unblock the situation.

Mr. Woods said that the South Africans may have to call home regularly since they had a limited mandate, but that they had special communications equipment to do that quickly. He would ask the Cubans/Angolans to make a short presentation. They would then have the opportunity to ask General Geldenhuys for an explanation of the recent incidents. That might take the first hour, and then hopefully we could go on to other matters.

MG del Toro stated that a discussion on practical problems on the ground could take place only if there was progress on the main question (South African withdrawal from Angola).

Mr. Woods pointed out that there were side rooms where bilateral discussions could be held, and offered U.N. documents relating to UNSCR 435. He added that General Geldenhuys also understands that technical discussions are more propitious to progress on these kind of issues than formal negotiations in plenary. The meeting adjourned about 1230.

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Plenary Session 1500, 22 July 1988

NOTE: The South African delegation, pleading weariness, declined to hold a morning session. This greatly irritated the Angolan/Cuban delegation who then said they were "too tired to meet after lunch." Hence the late starting time.

Participants

U.S.: DASD James L. Woods, LTC Charles S. Snyder, LTC Jean-Michel A. Beraud.

Angola: LTG Antonio Franca NDalu, Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of FAPLA; LTG Francisco M. Paiva Nvunda, Chief of the FAPLA National Political Directorate; COL Antonio Jose Maria, Secretary of the President for Defense; LTC Mario Placido de Seta, Chief of the Reconnaissance and Information Office of the General Staff; Mr. Gilberto Verissimo, Office of the President; and Mr. Stone Carlos, Interpreter.

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South Africa: General Janie Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African Defense Force; MG Cornelius Jacobus (N.) Van Tonder, Staff of the Chief of Defense Force; Brig. J. Sonnekus, Personal Staff Officer of the Chief of Defense Force; COL E. Viljoen, Staff Officer, Sector 10 Ovamboland; COL F. Oelschig, Staff Officer Sector 20 Kavango; Mr. Derek Auret, RSA Foreign Affairs Department.

Minutes

DASD Woods opened the session with a few words of welcome and stated that

-the newsmedia were still unaware of the conference, and thanked the participants for their cooperation;

-a bland statement was being drafted for use by the Government of Cape Verde after the conclusion of the talks. The other parties might also find it useful. The draft statement would be available for review and approval by the participants the following day;

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-the principles adopted in New York had been released to the press in all four countries on Wednesday, 19 July.

He then went on to remind the participants that it had been agreed in New York that the diplomats need time, that incidents in the field could pose a threat to the diplomatic process, and that all parties should exercise restraint. Also, in the development of a timetable, we should address a number of topics here, to include South African withdrawal from Angola, reciprocal measures by Angolan and Cuban troops and the monitoring and verification process.

LTG NDalu replied that he saw the Cape Verde talks as a follow up of the New York meeting. It must be a practical exercise related to military actions and the negotiating process. There were three military meetings in New York to exchange ideas. This time, the cessation of South African offensive acts must be the preamble to further understandings. Such an understanding had not been reached previously because all the parties were not ready. General Geldenhuys had promised to draft an instruction to restrain his troops, and we received that initiative with satisfaction and interest; and yet we do not have proof of the fulfillment of that order, since the shelling continued, especially in the Cuito Cuanavale area except on 16 and 17 July.

The Angolan/Cuban side does not want to solve the problem unilaterally, but through an understanding. We came to Cape Verde to seek a total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. We feel a solution through an understanding is within reach. We are open to any South African proposal, and are prepared to give the types of guarantees General Geldenhuys needs, such as

-our readiness to allow the South African troops to withdraw to the border securely,

-and our efforts to avoid incidents.

Such an understanding should cover a "prudent" period of time, two months for example. This understanding would pave the way for future agreements to avoid the loss of life. In New York we argued that it would be hard for our troops not to reply to offensive actions; in practice we have tried to avoid any incidents.

MG Del Toro agreed with everything General NDalu had said, but said he wanted to underscore the points he considered important for such an understanding. It should

-be a South African decision to withdraw its troops

-they could then provide certain guarantees as requested by South Africa.

-be a South African decision to withdraw its troops

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We need the basis for this understanding, that is to say a decision to withdraw and the proposed duration of such withdrawal. Progress toward such understanding will mean progress toward the total agreement. There needs to be an appropriate timeframe of one, two or more months. We are in a position to provide guarantees requested by South Africa. This meeting is aimed at short-range goals, but it could be very important if the results are positive for both sides; it will prepare the way for Geneva.

As military men, we should work in straight-forward fashion, and listen to what the other side has to say. We have presented our views, we now need a practical solution. Our delegation has a mandate to answer questions by the South African side.

Gen Geldenhuys expressed his appreciation to Mr. Woods and the Government of Cape Verde, and proceeded to explain the incidents that had occurred in the field. He was satisfied that his local commanders did not have bad intentions, but rather that they were reacting to situations they thought would threaten their own security. The situation would improve as both sides gained confidence. Two officers from northern Namibia, COLs Viljoen and Oelschig, had come as part of the South African delegation. They would act as personal representatives for Gen Geldenbuys to ensure his orders are carried out in Angola and along the Namibian border.

However regrettable the incidents that occurred since the New York talks, there is no change of heart on my part, and I want to reaffirm the intentions I expressed in New York:

- 1) Cessation of hostilities by South African troops;
- 2) Withdrawal of South African troops south of the Namibian border;
- 3) Undertaking not to cross the border.

I have requested that we reach an understanding with the other side so that we can avoid incidents such as the ones we experienced -- for instance a de facto "separation of troops" for a "practical cease-fire". I can find no disagreement with Generals NDalu and Del Toro; "we are on the same frequency," but we need more concrete undertakings -- a cessation of hostile acts, the withdrawal of South African troops, the setting of a timeframe for withdrawal, and suggestions for guarantees on both sides. I will not give a final proposal in detail, but enough (information) to reach conclusions.

First, the question of time:

-Phase 1 (From now to 2 August) we call the "confirmation of the cessation of offensive and aggressive action". The two

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officers who accompany me are to make the compromise 100 percent effective. When we meet on 2 August, each party should be able to tell the other whether restraint measures worked satisfactorily. It is for the three of us (Geldenhuis, Del Toro and NDalu) to achieve.

Gen Geldenhuis continued by saying he had not been accused (of responsibility for the incidents) and did not want to accuse anybody himself. Commanders at low levels have orders not to fire on either the Cubans or the Angolans. They may have felt their own safety was at stake, or that opposing units were taking unfair advantage of the lull in fighting. Let us all three try together so that on 2 August we can say "it worked". I agree with General NDalu that we can make progress, maybe even as far as phase 3, the withdrawal of South African troops (from Angola) in a matter of weeks, not months--certainly before the end of September. This is a time to discuss and compare ideas which will then become the basis for creating a break between opposing forces. We have considered a number of these bases, principally to create a time buffer so that a time delay will be built in, should a breach of understanding occur, during which troops cannot make contact, and thus avoid incidents. On the matter of "other forces" we do not ask for any action or reciprocal moves on the part of Angolan (government) troops. But we do make a strong, serious appeal to General NDalu to notify us if his troops are being moved. Remember, we do not want to create incidents. We ask that General NDalu take reciprocal measures, to include (control of) SWAPO.

In summary, we envisage the withdrawal of South African troops south of the border without contact with SWAPO. In fact, I thought that once South African troops had withdrawn, other troops could move back to previous positions.

The first phase would create a gap (excluding Angolan troops) and would serve as a good basis for negotiations.

Guarantees can best be implemented through the concept of teams. (One or two South African officers plus officers from other forces.) They would be more effective and provide better communications contact. (In response to a query from Mr. Woods, there were no objections from the participants on having the U.S. play a role in the verification process.) Teams will form the basis for an effective break between the forces. COLs Oelschig and Viljoen are to work on various proposals of what we envisage to do/not to do. I do not want to argue with Generals NDalu or del Toro about time and distance. Thus I offer these two officers and MG Van Tonder to participate in a "Working Group" to address practical questions, subject to my approval. Members of the Working Group will receive guidelines from general officers, and will not be empowered to make final decisions.

decisions.

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Mr. Woods summarized what Gen Geldenbuys had just said and asked what other measures needed to be agreed to. Since there were none, work on phase 1 could start right away. Some work on phase 2 can be done here and at home until 2 August. Gen Geldenbuys stated that the government of South Africa had agreed to a cessation of hostilities, but not to his decision to withdraw. If an agreement can be reached by 2 August, the South African government likely will approve it. The General announced that he and his delegation would leave for South Africa at 1400 the following day, so that he could attend Monday's State Security Council meeting. The participants still had 22 hours to reach an agreement.

*The plenary session broke at 1615, and resumed at 1745.

Gen Geldenhuys apologized for the delay in the return of his party and stated that he was ready and eager to discuss with Generals NDalu and Del Toro the incidents of the preceding week and also to exchange ideas on the next steps after South African withdrawal from Angola. If the Working Group can work on after the plenary, much can be accomplished prior to the South Africa delegation's departure.

LTG NDalu stated that

- instructions (for the Working Group) need to be clear;
- there are many things to negotiate;
- it was desirable to have a cessation of hostilities until 2 August, but wondered how it could be maintained in the future;
- additional clarifications would be needed before the working group would be left to continue working.

Gen Geldenhuys explained that the Working Group, being made up of colonels who were used to it, could start work earlier in the day and work later. He then addressed the issue of the past week's incidents. He had intended to give orders in New York but the meetings took longer than he had anticipated. He did not send the telex from New York as there were also technical difficulties with the communications equipment. He did send instructions, however, with an effective date of 15 July. Unfortunately, his first opportunity to explain the orders did not come until that Wednesday. He wants to establish border "contacts" (teams) before conflicts have a chance to develop, to settle questions on the ground. The instructions he gave worked 15 and 16 July, but Sunday 17 July the first "regrettable incident" took place. South African troops on the ground perceived the new wave of activity (repair) on the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale as threatening. The Commander had instructions not to act offensively or aggressively, but felt he needed to protect his troops. That was his rationale for taking action. perceived the new wave of activity (repair) on the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale as threatening. The Commander had instructions

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I appeal to you not to do anything that can be perceived as threatening. I am satisfied that the Commander acted against his orders because he felt it was a decision he had to make on behalf of his troops. On the 17th they observed and reported. On the 18th construction on the bridge continued and movement of BM 21's was reported. Angolan/Cuban information was that 8 shots had been fired. In fact, 54 shots were fired. The reported movement of South African troops near NGiva is simply not true.

On the 19th of July, the Angolans/Cubans reported 40 shots. We calculate that these 40 were part of the bombardment that was reported as 8. The 19th of July information should be added to that of the 18th. The last incident took place on 20 July - 14 BM 21's were sighted, and our troop positions were hit with B-40 and M-46 cannon fire. Our side returned fire, and 35 rounds were expended.

This is not a justification or an exemption for the actions that took place, it is simply information as I have it. Better conditions exist now to avoid such situations than a week ago.

LTG NDalu said he was less preoccupied, although he felt South African forces had taken offensive action while the repair of the Cuito bridge was not offensive in nature.

MG del Toro said the Angolans/Cubans attached special attention to Cuito Cuanavale. We have confidence in the proposals made by all four parties. The number of shots is not important, what is important is that hostilities had resumed because of an objective judgement (without foundation) on the repair of a bridge. If we can agree on a date (for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola) there will be a cessation of hostilities. (Stopping the firing on Cuito) was a gesture on your part, and we reciprocated. We need assurances that these incidents will not recur or they will cause additional problems in the negotiating process.

Gen Geldenhuys agreed that there was a need to seek new methods to avoid similar incidents. I said in New York that this could happen--not to leave the door open, but I did say it. I am sorry it happened, and I am willing to discuss measures to prevent a recurrence. (Del Toro makes a note in his book.)

LTG NDalu (moving at once to a new subject) said he needed clarification on the matter of working groups. You proposed 2 August as a date for the cessation of hostilities. This is all linked to South African withdrawal from Angola. We need a definite date for that withdrawal.

In your proposal you mentioned all troops on the ground.

-The issue of SWAPO is connected to the global issues. How would this link with a security agreement?

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Mr. Woods explained that there are 2 questions

- 1) What is the precise ending date (of the South African troop withdrawal from Angola)?
- 2) How does it fit into the overall framework? The first will be addressed by the working group, and the other will work itself out as the negotiations progress.

Gen Geldenhuys expressed the opinion that the parties should be close to an agreement before they leave Sal. If it is not complete, final touches can be put on in Geneva. In response to General NDalu, the withdrawal of South African troops can start 9 or 10 August, taking into account the Geneva negotiations, travel time and return to Pretoria on 6 August. I want to avoid similar incidents, but I need time to issue the instructions personally. I would also like to work out the duration of the withdrawal.

As for the second question, South African withdrawal from Angola is the first step. We will talk before we reach final agreement; we don't have to wait until a formal agreement. If we can achieve this, much progress will have been made, if not about the overall intent of the negotiations, at least toward the goals of the 2 August meeting.

Mr. Woods stated that it was his understanding that the U.S. was drafting and will bring a "road map" to the 2 August meeting, including a time sequence between each step. Of course, the time table remains to be negotiated. A solution satisfactory to all parties will be difficult, and we can't solve it here. A time table will be proposed in Geneva. We could discuss that tomorrow.

MG del Toro expressed some concern on the cessation of hostilities and wondered aloud why Gen Geldenhuys was talking about weeks and months for the removal of 3,000 troops (a number often claimed by General Geldenhuys himself). These are indeed political problems but this is a topic that needs analysis and that the Working Group should attack. We need to find out what our limitations are. Why should we continue to look at 2 or 9 August when we can reach a decision right here, and have immediate implementation.

Gen Geldenhuys pointed out that he had not said it would be a long process; it could be short. He needed to consult with his government if it were to be shorter, but it could be discussed.

Mr. Woods said it was possible to work in two directions:

- 1) The Working Group can work tonight and in the morning, to report no later than 1200, 23 July;

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or 2) We can continue discussions in the plenary session.

LTG NDalu agreed to the formation of the Working Group, and replied that his side would carry proposals (to answer calls by Gen Geldenhuys) and that the plenary could meet later to solve differences.

All parties agreed that the Working Group should be established immediately and start discussions within the hour.

The plenary session ended at 1815, and the heads of delegation agreed to meet again at 2130.

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Working Group, Session I 1915, 22 July 1988

Participants

U.S.: LTC Jean-Michel A. Beraud

Angola: COL Antonio Jose Maria, Secretary of the President for Defense; LTC Mario Placido de Seta, Chief of the Reconnaissance and Information Office of the General Staff; Mr. Gilberto Verissimo, Office of the President; and Mr. Stone Carlos, Interpreter.

Cuba: Brigadier General Sesus (sic) Bermudez Cutino, Chief, Directorate of Military Intelligence; COL Eduardo Morejon Estevez, General Staff; and COL Jose Garcia Yanez, General Staff.

South Africa: MG Cornelius Jacobus (N.) Van Tonder, Staff of the Chief of Defense Force; COL E. Viljoen, Staff Officer, Sector 10 Ovamboland; and COL F. Oelschig, Staff Officer Sector 20 Kavango.

Minutes

After a few introductory remarks by LTC Beraud,

MG Van Tonder gave his perception was that the Working Group's mission was to determine what is practical, and proposed two goals as achievable:

- 1) a break between opposing forces by use of communications and control,
- 2) a practical tempo that would include corresponding actions by opposing forces, excluding FAPLA forces.

COL Maria said he had some concrete proposals that could serve as a basis for discussion.

BG Bermudez requested the South Africans present their proposal before setting forth the Angolan/Cuban alternatives.

MG Van Tonder introduced a "process of reasoning" to determine (the size of) the break between the forces. The detail of the plan was presented by Col Oelschig and amounted to a request by the South Africans that Cubans and SWAPO withdraw to a line 360 kilometers above the Angola/Namibia border to put enough distance between the forces to avoid clashes.

COL Maria replied that there were two methods of looking at the issue (inductive and deductive) and that the lengthy and cumbersome (inductive) process outlined by the South Africans would complicate matters.

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COL Maria replied that there were two methods of looking at the issue (inductive and deductive) and that the lengthy and

MG Van Tonder stated that all parties were looking for common ground, and said that he would like to hear General NDalu's proposal.

BG Bermudez said that part of the problem had been addressed wrong -- the Cubans would eventually withdraw 12,000 kilometers, but in the meantime, they will remain where they are. Hostilities must cease, and the withdrawal of South African troops must take place before 15 August. Angola and Cuba will concede a 3 month period (Aug. Sep & Oct) during which they will refrain from hostile acts, and their forces will not go any further south than the line through Ngiva, Cuamato, Naulila, Calueque, Ruacana, and Chitado.

These guarantees are valid for a period of 3 months and can be prolonged indefinitely if a date is set for the implementation of UNSCR 435. There are guarantees for water and electricity supply for northern Namibia. Angola and Cuba undertake to arrange with SWAPO the cessation of hostilities in Angola and Namibia. SWAPO forces will remain above the 17th parallel according to the New York principles. What you (the South Africans) have given us is not a solution. We can give no guarantees as long as South African forces remain in Angola.

A rapid exchange ensued during which COL Maria said that military questions could not be divorced from their political context; BG Bermudez pointed out that Cuban troops had been 360 kilometers away before, and the South Africans had moved into Angola.

MG Van Tonder restated the fact that South Africa is working on the withdrawal of its troops from Angola, a time table for that withdrawal, and guarantees to remain south of the Namibian border.

BG Bermudez replied that, despite South African efforts, SWAPO's size had grown. Cuba and Angola would undertake to keep SWAPO above the 17th parallel (if an agreement on implementation of UNSCR 435 is reached).

MG Van Tonder asked whether SWAPO would continue fighting until that date; he wanted to fix Cuban and SWAPO forces in place with the announcement of South African troop withdrawal.

BG Bermudez replied that they would stop when a date is set for implementation of UNSCR 435.

MG Van Tonder reiterated the need for good communications and contact on the ground on both sides to ensure the success of a cessation of hostilities, and proposed adjournment until the next morning.

The meeting was adjourned at 2100.

a cessation of hostilities, and proposed adjournment until the next morning

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Working Group Meeting, 0800, 23 July 1988

Participants

U.S.: LTC Jean-Michel A. Beraud

Angola: COL Antonio Jose Maria, Secretary of the President for Defense, LTC Mario Placido de Seta, Chief of the Reconnaissance and Information Office of the General Staff; Mr. Gilberto Verissimo, Office of the President; and Mr. Stone Carlos, Interpreter.

Cuba: Brigadier General Sesus (sic) Bermudez Cutino, Chief, Directorate of Military Intelligence; and COL Eduardo Morejon Estevez, General Staff.

South Africa: MG Cornelius Jacobus (N.) Van Tonder, Staff of the Chief of Defense Force; COL E. Viljoen, Staff Officer, Sector 10 Ovamboland; and COL F. Oelschig, Staff Officer Sector 20 Kavango.

LTC Beraud opened the meeting by reminding the participants that the principals had agreed that "breathing space" between the opposing forces was desirable, and that it could be achieved either by the Cuban/Angolan force withdrawing or staying in place while the South African force withdrew. General Geldenhuys had said that the withdrawal process could take up to two months, but that maybe it could take a good deal less. He also said that it could start as early as 9 August, and that it would take at most eight weeks. We encourage both forces not to move forward. We also recognize the Angolan/Cuban generosity in their guarantee to allow operation of the Calueque facilities to provide water and electricity to northern Namibia. We would ask that the parties consider the formalization of General Geldenhuys' proposals concerning a stop to the bombardment of Cuito Cuanavale, no introduction of new South African troops into Angola, or overflights by either side, and guarantees by the Angolan/Cuban side that SWAPO will not conduct attacks on withdrawing South African forces. LTC Beraud then turned the floor over to the Angolans/Cubans and solicited comments on the South African proposal.

COL Maria qualified the proposal made by the South Africans the previous evening as "impracticable and unnecessary," impracticable because of the location of Angolan/Cuban troops and unnecessary because of the latest Cuban/Angolan proposal contained all elements of concern to the South Africans, to include withdrawal of SWAPO above the 17th parallel and the cessation of hostilities between Cuban/Angolan and South African troops. COL Maria also emphasized the need for trust on all sides, and the need for direct contact on the ground.

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MG Van Tonder qualified the Cuban/Angolan proposal as an effort to achieve peace in the region, but also expressed the feeling that the two parties were talking about different periods of time. He confirmed the South African intent to cease hostilities and to withdraw South African troops. To do so, he envisaged three time frames

- 1) from the present to 2 August.
- 2) to implementation of UNSCR 435
- 3) until implementation accords are reached

We (the technical Working Group) must concentrate on the period that ends on 2 August. After 2 August, the logical conclusion will be to achieve conditions (for an agreement), some of which may have to wait until after 2 August.

As was stated in Cairo we must try to solve the problem step by step; the ideal solution would be no conflicts, and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. The first step is as agreed: cessation of hostilities on the ground and in the air. (South African) ground commanders have a great deal of autonomy, and additional steps must be taken to ensure the conflict will not resume. In a second step, we must look at possible flash points, mostly because of artillery bombardments, particularly in the areas of Ruacana, Chitido, Calueque and Naulila. After cessation of hostilities

- 1) all forces should be out of artillery range,
- 2) monitoring should begin,
- 3) there should be a liaison body,
- 4) and conflict sparked by 3rd parties (SWAPO) should be avoided.

Cuito is also a flash point. The G5s could be placed where they cannot hit Cuban and Angolan positions. In Calueque/Ruacana, a better climate could be fostered by the creation of a buffer zone. At that time agreements for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola could be concluded.

The Angolan/Cuban document does not make provisions for the period that goes to the setting of a date for implementation of UNSCR 435.

COL Maria related his experiences of 1979, and said that history repeats itself.

MG Van Tonder pointed out that there are differences; for instance, there were only two forces in contention; there are

history repeats itself.

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now more than two opposing forces. The South African concern about the effect of SWAPO operations from Angola territory is not a military problem, but can have repercussions on the resolution of the conflict.

On the issue of time scales, we propose to cease hostilities until 2 August, then address the most serious flashpoints we discussed earlier and Cuito Cuanavale. By 16 August, we should create a break (buffer zone) and increase the break until the end of August. By the middle of September, if those steps are successful, total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola should be complete.

The working group adjourned at 0900 and reconvened at 0930.

Col Morejon said that Cubans/Angolans had examined the South African proposal and believed it had been presented in the same good faith exhibited in New York. Yet they found the formula presented by the South Africans to be impracticable and unnecessary, although they recognized its value as a military technical analysis. It would complicate and delay the withdrawal process, and thus perpetuate the danger of a large confrontation. It is clear that a South African buffer zone inside Angola would impinge on Angolan sovereignty. It would be more constructive to compare the combined number of Angolan, Cuban and SWAPO troops. A large imbalance is immediately apparent as this is a large force with much firepower. It would be easier to withdraw South African forces. To ask our forces to withdraw would be the same as asking you to withdraw your forces as far back as Grootfontein.

The Angola/Cuban proposal contains all the guarantees you seek and is honorable for all parties.

We need to address the issue of dates for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and for implementation of UNSCR 435 to facilitate the work of the United Nations. Even if a date for the implementation of UNSCR 435 were given now, the planning process of the UN could result in a delay of several months (possibly September, October or November). If the government of South Africa gives a date for implementation of UNSCR 435, the UN will then be able to start its planning. That is prevented only by the South African presence in Angola. The setting of that date would open guarantees on items that are the main cause of concern for the South Africans. We (Angola/Cuba) are sure that SWAPO will cooperate. Over the years, Angola/Cuba have shown flexibility in the search for a solution. The government of South Africa should also be flexible.

BG Bermudez said that South Africa had no more than 3,000 troops in Angola, while Angola/Cuba had many thousands. It is therefore easier for the South Africans to pull back from Angola. In order to achieve the separation desired by the South Africans, their aircraft would also have to be removed from the troops in Angola, while Angola/Cuba had many thousands. It is therefore easier for the South Africans to pull back from

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border area. As for the situation in Cuito, it is political, not military. The G5 and G6 have a long range, but are ineffective and have not caused a single death recently. South Africa does not have superiority in the area of Cuito. We have decided not to push at Cuito--if South Africa needs so much time to withdraw 3,000, how much time would be needed to withdraw tens of thousands?

We propose 15 August for total South African withdrawal from Angola on the basis of the 9 August start date proposed by General Geldenhuys. One week is sufficient for 3,000 troops waiting as long as the first two weeks of September is not necessary.

LTC Seta said that, according to what the South Africans had said the previous day, they were concerned about Cuban and SWAPO troops, and that they should withdraw 360 kilometers inside Angola -- while the South Africans would go only as far as the Namibian border. Obviously it would not be rational for Angola/Cuba to accept.

COL Morejon called for all to be realistic. Each party knows the other's capabilities. Cubans/Angolans are disciplined forces, and we believe the South Africans can control their troops. We should not complicate this phase of South African withdrawal from Angola by adopting the South African proposal. At any rate, we do not wish to reply to South African harassment, and do not wish to add bureaucratic complexities to the withdrawal process.

LTC Seta said that the South African proposal called for the withdrawal process to be completed before the middle of September. If it does take so much time, it will damage trust we are trying to build. South Africa does not trust our interests even though we have restated our proposed guarantees several times. Cuba/Angola can control their troops. What is lacking is trust.

MG Van Tonder stated that:

1) We have to work from reality: there is a conflict in the area. Fighting continues even though the current round of negotiations has been going on for the last two and a half months. We need to build trust before 2 August.

2) Of course, we are not talking about Angolan troops. And any understanding will be a decision by the sovereign government of Angola.

3) What appears as bureaucratic complexity is actually a different (decentralized) concept of command and control. Our commanders receive guidelines and restrictions. They make decisions concerning their security on the basis of their own analysis on the ground. We want to put our commanders in a

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commanders receive guidelines and restrictions. They make decisions concerning their security on the basis of their own

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position where they cannot be faced with conflict. We can discuss the question of the aircraft later (after we have a chance to talk with our leadership). We must take small steps.

LTC Beraud summarized the proceedings and noted that the South African party had offered to withdraw by 15 September, while the Angolan/Cuban side had demanded a 15 August withdrawal. He suggested that all parties consider a compromise date around 1 September.

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Meetings of the Principals Plus One, 1125, 23 July 1988

Participants: -

U.S.: DASD James L. Woods, LTC Jean-Michel A. Beraud

Angola: LTG Antonio Franca NDalu, Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of FAPLA; COL Antonio Jose Maria, Secretary of the President for Defense; and interpreter.

Cuba: Division General (MG) Ulises Rosales del Toro, First Vice Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR); COL Eduardo Morejon Estevez, General Staff; and interpreter.

South Africa: General Janie Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African defense Force; MG Cornelius Jacobus (N.) Van Tonder, Staff of the Chief of Defense Force.

Minutes:

Mr. Woods opened the session by asking the participants where they stood.

MG del Toro said that the Cubans/Angolans understood the statements General Geldenhuys made in New York concerning the intentions of South Africa to withdraw from Angola as a sovereign gesture of its own will, and that an instruction to cease hostilities had been given South African troops as a demonstration of good faith. We studied the alternatives, and drafted a number of criteria to demonstrate Angolan/Cuban good faith. We have studied the linkage with a global agreement and established that we are seeking:

- the cessation of hostilities
- a commitment to keep Cuban troops to a certain line
- a way of seeking a solution to problems between South Africa and SWAPO

We also took into consideration the South African request concerning water and electricity from the Cunene river. With our solution, there are no winners or losers, and the Angolan border is reestablished with South African withdrawal. We do not understand the need to prolong the South African withdrawal with a complex scheme. We proposed 15 August because we believe the South Africans do not need more than 48 or 72 hours to leave Angola if we give the guarantee that they will not be attacked as they withdraw. General Geldenhuys' statements reinforce our confidence, but your proposal to have our forces withdraw 360 kilometers would make us losers. We cannot admit limitations on Angola as far as the use of its territory is concerned. We have as they withdraw. General Geldenhuys' statements reinforce our

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no right to put their sovereignty in question. We accept the need for checkpoints and joint groups, but there can be no area where Angola does not control its own soil.

We defined a line beyond which there should be no (Cuban/SWAPO) movement. We do not understand the objectives of the South African proposal. We believe we have given a response to South African concerns in our own proposal.

We do not want to leave these talks without some progress. These could be a cease-fire if we had an agreement on South African withdrawal from Angola. We ask that General Geldenhuys reconsider our proposal.

LTG NDalu expressed his confidence that an understanding could be reached. We know that there are problems in South Africa, but there are problems in Angola as well. The South African presence is a problem in Angola. We are dealing with a concrete situation where one side, South Africa, must agree to leave Angola, and the other must provide guarantees according to South African needs. However, we find the time South Africa requested to be too long, and the separation (physical distance) to be too great. "We consider the border as one only". There can be no cease fire as long as South African troops remain in Angola. We will continue to examine the situation in Cuito Cuanavale. If we solve the military problem, we will have made great strides in solving the overall problem. The Angolan and Cuban delegations came to this meeting with a mandate to arrive at a solution.

Gen Geldenhuys said he needed clarification. When I offered South African withdrawal from Angola, I did not have a mandate to take that initiative. When I made the request to get the proposal implemented, I was also asking for something to justify my actions vis a vis my government.

Can you give me point by point what I can offer my government for the early withdrawal of South African troops from Angola?

Mr. Woods intervened to say that he did not share the apparent feeling of the other parties that there had not been a lot of progress since the day before. There are still important gaps that will require important concessions on both sides.

In view of the time table (pressure to finish before the departure of the South African delegation at 1400), there are practical ways to close these gaps in two hours, perhaps at the executive level. Failing that, we can recommend that a few military members arrive in Geneva early (to work out compromises). For example, the SWAPO question was not addressed in the initial Cuban/Angolan proposal. Or we could achieve compromises on specific points in separate bilaterals.

compromises). For example, the SWAPO question was not addressed in the initial Cuban/Angolan proposal. Or we could achieve

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-Timing can be negotiated. If it were simple, we would not take so much time in negotiations.

-If we agree on South African withdrawal from Angola, we are sure Angola will do all they can (to facilitate that withdrawal).

-Conditions are more serious now than before, and we need to come to an agreement.

-The South African withdrawal from Angola is politically significant, and is related to the main agreement.

Mr. Woods proposed that, in light of the impending departure of General Geldenhuys, the Working Group continue working (if the South African delegation is willing to leave behind two or three officers), and report its findings in Geneva. Unresolved problems will then be part of the agenda in Geneva. The Working Group report would be ad referendum to the principals and would be to

- 1) show progress
- 2) recommend specific proposals,
- 3) and especially address the SWAPO problem.

Remember that timing problems are addressed in UNSCR 435 and that the date for implementation of UNSCR 435 is set by the Secretary General. Guarantees should not be given ahead of the 435 process. During this fuzzy period SWAPO could endanger the withdrawal of South African troops and jeopardize the negotiations. We do not want to allow SWAPO to hold the negotiations hostage.

-If the SWAPO problem is too hard for discussion right now, it should be addressed in Geneva.

Gen Geldenhuys requested a 20 minute break to "reframe what we are willing to do". He proposed that all parties draw up a list of proposals so that the mediators could determine common ground and areas where differences still exist.

Each party then drew up a list and turned it in to the mediator who amalgamated the proposals into lists of agreements and requests for the South Africans and for the Cubans/Angolans.

When the session resumed at 1500, Mr. Woods reviewed the mediator's findings and a discussion of each item ensued. Mr. Woods proposed that the difference between the dates for completion of South Africa withdrawal (15 August and 15

When the session resumed at 1500, Mr. Woods reviewed the

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LTG NDalu replied that the Cuban/Angolan position was to request South African withdrawal from Angola.

--South Africa is requesting guarantees

- that our groupings do not cross the border;
- that we avoid conflict that would jeopardize the negotiations;
- and that we control SWAPO

--In our proposal

- we can give guarantees of our groupings and propose the line we discussed earlier
- we also propose no official understanding, but offer to take all precautions to avoid incidents;
- we will observe actions by South African forces.

Gen Geldenhuys answered that a possibility to reach an agreement exists.

-We do not want to use the negotiations as a means to establish control of SWAPO. The only problem is that they could have a negative influence on the conduct of the negotiations if there are contacts between SWAPO and South African troops, for example, or if there are bombardments across the border, as happens from time to time. This could be accompanied by a cross-border raid. The question is "Do we respond to bombardments?"

As for the question of water, that could be negotiated after the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, and does not need to be addressed here.

-The protraction of time which is unacceptable to you may be a misunderstanding and the question of an early withdrawal is subject to interpretation.

Our withdrawal could start as early as 7 or 8 August. Its duration is not a big problem, and can be changed by one or two weeks.

-Whatever arrangement we reach should not give the impression that there is a winner or a loser.

Can we get closer on the matter of reciprocal actions?

- on the cessation of hostilities;
- on the withdrawal of South African troops.

-on the cessation of hostilities-

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September respectively), be split, and all readily agreed to a 1 September date.

The discussions resulted in the acceptance of the document at enclosure 1. The typed version of the document was accepted by the Cuban/Angolan side, and was forwarded to the South Africans by courier since they had to leave before its completion.

All parties agreed to the joint press release at enclosure 2, with the understanding that it would also be given to the Government of Cape Verde for its use.

The meeting adjourned at 1630.

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