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Regional Security Studies Center

Technical Report  
RSSC-TR 7675-2

(THAI COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS COMMAND)  
**TRAINING FOR CSOC OPERATIONS  
PLAN NO. 9 (U)**

By: P. B. G. WALLER

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Prepared for:

U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND  
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

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Menlo Park California 94025 USA

SRI Project 7675

DECEMBER 1970

Regional Security Studies Center

Technical Report  
RSSC-TR 7675-2

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### TRAINING FOR CSOC OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 9 (U)

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6 Aug 1992

By

P. B. G. WALLER

Prepared for:

U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND  
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

CONTRACT DAAH01-69-C-0919

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PREFACE (U)

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(U) The research accomplished by Stanford Research Institute under the terms of ARPA Contract DAAH01-69-C-0919 is presented in four separate reports, as described below:

1. Evaluation of CSOC Operations Plan No. 9 (U)\*

(U) (2) This report is limited to an assessment of one of the Royal Thai Government's programs under CSOC (Communist Suppression Operations Command) for improving control of insurgent activities in border areas. The specific program evaluated is one carried out in a small border zone at the eastern end of Changwat Nong Khai, utilizing selected personnel from the local populace to serve as informants and as reinforcements to police-led strike forces. SRI employed Thai researchers to collect the data, make observations, and report their findings on the efforts of the local Thai officials to implement this operational plan. Limited field tests were designed by SRI to collect additional data needed to estimate the potential of this RTG concept. The evaluation covers the time period from January 1969 through June 1970; it is incomplete in the sense that the implementation of Plan No. 9 was just approaching the operational phase at the end of this evaluation period provided under SRI's contract.

2. Training for CSOC Operations Plan No. 9 (U)

(U) (2) The present report supplements that listed above; it describes and evaluates in particular the training program for village informants and strike force volunteers as planned and implemented under Plan 9 during the research period. The training assessment is based on written reports made by SRI's Thai observers who monitored the instruction periods and field exercises. Also presented are specific recommendations and a suggested outline for future training of this type, as prepared by the senior SRI analyst who followed the training program from its initial planning.

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\* (U) Technical Report RSSC-TR 7675-1; Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, December 1970. (Confidential)

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## GLOSSARY (U)

Amphoe	Administrative district of a changwat (Comparable to a county)
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
Ban/Muban	Village
BC HQ	Border Control Headquarters
BCS	Border Control System
BMI	Battelle Memorial Institute
BPP	Border Patrol Police
Changwat	Administrative province of Thailand
C <sup>3</sup>	Command-Control-Communications
CI	Counterinsurgency
CPM	Civil-Police-Military
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Command
CT	Communist Terrorist
DOLA	Department of Local Administration
DDP	Developing Democracy Program
EEl	Essential Elements of Information
FTX	Field Training Exercise
Kamnan	Head of a Tambon
King-Amphoe	Sub-district of a changwat
LCS	Local Control Station
MP	Marine Police
MRDC	Military Research and Development Center
MRS	Mekong River (Surveillance) System
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTX	Map Training Exercise
Nai Amphoe	District Officer
ORT	Operational Readiness Testing
Palad	Deputy (to changwat or amphoe head)
PAT	People's Assistance Teams

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## Glossary (Concluded)

PP	Provincial Police
Psyops	Psychological Operations
Puyaiban	Village headman
RDC-T	Research and Development Center - Thailand
RCP	River Check Point
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTG	Royal Thai Government
SAF	Special Action Force
SF	Strike Force
SOC	Special Operations Center
SOP	Standing Operations Procedures
SOT	Special Operations Team
SRI	Stanford Research Institute
TA	Target Area
Tambon	Subdivision of an amphoe
VDC	Volunteer Defense Corps
VI	Village Informant
VPT	Village Protection Team
VPU	Village Protection Unit
VSDU	Village Security and Development Unit
VSU	Village Security Unit
VV	Village Volunteer
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator

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## SUMMARY (U)

A. Purpose (U)

(U) This is one of several related reports of research performed by Stanford Research Institute (SRI) under the overall task objective of assisting the Thai-U.S. Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) to evaluate RTG plans for improving security operations along the Thai-Lao border.

(U) The specific purpose of this report is to present a detailed description and evaluation of the training program initiated under Operations Plan No. 9 of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC). Recommendations toward improvement of future training of this type are also presented.

B. Background (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ CSOC Operations Plan No. 9 was instituted in early 1969 in a restricted area extending 54 kilometers along the Mekong River border in Changwat Nong Khai of Northeast Thailand. The plan called for the coordination of military, paramilitary, and police units under the Nong Khai CPM (Civil-Police-Military command) with the mission of deterring communist infiltration and insurgent activities in the border area.

(U) ~~(C)~~ An essential feature of the plan was the recruitment, training, and use of volunteer personnel from the villages within the area. Some of these volunteers were to serve as "village informants"--their role being to detect and report suspicious movements or insurgent activities in or about their respective villages. A second group of village volunteers were to serve in strike force units under police leadership. The present report covers the basic and field training of 140 village informants and 40 strike force personnel as conducted by the Nong Khai CPM from May 1969 through June 1970.

C. Approach (U)

(U) The basic training classes were monitored by SRI's Thai research personnel, with two observers attending each session. Each observer wrote a report of his observations in a standard format, covering the factual details of lesson content and presentation methods, as

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well as his assessment of the effectiveness of the instruction. The field exercises were similarly reported by one or more observers.

(U) These performance reports were screened and assessed, in turn, by SRI analysts. The senior SRI evaluator then combined these results with his own observations of the program planning and development to arrive at an overall evaluation. Curricula, schedules, instructors, and training methods were appraised in terms of their effectiveness in fulfilling the training requirements for Plan 9 operations.

(U) An evaluation of this training program in terms of operational results was largely precluded by the fact that the Plan 9 system had only begun to be operational by the end of the evaluation period afforded by the research contract. Nonetheless, the developmental planning and initial training experience within this period afforded insights into the problems involved and their potential remedy.

D. Findings and Conclusions (U)

- (U) 1. ~~(S)~~ The training experience at Nong Khai indicated that it is feasible to train villagers for the informant and strike force roles assigned under Plan 9. About 90% of the trainees were judged as trainable.
- (U) 2. ~~(S)~~ Overall, the training program observed did not fully meet the requirements of Plan 9. However, it is considered that the Plan 9 mission and objectives can be accomplished with future correction of the particular deficiencies seen during the initial training experience-- as noted below.
- (U) 3. ~~(S)~~ The Nong Khai training program was inadequately planned and executed. This was due in part to the initial lack of clearly defined training objectives. Imbalances as to course content and scheduling, lack of qualified and adequately prepared instructors, and inappropriate training methods were all seen as contributing to the failure of approximately half the trainees to adequately grasp the course material presented.
- (U) 4. ~~(S)~~ Improved results during the later courses were attributed to better qualified instructors and greater emphasis on practical demonstrations and individual practice, as opposed to lectures. Technical subjects, especially map reading, communications, and weaponry, were not well assimilated and call for more individual practice at a more practical level.

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- (U) 5. ~~(C)~~ Classes were too large to permit the amount of individual instruction and practice needed.
- (U) 6. ~~(C)~~ The training program placed too large a burden on the regular CPM operational and administrative staff, but the problems encountered did point up the value of having key CPM officials fully involved in the planning, implementation, and coordination of the program.
- (U) 7. ~~(C)~~ The delay which ensued between the basic and field training programs resulted in lost ground on the part of the trainees. This emphasized the need not only for careful advance planning of the overall program, but also for periodic operational-readiness checks and refresher exercises as a follow-up to initial training.
- (U) 8. ~~(C)~~ The unsatisfactory results of the field training exercises indicated the need for more comprehensive basic training, especially for the strike forces. Also demonstrated was the need for participation in field and command post exercises by all RTA operational units in the Plan 9 area, together with advance briefing sessions for all officials involved in the exercises.

E. Recommendations (U)

- (U) 1. ~~(C)~~ A revision of the training plan is recommended to correct the imbalances and deficiencies seen in course content, scheduling, preparation and instructional techniques. (A suggested outline plan is given in Section VI.)
- (U) 2. ~~(C)~~ The village informant's role should be redefined to resolve the present contradiction between his overt recruitment and training and his supposedly covert role on return to his village. It is suggested that only two informants be trained from each village, that they operate overtly, and that they undertake the recruitment and training of additional village informants as their helpers. This would also reduce the basic training load, which resulted in too large training classes.
- (U) 3. ~~(C)~~ To relieve the training load on the CPM officials and also enhance the quality of instruction, it is suggested that special, experienced training teams (such as the BPP and RTA mobile training teams) be provided from outside sources.

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## I INTRODUCTION (U)

### A. Background (U)

#### 1. Origin of Plan 9 (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Operations Plan No. 9 was prepared by the Nong Khai CPM (Civil-Police-Military Command) in October 1968 as the outgrowth of an earlier directive issued by the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC). This CSOC directive (called "Operations Concept 111") had proposed to strengthen security against communist infiltration and activities within certain border zones along the Mekong River. Subsequently, CSOC had requested that each of the border CPMs prepare a border control plan which would incorporate the use of local villagers as a primary source of information and manpower. With its approval of Operations Plan No. 9, CSOC directed that it be implemented by the Nong Khai CPM as a border control project within a designated restricted area of that changwat.

#### 2. Plan 9 Concept (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ In essence, Plan 9 was designed to improve the effectiveness of border control\* operations, in a narrow zone along the Thai-Lao border, by recruiting and training local villagers to act as agents/observers and as strike force personnel in conjunction with existing operational resources.

(U) It was recognized by all concerned from the beginning that the plan was flexible and subject to adaptation as it progressed. And so it proved to be.

(U) ~~(S)~~ There were several unusual features of the plan, the most important of which was the proposed utilization of village volunteers, trained from local resources, as intelligence agents. In reality, owing to the methods of recruiting and training them and their mode of operations, they could never become the clandestine intelligence

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\* (U) As used throughout the report, this term encompasses counterinsurgency operations in general, as well as counter-infiltration operations in particular.

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(U) (C)

operators originally envisaged by the planners, and their role subsequently resolved into observing, collecting and reporting information. (They will henceforth be referred to as village informants, to distinguish them from the village volunteers (VV) in the Strike Forces). Although village security forces had been locally raised and trained before in Northeast Thailand, viz the Village Protection Teams (VPT), and 010/020 hunter-killer teams of Changwat Ubon, the concept of covering an area with trained local observers possessing a quick-reporting capacity was a unique undertaking in the Thai counterinsurgency campaign. It was a concept which, if successful, could be applied to security problems in inland as well as in border areas.

### 3. Plan 9 Provisions (U)

(U) (C) As stated in the Plan 9 document, the mission is "to establish a Border Control Headquarters, Local Control Stations, and Strike Forces for countering Communist infiltration from abroad along the Mekong River in Amphoes Bung Kan and Seka; in order to provide public security--searching for, following and eliminating CT in the area; and cutting off support and reinforcement from abroad."

(U) (C) Four phases of plan implementation were laid down as follows:

Phase One - Establishing the restricted area, conducting a population census and census of persons working or having relatives on the Lao side, controlling those crossing to work, screening of persons in restricted area, and resettlement of suspects.

Phase Two - Establishing control centers, deployment of VSUs\* to operate under the plan, and the recruitment, training and equipment of village intelligence and Strike Force personnel.

(U)

(C) There are altogether five Village Security Units (VSU) in the Plan 9 area, as indicated in Fig. 4 on page 65. Three of these are, in fact, Village Protection Units (VPU) and two are River Check Posts (RCP). Since their capability and functions under Plan 9 are similar, they will be referred to collectively as VSU throughout this paper.

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Phase Three - Operating in accordance with the plan.

Phase Four - (Restricted information)

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No timings for these four phases were specified except an allowance of 30 days for Phase Two, which was to include at least 15 days' training for the village informants and Strike Force personnel.

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A comprehensive budget was included, providing for buildings, transportation equipment, weapons and allowances. Important items for the purposes of this paper were that all volunteers were to be armed, each village was to be equipped with a radio, and the remuneration of volunteers was laid down as \$16 per diem for Strike Force personnel and budgeted to allow \$100 a month each for village informants--although the method of payment was not specified.

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Staffing of the Plan 9 units was laid down as follows:

Border Control Center - A total of 15 civilian, police and military officers and NCOs (the same personnel as for Target Area 2 Headquarters at Ban Sri Vi Lai with which the BC HQ was to be co-located).

Local Control Center - 7 Police NCOs for command, control and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) functions at each center.

Strike Force - 4 Police NCOs and 20 Village Volunteers (VV) at each center.

Village Informant Personnel - A total of 145 persons, 5 in each of the 29 villages in the restricted area.

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(U)

(C) Existing security force assets in the restricted area under the control of the Nong Khai CPM (i.e., five Village Security Units) were to be incorporated into the new plan, and other operational units such as the Border Patrol Police (BPP), Marine Police (MP). The RTA Special Operations Center (SOC), an RTA Psyops Team and certain intelligence organizations, were to support as necessary. (The Plan 9 area, control elements, communications, and associated operational units are shown at Fig. 4.)

(U) (C) A training curriculum was not attached to the order (it was issued separately seven months later) but these salient points were included:

"Training and equipment preparation: when personnel listed have been selected, the following should be executed -

- (a) Carry out the training curriculum, with at least 15 days of training.
- (b) Training for personnel of the BC HQ, LCS, Strike Force and Village Intelligence Personnel should be given on the mission, chain of command, procedures [SOP], and the use of weapons.
- (c) Preparation of arms and ammunition, communications, and other equipment, as necessary, for training and operations."

(U)

(C) A particular point to be noted in examination of the Plan 9 document is that it does not contain specific operational objectives. Under the heading "Concept of Operation" are listed certain broad objectives:

"Counter-infiltration activity along the border should be conducted continuously over a long period of time...

These activities include:

- Providing public security to border area villagers.
- Selecting volunteers for training and assignment in intelligence functions against local CT activity.

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- Carrying out psyops and civic action with the aim to persuade and promote the villagers' cooperation with the Government in countering CT infiltration along the border line.
- Finally, continuous patrolling of both ground and river."

(U) ~~(S)~~ Another omission from the plan is any reference to operational tactics. Thus, in addition to a lack of precision as to exactly what is required in the operation there is no direction on operational methods. These deficiencies in regard to objectives and tactics in the plan are important not only to comprehending the subsequent evolution of the operation but also to a proper assessment of the training function.

#### 4. Early Developments (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ After submission of the Plan 9 draft to CSOC, there were correspondence and meetings between CSOC and CPM officials on operational, training and financial aspects. (SRI was not in the picture at the time; thus, details are not known.) At one time (in February 1969), CPM officials stated that the plan would start on 1 March with the first batch of informant trainees, and the full training program, including the Strike Force, was scheduled to finish on May 11, but several postponements were subsequently made because the necessary funds were not available.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Final approval of the plan was given in early May, followed by the recruitment of 70 village informants in the second week of May and their immediately subsequent training which started on 19 May. In the meantime, the first phase--establishment of the restricted area and population census--had not been carried out, and this was not to take place until after the completion of the intelligence and Strike Force basic training in August. Neither were the control centers established nor were the VSUs deployed under Phase Two of the plan at this time.

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5. Development of Basic and Field Training Phases (U)

- (U) (X) Plan 9 originally called for only basic training sessions for village informants and Strike Force personnel. Following approval of the plan by the RTG Supreme Command in May 1969 and provision by CSOC of funds for salaries, per diem, and other operational and training expenses, the program began with the basic training of 140 villagers who had been selected to become village informants in the 28 villages inside the Plan 9 restricted area. The three weeks' course was given to two consecutive classes of 70 men each. Immediately afterward, four weeks' basic paramilitary training was given to the village volunteers and Provincial Police (PP) personnel selected for the two 24-man Strike Forces.
- (U) (X) This initial training program ended on 31 July 1969. The results, which will be discussed in detail in the next section, pointed up the need for more extensive training, including more practical exercise in operational tactics. Also, it should be noted here, the daily involvement of the responsible CPM officials in the training process had led them to expand the basic operational concept into new tactical doctrine. This, in turn, called for extensive field practice (map training, field training and command post exercises) in order to weld together the surveillance, C<sup>3</sup> and apprehension elements into an effective working system.
- (U) (X) Further reasons for such field training were that the other operational units associated with Plan 9--Marine Police, BPP, SOC and VSUs--had received no training whatsoever in tactics designed specifically for border control operations; neither had the communications system and command/control centers for Plan 9 been established, or tested.

(U) It was decided, therefore, that further individual, unit, and joint training was needed and that this could best be achieved by a series of field training and command post exercises that would practice and test all elements of the system.

(U) Since the basic training and advanced field training were essentially different in purpose, location and timing, they will be addressed separately in the following sections of this report.

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B. Research Objectives and Scope (U)

(U) (2) The work reported herein was a portion of the research effort conducted under the following overall task objectives:

(1) To assist the joint Thai-U.S. Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) in the evaluation of CSOC border security plans.

(2) To make recommendations for improving Plan 9 operations.

(U) (2) The specific objective of the training evaluation was to produce recommendations on instructional content, methods and phasing--with these recommendations leading to the formulation of a training plan for implementation in other areas along the Thai-Lao border. Subsidiary objectives were to establish training reference levels for interpreting test data for other portions of the Plan 9 evaluation; and to provide feedback for improving the ongoing Nong Khai CPM training activities.

(U) (2) In scope, this report is confined to an evaluation of the Plan 9 training program as it was planned and implemented from May 1969 through June 1970. The conclusions and recommendations are limited to those bearing directly on the training aspects of Plan 9; the overall evaluation of Plan 9 operations is contained in a companion report (see Preface).

C. Research Approach (U)

1. Basic Training Evaluation (U)

(U) During the basic training program, two Thai research personnel attended each lesson and produced, independently, written reports in a standard format. The reports included details of the type of lesson--lecture, demonstration and exercise--and what visual aids, if any, were used. Each report had a narrative on the scope and themes of the lesson, an assessment of the instructor's knowledge and degree of preparation, his delivery, mannerisms, and attitude to trainees; comments were also made on the trainees' attitude toward instruction, together with the evaluators' subjective assessments

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of the degree of their understanding and assimilation of lessons. A sample lesson report is attached as Appendix A to this report.

(U) All lesson reports were monitored regularly by an SRI professional experienced in intelligence and paramilitary training techniques--both to develop an overall evaluation and to provide the desired feedback to Changwat CPM training officials in the form of suggested amendments and improvements to the training courses as they progressed. Figure 1 illustrates this process. The more obvious and rectifiable shortcomings revealed in the training reports were discussed directly with training officials, and this led, among other things, to an increasing emphasis on practical training methods as the courses progressed. Written reports, particularly on training content and techniques, were also made.

## 2. Field Training Evaluation (U)

(U) The evaluation method during the field training phase was essentially the same as for basic training, save that it was seldom possible to have more than one evaluator present at each of the various scenes of action. All training activities were covered, however, and the reports of the assigned evaluators were supplemented by those of SRI personnel involved in Task One field testing, which took place during the field training period. Personal observation by SRI professionals, prohibited during most of the basic program, was also possible by this time and this greatly assisted in evaluating not only the standards of training achieved but also the previous reports of the evaluators.

## 3. Limitations (U)

(U) Assessments of training may be objective or subjective. Objective assessments can be achieved through written tests and controlled performance tests, but since these were not applied during the basic training and only minimally during field training, they were ruled out as an assessment vehicle. Subjective assessments of training can be made by experienced instructors on rating scales such as the STANINE GRADE\*. But even

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\* A system based on the curve of normal distribution of individual trainee performance by a series of tests throughout the training program.

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
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FIG. 1 TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROCEDURE CYCLE (U)

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this--perhaps the least satisfactory method of training assessment--was not feasible, owing to (1) the inexperience of the observers in training matters, and (2) the restriction of their activities to observation only, in as inconspicuous a manner as possible.

(U) Thus, from the outset it was recognized that the training evaluation was to be limited to a broad-gauge assessment of a training experiment. The observers were schooled in making their assessments deliberate, isolated, and comparative; and they caught on surprisingly quickly to the elementary principles of instruction and an understanding of major faults. From a detailed written account of what they themselves had learned (and separately reported), it was possible to gain a good picture of the methods and quality of instruction, and also a fair assessment of what the trainees assimilated. The initial evaluation process was later complemented and supplemented by the field training exercises, which served to confirm or amend the preliminary findings. During this latter phase, in which SRI staff more fully participated, a more substantive assessment of performance was achieved, although not all of the trainees were involved.

(U) A word is appropriate here regarding the assertions, often didactic, which will be made as to the theory and practice of instruction. This is done only to establish a yardstick for the criticisms, comments, and suggestions that follow, and in all cases they are drawn from the standard teaching of the Thai, British, U.S., and other sources quoted in the bibliography (Appendix K). Specific references are made in the text only when strictly necessary, in order to avoid repetitious footnotes.

(U) In the end, of course, the evaluative opinions expressed are necessarily those of the author. He has drawn on his experience of eight years with the training schools of the Royal Malaysia Police--the training department of which he headed from 1963 to 1966. These schools covered paramilitary, intelligence, and technical training as well as routine police subjects.

#### 4. Constraints (U)

(U) (C) The SRI participation in evaluating the basic training program for Plan 9 was undertaken on the condition that only Thai research personnel would attend classes. Background assistance and advice on this initial training was welcomed by CPM officials, after

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it had been made clear that formal advisory support was not desired. It was necessarily to be very much a Thai operation and foreign presence was to be kept, understandably, to a minimum. The relationship, therefore, was somewhat delicate and needed a considerable amount of understanding and cooperation on both sides. There are many problems inherent in a situation where outsiders are not only looking over the shoulders of officials but are, in fact, evaluating their performance. This becomes particularly sensitive when the outsiders in question are known to be linked, however tenuously, with those officials' ultimate superior (i.e., CSOC). This position was further complicated by the problem that the village informants were intended to be trained as covert agents, with the consequent need to safeguard their identities and modus operandi.

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It was only to be expected, then, that SRI research personnel were treated with some reservation at the beginning, that they should be given access to the minimum amount of restricted information, and that they should be required to operate at very low profile. That these initial doubts gradually and steadily disappeared is a tribute to the tact, sincerity, and willingness to assist displayed by personnel involved.

(U) ✓

It was perhaps the experiential approach to Plan 9 that allowed this cooperation to be established in the first place; and encouraged it not only through the basic training process but also in the evolution of the operational concepts and tactics upon which the field training was based; and thereafter in the field training itself.

D. Acknowledgments (U)

(U) Without the cooperation of the Governor of Changwat Nong Khai and officials of the CPM, particularly the two (successive) Military Advisors and the G2/3, this evaluation could not have been attempted. SRI is indebted to all of these officials for their tolerance and goodwill, and also to officials of MRDC, CSOC and RDC-T who approved and supported the project.

(U) A special note is made of the loyal and dedicated service of Wanchai Sukachiwa, SRI Research Associate, who participated in the training process from beginning to end; also of the other Thai research personnel who observed and reported various basic and field training sessions--namely, Kobkla Sirimas, SRI Research Assistant, Pakdi Rattanaphol, SRI

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Data Collector, Suvan Sriswat, BMI Data Collector Supervisor, Nopporn Paripunna, SRI Research Analyst, and Somphon Sripiphanta, SRI Research Assistant. Finally, recognition is due to Major Theb Linakanist, SRI Research Associate, both for his accurate and quick translations of many documents and for participation as an instructor in the basic training program at the request of the Nong Khai CPM.

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II BASIC TRAINING - VILLAGE INFORMANTS AND STRIKE FORCES (U)

A. Training Schedule (U)

(U) (2) Phase Two of Plan 9, as amended, called for three weeks' training of 140 villagers selected to become informants for the 28 villages in the 5 km-deep restricted areas of Amphoes Bung Kan and Seka, where the border control operation was to be mounted. Two groups of 70 villagers were to be trained consecutively and this was to be followed immediately by four weeks' paramilitary training of the two 20-man Strike Forces to be used in the restricted areas.

(U) (2) On 18 May 1969, the day before the first training course actually started, the Nong Khai CPM issued order 134/2512, which scheduled the village informant courses and the Strike Force course as shown in the first column below. Subsequently, all courses were shortened and the actual dates fell as indicated.

	<u>Schedule per Order</u>	<u>Actual Schedule</u>
First Informant Course:	17 May-6 June, 21 days	19 May-4 June, 17 days
Second Informant Course:	7 June-27 June, 21 days	16 June-3 July, 18 days
Strike Force Course:	28 June-26 July, 29 days	7 July-31 July, 25 days

The reason for courses being shortened was unavailability of scheduled instructors, and the gap between the first and second informant courses was caused by the difficulties of recruiting villagers during the wet (paddy planting) season, which broke in late May. All together, various postponements caused a slippage of nearly 12 weeks beyond the originally projected completion date of mid-May. Table 1 illustrates the successive schedule revisions.

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(C) TRAINING SCHEDULE CHANGES (U)  
Table 1

Course	(1969) March	April	May	June	July
	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24
First Informant Course	.....		-----		
Second Informant Course		.....		-----	
Strike Force Course		.....			-----

- ..... Originally projected dates
- Dates scheduled in training order 134/2512
- Actual dates

(U) It will be noted that the planned courses were considerably longer than the 15-day minimum laid down in the Plan 9 order and that the aggregate training period for the three courses was more than double the 30 days allowed for Phase Two in the plan. The individual durations of the courses were determined entirely pragmatically, according to the CPM training supervisor, based upon (a) training funds available, (b) the operational requirements, and (c), in the case of the Strike Force, by paramilitary training experience, e.g., the VDC basic training program.

B. Recruitment of Trainees (U)

(U) (C) For the first informant course, villagers were recruited rather hurriedly and

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informally in the preceding week by the Nai Amphoes of Bung Kan and Seka, there being some indications of conscription rather than a call for volunteers as envisaged in the plan. The overall caliber of trainees on this course, as judged by the two Thai course evaluators, was low.

(U) ~~(S)~~ For the second observer course, however, the Nai Amphoes were given more notice and used their kamnans and puyaibans in the recruiting process. Many villagers volunteered, and the caliber of trainees was distinctly higher than those of the first course--in the opinion of the CPM G2/3 and the Thai researchers.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Nai Amphoes also recruited the Strike Force personnel, assisted by local security officials including the local amphoe RTA recruiting officers. The quality of the villagers trained on this course was comparatively very high, recruitment being much facilitated by the fact that it was made known that the Strike Forces were to be paid regularly.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Table 2 summarizes the backgrounds of trainees, as derived from questionnaires the trainees filled in during their training period. The statistics show that the majority of trainees had received education up to Prathom 4 level (i.e., four years of village elementary education); they were practically all rice growers; their ages ranged from 17 to 60 with 80% under 40; and they had mostly had a lifelong acquaintance with the villages from which they were recruited. Although some of the informants had more or less been conscripted into service (the completed questionnaires are too obscure for an accurate number), they were almost all keen to learn initially. However, their motivation dropped off considerably when they were told that they would be rewarded only for specific information, rather than be given a small monthly retainer in addition to rewards, as they had expected when recruited.

(U) ~~(S)~~ It is worth mentioning at this stage that the problem of regular remuneration to the village informants, both for their out-of-pocket expenses and to maintain their interest and motivation, has not been satisfactorily resolved even now (July 1970). The original Plan 9 budget provides for payment of about B 100 a month to each informant, and most, if not all, of the trainees did receive B 100 for two or three months following

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Table 2  
~~(S)~~ TRAINEES' BACKGROUNDS (U)

Course	No. of Trainees	Ages			Married		Primary Occupation <sup>o</sup>		Years in School							Years in Village				
		17-30	31-45	46-60	No.	%	Rice Farmer	Other <sup>a</sup>	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<1	1	5	108 over
First Informant	70	31	31	8	37	52%	90%	10%	5	60	1		1			3				70
Second Informant	75**	47	23	5	40	53	82	17	1	65	1	1	4		1	2			8	67
Strike Force	40	24	16	-	23	58	86	14	1	35			2			2	2		4	34
Totals	185	102	70	13	100	53	86%	14%	7	160	2	1	7		1	2	2		12	171

\* (U) Other occupations: phuyaiban, carpenter, teacher, barber, hawker, poultry man, and swineherd.

\*\* ~~(S)~~ Including 5 villagers from King Amphoe Sang Khom, where an extension of Plan 9 was being considered.

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their return to their villages. This practice was discontinued, for reasons unknown, in October or November 1969, since when none of the informants has received anything in the way of a regular retainer. Added to this, even the most zealous informants have had little or no chance to gather any worthwhile information, since insurgent infiltration and other activities in and around the Plan 9 area have almost ceased since mid-1969.

(U) (C) It is known, moreover, that some informants have complained about the lack of financial incentive. This point has been made to responsible CPM officials who, although sympathetic to the informants' plight, have not yet been able to solve the problem. As matters stand, this seems a serious obstacle to the implementation of Plan 9.

(U) (C) Strike Force personnel, on the other hand, have had no such problem. They have regularly been paid \$16 per diem since they were recruited and are generally better off than VDC and VSDU personnel in the Bung Kan/Seka area, who are reported not to receive their per diem with such regularity.

C. Assignment of Instructors (U)

1. Sources (U)

(U) Nineteen instructors were scheduled for the informant courses and 10 for the Strike Force course. The training load fell heavily on the changwat CPM, especially the G2/3 who was the principal training planner, organizer and supervisor. Other officials involved were the CPM Military Advisor, the Signals Officer, the G1/G4, the Psyops Officer and the Adjutant. Other instructors were to be drawn from the 1/13 RCT and BPP Area Hqs at Udorn, the local police Special Branch, the Nong Khai PP Special Action Force (SAF), Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and the Immigration Department. In addition, one member of the SRI Thai staff, Major Theb Linakanist, an ex-RTA officer well-experienced in intelligence duties and counter-insurgency training, participated in the instructional process at the express invitation

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of the Nong Khai CPM Military Advisor and the G2/3, with whom he had been long acquainted.

(U) With this addition, the various lessons in the syllabus were covered by instructors with a background in their subjects. Whether they would also have teaching experience and would be available as scheduled remained to be seen.

2. Instructor/Trainee Ratio (U)

(U) It will be remembered that the trainees attending the three courses were to be 70, 70, 40, in that order. In four lessons (Weapon Training and Communications) an assistant instructor was also scheduled but this did not involve splitting the class into two. Thus, throughout all courses the class size ranged from 40 to 70 trainees. This was to prove a great handicap to good instruction: military training manuals commonly hold that no instructor can properly handle a class of more than 25 men. In the learning process it is commonly accepted that the maximum amount of individual practice is essential for good results, and it is obvious that the larger the class the smaller chance there is for individual participation. When classes reach fifty and a hundred, military instruction becomes mass production. From the outset, therefore, the prospects of attaining the training objectives among a majority of trainees during the basic training program were handicapped.

D. Training Objectives (U)

(U) (2) The objectives, common to the informant and Strike Force courses, were laid down in Nong Khai CPM Order 134/2512 as follows:

"Purpose of Training

1. To handle and maintain weapons for fighting and self-defense.
2. To learn basic tactical operations.
3. To understand operational orders and the command-control system.
4. To carry out tactical patrolling, and searching for and destroying insurgents in the area of responsibility.

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5. To assist in the protection of local stations (LCS), villages and village informants in the assigned operational areas, when harrassment and terrorism are carried out by the insurgents.
6. To understand government propaganda and psychological operations techniques.
7. To be responsible for assigned duties and to understand the democratic administration of the country.
8. To learn about intelligence and reporting both inside and outside the country.
9. To have a knowledge of insurgent tactical operations."

(U) (S) Although these objectives were somewhat ambitious in view of the short duration of the training courses and are unspecific in nature, they do accord generally with the concepts in Plan 9 of counter-infiltration, public security, intelligence, psychological operations, civic action, and patrolling. It remained to be seen how these objectives would be fulfilled during the training program. A point to be noted is that although the objectives of the village informant and Strike Force training were lumped together, the informants were never expected to carry out the offensive and defensive functions implied in objectives 2, 4 and 5.

E. Course Preparation (U)

1. Syllabus and Timetable - Village Informant Courses (C)

(U) (S) The block syllabus for the village informant training is shown in Table 3. A detailed syllabus and the daily timetable are attached as Appendixes B and C. Inasmuch as the syllabi were similar for both the village informant courses only one set is reproduced, although the variations in their implementation will be discussed separately under F below.

a. Comments on Syllabus (U)

(1) (U) Most of the syllabus subjects are generally in accordance with the training objectives relevant to the role of village informants as stated in Plan 9 and cover the communications function which was omitted from the list of objectives.

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(S) Table A-3  
VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING--BLOCK SYLLABUS (C)

	<u>Hours</u>
<b>A. <u>Subjects</u></b>	
1. Physical training and exercise	8
2. Hand combat	8
3. Weapon training (shotgun and carbine)	8
4. Communications	11
5. Intelligence and reporting	42
6. Map reading and compass using	12
7. Democratic administration	4
8. Communist administration	4
9. Comparison between democratic and communist administrations	4
10. Communist propaganda and recruitment	3
11. Psychological Operations	3
12. Rural development and public rehabilitation	4
13. Thai history	4
14. Airplanes, helicopters, weapons and uniforms of Red China, North Vietnam and Pathet Lao Leftist Lao soldiers	2
15. International laws in border crossing	2
16. Indoctrination	8
17. Tour	7
18. Commander's time	8
<b>B. <u>Process</u></b>	
1. Orientation to procedures and places	1 day
2. Opening ceremony	3 hours

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(2) Table A-3 (Concluded)

C. Number of Days and Hours in Training

1. Total days	21 days
2. Training days	16 days
3. Training hours	144 hours*
4. Training schedule	
0600 - 0700	Physical exercise
0900 - 1200	Class and training
1300 - 1700	
1900 - 2000	Indoctrination and entertainment

\* Excluding daily physical exercise, the actual planned lessons cover a total of 144-16 = 128 training hours (not including lesson breaks).

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(U) (2) ~~(S)~~ The syllabus attempts to cover too many subjects and too much matter, however, for minimally educated villagers. The selection of material and the allocation of time are common problems to all forms of training. It is better only to teach essentials thoroughly than to allot a proportion of time to every desirable subject. The essentials relevant to discharging an informant role are contained in items 4, 5, 6 and 14 of Table 3. These subjects total 75 hours, i.e., just over 50% of the overall syllabus. Insurgent activities (item 10) are allowed a mere 3 hours, as is government psyops (item 11). Motivational training, on the other hand, which is important but incidental to the specific training objectives, is given 28 hours, or 20% of the syllabus (items 7-9, 12, 13 and 16). This is too much for a course of this duration and purpose.

(U) (3) ~~(S)~~ No provision is made for explaining the concept of Plan 9 and the role, duties and responsibilities of village informants within this concept.

(4) (U) The detailed syllabus (Appendix B) does not indicate the instructional method or technique (lesson/demonstration/exercise) to be used in each lesson, nor is there reference to standard or specially produced lesson plans. Neither does the timetable (Appendix C).

(U) (5) ~~(S)~~ Overall, there is a flavour of training too sophisticated for the type of trainee involved, very few of whom had been exposed to military, paramilitary or any other form of training in their lives. It must be remembered, however, that the whole undertaking was necessarily experimental; there was no precedent for the attempt to convert villagers into trained informants within a three-week period.

b. Comments on Timetable (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ As indicated in Appendix C, the informant course timetable was produced weekly as the course progressed. The basic fault in this timetable is that the lessons are not sequential and not sufficiently graduated for trainees of this particular background. For example, ten of the eleven lessons on Communications were scheduled right at the beginning of the course before the trainees had any instruction on what their duties in observation and information gathering would be, and how they would be expected to record and relay their reports. Similarly, the basic principles of intelligence should have been taught earlier. It is not proposed to detail any more instances of sequence faults here

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but the interested reader can compare Appendix C with the timetable of the outline plan in Section VI , and with the recommendations for syllabus revision presented under part G.7. of this section.

(U) With further regard to lesson programming, it is an instructional tenet that to best ensure trainees' understanding and concentration, the hardest work should be scheduled in the morning when they are at their brightest, and the more interesting and practical work reserved for the afternoon when they are more fatigued. While this tenet is observed in about a half of the timetable, there are many violations. For example, the average receptivity of the trainees to three or four solid hours each of Democratic Administration, Communist Administration, Comparison between (the two) Administrations, and History would not be as great on hot afternoons as it would be in the morning. Instructor availability may have played some part in this timing, but better planning and imagination might have avoided scheduling consecutive lessons on these comparatively dull subjects at this time of day, with their highly probable result of saturation.

(U) Another basic training tenet is that the tempo of training must be controlled. In arranging a weekly timetable it is always necessary to bear in mind that work starts on a "Monday morning-ish" level, warms up on Wednesday and Thursday to its maximum, drops a little on Friday, and reaches its lowest point on Saturday in anticipation of the weekend. This tempo is therefore governed by the weekend rest, and Saturday morning is the ideal time for administrative and routine matters that require little energy. Although it is difficult to control training tempo satisfactorily in short courses, more should be done to place the essential core of training matter in the mid-week period. Examples of what should have been avoided were the intelligence lessons on Saturdays, and the seven hours of Psyops and Rural Development scheduled on the very last day in lieu of a more appropriate windup.

(U) A working week of five and a half days is the usually accepted norm for paramilitary training, particularly if the average working day contains more than eight training hours (it was nine in all three Nong Khai courses). As far as possible, Saturday afternoons should be free as well as Sundays, in order to avoid training fatigue and to allow trainees time to shop, sightsee, and otherwise refresh themselves.

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Receptivity to instruction, and hence assimilation, has traditionally been enhanced by the longer weekend rests; "crash" instruction for three weeks with only two one-day breaks is usually too much for the average man. It also throws a strain on the instructional and administrative staff, particularly if they have more than one course to teach.

(U) A notable omission from the timetable is night training in the important observation and reporting subjects. Since infiltration was known to take place usually during the hours of darkness, it should have been expected that the differences between observation by day and night would be explained (in a day lesson) and practiced by night. This comment also applies to the syllabus.

(U) Finally--perhaps a minor point on the surface, but one which can cause misunderstanding and abuse--is the omission of any regular specified breaks between lessons. The usual practice is 10 minutes after 45-50 minutes' instruction, with longer breaks, say for 20 minutes, at mid-morning and mid-afternoon for refreshment. However, such breaks were taken--and often for longer than 10 or 20 minutes--in interruption of actual lesson periods. Specification of precise lesson periods and the break between each period in the timetable would have made the situation clear to both instructors and trainees.

## 2. Syllabus and Timetable - Strike Force Course (U)

(U) The block syllabus is shown in Table 4. The detailed syllabus and the timetable are shown at Appendixes D and E. Before analyzing these it is necessary to give some details of the organization and strength of Strike Forces and the role they are expected to play in Plan 9.

### a. Role and Training Requirements for Strike Force (U)

(U) In brief, a Strike Force (SF) of 24 men, consisting of 20 village volunteers (VV), 2 Provincial Police (PP) NCOs as the leadership elements and 2 PP privates as radio operators, was to be established with and under the control of each of the two Plan 9 Local Control Stations (LCS). It was to be the first-line patrolling and response unit within the LCS area. Its basic structure is two squads of 10 VV each commanded

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Table 4

(U) STRIKE FORCE TRAINING--BLOCK SYLLABUS (U)

	<u>Hours</u>
A. <u>Subjects</u>	
1. Physical Exercise	10
2. Hand Combat	13
3. Foot Drill	7
4. Rifle Drill	11
5. Weapons Study	7
6. Firing and Firing Positions	7
7. Battle Drill and Combat Formations	14
8. Squad and Platoon Tactics	10
9. Patrolling	11
10. Grenade Throwing	7
11. Ambush and Counter-Ambush	7
12. Surprise Attacks and Raids	3
13. Guerrilla Capturing	8
14. Explosives and Sabotage	4
15. Map and Compass	14
16. Combat Intelligence	4
17. Communications	3
18. Psychological Operations	3
19. Nursing and Sanitation	3
20. Development and Rehabilitation	2
21. Democracy	2
22. Communism	2
23. Comparison of Democracy and Communism	2
24. History of Thailand	2
25. Firing with Live Ammunition	14
26. Tour	7
27. Motivational Training	16
28. Commander's Hours	7

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(U)  
(2) Table 4 (Concluded)

		<u>Hours</u>
<b>B. <u>Process</u></b>		
1.	Introduction to places and local programs	1 day
2.	Opening ceremony and orientation	3 hours
3.	Closing ceremony	4 hours
<b>C. <u>Days and Hours of Training</u></b>		
1.	Total days	29 days
2.	Training days	23 days
3.	Training hours	201 hours
4.	Training schedule	
	0600 - 0700	Physical Exercise
	0900 - 1200	Training
	1300 - 1700	
	1900 - 2000	Training and Recreation

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(C)

It is to be noted that these requirements are in accordance with the training objectives listed at part D above.

b. Comments on Syllabus (U)

(C) Comments already made on the village informant syllabus in regard to too much subject coverage, operational concept, instructional techniques, and sophistication of content, also apply to the SF syllabus. This syllabus was produced by the CPM training supervisor after studying the VDC recruit, RTA recruit, DDP (Developing Democracy Program), and Rangers' training syllabi. The course shows much more concentration on essential subjects than does the informant syllabus but, then, there were fairly ample precedents for SF-type training.

(C) It is to be noted, however, that there is no provision in the SF syllabus (nor in the informant syllabus) for insurgent tactics, which was one training objective; there is no mention of intelligence collection; and the provision of 3 hours for communications training is too little.

(C) At the outset, it was also noted that the SF course was to be shorter than other similar forms of paramilitary training. The VDC course, which is most analogous to the SF training, had been lengthened from four to six weeks, the latter period being considered the minimum necessary for imparting the basic military and paramilitary skills. Moreover, the SF role is similar to, and just as demanding as, the VDC. It would appear logical, therefore, to give the SF just as much basic training.

(C) A final, and perhaps the most important, point is that much more attention should be paid to ambush and counter-ambush training. It has always been clear that physical operations for border control will need to be able to interdict, particularly at night, the passage of insurgent personnel and supplies through a narrow border belt (in which there may never have been any permanent insurgent presence). However, the syllabus concentrates on drills and tactics (items 7, 8, 12 and 13: a total of 35 lesson periods) more suited to the regular daytime counterinsurgency operations against insurgent camps and overt activities in the interior areas of Northeast Thailand. Only 7 periods are allowed for ambush training although, together with patrolling, it was to be the prime operational tactic of Plan 9.

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c. Comments on Timetable (U)

(U) Comments made earlier on the informant course timetable regarding sequence, tempo, and rest periods also apply to the SF timetable (Appendix E). Additional comments on the latter follow.

(U) Saturation. A particular flaw in the SF timetable is the alarming amount of saturation inevitable in scheduling consecutive training on each subject in the syllabus until both it and the trainees are exhausted. For one example, all 18 actual training hours on the first three days are devoted exclusively to foot drill and weapons drill. Apart from the fact that drill is best learned in small daily doses in the coolest part of the day, and could have easily been spread evenly throughout the course because the instructors were local, nothing could have been more calculated to have put off the men, who had never been physically conditioned, than these solid, consecutive chunks of hard labor throughout the day. It is perhaps ironic that the subject of the motivational lecture on the fourth day was "Endurance."

(U)  Redundancy. Two whole days (the fourth and fifth) were given up to description, principles of aiming and firing postures for the rifle, carbine and shotgun respectively. Insofar as the shotgun was the only weapon likely to be available for the VV, a day spent on describing the characteristics and some parts of other weapons was inappropriate at this time. It also took another day to go through the principles of aiming and firing postures for each weapon individually when, although aiming a shotgun is not quite the same thing as aiming a rifle or carbine, the postures are similar for all weapons.

(U)  Lack of Night Training. There is no provision in the timetable for night training on patrolling, combat tactics and ambush, in spite of the fact that this is when the SF will be expected to operate against infiltrators. The reasons why such training was omitted should be reconsidered to make the program as realistic as possible.

(U) In summary, the timetable should be reexamined and realigned as to sequence, balance and realism. The subsequent reports of evaluators that the trainees were sometimes "tired," "bored" or "saturated" stem directly from weakness in these respects.

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### 3. Instructional Techniques (U)

(U) (C) Reference has already been made to the omission of lesson methods from the programs of both village informant and Strike Force courses. In early discussions with CPM officials it was learned that the emphasis of training was to be on the lecture,

(U) (C) which, although it has the advantage of handling easily the large number of trainees involved, is the instructional technique least likely to impart knowledge, especially to men of low educational background. In fact, all standard military training manuals emphasize the need to exploit as many of man's five senses as possible during the training process, with emphasis on trainee participation in this process. Training manuals commonly show approximately the following proportions as desirable for teaching most skills\*:

Explanation ("Tell")	10%
Demonstration ("Show")	25%
Practice ("Do")	65%

The techniques actually used during the conduct of training will be discussed later in contrast with this standard.

### 4. Lesson Planning (U)

(U) When, just before the beginning of the first informant course, it became apparent that no lesson plans had been produced and that the CPM was unable to obtain them, sample lesson plans were supplied from MRDC, USOM and SRI resources as follows:

- (a) English and Thai versions of the PP Special Action Force basic CI training manuals in two volumes
- (b) Three copies of the Thai manual used for police Chaiya basic CI training
- (c) Selected lesson plans in English and Thai of the basic training for People's Assistance Teams (PAT)-- village security units raised in Changwats Nakon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon, whose role emphasizes rural security, psyops and intelligence.

\* (U) FM 21-6, Techniques of Military Instruction, page 63, gives this ratio. So does the British War Office Manual on Good Instruction (Part One), at page 19.

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(d) Three copies (in Thai) of an SRI document on the fundamentals of agent recruitment, handling and training.

(U) These lesson plans and literature were aimed at a higher level of trainee than those in Plan 9 and they by no means covered the whole of the syllabi but some of them, suitably amended, were relevant to the scheduled lessons, and they were, at least, better than nothing.

(U) ~~(C)~~ As already mentioned, the CPM training order was published only the day before the first informant course started and this gave little lead time for instructors in the first week to prepare properly for their lessons. It transpired during the first course that few, if any, of the instructors prepared themselves satisfactorily. Whether this was owing to lack of notice, ignorance of method and of the need to prepare lessons, or for some other reason, is not known. Instructors who also took part later in the second informant and Strike Force courses improved noticeably in their delivery and knowledge as they became more exposed to the instructional process, and those few involved in the initial phases of field training, which included reiteration of basic training lessons, became quite expert.

#### 5. Training Aids (U)

(U) The detailed syllabi for all three courses indicate an impressive range of visual and other training aids. Except for the blackboard, pointer, chalk, weapons and radios, however, they did not exist. Again, the CPM was unable to obtain any assistance through its administrative channels, the weakness of which was underlined by the fact that the Military Advisor, a full Colonel of the RTA, himself had to visit the RTA film laboratory in Bangkok in order to seek appropriate training films.

(U) Other urgently required items were projection equipment, compasses and maps. When it became clear that these would not be forthcoming from any regular source, the following items were issued by MRDC on temporary loan:

16 mm film projector (sound) and screen - 1  
35 mm slide projector. - 1

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Tape recorder	- 1
Public address system	- 1
Lensatic compasses	- 12
1:50,000 maps of Plan 9 area (sets)	- 20

(U) In the absence of prepared lesson plans it is not possible to comment on the adequacy of these training aids to the instructional content, other than to state that most of them obviously would be required. This point will be dealt with under conduct of training later. Also, it is impossible to comment on the appropriateness of the many scheduled charts because these were not prepared in advance of the lessons, either.

#### 6. Training Facilities (U)

(U) For classroom and trainee accommodation, a disused school adjoining the Nong Khai CPM office was cleaned out, the building was wired for electricity, piped water was laid on and temporary bathrooms built--all for a few hundred baht. The classroom, which was large enough for 70 trainees, was equipped with borrowed modern desks, a blackboard and lecturer's podium, and much effort went into adorning the walls with well-prepared motivational and security slogans. The trainees' accommodations, next door to the classroom, were adequate and, after each man had been provided a mosquito net, pillow and blanket (on the third day of training during the first course), the trainees were quite comfortable. Adjoining the classroom also was a spacious yard for exercise, drill and games, with an adequate mess hall beyond. (Figure 2 shows typical training scenes at these facilities. The trainees being exercised are the Strike Forces at an early stage of their training.) Two kilometers away was the airfield, around which there was ample space for field training, with vegetation and open areas similar to a village environment. The CPM officials responsible for arranging these facilities were justly proud of their efforts.

#### 7. Caveat and Summary Comment on Training Preparations (U)

(U) To the practical supervising instructor, much of the foregoing comment must seem a catalog of the counsels of perfection--a primer, as it were, on the ideals of the art of instruction. He might well say that granted the importance of the principles mentioned, there is a great deal of difference between pointing out ideal methods of training and putting them into practice.

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
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(a) Classroom



(b) Exercise Yard



(c) Mess Hall

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FIG. 2 BASIC TRAINING SCENES (U)

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(U) In all training--even in the best-equipped, regular institutions--the weekly, sometimes daily, grapple with the training program destroys many illusions. The art of filling those serried rows of little squares in the timetable is conditioned not so much by considerations of technique, tempo, inhibition, or reinforcement,\* as by how many trucks are available on Tuesday, whether the practice range can be borrowed from the police on Thursday and, above all, whether the scheduled internal and external instructors will be on leave, sick, or otherwise unavailable.

(U) Compromise is inevitable; the supervising instructor must make the best of a series of bad jobs. The principles of learning themselves can be self-contradictory. Sometimes to ensure tempo will be more important than to avoid fatigue; sometimes variety will be impossible without a little inhibition, and so on.

(U) All of these problems were inevitably magnified in the Nong Khai basic training program. Although the overall impression given by this commentary may be that the instructional aspects of the courses were poorly prepared, and to some extent makeshift, against this must be balanced the facts that the organizers were inexperienced in planning for training, harassed by their regular operational and administrative duties which were often pressing, apparently ill-supported from national and from local government resources; above all, they were attempting to deal with an experimental operational plan and training program for which there are few, if any, precedents.

(U) Another factor to be borne in mind when assessing the Nong Khai training is the non-institutionalized character of the CPM concept within the RTG. As is the case in other changwats in Northeast Thailand, the Nong Khai CPM has only operational and limited administrative authority in regard to specific operations and operational forces assigned. It has no disciplinary authority and minimal means of ensuring that disciplinary action can be taken against miscreant personnel among the operational units under its control. In the absence of orders from the national level directing local civil police and military organizations to assist each other in specifically laid-down circumstances, the concept of local cooperation appears to be based on personal relationships.

\* (U) In teaching theory, learning two or more similar subjects side by side causes inhibition; learning two or more aspects of the same subject causes reinforcement.

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And even then there seems to be reticence to ask for anything unless the requestor is sure of a positive answer. This might explain the constraint in administrative relations between the CPM and CSOC encountered several times during the Nong Khai training experience.

(U) Thus the CPM tends to have form rather than substance and appears, at present, to be somewhat of an orphan in the government family. Whether the legal and formal reorganization of mid-1969 has ameliorated this situation remains to be seen, but unless the terms of reference of CPMs are more clearly established and made known in their relationship to other local operational agencies of the RTG, the present unsatisfactory state of affairs is likely to continue.

(U) In view of this situation and their many administrative and logistical handicaps, and considering the novel nature of Plan 9, CPM officials can be said to have expended a substantial effort in setting up the basic training program.

F. Conduct of Training--General Considerations (U)

1. Planned vs Actual Instruction (U)

(U) A summary of the lessons given during each course compared with those planned is shown in Table 5. From this it will be seen that the proportion of planned training actually carried out was: First Informant Course--76%; Second Informant Course--63%; and Strike Force Course--75%.

2. Instructional Techniques Used (U)

(U) (2) The overall ratios for lectures, demonstrations and practical exercises are shown in Fig. 3, together with the commonly recommended standard for comparison. As the chart illustrates, there was an increasing accent on demonstrations and trainee participation as the courses progressed. The main reason for the considerable difference between the two informant courses was that two days of practical field exercises on observation, memory training, recording, communications and reporting were staged at the end of the second informant course. The practical work on the Strike Force course was very good:

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
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Table 5  
COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL LESSONS  
FOR INFORMANT AND STRIKE FORCE BASIC TRAINING COURSES (U)

Subject	1st Informant Course		2nd Informant Course		Strike Force Course	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
<b>A. Curricular</b>						
1. Weapon Training	6	8	6	7	35	21
2. Communications	11	11	11	11	3	3
3. Intelligence and Reporting	42	41	55	36	4	4
4. Map Reading and Compass	12	11	13	10	14	16
5. Political Theory and History	16	9	9	5	6	4
6. Phys. and Development	7	0	2	0	5	3
7. Aircraft and Uniforms Recognition	2	0	2	1	-	-
8. Border Laws	2	2	2	2	-	-
9. Motivational Lecture	6	8	8	2	16	4
10. Commander's Hour	6	0	6	0	7	0
11. Foot Drill	-	-	-	-	7	7
12. Rifle Drill	-	-	-	-	11	10
13. Battle Drills	-	-	-	-	14	14
14. Squad and Platoon Tactics	-	-	-	-	10	6
15. Patrolling	-	-	-	-	11	16
16. Surprise Attacks	-	-	-	-	3	3
17. Anti-Guerrilla Operations	-	-	-	-	8	1
18. Ambush and Counter-Ambush	-	-	-	-	7	6
19. Explosives and Sabotage	-	-	-	-	4	5
20. First Aid and Sanitation	-	-	-	-	3	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>B. Extra-curricular</b>						
1. Physical Exercise & Games	8	8	8	8	10	10
2. Unarmed Combat	8	0	8	0	13	0
3. Tour	7	-	7	-	7	-
4. Opening Ceremony	3	3	3	2	3	1
5. Closing Ceremony	0	2	0	2	4	0
<b>GRAND TOTALS</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>138</b>

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FIG. 3 COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDED INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNIQUES AND THOSE USED IN BASIC TRAINING COURSES (U)

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morning lectures on weapon training, tactics, and map reading, particularly, were accompanied by many demonstrations and then followed by afternoon practical exercises to drive the lessons home.

3. Use of Training Aids (U)

(U) Training aids largely consisted of obvious items such as weapons, radios, maps and compasses. Diagrams, charts and pictures were seldom used, except for the SF course, and those used were generally too small and few for a large class. Much more should be done by instructors to stimulate trainee interest, by preparing simple charts and diagrams to illustrate their texts, if only to highlight the major themes of the lesson. More extensive use of the blackboard, always available in the classroom, should be made. The instructors should be given more thorough training in blackboard writing technique: e.g., letters and figures were often either badly written or too small to be seen at the back of the class, some instructors had the habit of talking to the blackboard, and none used the effective technique of uncovering prepared blackboard diagrams at the appropriate point in a lesson. Only one instructional film (on map reading) was screened, and the slide projector was not used at all.

4. Performance of Instructors (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Of the 19 instructors scheduled for the informant training, 3 were not available for the first course and 9 missed the second. The specific reasons for their absence are unknown, the usual response to a question on the point being that they were too busy with their duties or on leave. Occasionally, the CPM G2/3 replaced an absent instructor; more often the lesson was cancelled. All of the 15 instructors scheduled for the Strike Force training put in an appearance, however, although several were not able to give all the lessons expected of them.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Except for the Strike Force course, there was wide variation in the experience, knowledge, and competence of instructors. An overall evaluation, based on the observers' reports, indicates that the majority were unpunctual, not fully prepared in their subjects,

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and, as mentioned above, made insufficient use of visual aids. In no case was a lesson handout (text) given to the trainees and, except for the manuals on paramilitary subjects, no instructor had a full lesson plan prepared by himself. Most had made short notes of lesson topics and a few had nothing to refer to. At least half of the instructors spoke too fast for the students and they either could not or did not try to speak the Northeast dialect. There was a tendency for instructors to cover too much ground in the period allotted to them (a common instructional fault), and thus there was little or no time for question-and-answer. When questions were asked, instructors were often either unable or unwilling to answer them, and so the vital instructional aspects of trainees' reception and assimilation of knowledge were not tested; nor were written tests conducted except for a few message reports.

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There was a noticeable improvement in the standard of instruction during the second informant course. All the instructors had taken part in the first course and had benefited from the experience. Those who also instructed in the Strike Force program improved even further, thus supporting the previous inference that lack of instructing experience and preparation was the initial handicap.

5. Coverage of Technical Subjects (U)

(U) There was too much time emphasis on technical detail in all courses. For example, a lot of time was spent in explaining the theory of radio and the propagation of radio waves, and much of the weapon instruction was devoted to the students learning the sizes, weights and part names of various weapons. Many of these technical details were given in English, which was of no practical use to the trainees whatsoever, and the time spent on them detracted from the more important aspects of handling, use, and maintenance of these items.

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Similarly, the repeated attempts to instruct untrained villagers in the principles of map reading and compass were very unproductive. Subsequent efforts made to teach map reading to selected informants and Strike Force personnel during field training exercises were also to no avail. The Plan 9 training experience suggests that instructions might better be concentrated on natural direction-finding and distance-judging in relation to well

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defined natural and man-made landmarks. This would not only meet the plan requirements but would produce far more useful results than attempting to grapple with the complexities of the Universal Transverse Mercator, map symbols and compass variations--all of which few even highly-trained military personnel ever master, particularly in the rural Northeast Thailand environment. More will be said on this subject later, ending with specific proposals for feasible and practical training in Section VI (see Table 28).

G. Conduct of Informant Training and Results (U)

(U) (C) What then, at the end of his basic course had the average informant trainee really learned? It would perhaps be better to detail the results in terms of function rather than according to the training sequence.

1. Informant Role and Duties (C)

(U) (C) From his basic training, the informant gained some idea of Plan 9 and the fact that he was to observe and report suspicious movements and activities in his village area--although these subjects were not included in the course syllabus. He had been told repeatedly that his activities were to be covert but, if intelligent, he could not reconcile this with being recruited quite openly and then brought into Nong Khai for a three weeks' training course for which there was no cover story. Also, he was told that he would be supplied with a shotgun, radio and bicycle when he returned to his village, and must have wondered how he could explain these away to his fellow villagers. (It is relevant to note here that informants were repeatedly warned, in subsequent field training sessions, about their protective security and the need to keep their activities a secret from other villagers--all in an environment where this is patently impossible. This reflected a curious dichotomy in the official attitude over the role and activities of village informants, since in informal conversations it was freely and frequently recognized that they cannot operate underground, except perhaps those specially selected for intelligence activities in Laos. Nonetheless, the contrary attitude persisted in all training sessions.)

(U) ~~(C)~~ There was insufficient emphasis or clarification in the basic training program on the specific role of trainees in gathering information when they returned to their villages. It was not made clear to them whether they should go outside their village areas to seek information, whether they should establish a local informant network, or whether they should maintain occasional surveillance in and around their villages. The division of responsibility between the five informants to be used in each village, and their cooperation or coordination, was also not explained. Neither the Plan 9 concept nor the training objectives were specific about the role of informants and the basic training did not cover the subject satisfactorily. The underlying reason for this deficiency was that both the plan and the training started before the basic functions and operational tactics of a border control system had been formulated. A doctrine did evolve, concurrently with the training process, and this was to prove a serendipitous and most fruitful result of the whole experiment.

(U) ~~(C)~~ A vital aspect in the motivation of the village informants was that they had initially expected that they would be given at least a small monthly retainer for their services. When they were told during the basic training that they would get no remuneration of any sort except for hard information of good quality, their interest and attitude toward the training was inevitably affected adversely. Despite the fact that they would have to spend time and money (however small the amounts) in seeking information, there was no guarantee, then, of reimbursement; and the small monthly retainer they had anticipated was clearly out. Thus, if observers were located in areas where infiltration seldom or never takes place, they could expect little or no reward for their efforts.

2. Intelligence and Reporting Function of Informants (C)

(U) ~~(C)~~ Subjects under this category were the core of the instruction. The basic courses could be judged successful if--together with an ability to pinpoint locations and to operate a simple radio--informant trainees could be taught (a) what they were to look for, (b) how to look for it, (c) what details they were expected to remember, record, and report, and (d) how to report, (by day and by night). But less than 50 percent of the actual instruction dealt with these subjects.

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(2) An effort was made, however, to cover all these points, and lessons were given on the following:

(a) What: Strangers; suspicious disappearance of villagers; their behaviour on return; unusual village meetings; anti-government propaganda; law breakers and village "politicians"; and any unusual/suspicious villager activities.

Comment. Comprehensive training on types of information required should have included: indication of supplies or messages in transit; unusual movement of vehicles and animals; unusual noises (sounds of construction); suspect aircraft; suspicious villager reaction to security forces (over-friendliness/hostility); the movements, absenteeism and associates of known CT relatives; suspicious hawkers, monks, salesmen and quack doctors; overt insurgent activities; village alarm signals; man-traps and booby traps; and any other unaccountable occurrences.

(b) How: Elementary instruction was given, mainly in the classroom, on the principles of surveillance, camouflage, individual tracking (a practical exercise was also carried out in Nong Khai town by 12 trainees only, in conditions totally unlike their own environments), and counterintelligence--i.e., personal protective security.

Comment. The instructional content was good and comprehensive to the informant role, but rigorous practical demonstration and day and night exercises in a realistic environment (available at the nearby airfield) were essential to these activities, not only to reinforce the instruction but also to practice and test the trainees' assimilation and their ability to operate. This was not done.

(c) Information Details: Methods of describing people and places were explained, and so were map sketching and message writing. But, again, the trainees were given insufficient practice, and the little they did do was not corrected.

(d) Reporting: The various methods of making a report were taught in the classroom, and included a short exercise in report writing, followed by individual correction. Verbal reports and radio reports were not practiced and no rules were laid down for the choice of communications media. Although some general points were made on how information could be sent to the operational agencies by radio, messenger,

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or in person, there was no detailed guidance on how this should be done according to the nature of the information and the personal circumstances of the observer at the time of receiving it.

### 3. Technical Instruction of Informants (C)

(U) (S) As previously mentioned, there was too much emphasis on technical detail in the weapon training and communications lessons. The trainees were, in fact, taught the characteristics and name parts of two weapons (the M1 and 1903 rifles) which they were never intended to use under the Plan 9 order, in addition to the shotgun with which it was proposed to equip them in their villages. (Note: As of June 1970 shotguns still had not been issued.) Trainees were also taught the principles of aiming and shooting postures, but they did no dry or live firing, since the 2,400 rounds of training ammunition programmed for each course were not forthcoming.

(U) The communications lectures were well-delivered on both courses but the technical aspects should have given way to simple use and maintenance rules, erection of antennas, and, above all, practice, practice, and more practice, in voice procedure and sending messages. There was just not enough time allotted to practice the large number of students adequately in this vital skill.

### 4. Other Informant Subjects (C)

(U) For the first course, nine lessons were given on political theory (Communism vs Democracy) and Thai history; and there were eight motivational lectures on the following subjects: Loyalty, Endurance and Sacrifice, Civic Duty, Unity, Discipline, Morals, Bravery and Esprit-de-Corps. Most of these lectures, particularly the motivational ones, were above the heads of the trainees, and were poorly delivered. Political theory and history lessons were cut by half for the second course, and only two of the motivational lectures were repeated--the instructors failing to turn up for the other six scheduled.

(U) In summary, the indoctrination/motivation lectures of the two courses were not a success. Such subjects require knowledgeable and skilled lecturers who can adjust their content and delivery to the background of the audience. Such lecturers were apparently not available in Nong Khai.

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(U) (S) The only other subject taught was a two-hour lecture on border regulations. This was confined to a description of Immigration and Customs stations, of which there are none in the Plan 9 area, and details of passports, visas and border passes. The only instruction relevant to informants' duties is that concerning border passes, and future instruction on border regulations should concentrate on this topic alone.

5. Practical Exercises for Informant Training (C)

(U) (S) Before the second informant course started on 16 June 1969, a critique covering the points made above was discussed with the Military Advisor and G2/3 of the CPM. They made note of whatever suggestions were feasible for modification of the second course, in particular the need for practical, realistic field exercises to test trainees in every major aspect of their duties. These were, namely, to observe suspect infiltrators, to note and memorize their details and movements, to track them, and to camouflage themselves, if necessary, and to report their observations by the various means available.

(U) (S) Since the CPM had insufficient training staff and access to the manpower needed to stage these exercises, it was agreed that the Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) field team, which had been used in simulated infiltration exercises for Task One testing in the Plan 9 area, would be made available to the Nong Khai CPM for three days at the end of the second informant course. The syllabus was modified to include such exercises, increasing the Intelligence and Reporting element by 13 lesson periods by reducing instruction on Political Theory and History, and Psyops and Development (the latter subjects were not, in fact, taught in either course).

(U) To stage practical exercises properly it is necessary to have written exercise rules and scenarios for both the instructor and the actors. As the CPM staff were extremely busy catching up on their routine work after the first course, a sample set of rules and scenarios were produced for them (Appendix F.)

(U) (S) The author was invited to attend the exercises which took place during the last three days of the second informant course. On the first afternoon, BMI personnel staged simulated infiltration demonstrations, with the CPM training supervisor as the instructor. The demonstrations took place at the outskirts of a village on the edge of the

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(U) (S) Nong Khai airfield. Briefly, they consisted of runs in front of the trainees by varying numbers of targets, differently dressed and equipped, sometimes with weapons. The emphasis was on simplicity the first time around.

(U) (S) The instructor took the trainees point by point through each detail of the target description they were expected to report, i.e., numbers, direction of movement, actions, dress, equipment, and other personal details. He did this twice and then asked the trainees to write out their reports in the manner and format already taught in class. The results, according to the instructor, were of a generally very unsatisfactory standard.

(U) (S) The following morning he debriefed the trainees on their reports, corrected major mistakes, and ran through the basic reporting requirements once more. In the afternoon simple scenarios of clandestine meetings between insurgents and village supporters were staged and the trainees then required to make their reports in writing and by radio. There was a considerable general improvement in the content of these reports over the previous day. Radio reporting, however, was generally poor, most trainees being microphone-shy and requiring assistance in radio use and voice procedure.

(U) (S) On the third and final day of the course, more exercises were held simulating river crossings by infiltrators, and trainees were taken through all of their functions again. The standard again improved and it was the consensus of CPM, BMI and SRI staff attending that a few more days of such exercises (necessary because not all of the 70 trainees could be fully and individually practiced) would have brought the great majority of trainees (a few were apparently hopeless) to a satisfactory performance level. To this might be added the fact that more previous accent on practical exercises during the course (i.e., in radio reporting, message writing, observation, memory training, etc., which were taught individually) would have made the finale much easier and more effective.

(U) (S) Lack of time also prevented introduction of the element of competition into these exercises. Competition is one of the greatest motivating forces in training, and most individual training subjects can be organized with a background of groups or individuals to take advantage of it. Three good examples are observation, concealment and map reading.

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Searching and finding targets in a given area can be practice for both observation and concealment of two groups. There are many methods of holding a map reading competitive exercise on the treasure hunt principle. It is suggested that this technique should be used in any future training.

6. Assessment of Informant Training (U)

a. First Informant Course (C)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The CPM training supervisor was unable to make an assessment of the trainees on the first course. The SRI observers' rating of the first course was:

- 30-40% of the students had understood most of the instruction.
- A further 40-50% had gained a fair knowledge but needed more instruction.
- 20% had learned very little, owing mainly to poor intellect, lack of education, inability to understand the instructors, and, in some cases, disinterest.

b. Second Informant Course (C)

(U) The quality of instruction improved during the second course, for which three reasons can be adduced: (1) There was much more individual participation than on the first course; (2) The instructors had benefitted from their experience of the first course; and (3) The trainees were generally of a higher caliber.

(U) ~~(S)~~ At the end of the second course, the CPM supervising instructor gave his estimate of the proportion of trainees capable of producing useful information, based mainly on the results of the terminal field exercises, as follows:

- 60% were good material, subject to further training and experience.
- About 5% were totally useless (in part because they could not write).
- The remaining 35% were unassessable.

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(U) (C) The consensus of subjective assessments by SRI observers was that about 50% of the trainees had responded well to the instruction, 40% needed further instruction, and 10% were virtually untrainable.

c. Overall Assessment, Informant Training (C)

(U) (C) Based on such assessments, at least 2 out of 5 trainees on the first informant course and 3 out of 5 on the second course were able to understand this type of instruction. If these were spread evenly among the villages and if the training content had been comprehensive to informants' duties, the courses would have been highly successful, since two or three well-trained government agents in every village of an operational area represent a comparatively very high coverage in any counterinsurgency experience.

(U) (C) There was no breakdown of trainee performance by village; however, few, if any, villages are likely to have all five of their informants in the "totally useless" category--or even within or below the "unassessable/fair knowledge" middle range. The one positive conclusion was that although the courses demonstrated that villagers could be trained as informants, they had not been trained enough for the Plan 9 requirements; this owing to insufficiency of training content, quality of instruction, and the absence of clear-cut operational concepts and tactics--hence training objectives--from the start of the program. It was this major conclusion that persuaded CPM officials towards the end of the second course that further training of informants would be necessary.

(U) (C) Finally, perhaps the greatest handicap to successful training was the size of the classes. The concept of using five informants per village was quite arbitrary, and the decision might better have been to recruit one carefully selected, bright man from each village and train him to develop his own small village informant network, as necessary. This would have meant that the total training load of 140 trainees in two courses could have been reduced to a manageable 28 in one course. It would be wise, however, to train a relief observer for each village in the event of training failure or other incapacity of the first choice. In either case, the training results should have been immeasurably more effective with the smaller classes. Mass production training can be successful only if there are sufficient instructors and facilities to conform reasonably with the basic principles of good instruction.

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## 7. Revised Informant Training Syllabus (U)

(U) (C) During the second informant training period, tentative plans were made to introduce Plan 9 along the border of King Amphoe Sang Khom at the western side of Changwat Nong Khai. At the request of CPM officials, a new draft outline syllabus (Appendix G), incorporating many of the points and suggestions made above, was produced for the consideration of CSOC and the CPM. It will be noted that this draft included provision for the following subjects which were also missing from the first two informant courses:

- The role of puyaibans and kamnans vis-a-vis village observers and the information requirements of Plan 9.
- Insurgent infiltration and exfiltration methods.

(U) (C) In the event, the Sang Khom proposal was not followed through, and the draft syllabus was subsequently subjected to considerable amendment and refinement, ending with the detailed syllabi and programs presented in Section VI. By this time (i.e., towards the end of the field training period), it had become obvious that it is practically impossible to teach villagers to read a map properly, given the time and facilities involved, and that it would be far more efficient to concentrate on simple location finding. It also became obvious--and perhaps should have been apparent to all involved from the beginning--that weapon training is unnecessary. If the informants use a weapon at all (and they have not been issued with one yet), they need only a single-barrelled shotgun for defensive, not offensive, purposes. Since most, if not all, villagers have reasonable knowledge of either shotguns or the locally-made, long-barrelled cap guns of about .410 gauge, which are similar, instruction is really redundant.

(U) These points are made to emphasize the dynamism of Plan 9 and the learning process for all the officials and researchers involved. It was basically a new concept, and consequently there were not and could not be any ready-made experts at hand. It is necessary to stress this again and again if only to put the many criticisms in this report in their proper perspective.

## H. Conduct of Strike Force Course and Results (U)

### 1. General (U)

(U) (C) Despite the several criticisms already made (part E) on syllabus content and on the sequence and balance of the timetable, the SF course was by far the best conducted

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and most effective of the courses in the Plan 9 basic training program. For this, the following reasons are given:

- The trainees were of substantially higher all-round caliber than those on the two informant courses.
- The maximum class number was 40 and, for the subjects involving military skills, which comprised about 90% of the course, two instructors were available. Also, throughout the course an average of six of the PP NCOs and privates earmarked for the two Strike Forces were present to assist in the instruction.
- Expert BPP and RTA instructors were used for half of the program and this covered fortunately the essential core of the training, especially the BPP subjects.

2. Performance of Strike Force Instructors (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ RTA instructors from the 1/13 RCT in Udorn undertook the instruction in map reading and explosives and sabotage subjects. They did this competently in the time at their disposal, the map training being deficient in practical exercise, and the explosives/sabotage instruction hardly relevant to the expected functions and activities of a locally-raised paramilitary unit. The BPP instructors from the 4th Area Hq in Udorn were responsible for training in battle drills, formations, tactics, patrolling, ambush, and grenade throwing (items 7-12 in Table 4, preceding) and they gave a total of 49 lesson hours out of the 52 scheduled for them.

(U) The reports on the BPP instructional periods read very much as from a manual on good instruction. The instructors were consistently keen, enthusiastic and punctilious; their lessons were well-prepared; they ensured 10 minute breaks at the end of each 50-minute period of instruction; they brought useful charts of sufficient quantity and size to illustrate each lesson; their speech was slow and precise (most of them could use the Northeast dialect with telling effect); their blackboard technique was excellent; they had few distracting personal mannerisms; they punctuated their lessons with apt summaries and recapitulation; and they never lost sight of the lesson themes. In fact, the only single area seen for improvement in this thoroughly professional performance was that the instructors, probably through wanting to cover as much ground as possible, left insufficient time to question and be-questioned at the end of a lesson--the ubiquitous bugaboo for all instruction.

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(U) The method invariably used by BPP instructors for all their subjects was to give lectures, interlarded with demonstrations, in the morning, and then exercises practicing the trainees--preceded and succeeded by further demonstrations as necessary--in the afternoon. The method of practical exercise used was to split the class into three groups; one group being exercised at a time, often with another group acting as the enemy or as targets. If an exercise was not carried out to the instructor's satisfaction, it was repeated until the required standard was reached. Practical exercises in one subject were constantly used to confirm instruction previously given in another. For example, when practicing lessons in reconnaissance and tracking, opportunity was taken to introduce surprise, immediate contact and stand-to actions.

(U) Such efficiency and expertise inevitably evoked a strong response from the trainees themselves, who, according to the evaluators, showed marked keenness despite extreme heat and tiredness--in contrast with the general standard of their performance at other times. Perhaps the major lesson learned for future Plan 9 training from this BPP contribution was that training efficiency can be vastly increased, for both SF and village informant courses, by the provision of a small expert training element on temporary loan to take on the important subjects.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Foot and arms drill and weapon training were undertaken by the same SAF personnel who had taught the informant courses. Their performance was adequate, but paled in comparison with the BPP example.

3. Assessment of Strike Force Training (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Because of the individual participation of all trainees in practical exercises in the BPP subjects it was possible for the evaluators to keep a rough score card on the competence of trainees as displayed in their activities. Overall, the average assessment was that some 90%, or 36 out of the 40 trainees, had learned their lessons well and could do what was expected of them. Often, groups were taken through an exercise as much as three times, the scorecard for one lesson reading:

	<u>1st Group</u>	<u>2nd Group</u>
1st Run	60% (24 men)	65%
2nd Run	75%	80%
3rd Run	90%	97%

(U) ~~(S)~~

It thus appears that trainees reached a high level of performance in the battle drills, tactics and patrolling taught in the program.

(U) ~~(S)~~ However, as mentioned before, there was not enough provision in the syllabus for intelligence collection, communications, and ambush tactics and procedures; and insurgent tactics and night training were not even included. Only the linear type of ambush was taught; the multiple and area ambushes--which are usually more effective although more complex--were ignored for lack of time. On the other hand, just about every combat platoon and squad formation in the military textbook was taught to a unit which will never need more than three or four elementary formations in its operations under Plan 9. The men were, if anything, confused by the multiplicity and could not absorb it all in such a short training period. Future training of this type can easily be amended to focus on more ambush, insurgent tactics, communications, and intelligence training, at the expense of the battle formations, etc., without lengthening the training period.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the Strike Force course was the lack of musketry training. Unfortunately, as with the informant courses, no ammunition was available for range practice for the Strike Force. Responsible CPM officials stated that they had done their best to obtain training ammunition, but without avail. This would be a startling deficiency in any paramilitary training program were it not for the fact that a perennial problem in obtaining sufficient ammunition for training and retraining paramilitary units elsewhere in Northeast Thailand had been previously observed.\* It was not possible, however, to pin down the administrative responsibility for this deficiency, the official response being "lack of support," presumably at higher levels-- a complaint voiced quite frequently particularly in the later field training phase.

(U) ~~(S)~~ As it was, some of the SF personnel had individually used shotguns or cap guns previously in hunting expeditions around their villages, but none had any experience of firing rifled weapons, and none had any experience whatsoever in firing as a group.

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\* See page 81 of RSCC-RM 4923-19, "Security Forces and Border Control Agencies in Nakhon Phanom Province, June 1968. (U)" by P.B.G. Waller, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, December 1968 (Confidential), in regard to training deficiencies of local security forces in that province.

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Without any individual or group live-firing experience, the personnel could hardly be expected to realize the first, and probably the most important, objective--"To handle and maintain weapons for fighting and self-defense."

(U) ~~(S)~~ Their performance in map reading is difficult to assess as they were not tested, but it is unlikely that any of them gained more than a rudimentary knowledge, and certainly not enough to pinpoint locations on a map. In regard to map reading, and also communications, it is not necessary that all of the personnel should be trained. Two to three trained men in each squad would be adequate for all foreseeable operational requirements, and these could best be discharged by the two PP personnel in each squad, who are, presumably, well trained in such subjects.

4. Leadership of Strike Force Units (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The PP NCOs and privates, remained very much an unknown quantity during the basic training. Although they assisted instructors, they never took a class, were never trained themselves, or tested in any way. They were experienced rural policemen and had all attended the six-week PP "Chaiya" basic counterinsurgency training course, but there was no way of assessing their competence as leaders for counterinsurgency operations. This was to be revealed only to the extent that they were exercised and tested during the subsequent field training. The only points that need to be made here are that the SF basic program did not include leadership training, and that this should be carried out separately, preferably before the basic training program. The quality of the selected leaders very much predicated, of course, the ultimate effectiveness of the Strike Forces.

5. Comment (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Both before and after the SF course, it was valid to ponder the rationale for raising and training a special unit for border control operations, with all the concomitant extra administrative responsibility involved for local operational staff. The alternative was to utilize existing paramilitary resources in or near the Plan 9 area or to form new

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units, using established VDC or VSDU recruitment, training and administrative resources. This point will be explored further in Section IV. Suffice it to say here that the SF course, following closely upon the two informant courses, did quite literally exhaust the Changwat CPM officials involved, with the result that there was no training whatsoever on three out of the last four scheduled days.

I. Reconsideration of Plan 9 Training Concepts (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ A positive and completely unexpected feature of the Nong Khai basic training program was that the close involvement of CPM officials in the daily training process caused them to ponder deeply the concepts and practical implementation of the parent operational plan, for which they are responsible. In particular, they revised their thinking about the role of the village informant, who was originally conceived to be a covert operator but who, in reality, because of the methods of his recruitment, training and employment, could never hope to remain underground in an insurgency-affected area. This, in turn, made the CPM officials reconsider the deployment, mobility, tactics and training of the Strike Force: to be effective, the Strike Force would have to be capable of quick-response operations and be fed by an information system of forward and immediate reports, all channeled through a rapid communications network.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Before the basic training program was completed, it was decided to try out these revised concepts in a series of post-basic training exercises in the field. Another reason for holding such exercises was to remedy the deficiencies in the Nong Khai program, or as many of them as possible, which the CPM officials openly recognized as inadequate for Plan 9 operational requirements.

(U) ~~(S)~~ It was also intended that the field training exercises should develop a viable border security operational doctrine upon which similar operations in other areas could be based. This could provide for future courses the clear-cut training objectives which were almost totally lacking during the Nong Khai program.

(U) How the field exercises were carried out, and what results were achieved from them, will be described in the next main section.

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J. Summary of Findings on Basic Training (U)

(U) The detailed findings specific to the basic training courses are recapitulated below. The major conclusions drawn from these findings and those of the field training will be presented in Section VI.

1. General (U)

(U) a. (C) There were several postponements in the basic training program, owing to funds and instructors being unavailable and also to recruitment difficulties. Altogether, there was a slippage of nearly three months, and less than three-quarters of the overall training schedule was carried out.

(U) b. (C) Classes were far too large, numbering 40-70 trainees per instructor.

(U) c. (C) Training facilities were satisfactory, but visual aids were both inadequate and poorly used.

(U) d. (C) Trainee recruitment for the first course was hasty, but procedures improved for the subsequent two courses, resulting in a higher caliber of trainee. The majority of trainees had only four years of elementary education, however.

(U) e. (C) The training objectives were insufficiently specific to produce syllabi capable of realizing the Plan 9 objectives.

(U) f. (C) Training syllabi lacked balance; tried to cover too much ground; had too much technical content; were too sophisticated for the trainees involved; omitted or did not sufficiently emphasize the subjects necessary to Plan 9 requirements; and instructional techniques were not specified.

(U) g. (C) Timetables lacked proper sequence and tempo, allowed too much saturation, and, in some cases, were redundant.

(U) h. (C) The map reading lessons failed to teach trainees how to read a map, raising serious doubt as to whether villagers can generally be trained in this art.

(U) i. (C) Motivational lessons were generally poor in quality.

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(U) i. ~~(C)~~ The Nong Khai experience showed that the training responsibility threw too great a strain on the regular CPM operational and administrative staff.

(U) k. ~~(C)~~ The close involvement of CPM officials in the daily training process, however, caused them to expand and revise the concepts, and hence tactics, of the operation.

## 2. Informant Training (U)

(U) a. ~~(C)~~ Instructors for the informant courses were difficult to find, and the majority were inexperienced. They made virtually no advance preparations for their lessons, but they improved as the courses progressed.

(U) b. ~~(C)~~ Motivation of informant trainees was adversely affected by the uncertainty regarding their regular remuneration.

(U) c. ~~(C)~~ There was insufficient emphasis on specific duties of informants, particularly practice in observation and reporting, and there was no practical night training in these duties.

(U) d. ~~(C)~~ There was insufficient trainee participation, particularly that utilizing competition, in both informant courses, although demonstration and practical exercises increased in the second course.

(U) e. ~~(C)~~ Subjective assessments of training results were that two or three out of five informant trainees had understood the instruction, although there were the deficiencies in content and presentation mentioned above.

(U) f. ~~(C)~~ Involvement of the LCS staff in the training process would have (1) lightened the CPM administrative and training load, and (2) acquainted the staff with the informants they were required to handle.

## 3. Strike Force Training (U)

(U) a. ~~(C)~~ The performance of instructors on the SF course was generally high, the BPP instructors in particular being of professional standard.

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(U) b. ~~(C)~~ In addition to the deficiencies listed above as general to all syllabi, the SF syllabus in particular lacked border-orientation. It was also too short to cover fully the basic military skills necessary for an operational response unit.

(U) c. ~~(C)~~ There was too much emphasis on formations and drills, and not enough on ambush tactics and procedures.

(U) d. ~~(C)~~ Realism was lacking insofar as there was no night training; and lack of ammunition precluded musketry training.

(U) e. ~~(C)~~ Trainee participation in the SF course was satisfactory, but the PP leaders were not exercised or tested.

(U) f. ~~(C)~~ Assessment was that about 90 percent of the SF trainees assimilated the instruction--the training process being much facilitated, in comparison with the informant courses, by a higher standard of trainee, a smaller class, and adequate and experienced instructors.

(U) A listing of the basic weaknesses and suggested remedies for Plan 9-type basic training is shown in Table 6.

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Table 6

BASIC TRAINING PROBLEMS (U)

Weakness	Remedy
1. Inadequate training objectives	1. Define operational concepts and tactics in advance--training objectives follow from these.
2. CPM officials insufficiently trained in counterinsurgency training theory and practice	2. CSOC to arrange short, pre-posting familiarization courses.
3. Insufficient trained instructors	3. CSOC to direct local civil/police military agencies to give support.
4. No forward provision of funds for training facilities, equipment, and allowances	4. Improve CSOC/Changwat CPM liaison.
5. Syllabus, program, lesson plans and visual aids too late or insufficient	5. Produce standard syllabus and lesson plans; other preparations by designated CPM staff.
6. Insufficient emphasis on demonstration and exercise; training program not sequential	6. Restructure syllabus and program; provide training aids and demonstration personnel. Involve trainees also.
7. Too much emphasis on political theory and technical subjects	7. Restructure syllabus to concentrate on basic training objectives.

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## II FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES (U)

### A. Background (U)

#### 1. Reasons for Field Training (U)

(U) (C) Before the Plan 9 basic training program was completed in July 1969, the Nong Khai CPM, supported by CSOC, had decided that field training was necessary for the reasons below.

(U) a. (C) The initial training period had not included sufficient instruction, particularly practical exercise, to make the village informant trainees and SF trainees proficient in the operational tactics needed for successful surveillance and interdiction operations respectively.

(U) b. (C) The other operational units to be employed under Plan 9--Marine Police, Border Patrol Police (BPP), Special Operations Center (SOC), and Village Security Units (VSU)--had received no training in tactics designed for border control operations; nor had the Plan 9 command/control centers and their staffs, or communications systems, been established or tested.

(U) c. (C) It was necessary to exercise and test all Plan 9 elements in the feasibility and application of a tactical doctrine for border control operations which had been formulated concurrently with, and largely as a result of, the basic training experience.

#### 2. The Field Training Plan (U)

##### a. Operational Order (U)

(U) (C) On 26 September 1969 the Nong Khai CPM issued Order No. 271/2512, headed "Additional Exercise of Plan 9," in which a border control mission, objectives and tactics were clearly spelled out for the first time. The whole was to be achieved in three sequential stages, called Step One, Step Two, and Step Three.

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b. Training Mission (U)

(U) (2) The mission set forth in this training order was to have all integral and associated elements of Plan 9 tactically proficient and operationally ready for full-scale border control operations by 1 May 1970. This was to be achieved by procedural and tactical training exercises in the field that would develop and prescribe the administration, policies, tactics, and procedures of border area security organizations and related personnel in an effective operational system designed to prevent the passage of suspicious persons and supplies within (initially) a 6-km belt along a specified border area.

(U) c. Training Objectives (U)

(2) The objectives of this order were:

- (1) To develop operational techniques, communications, and procedures (SOP) for the Plan 9 command/control centers and their staff.
- (2) To develop operational tactics designed to detect and interdict insurgent movements.
- (3) To familiarize all operational units with their operational areas and, specifically, with preselected rendezvous and ambush points within those areas.
- (4) To provide follow-up training on tactics and procedures not covered in basic training.
- (5) To develop the technical proficiency of informants in observation and reporting so that they are effectively capable of performing operational missions.
- (6) To improve the technical proficiency of individuals in the Strike Forces and other operational units through on-the-job training.
- (7) To integrate the skills developed during individual training into the operation of teams.

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- (8) To reveal flaws, if any, in the current border security operational concepts and to point up appropriate solutions.
- (9) To provide a foundation, through training, for advanced, recurrent unit training.
- (10) To provide a body of doctrine in written form for application to other areas of the border.

d. Training Schedule (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The phasing of this field training was laid down as follows:

(1) Step One

Training review for informants, strike forces and LCS staffs. Two-week field training sessions to be concentrated in and around the two LCSs consecutively. Exercises to include information transfers from informants by radio and personal reporting. The Strike Forces and local VSUs and PP units to participate. Communications with the BC HQ also to be exercised.

Duration: Two weeks at each LCS--15 October to 15 November 1969.

(2) Step Two

Familiarization, briefing, and command post exercises (CPX)\* of the whole command and control system, to include local VSUs, Marine Police, BPP and SOC units. Joint skeleton and communications exercises between the BC HQ and two LCSs to be staged after the LCSs have been practiced individually in their ability to resolve operational problems.

Duration: Six to eight weeks--scheduled tentatively from 1 December 1969 to 31 January 1970.

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\* (U) A CPX (command post exercise) is defined as an exercise involving the commander, his staff and communications within and between headquarters. It exercises the planning, preparation, decision-making, and execution functions of an operational system. It does not involve the movement of troops in the field.

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(3) Step Three

Full system tests involving all detection, command, and tactical elements. This step to start with field training exercises (FTX)\* on deployment, mobility, and tactics, working up to full-scale CPX and FTX.

Duration: Ten to twelve weeks--tentative dates, 10 February to 30 April 1970.

(4) Additional Phases

Step Zero

It was recognized from the start, however, that field training of this nature had never been attempted outside major RTA formations and that CPM/BC HQ/LCS structures and the village elements of Plan 9 both should be previously familiarized and given elementary practice in field training procedures. Moreover, the implementation of Step One depended upon the buildings, staff and communications of the local Control Stations becoming ready and in operational order. Since this was not due to happen until later October and it was desired to carry out whatever training was possible in the meantime, it was decided (a) that the Strike Forces and VSUs would make reconnaissance patrols of their areas and carry out simple ambush drills and patrol formation in the field, and (b) that simple information transfers would be practiced between a few selected informants and a skeleton or ad hoc (specially-formed) LCS staff. This was called "Step Zero." The particular objective of this preliminary step was to ensure a good start to Step One.

Duration: One week at each LCS--29 September to 11 October 1969.

\* (U) An FTX (field training exercise) is an exercise conducted in the field, under actual or simulated operational conditions, in which troops are employed in tactical, maneuver and deployment operations. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, unified, joint or single service exercise, depending on the participating organizations. Command, control and communications elements may also be incidentally exercised. FTXs may also include the employment of enemy troops or targets--whether imaginary, skeleton or full strength.

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Step One-and-a-Half

In practice, however, both Step Zero and Step One were essentially a review and augmentation of certain elements of the basic training program for selected village informants, the Strike Forces and, in Step One, the newly formed LCS skeleton staffs. It was thus decided to introduce a "Step One-and-a-Half" program to cover the training planned but not implemented in Step One.

Duration: One week at each LCS--4 January to 17 January 1970.

e. Operational Concepts (U)

(U) (C) It had long been recognized that the organization and tactics required for a successful border control system are difficult and complex, and particularly so in an operational environment where several different types of units, and command/control/communications systems are already deployed on various operations. The problem and suggested remedies are discussed in depth in an annex to the CPM training order. This was an attempt at a simple doctrine of border control functions, operational tactics, and field training, and it was upon this doctrine that field training exercises were to be based.

(U) (C) In brief, this annex covers the following aspects of a border control operational system:

(1) Functions:

- Alerting/detection
- Communications
- Decision
- Response
- Reporting

(2) Tactics, which concentrate on ambush and blocking techniques:

- Action on advance information
- Action on immediate information
- Area ambushing by VSUs etc at preselected points

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- Area information network
- External information system
- External assistance

(3) Evaluation and testing

(4) Field training outline

(U) ✓ Although patrolling is not emphasized in the annex, the CPM training order specified that during Steps One and Two all operational units to be employed in Plan 9, when not specifically engaged in the scheduled exercises, would continue to patrol and reconnoiter their areas thoroughly in order to establish fixed unit operational boundaries and preselected ambush points. This was to be carried out in a series of simple map training exercises (MTX). Patrol units were also to be given further training in ambush drills and procedures.

f. Scope of Plan 9 (U)


(U) Before describing the conduct of the field training exercises, a review of the Plan 9 concept, structure, and associated operational units, as they existed in September 1969, is appropriate.

(U) ✓ The original plan called for the incorporation of the five VSUs in the area into Plan 9 operations and also for support from the BPP, Marine Police and SOC units in that area. These units, including their command/communications channels, are shown at Fig. 4, together with the BC HQ and two LCSs. The plan did not specify how such support should be obtained, nor was any provision made for a command/control/communications (C<sup>3</sup>) system for this purpose. How this was envisaged by the CPM is shown in the diagram at Fig. 5, which was sketched by the G2/3 at this time. Also included is the staffing of the two LCSs which had not yet been built or fully established (according to Plan 9 this should have happened in Phase Two at the same time that basic training was carried out), plus that of the BC HQ which was to become a dual function for the Target Area Two HQ which had been operating for over two years.

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
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**FIG. 4 PLAN 9 RESTRICTED AREA, CONTROL CENTERS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED OPERATIONAL UNITS**

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FIG. 5 PLAN 9 ELEMENTS, STAFFS AND ASSOCIATED UNITS (U)

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(U) (S) By September, also, it was apparent that the CSOC/CPM staff involved in Plan 9 were thinking more in terms of regional security than the original, narrow-border-area control concept. They felt that effective counter-infiltration operations would be difficult to carry out within a 6-km belt since the infiltrators almost always would have a head start on the interdiction forces (except in cases of precise advance intelligence), and thus would have a relatively easy task in passing safely through this operational zone. Thus they saw a need for the border screen provided by Plan 9 to act as a warning system for security units further inland (particularly the Target Area Two units around Phu Sing) and, conversely, that any C<sup>3</sup> system in the border area should include the capability for interdiction forces located on or near the border to be alerted to exfiltration and other movement reports originating from inland sources.

(U) (S) This new concept plus the interdiction tactics to be field-tested did, of course, have potential applicability to all counterinsurgency operations whether inland or on the border, and this meant that Plan 9 could become a successful guinea pig for RTG operational tactics against insurgents throughout the country. In this regard, the two successful CI campaigns in SE Asia--The Philippines and Malaya--were notable in that in each case it took six years to evolve a successful tactical doctrine tailored to their individual environments and insurgent threats. In Thailand, where the insurgency had so far lasted for four years at a comparatively low key, no such doctrine had yet been formulated, although several approaches had been tried. Thus, the tactics to be experimented with in Plan 9, albeit in a border area, could make a major contribution to a viable doctrine, this suggesting that the plan should be viewed from its dynamic potential as well as its intrinsic and somewhat limited objectives. To what extent the field training exercises contributed toward formulating a counterinsurgency doctrine will be described at the end of this section.

g. Method of Evaluation (U)

(U) (S) The method of evaluating field training exercises used by SRI was similar to that used during basic training. Two observers worked together and reported separately on each training step unless the exercise to be reported upon involved more than one scene of action. During Steps Two and Three--when up to three control centers plus Strike Forces, VSUs and informants were exercised simultaneously--extra observers were brought in to ensure a full coverage.

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(U) (C) In addition, the two regular observers and other SRI staff members became increasingly involved in planning processes between exercises during the field training program--particularly in the production of the special maps developed for Plan 9, in the production of draft standing operating procedures (SOP) for the LCSs, and in drafting scenario scripts for the exercises. In these last two steps also, MRDC and SRI staff were used by the CPM as monitors and umpires for their own evaluation of the exercises.

B. Conduct of Field Training (U)

1. Implementation of Schedule (U)

(U) The dates originally laid down for the various field training steps are shown above at part A.2.d. In the event, there were many postponements in this schedule owing mainly to staff shortage, holidays, other operational and training commitments, and administrative problems, only Step Zero taking place on time. In addition, for very much the same reasons as the postponements, the actual training periods were shortened--drastically in Steps Two and Three.

(U) It is not proposed to detail the postponements at this stage, in order to avoid confusion, but it is to be noted that from Step Zero onwards there were at least one, and as many as three, new dates set for each scheduled training step. The planned and ultimate dates and durations are shown at Table 7, however, as a background for the discussion which ensues.

2. Step Zero (U)

(U) (C) Step Zero training covered a three-day period (1-3 October 1969 at Lao Luang LCS and 6-8 October at Hat Hae LCS). It was an informal affair for which there was no prepared schedule, the CPM G2/3 being the principal instructor at Lao Luang and the BC HQ G2/3 (who had observed the Lao Luang training) repeating similar training at Hat Hae. The latter was not attended by SRI observers, however, owing to sickness, and this commentary will concentrate on the training at Lao Luang.

(U) (C) A summary of what was taught there is in Table 8. In addition to what they had already been taught during basic training, informants were told that their functions were to collect information according to "EElS" (essential elements of information), defined

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(U) Table 7  
 (U) FIELD TRAINING SCHEDULE (U)

----- Planned dates  
 ..... Planned extension  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Actual dates

Phase	Oct.(1969)	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.(1970)	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
<b>Step Zero</b>									
Lao Luang	-----								
Hat Mae	-----								
<b>Step One</b>									
Lao Luang	-----	-----							
Hat Mae		-----	-----						
BC HQ	-----	-----							
<b>Step One &amp; Half</b>									
Lao Luang				-----	-----				
Hat Mae				-----	-----				
BC HQ				-----	-----				
<b>Step Two</b>									
Lao Luang				-----	-----	-----			-----
Hat Mae				-----	-----	-----			-----
BC HQ				-----	-----	-----			-----
<b>Step Three</b>									
Lao Luang					-----	-----	-----		-----
Hat Mae					-----	-----	-----		-----
BC HQ					-----	-----	-----		-----

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Table 8  
STEP ZERO TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
1 October 1969	1120	1145	LCS Classroom	14 Informants 4 from 1st Regt 4 1st Regt LCS 99 Personnel and 1 Lao Luang LCS LCS 99 BC HQ G2 J BC HQ G1 4	Major Vichien, G13 of CPM	Observation and Reporting	Surveillance targets, including smugglers, intelligence (EI), assistance to guerrillas in apprehending criminals, farm irrigation with terrain 8-1m radius around village, reporting methods, and patrolling and reporting by informants.	This was revision of basic training, except for the designation of surveillance areas and the addition of reporting criminal activities to the informants' duties.
	1330	1610	-do-	-do-	Colonel Charin, Military Advisor, CPM		Informant reporting exercise on verbal version	The 8 informants listed were unable to make satisfactory verbal reports. Most were nervous and omitted impor- tant details from their reports. All clearly needed much more practice.
2 October 1969	1050	1157	LCS Classroom	6C HQ G2 J 1 LC 99 personnel 1 1st Regt personnel 23 Informants	CPM G 3	Observation and Reporting Counter- intelligence	Occasional surveillance, principles of individual and group tracking, weapons training and practice in the classroom, surveillance of suspect CI village smugglers, target descriptions, cover activity, protective security, and counter- intelligence	Most of the informants who attended the first day's train- ing were present. This was again basic training revision with more detail in regard to tracking and surveillance in- formants were told for the first time they were expected to patrol on orders from the LCS commander or whenever they are anything unusual. Emphasis of lessons was on tracking, for which small, various demonstrations and exercises were repeated twice. A third of the informants present demonstrated that they had understood the instruction.
3 October 1969	0930	1030	LCS Classroom	20 VC Strike Force 8 1st Regt personnel	CPM G2 J	Discipline	Camp discipline, weapon security, attitude to villagers	This was a "prep" with emphasizing the need for SF personnel to sleep and eat in the LCS compound, to be obedient to superiors, to look after and never lose their weapons, and to be friendly to villagers
	1400	1630	-do-	-do-	-do-	Patrols and ambushes	Patrol and ambush formations and drills were explained in the classroom.	This was revision of basic training lessons with some additions to ambush procedures and techniques. The SF was not exercised as before, and most trainees were still confused over the completion of the many drills and formations taught.

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as: strangers, "secret agents," CT supporters, suspicious boat activity, smuggling (arms, opium and other contraband), and trouble-makers (village bully boys and anti-government elements). They were instructed to assist puyaibans in apprehending thieves, and also required to survey the terrain, not only around their parent villages but also up to a 6-km distance including other villages within that distance which, in many instances, would take them well outside the Plan 9 operational area. They were told to carry out surveillance duties when they noted any suspicious activity or when ordered to do so.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The remainder of the informant training was focused on tracking and reporting procedures. Classroom demonstrations were given on individual and group tracking tactics, but no practical exercises were staged; i.e., the informants were not tested. On communications, they were taken through various radio and personal reporting procedures--to the LCS, BC HQ, or nearest security unit. They were also practiced on simple scenarios in reporting. Direct and indirect--i.e., overt and covert--methods of personal reporting were also explained.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Lessons were attended by 5 PP personnel of both LCSs and up to 23 village informants. The training given to informants totalled just over four hours and served little purpose other than to reveal inadequacies of the basic training program and/or the fact that the 3-4 month interim period had caused some informants to forget the previous lessons.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Lao Luang Strike Force also received four hours' instruction--in discipline and patrol and ambush formations, and drills. Trainees were not exercised, however, nor did they do any reconnaissance patrols.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Although PP staff from both LCSs attended the lessons, information transfer exercises between informants and the LCS were not carried out, as intended. In summary, Step Zero was purely revision or amplification of the basic training in Nong Khai, and it did not set the scene for the following field training stages as intended. Moreover, it was recognized by responsible CPM officials that the results were below expectations and it was subsequently decided that Step One should include a large amount of yet more revision of basic training.

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3. Step One (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Step One, originally scheduled to begin at Lao Luang on 15 October 1969, but postponed twice owing to administrative problems, was rescheduled and implemented from 10-21 November, although the period had to be extended to 26 November because of lost time owing to sickness among the trainees. As a result, the subsequent similar training scheduled for Hat Hae LCS was postponed and, again owing to administrative problems, was further postponed, eventually starting on 15 December and ending on 26 December.

a. Program (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The training program for both Lao Luang and Hat Hae is shown in Table 9. This covers the subjects in the CPM training order for Step One, although confined to LCS, SF and informant personnel only.

b. Implementation (U)

(1) Lao Luang (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Step One training carried out at Lao Luang is summarized in Table 10. It can be seen from the table that this was very much in the nature of basic training revision. In fact, save for the patrol exercise on 23 November, all of this instruction could have been given during the basic program. Despite a three-day extension, only three-quarters of the scheduled training was completed and, in practice, the emphasis swung from field exercise to classroom exercise. It was apparent from the results, however, that this revision training was badly needed both by the Strike Force personnel and by the village informants, as well as by the newly-formed LCS skeleton staffs. Consequently, a tentative decision was then made (and later confirmed) to introduce another short intermediate training session (to be called "Step One-and-a-Half") between Steps One and Two, to include further revision of the basic training syllabus. Emphasis would be on map reading, which was still below standard, and command/control SOPs would be more fully explained and exercised.

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(u) Table 9  
STEP ONE - TRAINING SCHEDULE (U)

Date	Time		Subject	Place	Instructor	Reference	Training Aid	Students
	From	To						
Monday, 10 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Communications - Introduction to Communications - Communications Doctrine (review) - RT using procedure - Technical using of equipment and antenna - Amplification - Maintenance  Practical Exercise - Radio Station Setting by team - Procedure in using radio for communication - Practice in receiving and sending	Loo Luang LCS	Maj. Sead Inna-Pakdi and assistant instructor as necessary	FM of Signal School, Signal Center, RTA	BAGAI (CSOC-5) CSOC-1 CSOC-5	Selected informants from all villages in Jaha and Jaha Strike Force.
	1300	1600	Information Collection and Report - Information collection (review) - Surveillance review - Reporting review - SOP for intercept review	Loo Luang LCS  Field	Maj. Vichien Papischai, Capt. Suphan Tipphul and assistant instructor as necessary  Maj. Vichien Papischai, Capt. Suphan Tipphul and assistant instructor as necessary	FM of Infantry School, Inf Center, RTA  -do-	Report Form  Red force	Selected informants from all villages in Jaha and Jaha Strike Force  Selected informants from all villages in Jaha and Jaha Strike Force
Tuesday, 11 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Organization and Mission of Units - Nonc RMA: CPM - BC HQ - LCS	Classroom	Maj. Vichien Capt. Suphan and assistant instructor as necessary and Maj. Sead	Operation Plan 9	Chart	Jaha LCS JGR.
	1300	1600	SOP for LCS	-do-	-do-	-do-	-do-	-do-
Thursday, 13 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Reconnaissance Patrol - Mission - ESI (Essential Elements of Information) - Weather - Terrain - Enemy - Composition of reconnaissance squad	Classroom	Maj. Vichien			
	1300	1600	Debriefing and reporting	-do-	-do-			
Friday, 14 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Reconnaissance Patrol Order - Patrol order and execution with situation - Critique and correction	Field	Maj. Vichien Papischai	FM of Inf School, Inf Center, RTA	Patrol Report Form, Intelligence Report Form	Strike Force
	1300	1600	Patrol Operation with Situation - Patrol report					

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(2) Table 9 (Continued)

Date	Time From	Time To	Subject	Place	Instructor	Reference	Training Aids	Students
Monday, 17 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Combat Patrol - Mission - Composition - Formations - Planning - Preparation Order - Patrol Order - Patrol Instructions and Hints	Classroom	Maj. Vichien Pasichai, Capt. Suphat Tippakul and assistant instructor as necessary	FM of Inf School, Inf. Center, RTA	Blackboard, Charts, Order Form	Strike Force
Tuesday, 18 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Communication Drilling (review) - RT Procedure - Technical using of equipments - Authentication - Maintenance Practical Exercise - Radio Yarnon Setting - Radio Procedure - Receiving sending practice - Squad to squad - Squad to LCS - Use of other communications equipments	Solo LCS	Maj. Samad Inna-Paldi	FM of Signal School	Blackboard CSOC-SA CSOC-3	Strike Force
Wednesday, 19 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Connect Drill for Strike Force - Immediate Action - Ambush - Counter-ambush - Raid - Electric trap Practical Exercise - Ambush - Immediate Action - Counter-ambush - Raid - Electric trap	Classroom  Field	Maj. Vichien Pasichai, Capt. Suphat Tippakul and assistant instructor as necessary	FM of Inf School, Inf. Center, RTA	Blackboard Charts	Strike Force
Thursday, 20 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	Command Post Exercise (CPE) - Map Training Exercise	Classroom	Maj. Vichien Pasichai, Capt. Suphat Tippakul, Maj. Samad Inna-Paldi, and assistant instructor as necessary	Operations Plan 9	Charts	Solo LCS staff
Friday, 21 Nov. 1969	0900	1200	CPE with Situation - LCS and Op order to Strike Force - Strike Force and Op order to Squad - Operation of Strike Force - Action of LCS on receiving from Strike Force - Critique and correction	Classroom	Maj. Vichien Pasichai, Capt. Suphat Tippakul, Maj. Samad Inna-Paldi, and assistant instructor as necessary	Operations Plan 9	Charts	Solo LCS staff

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AIR FORCE BASE  
DAYTON, OHIO 45433

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Table 10

~~(S)~~ STEP ONE TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Monday, Nov 10	1000	1035	LCC Classroom	34 observers 2 LCC PP personnel	Major Vichien G2/3 of CPM	Introduction	- Outline of field and command post exercises in three steps	Instructor's most pertinent statement was that "This training is to revise what has already been learned in order to understand more, because the last time [i.e. the basic training] you did not seem to understand all the instruc- tion well"
	1040	1207	LCC Classroom	-do-	Major Sanat Communications Officer of CPM	Radio communications	- Network procedure, security and discipline - Types and use of radios and antennas - Maintenance - Message and voice procedures	This was virtually the same as basic training lesson with a little more emphasis on practical aspects
	1340	1640	Field - P.E.	-do-	-do-	-do-	- Field exercise in radio use in vicinity of LCC	Three radios used. Most trainees tested. Satisfactory results. Those who had already used radios in villages voiced general complaint of interference from 1700 hours until dawn that made communication impossible
Tuesday, Nov 11	0920	1150	LCC Classroom	45 observers	Major Vichien	Observation and reporting techniques; observers SOPs	- Information sources and collection - CT organizations - CT recruits - CT logistics - Surveillance - Counter-intelligence - Observers' daily routine	This was straight forward revision of basic training. Observers reminded explicitly (as by the CPM military advisor on previous day) of their covert agent role
	1400	1640		2 LCC PP				
Wednesday, Nov 12								Training postponed owing to 3 trainees being sick and 3 more on leave

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Table 10 (Continued)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Thursday, Nov 13	0900 1310	1155 1640	LCC Classroom	18 Strike Force  4 LCC PP	Major Vichien	Reconnaissance	- Patrol missions - EEh - Patrol composition - Patrol orders	This again was revision of basic training
Friday, Nov 14	0900 1330	1215 1630	Field  LCC Classroom	15 Strike Force  3 LCC PP	Major Vichien	Observation and reporting-- reconnaissance patrols	- Practical exercise in watching and reporting physical and human objects	Standard of reporting unsatisfactory; insufficient knowledge of EEI; Strike Force inexperienced in surveillance technique; PP (LCC) assistant instructors performed badly as observers.  The last half of the afternoon period used for LCC base defense alarm system
Monday, Nov 17	0920 1310	1155 1600	Classroom and field	16 Strike Force  4 LCC PP	Major Sonot	Radio communications	- Demonstrations and exercises using three different radios, including whip antennae	Essentially the same lesson as on Nov 10 was repeated, this time with students using radios in villages as much as ten kilometers distant from the Lao Luing control
Tuesday, Nov 18								Training postponed owing to sickness (influenza) among trainees and instructor
Wednesday, Nov 19	1030 1400	1145 1650	Classroom and field	16 Strike Force  3 LCC PP	Major Vichien	Combat patrolling	- Patrol formations - Missions - Planning, preparation and orders - Equipment and rations	This instruction was a series of demonstra- tions and exercises covering elementary patrol formations and initial patrolling arrangements, including briefings based on scenarios
Thursday, Nov 20	0930 1400	1150 1630	Classroom and field	17 Strike Force  4 LCC PP	Major Vichien	Combat patrolling (continued)	- Patrol tactics, track discipline and signal - Immediate actions--attack and counter ambush - Ambush	The instructional methods were as for the previous day, ending up in a large practical exercise involving encirclement and attack of a simulated target. General standard of trainees was fair

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Table 10 (Concluded)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Friday, Nov 21								Training postponed owing to sickness and important religious ceremony
Sunday, Nov 23	1100		Phu Langka	16 Strike Force	Major Vichien	Field exercise -- patrolling	- Day and night combat and reconnaissance patrol exercise on Phu Langka	This was essentially a hill climb during which little training was carried out. Communications were tested frequently and successfully. Attempts (unsuccessful) were also made to discover OP positions on Phu Langka which could cover the surrounding flat land
Monday, Nov 24		0930		3 LCC PP				
	1320	1600	Classroom	-do-	-do-	Debriefing	- Patrol orders, formations and track discipline	Debriefing of field exercise--a lecture on mistakes made
Tuesday, Nov 25	1440	1640	Classroom	All available LCC personnel	Major Vichien	Command/control	- Organization and functions of: Changwat CPM BCC LCC, including staff procedures Target Area Two	Lecture included description of various permutations of Strike Force according to mission
Wednesday, Nov 26	0920	1155	Classroom	All available LCC personnel	Major Vichien	Command/control	Practical exercises on administrative (medical, logistics, discipline) and operational problems	Of eight simple situations (scenarios) posed, six were on administrative matters and two on CT sightings. The latter were the only exercises which could be considered as CPX and they were only lightly covered
	1345	1430						

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(2) Hat Hae (U)

(U) (C) Since the essentials of the Lao Luang training were repeated at Hat Hae, involving similar numbers and types of trainees, it is necessary only to draw comparisons between the two programs. The second Step One training session did, in fact, produce a higher standard of instruction, for which the following reasons are adduced:

- More instructors were available--two at Lao Luang, seven at Hat Hae.
- The Lao Luang experience provided better preparation for the Hat Hae lessons.
- The proficiency of instructors, some of whom were giving virtually the same lessons for the fourth or fifth time, had materially improved.
- Training aids, such as charts and explosives, were available for the second session.
- There was more emphasis on field training and command post exercise procedures.
- The local influenza epidemic had subsided by the time of the Hat Hae session.

(U) (C) On the other hand, the Hat Hae training revealed that the LCS staff there was less competent than the one at Lao Luang. This was because the staff was newer, relatively inexperienced, and the key positions--commander and S1/4--were filled by men of apparently lower caliber.

(U) (C) An interesting feature of the Step One training at Hat Hae was that two RTA captains of the Nakhon Phanom CPM attended as observers throughout, with the intention of applying the knowledge and lessons learned to a similar exercise in the Mukdahan area, where another border security program had recently been started. This session was

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also visited by two senior CSOC officers, the 4th BPP Area and Joint Security Center commanders from Udorn, and the Changwat Governor. The latter took a personal interest in the trainees' progress and their negative response to some of his questions is thought to have played some part in the decision to introduce further training between Steps One and Two.

(3) Deficiencies (U)

(U) (2) Finally, it is to be noted that at the end of Step One training the LCS staffs had not yet been fully formed, SOPs had not been produced for either the BC HQ or the LCS, field training exercises had not been carried out, and command post exercises only lightly touched on. In addition, information transfers between village informants (only about half of whom attended the training) had not been tested; neither had communications between the BC HQ and the LCSs. The major omission from the program is the map training exercises that were proposed for the Strike Force to run parallel with informant training. Again, there was no night training save for occasional stand-to's for practicing base defense.

c. Standing Operating Procedures (U)

(U) (2) There was initially some resistance at the lower staff levels in the Nong Khai CPM to the introduction of written SOPs for the LCSs, on the grounds that such a formal approach had not previously been found necessary in local counterinsurgency operational systems, and also because it was felt that they would involve far too much work.

(U) (2) The Military Advisor, however, insisted that SOPs were to be used for the newly-formed LCS staffs, not only for the exercises and tests but also for operational and administrative purposes later on. Work proceeded on the production of these concurrently with Step One, and drafts were ready at the end of 1969 in time for inclusion in the Step One-and-a-Half program.

(U) (2) These SOPs were comprehensive both to the overall mission and functions of the LCS and the detailed duties of each of the seven staff members--in operational, administrative and routine matters. The normal channels of messages, decision-making, and orders are shown in Figure 6. This procedure could be short-circuited in the event of any emergency, however.

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4. Step One-and-a-Half (U)

a. Program (U)

(U) (C) The schedule for this training step is at Table 11. Immediately after Step One training concluded at Hat Hae in December, it was decided to hold this additional training at the two LCSs consecutively in January. It was eventually carried out, however, from February 2 to 6 at Lao Luang and February 23 to 27 at Hat Hae. The postponements and splitting of the training sessions were necessitated by administrative work load and sickness among the training staff, principally the G2/3 who continued to be the key organizer and instructor.

(U) A comparison of the scheduled training at Table 11 with the schedule of Step One at Table 9 shows that it covers essentially the same subjects, most of which were not, however, carried out during Step One.

b. Implementation (U)

(U) (C) The actual training accomplished at Lao Luang in the Step One-and-a-Half training is summarized in Table 12. The same basic content, with the same instructors and a similar number and type of students, was provided at Hat Hae. In both places there were only four days of training rather than the eight scheduled. The Hat Hae training was curtailed by a visit from the Changwat Governor, which required the attendance of CPM training officials to discuss the deteriorating situation in the adjoining part of Laos.

(U) (C) A day of planned map-training exercise was cut from the program at both Lao Luang and Hat Hae; three days of other field exercises were also dropped; so were information transfers from informants and communications between the two LCSs and the BC HQ.

(U) (C) It will be noted from Table 12 that Step One-and-a-Half emphasized LCS personnel working together with local Village Security Unit, River Checkpoint and Strike Force police commanders. It was, in fact, the first time that the full complement of seven LCS personnel was brought together for training, following their assembly at the two LCSs toward the end of January. Once again, instruction was given in LCS standard operating procedures (SOP) and map training. Psyops, with a strong emphasis on villager cooperation, was introduced for the first time and, according to the two SRI observers, it was skillfully put across by an experienced instructor.

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Table 11

(C) STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF TRAINING SCHEDULE (U)

Item	Day	Exercise Type	Personnel	Duration	Monitors	Activity
1	1	Briefing: LCS SOP's	LCS Cmdr and Staff	2 hours	None	Includes LCS Mission, objectives, authority, SOP's--Comms schedules, Reporting format, Types of reports, Reporting frequency, Agent assignments, Intelligence handling and assessment, Situation status, Strength status, VSU, BPP, SOC, MP responsibilities and relation with LCS.
2	1	Briefing: CPX Conduct	LCS Cmdr and Staff	2 hours	None	Includes how CPX will be conducted, information and data requirements, forms to be filled out (if needed).
3	1	Briefing: Intelligence collection and procedures	Strike Force/VSU	2 hours	None	Includes, what to look for, message format, comm. procedures, mission, and objectives of reconnaissance patrols.
4	1	Intelligence collection and assessment exercise	Strike Force/VSU	2 hours	3	Observation and written assessment of activity-- at LCS
5	2	FTX: Intelligence collection	Strike Force/VSU	4 hours	6	Observation of activity in the field and written assessment of activity.
6	2	Briefing: BC HQ Missions etc.	LCS Cmdr and Staff	2 hours	None	Includes BC HQ, mission, objectives, authority, chain of command, report requirements, intelligence requirements, operational orders etc.
7	3	FTX: Operational Area Reconnaissance - Map Training Exercise	Strike Force	8 hours	6-as required with each patrol and at LCS	Patrols to perform reconnaissance of specified parts of operational area as a map training exercise, also reporting as required to LCS, and collecting information as observed.
8	3	FTX: Informant Communications exercise	Selected Informants in Operation Area	8 hours	3 at BC HQ and approx. 5 for message runners	Informants will be in villages-- prepared messages will be given to them for transmission to the LCS by available means.

(U)

(C) Table 11 (Concluded)

Item	Date	Exercise Type	Personnel	Duration	Monitors	Activity
9	4	FTX: Immediate Action Drills	Strike Force	8 hours	3-4 as required with patrol element	To practice immediate action drills of 1) encounter, 2) hasty ambush, and 3) counter-ambush.
10	5	CPX	LCS Cmdr and Staff	4 hours	3	Dry run CPX - using internal messages.
11	5	CPX	LCS Cmdr and Staff	4 hours	3	Scenario S1 - using internal messages.
12	6	CPX	LCS Cmdr and Staff	4 hours	3	Scenario S2 - using internal messages.
13	6	CPX: Procedures review	LCS Cmdr and Staff	4 hours	None	Debriefing of CPX - changes in SOP if necessary.
14	7	CPX	LCS Cmdr and Staff	8 hours	9	Scenario S3 - Utilizes external messages from VSI, BPP, SF Patrols, BCC and informants.
15	8	Briefing: Intelligence Collection and Procedures	Informants within LCS Operation Area	2 hours	None	Includes what to look for message format, comms procedures, contacts, mission, objectives, etc.
16	8	FTX: Intelligence Collection and Assessment Exercise	Informants within LCS Operation Area	2 hours	3	Observation and written assessment of familiar objects and activity.
17	8	FTX: Intelligence Collection	Informants within LCS Operation Area	4 hours	6	Observation and written assessment of suspect personnel activity.

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**Table 12**  
**STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)**

Date	Time		Place	Instructors	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To					
Monday Feb 2, 1970							No training held because 8 students were absent on administrative duties. Note: a training day was similarly lost during the subsequent Hanoi program owing to a visit from the Chinese' negotiator. In both cases, map reading subjects were dropped.
Tuesday Feb 3	1000	1125	LCC	Somchai Lernjanant, Chief Pyrap Section, Nong Nhai, CPAT	Pyrap	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Definition and purpose of pyrap</li> <li>- CP propaganda</li> <li>- Counter-propaganda</li> <li>- Public opinion molding</li> <li>- Civic action</li> </ul>	This lesson was a good introduction to pyrap and is used on the general benefit accruing to government from good security force people relations. No attempt was made within the workshop of pyrap with tactical intelligence which is normally a major objective.
Wednesday Feb 4	0945 1405	1025 1545	LCC Classroom	Major Vichien Pattichai, CPM C2B3	LCC standard operating procedures (SOP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Explanation of Plan 9</li> <li>- Mission of LCC</li> <li>- Relationships with BCC, VSU, RCP, and other local security forces</li> <li>- Individual LCC staff functions and duties</li> <li>- Message procedures</li> <li>- Reporting requirements</li> </ul>	Although Plan 9 organization and functions had previously been explained to some of these trainees during the Step One program, this was the first time that the specific role of the LCC and the LCC staff functions were clearly spelled out verbally and in writing.
Thursday Feb 5	1000 1400	1045 1630	LCC Classroom	Major Vichien	Use of maps and compasses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Types of maps</li> <li>- Symbols</li> <li>- Scale and measurement</li> <li>- Angles and direction finding</li> <li>- Compass use</li> </ul>	This was a revision lesson for the LCC and Strike Force, an introduction for the VSU and RCP commanders. The first part has been found necessary to repeat repeatedly upon maps and pyrap. The intelligibility of the present learning. Similar instructions given at Hanoi were more detailed, much more detailed. (REF: 1111, 1112)
Friday Feb 6	0900	1135	LCC Classroom and field	Major Vichien	Command post exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Message reception</li> <li>- Message routing</li> <li>- Report evaluation</li> <li>- Direction-making</li> <li>- Determination of orders</li> </ul>	Four scenarios were staged and the whole LCC staff required to operate according to the SOPs given over two days earlier. The scenarios practiced staff members in all their basic functions, with emphasis on the commander and the 32 B 3. The Strike Force was also given dry runs in forming up and firing procedures. The major benefit from these exercises was the practical familiarization of the LCC staff with their duties, although the solutions to the problems posed tended to be slow and inadequate.

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(U) (C) The most important element of the Step One-and-a-Half training was the skeleton CPXs staged on the last day, lasting for about two hours in each case. Four scenarios of operational situations were presented to the students for solution. The first called for action on advance information of an insurgent crossing; the second (based on the first) required appropriate action if no contact was made; the third was a report of four armed strangers; and the fourth was a report of enemy and friendly casualties resulting from a contact from the third scenario. Although the various answers to these situations (in both training locations) often left a lot to be desired in regard to the feasibility, timing, nature and tactics of the operational response, an encouraging result was that the internal LCS procedures of receiving and processing messages, making decisions, and then giving out operational orders, were becoming reasonably well understood by the appropriate staff members involved, particularly at Lao Luang.

(U) (C) Comparing the results of the CPX exercises at the two LCSs, it was quite clear that the Lao Luang LCS staff was at that time more competent than the one at Hat Hae. The latter was handicapped by having a new commander; the key S2/3 was absent; and the LCS clerk was completely new. Nonetheless, it might have been expected, for example, that an experienced police Master Sergeant (the Hat Hae LCS commander) could have thought of some response in the fourth scenario--particularly when one of his own men, according to the scenario, had been reported as seriously wounded. However, neither he nor his staff could think of anything. This could well have been due to unfamiliarity with this kind of training. It is expected that the response in actual situations will be far more prompt and practical than in simulated exercises novel to the type of man being trained. It was also expected that the comprehensive exercises planned for Steps Two and Three would produce improvements in the quality and speed of response.

### c. Summary (U)

(U) (C) At the end of Step One-and-a-Half it is pertinent to review what it, together with Steps Zero and One, had achieved in relation to the requirements of the CPM training order for Step One.

(U) (C) About a half of the informants had been taken again through their observation and reporting functions, more specifically than in the basic training; they also had further lessons on the use of radio; they had not been practiced, however, in

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information transfers or in personal reporting as required; and their map reading ability remained marginal. By the end of Step One-and-a-Half, moreover, there was a suggestion in the evaluators' reports that many of the informants had forgotten a substantial amount of the basic training lessons they had received as much as ten months before.

(U) (2) (2) The Strike Forces had been given more lessons, but little practical exercise, in patrol and ambush formations and drills, and in radio communications. They had received very little extra map reading instruction, had carried out no map training exercises, and had to depend on local knowledge to find their way around.

(U) (3) (2) The LCS staffs received their first training of any kind during this period, and this consisted of an explanation of Plan 9 C<sup>3</sup> system, the elements of psyops, an introduction to LCS SOPs and map reading, and familiarization with CPX procedures. About a half of the LCS staffs had also attended the review lessons for informants and Strike Forces during the Step One training. This did not, however, give them much insight into what the informants and SF had been taught during the basic training program. Thus, they had little knowledge of what could be expected of them, which, together with their brief acquaintanceship, particularly with the village informants, placed them under a considerable handicap. This problem could have been prevented if the LCS staffs had been fully established at the outset, as envisaged for Phase Two of Plan 9, and accompanied the informants through their basic training period. This is a particular point to be made for any future training.

(U) (4) (2) Local VSU commanders were brought into the training process during Step One-and-a-Half and instructed in the general Plan 9 outline and requirements of their units.

(U) (5) (2) Communications with the BC HQ were not tested from either LCS during the exercises.

(U) (6) (2) Despite these several deficiencies, the results of the exercises were encouraging and, although far too short in duration and scope, they did produce a viable structure for the singular, joint, and-full system exercises planned for Steps Two and Three.

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(U) (2) Note: That field training had not come up to expectations was fully recognized by RTG officials. At a CSOC meeting on the progress of Plan 9 held on 9 February 1970, at which the Director of the Operations and Coordination Center was present, the Nong Khai CPM Military Advisor cited the following problem areas: lack of training preparation; the limited CPM staff; inexperienced field personnel; insufficiency of umpires; and shortage of communications equipment.\*

5. Step Two (U)

a. Schedule and Program (U)

(U) (2) Step Two training exercises were carried out at the Lao Luang LCS and BC HQ from 23 to 27 March 1970 and at the Hat Hae LCS and BC HQ from 8 to 12 June. The reasons for the ten-week interval between the two exercises was because (1) the Nong Khai CPM had to conduct field exercises for two newly trained groups of VSDU personnel (separately reported on in Section IV) and (2) because of several national and religious holidays during that period.

(U) (2) A copy of the Step Two training program for the Lao Luang exercise is in Table 13. This was repeated at Hat Hae with the addition of an hour for debriefing by the umpire at the end of each day, and an additional three hours of scenario exercise on the Thursday afternoon. There were in all only three actual training days, the first and last days being reserved for briefing and debriefing at the BC HQ.

b. Implementation (U)

(U) (2) Thirteen scenarios were staged at Lao Luang and fourteen at Hat Hae, covering practical incidents of suspected infiltration, actual infiltration and exfiltration, and base defense. The BC HQ was involved in six of the scenarios in each case and simulated report sources were from village informants, villagers, local VSUs and the Nong Khai CPM. Umpires (CPM officials) were present at both the LCS and BC HQ during the Hat Hae exercise; at the BC HQ only during the Lao Luang exercise. SRI evaluators were present at all locations.

\* (U) Memorandum to the Record, by Vanpen Narakol, SRI, 16 February 1970. (Confidential)

(U)

Table 13

(C) STEP TWO - CPX TRAINING PROGRAM FOR BC HQ AND LCS LAO LUANG (I)

Date	Time		Training Program	Place	Reference	Training Aids	Remarks
	From	To					
Monday, 23 March 1970	0900	1200	Training introduction: - Method and problems - Umpire introduction - Distribution of aids	BC HQ A. Bung Kan	Infantry School Manual	- Map scale 1:50,000 area of A. Bung Kan and A. Seka - Stationery - 2 motorcycles - 2 bicycles - 1 long-shaft boat and munitions of the LCS	
	1300	1600	All personnel involved in the training to return to their stations				
Tuesday, 24 March 1970	0800	1200	Umpires hand scenarios to the trainees for solving.	BC HQ and LCS Lao Luang	Infantry School Manual	-Map scale 1:50,000 area of A. Bung Kan and A. Seka - Stationery - 2 motorcycles - 2 bicycles - 1 long-shaft boat and munitions of the LCS	
	1300	1600	-do-				
Wednesday, 25 March 1970	0800	1200	Umpires hand scenarios to the trainees for solving.	BC HQ and LCS Lao Luang	Infantry School Manual	- Map scale 1:50,000 area of A. Bung Kan and A. Seka - Stationery - 2 motorcycles - 2 bicycles - 1 long-shaft boat and munitions of the LCS	
	1300	2100	-do-				
Thursday, 26 March 1970	0800	1200	Scenario solving (cont.)	BC HQ and LCS	Infantry School	-do-	
Friday, 27 March 1970	0800	1200	Umpires debrief the results of training and discuss them at the BC HQ	BC HQ	Infantry School	- Map scale 1:50,000 area of A. Bung Kan and A. Seka - Stationery - 2 motorcycles - 2 bicycles - 1 long-shaft boat and munitions of the LCS	
	1300	1600	Chief umpire makes com- ment and briefs the result of the training				

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(1) Lao Luang (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ A summary of the training carried out is at Table 14. Samples of the evaluators' reports on scenario-solving at both the LCS and the BC HQ are in Tables 15 and 16, respectively. The evaluators' full reports were subsequently sent to the CPM Military Advisor together with the comments that follow.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The previously prepared scenarios were simple and practical but their timing was faulty in that they overlapped too much, thereby flooding the C<sup>3</sup> system before it had a chance to be properly established.

(U) ~~(S)~~ There was too much emphasis on the commander and the S2/3. Although these are the key officials in the LCS, the others needed practice in dealing with operational problems--as they will have to when the commander and S2/3 are on leave or away from the LCS.

(U) ~~(S)~~ There was considerable confusion at the start over the implementation of SOP, particularly the message routing. This improved towards the end but problems in distinguishing between urgent and routine messages were not resolved.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The major scene of action revolved, as intended, around the LCS rather than the BC HQ. Thus, an official umpire should have been at the LCS to correct mistakes in procedures or problem-solving on the spot--at the end of each scenario or at the end of each day. Leaving all comments and criticisms until the end of the exercise meant that their impact was much reduced because they were too generalized, the LCS staff already having forgotten many of the details by that time.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Overall, the whole LCS staff, the Strike Force and three or four village informants participated in Step Two at both Lao Luang and Hat Mae. Despite many faults in details, the LCS system worked well in its first tryout, and the Strike Force responded satisfactorily to orders, although their map-reading ability remained poor, and radio communications to the LCS were inadequate. The informants' performance was not good. They still could not operate their radios properly, and it was discovered that several of the sets issued to villages in January had already broken down because of poor maintenance. The previous inference of informants having forgotten some of the rudiments of their basic instruction was borne out during this exercise, the implication being that there had been too long a gap before the practical field exercises were held. However, it must be remembered that this represented a small sample size, since only a handful of informants participated.

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Table 14  
(U) STEP TWO TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Umpires	Subject	Scenario	Remarks
	From	To						
Tuesday, 24 Mar 1970	0920	1500	LCS hall and in the field	7 LCS staff 4 SF (PP) and all available SF (VV) 3 Village Informants	No CPM officials present	CPX (5 scenarios)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- General background situation of Laos and Thailand.</li> <li>- An agent informed LCS about an incident on the Laos bank.</li> <li>- A VSU informed LCS about suspect action by 2 boats in the Mekong river.</li> <li>- Investigation of the two boats.</li> <li>- An agent informed LCS about a suspect boat being found near a village.</li> <li>- A villager informed the LCS about Communist leaflets found around his village.</li> </ul>	Solutions made correctly and quickly owing to experience of the staffs especially the Commander and S2/3. Night exercise on base defense was also carried out well.
Wednesday, 25 Mar 1970	0846	2142	LCS classroom and in the field	7 LCS staff 4 SF (PP) and all available SF (VV) 3 Village Informants	No CPM officials present	CPX (6 scenarios)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- An agent informed LCS about Communist weapons hidden in the forest.</li> <li>- BC HQ gave LCS advance information on CTs crossing the river from Laos in order to get weapons.</li> <li>- SF patrol contacted CTs with casualties on both sides.</li> <li>- The captured CT disclosed a CT plan to attack LCS that night.</li> <li>- LCS base defense at night.</li> <li>- Helicopter brought in to evacuate casualties.</li> </ul>	Field ambush exercise was reasonably effected although SF patrolling and defensive tactics were poor. Another base defense exercise was carried out at night and was adequate.
Thursday, 26 Mar 70	0835	1904	LCS hall and in the field	As for 25 March	No CPM officials present	CPX (2 scenarios)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Report from Mat Hae LCS about two suspects travelling in the Lao Luang area.</li> <li>- BC HQ informed LCS about CT plan to cross from Thailand to Laos that night.</li> </ul>	Field exercises to carry out surveillance on suspects were satisfactory. A night ambush exercise was also included.

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Table 15

SUMMARY OF SRI EVALUATORS' COMMENTS ON LCS PROCEDURES DURING STEP TWO TRAINING AT LAO LUANG (U)

1. Date: March 25, 1970
2. Scenario No.: -6
3. Report source: Informant of Ban Dong Bang
4. Message method: Radio
5. Message details: On 25 March 1970 at 0600 the informant of Ban Dong Bang found 3 carbines with ammunition, a radio, 5 hand-grenades, and canned food, hidden in a charcoal pit in the forest at coordinate 075905.
6. Time received: 0846
7. Message routing details:
  - A. LCS Radio operator 0846
  - B. LCS Clerk 0849
  - C. Passed to:
    1. LCS Commander 0851 1/2
    2. S2/3 0853 1/2
    3. LCS Commander 0858 1/2
8. Decision taken:
  - A. Send a squad of SF consisting of 2 PP and 8 VV to go and observe the area where the weapons were hidden.
  - B. Then the squad mentioned would be divided into two groups, the first of which consisting of 1 PP and 6 VV had to go on surveillance around the area where the weapons were hidden. The other, consisting of 1 PP and 2 VV, would bring the weapons back to the LCS.
  - C. Those weapons would be sent to the appropriate authorized units later.
  - D. The LCS would also order the informant of Ban Dong Bang to go back immediately and observe the area where the weapons were hidden all the time, until the arrival of the strike force.

0859-0902
9. Action taken:
  - A. LCS Commander told the Chief of SF to form a squad of SF, then divide it into two groups.
  - B. Chief of SF called all SF into line.
  - C. LCS Commander let the SF know the situation and their mission.
  - D. LCS Commander told the radio operator to tell the informant of Ban Dong Bang through the radio to go on surveillance around the area where the weapons were hidden.

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(U)  
(S) Table 15 (Concluded)

10. Who informed: BCC Commander 0911
11. Results:
- A. The informant of Ban Dong Bang went to the area where the weapons were hidden. The Strike Force arrived later.
  - B. The weapons hidden at coordinates 075905 were brought back to the LCS on March 25, 1970 at approximately 1330 hours.
12. Other action: Nil
13. Umpire's comments:
- A. The LCS staff dealt with this sixth scenario well.
  - B. The LCS staff were right when they decided to send the squads and the informant to go on surveillance around the area at which the weapons were hidden.

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Table 16

(U) SUMMARY OF SRI EVALUATORS' COMMENTS ON BC HQ PROCEDURES DURING STEP TWO TRAINING AT SRI VILAI (U)

1. Date: March 26, 1970
2. Scenario No.: 13
3. Report source: NK CPM
4. Message method: Radio
5. Message details: A reliable source informed that tonight between 2000 to 2200 hours 3 CT plan to cross from Thailand to Laos. The area of crossing is between B. Tha-Hai and B. Foi-Lom. It is also reported that there are many CT supporters living in these two villages. The interception should be concealed as much as possible. The ambush spot should be set outside the village or near the bank of the river.
6. Time received: 1306
7. Message routing details:

A. Received by radio-operator	1306
B. Logged by the clerk	1315
C. Passed to:	
1. S2/3	1319
2. No approval from the Acting Commander*	
8. Decision taken: 1320
  - A. Order the LCS to send SF to intercept and observe secretly. The ambush spot should be set outside the village or near the bank of the river.
  - B. Order VSU B. Foi-Lom and RCP B. Tha-Sikai to observe and patrol both in the village and along the river bank.
9. Action taken: Three radio messages are written to send to LCC A. Seka, VSU B. Tha-Hai and RCP B. Tha-Sikai (1325)
10. BC HQ informed: LCS A. Seka  
VSU B. Tha-Hai  
RCP B. Tha-Sikai

\* S2/3 made decision by himself without the approval of the Acting Commander because the message was sent from NK CPM, so it was already screened.

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(U) (C) The BC HQ, also operating for the first time, was not rigorously tested, except in communicating with the LCS, and the two officials involved (G2/3, G1/4) demonstrated competence in handling the few problems posed to them.

(2) Hat Hae (U)

(a) Preparation (U)

(U) (C) With a much longer lead time, and with the Lao Luang CPX experience behind them, the CPM made a thorough job of preparing for the Step Two Hat Hae/BC HQ training. Scenarios were better written (they were similar to those used at Lao Luang but with detailed variations); this time there were official umpires for the Strike Force and village informants as well as the control centers, and comprehensive written staff solutions to each scenario had been prepared. An example of the umpire's brief (the first scenario) is in Table 17. All together, there was a much more professional and realistic flavour from the outset of this exercise.

(b) Implementation (U)

(U) (C) There was no attempt, however, to follow the operational SOP during the Hat Hae exercises. The commander, who had replaced the first one, was completely new to Plan 9 and to the area, and his method of approach to scenario-solving was to do everything himself, with the result that the LCS staff, particularly the S2/3, were not exercised. The performance of the Strike Force and the few informants who participated was of a similar standard to that at Lao Luang.

(U) (C) Although the Hat Hae exercises were well prepared, they were inadequately supervised; lessons learned in procedures and problem solving were not properly reviewed, the CPM staff by then being involved in preparing for the full-system Step Three exercises that were due to take place just over a week later. Thus the timing of Step Two at Hat Hae was faulty, the LCS was not fully exercised, and its standard of performance still remained below that of Lao Luang.

(c) Summary (U)

(U) (C) By the end of Step Two, both LCSs had been individually practiced in command post exercises and so, to limited extent, had the BC HQ. Communications between the three control elements had been tested and found satisfactory. The whole C<sup>3</sup>

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Table 17

(2) EXAMPLE OF SCENARIO AND UMPIRE'S BRIEF,  
STEP TWO BC HQ TRAINING AT HAT HAE (U)

Scenario No. 1

SUBJECT: Situation in Ban Xot

TO: Hat Hae LCS Commander

At 080800 June 1970, the source (village informant) visited relatives at Ban Nong Bo Tha (VF 024110) and stayed overnight there. He heard the noise of gun fire in the direction of Ban Xot (Laos) at 090100. The next morning at about 0600 hrs he crossed to Ban Xot with a relative and learned that about 40 PTL soldiers came to surrounding area, held a propaganda meeting, and asked for supplies from the villagers of Ban Xot. The PTL soldiers also asked about the number of the boats in village before withdrawing at 0400 hrs in an unknown direction. This information has never been told to anyone before.

Informant No. 111

(Ban Nong Bo)

Execution:

The umpire hands this message to the informant at 0730 hrs.

Requirement:

As LCS commander, what you should do on receipt of this message.

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(U)  
~~(S)~~ Table 17 (Continued)

Umpire's Solution to Scenario No. 1

Execution:

1. Radio Operator
  - Register in the log
  - Hand to the clerk
2. Clerk
  - Record in the journal
  - Hand to S2/3
3. S2/3
  - Evaluation of the source B, as a trained informant
  - Evaluation of the information
  - Interpretation
    - (1) PTL/VM was short of food and had been attacked by Laotian Government forces, disrupting their logistics, so they had to get food from the villagers.
    - (2) PTL/VM want to influence the people, for recruitment, supplies, and to use the village as a safe-haven.
    - (3) Asking about the number of boats in village (Ban Xot) could mean that the PTL/VM plan to infiltrate personnel and weapons into Thailand.
    - (4) The crossing time is unknown.

Action to be Taken:

This PTL/VM unit may infiltrate Thailand, for:

- reinforcing the local insurgents
- taking rest temporarily before returning to Laos.

Execution:

Examine the report on the map. The scene was in Ban Xot in Laos, 6 kms South of Hat Hae LCS and about 3 kms North of VSU Ban Lao.

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(U)

(S) Table 17 (Concluded)

Expected Crossing Point :

Many points could be used, but if boats of Ban Xot were to be used, the crossing point should be near the mouth of Huai Nam Um, because -

- There is a watercourse with a good concealment.
- Easy approach to Phu Wua where the insurgents are known to be staying.

Strength to be Deployed:

- Informants of Ban Nong Bo to collect more information.
- Instruct VSU Ban Tha Somhong, River Check Post Ban Bungkla, BPP 408 platoon and Lao Luang LCS to collect information and maintain surveillance.

Reporting:

- Report all decisions and actions to the BC HQ.

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system had not been tested, as envisaged for Step Two in the CPM training order, nor had local VSUs, BPP and SOC units participated. It was planned to do this, however, during Step Three.

6. Step Three (U)

a. Preparation and Schedule (U)

(U) (C) The orders setting the stage for Step Three--the finale of Plan 9 formal training--were impressive. A comprehensive plan for the exercises (Nong Khai CPM order 158/2513) was issued 18 June 1970; the body of this order is reproduced at Table 18. The first annex assigned 13 Changwat and Amphoe CPM officers (10 of them field-grade) as umpires for the BC HQ, two LCSs and their Strike Forces and village informants.

(U) (C) The second annex covered the names of every individual in the control organizations and operational units that were to participate, including the five Target Area Two strike force squads and the five VSUs in the Plan 9 area; also the names of 131 village informants in the 28 villages of the operational area.

(U) (C) The third annex gave a detailed operational picture of the security threat in and around the Plan 9 area, with emphasis on Communist insurgent activities in the adjoining parts of Laos. This was followed by 14 scenarios to be staged over the three training days exercising both LCSs and the BC HQ, with emphasis on coordinated operations and the main headquarters. (Five additional scenarios were inserted into the program by the Chief Umpire as the exercises progressed; mainly to force the BC HQ and the Target Area Two Strike Forces to become more involved.)

(U) The schedule for Step Three is in Table 19. This was generally followed during the exercises and, instead of a confusingly detailed, blow-by-blow account of the individual and joint implementation by the three control elements and their subordinate units and personnel, the discussion that follows will describe the highlights, together with the positive and negative results.

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SCHEDULE OF CPX AND FTX (STEP THREE) TO OPORD 9 (U)

1. OBJECTIVES: to familiarize the staff of BC HQ, LCS, VSUs, and other units in the area of Operation Plan 9 to operational and administrative procedures, which have been previously instructed in class and field; also to establish cooperation by requesting support from tactical subordinate units or units nearby within the responsible area of Nong Khai CPM by letting them participate in or observe the training [exercises] which are to be used as guidelines in the future.
2. SUBJECT MATTER
  - 2.1 The trainees are to study the training procedures, general instructions and critiques of the Step One and Two Exercises which have been previously performed.
  - 2.2 The trainees are to explain to subordinates about the importance of training and require them to train as in a real situation.
3. METHOD OF TRAINING
  - 3.1 The trainee units assign personnel and equipment to full authorized organic strength, and those who are assigned must stay in their role and duties until the training period is over.
  - 3.2 The umpires for personnel or units are to record actions performed.
  - 3.3 The umpire hands the scenario and requirement to the trainee.
  - 3.4 The trainee conducts exercise by following the SOPs or principles learned before.
  - 3.5 The Strike Force, VSUs and the tactical support units must send men out to operate as in a real situation as ordered. The trainees must obey the umpires except if an order is changed. This is to ensure the exercises will be thorough as planned and to prevent any dangerous situations.
  - 3.6 After each scenario has been dealt with by the trainee, the umpire will explain the correct solution and also will listen to the trainee's opinion.

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(5)  
(2) Table 18 (Concluded)

3.7 When aggressor forces are used, [in an] aim to make situations realistic, special attention and care must be paid in order to prevent any misunderstanding between the trainee and the aggressor.

4. ORGANIZATION AND SCHEDULE

- 4.1 The directing staff, umpires and aggressors (Annex A.)
- 4.2 The trainees (Annex B.)
- 4.3 The schedule (Annex C.)

5. TRAINING AID

- 5.1 Map 1:50,000 sheets of A. Bung Kan, A. Seka.
- 5.2 Stationery and forms as necessary.
- 5.3 Unit weapon and equipment as required.
- 5.4 Communication equipment as available to unit and in area.

6. SUPPORT

- 6.1 TA 2 provides one 3/4-ton truck to Hat Mae LCS. Nong Khai CPM provides one 3/4-ton truck to Lao Luang LCS.
- 6.2 Beverages and expense for visitors and commanders can be paid from unit fund as necessary.
- 6.3 Signal Office to prepare equipment for reserve.
- 6.4 S2 to provide from the intelligence fund for the agent's per diem (name list in Annex A.) at rate of  $\text{B} 16$  a day for 3 days (23-25 June 1970) and report to CPM.

Effective on June 18, 1970

(Signed) Wit Nimuan  
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Vichien Prasitchai  
S3

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b. Implementation (U)

(1) The First Scenario (U)

(U) (C) This first exercise on March 23 gave Step Three a very bad start. A simulated message was scheduled in the CPM order to be sent at 0730 hours, informing the Hat Hae LCS that 5 insurgents were expected to cross the Mekong river from an adjoining village in Laos to the Northern edge of the Lao Luang operational area. But the message was not received until 0815 hours for the simple reason that the exercises were not due to commence until 0800 hours (see Table 19) and it took 15 minutes for the LCS staff to get organized. Caught completely off their guard, the LCS staff made a shambles of a rather interesting scenario.

(U) (C) In the first place it took them one hour to decide what to do. At the end of this period a message was sent to the Lao Luang LCS requesting SF interception from there to the expected landing point 15 kms upstream; whereas it would have been only 9 kms downstream, with much more lead time, using the Hat Hae SF. The message also told Lao Luang that the Hat Hae LCS had already ordered two VSUs in the vicinity of the landing point to intercept and ambush the CTs, although both these units were in the operational area and ostensibly under control of the Lao Luang LCS. In addition, the Hat Hae LCS logged a simulated information message to the BPP Platoon situated 10 kms to the north of them, without the slightest idea of how such a message could be sent in reality. (Note: No communications system was established between Plan 9 units and the BPP during Step Three, but had such existed, an information message of this nature should rightly have been channeled through the BC HQ.) About the only thing the Hat Hae LCS did right in this first scenario was to alert its informants in appropriate villages to maintain surveillance.

(U) (C) The LCS did inform the BC HQ of the situation, however, and of the facts that it had instructed two Lao Luang VSUs to intercept the CTs and had alerted its own informants. The message mentioned nothing about the request for the Lao Luang Strike Force, nor about the simulated BPP message. The BC HQ reaction was merely to inform the Nong Khai CPM, and instruct the LCSs to report results.

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Table 19

STEP THREE - FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE SCHEDULE (U)

Date	Time		Subject	Place	Reference	Training Aids	Remarks
	From	To					
Monday, 22 June 1970	0800	1200	Orientation - Method of training - Introducing umpires - Issuing equipment - Explaining general situation	BC HQ	CSOC paper and others	M.p 1:50,000 sheet Ban Hui Suem, Ban Tho Si Khai. Comm. equipment in unit and in area. One motorcycle Two 3.4 ton trucks Two bicycles Long-shaft boats Organic weapons	BC HQ commander BC HQ staff LCS commanders
	1300	1600	The umpire and trainees travel to their exercise locations.	Hai Mao and Lao Luang LCSs			
Tuesday, 23 June 1970	0800	1200	The umpire hands out scenarios and the trainees conduct exercises.	BC HQ Hai Mao & Lao Luang LCSs	CSOC paper and others	-do-	[3 scenarios]
	1300	2100	-do-				
Wednesday, 24 June 1970	0800	0900	Umpires critique the exercises on June 23.	BC HQ and LCSs	CSOC paper and others	-do-	[7 scenarios]
	0900	1200	Umpires hand out scenarios and trainees conduct the exercise.				
	1300	1600	-do-				
	1600	1700	Umpires critique the day's exercises.				
Thursday, 25 June 1970	0800	1200	Umpires hands out scenarios and trainees conduct exercises.	BC HQ and LCSs	CSOC paper and others	-do-	[4 scenarios]
	1300	1600	-do-				
	1600	1700	End of training Umpires critique the day's exercises.				
Friday, 26 June 1970	0800	1200	Umpires collect the results and reports. The Director critiques and summarizes results.	BC HQ	CSOC paper and others	-do-	BC HQ commander, staff and umpires

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(U) (C) The LCS Lao Luang fared little better. It took less than 20 minutes to decide on a plan, but then proceeded to send its SF (fortunately, only in theory) on an interception course which took the SF not only well into the Hat Hae operational area but also over the operational boundary controlled by the Seka Amphoe CPM--without informing either of these commands. Accepting without protest the preemption by the Hat Hae LCS of its authority over VSU units (whose unspecified operations in reality could have led to a clash either with each other or with the SF), the Lao Luang LCS then alerted the informants in villages surrounding the expected landing area, but omitted informing those in the one village where the landing was most likely to occur.

(U) (C) Overall, no one came out very well in this first scenario, for which the untimeliness of the message and the complete abnegation of responsibility by the BC HQ were the main causes; and the four umpires concerned (all field-grade officers) did not explain the correct solutions as required under paragraph 3.6 of the Step Three training order.

(2) Developments (U)

(U) (C) In subsequent exercises, procedures and problem-solving never descended to the depths of Scenario One, and, although there continued to be faults in details, the LCS staffs gradually improved. The SF tactical exercises were satisfactorily carried out, although their map reading and communications were unsatisfactory, and the four or five agents practiced in both LCS areas performed quite well except that they were totally unable to read a map. There was some doubt also about the ability of the LCS staffs in the using of maps, which could account for them ordering operations outside their own areas of responsibility. There were certainly several unaccountable discrepancies of UTM coordinate details in the various evaluators' reports and message copies, but whether this was due to poor reporting or poor map reading is impossible to assess. The author's own impression of the trainees' performance at both LCS Lao Luang and the BC HQ was that they were slow in map reading and needed much more practice.

(U) (C) The major requirements in staging field exercises are realism and experience. As mentioned by several of the officials taking part, it is difficult to get men to do their best in a "cold" situation--the infiltration through the Plan 9 area reportedly having virtually ceased nearly a year before Step Three. Notwithstanding this, the exercises could have been

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much more realistic if the umpires had come up to expectations. As it was, they were all inexperienced in CPX/FTX, insufficiently briefed either as to being told what to do or by reading their orders, and some were rather relaxed in their attitude towards the exercises.

(U) (C) The LCS staffs, however, with little correction or advice, went steadily through their scenarios, which tested them quite exhaustively, and often learned from their own mistakes. There was a flavor of ritual attending the message-routing SOPs, although one LCS commander made it quite clear that he would short-circuit the system in the event of a real emergency--which, of course, he should do. Thus, any analysis of average timings from the message being received to a decision being taken (which was in the order of 20 minutes at both LCSs) would apply only to the exercises, and not a live operational situation.

(U) (C) The BC HQ tended to be used as a message channel rather than an operational center. It made no attempt to call in outside forces even when (in Scenario No. 5) 60 CTs in four groups were reported in the area. Its solution to this problem was merely to inform the two LCSs to follow the situation closely and to use very small Amphoe CPM units to intercept. No attempt was made to involve the Target Area Two Strike Forces nor the local BPP platoons. Neither were any attempts made to establish communications with the BPP or Marine Police and, although the latter were reportedly standing by for participation in Step Three, they were never used.

(U) (C) Although delegation of authority to local units is desirable, coordination of their activities and support is required from the BC HQ and this was rarely forthcoming. It was the first time that the HQ had been really tested in its decision-making function, however, and its staff clearly were inexperienced in dealing with the problems posed. The Chief Umpire, who was at the BC HQ, inserted additional surprise scenarios in order to force the staff into action but even when (in the last scenario) combined operations of all LCS and Target Area Two Strike Forces had to be undertaken, the reaction of the BC HQ was to assign the responsibility to the local LCS commander. This resulted in a problem of seniority between the various SF commanders, which the BC HQ should have anticipated by sending one of its own staff as overall commander, or by specifically designating the LCS commander to take charge.

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c. Debriefing (U)

(U) (C) On 26 June, the CPM Military Advisor held a debriefing meeting at the BC HQ in which all umpires, Plan 9 control staff and unit commanders, and observers participated. The principal umpires for the BC HQ, LCSs, SFs and informants gave their comments individually after which the Military Advisor summed up. The major points made were:

(U) (1) (C) The radio procedures and map-reading capability of both informants and SFs were below operational requirements. A different method of location finding and reporting was required.

(U) (2) (C) The operational tactics of all SFs were satisfactory, but patrol discipline was poor. No passwords were used throughout the exercises for any of the patrols and ambushes, nor were radio call-signs for operational units designated. The operational readiness of SF units, particularly at the BC HQ, was slow; SF commanders' briefings to their men were not sufficiently clear and comprehensive; and the SFs were inadequately practiced in emergency stand-to's for base defense, by day and night.

(U) (3) (C) The decision-making procedures at the BC HQ and the LCSs were too slow for operational requirements. The SOPs required amendment to allow for immediate action for emergency reports. The internal LCS routing procedures were unnecessarily handicapped by poor seating arrangements and untidy handling and filing of messages and orders.

(U) (4) (C) Communications between BC HQ and LCSs were satisfactory, but they were still not up to standard in regard to SFs and informants.

(U) (5) (C) Only 4 or 5 informants participated in Step Three and it was agreed that all informants should be included in future exercises. Emphasis of training should be on clear, simple and informal messages that the informants could understand and respond to. Military terminology should be discarded. In future scenarios, care must be taken to avoid overloading the informant communications network.

(U) (6) (C) It was recognized that the Lao Luang LCS staff was more experienced, efficient and ready for operational responsibility than the one at Hat Mae.

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(U) (7) (X) Overall, the Step Three exercises were deemed to be a success, and a great improvement over Step Two. It was recognized that the exercises could have been much more realistic in their planning, implementation and supervision, but it was felt that they had served a useful purpose in testing the C<sup>3</sup> and operational systems--the many faults of which had been noted and would be rectified in future training. In this regard, the Military Advisor stated that it was his intention to hold similar CPX and FTX for Plan 9 units at intervals of two months or so, not only to improve the system and operations, but also to maintain a satisfactory standard of operational readiness.

d. Comment (U)

(U) (X) Points that were not brought out in the debriefing but could have been discussed are as follows:

(U) (1) (X) None of the umpires--either at the debriefing or during the exercises--took any action to explain or correct the many mistakes and omissions in the operational and tactical decisions made. The umpires were, in fact, required by the CPM training order to make their critiques at the end of each scenario (see item 3.6 of Table 18); and the specific reasons for their failure to do so are not known. However, they had received no training in their role and duties, which is an obvious first requirement. If the umpires had understood and discharged the responsibilities laid down for them, the exercises would undoubtedly have benefited.

(U) (2) (X) As it was, the major responsibility for the planning and implementation of Step Three was borne by the CPM G2, 3. This he had also borne in previous Plan 9 training, but now that as many as half a dozen scenes of action were enacted concurrently, it was virtually impossible for him to carry the load all by himself whatever his experience and ability.

(U) (3) (X) There were considerable logistics handicaps to effective exercises in Step Three. First of all, it was the height of the rainy season, which made some roads unusable and particularly those around Hat Hae--thereby considerably curtailing the planned FTX. The 3/4-ton truck assigned to Hat Hae broke down and was unserviceable throughout the exercises, and both the LCS boats were unusable because of faulty engines.

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(U)  
(4) (U) Neither the SOC, BPP, nor Marine Police participated in Step Three, although expressly included in the CPM training order. The BPP was preoccupied with training of its own, the Marine Police reportedly standing by at Bung Kan were not used, and no mention was made of the SOC after the issue of the order. The five VSUs in the Plan 9 area did not participate actively either (in the FTX), and there is still considerable doubt about their reporting responsibility--whether it be, variously, to the Target Area HQs, to the BC HQ, to the Amphoe CPM, or to the LCSs. Since their communication channels are still linked with the Target Area Two HQ and the two Amphoe CPMs--as they were in September, 1969 (see Fig. 4, p. 62)--it would appear that the LCSs would have to ask for any VSU operational involvement through the BC HQ in the first instance. Thus the LCSs do not, at the present time, command or control the VSUs. Nor, strictly speaking, does the BC HQ.

(U)  
(5) (U) Another point of note was that the BC HQ commander, the new Nai Amphoe of Bung Kan, did not take part in the exercises. He did, however, attend the briefing and debriefing sessions at Sri Vilai on 22 and 26 June. In his absence, the two principal staff officers--the S1, 4 and S2, 3--acted as commander. Thus the capacity of the BC HQ commander was not tested.

(U)  
(6) (U) In summary, Step Three was confined to exercising and testing organic elements of Plan 9 only. It did not cover the full system tests involving all detection, command, and tactical elements as required in CPM order No. 271/2512.

C. Evaluation of Field Training (U)

(U)  
(U) The method adopted to assess the Plan 9 field training program, with its five rather complex and sometimes overlapping stages, is to compare the overall results achieved with the mission and objectives spelled out in 2.b. and c. above.

a. (U) (U) Objective No. 1--development of operational techniques, communications and SOP for the LCSs and BC HQ--was largely realized, although further training was necessary, particularly in the decision-making, response and reporting functions.

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(U)  
b. (2) Little headway had been made toward meeting Objectives Two and Three--border operational tactics, designation of operational areas and establishment of preselected ambush points within those areas. Although it was intended to pursue these goals after the Step Three exercises, the problem of control over or coordination with the VSUs, BPP and SOC units in the Plan 9 area had not been resolved and specific boundaries could not, therefore, be established. Attempts were made during Steps Two and Three to cover the area ambush principles enunciated in training order annex. Since specific points had not been established, the vectoring of forces in exercises had to concentrate on obvious landmarks such as villages or road and river intersections. Failing these, UTM coordinates were used, which were meaningless as none of the units participating could read a map with such precision. In regard to other tactics (paragraph 2.e. (2), p. 63), considerable effort was devoted in the exercises to ambushes on advance information, with good results, although there was not enough emphasis on night operations. No attempt was made, however, to establish and test systems of area information, external information and calling for external assistance. These again were still considered to be desirable objectives for future planning and training.

(U)  
c. (2) Objectives 4, 6 and 7--follow-up to the basic training, and individual and team training--were partially realized in regard to the Strike Forces. In particular, their knowledge and practice of ambush procedures were augmented and improved, but their map-reading capability never approached the required standard. Another point to be made is that about two weeks' training in what was really revision or augmentation of basic subjects was given to the SFs during field training, thus supporting the original inference that the four-week basic program was inadequate. The performance of the Strike Force PP leaders, as revealed from the exercises, was that one was good (Hat Hae), whereas the other was poor. (This was also the opinion expressed by responsible CPM officials, although not specifically mentioned during the Step Three debriefing.) Careful selection of leaders is an obvious requirement in the formation of any further Strike Forces.

(U)  
d. (2) The development of informants' technical proficiency in observation and reporting--Objective 5--did not receive much attention. After a short reiteration to about a half of the informants in Steps Zero and One on the map reading, radio procedure and elementary surveillance subjects already given in the basic training program, the informants were thenceforth somewhat neglected--no more than ten of them being

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the BPP, SOC, Marine Police and VSUs--all in the same area. Orders have been given, and often repeated--ever since the 2nd Army Operation Order No. 5 of December 1967--that unified border security operations should be carried out. None of these orders have been properly enforced, nor can they be until compatible communications are provided and a strong, well-supported, and well-supervised command/control system firmly established and maintained. Plan 9 provides a base upon which to build such a system, but it requires the participation of the other RTG units in its operational area, i.e., those shown as support units in Fig. 5.

(U)  
i. In summary, it can be stated that the field training program did not fully meet its mission and objectives. This was not so much because the 20 to 24 weeks of planned training had to be reduced to 12 weeks in practice, but because of the facts that:

- (1) The plans for basic training were not as well thought out or developed as they should have been. As a result, execution of the plans was ragged and could not be rectified for more than a relatively few trainees during the field exercises.
- (2) The local operational staff were inexperienced in planning and implementing CPX and FTX.
- (3) The innovation of training and organizing villagers as informants, linked with an operational response system, was bound to require much experimentation and correction before it could be made to work.
- (4) Other RTG units in the Plan 9 operational area did not participate in the field training as planned.

Despite these shortcomings, it is not suggested that the field training was a failure. In hindsight, the mission and objectives are clearly too ambitious for accomplishment in view of the time allowed, the facilities and staff available and, above all, the experimental nature of the plan itself. As matters stand, these objectives can be accomplished, based upon the valuable experience of the field exercises, if the CPM (and CSOC) persists

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used in the subsequent three training steps. In general, the informants' proficiency in using a radio remained low, and their ability to find and report a location on a map was virtually zero. The informants who took part in the field training showed that they had not assimilated or retained their basic training sufficiently, a contributory cause apparently being the long break in momentum between the basic and field training sessions. In addition, it was impossible for the small staff available to supervise them properly, raising once again the unwieldiness of the informant concept as implemented. In retrospect (and for future border security training programs), it would appear better to stage the informant basic training after that of the SF in order to ensure continuity and thus, to a certain extent, motivation.

(U) e. (S) The field exercises did not reveal flaws in the operational concepts-- Objective 8--since these concepts were not really practiced or tested.

(U) f. (S) It was the consensus of the CPM officials and SRI observers that the field exercises had produced a foundation for advanced, recurrent unit training-- Objective 9; also that there was a need for such further training to correct the mistakes and omissions noted from the field training experience.

(U) g. (S) In regard to Objective 10, it is not yet known if the CPM or CSOC will produce a written appreciation of the Plan 9 operation for application to other border areas. It is hoped that this report will be considered useful for this purpose.

(U) h. (S) The Overall mission--to have all integral and associated elements of Plan 9 tactically proficient and operationally ready for full-scale border security operations by 1 May 1970--was partially realized by 1 July 1970 with respect to the integral elements, namely, the LCSs, SFs, BC HQ and, to a lesser extent, the village informants. The associated elements--BPP, VSUs, SOC, and Marine Police--were not exercised or tested in the field training, nor were any specific C<sup>3</sup> arrangements made to facilitate coordination of their operations with Plan 9 units. It is still the intention of the CPM to integrate all operational assets into a single border security system--covering perhaps a greater area and more units than originally envisaged in the Plan 9 order. When this will be done is not known. Until then, Plan 9 and its implementation must be regarded as yet another addition to the several border security operations conducted separately by

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with whatever further training is necessary, followed by occasional operational readiness testing to maintain alertness and response. To produce a fully integrated system of all operational assets, however, the Nong Khai CPM will have to be given sufficient muscle, in the form of very specific and comprehensive orders, and equipment (communications), to enforce its writ among all the units separately and variously involved in border security operations at the present time in the Changwat area.

(U)  
1. (S) A final point to be stressed in regard to the field training program is the long delay in building the LCSs and establishing fully their staffs. This caused the overall training period to be extended by at least four months. In addition, the LCS staffs had no chance of acquainting themselves with the majority of informants they were to handle. The lesson for the future is that the LCS buildings should be constructed at the beginning (if no other building is available) and the staff formed up in time to take part in all training with the informants in order to develop the intimate personal relationships necessary for effective operation.

(U)  
k. (S) As to the development of a regional security system rather than the original Plan 9 narrow border zone security, it is clear that the Nong Khai CPM is pursuing this concept and intends to involve its Target Area Two Strike Forces and subordinate VSUs in Plan 9 operations whenever necessary. The Target Area SF squads were used physically during Step Three and simulated patrol squads of both the Bung Khan and Seka Amphoe CPMs were also called upon for interception purposes. In various conversations, the Military Advisor stated that he would use the Target Area forces in conjunction with those of Plan 9, and the co-location of the two headquarters at Sri Vilai readily affords the facilities for complete coordination. Thus, it can be assumed with confidence that an embryonic combined regional and border security system already exists in reality in eastern Nong Khai, but much more progress will have to be made before the functional and tactical concepts outlined in the training order annex are implemented, tested, and become operational. The field training exercises constituted the first step in that direction but, whether these concepts are viable, and applicable to other areas, it is too early to state.

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IV OTHER TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR  
PARAMILITARY UNITS AND VILLAGE INFORMANTS (U)

A. Introduction (U)

(U) This section describes briefly other training programs in the RTG counterinsurgency effort which are comparable or applicable to the training requirements of Plan 9. These programs are discussed either in terms of their possible utilization for training Plan 9 elements, or as examples of training experience with applicability to Plan 9 training.

B. Basic Training (U)

1. Nakon Phanom Border Defense Plan (U)

(U) (S) As indicated at the outset of this paper, the Plan 9 concept of using 5-10 formally trained informants equipped with radios, and perhaps weapons, in each village of a designated operational area was entirely new to the Thai counterinsurgency experience--whether on the border or inland. Toward the end of 1969, however, some six months after the Nong Khai basic training program, similar operational plans were started in the border changwats of Loei and Nakon Phanom, to the southwest and southeast of Nong Khai respectively. No information is available on the Loei operation, but the training orders for Nakon Phanom were made available by courtesy of CSOC.

(U) (S) In Nakon Phanom the operational area was centered around Amphoe Mukdahan, for which one LCS and one Strike Force were formed and 150 informants recruited from 43 villages on or near the border. (There was no set establishment of informants as in Nong Khai; numbers ranged from 1 to 8 per village, with an average of 3 or 4 in most villages).

(U) (S) The Nakon Phanom training order, which referred to the Thai-Lao Border Defense Plan rather than a numbered operations plan, was similar in content to that of Nong Khai and the objectives were the same, except that protection of the LCS, villagers and village informants was not included. There were significant differences, however, in the training program and the Strike Force trainees. The informant course in Nakon Phanom was scheduled for 15 days, whereas the SF course was for 11 days only, with 120 training hours in each case--an even more intensive program than that at Nong Khai.

(U) (S) A comparison of the two informant courses shows that, except for psyops and one political lesson, the subjects in the two syllabuses are the same, but with varying emphasis. Subjects and hours for the two courses are listed in Table 20.

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Table 20

COMPARISON OF INFORMANT TRAINING PROGRAMS (U)

Nong Khai		Nakon Phanom	
Subject	Hrs	Subject	Hrs
1. Physical Exercise	8	1. Physical Exercise	12
2. Unarmed Combat	8	2. Unarmed Combat	12
3. Weapon Training	8	3. Weapon Training	6
4. Communications	11	4. Communications	12
5. Intelligence and Reporting	42	5. Intelligence and Reporting	24
6. Map Reading and Compass	12	6. Map Reading and Compass	18
7. Democracy	4	7. Democracy	2
8. Communism	3	8. Communism	2
9. Comparison of Democracy and Communism	4	9. Comparison of Democracy and Communism	2
10. Communist Propaganda and Recruitment	3	10. Not in program	-
11. Psychological Operations	3	11. Not in program	-
12. Development and Rehabilitation	4	12. Development and Rehabilitation	2
13. History of Thailand	4	13. History of Thailand	5
14. Aircraft and Uniform Recognition	2	14. Aircraft and Uniform Recognition	2
15. Immigration Law	2	15. Immigration Law	3
16. Training (motivation-night class)	8	16. Training (motivation-night class)	12
17. Tour	7	17. Not in program	-
18. Commander's Period	8	18. Commander's Period	6
19. Opening Ceremony	3	19. Not in program	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>		<b>120</b>

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(U)  
(C) The SF course in Nakon Phanom was revision training because, unlike the trainees in Nong Khai, 18 of the trainees were already serving as VDC personnel, the squad leaders being a head teacher and a puyaiban experienced in counterinsurgency operations. The syllabus excluded range firing and the explosive/sabotage lessons but otherwise covered the same subjects as the Nong Khai SF course--again with varying emphasis. A comparison of the two syllabi is at Table 21.

(U)  
(C) A feature of the Nakon Phanom training was that the major share of the instructional load in both the informant and SF courses fell on local BPP officers and NCOs. It is not known, however, how this training was actually carried out or what the results were.

2. Paramilitary Basic Training (U)

(U)  
(C) The only regular basic training programs conducted at the present time for RTG paramilitary units analogous to the Plan 9 Strike Forces, and for potential candidates for any future SF courses, are for members of the Volunteer Defense Corp (VDC) and Village Security and Development Unit (VSDU). Information on the non-regular Village Protection Teams (VPT), which are singular to Changwat Ubon, is that they received training similar to that in the now obsolete 4-week VDC basic course. (The syllabus for the latter is shown at Table 22, for information only.)

a. VSDU (U)

(U)  
(C) The well-equipped and staffed VSDU Training Center in Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan has trained several thousand VSDU recruits since its opening in late 1968. Its program of instruction covers a period of eight weeks, and the syllabus content is evenly divided between political motivation, development, and paramilitary subjects. In the last category the emphasis is on musketry (31 hours), tactics (26 hours), patrols, ambushes and self-defense (32 hours), communications (4 hours), intelligence (12 hours), and map reading and compass (22 hours)--a total of 127 hours, or approximately three weeks of the eight in the overall program.

(U)  
(C) The point to be made about the VSDU Training Center is that it has a large training capacity--a maximum of 1,000 recruits at a time and a very large and well-

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(U)  
(S) COMPARISON OF STRIKE FORCE TRAINING PROGRAMS (U)

Nong Khai		Nakon Phanom	
Subject	Hrs.	Subject	Hrs.
1. Physical Exercise	10	1. Physical Exercise	12
2. Unarmed Combat	13	2. Unarmed Combat	12
3. Foot Drill	7	3. Foot Drill	4
4. Rifle Drill	11	4. Rifle Drill	6
5. Weapon Training	7	5. Weapon Training	4
6. Aiming and Firing Positions	7	6. Aiming and Firing Positions	4
7. Battle Drill and Combat Formation	14	7. Battle Drill and Combat Formation	8
8. Squad and Platoon Tactics	10	8. Squad and Platoon Tactics	4
9. Patrolling	11	9. Patrolling	6
10. Grenade Throwing	7	10. Grenade Throwing	2
11. Ambush and Counter-ambush	7	11. Ambush and Counter-ambush	6
12. Surprise Attacks	3	12. Surprise Attacks	3
13. Anti-Guerrilla Operations	8	13. Anti-Guerrilla Operations	4
14. Explosives and Sabotage	4	14. Not in program	-
15. Map and Compass	14	15. Map and Compass	7
16. Combat Intelligence and Reporting	4	16. Combat Intelligence and Reporting	3
17. Communications	3	17. Communications	3
18. Psychological Operations	3	18. Psychological Operations	2
19. Nursing and Sanitation	3	19. Nursing and Sanitation	2
20. Development and Rehabilitation	2	20. Development and Rehabilitation	2
21. Democracy	2	21. Democracy	2
22. Communism	2	22. Communism	2
23. Comparison of Democracy and Communism	2	23. Comparison of Democracy and Communism	2
24. History of Thailand	2	24. History of Thailand	5
25. Firing with Live Ammunition	14	25. Not in program	-
26. Tour	7	26. Not in program	-
27. Motivational Training	16	27. Motivational Training	12
28. Commander's Hour	7	28. Commander's Hour	
29. Opening & Closing Ceremonies	7	29. Not in program	-
Total	207		120

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Table 22

SUBJECTS COVERED IN VDC BASIC TRAINING PRIOR TO 1970 (U)

Subject	Hours
Basic Military Techniques	20
Weapons	28
VDC Organization	2
Collecting and Reporting Intelligence	4
Map Reading	16
Small-Unit Tactics	24
Communications Subjects (Use of Tambon Radio)	8
Basic PsyOps (Face-to-Face Persuasion)	6
Aerial Delivery of Supplies and Marking DZ's	8
Demolitions	12
Orientation to Unconventional Warfare and Tactics	4
Village Defense	8
First Aid	8
Operations Behind Enemy Lines	2
Physical Training	8
Commander's Time	10
Testing	6
Miscellaneous	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>176</b>

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qualified staff, which has shown considerable flexibility in amending and adjusting its training syllabus. Yet it has discharged less than a half of its maximum training capacity since its opening. With a slightly amended and augmented syllabus, it could take on the basic paramilitary training of Strike Forces if (1) this is administratively feasible and (2) the decision is made to recruit and train more Strike Forces for border operations.

b. VDC (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The method used for the basic training of VDC recruits is to send a mobile training team from a local army battalion, using available training facilities at changwat or amphoe level. A training cadre of officers and NCOs conducts a six-week course for VDC recruits, the syllabus of which is shown at Table 23. The cadre is adjusted to the training requirement, two officers and ten NCOs being used for one hundred trainees.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The training delivered is not necessarily standard, the syllabus being adjusted by the local army staffs to suit local requirements. The procedure for initiating these courses is to obtain approvals from the RTA, the Department of Local Administration and CSOC respectively, after which training orders are transmitted through the RTA chain of command. According to the JUSMAG VDC staff officer, the cost of basic training for the 45-day course is  $\text{฿} 2,000$  per trainee, made up of  $\text{฿} 900$  per diem for the trainee and  $\text{฿} 1100$  for the salary and per diem of the instructional team and training materials. At  $\text{฿} 45$  per trainee day, the VDC basic training cost compares favorably with the Nong Khai 25-day SF course, which is costed at  $\text{฿} 50$  per trainee day (see Appendix J, Table J-1).

(U) ~~(S)~~ The VDC training system is perhaps the most suitable vehicle for any future Strike Force training, policy and administrative considerations allowing, but the basic syllabus would have to be modified. Subjects such as Receiving Air Drops, Demolitions and Explosives, Unconventional Warfare and Operating Behind Enemy Lines, should be dropped altogether. Restructuring to include live shooting and emphasis on ambush tactics and night operations is required.

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Table 23

(U) SUBJECT CONTENT AND PERIODS FOR CURRENT VDC TRAINING (U)

Subject	Number of Hours						
	Total	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6
1. Basic Training for Foot Drill and Rifle Drill	24	8	8	8	-	-	-
2. M3, M1 Rifle, Carbine Cal. 30 (Semi-automatic), Shotgun	24	8	16	-	-	-	-
3. VDC Organization	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
4. Intelligence and Reporting	26	-	-	3	9	6	8
5. Map and Compass	16	-	-	4	4	4	4
6. Defensive Tactics for Small Units	26	-	-	4	6	8	8
7. Communications	16	-	-	-	8	8	-
8. Psychological Warfare	22	-	-	-	8	8	6
9. Receiving Air Drops	8	-	-	8	-	-	-
10. Demolitions and Explosives	16	-	-	-	-	7	9
11. Unconventional Warfare	12	8	4	-	-	-	-
12. Village Protection Tactics	18	5	5	6	2	-	-
13. First Aid	8	4	4	-	-	-	-
14. Operating behind Enemy Lines	4	-	-	4	-	-	-
15. Practice on Grenade Throwing	8	-	-	4	4	-	-
16. Civilian Protection	8	4	4	-	-	-	-
17. Physical Education	6	1	1	1	1	1	1
18. Commander's Disposal Time	10	-	2	2	2	2	2
19. Spare	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
20. Group Exercises	6	-	-	-	-	-	6
Totals	264	44	44	44	44	44	44

(U) Notes:

Night training is considered a special non-curricular period. It takes place for not over 2 hrs each day.

If night training is carried out, there is a rest period the following day using either the Commander's Hour or the Spare Period. This is recorded in the timetable. The main purpose of the Commander's Hour is also to allow the Commander to meet and get to know the trainees.

The Air Drop practice can be carried out only in daytime.

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C. Field Training (U)

1. Current Situation (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ As far as is known, before the introduction of Plan 9 no organized exercises had been carried out under the CSOC/CPM ambit that had systematically practiced, tested and corrected C<sup>3</sup> systems and operational responses based upon scenarios of tactical situations. The tendency is to treat basic training as an end in itself (a common defect among supervisors in most fields of effort) and, on completion, little or no follow-up, modification, or retraining is practiced. In the unique Nong Khai experience, CPM officials accepted the dual responsibility of training and supervision--functions that should be complementary and continuous. As an example--properly interpreted and explained--it has potential application to the whole counterinsurgency effort in Thailand.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The only other type of post-basic training carried out for paramilitary units is a one-week follow-up program for VSDU personnel, following their 8-week training in Prachuap Khiri Khan. This started in April or May of this year (1970). Courses were held in Nong Khai in May at Amphoe Phon Pisai (Target Area Twelve) and King-Amphoe Sang Khom (Target Area Seventeen) for 24 trainees in each case.

(U) ~~(S)~~ An SRI observer was invited to attend in order to make comparisons with Plan 9 and his summary of this program is at Table 24. As will be seen, the subjects were delivered mainly by the lecture method with a few practical exercises. In fact there were no field exercises, except the development practices held on the sixth day. This could perhaps have been staged in or around the Prachuap Khiri Khan training center; certainly all the other subjects could have been included in the basic program. One feature of obvious merit was involving local development, security and administrative officials in the program, and acquainting them with the VSDU graduates at the outset of their operational careers.

(U) ~~(S)~~ However, the major point to be noted is that the VSDU field training program did not include any exercises of C<sup>3</sup> system and operational tactics, and thus it is in no way comparable with the Plan 9 field training in the later exercises.

Table 24  
 JPT VSDU FIELD TRAINING AT TARGET AREA 17 HEADQUARTERS, KING-AMPHOE SANG KHOM, NONG KHAI (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Instructional Technique
	From	To						
Monday, 25 May 1970	0800	1200	Conference Room	24	Changret CPA Personnel	Timeliness report and process introduction to the course	Lecture (Observer not present)	Lecture
	1400	1600	Classroom	24				
Tuesday, 26 May 1970	0800	1055	Classroom	23	2nd Lieutenant Panya Wongsaphan, Sang Khan Community Development Officer	Community Development	Nong Khai development program, community development, local leaders, assembling groups of men for development, programming including written examination. Calling villagers to meetings, types of meetings.	2 hours lecture 1 hour test (exercise)
	1300	1400	Classroom	23	Pol. Sgt. Theang Hechaman, NAI Amphoe, Sang Khan	Political Militation		Lecture
	1420	1605	Classroom	23	NAI Lamkuan Sornasaphan, Changret CPA	Political Militation	CI propaganda operations; how to counter CI propaganda, types.	Lecture
	1618	1725	Classroom	23	2nd Lieutenant Panya Wongsaphan, Amphoe CD Officer	Village Survey		Lecture
Wednesday, 27 May 1970	0805	1000	Classroom	24	NAI Lamkuan, Changret CPA	Development	Meaning, how to develop school buildings and compounds, and monasteries and compounds.	Lecture
	1018	1200	Classroom	24	Pol. Sgt. Maj. 3rd Class Aditak, SAF, Nong Khai	Village Defense	Purpose of issues; how to defend; techniques of defense.	Lecture
	1325	1645	Classroom	24	Pol. Private Amekh Na-in, SAF, Nong Khai	Defense	Types of reconnaissance; ops, grouping, preparing, and selecting reconnaissance points, missions to be assigned to recon squad; size, leaving time, briefing, returning, and debriefing, report form.	Lecture
Thursday, 28 May 1970	0800	1030	Classroom	24	Pol. Sgt. Maj. 3rd Class Aditak, SAF, and two assistants	Defense	Combat formations, deployment, written test, practical exercise.	2 hours lecture, 1 hour test, 2 hours practical exercise
	1400	1613	Field					
Friday, 29 May 1970	0815	1140	Classroom	24	Pol. Sgt. Maj. 3rd Class Aditak, SAF, and two assistants	Defense	Attack, counter-attack, raids, exercises and practical exercise.	Lecture, Practical exercise
	1319	1600	Forest					
Saturday, 30 May 1970	0810	1800	Ban Pukham	24 trainees with 164 villagers	All program instructors	Village Development (practice)	Read leveling and wall improvement.	Practical exercise
	0850	1000	Classroom	23	Phuang Thee Panti, Pol. Lt Amphoe for Security, Sang Khan	Defense	Information - Indications - Sources - Types - Reporting methods - Report writing - Incident details	Lecture
Sunday, 31 May 1970	1015	1130	Classroom	24	Changret CPA G2/3	Defense		Lecture
	1326	1630	Conference Room	24	- All -	Closing ceremony		Lecture

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2. Need for Recurrent Field Training (U)

a. Objectives and Reasons (U)

(U) The primary objectives of all field exercises are improved training and operational readiness of personnel, units, commanders, and staffs; increased proficiency in tactical and logistical operations; and the welding of all elements into a team capable of effective action and counter-action in operations against insurgents.

(U) The need for such training, particularly when tactical CI doctrine is developing and as new organizations, weapons, equipment and systems of control are being brought into service, is incontestable. This need is further stressed by the alternately hot and cold nature of revolutionary war in its early phases, in which insurgents continually strive to probe the weakest points of the government system and to take advantage of the unavoidable inertia accompanying a long struggle by launching surprise and demoralizing attacks.

(U) (2) All this may seem so self-evident as to be considered a truism, but the message bears repeating here because of the wide gap that has existed between the need and the deed in this respect in Thailand's counterinsurgency campaign.

b. Method (U)

(U) Operational readiness testing in counterinsurgency can be achieved in the three ways described below.

(1) Local Exercises (U)

(U) These are irregular, normally surprise, checks by commanders at all levels on any or all elements of the operational system, designed to keep units and staffs on their toes. They are particularly necessary during periods of insurgent inactivity and are a regular requirement in the normally inactive border areas where covert infiltration takes place. Finally, they comprise a regular aspect of supervisory responsibility.

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## (2) CPX and FTX (U)

(U) It is not proposed to repeat previous discussion or go into the anatomy of field exercises here. More will be written on the content and staging of CPX and FTX appropriate to future Plan 9-type training later. The remainder of this paragraph will merely extract exercise principles from a military manual\*, recognized in Thailand, which are germane to counterinfiltration and counterinsurgency operational readiness and control:

"In the interest of attaining and maintaining a maximum degree of combat operational readiness within available resources the following principles apply:

- (1) An appropriate balance will be maintained in the conduct of field and command post exercises and other training.
- (2) In the utilization of limited resources, individual and unit training programs normally will be completed prior to the field exercise program.
- (5) Field and command post exercises will be designed to provide maximum training value to all participating elements and to represent the logical culmination of previous training.
- (6) The field and command post exercise program will be conducted within the resources available for the maintenance of operational readiness of the units concerned and in furtherance of the missions assigned them.
- (7) Live firing exercises will be conducted whenever practicable as a part of field exercises.
- (8) For economy in effort and costs, field tests will be conducted concurrently with field exercises to the extent that the objectives of the exercise permit.

\* (U) Army Regulation 220-55

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- (9) In considering exercises . . . recognition will be given to . . . the need for repeating elementary phases of training, corrective training, and maintenance of equipment. Timing and frequency of such exercises will, therefore, be regulated to permit attainment of a level of unit training which will assure effective field operations.
- (11) Command post exercises normally will be conducted in the field and will provide for realistic distances between and among participating headquarters in order to exercise properly the command and control systems of elements involved.
- (12) Resources permitting, field and command post exercises will be joint in nature when they contribute more to the training mission than a corresponding unilateral exercise exercise.
- (14) Field exercises are training vehicles, whether squad or multi-division in size. They should be mission oriented and designed to prepare participating units for identifiable missions. Environmental training should be conducted concurrently within field exercise and oriented toward assigned contingency missions."

### (3) External Checks (U)

(U) Another method of maintaining the operational alertness and efficiency of a border control system is to establish a small inspection team, controlled by CSOC, which would carry out random physical checks of any or all of the system functions from area to area. The team envisaged would be small--four to six specially trained officers and NCOs--and their task would include simulated infiltration and the observation and reporting on the reactions of C<sup>3</sup> and response elements to infiltration reports and scenarios



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fed into the system. Such a team could also assist in the staging of CPX and FTX in the post-basic training period scheduled for each operational area (see Suggested Program, Table 25 in section VI).

(U) The concept of an external inspection team of this nature is not new to the organization and control of counterinsurgency operations although it has not, as far as is known, been implemented in Thailand to date. It is suggested here merely as a potential method for maintaining effective border security operations. Whether it is needed is a policy matter depending upon the extent of such operations and the degree of importance assigned to them at the national level.

(U) In summary, the preceding paragraphs have made a case for local exercises and field exercises as a regular aspect of training for operational readiness in both border and regional security systems. Section VI will include a suggested outline of how both formal and informal exercises could be held in post-basic training for Plan 9 operations.

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## V FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS (U)

(U) (NOTE: Findings specific to the Basic Training and Field Training phases have been recapitulated in some detail at the end of each of the main sections covering these phases (sections II.J, p. 54 and III.C, p. 107, respectively). The major findings and conclusions are summarized below, both to review and to highlight them. Recommendations toward improvement or solution of the problems perceived are embodied in the Outline Plan for Future Plan 9-type Training presented in the next, and final, section.)

1. (U) (C) Approximately 90 percent of the trainees in the basic training program were deemed as trainable by the instructors and evaluators. This indicates that villagers of low educational background can be locally trained as informants and strike forces for a border control system.

2. (U) (C) Imbalances in the curricula and lack of preparation by instructors were evidenced by the smaller proportion of trainees--assessed at about 50 percent--who adequately grasped the course material presented. More advanced planning and preparation for training programs is indicated.

3. (U) (C) The imbalances and deficiencies in course content also reflected an initial lack of clear-cut training objectives. These must be spelled out specifically in line with the requirements of the operational plan.

4. (U) (C) Results improved with the later training courses, which involved more-experienced instructors and an increased proportion of demonstration and practice as opposed to lectures. This, together with an accepted principle of maximum trainee participation, leads to the conclusion that training should be simple and concentrated on demonstrations and practical exercises. The Strike Force course, however, was too short to impart the basic military skills.

5. (U) (C) Technical subjects, especially in map reading, communications, and weaponry, were not well assimilated by trainees. The requisite proficiency in these skills can better be inculcated by restricting instruction to the practical aspects and by emphasizing individual practice. Particular deficiencies of the Strike Force course in this regard were the

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lack of ammunition for practice firing and the omission of night training exercises. The informant training was also deficient in night exercise.

(U) 6. ~~(S)~~ Formal map reading training was inadequate in regard to both the informants and the Strike Forces, and subsequent attempts to improve proficiency during the field exercise period were not successful. The requirement in future is to substitute practical instruction on natural location finding methods.

(U) 7. ~~(S)~~ Classes were too large (40 to 70 trainees per instructor) to permit the amount of individual instruction and practice needed. With regard to informant training, a potential solution is to recognize that they have an overt role and to train only one selected villager and one substitute, instead of five, from each village--leaving further local recruitment and informant training up to them.

(U) 8. ~~(S)~~ The Nong Khai experience showed that the training responsibility put too great a strain on the regular CPM operational and administrative staff. A possible solution is to provide from outside sources a special, experienced training team, such as the BPP and RTA Mobile Training Teams, using well-prepared syllabi and timetables together with a comprehensive set of training aids. To achieve the required coordination under the CPM, however, key CPM officials should be involved fully in the implementation of the plan from the start. So also should the PP personnel earmarked for LCS staff and Strike Force leadership, not only to assist in the administration and instruction of training programs but also to become thoroughly familiarized with the men they are to lead and handle.

(U) 9. ~~(S)~~ There was too great a time lag between the basic and field training programs, owing mainly to the delays in building the LCSs and fully establishing their staffs. The solution would have been for these administrative requirements to precede, or at least run concurrently with, the basic training program.

(U) 10. ~~(S)~~ At the end of the basic training program, several subjects needed revision and augmentation, and these had to be included in the subsequent field training exercise phases, thus causing a long and complex overall training program. This problem could have been precluded by a better planned and more comprehensive basic program which,

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with the inclusion of more practical exercise, would set the foundation for multi-element advanced exercising and testing in the actual operational environment. The field training phase showed in particular that the SF basic training period was inadequate and the overall program would have benefited by lengthening this by about two weeks.

(U) 11. ~~(S)~~ The need for occasional review and recurrent refresher training was evidenced, however, by the ground lost by trainees between the training periods. The conclusion drawn from this experience is that there is a requirement for recurrent operational readiness exercises and testing throughout the operational cycle of a border control system, preceded by training of the officials who conduct such exercises and tests.

(U) 12. ~~(S)~~ Less than half the informants participated in the early field training steps and only a handful were included in the important CPX and FTX of Steps Two and Three. As mentioned above, the informants generally showed that they had not properly retained the basic instruction. In addition, informants were inadequately supervised in the field owing mainly to their large numbers. The lessons learned for future border security programs is to reduce the number of trained informants as far as possible and to stage their field training immediately following the basic training period in order to ensure momentum and, to a certain extent, motivation.

(U) 13. ~~(S)~~ As in basic training, there was insufficient emphasis on night training during the field exercises. Since the ultimate test of efficient border security centers around the ability to operate at night, this subject needs to be stressed in the future programs.

(U) 14. ~~(S)~~ Overall, the Plan 9 training program did not fully meet its mission and objectives. The major reasons ascribed for this are:

- (a) Training was inadequately planned and executed.
- (b) The innovation of a village informant system needs considerable experimentation and correction and, above all, supervision before it can be made to work.
- (c) The training staff used was insufficient for the task. More use should be made of local and regional training assets in future programs.

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(d) RTA operational units in the Plan 9 area did not participate in the field training program as planned.

(U)

15. (c) The Plan 9 mission and objectives can still be accomplished, however, with additional selective field training, based upon the experience and lessons learned from the program to date.

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## VI AN OUTLINE PLAN FOR FUTURE PLAN 9-TYPE TRAINING (U)

### A. Purpose (U)

(U) This final section will attempt to crystallize the comments, criticisms and suggestions already made in the evaluation and analysis of the Nong Khai Plan 9 training program into a form readily usable by the planners of future border control operations.

(U) It will be remembered that the primary objective of the training evaluation (as stated on page 7) was "to produce recommendations on instructional content, methods and phasing (emphasizing village informant training), with these recommendations leading to the formulation of a model training plan for implementation in other areas along the Thai/Lao border." Although the recommendations to be made will concentrate upon the application of a system similar to that in Nong Khai, it is recognized that the operational requirements of border control in other areas may require greater or less emphasis on any of the basic system elements--detection, C<sup>3</sup>, and response--with corresponding adjustment of the training requirements in each case.

(U) Thus, a recommended program of basic and field training needs to be flexible enough to allow the foreseeable operational options to be applied with ease. Examples of such major options are:

- (1) LCS, informant, and Strike Force elements--all newly-raised and trained--for an integrated border control system to be used in conjunction with existing operational assets (as in Nong Khai).
- (2) A full informant training program only, the informants to be used in conjunction with existing supervisory organizations and facilities (e.g., an Amphoe CPM, PP or BPP unit) and using existing operational forces (with a minimum, say 10 days, of revision and familiarization training) as the response element. This is similar to the border control training program used in Mukdahan.

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- (3) An informant and C<sup>3</sup> program, without a response element, and with the C<sup>3</sup> to be either an LCS or existing supervisory unit.
- (4) A Strike Force program with either type of C<sup>3</sup> system, using existing detection (informant) assets.
- (5) A C<sup>3</sup> system of either type, using existing detection and response assets.

B. Approach (U)

(U) For the sake of simplicity, this section will address the first option above, an integrated system. It will outline the suggested building blocks and phasing of the fundamentals in training for such a system, from its genesis to completion of field exercises. Application of this phasing, in toto or in part, is a matter for the planners to decide after assessment of the operational requirements has been made in each individual case.

C. Suggested Program for an Integrated System (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The phasing, and major details, of a suggested program for future Plan 9-type training is shown at Table 25. This is based upon the assumptions that (a) staffing and facilities for a BC HQ, in the form of an Amphoe CPM or Target Area HQ, already exist; (b) not more than two LCSs will be established; (c) two Strike Forces and not more than 50 informants will be taken through the basic and field training phases. If the training load should be greater than this, either the training staff or the overall training period would have to be increased commensurately.

(U) The phasing and details shown in Table 25 are necessarily in abbreviated form. The discussion that follows will add--item by item--sufficient additional information to comprehend the outline program suggested. D-Day is arbitrarily fixed as the end of the basic training period, when field exercises start, and the system becomes at least partly operational. Timings in this discussion will specify the number of days before or after D-Day--a level of detail not shown in the table. The paragraph numbers below correspond with the serial numbers of the table.

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Table 25

SUGGESTED PROGRAM OF PLAN 9-TYPE TRAINING FOR AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM (U)

Serial No.	Activity	Organization, Units, and Personnel Involved	Weeks															
			-18	-16	-14	-12	-10	-8	-6	-4	-2	D-Day (Monday)	+2	+4	+6	+8		
1	Submission of operational appreciation and draft orders, including budget and training staff requirements.	CPM-CSOC	.....															
2	Border security operation order.	CPM-CSOC, SF, BPP Amphoe(s), etc.			.....													
3	LCS buildings: a) tendering b) construction	CPM			.....													
4	Formation and briefing of PP personnel for LCS staff and Strike Force	CPM, PP				.....												
5	Briefing of local officials on operational concept, and recruiting requirement for Strike Force and Village Informants--one day.	CPM-Pual Amphoe(s), Pual Amphoe(s) Security, RTA Recruiting Officer(s)																
6	Recruitment: a) Strike Force (SF) b) Village Informants (VI)	- do - (including CPM)																
7	Liaison between Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and CPM on training requirements, review of syllabi, timetables, instructors, lesson plans and training aids. MTT then prepares complete training literature and moves into training area. Final preparation of training facilities, training aids, equipment, weapons and clothing.	SF VI RTA MTT/CPM/SF PP Staff BPP MTT/CPM/LCS PP Staff																
8	Issue of basic training orders.	CPM/MTT																
9	a. SF basic training course (VDC) - Post-basic map training exercises (MTX), and practical exercises (PE) with VI course b. Alternate SF basic training course (VSDU) - Post-basic familiarization with plan, MTX, and PE with VI course.	MTT/CPM SF PP VSDU Training Center																
10	VI basic training course.	MTT/CPM/LCS PP																
11	Issue of field training order.	CPM																
12	Exercise umpires: a) briefing on plan, and C <sup>2</sup> --one day, umpiring course--two days, exercise briefing--one day b) exercise debriefing--one day.	Changmat and Amphoe CPM Officials (CSOC Border Security Team - if available)																
13	Command post exercises (CPX)	- do -																
14	Combined CPX and field training exercises (FTX)	- do -																
15	Extra CPX and FTX, as necessary. (Alternatively, exercises conducted by CSOC B.S. Team)	(B.S. Team/CPM)																
<b>SUBSEQUENT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES AND TESTS</b>																		
	Operational readiness testing: a) Local exercises b) External checks	Changmat and Amphoe CPM Officials, LCS Commander CSOC Border Security Team	<p>After the formal field training is completed, local commanders from Changmat CPM down will carry out occasional surprise checks on any or all of the detection, C<sup>2</sup> and operational response elements of the border control system.</p> <p>If CSOC establishes regular or occasional inspection teams (drawn either from national or regional levels, or both), periodic (including surprise) tests, including short CPX and FTX, will be made of system elements in all areas where border control operations have been mounted.</p>															

**Legend**  
 ..... Administration and planning  
 — SF recruitment and basic training  
 — VI recruitment and basic training  
 - - - - - Field and command post exercises

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(U) 1. D-126 to 98. The month allowed for CSOC consideration and approval of the draft orders may, of course, be extended at the discretion of CSOC. It is assumed, moreover, that CSOC would already have advised the changwat CPM involved on the major requirements of a border control operation, based upon previous experience.

(U) 2. D-98 to 91. This would merely require the finalization of the draft order, based on CSOC direction, and its issuance.

(U) 3. D-94 to 84 and D-77 to 35. Over eight weeks is allowed for the tendering and construction of LCS buildings. This is slightly longer than was the case in Nong Khai after approvals had been given.

(U) 4. D-84 to 77. One week is allowed for briefing the policemen selected for the LCS staffs and Strike Forces, this briefing to cover the basic concepts of the border control plan and their part in the administrative and training processes prior to its establishment.

(U) 5. D-85. One day is allowed for briefing officials on operational concepts and recruiting requirements. Recruiting for Strike Forces should follow the norms established for VDC and VSDU programs, with emphasis on strong physique. A list of suggested criteria for the selection of village informants is given as Appendix H.

(U) 6. D-84 to 77 and D-49 to 42. One week is allowed respectively for the recruitment of Strike Force and informant trainees, leaving three weeks in each case for screening and induction before basic training takes place.

(U) 7. a. D-77 to 56. It is assumed that an RTA Mobile Training Team (MTT) of the type normally used for VDC basic training would be made available for Strike Force training; that there are local training facilities available at changwat or amphoe level; that necessary approvals would have been obtained for this by CSOC through RTA and DOLA channels in the early planning period (D-126 to 98); and that a syllabus (see par. 8 below) of specific Strike Force training requirements would have been issued through the RTA training staff. The final training preparations should largely be an MTT responsibility, with CPM assistance and approval as required. Approximately 90 percent of the training program would be carried out by MTT instructors. If an MTT

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cannot be made available for any reason, it is assumed that CSOC would make alternative arrangements for Strike Force training at the VSDU Training Center, again sending detailed syllabus requirements for local staff preparation, after consultation with the CPM involved. In this case the three-week preparatory phase would be eliminated.

(U)

(U) b. D-42 to 21. For informant training, similar preparatory training arrangements would be carried out by a BPP MTT, again with CPM assistance and approval. Suggested block and detailed syllabi are shown in Tables 27 and 28 under par. 8 below, with a sample training order and timetables at Appendix I. About 80 percent of the instruction responsibility will be discharged by the MTT.

(U)

(U) 8. a. D-70 to 56. As mentioned before, it was not intended that this outline plan should focus on Strike Force basic training, for which the basic paramilitary skills only are required. A sample six-week syllabus for a training program, whether given by an MTT or in the VSDU Training Center, is shown at Table 26. This is similar to the VDC basic training syllabus (Table 23), but with a varied emphasis and the exclusion of subjects not considered appropriate to the Strike Force role, namely, Air Drops, Demolitions, Unconventional Warfare, Village Protection Tactics, and Operating Behind Enemy Lines. Provision is made for direct participation of CPM officials for 26 hours of the training process, although this could be increased if required. Except for the lessons covering the border control concept and laws, all of this syllabus could be instructed at the VSDU Training Center, but without CPM participation.

(U)

(U) b. D-35 to 28. A suggested skeleton order for informant basic training is shown in Appendix I, together with a detailed timetable. The block and detailed syllabi and the block timetable are given in Tables 27, 28, and 29, respectively. About 20 percent of the program involves local CPM participation (Table 28 earmarks the specific lessons suitable for CPM instructors).

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(u) (c) Table 28 is of particular note in that it contains the core of suggested instructional content and methods for improved informant training, which was a principal objective of this evaluation being undertaken in the first place. Drawing on the many comments and criticisms of informant training in this report, and the lessons learned during the training process, it is an attempt at a balanced syllabus capable of realizing the objectives contained in Appendix I for training villagers in the essentials of an informant's role and duties, with emphasis on establishing a basis of knowledge and expertise that will obviate lengthy follow-up training, and reduce field exercises to the minimum.

(u) (c) As will be seen, the whole program is heavily oriented toward trainee participation and emphasizes the basic informant functions on the assumption that informants will operate in an overt role. No attempt is made, moreover, to include instruction to informants on how to handle covert agents because a) this is a matter of policy which has

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Table 26

(U) SAMPLE BLOCK SYLLABUS FOR STRIKE FORCE BASIC TRAINING (U)

Subject	No. of Hours	CPM Instructor Lesson Hours
1. Foot drill and arms drill	24	
2. M3 Shotgun, M1 carbine, M1 rifle	24	
3. Grenades	8	
4. Border security concept and SF organization	4	4
5. Intelligence and reporting	26	4
6. Location finding*	27	2
7. Combat tactics:		
- Formations and drills	14	
- Patrolling	12	
- Ambush	27	
8. Communications	16	
9. Psyops, development and motivation	22	10
10. Villager protection and cooperation	8	
11. Border Laws	2	2
12. First Aid and field sanitation	8	
13. Physical exercise	6	
14. Commander's periods	10	
15. Spare	2	
16. Practical field exercises	24	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>26</b>
Night exercises (additional)	24	

\* (U) The detailed syllabus (Table 28) outlines the type of training content suitable for this subject.

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Table 27

(U) SAMPLE BLOCK SYLLABUS FOR VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING (U)

Subject	No. of Periods*	Total Training Time		CPM Instructor Lesson Hours
		hrs	mins	
1. Introduction, orientation and intelligence	7	5	50	4
2. Border threat and present control methods	7	5	50	4
3. Location finding	27	22	30	2
4. Observation and reporting	39	32	30	4
5. Radio communications	21	17	30	5
6. Field exercises and review	18	15	00	4
7. Instructors' periods	13	10	50	
8. Motivation classes and night training	15	12	30	7
9. Physical exercise	14	7	00	
<b>Total</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>

\* (U) Each lesson period, except physical exercise, is of 50 minutes' duration.

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CT SAMPLE DETAILED SYLLABUS FOR VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING (U)

A. Introduction, Orientation and Intelligence (7 hours)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks*
1	Opening ceremony	1	1		Lecture		CPM commander and training officials to attend.
1	Agent concept	1	2	Outline of border control (Plan 9) and opportunities of villagers to observe and report movements and activities of suspicious CTs and infiltrators. Includes resume of typical CT activities in operational area over past two years.	Lecture	Chart (CT activities)	(CPM Instructor)
1	Role and duties	1	3	General description of information requirements and reporting methods. Division of village area between informants (if there is more than one). Extent of surveillance from village. Surveillance responsibilities (a) during normal working hours, (b) outside normal working hours. Reporting relationship with puyaiban, kamnan, security units, LCS, other officials.	Lecture	Charts	See PP Special Action Force (SAF) Manual, Vol. 1, pp. 215-218. (CPM Instructor)
1	Retainers and rewards	1	4	Amount and method of payment of regular monthly salary retainer. Ranges of rewards for different types of information, e.g., eliminations of CTs, recovery of CT weapons and equipment, CT supporter and relative activity, eligibility for rewards for other types of contraband such as opium and illegal weapons. Payment for quality of information rather than results. Citizen responsibility aspect.	Lecture		(CPM Instructor)

\* (U) All references marked X are lesson plans (instructor's folder) of the U.S. Army Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program (training plan), April 1969.

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(U)  
 (2) Table 28 (Continued)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
1	Intelligence orientation	1	5	Introduction to principles of intelligence. Definitions of intelligence and counterintelligence. Requirement for intelligence to support border and internal security, internal development and psychological operations. Integration of Plan 9 intelligence within the overall RTG intelligence effort.	Lecture	Chart (principles)	93930 - X. SAF Manual, Vol. I, pp. 202-203.
1	Insurgent activity indicators	1	6	Definition, importance and utilization of insurgent activity indicators. Types of rural and urban indicators as they affect the population, the insurgent propagandic effort, the commodities and logistics CTs require to operate, and the environment in which the CT operates.	Lecture	Chart (indicators)	93941 - X
1	Counterintelligence and personal security	1	7	Definition and importance of counterintelligence. Programs and procedures for personal (physical) security, document security and communications security. Countering hostile intelligence activities.	Lecture		91910 - X SAF Manual, Vol. I, pp. 203-214.

B. Communist Border Threat and Present Control Methods (7 hours)

2	Communist doctrine and tactics	1	8	Objectives of revolutionary Communism in theory and practice. Ethics of Communism as reflected in subversive insurgency. The five steps in promotion of insurgency: intelligence, propaganda, organization, training and armed struggle. Means of protracting and escalating insurgency, especially external support. Importance of intelligence to the insurgent. Intelligence priorities and objectives. Insurgent intelligence organization. Use of population as information collectors. Insurgent counterintelligence procedures.	Lecture	Charts	91913 - X, 91918 - X, 91919 - X.
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Table 28 (Continued)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
2	Mechanics of mass support, propaganda and subversion	2	9	Importance of mass organizations. Objectives of infiltrating local population. Party control of the infiltration cell. Techniques of subversion and manipulation. Left wing and right wing organizations as targets. Formation of new mass organizations. Content and focus of insurgent propaganda. Typical propaganda themes in Northeast. Types of terrorism and selection of targets.	Lecture	Charts	91917 - X, 91920 - X
2	Infiltration and exfiltration methods	1	10	Insurgent communications and logistics organization for infiltrating and exfiltrating CTs: (a) inside Laos border area, and (b) inside Thai border area. Includes activities of CT contacts and couriers on river banks and inland, preparatory arrangements and indicators of river crossing including methods, with examples, such as That Phanom	Lecture	Chart (CT routes)	CPM Instructor
2	Border control laws and practices	2	11	Immigration and Customs laws on border crossing, especially illegal entry, aliens and contraband; local procedures (border passes) for villagers crossing river Thailand-Laos, Laos-Thailand; reasons for crossing--trade, farming, relatives, religious festivals, smuggling; opportunities for insurgent and counterinsurgent movement and activities.	Lecture Demonstration	Border pass samples. Chart (border crosses)	CPM Instructor
2	Border control agencies	1	12	Description of numbers, locations and missions of following agencies and forces in area: Immigration, Customs, Marine Police, BPP, SOC, VSUs, river checkpoints, road checkpoints, Target Area 2 units. Also description of command control system.		Charts: 1. Units 2. Command control	CPM Instructor

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(2) Table 20 (Continued)

C. Location Finding (27 hours)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
3	Introduction and purpose	2	13	Purpose of location-finding lessons. Importance of accurate targeting in border security operations. Brief description of 1:50,000 map, with emphasis on natural and man-made landmarks shown on map which are known to villagers in their own environments, and which can be identified on maps. Maps to be used only to be used by staff of control center. Informants will be trained to report the direction, and distance, of sightings and incidents from identifiable landmarks. Control staff will plot on map. Short description of compass (dry) to be included in instruction. All the rest to be concentrated on the use of natural methods to find and report locations. Simple sketching to be included.	Lecture Demonstration	Maps	FM 21-26 (CPM Instructor)
3	Landmarks	2	14	Types and description of natural and man-made landmarks. Observation from ground and higher levels.	Lecture Demonstration	Maps, charts	FM 21-26
3	Compass, description and use	2	15	Description of hand magnetic dry compass. Direction points, sighting procedure.	Demonstration Exercise	Compasses	20176 - X SAF, Vol. 1, P. 97 FM 21-26
3	Direction finding by day	2	16	Use of sun and sunlight watch. Direction by vegetation signs.	Lecture Demonstration Exercise	Watches	FM 21-26
4	Direction finding at night	2	17	Use of stars and moon. Natural indicators in complete darkness.	Lecture Demonstration Exercise	Diagram	FM 21-26 Including night exercise
4	Distance judging	2	18	Review of landmarks and distances from village. Test of trainees' knowledge and accuracy by comparing with map details around village areas.	Lecture Exercise	Chart (landmarks)	FM 21-26

(U)  
Table 28 (Continued)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
4	Distance in meters	1	19	Method of estimation by pacing.	Demonstration, Exercise		FM 21-26
4	Estimation by milestones	1	20	Measurement of pacing by comparing with milestones.	Demonstration, Exercise		FM 21-26
4	Diversionsary measurement	1	21	Methods of measuring distance over winding routes.	Demonstration, Exercise		FM 21-26
4	Calculation in a straight line	1	22	Use of memory and observation, in conjunction with landmarks, to estimate distances.	Demonstration, Exercise		FM 21-26
5	Sketch map making	7	23	Necessities for sketching and the materials required. Techniques of sketching. Types of straight and curved lines. Scale estimation. Overhead view and perspective drawing. The panoramic sketch. Practice in copying sketches and then in producing in the field.	Lecture, Demonstration, Exercise	Sketching materials, charts	91944 - X. FM 21-26
6	Practical exercises	4	24	First, practices of direction finding (with and without compass), distance judging and sketching. Finally, exercises testing all three skills using simulated targets.	Exercise	Maps, compasses, sketching materials, charts	
<b>D. Observation and Reporting (39 hours)</b>							
7	Information types, targets and requirements	4	25	Unusual movement of people, vehicles, animals; indications of supplies in transit; indications of messages in transit; unusual noises, sounds of construction; suspicious villager reaction to security units; village alarm signals; insurgent slogans and leaflets; abnormal activity; banby traps and mantraps; suspect aircraft; CT relatives--movements, absenteeism, associates, own relatives, suspicious hawkers, market salesmen, quack doctors, any overt CT activities, any other unaccountable occurrences.	Lecture, Demonstration	Charts, samples (leaflets, etc.)	(CPM Instructor)

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(C) Table 28 (Continued)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
7	Methods of surveillance	3	26	The meaning and purpose of surveillance. Local resources available for use in surveillance. Major types of surveillance activities. Methods appropriate to local environment. Considerations in selection of an observation posts. Surveillance areas and critical points.	Lecture Demonstration Exercise		93970 - X, 93971 - X
8	Night vision and sounds	2	27	General classification of night sounds. Estimation of distance. Day and night "eyes". Off-center vision. Factors affecting night vision.			SAF Vol. II, p. 139 Note: Night exercise for three nights.
8	Camouflage and avoiding detection	2	28	Use of concealment, camouflage, and active deception. Clothing and local materials appropriate to surveillance mission.	Demonstration	Clothing, etc.	93971 - X
8	Surveillance exercise	3	29	Field exercises in the selection of observation points and camouflage, in varied surroundings.	Exercise	Clothing, etc.	
9	Tracking, escape and evasion	7	30	Principles of tracking, escape and evasion. Blackboard scenarios followed by field exercises (rural environment) of complete range of foreseeable tracking situations and procedures--both individual and group tracking.	Demonstration Exercise	Clothing, etc.	
10	Terrain and people description	4	31	Description of people. Outstanding, general and specific characteristics of people. Description of fixed objects, areas and scenes. Recognition of patterns in man-made objects. General characteristics of man-made objectives. Major terrain features and methods of description.	Demonstration		91943 - X
10	Memory training	3	32	Exercises in identification of static and movable objects followed by recording of details.	Demonstration Exercise	Target objects and personnel film strips	

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(2) Table 28 (Continued)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
11	Reporting writing	7	33	Reporting requirements and written formats. Classroom exercises based on scenarios, followed by field exercises with live targets. Sketches to be included, as necessary.	Demonstration	Formats, target personnel	
12	Reporting rules and procedures, briefing and debriefing	4	34	Methods of conveying verbal, written and radio reports. Overt and covert approaches. Information requirements for briefing and debriefing. Playlets by instructional staff, followed by trainee participation.	Lecture Demonstration Exercise		

E. Radio Communications (21 hours)

13	Radio description, use and maintenance	1	35	Description of important parts of radio and their use, especially the pressel switch. Maintenance and recharging of batteries. Elementary fault - finding procedures. Methods of concealing radio.	Demonstration	SSB radios	
13	Network description, call-signs and times	1	36	Network diagram, frequencies, contact procedures and regular test calls. Network discipline.	Lecture	Chart	(CPM Instructor)
13	Antennae	1	37	Types of antennae in differing vegetation and operational requirements. Erection and dismantling of antennae.	Demonstration	Antennae radio	
13	Message formats and priorities	1	38	Explanation of message formats, the meaning and use of priority classifications. Practice in filling up form.	Demonstration Exercise	Message formats	(CPM Instructor)
13	Voice procedure	3	39	The principles of speaking with microphones. Procedure and alphabet of spelling. Enunciation, confirmation and repetition.	Demonstration Exercise	Radios	

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(U)  
(S) Table 28 (Concluded)

Training Day	Subject	Lesson Hours	Sequence	Scope	Method	Training Aids	Training References and Remarks
14, 15	Communications exercise	14	40	Field exercise of radio and antenna installation. Practice, based on simple scenarios, of all trainees. Report writing to be included	Exercise	Radios	(CPM Officials observe - 3 hours)

F. Field Exercises and Review (18 hours)

16, 17	Field exercises	14	41	Practical exercises based on scenarios, to test all informants' functions: observation, camouflage, report writing, sketching, personal and radio reporting.	Exercise	As appropriate to exercise	2nd day exercises will be based on lessons of 1st day. Sample scenarios attached. (CPM Officials observe - 4 hours)
18	Course review	2	42	Recapitulation on informants' functions and other course details. Review of results of training exercises.	Lecture		(CPM Instructor)
18	Closing ceremony	1	43	Address by senior CPM official, to emphasize attitude of informants on return to villages.	Lecture		(CPM Instructor)
18	Preparations for return	1	44		-		(CPM Instructor)

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Table 29

(U) SAMPLE BLOCK TIMETABLE FOR VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING (U)

Item	Subject	Training Days and Hours														Totals				
		Week One						Week Two					Week Three							
		Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat	Mon	Tues		Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
1	Introduction, orientation and intelligence	7																		7
2	Communist border threat and present control methods		7																	7
3	Location Finding			8	8	7	4													27
4	Observation and reporting							7	7	7	7	7	4							39
5	Radio communications													7	7	7				21
6	Field exercises, review and wind-up																7	7	4	18
7	Instructor's preference periods	1	1			1		1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1		13
	Total lesson hours	8	8	8	8	8	4	8	8	8	8	8	4	8	8	8	8	8	4	132
8	Physical exercise	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2			1/2	1/2		1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2		1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	7
9	Night classes	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1		15

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not been decided, and b) agent handling is an extremely complex and sophisticated activity in which only proven bright and trustworthy individuals can be trained (and this would require at least an additional two-week course).

(U) ~~(S)~~ 9. D-56 to 14. For a Strike Force course conducted in a local changwat or amphoe training facility, familiarization with the border security concept and laws would be included in the training program. If instruction were to be given in the period D-10 to D-Day, then map training exercises and familiarization between Strike Force and informant trainees would also be carried out.

(U) ~~(S)~~ 10. D-21 to D-Day. The program envisages that informant basic training would be held in the LCS scheduled for completion two weeks earlier. This would provide for more realistic training and familiarization with the LCS and its staff. Such training could, of course, also be held in other locations if required.

(U) ~~(S)~~ 11. D-21 to 14. The mission and objectives of field training order proposed for any border control operation are similar to those laid down for Plan 9 at pages 60 and 61, tailored as necessary for local conditions, and including local units required to support the operation. With the basic training of Strike Forces and informants completed at about the same time, the field exercises can be concentrated on testing the C<sup>3</sup> element separately in the application of SOP and then in combination with the detection and response elements, based upon scenarios similar to those used during Steps Two and Three of Plan 9.

(U) 12. D+3 to 6 and D+17. The comprehensive briefing of umpires on the plan, on umpiring requirements, and on their part in the exercises to be staged, are essential requirements for successful exercises. Formal debriefings (scheduled for D+13 and D+24) are equally important to digest lessons learned for future operations and exercises.

(U) The value to be obtained from field exercises depends largely on the care with which umpires are selected and trained. A two-day umpiring course should include the following lessons:

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- a. The umpire's job; principles of umpiring
- b. Umpire organization and neutral (umpire) signals; umpires' logs and reports
- c. Methods of scenario presentation and control; including (1) the wrong way, and (2) the right way
- d. Umpiring skeleton and imaginary exercises--CPX
- e. Practical umpiring of exercises with troops--FTX
- f. Corrective actions to be taken and timing
- g. Debriefing details.

(U) A final point on umpiring is that the schedule calls for the continuous involvement of umpires for just over three weeks--D+3 to 26. This involves a considerable strain on the local CPM manpower but it does provide continuity, obviates any need for briefing and training new umpires, and therefore facilitates more efficient and, ultimately, more economical, field exercises than would be the case if they were staggered over a long period of time as happened in Nong Khai.

(U)  
(2) 13. D+7 to 12. The essential part of the command post exercises is first to test the C<sup>3</sup> element integral to the plan, then with the C<sup>3</sup> elements of supporting units, and finally all C<sup>3</sup> elements should be tested in simulated exercises in conjunction with the detection and response elements. All Strike Force and informant personnel should be involved in these exercises. Scenarios will need to be prepared to suit the local conditions and operational units involved. Scenarios similar to those used during Step Two, but including more informant message transfers, would be suitable for these exercises.

(U)  
(2) 14. D+18 to 23. The exercises envisaged are full system tests involving all detection, command and tactical elements of the system. These exercises could be similar to those staged for Step Three but with much more emphasis on actual physical deployment of both operational units and informants.

(U) 15. D+35 to 56. The provision for extra CPX and FTX is entirely flexible, their necessity, length and duration to be determined according to the results of the previous exercises and local administrative considerations.

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(U) 16. Local and External Checks. The last item of Table 25 is explained in more detail in Section IV C.2, p. 122. Local checks are envisaged as a regular aspect of supervisory responsibility; external checks would require the establishment of a special team, and the concept is included here only for the consideration of operational planners.

D. Conclusion (U)

(U) (C) In summary, the training program envisaged for an integrated system in Table 25 is scheduled for completion within a 20-week period from the CSOC approval of an operation through to the end of formal field training exercises. This period could be shortened if, for example, there was no LCS building requirement, or the SF basic course remained at four weeks, or the SF and informant basic courses were carried out concurrently. The program would also be shortened if any of the other organizational options (A2-5 above) for a border control program were adopted.

(U) It is suggested, however, that the sequence and content of the basic building blocks shown at Table 25, appropriate to the organizational option and elements used, are necessary for the proper implementation of a border control training program. The periods allowed for any activity may be postponed or lengthened according to administrative and local requirements but this would require proportionate postponement of the succeeding stages. So long as this point is taken, the sequence of the program will be unimpaired and will retain the flexibility necessary for program implementation in differing environments and administrative circumstances.

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Appendix A

(U)  
(U) EXAMPLE OF STRIKE FORCE COURSE OBSERVER'S REPORT (U)  
(Observer: Pakdi Rattanaphol)

Lesson Points

1. Date July 12, 1969
2. Subject Intelligence and reporting
3. Instructor Maj. Vichian Prasithichai
4. Place Classroom
5. Time 1305-1645
6. Method
  - a. Lecture (With/without visual aids? Specify: Blackboard (only if used)/charts/diagrams/exhibits/films/film strips or slides/models/maps/text book/other. Describe visual aids used.)

Mostly the instructor explained by writing on the blackboard. Message forms were also distributed to the trainees.
  - b. Demonstration

The instructor showed how to make good and bad reports.
  - c. Practical Exercise

The students were ordered to make observation at a given spot and then they were told to make reports of what they saw to the instructor.
  - d. Group Study

N/A

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(U)  
Appendix A (Continued)

e. Other Method

N/A

7. Handouts (attach)

N/A

8. Narrative (What was the scope of the lesson? Outline the main themes and points and give a resume of what you learned. Also comment on instructor's knowledge and preparation of the lesson, his delivery, mannerisms, attitude to class, and whether you (from back of class) could hear and see him clearly. Also mention if you used tape recorder and/or camera. Finally, what is your opinion of class assimilation; i.e. roughly how many students understood and retained the main points of the lesson, and how many did not understand?)

The scope of the lesson and the resume of what I learned are as follows:

1. Mission of Strike Force.

- a) Major mission - to observe, search, attack and capture CT and also make patrol in the restricted area.
- b) Sub-mission - to look for information.

2. What is the information.

The information covers events which have occurred or are going to occur. It may come from being told or seeing and it may be true or false.

3. Intelligence (screening information)

- a) Consideration.
- b) Interpretation.
- c) Evaluation.

Intelligence comes from different information which has been screened through the three procedures mentioned in a, b and c.

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(U)  
(S) Appendix A (Continued)

4. Information sources
  - a) Indicators
  - b) Clues
  - c) Unusual happenings
  - d) Persons
    - talk
    - behaviour
      - frequent disappearance from the village
      - disobey local authorities
      - criticize the government
  
5. Information required
  - a) Border crossing
    - when
    - where
    - how
    - how many
  - b) The appearance of strangers in the village.
  - c) Disappearances of villagers.
  - d) Behaviour of suspect persons.
  - e) Leaflets and any publications which are not released by the Government.
  
7. The principles of reporting
  - a) Timely
  - b) Accurate
  - c) Detailed
  - d) Complete report - who, what, where and when
  - e) Reporter's comments (suggestions and recommendations)
  - f) Possibilities
  
8. Where reported:
  - a) Local station
  - b) Nearest units

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(u)  
~~(S)~~ Appendix A (Concluded)

Comment

The instructor had plenty of experience in this subject and prepared the lesson well. His instruction went faster than some trainees could absorb. His attitude to the class was such that the trainees (Strike Force) paid attention to his teaching. The reason he did not give much detail in this lesson was because it is not a major function of the Strike Force. Even so, his teaching was quite good, but the weak point was that he spoke too fast. In my opinion, about 80% of the trainees could understand and assimilate what he taught. I heard and saw him well from the back of the class.

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Appendix B

VILLAGE INFORMANT COURSE, DETAILED SYLLABUS (U)

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(U)

(2) VILLAGE INFORMANT COURSE, DETAILED SYLLABUS (U)

Appendix B

Nongkhal CPM

No.	Subject	Hours	References	Training Aids
1	<u>Physical Training and Exercise</u>	(8)	Dept. of Physical Education	-Whistle, charts, stand -Takhlaw (Thai rattan ball), 2 poles, rope
	-Physical exercise	4		
	-Sports	4		
2	<u>Hand Combat</u>	(8)	Judo	-Charts of Judo techniques -4 pairs of boxing gloves -Bowie knives, Thai knives, and wooden knives
	-Judo, holding, throwing and arm locking	4		
	-Thai boxing	2		
	-Use of silent weapons	2		
3	<u>Use of Weapons (Shotgun and Carbine)</u>	(8)		-15 shotguns (1 for 5 men) -1 carbine, 1 rifle -70 shotguns, 1 carbine, 1 rifle, 10 stands, 10 targets
	-Materiel (shotgun and ammunition)	2		
	-Materiel (carbine and rifle)	2		
	-Aiming and shooting	4		
4	<u>Communications</u>	(11)	CSOC, SSI	-Charts, chalk, pointer -CSOC 1-3 radio sets -Charts
	-Principles and security in communication	1		
	-Use of radio telephone	1		
	-Message writing and forms	1		
	-Antenna and radiation of transmitter waves	1		
	-Use of SSB radio	1		
	-Use of CSOC 1-3 radios (in class and field)	5		
	-Use of automatic telephone and summary	1		

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(2)

Appendix B (Continued)

No.	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
5	<u>Intelligence and Reporting</u>	(42)		
	-Observation and memory training	3		-Blackboard, chalk, pointer.
	-Camouflage	4		-20 observation items for memory training
	-Intelligence: definition, information collection and processing	10		-Charts of natural camouflage and natural terrain
	-Intelligence operations	3		-Charts showing camouflage techniques
	-Verbal reporting, written reporting and reporting by radio	7		-Charts showing types of information, and intelligence circle (processing)
	-Counter-intelligence and security	7		-Charts of forms
	-Surveillance	8		-Charts showing correct and incorrect reporting -Movie on intelligence
6	<u>Map Reading and Compass Using</u>			
	-Principles in map reading, and setting a map	4		-Map of Thailand 1/50,000 A. Saka and A. Bungkan
	-Map reading	3		-70 compasses
	-Use of compass in finding direction and for traveling	3		-Paper and pencil
	-Sketching	2		-Movie for 1 hour
7	<u>Democratic Administration</u>	(4)		
	-Democratic administration with Presidency and with King	1	Constitutional Law	-Blackboard, chalk, pointer
	-Democratic administration of Thailand	1		-Movie shows the election
	-Election	1		
	-Rights and duties of democratic people	1		

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(U)  
(S) Appendix B (Continued)

No.	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
8	<u>Communist Administration</u>	(3)		
	-Communist ideology	2		-Slides
	-Rights and freedom of Communist people (in Red China, Czechoslovakia and East Germany)	1		-Charts -Movie (if available)
9	<u>Comparison between the Democratic and Communist Administrations</u>	(4)		
	-Tyranny of Dictatorship, flaws in the Communist economy			-Charts -Movie (if available)
10	<u>Communist Propaganda and Recruitment</u>	(3)		
	-Propaganda against local government of various types			-Charts showing different types of Communist propaganda
	-Propaganda for recruiting -Communist activities in Thailand			
11	<u>Psychological Operations</u>	(3)		-Charts
12	<u>Rural Development and Public Rehabilitation</u>	(4)		
	-Rural Development carried out by government			-Charts of the national organization
	-Regional agriculture, breeding, selecting of fertilizer soil and the forest preservation			-Charts of agricultural activities.
	-Sanitary, public health and domestic hygiene -Thai tradition, custom and entertainment			-Movie (if available)
13	<u>Thai History</u>	(4)		
	-Thai migration from China			-Map of Thailand
	-Nation rebuilding by King Rama Khamhang			
	-King Nare Suan the Great -King Tak Sin the Great			

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(J)

(C) Appendix B (Concluded)

No.	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
14	<u>Airplanes, helicopters, weapons and uniforms of Red China, North Vietnam and Pathet Lao Soldiers</u>	(2)		-Charts showing different types of planes and helicopters -Charts of Communist weapons -Pictures of Communist military uniforms -Movie (if available)
15	<u>International Laws in Border Crossing</u>	(2)	Acts and Laws	
16	<u>Indoctrination</u>	(8)		
	-Loyalty	1		-Charts
	-Endurance and Devotion	1		-Blackboard, chalk, pointer
	-Duties of citizenship	1		
	-Bravery	1		
	-Esprit de corps	1		
	-Discipline	1		
	-Latest news in area	1		
	-Morals	1		
17	<u>Tour</u>	(7)		
	Visit the important places in Nong Khai and Udorn			
18	<u>Commander's Time</u>	(8)		

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	Appendix C		
	VILLAGE INFORMANT COURSE TIMETABLE (U)		
<p>1. Introduction to the Village Informant Course</p> <p>2. The Village Informant Course Objectives</p> <p>3. The Village Informant Course Structure</p> <p>4. The Village Informant Course Curriculum</p> <p>5. The Village Informant Course Evaluation</p> <p>6. The Village Informant Course Completion</p>			

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Appendix C

(U) VILLAGE INFORMANT COURSE TIMETABLE (U)

First Week

Nong Khai CPM

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Monday 19 May 69	Physical Training & Exercise	0600	0700	Playground	Superintendent	Pol. Sgt. Son Yunsuk	
	Opening ceremony	0900	1200	Classroom	CPM Advisor		
	Materiel (Shotgun and ammunitions)	1300	1500	"	Pol. Lt. Ruangsak ) Chualaka )		
	Materiel (carbine and rifle)	1500	1700	"	" )		
	Loyalty	1900	2000	"	Maj. Sakdo Khongphatyun		
Tuesday 20 May 69	Physical exercise	0600	0700	Playground	Superintendent	Sgt. Chuan Nakmai	
	SSI and security in communications	0900	1000	Classroom	Maj. Sanat ) Intarapakdi )		
	Use of radio telephone	1000	1100	"	" )		
	Message writing and forms	1100	1200	"	" )		
	Weapon training (aiming and shooting)	1300	1700	Playground	Pol. Lt. Ruangsak ) Chualaka )		
	Endurance and devotion	1900	2000	Classroom	Nai Adirek Phonsak		
Wednesday 21 May 69	Physical exercise	0600	0700	Playground	Superintendent	Sgt. Chuan Nakmai	
	Antenna & Radiation of transmitter waves	0900	1000	Classroom	Maj. Sanat ) Intarapakdi )		
	Use of SSB radio	1000	1100	"	" )		
	Use of CSOC 1-3 radios	1100	1200	"	" )		
	Use of CSOC 1-3 radios	1300	1700	Field (Training)	" )		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	Classroom			

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(u)  
~~(S)~~ Appendix C (Continued)

(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Thursday 22 May 69	Physical exercise	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Observation and memory training	0900	1200	Classroom	MRDC		
	Intelligence, definition, information collection and processing	1300	1600	"	RCT 13		
	Use of radio telephone and summary	1600	1700	"	Maj. Sanat Intarapakdi		
	Duty of citizenship	1900	2000	"	Nai Thongkhun Phuthiwong		
Friday 23 May 69	Sports	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence, definition, information collection and processing	0900	1200	Classroom	RCT 13		
	"	1300	1700	"	RCT 13		
	Bravery	1900	2000	"	Nai Somphit Loetprasert		
Saturday 24 May 69	Sports	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence operations	0900	1200	Classroom	Pol. Maj. Piraphon Suksoem		
	Democratic Administration	1300	1700	"	Sub. Lt. Thaksin Mahasiriphan		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			

Signed: Maj. Wichian Prasitchai  
G-3, CPM Nong Khai

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(U)  
~~(S)~~ Appendix C (Continued)

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Second Week

(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Monday 26 May 69	Sports	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Surveillance	0900	1200	Classroom	Pol. Maj. Pirabhan Kuksoem		
	Camouflage	1300	1700	"	RCT 13		Capt. Thirawat Prempakhin
	Esprit de corps	1900	2000	"	Nai Thawin Potawat		CPM
Tuesday 27 May 69	Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Thai History	0900	1100	Classroom	Nai Isara Charanyanon		CPM
	Surveillance	1100	1200	"	Pol. Maj. Piraphon Suksoem		
	Surveillance Discipline	1300 1900	1700 2000	Field Classroom	" Lt. Thawat Raksa, RTN		
Wednesday 28 May 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence reporting	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	International law in border crossing	1300	1500	"	Immigration		Pol. Lt. Thanom Wongnakphet
	Thai history	1500	1700	"	Nai Isara Charanyanon		
Morals	1900	2000	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam			

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(U)  
(C) Appendix C (Continued)

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(C)  
(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Thursday 29 May 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence reporting	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	Intelligence reporting	1300	1400	"	"		
	Communist Administration	1400	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		
	Morals	1900	2000	"	"		
Friday 30 May 69	Tour						
Saturday 31 May 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Counter-intelligence and security	0900	1200	Classroom	MRDC		Maj. Theb
	Comparison between the democratic and communist administrations	1300	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		

Signed Maj. Wichian Prasitchai  
G-3, CPM Nong Khai

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(U)  
~~(S)~~ Appendix C (Continued)

Third Week

(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Monday 2 June 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Communist Propaganda and recruitment	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	Compass using	1300	1700	"	MRDC		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			
Tuesday 3 June 69	Thai boxing	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Principles in map reading and setting the map	0900	1200	Classroom	RCT 13		Sub Lt. Worawit Rawangset
	"	1300	1400	"	RCT 13		
	Map reading	1400	1700	"	RCT 13		
	Latest news in area	1900	2000	"	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
Wednesday 4 June 69	Thai boxing	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Use of compass in finding direction & for travelling	0900	1200	Classroom	MRDC		
	Sketching	1300	1400	"	"		
	Air planes, helicopters, weapon: and uniforms of North Vietnam, Red China and Pathet Lao soldiers	1500	1700	"	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			

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(S) Appendix C (Concluded)

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(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Thursday 5 June 69	Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Psychological operations	0900	1200	Classroom	Nai Somphit Loetprasoet		
	Rural development and public rehabilitation	1300	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			

Signed: Maj. Wichian Pro-itichai  
G-3, CPM Nong Khai

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Appendix D

**STRIKE FORCE TRAINING COURSE, DETAILED SYLLABUS (U)**

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(U)  
 (U) STRIKE FORCE TRAINING COURSE  
 DETAILED SYLLABUS (U)

Nong Khai CPM

Item	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
1	<u>Physical Training</u>	(10)	Physical Educa- tion Department	- Whistle, training charts - Trakraw, post and tug-of-war rope
	- Exercise	5		
	- Sports	5		
2	<u>Hand-combat</u>	(13)	Judo text	- Training charts - Four pairs of boxing gloves - Knives and sticks
	- Judo	5		
	- Thai boxing	4		
	- Use of silent weapons	4		
3	<u>Foot Drill</u>	(7)	Inf. School	- Teaching stand - Training charts
	- To form line			
	- To stand still and rest			
	- Combat positions			
	- To turn			
	- To march and stop			
	- To run and stop			
- To lie and stand-up				
4	<u>Arms Drill</u>	(11)	Inf. School	- Teaching stand - Rifle and Carbine M-1 - Training chart
	- To form line			
	- To salute			
	- To carry rifle (in different positions)			
	- To fix and unfix bayonets			
- To lie and stand-up				
5	<u>Weapons Study</u>	(7)		- Rifle - Carbine - Shotgun
	- Rifle	3		
	- Carbine	2		
	- Shotgun	2		
6	<u>Firing and Positions</u>	(7)		- Rifle - Carbine - Shotgun
	- Rifle			
	- Carbine			
	- Shotgun			

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(2) Appendix D (Continued)

Item	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
7	<u>Battle Drill and Formation</u>	(14)		
	- Daytime fighting	4	Inf. school	- Blackboard, chalk and pointer
	- Nighttime fighting	7		- Training charts
	- Squad and platoon formation	7		
8	<u>Squad and platoon tactics</u>	(10)		
	- Offense	3	Inf. School	- Blackboard, chalk and pointer
	- Defense	3		- Training charts
	- Retreat and withdrawal	4		
9	<u>Patrolling</u>	(11)		
	- Mission and duties of patrol unit	3	Inf. School	
	- To prepare and form patrol squad	2		
	- Technique of controlling patrol unit	2		
	- Patrol drill	4		
10	<u>Hand grenade throwing</u>	(7)		
	- Kinds, range and how to throw	3		- Blackboard, chalk, pointer, training charts and hand grenade
	- Throwing in the training field	4		
11	<u>Ambush and counter-ambush</u>	(7)		
	- How to set ambush		Inf. School	- Training charts
	- To ambush vehicles			- Blackboard, chalk and pointer
	- Counter-ambush			- Movie (if available)
12	<u>Surprise attack and raids</u>	(3)	Inf. School	
	- Method of surprise attack	1		
	- Method of raids	1		
	- Reason for raids and organization	1		
13	<u>Guerrilla capturing</u>	(8)		
	- How to encircle	3	Inf. School	
	- Hammer and anvil (sweep) operations	5		
14	<u>Explosive and sabotage</u>	(4)		

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(U)  
Appendix D (Continued)

Item	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
15	<u>Map and compass</u> - How to read and set the map - How to use compass for finding direction and travelling - How to sketch the map	(14) 5 5	Inf. School	
16	<u>Combat intelligence and reporting</u> - Observation and memory training - Intelligence - Reporting - Counter-intelligence and security	(4) 1 1 1 1	Inf. School	
17	<u>Communications</u> - Principle and method of communication - Use of communication equipments - Report writing and forms	(3)		- Chart
18	<u>Psychological operations</u> - How to win others' minds - How to get along with people	(3)		- Chart
19	<u>First aid and sanitation</u> - First aid - Hygiene - Sanitation in the field	(3)		- Chart
20	<u>Development and rehabilitation</u> - Local development - Agricultural improvement - Local tradition and cultural customs	(2)		- Chart
21	<u>Democratic government</u> - Principles of democratic government - Democratic government of Thailand - Rights and liberties of the people under democracy	(2)		

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(U)  
Appendix D (Continued)

Item	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
22	<u>Communist government</u> - Communist doctrine - Rights and liberties of the people under Communism - Propaganda and recruiting - Communist operations in Thailand	(2)		
23	<u>Comparison of Democratic government and Communist government</u> - Rights and liberties of the people under Democracy - Rights and liberties of the people under Communism	(2)		- Chart
24	<u>History of Thailand</u> - The movement of the ancient Thais and Chinese aggression - The restoration of King Ram-kam-hang - The liberation of King Nare-suan, the Great	(2)		- Chart
25	<u>Firing drill (with real ammunition)</u> - Rifle - Lying position - Carbine - Sitting position - Shotgun - Standing position	(14)		- Rifle - Carbine - Shotgun - Ammunitions
26	<u>Tour</u> - Nong Khai and Udon	(7)		

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(2) Appendix D (Concluded)

Item	Subject	Hours	Reference	Training Aids
27	<u>Motivational training</u> - Loyalty - Endurance - Bravery - Unity - Devotion - Discipline - Civil obligations - Morals - Current affairs	(16) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1		
28	<u>Commander's hour</u>	(7)		

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Appendix E  
STRIKE FORCE TRAINING COURSE TIMETABLE (U)

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Tab 2

Nong Khai CPM

STRIKE FORCE TRAINING COURSE TIMETABLE (U)  
7 July 1969 - 1 August 1969

First Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 7 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Opening ceremony and orientation	0900	1200	Classroom	CPM staff
	-Unarmed drill	1300	1700	School ground	From SAF (Special Action Force)
	-Loyalty	1900	2000	Classroom	Maj. Sakda Kongpatyuen
Tuesday 8 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Unarmed drill	0900	1200	"	From SAF
	-Arms drill	1300	1700	"	"
	-Loyalty	1900	2000	Classroom	Maj. Sakda Kongpatyuen
Wednesday 9 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Arms drill	0900	1200	"	From SAF
	-Arms drill	1300	1700	"	"
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	"
Thursday 10 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Rifle study	0900	1200	Classroom	From SAF
	-Carbine study	1300	1500	"	"
	-Shotgun study	1500	1700	"	"
	-Endurance	1900	2000	"	Mr. Adirek Phonsak
Friday 11 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Principles & posture of firing (rifle)	0900	1200	Classroom	From SAF
	-Principles & posture of firing (carbine)	1300	1500	"	"
	-Principles & posture of firing (shotgun)	1500	1700	"	"
	-Endurance	1900	2000	"	Mr. Adirek Phonsak
Saturday 12 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Communications	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Snad Intarapakdi
	-Combat intelligence & reporting	1300	1700	"	Maj. Vichian Prasithichai
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	"	(Asst. Sgt. Maj. Juan Nakmai)

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Second Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 14 July 69	-Judo	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	Combat drill				
	-Daytime fighting	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Nighttime fighting	1300	1700	"	"
	-Bravery	1900	2000	"	Mr. Somphit Lertprasert
Tuesday 15 July 69	-Judo	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	Combat formations				
	-Squad formations	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Platoon formations	1300	1700	"	"
	-Movie	1900	2000	"	"
Wednesday 16 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	Squad and platoon tactics				
	-Offense	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Defense	1300	1700	"	"
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	"	Col. Chaiphon Van-iem
Thursday 17 July 69	-Judo	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	Withdrawal				
	-Patrolling	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Organization and mission	1300	1700	"	"
	-Unity	1900	2000	"	Mr. Thavin Potavat
Friday 18 July 69	-Judo	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instruction
	Patrols				
	-Patrol preparations	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Patrol drills	1300	1700	Field	"
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	"
Saturday 19 July 69	-Judo	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	Hand-grenade throwing				
	-Kinds of grenades and booby traps	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Throwing positions	1300	1700	Field	"
	-Entertainment (movie)	1900	2000	Classroom	"

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## Third Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 21 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>Ambush and counter-ambush</u>				
	-Ambush	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Counter-ambush	1300	1700	"	"
	-Devotion	1900	2000	"	Mr. Somphit Letprasert
Tuesday 22 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>Raids and surprise</u>				
	-Principles and surprise actions	0900	1200	Classroom	From EPP
	-Raids, element of raids	0900	1200	"	"
	-History of Thailand	1300	1500	"	From Changwad Education
	-Development	1500	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	"	
Wednesday 23 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>Map and compass</u>				
	-Map reading	0900	1200	Classroom	From RCT 13
	-Use of compass and direction	1500	1700	"	"
	-Discipline	1900	2000	"	Lt. Thawat
Thursday 24 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>-Use of compass and direction</u>				
	-Map sketching	0900	1200	Field	From RCT 13
	-Morals	1300	1700	"	"
		1900	2000	Classroom	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
Friday 25 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>-Psychological operations</u>				
	-Explosives and sabotage	0900	1200	Classroom	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
	-Unity	1300	1700	"	From RCT 13
		1900	2000	"	Mr. Thavin Potawat
Saturday 26 July 69	<u>-Use of silent weapons</u>				
	-Guerrilla capturing	0600	0700	Ground	Maj. Vichian Prasitchai
	-Democratic government	0900	1200	Classroom	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
	-Communist government	1300	1500	"	"
	-Civil obligations	1500	1700	"	"
		1900	2000	"	Mr. Thongkoon Phuthiwong

Fourth Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 28 July 69	-Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. Instructor Maj. Vichian Prasitchai
	-Guerrilla capturing	0900	1200	Classroom	
	-Guerrilla capturing	1300	1500	"	
	-Guerrilla capturing drill	1500	1700	Field	
	-Current events	1900	2000	Classroom	
Tuesday 29 July 69	-Tour				
Wednesday 30 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor from SAF
	-Firing in the range	0900	1200	Classroom	
	-Revision for firing positions	1300	1700	Field	
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	
Thursday 31 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor from SAF
	-Firing with real ammunition	0900	1700	Range	
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	
Friday 1 Aug 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor from Changwad Health Dept. CPM staff
	-Nursing and field sanitation	0900	1200	Classroom	
	-Closing ceremony	1300	1700	"	

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Appendix F

VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING--  
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES (U)

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Appendix F

(U) VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING  
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES (U)

1. There will be an exercise director (G2/3) assisted by one BMI supervisor.
2. The students will be in groups of not more than 10, each monitored by an instructor or BMI assistant.
3. The demonstration team will be run by BMI and will use students to simulate infiltrators (targets) as required.
4. There will be constant two-way radio or telephone communication between the exercise director and the demonstration team.
5. The CPM to provide appropriate props, i.e. uniforms, hats, different types of clothing, weapons (rifles, pistols, machine guns and sub-machine gun). Also different-sized bundles for targets to carry.
6. Four or five radios to be available for each trainee group, so that live reports can be made by trainees. This will also need monitor radios (all on different frequencies) to be manned by CPM. (Note: This is not an essential requirement but it will add realism and will test trainees in sending messages under operational conditions.)
7. The demonstration team will be supplied with a script for each situation they are to stage, detailing numbers of people to be used, their dress, equipment (including bundles), direction(s) of movement, actions and the amount of time they will expose themselves to the informants.
8. The method of exercise will be to run through the situation and have the trainee record what they have observed in writing, or, if they cannot write, to report verbally (individually) to the group monitor. Selected individuals will make reports on their observations by radio. After reports have been made, the test director will normally ask for the situation to be rerun. The targets will be stopped in the middle of the run (by loud-hailer) and group monitors will then take trainees through the details of the

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Appendix F (Continued)

targets they should have observed and reported, commenting upon accuracy of trainees' reports. (Note: Reports will be marked with the situation number by the group monitor and retained by him for further evaluation.)

9. There will probably be two or more demonstration and observation sites, in order to test students in both open and close terrain.

10. The objects of the exercise will be to test all students on what they have previously learned in the classroom about:

- a. Observation
- b. Memory training
- c. Recording
- d. Reporting

11. If initial results are not satisfactory, further exercises may be needed the following day, after pointing out mistakes and omissions to the students.

SAMPLE SCENARIOS

Situation One

1. Number of target personnel: 6
2. Dress and Equipment: Black villagers' clothing (all); villagers' hats (2); ammunition box (2); rifles--wrapped in cloth (3); packs--carried on back (2).
3. Action: target party will emerge from trees, bushes about 50 meters away from informants walking north; will stop at intersection, look around, hold short discussion (30 seconds) and then turn west going out of sight after 30-40 meters.
4. Total time exposure to informants: 2 minutes.
5. Action by informants: make out written reports on training proforma. Illiterates to report verbally to group monitors.

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6. Follow-up action: Targets to rerun exactly as before (Item 3), then to "freeze" on exercise director's signal after turning west. Informants will be taken up close to observe details of target personnel and equipment.

7. Monitor's task: go through correct observation details and compare with trainees' reports. Target personnel to be released back to demonstration base afterwards.

#### Situation Two

1. Number of target personnel: 15

2. Dress and Equipment: jungle-green uniform, including hats and boots (4); black villagers' clothing (5); mixed jungle-green, black, white and coloured shirts and trousers (6); rifles (5); pistols--on belts of uniformed men (2); shoulder packs, large (3); shoulder packs, small (5); medium machine gun--carried by two men (1).

3. Action: students will take cover on ground or behind bushes. Target party will move slowly in a straight line through bushes for about 50-60 meters in front of informants. They will sometimes move in open, sometimes behind bushes. Man at back of target party will stop to take compass reading, will then run to catch target party.

4. Total time exposure to informants: 1-1/2 minutes.

5. Action by informants: make out written reports. Then one selected (illiterate) informant in each group to make radio report with others listening (after their written reports collected by monitor).

6. Follow-up action: as for Situation One.

7. Monitor's task: to critique radio report, then written reports.

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Appendix G

VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING--REVISED OUTLINE (U)

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Appendix G

VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING - REVISED OUTLINE (U)

(Draft as of June 1969)

1. Mission

To carry out basic training of village personnel recruited to be informants in border security operations under the CSOC 9 Plan.

2. Objectives

(a) To make the trainees sufficiently proficient for their operational role in the following subjects:

- Concept of operations, role and duties of informants
- Elementary intelligence and counter-intelligence
- CT threat and activity
- Observation and reporting techniques
- Map reading and compass using
- Radio communications and message writing
- Weapon handling and maintenance

(b) To develop trainees' motivation

(c) To provide a foundation through training for subsequent field training.

3. Training Time

(a) The course will consist of 16-1/2 training days spread over a period of three weeks.

(b) Training will be conducted on a 44-hour, 5-1/2 day week basis.

(c) Training hours and training emphasis will be as follows:

0700 - 0730	}	Physical training	
0830 - 0920		}	Lectures and demonstrations
0930 - 1020			
1040 - 1130			
1140 - 1230	}	Demonstrations and practical exercises	
1340 - 1430			
1440 - 1530			
1540 - 1630			
1900 - 1930/2000		Motivational lectures and films	

4. A suggested training syllabus is attached.

5. The instructional techniques for the two Nong Khai courses included less than 20% demonstrations and exercises in the overall syllabus. The new suggested syllabus incorporates more than 80% practical work, which is more in conformity with the principles of good instruction, particularly with trainees of low educational background.

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(U) Appendix G (Continued)  
SUGGESTED VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING SYLLABUS

Item	Subject	Lesson	Types of Instruction			Visual Aids to be used	No. of Lesson Periods	Lesson Hours
			Lecture	Demonstration	Exercise			
1	Introduction	- Opening ceremony	X				1	4
		- Plan 9 concept and functions, informants and village coverage	X	X		X	1	
		- Role, duties and responsibilities, and role of puyabans, kannans	X				1	
		- Retainers and rewards	X				1	
2	Intelligence	- Intelligence orientation and intelligence cycle	X			X	2	3
		- Counter-intelligence and personal security	X	X		X	1	
3	Communist Threat	- Communist doctrine and tactics	X			X	1	6
		- Mechanics of subversion and mass support	X			X	1	
		- Infiltration and exfiltration methods	X				1	
		- Insurgent activity indicators	X			X	1	
		- Enemy aircraft, arms, uniforms and equipment	X	X		X	2	
4	Border Control	- RTG agencies, laws and procedures relating to border crossing	X			X	2	2
5	Map Reading	- Principles, introduction and geographic coordinates	X	X		X	1	
		- Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) 1:50,000 map		X		X	1	

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(2) Appendix G (Continued)

Item	Subject	Lesson	Types of Instruction			Visual Aids to be used	No. of Lesson Periods	Lesson Hours
			Lecture	Demonstration	Exercise			
5	Map Reading	- Map symbols		X	X	X	2	
		- Compass, description and use		X	X	X	2	
		- Direction, with and without compass	X	X	X	X	2	
		- Distance judging		X	X	X	3	
		- Sketch-map making		X	X	X	6	
		- Map training practical exercise				X	X	3
							<u>20</u>	
6	Observation and Reporting	- Information types, targets and requirements	X	X		X	5	
		- Terrain description	X	X		X	2	
		- Methods of surveillance	X	X	X	X	5	
		- Camouflage		X	X	X	3	
		- Tracking and avoiding detection		X	X	X	7	
		- Memory training		X	X	X	3	
		- Report writing		X	X	X	7	
		- Reporting rules and procedures	X	X	X	X	3	
		- Briefing and debriefing	X	X	X	X	2	
							<u>37</u>	
7	Communications	- Radio description and use		X		X	1	
		- Elementary maintenance		X	X	X	1	
		- Antennae		X	X	X	1	
		- Voice procedure		X	X	X	6	
		- Message formats & message priorities		X		X	1	
		- Message writing		X	X	X	3	
		- Radio exercise			X	X	4	
							<u>17</u>	
8	Weaponry	- Description	X	X		X	1	
		- Stripping, cleaning and maintenance		X	X	X	2	
		- Aiming and trigger pressure		X	X	X	3	
		- Range firing			X	X	5	
							<u>11</u>	

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Appendix G (Concluded)

Item	Subject	Lesson	Types of Instruction			Visual Aids to be Used	No. of Lesson Periods	Lesson Hours
			Lecture	Demonstration	Exercise			
9	Motivation (night classes)	- Thai history	X				2	9
		- Thai constitution	X			X	1	
		- Government administration	X			X	2	
		- Communism (land reform)	X			X	2	
		- Democracy	X				2	
		- Citizens' rights and duties	X				1	
		- Development programs and psyops	X			X	2	
- Films						6		
10	Physical Exercises (morning period)	- Simple conditioning calisthenics					18	9
11	Field Exercises	- Practical exercises based on scenarios to test informant functions: observation, camouflage, surveillance, sketching, report writing, radio use and debriefing			X	X	14	14
Total Lesson Hours							132	

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Appendix H

**SUGGESTED CRITERIA FOR THE  
SELECTION OF VILLAGE INFORMANTS (U)**

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Appendix H

(U)  
(C) SUGGESTED CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF VILLAGE INFORMANTS (U)

1. Personnel must be completely trustworthy and loyal.

Since the village informants will be operating against insurgents it is important that they be firmly committed to the RTG.

2. Personnel should be volunteers and anxious to help against the insurgents.

This criterion is set to insure that well-motivated persons are selected.

3. Personnel should be able to see distant objects clearly and have good hearing.

Detection and identification of strangers requires good distance vision. Good hearing is necessary for radio operators and possibly would assist in nighttime detection.

4. Personnel should be healthy and at least 18 years of age.

The lower age limit is selected to insure a degree of maturity and stability. There appears to be no reason for imposing an upper age limit, provided the candidate is in good health.

5. Personnel should not have other responsibilities that might interfere with timely performance.

Some individuals--e.g., school teachers--might not be able to get free at a critical time.

6. Within a village where more than one informant is to operate, personnel should be selected whose activities and dwelling places cover the whole village and its environs, and in particular their places of work should not overlap each other.

This criterion has two aspects: a) for detecting strangers near or around the village it is desirable to have a broad geographical coverage and b) word of the presence of strangers is likely to come most quickly to the informant from his nearby friends and neighbors.

7. Personnel selected should be friendly, cooperative, well-liked and respected.

People with these characteristics are likely to be informed of strangers and suspicious actions. Furthermore, village informants should be of the type who enhance the general morale in their village and, insofar as they are perceived as RTG representatives, improve the government image.

8. Personnel should be able to read, write and talk clearly.

To make notes on sightings and villagers' reports, and also to transmit and receive written information by others, they must be able to read and write. Clear speech is necessary for radio transmission as well as for communicating with other villagers.

9. Personnel should not all be selected from the same families.

Family ties are important and it is assumed that information is less likely to be transmitted between families than within a family, so distribution in this respect is desirable.

10. Personnel should include a range of ages.

It appears that contact with and communication from other villagers will be widened if the village informants tend to span a variety of age groups.

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Appendix H (Concluded)

11. Some personnel selected should be those who are likely to have wide contact with other villagers--as, for example, storekeepers.

This criterion is selected to increase the probability that other villagers will communicate with the village informants.

12. Women may be selected as village informants.

Because women are more likely to talk to women and because male candidates of the right caliber and qualifications may be in short supply in some villages, it appears reasonable to include women in the village informant network.

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Appendix I

**SUGGESTED PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION  
VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING (U)**

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Appendix I

(U) ~~(C)~~ SUGGESTED PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION--VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING (U)

A. Purpose (U)

(C) To provide the minimum basic training required for villagers to act as effective informants in border control operations.

B. Objectives (U)

1. (C) To make the trainees sufficiently proficient for their operational role in the following subjects:

- Concept of operations role and duties
- CT threat and activity
- Elementary intelligence and counterintelligence
- Observation and reporting procedures
- Location finding
- Message writing and sketching
- Communications.

2. (U) To develop trainees' motivation.

3. (U) To provide a foundation through training for subsequent field training.

C. Training Time (U)

1. (U) The course will consist of 16-1/2 training days spread over a period of three weeks.

2. (U) Training will be conducted on a 44-hour, 5-1/2 day week basis.

3. (U) Training hours and training emphasis will be as follows:

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(C) Appendix I (Continued)

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0600 - 0630		Physical exercise (extracurricular)
0800 - 0850	}	Lectures and demonstrations
0900 - 0950		
1010 - 1100		
1110 - 1200		
1300 - 1350	}	Demonstrations and practical exercises
1400 - 1450		
1510 - 1600		
1610 - 1700		Instructor's preference period (used for whatever extra instruction is indicated by daily training progress)
1900 - 2000		Motivational lectures and films, and night exercises (extracurricular)

D. Location (U)

(U) Local training centers as arranged by the Changwat CPM.

E. Training Schedules (U)

1. (U) Detailed syllabus--Table 1.
2. (U) Block timetable--Table 2.
3. (U) Weekly training program--Table 3.

F. Sequence (U)

(U) The training is scheduled to allow for consecutive teaching by instructors who may be available for only a day or two during the program.

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(U)  
(S) Appendix I (Continued)

(C) VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING COURSE--WEEKLY TRAINING PROGRAM (U)

First Week

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
1	Monday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Opening ceremony	0800	0850	Classroom
		Informant concept	0900	0950	"
		Informants' role and duties	1010	1100	"
		Informants' retainers and rewards	1110	1200	"
		Intelligence orientation	1300	1350	"
		Insurgent activity indicators	1400	1450	"
		Counterintelligence and personal security	1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	"
Thai history	1900	2000	Classroom		
2	Tuesday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Communist doctrine and tactics	0800	0850	Classroom
		Mass support, propaganda and subversion	0900 1010	0950 1100	" "
		Infiltration and exfiltration methods	1110	1200	"
		Border control laws and practices	1300 1400	1350 1450	" "
		Border control agencies	1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	"
		Film	1900	2000	"

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(S) Appendix I (Continued)

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
3	Wednesday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Location finding, introduction and purpose	0800 0900	0850 0950	Classroom "
		Landmarks	1010 1110	1100 1200	" Field
		Compass, description and use	1300	1350	Classroom
		Direction finding by day	1400 1510 1610	1450 1600 1650	" " "
		Democracy, the Thai constitution and Government Administration	1900	2000	"
		4	Thursday	Physical exercise	0600
Direction finding at night	0800 0900			0850 0950	Classroom "
Distance judging	1010 1110			1100 1200	" Field
Distance in meters	1300			1350	"
Milestones	1400			1450	"
Diversiory routes	1510			1600	"
Calculation in a straight line	1610			1700	"
Night exercise - direction finding	1900			2000	"

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(C) Appendix I (Continued)

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
5	Friday	Sketching techniques	0800	0850	Classroom
		Line types and scale estimation	0900	0950	"
		Overhead view and perspective drawing	1010	1100	"
		The panoramic sketch	1110	1200	"
		Sketch-map making, field exercises	1300 1400 1510	1350 1450 1600	Field " "
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	-
		Night exercise--direction finding	1900	2000	Field
6	Saturday	Location finding--practical exercises	0800	0850	Field
			0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	"
			1110	1200	"

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(U)  
(S) Appendix I (Continued)

Second Week

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
7	Monday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Unusual movements and activities	0800	0850	Classroom
			0900	0950	"
		Suspect persons	1010	1100	"
			1110	1200	"
		Methods of surveillance	1300	1350	Field
			1400	1450	"
1510	1600	"			
Instructor's preference	1610	1700			
Villager cooperation	1900	2000	Classroom		
8	Tuesday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Night vision and sounds	0800	0850	Classroom
			0900	0950	"
		Camouflage and avoiding detection	1010	1100	Field
			1110	1200	"
		Surveillance exercise	1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
1510	1600	"			
Instructor's preference	1610	1700			
Demonstration of night vision and sounds	1900	2000	"		

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(2) Appendix I (Continued)

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
9	Wednesday	Tracking, escape and evasion	0800	0850	Classroom
			0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	Field
			1110	1200	"
			1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
		1510	1600	"	
	Instructor's preference	1610	1700		
	Film	1900	2000	Classroom	
10	Thursday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Terrain and people description	0800	0850	Classroom
			0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	Field
			1110	1200	"
		Memory training	1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
			1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	
Exercise in night vision and sounds	1900	2000			

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(U)  
(L) Appendix I (Continued)

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
11	Friday	Report writing	0800	0850	Classroom
			0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	"
			1110	1200	"
			1300	1350	Field
			1400	1450	"
			1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	
		Rights and duties of the citizen	1900	2000	Classroom
12	Saturday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Briefing and debriefing	0800	0850	Classroom
		Reporting rules and procedures	0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	Field
			1110	1200	"

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(U)  
(S) Appendix I (Continued)

Third Week

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
13	Monday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Radio description, maintenance and use (network)	0800	0850	Classroom
		Message formats and priorities	1010	1100	"
		Voice procedure	1110	1200	"
		Antennae	1300	1350	Field
		Voice procedure	1400 1510	1450 1600	" "
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	"
		Exercise in night vision and sounds	1900	2000	"
14	Tuesday		0800	0850	Field
			0900	0950	"
		Communications exercise	1010	1100	"
			1110	1200	"
			1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
			1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	"
Communist land reform	1900	2000	Classroom		

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(U)  
(K) Appendix I (Continued)

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
15	Wednesday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
			0800	0850	Field
		Communications exercise	0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	"
			1110	1200	"
			1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
			1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	
		Villager cooperation (continued)	1900	2000	Classroom
16	Thursday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
			0800	0850	Field
		General field exercises	0900	0950	"
			1010	1100	"
			1110	1200	"
			1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
			1510	1600	"
		Instructor's preference	1610	1700	
		Government development programs and psyops	1900	2000	Classroom

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(S)  
(2) Appendix I (Concluded)

Training Day	Date	Subject	Time		Place
			From	To	
17	Friday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Review of previous day's exercises	0800	0850	Classroom
		General field exercises	0900	0950	Field
			1000	1050	"
			1110	1200	"
			1300	1350	"
			1400	1450	"
		1510	1600	"	
Instructor's preference	1010	1700			
Film	1900	2000	Classroom		
18	Saturday	Physical exercise	0600	0630	Playground
		Course review	0800	0850	Classroom
			0900	0950	"
		Closing ceremony	1010	1100	"
		Return preparations	1110	1200	Quarters

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**Appendix J**  
**TRAINING COSTS (U)**

J-1

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(U) Appendix J  
~~(C)~~ TRAINING COSTS (U)

- (U) ~~(C)~~ Training for strike force personnel and village informants is made up of basic and post-basic training given by personnel of the RTA, PP, BPP and DOLA. The basic training for strike force personnel involved orientation and basic paramilitary training; for village informants, training emphasized the intelligence gathering and reporting functions.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ The post-basic training in the field was given to LCS staffs, strike force personnel and village informants after the operation commenced. Five post-basic training exercises were conducted: namely, Step Zero, Step One, Step One-and-a-Half, Step Two and Step Three.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ The Nong Khai CPM was directly responsible for both types of training. CPM personnel conducted the training with assistance from both the MRDC and SRI teams who were present during the training. The cost of CPM personnel is treated as training cost. MRDC and SRI personnel costs are not included in the basic training cost because they acted as observers and evaluators of the training. However, the post-basic training cost included the cost of personnel from MRDC and SRI because of their direct participation in the training as either umpires or simulated CT infiltrators.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ The cost of conducting the lessons is made up of personnel salary and per diem of instructors, per diem and equipment for trainees (village volunteers and the assigned unit PP personnel), facility improvements, and transportation for trainees to and from Nong Khai (for the basic training only). The training facilities were already available and were utilized for the training of villagers with small modification cost. If additional Plan 9-type security unit training is to be conducted somewhere else, in the future, facilities may not be available and may have to be procured--resulting in a higher training cost per student.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ Costs of basic training for strike force personnel and village informants are shown in Tables J-1 and J-2 respectively.

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(U)

Table J-1

(U) BASIC TRAINING COST FOR PLAN 7 STRIKE FORCE VOLUNTEERS (U)  
(Baht)

Item	No.	No. of Days	Cost* ฿, Man-Day	Total
Instructors: <u>RTA</u>				
Col.	1	3	410	1,230
Maj.	2	4	230	1,240
<u>TNPD</u>				
2nd Lt.	2	3	120	720
Spc. Sgt.	4	9	100	3,600
Sgt.	1	7	80	560
Pvt.	2	6	70	840
<u>Civil Service</u>				
3rd Grade	3	3	120	1,080
Students: Strike Force Volunteers	40	25	16	16,000
Strike Force: <u>PP</u>				
Sgt.	2	25	80	4,000
L. Cpl.	2	25	80	4,000
Pvt.	4	25	70	7,000
Transportation** @ ฿50 per student				2,400
@ ฿20 per instructor				460
Facility Improvement <sup>+</sup>				220
Material Consumed <sup>++</sup>				2,000
Course Preparation <sup>x</sup>				3,530
			Total	49,460

\* (U) Personnel cost per man-day is the equivalent per-day cost of total annual cost.

(U) \*\* (U) Transportation cost per student is based on a 20 baht allowance given to a trainee for transportation from his own village to a pick-up point, 20 baht for transportation from the pick-up point to the training center and another 20 baht for transportation during training. For instructors, transportation cost is estimated at 20 baht for the round trip from base to training center and during the training period.

(U) + (U) Total cost of 1,000 baht was incurred in preparing facilities. The cost is allocated in 2:7 ratio of strike force personnel to village informants.

++ (U) SRI guesstimate.

x (U) Course preparation is based on estimated time spent by the official who planned and prepared the training courses.

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Table J-2

(U) BASIC TRAINING COST FOR PLAN 9 VILLAGE INFORMANTS (U)

Item	No.	No. of Days	Cost* ฿/Man-Day	Total
<u>Instructor: RTA</u>				
Col.	1	4	410	1,640
Maj.	3	21	230	14,490
Capt.	2	2	190	760
2nd Lt.	1	1	140	140
<u>TNPD</u>				
Maj.	1	6	190	1,140
1st Lt.	1	2	130	260
Spc. Sgt.	2	7	100	1,400
Pvt.	1	2	70	140
<u>Civil Service</u>				
3rd Grade	4	8	120	3,840
Students: Village Informants	140	16	16	40,320
Transportation** @ 360 per student				8,400
@ 20 per instructor				320
Facility Improvement <sup>+</sup>				780
Material Consumed <sup>++</sup>				2,000
Course Preparation <sup>x</sup>				3,530
		Total		79,160

\* (U) Personnel cost per man-day is the equivalent per-day cost of total annual cost.

(U)\*\* (U) Transportation cost per student is based on a 20 baht allowance given to trainees for transportation from their villages to a pick-up point, 20 baht for transportation from the pick-up point to the training center and another 20 baht for transportation during training. For instructors, transportation cost is estimated at 20 baht for the round trip from base to training center and during the training period.

(U)+ (U) Total cost of 1,000 baht was incurred in preparing facilities. The cost is allocated in 2:7 ratio of SF personnel to village informants.

++ (U) SRI guesstimate.

x (U) Course preparation is based on estimated time spent by official who planned and prepared the training courses.

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(U) ~~(C)~~ The cost of post-basic training is allocated to LCS staffs, strike forces and village informants according to the purpose of the training. Step Zero training was given to village informants with emphasis on intelligence collection and dissemination. Step One training was given both to strike force personnel and to village informants. Step One-and-a-Half training was aimed at the LCS staffs, SF leaders and PP personnel in nearby VSUs. Step Two training, which was a command post exercise, involved all command centers that are directly responsible for Plan 9 operations such as the Local Control Stations (LCS), the Border Control Headquarters (BC HQ) at Target Area 2 Headquarters and the Nong Khai CPM. Step Three training, which was a field training exercise, again, involved all the units that participated in Step Two training.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Since the field training was held after Plan 9 was considered operational, costs of Strike Force, LCS police and BC HQ personnel are already discounted as part of the annual operation costs. Therefore, the only costs involved in this post-basic training are the costs generated by bringing in personnel from other units to act as instructors, umpires and observers.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The cost of post-basic training is shown in Tables J-3 and J-4 for each group of Plan 9 volunteers. A summary of training cost for Strike Forces, and village informants is shown in Table J-5.

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(U)  
(S) Table J-3  
POST-BASIC TRAINING COST FOR PLAN 9 STRIKE FORCE VOLUNTEERS (U)  
(Baht)

Item	No. of Man-Days					Total Cost	Cost B/Man-Day	Total Cost
	Step 0	Step 1	Step 1 1/2	Step 2	Step 3			
Strike Force Group*								
RTA: Cpl.	1	-	-	5	5	11	410	4,510
Maj.	3	15	6	10	25	59	230	13,570
Capt.	-	-	-	-	10	10	190	1,900
Lt.	-	-	-	-	5	5	160	800
Master Sgt.	-	-	-	5	-	5	100	500
Sgt.	-	2	-	-	-	2	90	180
Cpl.	-	2	-	-	-	2	90	180
TNPD: Lt. Cpl.	-	-	-	-	5	5	240	1,200
Sgt.	-	-	-	-	15	15	80	1,200
Cpl.	-	15	-	-	-	15	80	1,200
Pvt.	-	6	-	4	10	20	70	1,400
Civilian: 2nd Grade	-	-	2	-	-	2	80	160
3rd Grade**	4	4	4	50	50	112	120	13,440
Subtotal								40,240
Add 11% for material consumed and exercise preparation.								4,430
Total Cost for Strike Force Post-Basic Training								44,670

\* (U) Per diem for Strike Force personnel is not included since the unit is operational and per diem cost is already included in annual personnel cost.

\*\* (U) These personnel were actually from MRDC and SRI staff and their services were not charged. It is estimated, however, that the duties could have been performed by a 3rd grade civil service employee.

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(U)  
(S)

Table J-4

POST-BASIC TRAINING COST FOR PLAN 9 VILLAGE INFORMANTS (U)

Item	No. of Man-Days					Total Days	Cost \$/Man-Day	Total Cost
	Step 0	Step 1	Step 1 1/2	Step 2	Step 3			
	<b>Instructors</b>							
RTA: Col.	4	-	-	-	-	4	410	1,640
Maj.	4	2	-	-	-	6	230	1,380
Master Sgt.	-	1	-	-	-	1	100	100
Sgt.	-	1	-	-	-	1	90	90
Cpl.	-	1	-	-	-	1	90	90
Students: Village Informants*	37	79	-	20	30	220	16**	3,520
Subtotal								6,820
Add 7% for material consumed and exercise preparation								480
Total Cost for Village Informant Post-Basic Training								7,300

(U)\* (S) Only village informants chosen to receive transmitters receive this training.

(U)\*\* (S) Per diem included since it is received by village informants when required to attend class.

(U)  
(S)

Table J-5

SUMMARY OF TRAINING COST (U)  
(Baht)

Plan 9 Element	No. of Trainees	Basic Training Cost	Post-Basic Training Cost	Total Cost
Strike Forces	48*	49,480	44,670	94,150
Village Informants	140	79,160	7,300	86,460

\* (U) Including 8 PP personnel assigned as unit leaders.

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(Table 1-1)  
 COST ESTIMATE TRAINING COST FOR PLAN 9 VILLAGE TRAINING CENTER (U)

Item	Unit	Quantity	List of Materials					Remarks
			1	2	3	4	5	
Student Village Training		1	20	50	-	-	-	1000
Chalk		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
Blackboard		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
Table		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
Chair		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
Books		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
Stationery		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
Other		1	-	-	-	-	-	100
<b>Total</b>			<b>20</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1000</b>

**Appendix K**

1. Add the total cost of (U) BIBLIOGRAPHY (U) preparation

2. Total cost for Village Training Center (U)

(U) Only village information should be included in this report. (U)  
 (U) Information received by village information should be included in this report. (U)

Table 1-1  
 SUMMARY OF TRAINING COST (U)  
 (Form)

Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Remarks
Student Village Training	1	1000	1000	
Chalk	1	100	100	
Blackboard	1	100	100	
Table	1	100	100	
Chair	1	100	100	
Books	1	100	100	
Stationery	1	100	100	
Other	1	100	100	
<b>Total</b>			<b>1600</b>	

(U) Information received by village information should be included in this report. (U)

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## Appendix K BIBLIOGRAPHY (U)

### A. Training

#### Thai

1. Provincial Police (PP) "Chaiya" basic counterinsurgency training manual
2. PP Special Action Force (SAF) training manual - 2 volumes
3. Map Reading Manual, RTA School of Military Engineering.

#### U.S. Army

1. FM 21-5. Military Training Management
2. FM 21-6. Techniques of Military Instruction
3. AR 220-55. Field and Command Post Exercises
4. AR 350-15. Military Training Aids
5. FM 21-26. Map Reading.

#### British (All War Office publications)

1. Successful Instruction, 1951
2. Good Instruction, Parts 1 and 2, 1952
3. Organization of Training, 1961
4. Unit and Formation Training, 1961
5. Leadership and Individual Training, 1961
6. Exercise Control and Umpiring, 1960.

#### Author

1. Police Instruction Manual (English, Malay and French), 1958
2. Police Instruction Manual (Translated into Thai by TNPD Education Bureau), 1962.

Appendix K (Concluded)

B. Counterinsurgency Subjects

MRDC/RDC-T

1. Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand (Vol. 1-4). Research Analysis Corporation, 1968 and 1969. (Confidential)

U.S. Army

1. FM 31-23. Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine
2. FM 31-16. Counterguerrilla Operations
3. FM 30-5. Combat Intelligence
4. FM 30-10. Terrain Intelligence.

British and Commonwealth

1. Manual of Joint Warfare - Concept, Planning and Control of Limited War Operations, 1967
2. Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Manual. Australian Army, 1965
3. Counter-Terrorist Operations. Tactics. Malaysian Armed Forces, 1964
4. Counter-Guerrilla Operations. Malaysian Armed Forces, 1965
5. The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 1958.

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1. Security Forces and Border Control Agencies in Nakhon Phanom Province, June 1968. RSSC-RM 4923-19, Stanford Research Institute, December 1968. (Confidential).
2. Border Control Intelligence. Appendix B to Technical Note 4923-38, Stanford Research Institute, 15 July 1968. (Confidential).
3. The Fundamentals of Agent Recruitment, Training and Handling. (Working Paper) Stanford Research Institute, 1969.
4. The Evolution of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya. RSSC-RM 4923-14, Stanford Research Institute, July 1967. (Confidential).

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13 ABSTRACT <p>(U) A detailed description and evaluation is given of a training program initiated as part of a border control project in Northeast Thailand under the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC). This program, conducted during the period May 1969 through June 1970, involved the training of volunteers from local villages for certain roles in the counterinsurgency operations set forth under CSOC "Operations Plan No. 9."</p> <p>(U) The evaluation is based on reports by observers who attended the basic and field training courses, combined with the observations of the author, who followed the planning and development of the training program from the beginning. Recommendations are made toward the improvement of future training of the type required under the plan.</p>		

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