

HSS

CHRONOLOGY OF
THE CRISIS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
24 APRIL-31 AUGUST 1965

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Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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1965-1966

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Introduction

The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern, and larger part of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with Haiti. It has a population of 3,340,000 living in an area of approximately 19,000 square miles. Two-thirds of the people live in the northeast. The average density is 150 per square mile, which is higher than Latin America as a whole. The Republic's racial composition is estimated as about 70 per cent mestizo and mulatto, 10 per cent negro, and 12 per cent caucasian. The Dominican Republic has had a long history of internal conflict, with frequent outside intervention. Government has traditionally revolved around personalities rather than institutions or ideologies, and the administration of public affairs, usually in the hands of incompetent and corrupt officials, has been characterized by opportunism and authoritarian methods. In this environment, control of the army, as in so many Latin American countries, has been the key to political power.

Early History

After 350 years of colonial rule, the Dominican Republic emerged as an independent nation in 1844. In constant fear of invasion from their neighbor and former conqueror, Haiti, the Dominicans made repeated overtures to France and Spain for protection. For a brief period during the US Civil War Spain regained control of the country, but, partly because of US pressure and the united resistance of the Dominicans, Spain withdrew in 1865. Despite the long struggle for independence the Dominican Republic was unprepared for liberty and democracy. Its people had received no training in politics or public administration from the Spaniards and had been given no effective voice in government during the two decades of Haitian rule. In its first 40 years of independence the Republic endured 40 revolutions, several succeeding in overthrowing the national government. Rapidly, and often violently, strong men, supported by caudillos--provisional political figures with large private armies--succeeded each other to the presidency.

US Intervention

In 1869 the Dominican government requested US annexation. The Grant administration was receptive; it dispatched US naval forces and drew up a treaty of annexation. The treaty failed to win ratification in the Senate, however, and the entire project was abandoned in 1871. US action was thus forestalled a generation, but the later decades of the nineteenth century were a prelude to intervention. Years of mismanagement, opportunism, corruption, and outright looting, left the country insolvent by the end of the century. The situation had degenerated into financial and political chaos, and European countries, demanding payment on long-overdue loans, threatened to collect by armed force. At this point the US intervened.

In 1899 the Dominicans agreed to the appointment of resident US fiscal agents. In 1905 Theodore Roosevelt undertook the management of Dominican customs revenues and arranged settlements with creditor powers. Gradually the US assumed even greater control of Dominican finances, principally under the terms of a 1907 treaty. The experiment was a resounding fiscal success. Internal strife continued, however, and the US dispatched a small Marine force in 1912 and again in 1914 to protect US administrators. Finally in 1916 the US assumed complete responsibility for governing the country.

The US military ruled the Dominican Republic for 8 years. The Dominican congress was dissolved, US naval officers were appointed

to cabinet positions and key subordinate offices, and US officials overhauled the Dominican armed forces, creating the country's first regular army and establishing a native constabulary. The consequence of these military reforms was the undermining of the regional caudillos who had formed the backbone of former incursions. US military government also instituted financial and educational reforms and public works projects resulting in increased prosperity for the Republic. Despite the rise in living standards however, Dominican hostility to the occupation intensified: while US loyalty was subjected to severe domestic and international criticism. Accordingly, President Wilson announced the end of the occupation in 1920, although a lengthy period of negotiation preceded the establishment of an independent Dominican government, and the US retained some control over Dominican finances until 1941. Latent resentment of the occupation lingered and even today tends to color the Dominican attitude toward the US.

Trujillo Dictatorship (1930-1960)

Rising from obscure beginnings through the ranks of the constabulary to become commander of the army, Rafael Trujillo Molina proved ready to use his military position to advance to supreme power. Following a revolt against President Vasquez and the formation of a provisional government in 1930, Trujillo was elected president with the support of his army and immediately set about consolidating his position, launching a reign of terror, and ruthlessly suppressing all opposition. By 1936 he had established a complete and unchallenged dictatorship. Trujillo finally resolved the Dominican financial crisis, and his facade of social progress--opening new lands, building canals and roads, and modernizing the cities--was impressive. In human terms, however, the regime meant an atrophy of freedom, justice, and self-respect for the Dominican people.

The Republic's relations with its neighbors during the Trujillo era fluctuated violently. Although Trujillo settled a long-standing boundary dispute with Haiti in 1935, he later massacred thousands of Haitians who had entered the country in search of employment. Later though, his government made a cash restitution, and in 1951 he signed a treaty with Haiti. In 1951 Trujillo also ended a dispute with Cuba's Fulgencio Batista and signed a declaration of nonintervention before the Inter-American Peace Commission. But with the rise of Castro, relations between Cuba and the Dominican Republic once more soured. Trujillo generally followed a policy of friendly cooperation with the US and with few exceptions supported the US position in international affairs. He also cooperated with the OAS and supported the Western Hemisphere defense proposals.

Trujillo was unrelentingly anticommunist. During his reign there was no overt or covert communist activity in the Republic.

Dominican exiles, long a focal point of agitation in the Caribbean, first posed a major threat to Trujillo in 1959. At that time the rise of Castro and the installation of democratic government in Venezuela gave fresh impetus to the revolutionary cause. Small-scale forces associated with the Dominican Patriotic Union (UPD), a Dominican exile organization operating out of Cuba and Venezuela with some communist members and support, invaded the country on 14 June. The invasion failed, however, and resulted in a considerable demoralization of the Dominican liberation movement.

The abortive invasion was followed by a period of renewed repression and violence in the Dominican Republic, but opposition from several quarters mounted against the renewed terror. The Dominican bishops condemned the dictator's policies in January 1960. Venezuela's indictment of the Dominican government for violations of human rights

was confirmed by the OAS Inter-American Peace Committee. Finally, in August the American foreign ministers signed the San Jose Declaration calling for a collective diplomatic break with Trujillo's government and an arms embargo. Pursuant to the San Jose Resolution, the US severed diplomatic relations on 28 August. On 4 January 1961 the OAS Council voted limited economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic.

Trujillo was assassinated on 30 May 1961 by a group of Dominican military officers, but "Trujillismo" continued under the slain dictator's son and two brothers, who dominated the country through figurehead President Joaquin Balaguer. It was only the continued pressure of OAS political and economic sanctions that finally forced the Trujillo family from power in 1962 and led to the installation of a provisional council of state to prepare the way for free elections.

The Bosch Government (1963)

Dr. Juan Bosch, a writer and political scientist, returned from 25 years' exile to head the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) to easy victory in these elections and was inaugurated on 27 February 1963. Bosch had a clear mandate to institute major political, economic, and social reforms, but his experience in exile had not prepared him to cope with the practical problems of the task. His ineffective government disappointed his party and the people, and Bosch himself never gained the confidence of the economic oligarchy because of his reform proposals. He lost the confidence of the armed forces because of his opposition to their special privileges and his permissive attitude toward communism.

While Bosch himself was not a communist or a communist sympathizer, he took no action to control communist activity on the ground that communism was not an urgent problem. There were two communist organizations in the Dominican Republic: the regular Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party-PSPD); and the Communist-Castroist Dominican Movement (MPD). []

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A more significant group--listed by US intelligence organizations as the "extreme left," "subversive," or a center of "militant disaffection," but not labelled as "Communist"--was the 14th of June Political Group (APGJ). []

] After the fall of Trujillo, the APGJ emerged as a "radically leftist party but one that refused to coalesce with the Communist MEP and PSPD."

[] (S) DIA, "Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning, 1 July 1964 through 30 June 1976." []

A military coup led by Colonel (after 25 April General) Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander of the powerful Armed Forces Training Center at San Isidro, overthrew the Bosch government on 25 September 1963 and created a civilian junta under Donald Reid Cabral to run the country. Although rightist politically, the Reid junta worked conscientiously to improve the lot of the Dominican people. Reid never won substantial popular support, however, and Bosch retained a large following. In the week preceding the coup, [] the PRD was gradually intensifying its plotting for Bosch's return. Further, some of the younger officers, although []

they had helped or tacitly accepted Bosch's ouster, were now engaged in the conspiracy to bring back the deposed president. Prominent among these were Lt. Col. Hernando Ramirez and Lt. Col. Montes Arache, the leader of the Navy's elite frogman unit. On 15 April, PRD leader Pena Gomez returned from Puerto Rico with funds to buy support for a coup from units of the Duarte, Mella, and Sanchez battalions, --the units that did launch the coup effort on 24 April.

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US Dominican Policy (1963-1965)

The US had worked for the creation of a middle-of-the road popularly elected democratic government in the Dominican Republic aligned with the West. To this end it pressured the Dominican government to hold the 1963 elections and after Bosch's election adopted the following objectives:

1. Maintenance of the Bosch administration in power as the duly elected government for so long as it maintains a democratic, pro-Western orientation.
2. Orientation of that administration toward democratic, pro-Western policy objectives in both internal and external policies.
3. Isolation and control of the extreme left and extreme right.
4. Strengthening of the moderate, democratic elements and forces within the Dominican Republic.
5. Increasing the capability of the Armed Forces for maintaining internal security and strengthening of their ability to resist Communist subversion.
6. Support of the Bosch administration in a sound program of meaningful economic, social and political reforms within the framework of the Alliance for Progress.

(S) Latin American Policy Committee, "Dominican Republic: Plan of Action for the Period Beginning February 27, 1963," 21 Feb 63, attached to (S) Memo, DASD (ISA) to CJCS, I-23752/63, 12 Jun 63, JMF 9128.4/9105 (15 May 62).

In keeping with this policy, the US suspended all economic and military aid to the Dominican Republic when the Bosch government was overthrown. "The establishment and maintenance of representative and constitutional government is an essential element in the Alliance for Progress . . .," said Secretary of State Rusk in announcing this action to the press. "Under existing conditions . . . there is no opportunity for effective collaboration by the United States under the Alliance for Progress or for normalization of diplomatic relations." The US later recognized the new government when Reid announced his intention to hold free elections, issued a decree setting forth election timetables, and gave public assurances of respect for civil and political liberties.

(U) "Statement by Secretary Rusk, 4 Apr 1964," Dept of State Bulletin, LXXXI, 1205 (41 Apr 63), 12-13 Apr 64, 1205-06 Apr 64, 127.

The US contingency plan for the Dominican Republic in force at the time of the 1965 revolt was CINCLANT's OPLAN 310/2-63 (redesignated 373-64 in March 1964). CINCLANT noted that US military intervention in the Dominican Republic might be directed if the Dominican government became hostile to the aims and objectives of the US or OAS, if severe internal disorders occurred in the Republic, or if the government or a group "claiming" to exercise authority requested military aid. The object of any US military action would be the restoration or support of a government friendly to the US, approved by a substantial group of OAS members, and supported by a significant portion of the Dominican people. CINCLANT added that "in all planning, consideration will be given to the development of sound social, economic, military and political structures in the Dominican Republic."

The OPLAN authorized courses of action from a show-of-force operation through blockades and air interdiction to evacuation operations and ground intervention by airborne or amphibious groups. The plan went into effect on 27 April when President Johnson ordered the landing of US troops.

(TS-Gp 3) CINCLANT OPLAN 373-65, 4 Mar 64, JMF 3142-373.

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APRIL

24 Apr 65

An appeal for mass action against the Reid government, broadcast in the early afternoon by two stations owned by PRD Finance Secretary Jose Brea Pena, signalled the beginning of the Dominican revolution. Demonstrations broke out in Santo Domingo, and at about 1400 crowds gathered before the National Palace demanding a return to the 1963 constitution. In response to a presumably pre-set signal, people driving in the city began sounding their horns, and in an apparently well-planned move at 1500 a group of young army officers under Lt. Col. Fernando Ramirez (see introduction) captured the government's Radio Santo Domingo, where a PRD leader, Francisco Pena Gomez, broadcast the "fall" of the Reid government and the "restoration" of the 1963 constitution. He also appealed for large-scale demonstrations in support of the revolt. After his broadcast, demonstrations spread throughout the city, but government troops regained control of the radio station shortly before 1600 and dispersed the demonstrators in the vicinity, although large crowds continued to roam the streets.

I "preselected agitators" kept urging the crowds--for the most part people from Santo Domingo's poorest sections--to return to the palace and radio station after each dispersal by the police. The police were using fire hoses, tear gas, and overhead submachinegun fire to keep the crowds away. C

All times are local time-EST. I (S-Gp 1) C
to JCS, et al., 250345Z Apr 65, JCS I Facts
on File, XXV, 1278. I (S-Gp 1)

At 2035 Reid reported to the nation on radio and TV that the country was "calm and under absolute control of the government" with the exception of two army bases, the 27th February (just outside the capital) and 16th August (25 kilometers from the city). To the rebellious troops at these camps Reid issued an ultimatum: surrender before 0500, 25 April, accepting a governmental offer of amnesty, or the loyal troops then surrounding the bases would take "necessary measures." Reid urged people living near the bases to leave the area and announced a curfew until 0600, 25 April. He added that elements of all services, including the police, were patrolling the streets to maintain order and protect property.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1036 to State,
250228Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29379.

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Early US assessments of the situation said little about the political complexion of the revolt. [] the

old-line Communist Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano (PSPD) (see introduction) was "completely unaware of the attempted coup," but [] members of the Castroite party, the Agrupacion Politica Catorce De Junio (APCJ) (see introduction) were in the streets at 1300 seemingly aware of the revolt.

The US Embassy also reported on the political

At the time of the revolt, the US Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., was in Washington on routine business, and the US Mission was headed by the Embassy's Charge, William Connett.

situation, noting that PRD Secretary General Antonio Martinez had assured an Embassy officer that his party was not involved. He expressed concern over Communist activity, but said the coup was less a matter of political than internal military unrest, attributing it to the dissatisfied junior officers and noncoms. (The Embassy added, however, that Martinez was a pro-US moderate, and probably unaware of any coup plots in his own party.) The Embassy reported that Social Christian Labor Movement leader Henry Molina had also expressed surprise at the revolt. The Embassy concluded that the political situation remained unclear and admitted that the demonstrators' pro-Bosch sentiment seemed largely spontaneous, but it suspected that leaders of the PRD, Balaguer's Partido Reformista (PR), and certain "extremists" were responsible for the revolt.

(2-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1037 to State, 250303Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29434. [] (S-Gp 1)

25 Apr 65

President Reid's plan to surround the rebel camps was frustrated, partly by the Dominican military leaders who refused to "kill their brother officers," and partly by several senior officers []

[] who, although not involved in the insurrection, secretly dispatched junior officers to assume command of loyal units. These officers in turn instructed the troops not to fight. In an attempt to strengthen his position, Reid appointed General Elias Wessin y Wessin Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.


[] In the early morning hours, however, rebel troops began infiltrating Santo Domingo, issuing pistols and machine guns to civilians. They also tried, but failed, to recapture Radio Santo Domingo.

(2-Gp 3) Msg, JAF AF Attaches Santo Domingo to CNO, et al., 251402Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29733. [] (S-Gp 1)

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The US Embassy reported that Wessin and the other senior officers loyal to Reid were reluctant to fight because of the difficulty of urban combat and their desire to avoid bloodshed. These officers later recognized, however, that their failure to support Reid was leaving the way open to the political left to advance to power. Their proposed solution was to form a military junta, composed of nonrebel officers, to succeed Reid and then negotiate with the rebels. The Embassy concluded that "Reid's hours are numbered," but that the junta solution was probably impossible, since it would be unacceptable to the rebels who controlled most of the city.

Ibid.



(L-Gp 1) Msg, Santo Domingo 1043 to State, 251515Z
Apr 65, JCS IN 29817.

Realizing that the military would not fight to save his government, President Reid agreed later in the morning to turn the government over to a military junta provided that he be permitted to name its members. When the rebel officers rejected this condition, however, Reid agreed to a rebel-appointed junta "in order to prevent useless bloodshed." The junta, finally appointed by the rebels and accepted by Reid, included Lt. Cols. Fernandez Perez, Caamano Deno, Hernando Ramirez, Alvarez Holquin, and Gutierrez Ramirez. Key military officers loyal to the government, including Generals Wessin, Rivera Cuesta, Army Chief of Staff, and de los Santos, Air Force Chief of Staff, also accepted the junta on condition that it remain military in make up and serve only until a government could be elected before 1 September 1965.

The agreement lasted only a few hours. When the junta members assembled at the National Palace at 1530, they were met by about 70 leaders of the PRD who announced that they were there to participate in and preside over the junta. This pronouncement shattered the newly achieved unity of the officer corps. The majority of the rebel officers, declaring as their ultimate goal the return of Juan Bosch to power, decided

to form, in conjunction with the rest, a "Constitutionalist Government" with the late Rafael Solina Urena as provisional president. (These rebellious

Molina had been President of the Chamber of Deputies during the Bosch regime and under the provisions of the 1963 constitution was next in line for the presidency in the absence of the president, vice-president, and president of the Senate.

officers and civilians are hereinafter called Constitutionalists.) Another small group of rebel officers announced that they had not fought Reid's government in order to bring Bosch back to power and would prefer Joaquin Balaguer. The Service Chiefs and the rest of the officers loyal to the military junta agreement (thereafter called Loyalists because of that loyalty) would not agree to civilian participation in the junta, rejected the pro-Bosch officers' "Constitutional Government," so named because it sought to restore the "Constitutional" Bosch regime and the Constitution of 1963. The Service Chiefs issued an ultimatum to the military leader of the Constitutionalists, Lt. Col. Hernando, demanding that Molina not be sworn in as provisional president and that the Constitutionalists accept the original agreement for a military junta by 1600 hours. To reinforce the ultimatum four Dominican Air Force F-51's began circling the Constitutionalist-held National Palace at 1600 and ships of the Dominican Navy moved closer to shore. At 1630, the ultimatum still unanswered, the Air Force and Navy went into action. The F-51's made two firing passes at the Palace and at least two firing passes at the Constitutionalist's headquarters at the 27th February Camp. The Navy fired about four shells over the Palace, but no casualties were reported.

[E] I was still in control of the Loyalist military forces and [J] all army commanders in the interior had reported their adherence to the military junta agreement and had agreed to send their troops to Santo Domingo if Wessia's forces proved inadequate. C

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In Washington, meanwhile, the State Department acted in response to the deteriorating situation. Secretary Rusk expressed concern over the appearance of "extreme leftist elements," in the demonstrations and instructed the Embassy to urge all Dominican military leaders to unite and form some type of provisional government capable of restoring order and preventing a Communist takeover. He also asked the Department of Defense to place vessels off the Dominican Republic suitable for the embarkation of up to 1,200 US citizens. At 0930 the JCS directed CINCLANT to dispatch the appropriate ships, and CINCLANT deployed Task Group 44.9 (under

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Command James A. Dore, with the South Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard, with an evacuation capability of 3,600.

(C) Msg, State 633 to Santo Domingo, 25 May 65, JCS IN 30100. (C) Msg, State to Dep Dir for Ops, J-3, 251305Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29636. (C-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 9731 to CINCLANT, 251432Z Apr 65. (C-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 260306Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30094.

At 1600 the Embassy reported that the Loyalists had decided to fight because "the return of Bosch would mean surrendering country to Communists." They believed that the fight was "now against [Communists] and not exclusively with rebel elements of Army." The Embassy reported that the US Country Team also "felt strongly that it was against US interests for Bosch to return and assume control in Santo Domingo especially in view [of] extremist participation in coup and the announced Communist advocacy of Bosch's return as favorable to their long term interests." The Country Team had "reluctantly" agreed that the course of action taken by the Dominican Service Chiefs against the pro-Bosch Constitutionals was the only one that might possibly prevent Bosch's return and contain the growing mob violence. While such a course might mean further bloodshed, the Country Team believed that the risk should be taken. The Team also concluded that a show of force or other military support for the Loyalists, requested several times in the afternoon by Wessin and his followers, would not serve the best interests of the US.

(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1051 to State, 252022Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29901.

At 1800 the US Embassy refused a PRD delegation's request for aid. They wanted the US to pressure the Dominican Air Force to stop the strafing. The Embassy expressed concern over the violence and a "situation favorable to Communists" and called for Dominicans of good will to act responsibly. Embassy officials suggested that if the PRD leaders could persuade the Constitutionalist military to negotiate with the Service Chiefs "in good faith and without preconditions," the Embassy would try to mediate.

(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1061 to State, 260100Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30023.


Meanwhile mob violence increased as the rebellion gained momentum in the capital. Throughout the day mobs continued to roam the streets of Santo Domingo, and sporadic firing was heard in the downtown area. The mobs

set fire to the headquarters of the National Civic Union Party and the Dominican Vanguard Party, two minor parties that had participated in the overthrow of Juan Bosch. Other mobs bombed and burned the progovernment newspaper Prensa-Libre and the headquarters of the Liberal Revolutionary Party, headed by Luis Amiana Tio -- one of the participants in the assassination of Trujillo. The mobs also sacked and burned Reid's automobile dealership, a government-owned shoe factory, and the homes of several known Trujillistas.

(U) NY Times, 26 Apr 65, 1. (C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1045 to State, 251630Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29755. (C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1053 to State, 252133Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29927.

The Constitutionlists tried to consolidate their position during the afternoon. They again seized control of Radio Santo Domingo, and PRD leaders and rebel officers broadcast the capitulation of the Loyalist military and the expected restoration of the Bosch regime. They also appealed for an end to the mob violence. At 1710 the station broadcast a speech by Juan Bosch from Puerto Rico in which he clearly identified himself with the rebellion and announced his imminent return to the Dominican Republic

(U) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1045 to State, 251650Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29757; Santo Domingo 1049 to State, 251733Z Apr 65, JCS IN 29777. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1060 to State, 260050Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30025.



(C) Msg, Santo Domingo 1067 to State, 261120Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30313.

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As 2900 Radio Santo Domingo announced that Molina had summoned the Congress elected with Juan Bosch in 1963 to meet at 0800 on the 26th and had issued decrees permitting the return of all exiles, specifically including former President Balaguer.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1065 to State, 260600Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30131. (S-Gp 1)

The Loyalists also initiated action. General Wessin began to move his tanks and troops toward the city from the Armed Forces Training Center at San Isidro, about 15 miles away. He was detained, however, by road blocks and a well-armed force on the Ozama River bridge, and as the day ended, Loyalist troops had not yet entered the city.

(S-Gp 1)

26 Apr 65

With the opposing forces unable to reconcile their differences, the violence that began as a revolt against the Reid government assumed the dimensions of a civil war. At the same time, the civilian leadership abdicated its control to military; the Reid government had resigned in favor of a military junta, and the PRD leadership was rapidly losing control of the Constitutionalist movement to its left-wing military supporters.

(S-Gp 1)

The violence grew more intense during the day. To support their troops stalled before the Duarte River Bridge, the Loyalist military forces launched an air attack on Santo Domingo, the bridge, and the 27th February encampment. The Air Force later shifted its attack to the Constitutionalist-held National Palace, with F-51's making strafing runs at tree-top level. In retaliation, the Constitutionalist's military forces armed thousands of civilians with sub-machine guns and rifles, and civilian-manufactured incendiary bombs, loaded with gasoline freely dispensed by the city's service stations, were distributed by the thousands. They also announced over Radio Santo Domingo that the families of the attacking pilots were being taken as hostages to the points under attack and called on the public to sack the pilots' homes.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1066 to State, 261110Z Apr 65. (C-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1068 to State, 261145Z Apr 65 and 1070, 261325Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30354. (U) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1069 to State, 261318Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30357 and 261522 Apr 65. (U) NY Times, 27 Apr 65, 1.

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Charge Connett, pointed out that the Navy's adherence to the Constitutionalist cause, the establishment of a provisional government under Molina, and the continuing Constitutionalist control of Radio Santo Domingo had further weakened the position of the Loyalists. He also doubted Loyalist control of Army units in the regional centers. In a lengthy cable Connett reported:

Probably nothing short of major US involvement could prevent Bosch's return at this stage. . . . We believe commitment of U.S. combat forces in the present circumstances would have extremely serious implications for our foreign relations and particularly serious repercussions in Latin America. . . . We do not believe we could effectively make a case that this is a Communist-controlled movement at the present time, although we all know that Communists are deeply involved in the rebel movement Only effective alternative we see . . . is a strong diplomatic initiative designed to prevent the return of Bosch through creation of a military junta which will schedule elections for September. We believe there is serious threat of a Communist takeover in country and that very little time remains in which to act. Under these circumstances, we recommend that we be authorized here to make clear to Molina Urena and rebel military officers our serious concern about Communist influence in the present revolutionary movement, our desire to avoid continuing public disorder and intra-service fighting, and our strong conviction that the formula suggested above of a military junta with elections in September is in the best interests of the Dominican Republic.

(~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1071 to State, 261330Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30374.

In the early afternoon the Embassy suggested another line of action: It recommended a direct approach be made to Juan Bosch in Puerto Rico. Using someone who enjoyed Bosch's confidence, the US could spell out for the exiled leader the extent of Communist "participation in and utilization of the rebel movement" and the US conviction that respected PRD leaders in the Dominican Republic "are far from in control of the party." The US emissary could also point out the "disposition on the part of some elements of the military and virtually all non-Communist political parties to accept a military junta that would promise Bosch and Balaguer the right to return and to hold an election on September 1." Such an election, the emissary could say, offered the solution "best calculated to confound extremists, while satisfying legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people."

(Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1088 to State,
261855Z Apr 65, JCS IN 31038.

While these suggestions were being weighed in Washington, the Embassy continued action in other areas. Although US efforts to bring about negotiations had failed, the Embassy's Air Attache did succeed in persuading Air Force Chief of Staff de los Santos to delay further air attacks on the city for two hours. The Embassy also continued preparations for the evacuation of US nationals and advised Americans to prepare for possible withdrawal. The State Department asked the Embassy to approach "highest authorities in Santo Domingo and leading military officers on both sides" and request an immediate cease-fire to allow for the safe evacuation of US citizens. The Department added that the US wanted to "build on the cease-fire" to obtain same kind of provisional government.

The Embassy did secure an agreement for a cease-fire effective when evacuation operations began, the Constitutionlists agreeing to allow US helicopters to land next to the Embajador Hotel and US ships to dock at Haina west of the city. At 1530 the Embassy recommended to Washington an emergency evacuation plan using ships loading at Haina and a helicopter lift from the polo field next to the Embajador Hotel direct to ships offshore. Helicopters would also pick up evacuees from Santiago and other inland points if necessary.

(Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1080 to State,
261606Z Apr 65, JCS IN 30746; 1031, 261613Z, JCS IN
30732; and 1095, 262352Z Apr 65, JCS IN 31321. (G)
Msg, State 634 to Santo Domingo, 261830Z Apr 65, JCS
IN 30788. (G) Msg, Santo Domingo 1091 to State, 262030Z
Apr 65, JCS IN 31039.

In response to a JCS request for operational evaluation and recommendations, CINCLANT admitted at 2330 that the Embassy's plan appeared feasible except for the helicopter evacuation from inland points. Because of the long distances, CINCLANT suggested rather the use of fixed-wing aircraft from Santiago Airport or surface evacuation through Puerto Plata to a ship positioned off the north coast.

(U) Msg, JCS 9783 to CINCLANT, 262213Z Apr 65.
(Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 270430Z Apr 65, JCS IN
31603.

The JCS directed CINCLANT to place in DEFCON 3 status the following forces detailed under CINCLANT OPLAN 310/2: two airborne battalion combat teams together with the required airlift; tactical air units necessary to support an assault landing or combat

operations by the above; and appropriate command, control, and support forces. The JCS also directed the alerting of one Marine fighter squadron.

(~~TS~~) Msg, JCS 9602 to CINCLANT, 262349Z Apr 65.
(~~TS~~) Rpt, J-3, for Dep SecDef, "Data Concerning Roles and Actions of the Department of Defense in the Dominican Republic, 22 Apr-22 Jun 65," n.d., p. II-1-1 (hereinafter cited as DOMREP Data).

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Despite US mediation efforts, the military situation worsened. At about 0300 the Loyalists broadcast an ultimatum to the Constitutionalists, demanding that they agree to the formation of a military junta that would promise free elections by 1 September or face "maximum bombardment" of the capital.

An effort was made to prevent the threatened bombardment. Speaking as a private citizen, Constitutionalist Foreign Minister Maximo Lovaton approached US officials with a plan. Concluding that the solution lay in the hands of the military, he suggested that the following proposition be made to the military officers on both sides: if both the Constitutionalists and Loyalist military agreed to negotiate, the Loyalists would agree to cancel the bombardment. He would deliver the proposition to the Constitutionalists; he wanted the US Embassy to contact the Loyalists. The Embassy did agree to contact the Loyalist military, but in the words of Charge Connett, "continuous strenuous efforts [on] our part [to] bring two sides together seem to have failed." At 1145 the Loyalist Air Force attacked the city, and the Navy, returning its allegiance to the Loyalists, joined in shelling Santo Domingo. Under cover of the air and naval bombardment, General Wessin's tanks and infantry fought their way across the Duarte bridge. Within the city meanwhile, violence continued unabated.

(~~C~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1108 to State, 270930Z Apr 65. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1110 to State, 271300Z Apr 65. (~~C~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1111 to State, 271415Z Apr 65. (C) Msg, Santo Domingo to DIRNSA, CRITIC THREE, 271615Z Apr 65. (~~C~~-Gp 1)
(U) NY Times, 28 Apr 65, 1.
(S) DIA Intell Bul 82-05, 28 Apr 65, 1.

US involvement in the crisis took a new turn when Secretary Rusk issued detailed policy instructions, and Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett returned from his Washington consultations. At 1513 Secretary Rusk listed for American officials in Santo Domingo the following "primary objectives": the restoration of law and order, the prevention of a possible Communist takeover, and the protection of American lives. In pursuance of these objectives, the Secretary ordered the Embassy to contact the military leaders of both sides and suggest to them the establishment of a military junta to act as a provisional government and to hold free and democratic

elections as soon as possible. The Embassy was not to become involved in details of forming the junta, but was to urge that there be no preconditions regarding participation in it. The Embassy should also seek assurances from both sides that there would be no reprisals.

(S-LIMDIS-Gp 3) Msg, State 044 to Santo Domingo, 272013Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32579. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1116 to State, 271715Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32393.

Ambassador Bennett immediately began a series of consultations with the Constitutionalist military leaders. In the early afternoon he met with Captain Mario Pena Taveras and other Constitutionalist officers and talked, by phone, with PRD Secretary General Antonio Martinez Francisco. Bennett told them all that it was time to "put an end to this senseless slaughter," that the US wanted a "cease-fire to give opportunity to form a government which can effectively govern," that the Constitutionlists were obviously not doing so, that the "extreme left is taking full advantage of the situation," and that as force was "clearly now on the other side it was time to capitulate."

The Embassy also conveyed the same message to Juan Bosch when a US official told Martinez "to inform Bosch that we believed strongly that the moment had come for him . . . to call on his countrymen to lay down their arms."

(S-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1118 to State, 271815Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32470; and 1119 to State, 271830Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32626.

A third exchange between Bennett and the Constitutionlists came about 1600 when Molina Urena and his principal supporters, apparently convinced that they were losing, came to the Embassy to say they were now ready to negotiate and to request Bennett to act as mediator. Bennett, in reporting the ensuing conversation to the Department of State, said that he "made clear our emphatic view senseless shedding of blood must end, at the same time reminding them it was their action on Saturday which initiated this fratricide." This "effort to restore Bosch was obviously unsuccessful," Bennett had said, and "it was high time they approach the other side for talks," but he had "declined courteously" Molina's proposal to attend negotiating sessions on the ground that the agreement should be reached by the Dominicans among themselves. Bennett added that he had "underlined and reiterated there was no question Communists had taken advantage of their legitimate movement, having been tolerated and even encouraged by the PRD."

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1125 to State, 280230Z Apr 65, JCS IN 33387.

Bennett's comments provoked a mixed reaction. Following the interview with Bennett, Molina resigned as Acting President of the Constitutionalist Government. He and several other prominent liberal democratic politicians of the PRD took refuge in the Colombian and Ecuadorian Embassies or escaped behind Loyalist lines. In addition to Molina, the principal defectors were Maximo Lovaton, Jose Pena Gomez, Lt. Col. Hernando Ramirez, and Antonio Martinez Francisco. For some, however, Bennett's words seemed to have the opposite effect. Reminiscing in a later press interview, Lt. Col. Caamano said, "we left deeply offended by his attitude We decided to fight on with the people until we had won." After the defection of Molina and the others, Caamano and Montes Arache claimed command of the Constitutionalist movement.

(U) Wash Post, 10 May 65, A8. [G-Gp 1]
 (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1150 to State
 281915Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34502.

Encouraged by the reported progress of Loyalist forces and by the Constitutionalist proposals for negotiations, Bennett reported to the Department of State that the Loyalists should be able to "mop up . . . but some of it may be rough." The Department, in reply, advised Bennett to urge on Wessin a policy of moderation in dealing with the Constitutionalist. Acting to speed the "mop up," Bennett called in Police Chief General Despradel and told him that his first duty was to "restore public order so that innocent people may live in peace." Despradel promised that the streets would be cleaned up that night. By nightfall, however, the Loyalist had been unable to make any significant advance into the city and had actually been driven back across the Duarte Bridge. They halted operations for the night, planning to resume the attack in the morning.

(G-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1125 to State, 272247Z
 Apr 65, JCS IN 32898. (G-LIMDIS) Msg, State 653 to
 Santo Domingo, 27 Apr 65, JCS IN 33293. [G-Gp 1]

The protection of US citizens, the third US objective in Secretary Rusk's list, was under way in the form of a large-scale evacuation. At 0027 the Embassy clarified the procedure for Captain Dare, Commander Task Group 44.9: 1) all evacuation would be through the port of Haina; 2) transfer from the Embajador Hotel to Haina would be by surface means; 3) the use of helicopters was not anticipated; and 4) augmentation of administrative or medical personnel at the port would probably not be necessary. A half hour later the State Department informed the Embassy, the JCS, CINCLANT, and others that "target hour" for evacuations was being deferred until later in the day when "developments next six to eight hours can be assessed."

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(✓-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1109 to DTG #4.0, 270527Z Apr 65, JCS IN 31656; State 643 to Santo Domingo, 270558Z, JCS IN 31072. (✓) NMCC OPSUM 98-65, 28 Apr 65, 1.

At 0600, Embassy officers set up evacuation facilities at the Embajador Hotel. Evacuees assembled at the hotel and processing proceeded smoothly until about 0815, when a group of about 20 armed men arrived to search for newspapermen and radio and television commentator Rafael Bonilla Aybar who had left about an hour before. While the search was in progress, submachine-gun fire broke out, allegedly because the searchers had been fired on from an upper floor. Their leader assured Embassy officers he did not want to harm Americans, but refused to call off the search. About 1030, Army Lt. Col. Venencio Fernandez Perez arrived with a body of troops and assumed control of the hotel.

(✓-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1123 to State, 272042Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32718.

The Ambassador, meanwhile, had determined that no Americans in other parts of the country wished to be evacuated. The Embassy reported that the evacuation cease-fire had been extended, and that Americans were being moved from the hotel to the port after Commodore Rivera Caminero assured the US Air Attache that the route from the hotel to the port would be secure.

(✓) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1115 to State, 271525Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32311; and 1127, 272325Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32851.

At 1048, the Department of State authorized Ambassador Bennett to proceed with the evacuation at his discretion. At 1157 the JCS, at the request of the Department of State, directed CINCLANT to evacuate the refugees to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and to return the Task Group to station off Santo Domingo upon completion of the operation.

(✓-Gp 3) Msgs, State 645 to Santo Domingo, 271548Z Apr 65; JCS 9840 to CINCLANT, 271657Z Apr 65. (C) Msg, Asst. SecState Vaughn to JCS, 271725Z Apr 65.

By 1330, all evacuees had cleared the Embajador area. At 1415, USS Rachamkin docked at Haina to be followed by USS Wood County at 1515. By 1720, all evacuees had walked aboard these two ships or had been helicopter-lifted aboard USS Boxer and USS Raleigh offshore. (For the number evacuated, see Appendix.)

(~~2~~-Gp 4) Msgs, CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON, 271840Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32582; and 272156Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32782. (~~2~~) Msg, CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON, 271940Z Apr 65, JCS IN 32694. (~~2~~-Gp 4) Msg, CTG 44.9 to CINCLANTFLT, 281306Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34128.

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Military operations continued with neither side gaining the advantage. In the morning the Loyalists resumed the offensive when Wessin's tanks and infantry joined battle with Constitutionalist holding the Duarte Bridge, and the Air Force resumed its bombing and strafing of Constitutionalist-held areas of the city. The Embassy reported indications of some initial Loyalist successes, particularly the seizure of the National Palace by forces under Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barreras. Further, despite indications of looting and indiscriminate shooting in some areas of the city, the Embassy reported that the better residential quarters and the downtown business district remained generally quiet. Even at the height of the Loyalist offensive, however, the Constitutionalist scored some successes. A force under Lt. Col. Caamano captured a police station in central Santo Domingo. At 1135 the Embassy, still optimistic of a Loyalist victory, pointed out that Caamano had been surrounded by Loyalist forces and given the choice either to surrender or suffer direct attack.

(~~2~~-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1137 to State, 281904Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34123; 1139, 281529Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34016; 1145, 281707Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34090; and 1144 to State, 281635Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34120.

Ambassador Bennett continued efforts to end the crisis by encouraging the formation of a stable government and urging that the US supply materiel for the Loyalist forces. In accordance with the State Department instructions of 25 April, he urged the Loyalists to form a military junta. About 1100 the Air Force radio announced the establishment of a junta consisting of three officers: Air Force Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit, Army Colonel Enrique Apolinar Caeado Saladin; and Navy Captain Manuel Santana Carrasco. The junta announced that it would prepare the nation for free and democratic elections and the subsequent installation of a constitutional regime.

(~~2~~-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1139 to State, 281529Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34016, and 1143, 281629Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34028. (~~2~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 1136 to State, 281135Z Apr 65, JCS IN 33652.

Bennett also tried to obtain materiel support for the Loyalists. At 0635 he recommended that the US honor a request by General de los Santos for 50 walkie talkie radios needed to coordinate the attacks of the Loyalists' widely dispersed forces. The State Department replied that the US had not yet intervened, except to urge unity and the restoration of law and

order, and the outcome of the battle was in doubt. Bennett's reports that the Loyalists were winning and that the outcome was merely a matter of time. The radios would be sent to the Boxer, however, where they would be available "if critical to outcome."

(c) Msg, Santo Domingo 1136 to State, 281135Z Apr 65, JCS IN 33652. (c) Msg, State 657 to Santo Domingo, 281713Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34460.

Bennett's reply was a reversal of his early optimism. Shortly after noon he reported to the Department that the battle was not running so strongly in favor of the Loyalists. Citing the opinions of the Service attaches, Bennett claimed that delivery of the radios was critical and "could well mean the difference in results of present confrontation" because Loyalist forces, though numerically superior, were widely dispersed. Equally important, said Bennett, would be the adverse effect on Loyalist morale if the US refused the radio equipment. The "issue here now is a fight between Castro-type elements and those who oppose it. I do not wish to be over dramatic, but if we deny simple communications equipment and the opposition to a leftist takeover here loses for lack of heart or otherwise, we may well be asking in the near future for landing of Marines to protect US citizens and possible for other purposes. Which would Washington prefer?" After receipt of this message the US reversed its earlier decision and shipped the radio sets to San Isidro where they arrived late that night.

(c) Msg, State 660 to Santo Domingo, 282138Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34456. (c-Gp 4) Msg, COMCARIBSEAFRON to CINCLANTFLT, 290021Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34966. (c-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1146 to State, 281718Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34119.

As the day wore on, the position of the junta forces became more critical, and reports from Santa Domingo became increasingly alarming. At 1350 Bennett reported that the Loyalist forces had not advanced beyond the bridgehead on the west bank of the Ozama River, and that Colonel Benoit, a member of the Loyalist junta, had requested the landing of 1,200 US Marines "to help restore peace." Bennett said that he had not encouraged Benoit and did not believe "the situation justifies such action at this time." With its preponderant though geographically separated force, Bennett reported, the Loyalist logically "should be able to bring the situation under control, but the situation not really very logical and severe test of nerves now in process." At 1500, the Embassy reported that the Loyalists had still made no serious effort to take the police station captured by Caamano, and that the telephone company headquarters and Royal Bank of Canada building had fallen to the Constitutionalists. At 1515, Bennett dispatched a CRETIC message to Washington reporting that the Loyalists had just made a formal request for "unlimited and immediate" US

military assistance. Twenty-five minutes later, the Ambassador dispatched another CRITIC message recommending the immediate landing of Marines. In support of this recommendation, Bennett described a rapidly deteriorating situation, with the Loyalist forces exhausted and disorganized and on the point of "quitting," with the police force in a state of collapse, and with American lives in danger. Bennett suggested that Marines establish an airhead in the area of the Embajador Hotel and the adjacent polo field, and send a detachment to protect the Embassy.

(e-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1149 to State, 281850Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34193. (e-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1151 to State, 282000Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34406. (e) Msgs, Santo Domingo to DIRNSA, 282015Z and 282040Z Apr 65, both CRITIC FOUR. (e-Gp 4) Msgs, CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON, 282122Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34731 and 282154Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34492.

President Johnson received Bennett's second CRITIC message at 1615, and with the concurrence of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara decided to comply with the Ambassador's request. The JCS then directed CINCLANT to: 1) direct Task Group 44.9 and Carib Ready Phibron elements to close Santo Domingo ready to land and protect American citizens when requested by the US Ambassador; 2) close remaining air elements of the Marine Expeditionary Unit assigned to the task group; 3) land all Marines now in Boxer to secure the area surrounding the Embajador and the adjacent polo field, when requested by the US Ambassador; 4) conduct a show-of-force overflight of the environs of Santo Domingo by two flights of tactical aircraft, subject to request by the US Ambassador; and 5) direct the two airborne battalions, tactical support air units, and appropriate command and control support forces alerted on 26 April to be ready for instant departure when so ordered. At the same time CINCSTRIKE, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD were ordered to provide necessary forces and support to CINCLANT.

(e-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 9987 to CINCLANT, et al., 282321Z Apr 65. (U) Transcript of SecState's News Conference 26 May 65, Dept of State Bulletin LII, 1355 (14 Jun 65), 942.

At 1800, Ambassador Bennett dispatched another CRITIC message, reporting that Police Chief Despradel could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans enroute to the evacuation area, that American residents reported their residential areas without police protection, and that the AID office had been broken into. Moreover, the Constitutionlists were firing on the evacuation area and Colonel Benoit had reported his situation deteriorating rapidly.

(e-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo, CRITIC SIX, to DIRNSA, 282300Z Apr 65.

At the Ambassador's request, the Commander, Task Force 44.9, began landing troops at 1820. By midnight he reported that 830 troops, consisting of two rifle companies and a battalion headquarters, had been landed by helicopters near the Embajador. His troops had met no hostile action, and at the Ambassador's request, no overflights were made. At 2320 the Ambassador reported that the Marines had established a base near the Embajador and had evacuated by helicopter all but 10 of the Americans desiring to leave.

(C-Gp 4) Msgs, CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON, 282320Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34593; and 290400Z Apr 65, JCS IN 35040. (C-Gp 4) Msg, COMCARIBSEAFRON to CINCLANTFLT, 282331Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34756. (C) Msg, Santo Domingo 1160 to State, 290300Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34943. (C) 6th MEU Command Diary, 9 Jul 65, Hist Br, HQMC.

Reports from Santo Domingo soon made it clear that the Marine landings might prove inadequate. At 2315 Ambassador Bennett reported that he hoped the presence of the US Marines would "give some heart to loyal forces." It was possible, he continued, that the Loyalists might soon tire or become physically incapable of maintaining their present position. In that event he recommended:

Serious thought be given in Washington to armed intervention which would go beyond the mere protection of Americans and seek to establish order in this strife ridden country. All indications point to the fact that if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist Party. If the situation described above comes to pass, my own recommendation and that of the Country Team is that we should intervene to prevent another Cuba Pending this decision we recommend that additional military units be dispatched to this area since present forces available are considered inadequate to perform the mission I have suggested as our last resort.

(Unknown) Msg, Santo Domingo 1155 to State, 282315Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34581.

Meanwhile, the US was preparing for further military commitments. At 1848 the JCS directed CINCLANT and other concerned commanders to place on DEFCON 3 status the four remaining airborne battalion combat teams listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 310/2, together with appropriate supporting tactical air units and command, control, and support forces. To reinforce Task Group 44.9, the USS Raleigh, which had transported refugees to Puerto Rico, was ordered to rejoin the Task Group at best speed, and four additional destroyers were transferred to the operational control of Captain Dare.

~~(S)~~-Gp 3) Msgs, UNCORRECTED FORMS TO CINCLANT, 282249Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34742; 282348Z Apr 65, JCS IN 34732. (~~(S)~~-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 9088 to CINCLANT, et al., 282348Z Apr 65.

In mid evening the US announced the landings. At 2000 President Johnson reported to the nation that about 400 Marines had landed "to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the D.R. and escort them safely back to this country." At 2030, the US requested a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States for the next morning and informed the Ambassadors of Latin American countries of the Marine landing. All US diplomatic posts in Latin America were instructed to "avoid any suggestion that US is supporting or opposing any particular political faction or group," and to emphasize that the purpose of the landing was "to evacuate Americans and nationals of other countries desiring to leave."

(S) Msg, State Circ 2066, 28 Apr 65, JCS IN 35348. (S) Msg, State Circ 2064, 28 Apr 65, JCS IN 35367.

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Although the Loyalists announced an ambitious and optimistic plan for an "Operational Cleanup," the tide of battle began to turn in favor of the Constitutional forces. The Loyalist plan called for a "two-pronged circular movement" whereby Wessin's approximately 1,000 troops moving across the Duarte Bridge northwest through Santo Domingo would link up with a force of about 700 troops under General Salvador Augusta Montas Guerre moving northeast from the fair grounds on the western edge of the city.

Two other Loyalist units willing to join in the attack, but handicapped by inadequate communications facilities: a 400-man force under General Marcos Rivera Cuesta located at the quartermaster headquarters on the northwest outskirts of the city, and an approximately 300-man unit under Generals Felix Hermida and Atila Luna Perez near police headquarters. To support the Loyalist forces, Ambassador Bennett assigned MAAG Army and Air Forces officers to help with communications and operational planning at San Isidro. He also directed the Commander, 6th MEU, to deliver 4,000 MCI rations to San Isidro. Despite their ambitious plans, numerical superiority, and US assistance, the Loyalists did not launch an offensive, although their air attacks against Constitutional positions continued throughout the day.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1173 to State, 291421Z Apr 65, JCS IN 35777. (S-Gp 1)

(S-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1137 to State, 292023Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36501. (S) 5th MEU Command Diary, 9 Jul 56, op. cit. (S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1178 to State, 291725Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36084. (S-Gp 3)

It was the Communist-led forces, barricaded in the narrow streets of the older quarter of the city, who pushed the attack, and the fighting went in their favor from the outset. They made the police stations their principal target and also attacked Rivera at the quartermaster headquarters. Although their major offensive against the police-held Ozama Fortress did not succeed during the day, they were able to seize many police stations, and snipers and groups of looters spread westward into the residential areas, pillaging and looting private homes, and violating several embassies, including those of Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Ecuador. At about 1100, snipers began firing into the US Embassy's administration building across the street from the Chancery. At 1340 they opened fire on US Marines guarding the Embassy grounds. The Marines were ordered to return the fire and two snipers were reported killed.

Other evidence indicated, however, that conditions of law and order were returning to the Constitutionalist-held areas. Peace Corps workers reported that the Barrio seemed quieter than on previous days, and two US business leaders informed the Embassy that people were leaving the downtown area without fear of "extremist reprisals."

(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1178 to State, 291725Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36084. (C-Gp 1)

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During the day the US Embassy published intelligence estimates of the relative strengths of the opposing ground forces. The Loyalists were credited with a force of approximately 2,400 troops operating under commanders who professed their readiness for an offensive operation. The Embassy cautioned, however, that these troops were tired and discouraged and that there was no positive operational control over them. Reestablishment of order by the Loyalist junta depended, therefore, on "whether 2,000 or so remaining ground forces of junta can hold together long enough to accomplish this mission. If they do not do it quickly, large defections are probably to be expected."

The Constitutionalist forces, barricaded in the narrow streets of the older quarter of the city, anachronistically termed Ciudad Nueva, were estimated by the Embassy to number somewhere between 3,500 and 6,500. Of these, 1,500 were believed to be a hard-core under the direct leadership of Communist-trained fighters, about 1,000 were regular army troops, and from 1,000 to 4,000 were described as "hangers on" who would fight only so long as they were winning. Information about the Constitutionalist leadership, its composition, organization, and plans, was partially nonexistent. [

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(~~2~~-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1187 to State, 292023Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36501. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1173 to State, 291421Z Apr 65, JCS IN 35777.
 (~~2~~-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1187 to State, 292023Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36501. (~~2~~) 5th MEU Command Diary, 9 Jul 65.
 (~~2~~-Gp 1) []

A search for a solution to the crisis continued in Washington where both international and unilateral action was taken. In an effort to obtain international support for its actions, the US requested a special meeting of the OAS Council. At 0930 the Council heard Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker report the 28th April landings. The Council decided to allow time for its members to consult with their governments before convening a meeting of the Organ of Consultation. It did, however, dispatch a message to the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo, requesting him to try to arrange a cease-fire.

(~~2~~) Msg, State Cir 2116, 3 May 65. (U) Transcript of Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 26 May 65, Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1355 (14 Jun 65), 942.

That Washington was determined to act unilaterally if necessary was revealed in two messages. At 1326 the State Department directed Bennett to report whether direct intervention by US forces was necessary to save the situation and stated: "We cannot afford permit the situation [to] deteriorate to point where Communist takeover occurs." (Embassy reply, if there was one, is unavailable in JCS files.)

(~~2~~-EXDIS) Msg, State 681 to Santo Domingo, 29 Apr 65, JCS IN 36791.

At 1207 the Chairman, JCS, sent CINCLANT, for transmittal to Commander, Task Force 44.9, the following:

1. We believe that basic objective of American forces in Dominican area is not repeat not a Communist take-over in the island. You are not repeat not authorized to employ your forces for other than security of Americans without further instructions from Washington. However, you should maintain close watch on the situation and close contact with Ambassador Bennett, and you should recommend immediately the expansion of your mission should the situation demand.
2. Inform Ambassador of content of this message

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~~(S)~~ (P) JCS to CINCLANT, 300142Z Apr 65.
3500 files.

Captain Dare delivered General Wheeler's message to Ambassador Bennett about 1400. The Ambassador readily agreed to the basic objective, and, according to his version of the meeting, "in view various reports coming in," authorized Dare to "bring ships in preparatory to landing. This will take two or three hours and gives US time to review situation again before finally committing troops to shore." CINCLANT's version, however, was that Bennett "requested remainder of landing force to land before dark."

(TS-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 300142Z Apr 65.
(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo, CRITIC SEVEN, to DIRNSA, 292000Z Apr 65.

Although initial planning for the anticipated landing called for the troops to assemble at the Embajador and wait further orders, Ambassador Bennett believed the "current situation"--i.e., the failure of the Loyalists to launch an offensive, to augment their forces with troops from the interior, and to establish an adequate communications system for their widely scattered force, plus the low morale of their units--would make expansion of the US Marine perimeter necessary. The first phase of such an operation, the Ambassador reported to State, should be to secure the residential and embassy area of the city from the Embajador to the National Palace.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1187 to State, 292023Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36501.

Presumably, a high-level decision was made in Washington to land the remainder of the 6th MEU about the time Bennett and Dare were meeting in Santo Domingo and perhaps as the result of a telephone conversation between Washington and Santo Domingo.

At 1511 the JCS ordered CINCLANT to land the remainder of the 6th MEU. (Since CINCLANTFLT transmitted the order to his subordinates at 1508 it must be presumed that there had been a communication earlier than the 1511 order.) At 1518 Vice Admiral K. S. Masterson, Commander Joint Task Force 122, assumed local control of the US Dominican operation and ordered "land the landing force" at Red Beach near Haina. H-hour was set for 1630, and the first wave touched down at that time. No opposition was encountered, and by 1800 the major elements of the landing force were ashore. At 2100 the

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infantry and armor had linked up with the Marine perimeter around the Embajador Hotel. The artillery and antitank weapons remained on the beach for the night. Marine strength ashore at 2400 totalled about 1,550.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1037 to CINCLANT, 292011Z Apr 65. (S-Gp 4) Msgs, CINCLANTFLT to CTG 44.9, 292008Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36272; CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON, 292032Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36128; and CTG 44.9 to COMSEC-ONDFLT, 292305Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36406. (TS-Gp 3) Rpt., CJTF 122, "Operation Power Pack, 28 Apr-7 May 1965," 9 May 65 (hereafter CJTF 122 Hist.) (TS) DomRep Data, p. I-2-2.

Anticipating that additional US forces might be required ashore, the JCS took the precaution of ordering the two alerted battalion combat teams of the 82d Airborne Division at Pope Air Force Base deployed to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico. The first of 144 troop carrying C-130 aircraft took off from Pope at 1811, but shortly before midnight, the two battalion combat teams were diverted to San Isidro.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1023 to CINCLANT, et al., 291914Z Apr 65. (S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCAFLANT OP to JCS, 292339Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36436. (TS-Gp 3) CJTF 122 Hist, III-III-2.

Late in the day, high-level US officials began considering a scheme to impose US forces between the Constitutionalist and Loyalists in order to bring about a cease-fire and allow the OAS time to settle the crisis. The JCS, accordingly, directed CJTF 122 to prepare an operation plan using the following guide lines: 1) the Constitutionalist forces were largely concentrated in the southeast portion of the city; 2) the object was to cordon off this area without unnecessarily endangering US troops; and 3) the plan should be based initially on forces already ashore and be expanded when airborne forces arrived. The JCS hoped this action could be executed in conjunction with a cease-fire. They requested the Task Force Commander's estimate of the forces required.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, State 689 to Santo Domingo, 200445Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36996. (TS-Gp 1) Msg, JCS to CJTF 122, 300056Z Apr 65.

30 Apr 65

With the initial landings completed, Admiral Masterson (CJTF 122) proceeded to carry out the JCS orders. At 0108 he submitted an operation concept, which he was prepared to execute unless otherwise directed. The

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concept called for Army airborne troops then enroute to the Dominican Republic to secure San Isidro Airfield, then to relieve Loyalist forces on the east bank of the Ozama River, secure all Ozama River bridges, and establish a cordon and road blocks along the east bank of the river. Marine forces would establish a line in the western part of the city running north and south and about a block east of the American Embassy. Loyalist forces would be expected to patrol between the Army and Marine forces. Admiral Masterson estimated that if only US troops were to be used, two more battalions would be needed to seal off the southeast portion of the city.

Later in the morning CJTF 122 requested the deployment of four additional BCT's to San Isidro. Although no additional forces were deployed on 30 April, the JCS did direct CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE to place the 101st Airborne Division and the three infantry battalions and brigade headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division remaining in CONUS on DEFCON THREE.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 300608Z Apr 65, (S) Msg, JCS 1137 to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE, 301804Z Apr 65.

The Army airborne forces, two battalion combat teams under Major General Robert York, CG 82d Airborne Division, began arriving at San Isidro at 0230 and proceeded to execute the CJTF concept. By 2000 York's troops had secured the Duarte Bridge and sent out reconnaissance units to screen the east bank of the Ozama River from the bridge to the sea.

Operating under the same CJTF 122 plan, the 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit established a phase line west of the US Embassy. During the day, the Marine unit was reinforced by one rifle company airlifted from Cherry Point, North Carolina, to Guantanamo and sealifted from there to the Dominican Republic. The Marines reported casualties from sniper fire and received permission to return fire with 3.5 rocket launchers. One platoon of paratroopers was attached to the Marine unit at the American Embassy.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 300608Z Apr 65. (S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1195 to AIG 936, 302336Z Apr 65. (S) CJTF 122 Hist., pp. III-III-1-3 and 4.

The JCS ordered several changes in command arrangements during the day. General York was designated Commander Land Forces, Santo Domingo Area (CTF 120), with command of all forces ashore, both Army and Marine. CTG 44.9 was redesignated CTF 124. The JCS also directed CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE to activate Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer commanding, under operational control of

COMLAN and move it to San Isidro. General Palmer and the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters (-) arrived at San Isidro at 2200 and prepared to assume command of all land forces.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1195 to AIG 936, 302336Z Apr 65. (S) Msg, JCS 1197 to CINCLANT and CINCSRIKE, 301804Z Apr 65. (S-Gp 4) Msg, COMLAN to JCS, 010720Z May 65, JCS IN 38717.

As US military intervention progressed, fighting between the Constitutionalist and Loyalist forces continued, but, as on previous days, the Loyalists proved incapable of retaining the offensive. By the end of the day, the Ozama Fortress police station had fallen to the Constitutionlists. The US Country Team now doubted the Loyalist commanders' determination "to see this thing through," and the Team had good reason to suspect that the Loyalists forces were incapable of accomplishing any mission assigned to them.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1207 to State, 301759Z Apr 65, JCS IN 37743. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1208 to State, 301825Z Apr 65, JCS IN 37730.

In the midst of the fighting the OAS was able to register some diplomatic gains. Through the good offices of the Papal Nuncio, a cease-fire agreement was signed by the Loyalists, two Constitutionalist representatives (attempts to get Col. Caamano's signature were postponed because of the danger in entering the Constitutionalist territory after dark), Ambassador Bennett, General York, the Papal Nuncio, and the head of the Dominican Red Cross. The cease-fire was based on two conditions: guarantee of personal safety to all individuals on both sides; and establishment of an OAS commission to act as arbiter between the two sides. Aiding the Nuncio in the long negotiations at San Isidro that preceded the cease-fire agreement was John Bartlow Martin, former US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic and now a special representative of President Johnson sent to Santo Domingo on a fact-finding mission.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, State 696 to Santo Domingo, 301615Z Apr 65, JCS IN 37652. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1217 to State, 010230Z Apr 65.

The OAS also stepped up its activity in Washington. The OAS Council adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire and the establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge in Santo Domingo, "encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments."

Texts in Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1351 (17 May 65), 739-741.

MAY

1 May 65

The US military buildup in the Dominican Republic continued. At 0720 General Palmer informed the JCS that he agreed with General York's estimate that present forces were inadequate. He noted that only two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division had landed and that "the next two battalions had been withheld. Assuming no change in basic objective outlined to me by Chairman JCS," he continued, "request air movement of 82d continue."

At 1000 General Palmer reported to the JCS that Loyalist forces had not moved into the gap between the Marines and Paratroopers as planned, apparently because Col. Benoit considered such a move a cease-fire violation. There was civilian movement through the gap in US forces toward the inland city of Santiago, and there were reports that the Valle Nuevo communication center might be the target of a "Castro-directed" take over. Palmer also reported landings from an "unidentified, possibly Castro, submarine." In view of these developments, Palmer again asked the JCS for more forces -- "on the order of four more battalions of 82d Airborne and we need a third BLT of Marines At this juncture seems only prudent to deploy more US forces. We should not send a boy to do a man's job."

(~~8~~-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1214 to AIG 936, 011224Z May 65.
 (~~8~~-Gp 4) Msg, COMLAN to JCS, 010720Z May 65, JCS IN 38717.
 (~~28~~-Gp 1) Msg, JTF 120 to JCS, 011455Z May 65, JCS IN 39461.

After receiving this message, the JCS ordered CINCLANT to deploy additional forces to the Dominican Republic as follows: 1) the remainder of the 4th MEB; 2) Marine BLT 1/2 in USS OKINAWA; and 3) 3rd and 4th BCTs of the 82d Airborne Division. The JCS also directed CINCLANT to prepare to load the 5th and 6th BCTs of the 82d Airborne Division upon turn around of the airlift used for the 3rd and 4th BCTs. In addition about 500 Marines of BLT 1/6 arrived in the Dominican Republic during the day.

The JCS also ordered the following changes in command and command relationships: 1) that CINCLANT activate CINCARLANT, CINCAFLANT and CINCLANTFLT as Army, Air Force, and Navy Commanders responsible under him for preparation, movement, and control of designated forces to the Dominican Republic; and 2) that General Palmer relieve General York as COMLANDFOR-DOMREP (CTF 120).

(~~8~~-Gp 3) Msgs, JCS 1218 to CINCLANT, 011609Z May 65; 1219, 011611Z May 65; 1220, 011612Z May 65; 1221, 011621Z May 65. (~~25~~) CJTF 122 Hist, pp. III-III-1, 6, 7. (~~8~~-Gp 4) Msg, COMLANDFOR-DOMREP to CJTF 122, 012145Z May 65. (~~8~~-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1216 to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE, 011550Z May 65.

President Johnson made a public statement on the American troop buildup of the previous day, saying it was necessary in order to man the international safety zone called for by the OAS, and thereby protect the lives and insure the safe evacuation of all foreign nationals. In another public statement, the President explained that the US goal in the Dominican Republic was "that the people of that country must be permitted to freely choose the path of political democracy, social justice, and economic progress. Neither the United States, nor any other nation, can want or permit a return to that brutal and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and punishment of this hemisphere and of all civilized humanity."

(U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1351 (17 May 65), 743-744.

Meanwhile, in Santo Domingo US Marine and Army units continued to hold their positions under sniper fire. Airborne forces returned fire from a rebel gunboat in the Ozama River and sank it. Contact was made between the Army and Marine forces by a paratroop patrol.

(~~TS~~) CJTF 122 Hist, p. III-1-5.

Again the OAS held center stage in the diplomatic play surrounding the Dominican crisis. It established a five-member committee (with representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama):

- a. to offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:
 - i. a cease-fire; and
 - ii. the orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and
- b. to carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting; . . .

(U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1351 (17 May 65), 741.

The cease-fire agreement, announced on 1 May, was further strengthened when Ambassador Martin succeeded in obtaining the signature of Col. Caamane and several other military officers of the Constitutionalist Command. Despite the agreement, however, Constitutionalist firing continued throughout the day.

(✓-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1256 to State, 020810Z May 65, JCS IN 40371.

2 May 65

The OAS cease-fire stopped most of the fighting in Santo Domingo; only scattered incidents marred the calm. There was sporadic shooting in the US Embassy area, and a US helicopter was fired on by small arms during a morning reconnaissance flight. Two armed patrols attempted to infiltrate Marine positions in the embassy quarters and were decisively repulsed. US Marines also drew fire in the northeastern part of the city. Otherwise, the city remained quiet, and for the first time in four days, no armed groups were seen on the streets. The five-man OAS commission arrived about noon and immediately began consultations with the diplomatic representatives of their own countries. These consultations were followed by meetings with the Papal Nuncio, Police Chief Despradel, Ambassador Bennett, and General Palmer.

(✓-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1260 to AIG 936, 030052Z May 65. (e-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1270 to State, 021900Z May 65, JCS IN 41040. (e-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1276 to State, 022246Z May 65; and 1303, 031450Z May 65, JCS IN 42020.

The political situation remained basically unchanged. Ambassador Bennett reported that no effective government existed. The closest thing to a government in the Dominican Republic was the Loyalist junta, but the junta was very weak, had little real support, was indecisive, and lacked the stature, education, will, or experience with which to govern. The Loyalists' efforts to form a cabinet had not been successful. The Ambassador held little hope for a negotiated solution under present cease-fire conditions notwithstanding the presence of the OAS committee. He believed the cease-fire strengthened the Constitutionalist position.

In Bennett's opinion, however, there was no danger of a Castroite or Communist take-over so long as the US kept strong forces ashore. He recommended that the US "discreetly help junta commence operating as some kind of government," and then, with the establishment of a legal base and recognized government, disarm the Constitutionalist. He said that the US had two "psychological" problems in the Dominican Republic: explaining its presence there, and "the wide-spread popular belief we are supporting Messin against the people. Messin has become

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case-voire and is from a rebel army captain." The Ambassador added, "we must push as hard as possible to correct misleading impressions concerning our role here."

(1-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1264 to State, 030125Z May 65, JCS IN 41185. (2-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1257 to State, 020900Z May 65, JCS IN 40376.

Washington was conscious of the psychological battle. Once again President Johnson went on television to explain the US intervention, announcing that he had ordered two additional battalions (2,000 men) to the Dominican Republic earlier in the day and that just prior to the broadcast he had directed the landing of 4,500 additional men at the earliest possible moment. The President said that what had begun as a popular democratic revolution had been seized by "a band of communist conspirators." He stated that the US goal was "to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people" and "to help prevent another communist state in this hemisphere."

(U) NY Times, 3 May 65, 10.

The US also began psychological warfare operations in Santo Domingo. Pamphlets were dropped and airborne and truck-mounted loudspeakers were employed without incident. Both operations stressed the peaceful and nonpartisan nature of the US landing, and President Johnson's comments were quoted frequently. More extensive drops and loudspeaker operations were scheduled for the next day.]

(3-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1249 to CINCLANT, 021734 May 65. (2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1274 to State, 022025Z May 65, JCS IN 41075. (2-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1286 to State, 041214Z May 65, JCS IN 43876.

Continuing his mission as a special representative of President Johnson, former Ambassador Joseph Martin forwarded his views on the Constitutionalist movement to the State Department. Martin considered that what had begun as a PRD rebellion had been taken over by extremists, including military leaders "who have now gone so far they had nothing more to lose" and by hard core Castro/Communists. Martin said that Communist and non-Communist tags no longer mattered since the Constitutionalist leaders, especially Caamano, were "effective fanatics as Castro was from beginning." In Martin's opinion, the rank and file of the movement probably were not communists, but it was impossible to separate innocent followers from the leaders. Turning to an assessment of the Loyalists, Martin added that the Dominican army had virtually disintegrated, its "gutless generals waiting for us to do the job for them." Among the generals, Martin considered

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Antonio imports the best. He is a... and the Loyalist... port and probably little future independent of US."

(~~2~~-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1250 to State, 020900Z May 65, JCS IN 40383.

The day's major story was the series of military moves taken to strengthen the US position in the Dominican Republic. At 0320, Commander, Joint Task Force 122, established the International Security Zone in a large area of the western part of the city that included the embassies, the Embajador Hotel, and the better residential districts in its boundaries. US Marines carried out the operation, and later in the afternoon they enlarged the zone, extending its eastern boundary two city blocks "to provide better security for the US Embassy." At the same time, paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division held the western bank of the Ozama River, a line which they extended during the day 800 meters south along the river toward the sea. These moves resulted in a partial encirclement of the Constitutionals in the old city area. A US paratroop motorized patrol did cross the northern boundary of the old city and made contact with the Marines in the ISZ, but not without casualties of two killed and two wounded, and Constitutionalist containment remained uncompleted.

(~~2~~-Gp 4) Msg, CJTF 122 to JTF 122, 020820Z May 65. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1301 to CJTF 122, 021151Z May 65, JCS IN 41656. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1248 to AIG 936, 021632Z May 65.

In Washington the JCS were studying the problem of containing the Constitutionalist forces in the event that the cease-fire proved ineffectual. In a special meeting they considered a paper that concluded that the cease-fire was ineffectual. The paper considered the following three alternative perimeters designed to confine Constitutionalist activity to the southeastern portion of the city: (a) an "in-close" perimeter - sealing off the old quarter of the city; (b) a perimeter linking airborne elements at the Duarte Bridge on the east with Marine forces maintaining the ISZ on the west; and (c) a perimeter farther out on a line to be selected by CINCLANT. The paper concluded that the "in-close" perimeter was the most advantageous and that a perimeter linking the Duarte Bridge with the Marine forces in the ISZ could be drawn as the initial step in the execution of the "in-close" perimeter.

Ambassador Barnett was also concerned about containing the Constitutionals. He informed the State Department that it was essential to close the gap between the US airborne forces and the Marines in

the ISZ as soon as possible. The operation was planned to be a land route from the ISZ to the Dominican Republic. The CAS Secretary Mora agreed with him on the need for a land route and concluded: "We must move now. Situation downtown increasingly ugly. Agitators reported already attempting stir mobs to anti-American fury."

At 1303 the JCS directed CINCLANT to have General Palmer prepare to establish at daylight 3 May a line of communication (LCC), perimeter linking Marine forces in the ISZ and airborne elements at the Duarte Bridge. Later the JCS sent an execute message ordering the operation to begin anytime after midnight 2/3 May.

In accordance with State Department instructions, Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer met with the CAS Commission and obtained its concurrence in action to establish the LCC between the Duarte Bridge and the ISZ.

(~~TS~~-Gp 1) Talking Paper, J-3TP-22-65, "Alternative Courses of Action in the Dominican Republic (~~S~~)," 2 May 65. (~~S~~-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1267 to State, 021800Z May 65, JCS IN 41066. (~~TS~~-Gp 1) Msg, JCS 1251 to CINCLANT, 021803Z May 65. (~~TS~~-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1261 to CINCLANT and CTF 120, 030140Z May 65. (~~S~~-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, State 742 to Santo Domingo, 2 May 65. (~~S~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1294 to State, 030520Z May 65, JCS IN 41254.

Although General Palmer considered his present force adequate to prevent any immediate Constitutionalist thrust, he told CINCLANT that it would not be sufficient to meet an all-out attack in Santo Domingo combined with uprisings in other parts of the country. He therefore requested the immediate deployment of two more battalions of the 82d Airborne Division and the remaining battalion of the Marine Brigade and a minimum of one, preferably two, Air Mobile companies. He also requested that the remaining brigade of the 82d Airborne Division remain on alert at Fort Bragg.

(~~TS~~) Msg, CJTF 120 to CINCLANT, 021328Z May 65.

Responding at 1258 hours, the JCS directed CINCLANT to deploy "the remainder of the tactical air support units, including command, control and support elements to Ramey AFB." At 1326 the JCS instructed CINCLANT to deploy immediately the 5th and 6th BCTs of the 82d Airborne Division to the Dominican Republic. At 1453 they directed CSA to assign to CINCLANT the helicopters of one air mobile company plus the necessary command elements, air crews, and field maintenance personnel for deployment to the Dominican Republic upon the request of CTF 120. At 1800 the JCS instructed

CINCLANT to assign the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, currently on air alert at Camp Lejeune, to those forces committed to operations in the Dominican Republic, but not to deploy the battalion until specifically directed. At 2053 JCS directed CINCLANT to deploy the 7th, 8th, and 9th BCTs of the 326 Airborne Division and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (using available organic airlift for the Marines) to the Dominican Republic.

(X-Gp 3) Msgs, JCS-1250 to CINCLANT, 021758Z May 65; 1252 to CINCLANT, 021826Z May 65; 1258 to CINCLANT, 022259Z May 65; and 1262 to CINCLANT, 030153Z May 65. (X-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1255 to CSA, et al., 021958Z May 65.

3 May 65

Military activity was confined to "Operation Blue Chip," the US effort to establish a line of communication (LOC) between the Marine units in the western sector of Santo Domingo and the airborne elements along the Ozama River in the east. The action proceeded without incident. US forces returned the fire and completed the deployment by 0111. The deployment cordoned off the Constitutionalist forces in downtown Santo Domingo, and a corridor was opened between the ISZ and the only air fields near the city. Later in the day, US Army and Marine units consolidated and widened the corridor, and at 1545 General Palmer notified CJTF 122 that the first military convoy had passed through safely.

The US continued its troop buildup in Santo Domingo. During the day two ECT's of the 82d Airborne Division and one Marine BLT, ordered on the previous day, arrived in the Dominican Republic.

(U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1293 to State, 030530Z May 65, JCS IN 41464. (X-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1301 to CJTF 122, 031151Z May 65, JCS IN 41656. (X-Gp 3) JCS 1266 to AIG 938, et al., 031236Z May 65. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1309 to State, 031855Z May 65, JCS IN 42649. (X-Gp 1) Msg, Santo Domingo 1315 to CJTF 122, 032045Z May 65, JCS IN 41982.

The week's fighting had brought severe hardship to the civilian population of the city. The US Embassy reported that the people of Santo Domingo were hungry, especially in the Constitutionalist zone, because of the scarcity of food coming in from the countryside. The Embassy distributed beans, milk, and flour throughout the day at various fixed points outside the Constitutionalist zone, while US military forces distributed 14,000 lbs of beans and condensed milk along the newly opened corridor. Just after midnight, the JCS directed CINCLANT to off-load the ALCOA RANGER, which was carrying PE #800 food for relief purposes, as soon as adequate docking arrangements at Haina were completed.

In further relief of the 100,000 population, the US Army opened a 100-bed hospital on the banks of the Sanja River and the Marines established a 50-bed hospital in the ISZ to relieve the crowded conditions in the two hospitals in the Constitutionalist zone.

(C) Msg, Santo Domingo 1327 to State, 040335Z May 65, JCS IN 42630. (C) Msg, Santo Domingo 1323 to State, 040150Z May 65, JCS IN 42497. (C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1325 to State, 040250Z May 65, JCS IN 42722. (U) Msg, JCS 1264 to CINCLANT, 030503Z May 65.

In Santo Domingo a more hopeful note was sounded by a new effort to establish an effective interim government and by the reported left-wing desertion of the Constitutionalist movement. General Imbert approached Ambassador Martin and offered to form a government independent of the extremes of left and right as represented by the Constitutionlists and the Loyalist junta. Martin warned Imbert that the US would not support a military dictatorship, and the two men agreed to seek a five-man group consisting of Imbert, Colonel Benoit of the junta, and three distinguished but non-political civilians. [

(U) John Bartlow Martin, "Inside the Drama and Chaos of the Dominican Upheaval," Life, LVIII, 21 (28 May 65), 70. [C-Gp 1] [

Concurrently, two less favorable events occurred. After a 10-hour conversation, Ambassador Martin failed to convince Juan Bosch that American intervention had been necessary to prevent a Castroite or Communist take-over or to persuade him to make a public statement to that effect. In the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union alleged that US intervention in the Dominican Republic constituted a violation of international peace and the UN Charter.

(C-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1330 to State, 040430Z May 65, JCS IN 42720. (U) NY Times, 4 May 65, 11.

The US worked for a solution through the offices of the OAS. It proposed to the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM), which had convened in response to the Council request of 30 April, the creation of an inter-American peace force to help restore order in the Dominican Republic. The US introduced a resolution calling on the American States to make military contingents available to assist the five-member commission in reestablishing peace and normal relations in the Dominican Republic. In a move to facilitate the creation of such a force and in response to inquiries from US Latin Embassies, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested JCS recommendations on the following: 1) size, type, and equipment of forces to be supplied; 2) command structure under which they should operate; 3) source of logistic support; and 4) total forces required. The JCS, in turn, sought CINCLANT and CINCSO's comments.

(S) Memo, ASD/ISA to CJCS, 3 May 65, encl to (S-Gp 4) JCS 2338/12, 4 May 65. (S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1336 to CINCLANT and USCINCSO, 040111Z May 65. (U) NY Times, 4 May 65, 1.

In Washington President Johnson again defended US policy in the Dominican Republic in an unexpected appearance before a labor conference. He said: "We don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere." President Johnson stated that he had acted to preserve peace and "save those people from conquest." He pledged that US forces would be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic when the OAS had reestablished peace and security there.

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(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1325 to State, 040150Z May 65, JCS IN 42497. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1304 to State, 031430Z May 65, JCS IN 42753. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 1313 to CINCLANT, 032123Z May 65. (S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1316 to State, 032023Z May 65, JCS IN 42088. (S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1337 to CSA and CINCLANT, 040131Z May 65. (U) NY Times, 4 May 65, 1.

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US military activity was limited to an extension of the ISZ in order to protect the embassies. The State Department authorized the extension at the request of the OAS Commission, and the JCS directed its execution. US Marines carried out the operation, moving the ISZ boundary two blocks eastward without incident.

(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1351 to State, 031830Z May 65, JCS IN 43838. (S) Msg, State 797 to Santo Domingo, 042118Z May 65, JCS IN 44324. (S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1400 to CINCLANT, et al., 042149Z May 65. (D) 6th MEU Command Diary, 9 Jul 65

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(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1358 to State, 050120Z May 65, JCS IN 44450.

At the same time that it was restricting its military and psychological warfare activities, the US was expanding its relief work in the Dominican Republic. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Anthony Solomon, the State Department relief administrator, reported that he had developed a food relief program that would bring 60 tons of rice daily from the Banco Agricola's stock in the north of the island, unload the PL 480 food from ALCOA RANGER, airlift 90 tons of food daily by US military aircraft "for a few days" until the flow of rice from the north was sufficient, and increase the volume of food distributed by US troops along the corridor in the Constitutionalist area. Solomon reported that by the end of the day three additional centers of bulk food distribution would be functioning outside the Constitutionalist area, manned by businessmen and clergymen. Although certain areas outside Santo Domingo might require food distribution during the next few days, Solomon expected adequate food supplies to be available in most of the country as soon as movement on the roads became easier. Then the problem would be the lack of money to buy food since the economy was at a standstill and wages had not been paid for 10 days. Solomon suggested that the public sector, including government, business, and the Sugar Corporation, meet the next pay day.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1341 to State, 041205Z May 65, JCS IN 43230.

In reply, the State Department notified Ambassador Bennett and Secretary Solomon that \$3 million in additional disaster relief funds had been approved for the following purposes: 1) to organize emergency work programs under municipal and provincial governmental direction or through existing local development associations; 2) to make arrangements for the public sector, including government, business, and the Sugar Corporation, to meet the next pay day; 3) to administer emergency food and medical relief, repair and reconstruct essential public utilities, and to establish emergency public work programs.

(e-Gp 1) Msg, State 798 to Santo Domingo,
4 May 65, JCS IN 44581.

The Constitutionalist seized the political initiative when the members of the 1963 National Congress in a rump session elected Francisco Caamano president of the provisional government. Later in the day, the Constitutionalist "Radio Constitution" carried a recorded speech by Bosch, supporting the choice of Caamano, characterizing him as a leader who could "act against the tanks and machines to defend the people's rights."

(e-Gp 1)

In a cable to the State Department, Ambassador Bennett stated that "with the rebel forces contained," the priorities for US action were now: a functioning Dominican government and the "restoration of normalcy" in Santo Domingo. With regard to these priorities, Bennett suggested that the US recognize the Loyalist junta as the de facto successor to the Reid Government and that restrictions on the freedom of movement of Dominican civilians be removed.

Bennett proposed the following three point program to rally popular support behind the junta: 1) urge the Loyalists to add two civilians to their junta and discuss possible candidates with them; 2) if the junta was agreeable, offer US good offices in helping to persuade the two chosen to join the government; and 3) urge the junta to appoint a cabinet of non-partisan technicians and offer to work with the junta in the selection process. Bennett cautioned, however, that some of the Loyalist military had been trying in the past week to consolidate their positions, while under the protection of the US military presence. To permit these right-wing military leaders to consolidate their power, Bennett believed, would be a great disservice to the Dominicans and a damaging blow to the US public image in the country. He suggested, therefore, that once Constitutionalist resistance had ended, Wessin should be encouraged to retire and that Rivera Cuesta and de los Santos be

encouraged to remain as chiefs of the Army and the Air Force. Bennett also suggested that Rivera Caminero, Navy Chief of Staff, would make the best Secretary of State for Armed Forces.

Commenting on the potentially risky situation in the provinces, Bennett pointed out the need for rapid action to ensure effective and friendly local governments. He urged the strengthening of the local governments through the appropriate channeling of relief supplies and the organization of emergency work programs. He also suggested the payment of back wages to a large number of persons in the provinces employed in public works projects who had not been paid for as long as ten weeks.

(Unknown) Msg, Santo Domingo 1340 to State, 041134Z May 65, JCS IN 43818. (Z-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1337 to State, 040715Z May 65, JCS IN 42738.

Bennett also believed that "fast action essential to counter" the political initiative shown by the Constitutionalists in appointing Caamano as their president. He therefore was suggesting to the Loyalists that they form a more broadly-based junta including civilians. Specifically he wanted General Imbert to head the junta; Colonel Benoit to be the military representative, and the following civilians be included: Alfonso Morano a respected non-Communist leftist, Antonio Guzman, formerly Bosch's Secretary of Agriculture, and Anselmo Brache, a prominent member of Balaguer's movement who enjoyed Imbert's confidence.

The Secretary of State approved Ambassador Bennett's course of action and directed the Ambassador to seek OAS Commission approval since the Department did not consider either side in the Dominican dispute as then constituted capable of running the country. The Dominicans needed a broadly based group "to re-establish and maintain law and order and getting normal government functions underway." The Secretary agreed with all the names that Bennett had suggested for the junta, but recommended against Imbert as the leader, preferring that all members have equal rank.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1348 to State, 041730Z May 65, JCS IN 43823. (U) NY Times, 5 May 65, 1. (S-Gp 2) Msg, State 796 to Santo Domingo, 4 May 65, JCS IN 44579.

The OAS continued its efforts to end the crisis. In Santo Domingo its Commission completed a report for the Meeting of Consultation that included, at the urging of the US, a recommendation for a combined inter-American military force under the OAS. The Commission also presented Ambassador Bennett with a formula for a new cease-fire agreement and asked for US cooperation in making it an "effective instrument" and a US reaffirmation of the 1 May OAS Resolution. The Commission's proposed cease-fire, called the "Act of Santo Domingo," would be signed only by the Benoit and Caamano forces. Further, the Commission presented Bennett with a memorandum requesting "whether the military forces of the United States in the Dominican Republic could be given precise instructions to cooperate in the execution of that which has been agreed."

Bennett accepted the Commission's formula, saying that he would have to refer it to Washington. Bennett told the Secretary of State that a new cease-fire was not necessary, but that the US could not refuse the Commission's request. He recommended that he be authorized to give the Commission a note reiterating US cooperation with the 30 April cease-fire and pledging continued full cooperation with the work of the Commission. General Palmer concurred in Bennett's recommendation.

(e) Msg, State 788 to Santo Domingo, 040250Z May 65, JCS IN 44293. (e-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1350 to State, 041313Z May 65, JCS IN 43866, and 1359, 050255Z May 65, JCS IN 44783.

5 May 65


Military activity was limited to an expansion of the LOC in order to improve the security of the corridor. At 0600 elements of the 82d Airborne Division began the operation, and by 0800 the corridor had been enlarged. As usual, Constitutionalist snipers were active, with heavy firing reported.

At 0500 General Palmer assumed command of Land Forces Dominican Republic CTF 120, reporting directly to CINCLANT. The revised command structure effective at that time was as follows:

CINCLANT - Adm Moorer, USN

- a. CJTF 122 - VAdm Masterson, USN.
 - (1) CTF 121, Commander Air Force Component - MGen McNickle, USAF
 - (2) CTF 124, Command Naval Component - VAdm McCain, USN
- b. CTF 120, Commander Land Forces DOMREP - LtGen Palmer, USA
 - (1) 4th MEB - BGen Bouker, USMC
 - (2) 82d Abn Div - MGen York, USA

(TS-Gp 3) JTF 122 Hist, pp. III-I-5 and III-III-I-14. (TS) NMCC Op Sum 105-65, 6 May 65. (e-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1444 to AIG 936, et al., 051238Z May 65. (e-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to CINCARLANT, et al., 061932Z May 65, JCS IN 47984.



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The OAS continued its efforts to restore peace to the Dominican Republic. It got the Constitutionalist and Loyalist leaders to sign the "Act of Santo Domingo," ratifying the ceasefire of 30 April and establishing a zone of security in Santo Domingo. The Agreement also guaranteed the inviolability of the embassies and missions in the city and the evacuation of persons in asylum there. The parties to the act also promised to assist the International Red Cross and the OAS in the distribution of food, medicine, and medical supplies in Santo Domingo and throughout the country. The Act referred to the Caamano Group as the "Constitutionalist Government," giving them, Ambassador Bennett claimed an "unwarranted status" and constituting a "substantive modification" to the original OAS proposal.

(~~S~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 1386 to State, 060245Z May 65, JCS IN 46672. (~~S~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1360 to State, 050250Z May 65, JCS IN 44826. (U) NY Times, 6 May 65, 1, 14.

(Late in the evening, four members of the OAS Commission departed for Washington to give the OAS Meeting of Consultation a first hand report. One member of the Commission, Ambassador Morrice of Panama, and OAS Secretary General Mora remained in Santo Domingo.)

(~~S~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1396 to State, 060918Z May 65, JCS IN 46976.

The OAS also met in Washington where the US representative Ellsworth Bunker sought a compromise on the US-sponsored resolution for an inter-American peace force. Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and the US agreed to a revised resolution to be jointly presented to the OAS MFM. The revised resolution requested member governments to make contingents of their military, naval, air, or police forces available to the OAS to form an Inter-American Armed Force to restore order in the Dominican Republic.

(U) Msg, State Circ 2140, 5 May 65, JCS IN 46586. (U) NY Times, 7 May 65, 1.

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US unilateral political moves continued in Santo Domingo where Ambassador Bennett tried to form a government of national reconciliation composed of both military and civilian leaders representing a broad political spectrum. He was not successful. Representatives of Bosch's PRD and Balaguer's PR refused to serve. Even the pro-US Secretary General of the PRD, Antonio Martinez Francisco, was unwilling to participate in a junta that would include Imbert or to volunteer his own services without the approval of his party. Approval, according to Martinez, would probably be contingent upon the right of Bosch to run for office in the next election.

Rebuffed by the politicians, Bennett tried to form a non-political junta including three civilian "technicians." He lined up a five-man group consisting of Imbert, Benoit, Dr. Hector Goico, Supreme Court President Julio Cuello, and Luis Julian Perez. The three civilians, however, refused to serve until they had discussed the proposition with Caamano and the OAS.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1385 to State, 060145Z May 65, JCS IN 46489.

6 May 65

With the exception of one incident involving US and Constitutionalist forces, the cease-fire continued effective. Three US Marines were killed when a two-vehicle convoy with seven Marines, proceeding eastward along the LOC, took a wrong turn into Constitutionalist-held territory and was fired upon. In addition to the three fatalities, two Marines were wounded and two were captured.

(U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1403 to State, 061705Z May 65, JCS IN 47483. (S-Gp 3) Msg, CTF 120 to CINCLANT, 070153Z May 65, JCS IN 48569.

In Washington the OAS MFM voted to establish an Inter-American Armed Force (IAF) to cooperate in restoring and maintaining normal conditions in the Dominican Republic and in establishing there an atmosphere "conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions." Member states would be asked to contribute land, sea, air, or police contingents to the IAF. The commanders of these contingents were to work out among themselves and with an OAS Committee arrangements for an OAS Unified Command.

The US did not insist on the selection of COMDOMREP as Commander, IAF, and was willing to accept the appointment of a Latin American as commander, with a deputy from the US. US forces in the Dominican Republic would become part of the IAF when it was formed; any US forces not needed for the IAF would be withdrawn. The US was prepared to provide both transportation and logistic support for the IAF, though

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desirable maximum contribution by Latin American countries.

(X-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2157, 6 May 65, JCS IN 48554. (U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1353 (31 May 65), 862-863.

Looking ahead to eventual withdrawal of US forces, the JCS asked CINCLANT: (1) assuming the cease-fire continued and the security mission remained essentially as at present, what military forces should remain in the Dominican Republic for the foreseeable future?; (2) if these forces were smaller than those now deployed, when could withdrawals begin, and how and in what order should they take place?; and (3) if the Loyalists did establish an effective government in the near future, what US forces should remain in the Republic? The JCS added that if an OAS force were established, Latin American units might supplant some of the US units.

(X-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1547 to CINCLANT, C61649Z May 65. For the reply, see below, under 8 May (CINCLANT msg 082322Z).

7 May 65

The US effort (begun on 5 May) to construct a broad-based Dominican government finally succeeded when the Loyalist junta resigned in favor of a Council of National Reconstruction (GNR), a five-man group headed by General Antonio Imbert Barreras. The civilians in the group were not those originally suggested by Bennett, but the Ambassador considered them a "well-balanced group which can command national support." In addition to Imbert the group included: Julio Postigo, a personal friend of Bosch; the "highly respected" governor of Puerto Plata, Carlos Grisolia Polonywn; and Alejandro Zeller Ioeco, a young engineer and non-partisan former Minister of Water Resources. Colonel Enoit, the one holdover from the junta, completed the group.

Ambassador Bennett recommended that the US recognize the new government "without delay." Secretary Rusk replied, however, that the US welcomed the formation of the GNR, but regarded it as only an interim group that would be expected to assist in the establishment of a permanent, duly elected government with broad popular support. Hence, although the US would give the GNR "all appropriate help" in holding the country together, it would not extend formal recognition. Later in the day the Secretary added that Bennett should urge the GNR not to attack the Constitutionalist positions and to protest to the OAS Constitutionalist attacks on the National Palace. The Secretary authorized US military action "if immediately necessary to save the Palace," but US action should not be taken as "pretext to support Imbert by military demonstration against rebels."

(✓-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo (no number) to State
071838Z May 65, JCS IN 49513. (✓-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg,
State 372 to Santo Domingo, 7 May 65, JCS IN 50053.
(✓-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, State 888 to Santo Domingo,
7 May 65, JCS IN 50309.

Preparing for the activation of the IAF, the State Department ordered Ambassador Bennett to coordinate with commanders of any Latin American contingents assigned and, in collaboration with General Palmer, to submit recommendations for the structure and functions of the unified command. At the same time the JCS directed CINCLANT and USCINCSO to prepare to transport by air and sea the Latin American contingents.

(✓-Gp 3) Msg, State 856 to Santo Domingo and CJTF 122, 070110Z May 65, JCS IN 48144. For reply, see under 9 May (Santo Domingo 1526, 091826Z). (✓-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 1640 to CINCLANT and USCINCSO, 071606Z May 65.

On this day, the US completed all planned major force deployments to the Dominican Republic. The designation and size of the Committed forces were as follows:

Ground Forces

US Army

Hq USCOMREP	160
Special Forces Co (Reinf)	332
82d Abn Div (9 Bn)	12,301
Air Mobile Co.	200
1st Psy Bn & 1st Psy War Co	116
Miscellaneous	156
Total US Army	<u>13,265</u>

USMC

4th MEB - Ashore	4,145
Afloat	3,304
Total USMC	<u>7,449</u>

Air Forces

USAF

507th TAC Cont Gp & Sptg Units	<u>1,086</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>21,800</u>

US Naval Forces

Combatant & Supporting Ships	35
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Supporting Air Forces in Puerto Rico

USMC

VMFA-323	15-F-4B
VMF (AW451)	15-F-8D
Det, VMCJ-2	2RF-8A

USAF

353 TFS	18 F-100
363 TRW Element	6 RF-100
	3 RB-66
331 FIS	12 F-104

(25) NMCC OPSUM, 107-65, 8 May 65, 2-3.

At 1200 General Bruce Palmer became Commander, US Forces in Dominican Republic (USCOMDOMREP), with command over all Army, Air Force, and Naval units, MAAG, and JACCC physically located in the Dominican Republic. Forces designated for POWER PACK (the nickname for the US operations), but not physically on the island, remained under the appropriate component commanders of CINCLANT. JTF 120 and JTF 122 were dissolved. CTF 121 and CTF 124 remained under CINCAFLANT and CINCLANTFLT, respectively, to support USCOMDOMREP, who was authorized direct liaison with them.

(Z-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to CINCARLANT, et al., 070010Z May 65, JCS IN 48269.

Communist involvement in the Dominican crisis was further documented.

"a modest number of hard-core Communist leaders in Santo Domingo managed by superior training and tactics to win for themselves a position of considerable influence in the revolt within the first few days." Unclassified annexes summarized Cuba's involvement in Dominican revolutionary activities and listed the names of 83 Communists and other extreme leftists who were "active participants" in the Dominican revolt.

(Z-Gp 1)

JCS files.

The JCS was also concerned with Communist involvement in the Dominican crisis, specifically in the amount of Communist propaganda being beamed to the island from Cuba.

(S-SENSITIVE)

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8 May 65

The military situation remained quiet with few violations of the cease-fire reported. In the most serious incident, five men with automatic weapons infiltrated the US Navy unloading facilities in Haina, wounding a Marine who later died.

CINCLANT reported to the JCS that arms were apparently being landed secretly in the Dominican Republic. In reply, the JCS noted that Dominican forces were responsible for controlling such activity, but might not be adequate to the task. They authorized CINCLANT, subject to coordination with Ambassador Bennett, to provide such assistance as he deemed necessary to control activities of this type.

(S) Santo Domingo 1487 to State, 082325Z May 65, JCS IN 51601. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 1733 to CINCLANT, 081803Z May 65.

The composition of the IAF was being studied in Washington. In response to a request by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for their views, the JCS stated that they favored employment of OAS forces in the Dominican Republic as a demonstration of hemispheric solidarity. They recommended that member countries be encouraged to supply self-contained company-size units, except for Argentina and Brazil, from whom battalions were desired. The forces contributed should, as far as possible, be logistically self-sufficient, but should be able to request, receive, and distribute bulk supplies from US sources. Pending establishment of the command structure, the Latin American contingents should be placed under operational control of CINCLANT. The JCS recommended that USCOMDOMREP be designated commander of the IAF, but they were prepared to accept a Latin American commander with a US deputy.

(S-Gp 3) JCSM-344-65 to SecDef, "OAS Forces for the Dominican Republic," 8 May 65, derived from (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/12-1, same subj, 6 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (3 May 65).

In response to the JCS request of 6 May, CINCLANT transmitted USCOMDOMREP's views that, once an effective, stable government was in operation, three or four of the 12 US battalions in the Dominican Republic could possibly be released. CINCLANT foresaw an extended requirement for approximately four or five battalions, plus other units for engineering reconstruction, civil affairs, and psychological warfare. When withdrawals began, Marine units should be withdrawn first, in order to improve over-all readiness in the Caribbean. Marines should be withdrawn almost entirely by sea; Army forces, by a combination of ship and air transportation. Whether these recommendations could be

modified if the GNR became an effective governing body depended on future developments. CINCLANT cited as examples of factors affecting his future needs: the undetermined Communist strength in the new Dominican government, and the effectiveness of OAS forces on the scene.

(2-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 082322Z May 65, JCS IN 51662.

9 May 65

Cease-fire violations increased. A force of 50 Constitutionlists attacked the headquarters of the GNR's transportation battalion in Santo Domingo, but were successfully repulsed. At 1715 two shells exploded near USCOMDOMREP's headquarters. Sniper fire continued at about the same level as previous days.

(6-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1543 to State, 092305Z May 65, JCS IN 52741. (2-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOM-REP/CTF 120 to CINCLANT, 100616Z May 65, JCS IN 53065.

Replying to the State Department request of 7 May, Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer suggested the following policy and command structures for the IAF: 1) policy guidance for the IAF would be provided by the MFM, which in turn might receive military advice from the Inter-American Defense Board; 2) the OAS Commission, reconstructed to include eminent Latin Americans, perhaps including former heads of State, would operate as the executive and policy arm of the MFM in the Dominican Republic; 3) this OAS Commission should include an Office of the Military Advisor headed by a senior Latin American officer, supported by a multinational staff (this officer should be a Latin American, just as the IAF commander should be a US officer); 4) the combined staff should be organized along US military lines and as a minimum the Secretary, C4 (logistics), and C6 (communications) should be US officers; 5) since operations would primarily be on the ground, the IAF commander should wear a second hat as land forces commander with separate subordinate sea and air commanders; 6) brigade commander slots could be allocated to officers of the participating nations to assuage the question of national prestige; however, during active operations US battalions should be brigaded together and multinational battalions should not be considered as effective forces for more than guard duty. Bennett and Palmer added that the US should remain prepared to commit additional forces rapidly should the IAF prove to be militarily incapable. If the OAS Commission refused to authorize IAF action, the US should decide whether unilateral action was required by US forces not allocated to the IAF.

(2-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1526 to State and OSD, 091826Z May 65, JCS IN 52615.

General Palmer established a "rapid reaction force" consisting of units from the 22d Airborne Division and the 4th AEB. This alert force, consisting of platoon, company, and battalion size units, would respond to requests by Ambassador Bennett for assistance to local government forces in areas outside Santo Domingo.

(2) Msg, USCOMDOMREP/CTF 120 to CINCLANT, 092054Z May 65, JCS IN 52856.

Fearing the possible effects of the inflammatory Constitutionalist broadcasts on Radio Santo Domingo,

Secretary Rusk replied that Washington echoed their concern and that denying the station to the Constitutionlists as soon as possible was "highest priority item." He asked for details on the location of the station and its towers and whether they could be destroyed or captured. He noted that it would be best to involve the OAS Commission in the matter and concluded that the US would investigate the feasibility of the Commission's assuming control over all broadcast facilities in the Dominican Republic. (125)

(2S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP/CJTF 120 to CINCLANT, 090340Z May 65, JCS IN 51923; (2-LIMDIS-Gp 3) Msg, State 919 to Santo Domingo and CJTF 120, 091840Z May 65, JCS IN 52531.

CINCLANT published US casualties figures for the Dominican operation. As of 2400Z, total US casualties were:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
Army	3	51	0	2
Navy	2	1	0	0
Marine Corps	6	24	0	0
Air Force	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	11	76	0	2

(2-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to AIG 930, 100120Z May 65, JCS IN 52819. (The DOW figures are included in the WIA). [For further casualties figures see appendix.]

10 May 65

Santo Domingo remained quiet, with sniper fire reported reduced from previous days. Some factories and businesses reopened in the city, but Constitutionalist barricades prevented workers from getting to their jobs in the northern industrial zone. Commercial air service

resumed to and from Santo Domingo. Ambassador Bennett reported that about 800 persons still awaited evacuation, but he was concentrating on the "free evacuation" of the few "hardship or other special cases." The majority of the 800 were being encouraged to use the commercial flights. The US had evacuated 4,437 (2,711 US) refugees by this date (see appendix).

Ambassador Bennett rejected a request from the Dominican Air Force Chief of Staff for US assistance in garrisoning Santiago Airfield against possible disturbances. This did not mean, however, that the US was not willing to take military action if required. Commenting on the mortar fire near General Palmer's headquarters on 9 May, Ambassador Bennett requested permission to move the northeastern boundary of the ISZ (north of Avenida Bolivar) one block eastward, i.e., to coincide with Calle Rosa Duarte. This move, approved by General Palmer and informally and privately by Secretary Mora, would also provide added protection for the US and French Embassies. The State Department referred the request to the OAS Committee (which was preparing to return to Santo Domingo) asking that the Committee obtain agreement from the Dominican factions. State also told USCOMDOM-REP that it preferred not to take unilateral action unless the Committee delayed unreasonably. Meanwhile, the JCS directed CINCLANT to prepare plans for the capture of the Constitutionalist stronghold in Santo Domingo.

(6-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1577 to State, 102315Z May 65, JCS IN 53906. (2-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1565 to State, 101715Z May 65, JCS IN 53360. (2) Msg, State to CJTF 120, 110240Z May 65, JCS IN 53938. (2-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 1768 to CINCLANT, 101841Z May 65.

The President's Special Ambassador, John Martin, submitted a lengthy assessment of the Dominican situation as it entered a "politico-propaganda" phase, a struggle between the rival Constitutionalist and GNR "governments" for popular support. Martin admitted that it was "virtually impossible" to assess the Constitutionalist position; CIA

Other well-informed sources, however, reported that the Constitutionlists were confident of victory. Whatever their expectations, the Constitutionlists held the propaganda initiative, principally through Radio Santo Domingo, and "the importance of this cannot be overstated," Martin added. They had organized large demonstrations in the center of the city and were successfully linking "constitutionality" with jobs and food in the minds of the uniformed masses. "Rebels are working to consolidate political position as champion of masses against US military--San Isidro military-- upperclass and middle-class government. And unquestionably, they are ahead of GNR in this propaganda political war."

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Martin admitted that it had been impossible to recruit a "truly broad-spectrum political group," but the five-member GNR did provide an entity to counter the Constitutionalist government and did divorce the US from the "odious San Isidro old general group." The GNR had a basic weakness, however, it was open to Constitutionalist charges of being another "reactionary business-class civilian government with a military strong-man overlay." To counter the GNR's political vulnerability, Martin and Bennett were assisting in the deportation of some of the "old" generals, including General Wessin, (scheduled to leave on 11 May), who had become to the masses the symbol of military oppression.

The GNR's basic political problem remained, however. The revolt against Reid was "almost surely" an attempt by PRD leaders and others to reverse the coup against Bosch. Bosch's ideas of social and economic justice had germinated slowly and had later mobilized the "latent and legitimate revolutionary aspirations" of the Dominicans, particularly Dominican youth. The Constitutionlists had inherited these revolutionary aspirations. The GNR might meet this problem by instituting reforms and by divorcing itself from discredited politicians and generals.

Martin outlined several courses of action the US might follow, but recommended "for the short run" that the US give all-out support short of recognition to the GNR, waiting for new figures free of Communist domination but capable of mobilizing the "peoples aspirations" to emerge on the political landscape. In the interim period, the US should try to add other non-Communist elements to the GNR (should Caamano surrender, Martin recommended that the US recognize the GNR quickly, after getting from it any desired commitments.)

Martin admitted that although the IAF cloak helped the US public image greatly, the US should remove its troops within the next six months or less. Further, the US should avoid a full-scale military occupation, even under OAS auspices, "unless nothing else can prevent Communist takeover." Martin concluded that a US political presence would be required in the Dominican Republic long after its military forces departed. "Landing our troops prevented country from disintegrating totally. But troops can build nothing politically and process of disintegration has gone so far that this country cannot alone reorganize its affairs for a long time without vigorous assistance."

(2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1558 to State, 100520Z
May 65, JCS IN 52922.

In reply, the State Department directed the US Embassy to adopt a modified version of Martin's suggestion: explore the possibility of establishing a coalition regime which would include Caamano and perhaps one other non-Communist member of his group acceptable to Libert and his group. The Department

hoped thereby to split Caamano and the Bosch partisans from the extremists, a further step toward establishing a provisional government that might gradually consolidate its control over the entire country, with broad popular support. Even if Caamano could not be won over, US officials should work for a provisional coalition government that could "return the country to normalcy and eventually, under OAS supervision, guide country to a non-communist constitutional government."

(2-Gp 1) Msg, State 949 to Santo Domingo, 10 May 65, JCS IN 54405.

The GNR, as well as the US, continued to face the problem of Constitutionalist propaganda broadcasts on Radio Santo Domingo. Bennett reported that GNR Special Forces were preparing to sabotage the station's transmitters, "and we propose to agree." Secretary Rusk ruled that these operations, which would be in violation of the cease-fire, were neither to be prevented nor assisted. [] (1)(S)

General Palmer and Ambassador Bennett recommended that all radio facilities in the country be placed under OAS control. They were prepared to place US facilities under such control; they believed they could persuade the GNR to do so if Caamano would also agree.

(2S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1567 to State, 101733Z May 65, JCS IN 53366. (2S-LIMDIS-Gp 1) Msg, State 948 to Santo Domingo, 10 May 65, JCS IN 54020. (2S) DOMREP Task Force Evaluations, "Status of Jamming Operations (to 6:00 EDT, 10 May 65)" and "Rebel Propaganda Jamming Operations - 10 May 65," dtd 11 May 65. No other identification. (2S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 110420Z May 65, JCS IN 54312. (2S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1586 to State, 110215Z May 65, JCS IN 53942.

On the diplomatic front the OAS MFM voted to continue its five-man committee to work out command arrangements for the IAF with commanders of assigned contingents. At the same time, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) directed USCOMDOMREP and CINCLANT to submit proposals regarding the unified command organization, and the JCS assigned the unclassified nickname PRESS AHEAD to operations of Latin American contingents of the IAF.

(2S-EYES ONLY-Gp 1) Msg, OSD (ISA) 1756 to USCOMDOMREP and CINCLANT, 101658Z May 65. (2-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 1752 to CINCLANT and USCENCSO, 101618Z May 65. (U) Dept of State Bulletin LII, 1353 (31 May 65), 366.

~~TOP SECRET~~
11 May 65

Cease-fire violations increased slightly over those of the previous day although the US Embassy considered that the increase probably reflected more accurate reporting rather than a rise in violations. In one incident, a group of 20 Constitutionalists, equipped with bazookas as well as small arms, attacked the eastern perimeter of the ISE, but were repulsed.

(8) Msg, Santo Domingo 1606 to State, 112330Z May 65, JCS IN 55589. (8-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1644 to State, 122315Z May 65, JCS IN 57633.

The OAS continued its efforts to settle the crisis. Ambassador Martin and the Papal Nuncio met with Caamano and urged him to negotiate with the GNR. Caamano agreed to consult his associates and meet again with the Ambassador and the Nuncio later in the day. He cancelled the meeting, however, when he received a report that a group of GNR troops had been allowed to enter the Constitutionalist zone through US lines and, allegedly in cooperation with US forces, had shot up a restaurant. The Constitutionalists also complained that US troops east of the Ozama River were shooting unarmed civilians on the docks. The latter allegation was at once relayed to General Palmer, who began an investigation and reaffirmed his standing orders to US troops not to fire unless fired upon. Caamano finally informed the Papal Nuncio that he would talk with the OAS Commission the next day.

(8-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1602 to State, 111930Z May 65, JCS IN 55144. (8) Msg, Santo Domingo 1612 to State, 120139Z May 65, JCS IN 55645.

Reporting on the incident that led to cancellation of the Caamano Meeting, the Embassy admitted that there "apparently" was some shooting at a restaurant near Constitutionalist headquarters when the GNR relieved its National Palace guard. The Embassy explained that a force of 300 GNR soldiers, accompanied by an English-speaking guide, talked their way through a US checkpoint to relieve the guard at the Palace, which was held by the GNR although located in the Constitutionalist zone. The relieved troops were returning by the same route when the shooting occurred.

(8-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1626 to State, 121140Z May 65, JCS IN 56508.

The Embassy also reiterated their 10 May recommendation that US forces move the boundary of the ISE one block eastward. The State Department modified their previous decision and now agreed that the OAS Committee should first move the boundary and then announce it to the two Dominican parties as an accomplished fact. With Departmental approval, therefore,

Ambassador Bennett suggested the move to members of the CAS Committee, and in a letter to Secretary General Mora, the French Ambassador in Washington supported the enlargement of the ISZ.

(Z) Msg, Santo Domingo 1597 to State, 111715Z May 65, JCS IN 55040. (Z) Msg, State 958 to Santo Domingo, 112003Z May 65. (Z-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1608 to State, 112355Z, JCS IN 55704.

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(Z-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 110450Z May 65, JCS IN 54342. (Z-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 111258Z May 65, JCS IN 54629.

USCOMDOMREP also requested additional Military Police, Quartermaster, Finance troops, and maintenance and support units of the 82d Airborne Division deleted from the initial deployment plans.

(Z-Gp 4) Msg, HQ USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, et al., 110406Z May 65, JCS IN 55148. (Z-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, et al., 110403Z May 65, JCS IN 56898.

~~TOP SECRET~~
12 May 65

The volume of sniper fire was considerably reduced with only two cease-fire violations reported. [

(1X5)

Constitutionalist spokesman, in discussions with OAS representatives, asked for a corridor across the LOC to transport their military forces. When this suggestion was transmitted to Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer, both demurred, pointing out that GNR forces were not permitted to use the LOC.

Meanwhile the OAS Committee agreed to the extension of the northeastern boundary of the ISZ (between Avenida Bolivar and Avenida Francia) to Calle Rosa Durate. Caamano, advised of this decision, raised no objection. The 4th MEB, which was guarding this part of the boundary, made the move between 1600 and 1630.

US forces in the Dominican Republic were strengthened as the additional Military Police, Quartermaster, and Finance units, and remaining elements of the 82d Airborne Division, requested by USCOMDOMREP on 11 May, began landing in Santo Domingo.

(8-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1662 to State, 130639Z May 65, JCS IN 57862. (8) Msg, Santo Domingo 1639 to State, 122045Z May 65, JCS IN 57010. (8-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1644 to State, 122315Z May 65, JCS IN 57633. (8-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP/CTF 120 to CINCLANT, 130650Z May 65, JCS IN 58107. (8-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to AIG 930, 130210Z May 65, JCS IN 57616. [(23)]

(4)

After considering the recommendations of USCOMDOMREP and CINCLANT, the State and Defense Departments issued a joint policy directive on the IAF. The Departments wanted the IAF established by the commanders of the various national units in the Dominican Republic. At least three countries (including Brazil) should sign the original agreement. The agreement should prescribe the structure and command arrangements of the force and designate the commander and deputy, one of whom should be a US officer. State and Defense did not consider it desirable for the US to appoint a provisional IAF commander unilaterally. The staff would consist of representatives of each nation contributing forces. One member of the staff

should as a full-time liaison officer with the OAS Committee. The commander would have operational control over all elements of the IAF and would be authorized to issue orders to all components; otherwise, command would remain vested in each national commander. Provision should be made in the agreement for consultation between the IAF and the OAS Committee.

If possible, command and logistics arrangements for the Latin American contingent should be worked out in advance, but the important thing was that they should arrive as soon as possible. Until all Latin American units had arrived, the US Ambassador, in consultation with commanders of arriving contingents and with the OAS Committee, should work out coordinating arrangements with USCOMDOMREP. The Ambassador and USCOMDOMREP were directed to prepare a draft document along these lines and submit it to Washington.

(8) Msg, State Circ 2211 to Santo Domingo, 12 May 65, JCS IN 58114.

The US was also preparing to support, in part, the Latin American contingents in the Dominican Republic. The JCS notified CINCLANT that some Latin American contingents to be deployed to the Dominican Republic would require additional equipment, and asked CINCLANT to recommend, after coordination with USCINCSO, methods of meeting these requirements.

(8-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 1956 to CINCLANT, 122046Z May 65.

Meanwhile, US hopes of restoring the Dominican economy suffered a setback when few workers reported for duty. The Embassy also reported food riots in the city and the illegal seizure of foodstuffs. In an effort to shore up the economy, the US agreed to continue furnishing AID funds to defray the costs of essential government services. Further, a joint State/Defense message requested US officials to submit a plan for resuming normal industrial operations in the northern part of the city.

(8-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1656 to State, 130339Z May 65, JCS IN 58002. (8-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1644 to State, JCS IN 57633. (8-Gp 3) Msg, State 992 to Santo Domingo, 12 May 65, JCS IN 57912. (8-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1626 to State, 121140Z May 65, JCS IN 56508. (8) Msg, State 979 to Santo Domingo, 121757Z May 65, JCS IN 56890.

Returning from consultations in Washington, the OAS Commission proceeded with its search for a solution to the crisis. (The Embassy reported that Special Ambassador Martin suspended his negotiation activities "to give full scope to OAS efforts.") Commission

members met with both factions. Imbert agreed to negotiate, but refused to accept the 1963 constitution as a precondition. Caamano at first agreed to talks with Imbert, but postponed them in favor of a pre-negotiation meeting of advisors and assistants. The Embassy believed this vacillation indicated, perhaps, Caamano's lack of independence. They saw signs that Caamano was wavering and that the other Constitutionnalists feared to "let him out of their sight." The Embassy reported that it would try to split Caamano from the extremist elements in his group.

(S-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1663 to State, 131130Z May 65, JCS IN 58229. (S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1625 to State, 120630Z May 65, JCS IN 56042. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1662 to State, 130639Z May 65, JCS IN 57862.

[Presumably, a high level US decision was made to seek an alternative approach to the Dominican crisis, based upon creation of a broadly-based civilian-dominated government of national concord excluding extremes of right and left and built around a figure acceptable to Juan Bosch.] For this purpose, an American agent conferred with Bosch and his close friend, Jaime Benitez, Chancellor of the University

The American agent was identified as Irving Davidson, a Latin American Lobbyist. (S-EXDIS) Kennedy M. Crockett, Memo for the Record, "Contact with Dr. Joaquin Balaguer," 15 May 65, CJCS files.

of Puerto Rico. Bosch agreed that active Communists and Trujillistas presented a problem for democratic government in the Dominican Republic and that active measures, including deportation or exile should be taken against them by a Constitutionalist government. Identification of such persons would be effected by mutual consultation [presumably between the US and Dominican Government].

Text is in (S-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, State 1153 to Santo Domingo, 20 May 65, JCS IN 70684.

13 May 55

At 0930 troops from the 82d Airborne Division cleared a building from which Constitutionalist snipers had been persistantly firing on US personnel guarding the Santo Domingo power plant and nearby areas. General Palmer reported the incident to CINCLANT, asserting that his troops had behaved correctly, and that it was in their terms of reference to go outside the perimeter of the LOC if necessary to eradicate enemy fire. He noted that the power plant had been in US hands since US troops arrived and under the terms of the cease-fire agreement was recognized as within the LOC boundary.

The Constitutionlists disputed Palmer's claim that the power plant was included in the "safety zone." The State Department informed Ambassador Bunker that the "highest authority" was greatly concerned by this contention and wanted the Ambassador to contact the OAS Committee immediately to emphasize that the US expected the cease-fire agreement be fully observed.

(C-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, et al., 132000Z May 65, JCS IN-60389. (C-Gp 3) Msg, State 1004 to Santo Domingo, 13 May 65, JCS IN 58671.

Cease-fire violations continued in Santo Domingo. In once incident, two US Army personnel strayed into Constitutionlist territory in a truck and were fatally wounded.

GNR forces, on the other hand, committed a serious violation when five P-51's of the Dominican Air Force launched a strafing and rocket attack on the main studio and transmitter of Radio Santo Domingo, near the western end of the LOC, at 1400. US forces, believing themselves under attack, brought down one plane by anti-aircraft fire. US officials had no foreknowledge of the attack, and Ambassador Bennett protested the violation to the OAS. The Chief of Staff of the GNR Air Force, General de los Santos, assured US officials that no more air operations would be conducted.

The claim by participating pilots that they inflicted "heavy damage" was viewed with skepticism by General Palmer, who inspected the target areas from an observation post on the LOC. However, Radio Santo Domingo went off the air at the time of the attack and had not come back on the air as of midnight.

(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1674 to State, 132145Z May 65, JCS IN 58866. (S) Msg, Gen. Palmer to CINCLANT, 140127Z May 65, JCS IN 59155. (C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1690 to State, 140530Z May 65, JCS IN 59611. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1697 to State, 141130Z May 65, JCS IN 59892.

The problem of Constitutionlist propaganda attacks, cease-fire violations, and conditions in the northern sector of Santo Domingo continued to trouble US planners. Concerned over the possible effects of the inflammatory and virulent attacks emanating from the Radio Santo Domingo, General Palmer suggested widening the LOC to seize the Constitutionlist-held facility. His suggestion was disapproved by Admiral McDonald, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS, however, directed CINCLANT to prepare a plan, including an appropriate cover story, for sabotaging the Constitutionlist medium-wave transmitters in the area north of the LOC, assuming that the OAS failed to neutralize Radio Santo Domingo by political means.


(S) Msgs, General Palmer to CINCLANT, 131759Z May 65, JCS IN 58569, and 140127Z May 65, JCS IN 59155. (PS-LINDIS-Gp 1) Msg, JCS 2080 to CINCLANT, 132311Z May 65.

US officials on the scene continued to be occupied with Constitutionalist activities during the cease-fire. CINCLANT informed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that he agreed with Special Ambassador Martin that "tying our hand militarily likely to harm GNR while at the same time not only uplifting rebel morale but also providing them with opportunity to consolidate their strength." The net effect he deduced from this was "an everincreasing deterioration of the military situation with no ready political solution in sight." CINCLANT considered time working against US; "we are bound to suffer additional casualties and become involved in unpleasant incidents." Therefore, he recommended that the US: 1) wire the LOC and designate a specific cross-over point where local police could "recognize known Communists, rebels, criminals, etc", and 2) capture the Peynado bridge, remove the Constitutionalist roadblock south of Avenida Teradentes, and establish a linkup with the present LOC. CINCLANT believed that such actions could be justified because of continued violation of the cease-fire and the need to ensure free access to the city north of the Rio Isabella. He directed USCOMDOMREP to comment on the proposal and prepare plans for the operation.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to CJCS and USCOMDOMREP, 131622Z May 65, JCS IN 58568, CJCS files.

The three problems of radio propaganda, cease-fire violations, and resumptions of normal industrial operations in the northern part of Santo Domingo were all addressed in a joint State/Defense contingency plan prepared in Santo Domingo in answer to a request from Washington of 12 May. The planners presented in great detail the economic justifications for US action, noting that the area around Avenue Maximo Gomez was the industrial heart of the nation. They then recommended that the US seek the OAS Commission's approval for the operation, which would first extend the LOC to include the area around Radio Santo Domingo and then further extend the ISZ to establish a line of departure for operations to the north to secure the industrial complexes. The plan also included the capture of the Peynado bridge, thus isolating the city and cutting the Constitutionlists' line of communication to the countryside. The planners noted that the key to the operation, and the area of heaviest resistance, would be Radio Santo Domingo. They admitted that the political consequences of these actions were largely incalculable. Whether or not the plan should be unilaterally implemented without the approval of the OAS Commission was a matter for decision in Washington.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1682 to State, 140045Z May 65, JCS IN 59597.



In response to the State Department request of 12 May, General Palmer and Ambassador Bennett submitted to the Department a draft proclamation establishing the IAF. It called for a Special Committee of the CAS MFM to appoint the commander and deputy commander, who would be supported by a staff and would exercise operational control over the troops assigned to the IAF.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1685 to State, 140300Z May 65, JCS IN 59588.

As directed by the JCS on 12 May, CINCLANT recommended procedures for logistic support of IAF (PRESS AHEAD) forces. Contingent units should deploy to the Dominican Republic at once and have equipment shortages filled after they arrived. If, however, the items involved were essential to the mission, the units should delay deployment until delivery of the items in the Dominican Republic was assured. US Service counterparts would initiate action to fill shortages.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 131900Z May 65, JCS IN 58629.

The governments of Costa Rica and Honduras formally offered contingents of 20 and 250 men, respectively, to the IAF.

(S) State Circ 2213, 13 May 65, JCS IN 59327

The significant political development of the day occurred in Puerto Rico where Juan Bosch, continuing conversations with a US representative, agreed: 1) to seek former President Balaguer's support for a provisional government; 2) to support his former Minister of Agriculture, Silvestre Antonio Guzman for President; and 3) to inquire whether Balaguer or one of his supporters would accept a cabinet post in the new government. Bosch also agreed that the cabinet might include a person who had a special appeal to the "San Isidro" military forces.

Text in (~~TS~~-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, State 1135 to Santo Domingo, 20 May 65, JCS IN 70684.

14 May 65

Constitutionalist forces made an unsuccessful attack on Imbert's troops in the Transportation Battalion Headquarters in the northwest part of the city. Thirty-two cease-fire violations were reported between 141300Z and 150100Z, but there were no US casualties.

(~~S~~-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to USCOMDOMREP, 151824Z May 65, JCS IN 62778. (~~TS~~) NMCC OPSUM 113-65, 15 May 65, 3-4.

Constitutionalist propaganda attacks over Radio Santo Domingo remained a problem. The station, which had been silenced by GNR air attacks the previous day, returned to the air from 0845 to 1245. It began broadcasting again at 1500. [

] At 1700 the station again went off the air, this time being knocked out by Imbert's special forces. [

The JCS were also planning operations to destroy Constitutionalist radio propaganda altogether. At their request, USCOMDOMREP submitted a plan for the destruction of Constitutionalist radio facilities by US Special Forces. [

(5)

(~~S~~-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 2096 to CINCLANT, 141248Z May 65. (~~S~~-LIMDIS-Gp 1) Msg, JCS 2110 to CINCLANT, 141625Z May 65. (~~TS~~-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 142055Z May 65, JCS IN 60751. (~~S~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 1710 to State, 142330Z May 65, JCS IN 61327.

In addition to these plans for limited action by Special Forces, US military commanders also completed action on a plan for more ambitious operations in

northern Santo Domingo by US forces. The JCS having reviewed USCOMDOMREP's plan of 13 May for operations north of the LOC, asked CINCLANT whether it was the plan he wished to implement, how long it would take to begin operations after being ordered to do so, and how many Constitutionalist could be expected to oppose it. CINCLANT replied that the plan was "generally acceptable," could be implemented immediately, and would probably be opposed by about 4,000 Constitution-
alists.

(S-Gp 4) Msgs, JCS 2111 to CINCLANT, 141718Z May 65 and CINCLANT to JCS, 142016Z May 65, JCS IN 60870.

Within the US Government, work continued on command relations of the proposed IAF. The State Department, having received the draft proclamation submitted the previous day by General Palmer and Ambassador Bennett, prepared a revised draft. This revision differed from the Bennett-Palmer recommendations in the following respects: 1) the commander and deputy commander were to be "designated by commanders of national contingents" and approved by the Special Commission; 2) the commander and deputy commander should not be of the same nationality; and 3) the staff was to include representatives of each member state contributing forces, apportioned according to the size of the contingent provided by each state.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2225, 14 May 65, JCS IN 61271.

Commenting on the proposed IAF command arrangements submitted by Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer on 9 May, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that every attempt should be made to structure the force along the following lines: 1) policy guidance should come from the OAS MFM, 2) the IAF commander should act as advisor to the Special OAS Commission, and, if a Latin American, should have USCOMDOMREP as his deputy; 3) the Special Commission should be furnished a military liaison group of from three to seven members; 4) the commanders' staff should be combined staff organized along US lines; and 5) commanders of combined component commands should be US officers. (On 17 June the Assistant Sec Def/ISA told the CJCS that the JCS views were considered and "so far as politically possible" were adopted in negotiations.)

(S-Gp 3) JCSM-363-65 to SecDef, "Command Structure for Dominican Republic - Unified Command Organization (U)," 14 May 65, derived from (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/12-3, same subj, 11 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (3 May 65). (S-Gp 4) Memo, ASD/ISA to CJCS, same subj, 17 Jun 65, encl to (S-Gp 4) 1st N/M of JCS 2338/12-3, same subj, 21 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (3 May 65).

In the logistics field, the JCS approved CINCLANT's proposal of 13 May that the United States make up supply deficits for Latin American IAF contingents. The JCS informed CINCLANT, USCINCEO, D3A, and the US Service Chiefs that US supply agencies would fill shortages when directed by JCS on request of CINCLANT.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 2144 to CINCLANT, et al., 142104Z May 65.

The first contingent of the IAF, a 250-man Honduran force, consisting of a rifle company, a MP platoon, and a medical section, arrived in the Dominican Republic. In the absence of an agreed OAS document formally establishing the IAF and defining command relationships, the Hondurans reported to the OAS Commission and not to USCOMDOMREP. General Palmer, who had assumed responsibility for performing housekeeping functions for the Latin American contingents, bivouacked the Hondurans under canvas at San Isidro.

(S) Memo, Exec Asst to CNO for Record, 00127-65, 14 May 65. (S-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 142311Z May 65, JCS IN 61580.

Another force entered the political arena when the UN Security Council called for a strict cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. It also voted unanimously to send a fact-finding mission to the scene. Ambassador Bennett reported that the UN action had already handicapped efforts to reach a political solution; Caamano and his associates, had treated the OAS Commission with arrogance and disrespect, stating that their struggle was against American forces and that they would negotiate only with the US. As a counter to the UN action, Ambassador Bennett said he had pressed the OAS Commission without success to demonstrate its ability to handle the situation by taking such positive measures as taking over radio stations, establishing arms collection points, and trying to form a provisional government independent of the contending factions. Adding his opinion to that of Ambassador Bennett, USCOMDOMREP reported that in view of the increased number of cease-fire violations, it was "increasingly doubtful whether OAS Commission can effectively carry out its role."

(S-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1710 to State, 142330Z May 65, JCS IN 61327. (U) Wash Post, 15 May 65, 1. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1720 to State, 151140Z May 65, JCS IN 61807. (S-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 142311Z May 65, JCS IN 61580.


15 May 65

The ONR forces launched a major military offensive to clear the Constitutionalists from the industrial areas northeast of the LOC. The reported purpose of the

drive: to open the factories and allow the people to return to work. General Imbert, who commanded the drive, had about 2,000 troops, including the Quartermaster and Transportation Barracks garrisons, a battalion from San Cristobal, and 250 troops sent by General Wessin from San Isidro. Only 700 CNR troops saw action during the day, however. By nightfall, Imbert's forces had advanced eastward about six blocks to Avenida Maximo Gomez.

(8-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to USCOMDOMREP, 152332Z May 65, JCS IN 62612. (TS) NMCC OPSUM 114-65, 17 May 65, 1. (8-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1737 to State, 161119Z May 65, JCS IN 63022.

In Washington the JCS were also occupied with the problem of the northeastern industrial zone. III



(8-Gp 3) JCSM-372-65 to SecDef, "Establishment of a New Safety Zone and Reduction of Rebel Strong Points in Santo Domingo (U)," 15 May 65, derived from (8-Gp 3) JCS 2338/16, same subj, 14 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). OKS

The JCS continued to be concerned with the problem of Constitutionalist radio propaganda. Noting that some Constitutionalist radio facilities had been destroyed, they asked CINCLANT to evaluate the remaining Constitutionalist broadcasting capabilities and make recommendations for silencing AM transmission. At the same time General Palmer reported that he had activated jamming equipment in Santiago as directed by the JCS on 14 May.

(2) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 151817Z May 65, JCS IN 62548. (25-Gp 1) Msg, JCS 2218 to CINCLANT, 151715Z May 65.

The organization and development of an IAF continued. US officials were able to solve an intra-governmental misunderstanding over intended procedures for selecting the IAF commanders. Ambassador Bennett, CINCLANT, and USCOMDOMREP objected to the 14 May State Department draft plan, which they understood called for election of the commander and deputy commander by the national contingent commanders. The State Department replied that election by the contingent commanders was not intended; the commanders would be selected through consultations with the governments concerned, who would then instruct

their commanders how to vote. The State Department favored a Brazilian commander with a US deputy, and had instructed US missions in the countries concerned to initiate appropriate consultations.

(~~2~~-LIMDIS-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 152024Z May 65, JCS IN 62529. (~~2~~-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1717 to State, 150445Z May 65, JCS IN 61288. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150515Z May 65, JCS IN 61886. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2232, 15 May 65, JCS IN 62766. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, State 1665 to Rio de Janeiro, 15 May 65, JCS IN 62767. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, State 1015 to Santo Domingo, 15 May 65, JCS IN 62760.

The State Department also informed Ambassador Bennett that the IADB's advice to the OAS (see 13 May) was not consistent with the Department's instructions concerning the composition of the IAF (see 14 May). Therefore, the Ambassador should "indicate" that the Commander Inter-American Force might find the IADB paper useful but that the agreement worked out with the contributing countries and the OAS Committee would be the governing document.

(~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, State 1045 to Santo Domingo, 15 May 65, JCS IN 61738. (For JCS comments see 21 May 65.)

Meanwhile new contingents for the IAF, a Nicaraguan rifle company of 166 officers and men and a Costa Rican Civil Guard platoon of 21 officers and men, landed in the Dominican Republic.

(~~2~~) NMCC CPSUM, 114-65, 17 May 65.

While drawing up contingency plans for further military action and organizing the IAF, the US continued diplomatic efforts to form a compromise government in Santo Domingo. Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance went to Puerto Rico to consult with Juan Bosch and Silvestre Guzman. The two Dominicans agreed to accept a provisional government led by Guzman with a cabinet minister proposed by the GNR (preferably a civilian) and an Armed Forces Minister mutually satisfactory to the GNR and Constitutionalists. They also agreed to the internment or deportation of Communists and Trujillistas, but suggested that this might have "practical disadvantages."

(~~2~~-LIMDIS-Gp 1) Msg, State 1153 to Santo Domingo, 20 May 65, JCS IN 70634.

At the same time, Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann and Assistant Secretary of State Jack Vaughn

arrived in Santo Domingo and organized a provisional "government of national concord" **C**

J

(~~8~~-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1756 to State, 172040Z May 65, JCS IN 64571.

A further action complicating the political situation was the arrival of the UN advance group, headed by the Indian Major General Rikhye. Ambassador Bennett reported that the OAS Commission, stung by the UN action of 14 May and the rebuff it received at Constitutionalist headquarters, was making plans to return to Washington.

Summing up the situation for the President, Ambassador Bennett reported that many observers considered each day of military inactivity a day of political gain for the Constitutionlists who, growing stronger, would eventually spread the revolt to the countryside. He commented on the GNR offensive begun that morning and concluded:

Informed Dominicans and Americans are convinced no negotiated settlement is possible in absence military pressure, considering any negotiations as matters now stand can only be on rebel terms, simply delaying and making more difficult final confrontation. Perhaps today's action in northern part of city will weaken their [Constitutionalist] intransigence.

(~~8~~-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1730 to State, 160015Z May 65, JCS IN 62557. (~~8~~-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1737 to State, 161119Z May 65, JCS IN 63022.

16 May 65


Imbert's troops resumed the offensive north of the LOC, attacking with a force numbering about 700 men supported by armored vehicles. By noon, they had reached their stated objective, Calle Maria Montez. According to Imbert's reports, his forces had lost only 3 killed and 10 wounded, while Constitutionalist casualties numbered 200 killed and 350 prisoners.

(~~8~~-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1746 to State, 162358Z May 65, JCS IN 63487.


Radio Santo Domingo began broadcasting at 0115, but was jammed off the air at 1130. USCOMDOMREP, in response to the JCS request of 15 May, submitted a

list of all Constitutionalist broadcast facilities known to exist north of the LOC and concluded that although the Constitutionlists could broadcast on a limited basis, USCOMDOMREP could jam this broadcasting with available equipment. When the transmitters had been positively located, appropriate plans for their destruction would be prepared and submitted to CINCLANT. The plans could be implemented if jamming proved inadequate.

(Z-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to USCOMDOMREP, 170157Z May 65, JCS IN 63503. (Z-LIMDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 162135Z May 65, JCS IN 63398.



(Z-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1752 to State, 170605Z May 65, JCS IN 64194.



(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1753 to State, 171135Z
May 65, JCS IN 63756.

Summing up the day's political development for
the President, Bundy concluded:

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1752 to State, 170605Z
May 65, JCS IN 64194.

17 May 65

The GNR offensive against Constitutionalist forces north of the LOC continued against stiffening resistance. During the day Imbert's force, numbering 1,200 men and 12 tanks, had consolidated its positions of the previous day running generally north and south along Calle Maria Montez. USCOMDOMREP estimated the strength of the Constitutionalist forces in the area at 850-1,000 men.

General Palmer reported that the GNR attack south-eastward might endanger US troops guarding the northern border of the ISZ and the LOC. Therefore, he had authorized US vehicular patrols to remain near the GNR south flank and report Imbert's position. He was trying to do this unobtrusively to avoid any identification with the GNR forces.

The usual Constitutionalist sniping at US troops continued during the day, and a Constitutionalist tank fired on a 82d Airborne Division position. It was silenced by 106-mm recoilless rifle fire.

(~~Z~~-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 180048Z
May 65, JCS IN 64890. (~~Z~~) NMCC OPSUM 116-65,
19 May 65, 1.

The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the US take immediate unilateral military action to reduce the Constitutionalist stronghold in northern Santo Domingo, thereby consolidating recent GNR gains, confining the Constitutionalist to one small sector of the city, and reducing their ability to carry the revolution to the countryside.

(~~Z~~-Gp 3) JCSM 377-65 to SecDef, "Military Considerations Relative to Conduct of Operations by USCOM-DOMREP (U)," derived from (~~Z~~-Gp 3) JCS 2338/17, same subj, 17 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). (For SecDef reply see 21 May 65.)

In order to meet the objections expressed by Ambassador Bennett, CINCLANT, and USCOMDOMREP on 15 May, the State Department amended the draft act establishing the IAF to specify that the commander and deputy commander would be designated by the commanders of the national contingents upon instructions of their respective governments.

(~~Z~~-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2245, 17 May 65,
JCS IN 65050.

US officials reported several incidents, however, that cast doubts on the effectiveness of any such inter-American peace keeping force. General Palmer reported that the OAS Commission "got cold feet" and refused to approve the planned use of Latin American contingents on international MP patrols in the ISZ. Ambassador Bennett was able to obtain the Commission's consent to moving the Latin American troops into the ISZ, but the Commission refused to list duties for the troops in spite of Secretary Mora's desire to have these units engaged in "safe and highly visible activity." General Palmer reported that the Latin American contingents were eager to be employed in an active role, but a role that was purely security and humanitarian in nature. The Latin commanders had stated that they did not come to Santo Domingo to fight. Palmer concluded that, "this is an understandable but rather curious view and makes me wonder whether a truly effective IAF can be established."

(~~Z~~-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 180248Z
May 65, JCS IN 64880. (~~Z~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo
1766 to State, 180340Z May 65, JCS IN 65003.

As Latin American contingents began trickling in for the IAF, US force levels in the Dominican Republic reached their peak strength, as follows:

US Army

Hq USCOMDOMREP	317	
62d Abr Div (9Br)	3,650	
Non-Divisional Troops	<u>4,922</u>	
Total US Army		14,889

USMC

4th MEB - Ashore	6,049	
Afloat	<u>1,909</u>	
Total USMC		7,958


USAF

HQ CTF 121 (Advon)	137	
507th TAC Cont Gp and Supporting Units	<u>864</u>	
Total USAF		1,001

MAAG	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>
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TOTALS		23,889
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(28) NMCC OPSUM 114-65, 17 May 65, 3. (S)
DomRep Data, P II-2-1.



id in spite of efforts of Secretary Mann and Ambassador Bennett to persuade it to remain, departed for Washington in the evening.

(Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1766 to State, 180340Z May 65, JCS IN 65003. (2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1770 to State, 181125Z May 65, JCS IN 65412.

The US registered one diplomatic success during the day. USCOMDOMREP reported that he and Ambassador Bennett had met with General Rikhye and his UN Observation Team, that the UN official had been "completely uninformed on the US side of the story." After discussions at USCOMDOMREP Headquarters, Rikhye had commented favorably on the US modus operandi during the cease-fire. General Rikhye also discussed

the IAF and agreed with the US plans for the employment of that international force.

(Z-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT,
180248Z May 65, JCS IN 64880.

18 May 65

Imbert's forces continued their attack north of the LOC, reaching a general line extending from Peynado bridge southward along Avenida Maximo Gomez to the cemetery, then east 10 blocks to Avenida Manuel Ubaldo Gomez and south to Avenida San Martin, about one block west of Radio Santo Domingo.

(Z-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT,
190610Z May 65, JCS IN 66733.

Meanwhile the Director, USIA, reported to the President that the USIA-controlled stations were dominant throughout the country. The Constitutionalist broadcast output had been reduced to a weak signal, apparently from makeshift facilities, heard only sporadically, and then only in a small area of the city. The USIA now controlled four stations in Santo Domingo, which broadcast news, public service announcements, and Alliance for Progress programs 24 hours a day. Rowan noted that US broadcasts enjoyed a Dominican audience of all political leanings. Further, he reported that Messin and Imbert's stations had improved their broadcasting, tempering their emotional attacks and appealing for an end to the fighting.

(S) Memo, Director, USIA, to the President, "Psychological Situation Report -- Dominican Republic," 18 May 65, CJCS files.

In an effort to break the growing stalemate between the two Dominican factions, senior US officials in Santo Domingo--Bundy, Mann, Vance, Palmer, Bennett, and Martin--proposed a series of US military actions. They suggested that with the approval of the OAS and the Dominican factions, the US should physically impose its forces between the belligerents in the northern sector of the city, thereby: 1) demonstrating that the US was truly neutral, humanitarian, and desirous of a cease-fire; 2) enabling the US to prevent a disruption of negotiations by renewed fighting; and 3) reducing pressure for UN involvement by demonstrating that the OAS, through its member the US, was acting effectively. They outlined a military plan that envisaged the imposition of US troops along a north-south corridor roughly paralleling the present position of the opposing Dominican forces.

General Palmer admitted that the plan was "risky," especially if the GNR demurred. Nevertheless, it could be done, and it would effectively seal the Constitutionals in one sector of the city.

(Z-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1774 to State,
181925Z May 65, JCS IN 66070. (Z-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg,
USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 190610Z May 65, JCS IN 66733.

Following the breakdown in negotiations, Secretary Mann and Special Ambassador Martin left for Washington.

(Z-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1778 to State,
182055Z May 65, JCS IN 66138. (Z) Msg, Santo Domingo
1797 to State, 191155Z May 65, JCS IN 67151.
(Z-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1804 to State,
191605Z May 65, JCS IN 67429.

In an effort to bring the Latin American contingents of the IAF into action as soon as possible, the US Embassy presented to Secretary General Mora a draft memorandum of understanding covering interim arrangements pending formal establishment of the IAF. The memorandum, which was to be signed by Mora and the national contingent commanders, called for Latin American contingents to perform security and humanitarian missions within the ISZ. When necessary, these contingents would work with US units to which they would assign liaison officers. Command of the Latin American contingents would remain with their national commanders; operational guidance would be channelled as far as practicable through the OAS Secretariat.

Mora approved the draft memorandum and was prepared to present it for signing to national commanders

but the State Department, considering the time inappropriate for creating a provisional IAF, ordered Ambassador Bennett not to sign the agreement.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1780 to State, 182130Z May 65, JCS IN 66350. (S) Msg, State 1109 to Santo Domingo, 18 May 65, JCS IN 66677.

US officials were apparently concerned with the question of US troop withdrawals to match IAF troop arrivals. Bundy, Vance, Bennett, and Palmer recommended against such a parity arrangement and suggested to the President that he announce: his appreciation for the arrival of the Latin American troops; his hope for the early arrival of more; his expectation that an agreement would be reached to permit their use in all areas; and his intention to withdraw a US Marine battalion as soon as these things were achieved. The four US officials agreed that such an announcement, as distinct from any action, would "slightly improve basic atmosphere for negotiations."

(S-LIMDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1790 to State, 190400Z May 65, JCS IN 66490.

The UN's presence in the Dominican Republic became official when Antonio Mayobre, special representative to the Secretary General of the UN, arrived in Santo Domingo. He told Secretary General Mora that his mission was merely to observe and report on the Dominican crisis. He noted that a cease-fire was of the first importance, and found it difficult to understand why the US with its preponderance of force could not stop Dominicans from shooting one another. Mayobre also observed that the US position was very vulnerable because it seemed to favor Imbert.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 1777 to State, 182050Z May 65, JCS IN 66059.

19 May 65

GNR forces captured Radio Santo Domingo and continued their advance eastward. Late in the afternoon, Constitutionalist forces provoked a three-way fight with US paratroopers in the LOC and Imbert's forces in the National Palace. Two Constitutionalist leaders, Bosch protege Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez and the Communist leader Juan Miguel Roman, were killed. In another incident, one US Marine was killed and another wounded when they inadvertently drove their jeep into the Constitutionalist zone.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1805 to State, 191620Z May 65, JCS IN 67506. (S) NMCC OPSUM 117-65, 20 May 65, 1.

Vance and Bundy, along with the Ambassador and USCOMDOMREP, reported that the GNR was "somewhat flushed with success," and that they were concerned over Imbert's increasing intransigence resulting from his recent victories. They proposed a modification of their 13 May plan for US military interposition between the Dominican factions; a modification that would deny Imbert the territory east of a line running along Avenue Duarte between the Rio Isabella on the north and the Rio Ozama on the east.

CINCLANT informed the JCS that he objected to the plan because it could result in US forces having to fight both factions. He added that the Constitutionalist group was controlled by "about 60 hard-core Communist leaders," and that they had killed 18 US troops and wounded 96 others. Since US was dedicated to forestalling the installation of a Communist controlled or influenced government in Santo Domingo, it should "stay quiet where we are now and let the Loyalist junta forces continue present action until rebels are defeated."

CJCS replied that he agreed with CINCLANT about the disadvantages to the proposed plan. He continued, however: "on balance, the JCS consider that the governing factors in this chaotic situation are largely political rather than military."

By evening, however, the US plan was again no longer feasible because the GNR forces had advanced up to the proposed interposition line in some places. Although USCOMDOMREP had agreed with Vance and Bundy on the feasibility of the proposed plan in the event negotiations failed, he later informed CINCLANT that it was "no longer regarded as a desirable or feasible course of action." He added "I breathed a sigh of relief, as we could visualize a situation where our troops were the ham in the sandwich,"

(S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1805 to State, 191620Z May 65, JCS IN 67506. (S-EXDIS-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 192338Z May 65, JCS IN 68099. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 2484 to CINCLANT, 201636Z May 65. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 200800Z May 65, JCS IN 68615.

Vance, Bundy, Palmer, and Bennett also wanted to persuade Imbert to surrender the newly-captured Radio Santo Domingo to the CAS and Secretary Mora to accept it. In the opinion of the four American officials, "nothing could do more to move us forward here than a strong radio that tells truth and preaches peace and national concord." If the CAS refused to accept the offer, the four added, "they deserve to suffer UN interference and all other woes."

(S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1801 to State, 191545Z May 65, JCS IN 67401.

(48-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1798 to State, 191400Z May 65, JCS IN 67273.

(8-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1830 to State, 200630Z May 65, JCS IN 68533.

In Washington, the special five-man OAS Peace Commission reported that it had achieved its primary mission of arranging a cease-fire, overseeing evacuation of civilians, and arranging for emergency food and medical supplies. A four-man majority concluded that the Committee's mission was over and recommended the appointment of a single representative to act in accordance with any OAS resolutions calling for further action. The Commission majority said that the presence of UN observers had interfered with the Committee's mission and recommended that the OAS request the UN to withdraw. Finally, it recommended that the OAS refrain from "forming a Dominican government as distinct from seeking a return to peace and normality." The Panamanian member filed a minority report disagreeing with this last point and also opposing dissolution of the Committee and its replacement by a single representative.

(U) Wash Post, 20 May 65, 1.

20 May 65

The CNR continued its largely unopposed eastward advance in northern Santo Domingo. Imbert's forces now controlled the whole area west of Avenue Duarte, just five blocks short of the Rio Ozama. Meanwhile, the International Red Cross and the World Health Organization proposed a 24-hour cease-fire beginning at 1200 on 21 May to allow for the removal of dead and wounded from the battle area. The truce, negotiated by UN representatives Mayobre and Rikhye, was signed by both Imbert and Caamano.

(8) Msg, Santo Domingo 1846 to State, 210030Z May 65, JCS IN 69833.

The US continued to work on the difficult problem of organizing the IAF. The JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that they still supported their 14 May view on IAF organization, command arrangements, and force structure, but in view of the intent to name a Brazilian as commander, the JCS "consider it vital" that the US name the deputy. The deputy should operate in a dual capacity: internationally he should exercise "considerable influence" on the Commander to direct operations that would further US objectives; nationally, he should have the flexibility necessary to allow US unilateral action if required. The JCS added that "it is of paramount importance" that the US maintain "sufficient flexibility" to permit unilateral US military action, using other than IAF committed forces.

The JCS concluded that the size and exact composition of IAF forces could not be assessed until the Latin American contributions were operationally effective. Moreover, the US should resist pressure to reduce its forces--pressure that was bound to increase as the Latin Americans arrived--until the IAF was fully capable of carrying out its mission without these US forces.

(8-Gp 4) JCSM 393-65 to SecDef, "Considerations Relative to the Establishment of an Inter-American Force in the Dominican Republic (U)," 20 May 65, derived from (8-Gp 4) JCS 2338/19, same subj, 18 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65). (For SecDef reply see 2 Jun 65.)

The JCS also recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the OAS should finance the transportation and soft goods costs of the Latin American contingents. If that proved impossible, the JCS suggested that the costs should be underwritten by AID and the President's Special Contingency Fund, not by MAP.

(8-Gp 4) JCSM 397-65 to SecDef, "Financial Support Concept, OAS Forces in the Dominican Republic (U)," 20 May 65, derived from (8-Gp 4) JCS 2338/18, same subj, 18 May 65, JMF 9128.4

(18 May 65). No decision on the financing of the IAF had been made as of 1 Feb 66. On 9 Jul 65, the Administrator, AID, informed the Deputy SecDef that the financing would not be decided "pending interpretation of the Fulbright amendment and other elements of foreign assistance."
(S) Ltr, Adm, AID, to Dep SecDef, 9 Jul 65, encl to (C-Gp 4) JCS 2338/31, "Estimate for FY 1966 to Support an Inter-American Force (U)," 16 Jul 65, JMF 9128.4 (9 Jul 65).

Meanwhile, the Nicaraguan and Honduran units were deployed in the ISZ in anticipation of agreement on their mission by OAS authorities.

(TS) NMCC OPSUM 118-65, 21 May 65, 1.

The OAS, however, was more immediately concerned with establishing a permanent cease-fire. The OAS accepted the recommendations made the previous day by its Special Commission and named Secretary General Mora to succeed the Commission as its representative in the Dominican Republic. Mora was specifically instructed to negotiate a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo, to provide his good offices to both sides in seeking a settlement, and to coordinate these activities with the UN representatives in Santo Domingo.

(U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1354, (7 Jun 65), 912.

Hope for a permanent cease-fire and settlement of the crisis appeared dim, however, with Imbert proving increasingly intransigent. Imbert denied to the press any movement toward a coalition government with the Constitutionalists, claiming that the GNR represented "total reconstruction of economic and political systems" and claimed to have proof of Communist support for the Constitutionalist cause.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1846 to State, 210030Z May 65, JCS IN 69833.

21 May 65

The 24-hour cease-fire, in which, Ambassador Bennett reported, "OAS unfortunately played no role," went into effect at 1200. Despite scattered firing, the UN team pronounced the truce effective.

The cease-fire marked the beginning of a new phase in the Dominican crisis. Imbert's forces had successfully swept the area north of the LOC as far as the Rio Ozama, and with one exception, the opposing Dominican factions were now left in to areas separated by US forces in the LCC and the ISZ. The exception was the National Palace, held by 250 Loyalist troops, deep in Constitutionalist territory.

The US was now in a position where it could exercise substantial control over the country. Secretary Vance made clear that the US was determined to exercise this control when he told Imbert that the Loyalists would not be permitted to attack the Constitutionals "either by land or sea."

The OAS tried to build on the successful cease-fire. It called on the Dominican factions to convert the 24-hour truce into a permanent cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo. Secretary Mora was instructed to communicate the text of the OAS resolution to the Dominicans and "to do everything possible to accomplish its objectives."

(S) Msgs, Santo Domingo 1878 to State, 220015Z May 65, JCS IN 71638 and Santo Domingo 1893 to State, 221045Z May 65, JCS IN 72268. (U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1354 (7 Jun 65), 913.

In spite of the success of the cease-fire, a political solution to the crisis seemed farther away than ever. Imbert refused to enter into an agreement with the Constitutionals or to return to the 1963 Constitution. Ambassador Bennett reported that while the Constitutionals put on a "brave but conciliatory and uncertain front," Imbert refused to extend the cease-fire, and rejected any agreement with the Constitutionals. Imbert did, however, agree to turn Radio Santo Domingo over to the OAS. (See, however, item of 27 May.)

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1893 to State, 221045Z May 65, JCS IN 72268. (S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Santo Domingo 1881 to State, 220140Z May 65, JCS IN 71719.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense informed the CJCS that the JCS recommendations of 15 and 17 May for unilateral US military action to seize the Constitutionalist-controlled industrial area north of the LOC were being held in abeyance. (An ex post facto memorandum, since the GNR had been in control of the whole area since 1200.)

(S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Military Consideration Relative to Conduct of Operations by USCOMDOM-REP (U)," 21 May 65, attached to (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/16-1, same subj, 25 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65).

The JCS recommended that the CJCS discuss with OSD and State the 15 May State Department message to Ambassador Bennett that challenged the advice of the IADB and did not "reflect any coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The JCS noted that the IADB had acted with dispatch and at the request of recognized authority to produce advice that was

"in harmony" with JCS views. The JCS added that to forego the IADB advice would lose needed support for the US. They suggested using the IADB action "as a springboard for appropriate US activity." [CJCS action on this recommendation is not reflected in available records.]

(S-Gp 4) JCS 2338/20, "OAS/IADB Collaboration on the Intra-American Force (U)," 19 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (19 May 65).

22 May 65

The cease-fire proved generally effective, and General Palmer reported the quietest 24-hour period since he had arrived in Santo Domingo. During the morning Imbert rejected a Red Cross appeal for a second 24-hour truce, but he did promise to abstain from initiating operations while peace talks begun by OAS Secretary General Mora continued. After the expiration of the agreed truce at 1200 hours, however, Constitutionalist violations increased, and the GNR forces began mop-up operations in the northern sector of the city.

General Palmer reported to CINCLANT and CJCS that the Constitutionlists had initiated 34 armed attacks resulting in 6 US wounded in the first post-cease-fire hours. He noted that these attacks came at a time when the cease-fire had been "accepted and extended" by the Loyalists and were a "deliberately planned, premeditated rupture" of the cease-fire. He had urged Ambassador Bennett to protest to the OAS and the UN representatives and warned that despite the "sensitive and important negotiations" in progress, he could not allow his troops to suffer such attacks indefinitely. He recommended that CJCS and CINCLANT inform the Secretary of Defense and the JCS of the danger and suggested that Caamano be warned of possible US retaliation.

Fighting in the city ceased at 1800 hours, the Loyalists claiming that all Constitutionalist resistance in the northern area had been overcome. In a related move, USCOMDOMREP, with OAS approval, permitted two defecting Constitutionalist units to cross the ISZ after their arms had been confiscated.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 230530Z May 65, JCS IN 73218. (S-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2324, 22 May 65, JCS IN 73546. (S) Msgs, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 230659Z May 65 and 220630Z May 65. (TS) NMCC OPSUM 120-65, 24 May 65, 1.

The UN Security Council approved a French resolution calling for a permanent cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. At the same meeting, the Security Council rejected new Soviet demands for a condemnation of US intervention and for immediate withdrawal of US troops.

(U) NY Times, 23 May 65, 1.

The IAF came closer to reality when the O.A. Foreign Ministers approved a resolution requesting Brazil to name a commander of the IAF and the US to designate a deputy commander. The resolution directed Secretary General Mora to organize the force as outlined in the 6 May resolution and suggested the establishment of a committee to study the functioning and maintenance of the IAF.

(U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1354, (7 Jun 65), 913.

Secretary Vance and General Palmer informed the CJCS, that "from the military standpoint" they believed that the one US Marine BLT (1,600 men) then afloat off the Dominican Republic could be withdrawn immediately and that a second Marine BLT (1,700 men) could at least be withdrawn to ships offshore when the Brazilian IAF contingent arrived.

(S-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 1916 to State, 230140Z May 65, JCS IN 73023.

23 May 65

General Palmer reported a generally quiet city. US troops were avoiding confrontation with Constitutionalist forces near the LOC and were returning fire only in the case of major attacks in order to avoid any "distorted picture" being presented to the OAS or the UN representatives. Palmer had denied Constitutionalist charges of US advances into their territory, and had so informed the UN.

Meanwhile, chances of a cease-fire improved. Secretary Mora met with Caamano who agreed to accept a cease-fire, and Imbert was reported willing to refrain from initiating any military actions. Late in the day Mora was able to announce the establishment of an informal cease-fire.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 240400Z May 65, JCS IN 73802. (U) Wash Post, 24 May 65, 12.

Radio Santo Domingo returned to the air, and Imbert made a 15-minute address to the nation, denying any dictatorial aspirations and soliciting support, especially from the Dominican youth, for himself and his "provisional and transitory GNR."

(U) Msg, Santo Domingo 1947 to State, 240130Z May 65, JCS IN 73715.

Secretary Mora and the commanders of the contingents contributed by ~~Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras,~~ Nicaragua, and the US signed an act formally establishing the IAF. The IAF was constituted as a

Unified Command, with a commander, a deputy, and a staff, and national contingents from OAS states. The commander would exercise operational control over the force; command, less operational control over the national contingents, would remain with the national commanders. The commander would also issue Force regulations and establish a table of organization and a chain of command. The staff would include representatives of each member state contributing forces, apportioned according to the size of the contribution. In accordance with the OAS resolution of 22 May, Brazil named General Hugo Panasco Alvim as force commander, and the US named General Palmer as deputy commander.

Unclassified text in (TS) DomRep Data, IV, 1-4.

The Brazilian contingent was authorized to proceed to the Dominican Republic, and the JCS directed CINCSTRIKE to provide CINCLANT the tactical airlift required to move this contingent. The Brazilian advance military element (23 personnel) arrived in Santo Domingo at 1800.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 2675 to CSAF, et al., 232359Z May 65. (S) Telecon item, NMCC to White House, 240156Z May 65.

24 May 65

US technicians stopped jamming the Constitutionalist broadcasting facilities at 1200, and immediately the Caamano government returned to the air over a "Radio Santo Domingo." The official Radio Santo Domingo, meanwhile, continued operating under GNR control.

There was no significant military activity during the day. The IAF, however, initiated operations with three-man police teams patrolling the LOC and ISZ from the Duarte Bridge to the Embajador Hotel. Each team consisted of a soldier from the US, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

(S) Resume of Significant Intelligence Relating to the DOMREP, 25 May 65, CJCS files. (TS) NMCC OPSUM 121-65, 25 May 65, 1.

In anticipation of the Latin American buildup in the IAF, the JCS asked CINCLANT and COMDOMREP to submit their views on the withdrawal of US forces, using as a guideline the withdrawal of up to 10,000 troops over the next 10 days to two weeks. The JCS added that "highest authority recognize political desirability" of substantial US withdrawal in order to "place problems associated with reestablishing governmental control squarely in hands of OAS."

(TS-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 2703 to CINCLANT, 241914Z May 65.

In response to the JCS request, USCOMDOMREP submitted a plan for the progressive reduction of US forces in the Dominican Republic. Predicated on the assumption that Santo Domingo, with the exception of the Constitutionalist zone, would continue to progress toward "normalcy," the plan outlined a force reduction from the current nine infantry and three Marine battalions ashore and the one Marine Battalion afloat (i.e. BLT 1/2 under CTF 124) to a total of seven infantry battalions (i.e. the 82nd Airborne Division minus two infantry battalions). The US force remaining in the Dominican Republic would be required to maintain: 1) the physical separation of the GNR and Constitutionalist forces; 2) the capability to reduce the Constitutionalist resistance south of the LOC; 3) capability to protect US and foreign nationals; and 4) a balanced US contribution to, and necessary support for, the IAF.

General Palmer recommended a three-phase reduction:

1. Immediate withdrawal: 3,500 Marines (one half afloat); 1,552 Army troops; and 68 Air Force personnel, reducing the US forces to eleven battalions ashore.
2. Withdrawal within seven days: the remaining Marines (4,500 men), reducing the US force to nine infantry battalions of the 82d Airborne Division.
3. Withdrawal within 14 days: a brigade force of two battalions and Divisional support troops (2,000 men), leaving seven US infantry battalions in the Dominican Republic.

General Palmer concluded that the remaining US forces would be deployed as follows: four battalions would seal off the Constitutionalist zone; one battalion would be stationed at San Isidro airfield and Port Andres; and the remaining two battalions would be held in ready reserve status, probably at the Rio Ozama Bridge and the ISZ.

(25-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 250530Z May 65, JCS IN 75186.

[] 3/05

(~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1963 to State, 241830Z May 65, JCS IN 74432. (~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1985 to State, 251900Z May 65, JCS IN 76274.

One further political development: the USSR renewed its demand in the UN Security Council that the US be condemned for "aggression" against the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, President Johnson ordered an FBI team into the Republic to investigate the extent and nature of Communist influence in the crisis.

(U) Wash Post, 25 May 65, 1 and 15.

25 May 65

The military situation continued calm, with the exception of a brief flare-up when Constitutionalist troops attacked the power plant, located just inside the ISZ, and the Loyalist-held National Palace. To give better protection to the power plant, General Palmer recommended to the OAS that the ISZ boundary in the vicinity of the plant be extended.

(~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 260531Z May 65, JCS IN 77154.

USCOMDOMREP reported to CINCLANT that in response to Secretary McNamara's telephoned instructions to Secretary Vance at 0930, he had ordered the withdrawal of 600 US Marines from the 4th MEB to begin at 0800 26 May. (The 600 figure approximated the number of Latin American troops in the IAF.)

As a result of discussion with the Secretary of Defense, the JCS directed CINCLANT and General Palmer to consult with General Alvim and obtain his agreement for subsequent US troop withdrawals. The JCS also wanted General Alvim to state his requirement for a US reserve force remaining in a quick reaction readiness posture for immediate return to the Dominican Republic.

(~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 2780 to CINCLANT and CONDOMREP, 252023Z May 65. (~~S~~-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 252047Z May 65, JCS IN 76407.

General Palmer's 24 May withdrawal plan was echoed by CINCLANT who outlined the same plan for the JCS but in terms of units rather than numbers of men. CINCLANT listed the following:

1. Immediate withdrawal: BLT 1/2 (now afloat); HMM 263 (now afloat) BLT 3/6 (now ashore and to be reembarked in Phibron Ten and reconstitute ready Phibron, under CINCLANTFLT); 6th MEU Headquarters (to be re-embarked with BLT 3/6 if directed by CG 4th MEB); and miscellaneous army support units.
2. Withdrawal within seven days: BLT 1/6; Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines; 6th MEU Headquarters (if not already re-embarked); 4th MEB Headquarters.
3. Withdrawal within 130 days: Two airborne infantry battalions with appropriate reinforcing units.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 252314Z May 65, JCS IN 16719.


President Johnson, after a "full review" of Dominican policy, approved a recommendation by Bundy and Vance that they return to Washington, thus terminating their efforts to build a broadly-based, moderate, anti-Communist government around Guzman, and leaving negotiations to the OAS. Before leaving Santo Domingo, Bundy and Vance were ordered by President Johnson to hold summary conversations with Caamano and Imbert to review the situation and caution restraint pending arrival of OAS representatives. Bundy was to depart on 26 May; Vance was to remain a few days to work on problems relating to the IAF.

(S-EXDIS) Msg, President to Bundy and Vance, 25 May 65, CJCS files. (S-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2347, 25 May 65, JCS IN 77676.

Bundy and Vance met with Mora, Caamano and his chief aids, Hector Aristy and Jottin Cury, and Guzman. Bundy outlined the remaining obstacles to a political solution: Constitutionalist insistence on a return to the 1963 constitution; Constitutionalist demands for command of the Dominican Army; and Constitutionalist refusal to deal with the Communist problem.

Caamano and his associates began by reiterating their positions on all these issues, but later offered the following concessions: Constitutionalist leaders would not seek places in the new government; they wanted a government covering the broadest possible range of Dominican political opinion; they agreed to submit the 1963 constitution to a referendum; and they wanted new government with "closest possible ties" with the US, based on a common opposition to Communism.

(S-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 2003 to State, 261050Z May 65, JCS IN 77492.



(~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 1990 to State, 260130Z May 65, JCS IN 76834.

State

26 May 65

Nine cease-fire violations marred the general military calm in Santo Domingo. US troops returned the Constitutionalist fire in two incidents. In view of the continued Constitutionalist attacks on US troops, the JCS prepared a draft joint-State-Defense protest to the OAS/UN representatives warning that the US would "conduct appropriate retaliatory attacks." CJCS concluded, however, that with the establishment of the IAF, the recommended draft had been overtaken by events, and the message was never sent.

(~~S~~) NMCC OPSUM 123-65, 27 May 65, 1.
(~~S~~-Gp 3) DJSM 616-65 to CJCS, "US Protest to OAS/UN regarding Unprovoked Attacks Against US (~~S~~)," 26 May 65 with attached CJCS comments, CJCS files.

The build-up of the IAF continued, with 400 additional Brazilian troops arriving, raising the Latin American contribution to 1,035. General Palmer continued to have reservations about the IAF and advised CINCLANT that it would be a "grave mistake" to place all US forces in the Dominican Republic under OAS control, making unilateral action by the US difficult if not impossible. He recommended that no more than a three-battalion brigade be formally assigned to the IAF. Palmer reported that Secretary Vance, with whom he had discussed the matter, saw no alternative but to assign all US forces present to the IAF. Vance believed that the US would have to depend on getting operational control of the IAF in the hands of the deputy commander as a safeguard. Palmer also noted that he had not received orders formally assigning US forces to the IAF, nor was he aware of any official documents on the subject.

(~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 270321Z May 65, JCS IN 78885. (~~S~~) Telecon item, NMCC to White House, 270918Z May 65.

General Palmer reported that Secretary Vance concurred in his withdrawal plan, although Vance believed the timetable could be accelerated. General Palmer agreed with Vance on this point and recommended to CINCLANT that the 10,000 troops ashore covered by the plan be taken out over the next seven to ten days.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 270605Z May 65, JCS IN 79075.

During the day, the actual redeployment of US forces got under way. By verbal authority of Secretary Vance who was carrying out Secretary McNamara's instructions, General Palmer began withdrawal of Marine BLT 3/6. A total of 915 Marines had embarked by the end of the day. An additional withdrawal took place as the result of a JCS message authorizing CINCLANT to return to normal operations Marine BLT 1/2 and HMM 263, plus the ships in which they were embarked. As a result, the USS Okinawa and associated shipping carrying these units departed for CONUS at 1800. The JCS also authorized the redeployment of the 353d Tactical Fighter Squadron now at Ramey AF Base.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 261730Z May 65, JCS IN 77804. (S) Telecon item, NMCC to White House, 270214Z May 65. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 2883 to CINCLANT, 262110Z May 65. (S-Gp 1) NMCC OPSUM 133-65, 27 May 65, 1.

The political situation remained stalemated, and, as ordered by the President on 25 May, Bundy left Santo Domingo to report on the situation prior to the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Secretary Vance remained to work on current military problems, including the physical control of the National Palace and the security of the power plant. His meetings with Imbert and Caamano, however, were largely unproductive.

At a press conference, Caamano listed the following conditions for a political settlement: the 1963 constitution and the 1962 congress must be restored, the Constitutional military leaders must be maintained "in position of command"; a government composed of "democratic civilians" must be formed; and the "interventionist troops" must be withdrawn.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 1998 to State, 260355Z May 65, JCS IN 77152. (S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2017 to State, 270112Z May 65, JCS IN 78498. (S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2022 to State, 270510Z May 65, JCS IN 78969. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2016 to State, 270045Z May 65, JCS IN 78673. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2031 to State, 271808Z May 65, JCS IN 79911.

27 May 65

As the result of OAS negotiations, a block-wide buffer zone was established west of the Santo Domingo power plant. No progress was reported, however, on the OAS plan to assume control of Radio Santo Domingo, and General Palmer informed CINCLANT that Imbert had

no intention of surrendering the station to the OAS until Caamano had placed Constitutionalist stations in OAS hands. General Palmer placed paratroop platoons around the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank to forestall any GNR move to obtain money or sign checks not properly authorized by the OAS.

(~~Z~~-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 272013Z May 65. (~~Z~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 280430Z May 65, JCS IN 80660.

CINCLANT agreed with USCOMDOMREP that it would be a "grave mistake" to place all US forces in the Dominican Republic in the IAF, and he recommended that the US contribution be limited to a three-battalion brigade. He further recommended that General Palmer, as Deputy Commander IAF, should retain his status as USCOMDOMREP, a US commander with authority to employ US forces for such unilateral action as might be necessary. He also recommended that a clear political and military directive be issued the IAF, assigning it a MP/security role.

(~~Z~~-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 271832Z May 65.

CJCS informed CINCLANT and General Palmer, however, that "the U.S. would be in an untenable position should we withhold any sizable troop elements from IAF commitments" since the US had initiated the IAF concept. CJCS noted that General Palmer, as the IAF Deputy Commander, should have operational control of ground forces or be designated by the IAF Commander as Field Forces Commander. This would give him proper authority to control operations in the US interests. Moreover, he believed that since the US was providing the bulk of the IAF forces, General Palmer could exercise "powerful leverage" to influence operations.

(~~Z~~-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, CJCS 2997 to CINCLANT and USCOMDOMREP, 272213Z May 65.

Meanwhile the IAF continued to grow as USAF C-130's delivered 431 Brazilian troops and cargo to the Dominican Republic. To meet logistic requirements, the JCS directed CSA to fill USCOMDOMREP's requirement for vehicles for IAF contingents.

(~~Z~~-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 2986 to CSA and CINCLANT, 272119Z May 65. (~~Z~~) Telecon item, NMCC to White House, 280210Z May 65.

The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that they had reviewed and agreed with the military aspects of the USCOMDOMREP plan of 26 May for the phased reduction of US forces in the Dominican Republic. Marine BLT 3/6 completed embarkation in ships of the USS Boxer Amphibious Group which then took up positions off-shore. There were now a total of 19,219 US military personnel remaining in the Dominican Republic.

(~~TS~~-Gp 3) JCSM-414-65 to SecDef, "Forces in the Dominican Republic (U)," 27 May 65, derived from (~~TS~~-Gp 3) JCS 2338/12-4, same subj, 26 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). (According to the JCS Control Division, no action was required by OSD on this JCSM. Mr. Quant (ISA) reported that action was taken at a higher level.) (S) Telecon Item, NMCC to White House, 280210Z May 65. (S) NMCC Rept, "Force status-DOMREP," 27 May 65.

28 May 65

Secretary Mora announced that the OAS had assumed control of the Dominican Central Bank to prevent "irresponsible" use of its funds by Imbert and the GNR. Mora cited the OAS resolution giving him a mandate to prevent economic chaos in the Dominican Republic as his authority for the action.

(U) NY Times, 29 May 65, 1.

The State Department forwarded to General Palmer joint State/Defense "Regulations for the OAS Inter-American Force," requesting that he submit them to General Alvim, and that if acceptable to the Commander, they be issued as soon as possible. The draft regulations gave the Commander operational control over the IAF and made him responsible for the performance of all functions assigned to the IAF by the OAS. They authorized the Deputy Commander, "the alter ego of the commander," to perform duties assigned him by the Commander and to exercise full powers in the absence of the Commander. The regulations further provided that the Commander establish an OAS Unified Command Headquarters and designate a chain of command for the IAF, making use of the officers of the OAS Unified Command and the commanders of the national contingents in the IAF.

(U) Msg, State 1273 to Santo Domingo, 28 May 65, JCS IN 81835.

Reduction of the US forces in the Dominican Republic continued with the embarkation of 356 US Marines from miscellaneous units of the 4th MEB. The JCS also directed CINCLANT to make a further

reduction by redeploying approximately 1,700 US Army and Air Force personnel, the main body to depart on 29 May.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3045 to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE, 281752Z May 65. (2S-Gp 1) NMCC OPSUM 125-65, 29 May 65, 1.

In a speech at Baylor University, President Johnson urged the establishment of "new international machinery" to deal with Communist subversion and revolution in the Western Hemisphere. He also defended the US role in the Dominican crisis and announced that 1,700 additional troops would be withdrawn from Santo Domingo the next day.

(U) NY Times, 29 May 65, 2.

29 May 65 The final Brazilian contingent for the IAF arrived in the Dominican Republic, bringing the Brazilian force strength to 1,129 men and the total Latin American troop deployment to 1,562 men. Brazilian General Panasco Alvim arrived in Santo Domingo and assumed command of the IAF. At the same time 745 of the 1,700 US Army and AF personnel ordered re-deployed by the JCS on 28 May departed the Dominican Republic.

(S) Telecon items, NMCC to White House, 300300Z May 65 and 300951Z May 65.

Ambassador Bennett reported no progress in arriving at a political solution. [M]

[Handwritten scribble and signature]

Meanwhile, Santo Domingo and the countryside slowly returned to "as much normalcy as circumstance would permit."

Secretary Vance completed his mission in Santo Domingo and returned to Washington.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 2077 to State, 291120Z May 65, JCS IN 82501. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2097 to State, 292300Z May 65, JCS IN 83094.

30 May 65 Redeployment of the 1,700 US Army and Air Force personnel to CONUS begun the previous day was completed, ending Phase I of the US troop withdrawal and leaving US troop strength in the Dominican Republic at 18,900. In preparation for the Phase II withdrawal, the JCS directed CINCLANT to prepare to return all the remaining Marine units and associated shipping to normal operations and to expect an execute order within 24 to 48 hours. General Alvin, the IAF commander, approved this withdrawal.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 310153Z May 65, JCS IN 83861. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 310636Z May 65, JCS IN 83866. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3142 to CINCLANT, 302343Z May 65. (S) Telecon Item, NMCC to White House, 310200Z May 65.

To meet logistic support requirements of the IAF, CINCLANT requested JCS authority to introduce an engineer construction force of less than 300 men into the Dominican Republic.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 310100Z May 65, JCS IN 83703.

The GNR refused to turn over Radio Santo Domingo to the OAS, as a result, US equipment was withdrawn from the station.

(S) Telecon item, NMCC to White House, 310200Z May 65.

31 May 65 In Washington a closed, informal session of the OAS MFM considered Secretary General Mora's report on the status of negotiations in the Dominican Republic, "the acceptability of the IAF," and the cease-fire situation. Mora concluded that the creation of an ad hoc committee could be "extremely useful and valuable as a complementary measure to those taken by the MFM." Following a discussion of the Mora report, the MFM received from the Brazilian delegate a draft resolution proposing a three-man committee of prominent diplomats to seek a political solution to the Dominican crisis. Discussion of the Brazilian resolution was scheduled for the next day.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, State Circ 2392, 010250Z Jun 65, JCS IN 84332. (U) NY Times, 1 Jun 65, 1.

~~TOP SECRET~~

In preparation for the redeployment announced by the JCS on 30 May, USCOMDOMREP submitted a plan for withdrawal of all US Marines left in the Dominican Republic (4,100 men). He suggested a two-phase withdrawal: one BLT (2,050 men) to depart on 1-3 June and the second on 4-6 June.

(S-Gp 3) J-3 TP 29-65, 1 June 65, JMF 9128.4
(25 May 65).

~~TOP SECRET~~

JUNE

1 Jun 65 A US Army officer and two enlisted men were captured when they accidentally wandered into the Constitutionalist zone. They were turned over to the OAS representative and returned unharmed to the ISZ.

(S-Gp 1) NMCC OPSUM 127-65, 2 Jun '65, 1.

The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that they concurred in General Palmer's recommendation for the withdrawal of the remaining 4,000 Marines in the Dominican Republic by 6 June. The Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the proposal to the President with the additional recommendation that the withdrawal of this force not be announced until 4 June. President Johnson announced at a press conference that the Marine BLT would be withdrawn from Santo Domingo. In consonance with this announcement, the JCS directed CINCLANT to withdraw one of the BLTs and to expect the announcement of the withdrawal of the remaining BLT on 4 June.

(S-Gp 3) JCSM-423-65, "Withdrawal of US Marine Forces from the Dominican Republic (U)," 1 Jun 65, derived from (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/22, same subj, 1 Jun 65. (S) Memo, Dep SecDef to President, 1 Jun 65, reproduced in JCS 2338/22. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3133 to CINCLANT, 012045Z Jun 65. All in JMF 9128.4 (25 May 1965).

While US force redeployments from the Dominican Republic were being planned, the US continued to deploy certain elements to Santo Domingo. The JCS approved a CINCLANT request of 30 May for an augmented US Army construction company, not to exceed 300 men, for the Dominican Republic, specifying that equal numbers of light engineering units there should be returned to normal operations in CONUS upon arrival of the construction company.

In response to a request by General Palmer, the JCS approved the dispatch of three H-13 helicopters and three L-20 liaison aircraft to the Dominican Republic for use by the Brazilian contingent of the IAF.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3167 to CSA et al., 011838Z Jun 65. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3193 to CINCLANT, 012313Z Jun 65.

Secretary General Mora succeeded in getting Imbert to sign an agreement for the neutralization of the National Palace by the IAF.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2169 to State, 012345Z Jun 65, JCS IN 85462.

2 Jun 65 In accordance with the agreement of the previous day, IAF troops began the demilitarization of a zone around the National Palace at 1100 hours. The demilitarization was completed at 1900 hours without incident, and approximately 360 GNR troops, 12,000 weapons, and several combat vehicles were evacuated from the Palace.

(S) Telecon Item, NMCC to White House, 031010Z Jun 65.

As recommended by Secretary General Mora on 31 May, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers approved a resolution establishing a three-man mediation committee to continue the negotiations being carried out by Mora and to provide political guidance to the IAF. The committee was composed of Ellsworth Bunker of the US, Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, and Ramon de Clairmont Duenas of El Salvador.

(U) Dept of State Bulletin, LII, 1356 (21 Jun 65), 1018.

In response to the JCS recommendation of 20 May for a more precise statement of the IAF mission, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the CJCS that the wisest course would be to accept the language of the 6 May OAS resolution as applicable to the IAF as a whole and to introduce greater military precision in the statements of mission of the subordinate elements of the IAF. The Secretary stated that the JCS suggestion for possible US unilateral action outside the IAF would have to await the developments in the Dominican Republic, adding that the US was committed to working within the IAF and that US military actions should be in accordance with this commitment.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD/ISA to CJCS, 2 June 65, encl to (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/19-1, "Considerations Relative to the Establishment of an Inter-American Force in the Dominican Republic (U)," 4 June 65.

The redeployment of the Marine BLT (2,050 men) ordered on 1 June began; it was scheduled to be completed on 3 June by 1500 hours. CINCLANT requested authority to return to CONUS three RF-101 aircraft, twelve F-104 aircraft, and the photo processing cell from Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico.

(S) Msg, NMCC to White House, 031010Z Jun 65.
(S-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 021850Z May 65, JCS IN 87043.

3 Jun 65 During the night of 2-3 June, the Constitutionals directed heavy fire at US troops in the Sans Souci area, east of the Rio Ozama, provoking return fire. General Palmer reported that the Constitutionals might be attempting to draw prolonged US fire in the presence of UN or other observers, and he cautioned his officers to be "very careful" in returning fire. There were also separate attacks during the night on the army barracks and the police headquarters in the provincial town of San Juan de la Maguana.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2221 to State, 032347Z Jun 65, JCS IN 88864. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2206 to State, 031130Z Jun 65, JCS IN 87872.

Meanwhile, in reply to a CINCLANT request of 2 June, JCS directed the return to normal operations of one reconnaissance element (3 RF-101s), one FIS (12 F-104s), and the photo processing cell from Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3277 to CINCLANT, 031442Z Jun 65.

The OAS changed the name of the Inter-American Force (IAF) to the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). General Palmer stressed to General Alvim the urgent need to publish regulations for the IAPF. Alvim indicated that he was writing a new draft of the regulations based on the US draft (forwarded to General Palmer by the State Department on 28 May) which he would submit to the Brazilian government. Palmer suggested that the IAPF regulations might have to be negotiated at the Washington level.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 040445Z Jun 65.

The three-man OAS committee arrived in Santo Domingo to work with Secretary General Mora for a political solution to the crisis and to provide political guidance and direction to the IAPF.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2221 to State, 032347Z Jun 65, JCS IN 88864.

The Soviet Union attacked the creation of the IAPF in the UN Security Council. The USSR called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Dominican Republic, and requested the Council to take up Constitutionalist allegations of GNR atrocities. The US

Delegate rejected the Soviet charges and protested that the Council had been called into urgent session to provide a Soviet propaganda platform. The Council also received a letter from 13 Latin American states upholding the OAS action in the Dominican Republic.

(U) NY Times, 4 Jun 65, 4.

4 Jun 65 Mortar and bazooka fire into the Constitutionalist zone, allegedly from the Sans Souci area, resulted in the death of a woman and a small child.

(P) Msg, Santo Domingo 2245 to State, 050610Z Jun 65, JCS IN 90747.

In accordance with the JCS directive that all remaining USMC units and associated amphibious shipping be returned to normal operations, the Marines began reembarkation at 0930 hours; the operation was scheduled to be completed by 6 June. The 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry, relieved the departing 4th MEB in the ISZ.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3338 to CINCLANT, 041247Z Jun 65. (P) Telecon Item, NMCC to White House, 050315Z Jun 65. (C) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 050250Z Jun 65.

The JCS also requested CINCLANT's comments on further US troop withdrawals, and on units, strengths, and time schedules if he favored such withdrawals.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3408 to CINCLANT, 042313Z Jun 65.

The OAS three-man committee met with Secretary General Mora, the Papal Nuncio, General Alvim, Ambassador Bennett, representatives of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and Caamano, but made no progress on a political settlement. Ambassador Bunker blamed Constitutionalist intransigence on UN representative Mayobre who, Bunker charged, was biased in favor of the Constitutionlists. Bunker believed that the Caamano group was likely to resist compromise efforts as long as there was hope of UN intervention.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2236 to State, 042340Z Jun 65, JCS IN 90475. (P) Msg, Santo Domingo 2232 to State, 042130Z Jun 65, JCS IN 90315.

5 Jun 65 The Constitutionlists formally complained to the UN Security Council, charging US troops with the previous evening's mortar firing that killed a woman and child. General Palmer's investigation, however, indicated that no US mortars or heavy weapons were fired and that no US or any other IAPF troops were involved.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2257 to State, 052325Z Jun 65, JCS IN 91532. (S-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 052001Z Jun 65, JCS IN 91540.

The special three-man OAS committee met with Imbert and other GNR members. The committee also expressed its intention to have further talks with Guzman, the military leaders of both sides, "third position" elements, and the Latin American diplomatic corps. Meanwhile, representatives of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission inspected GNR and Constitutionlists prisons and reported to Secretary General Mora that GNR prison conditions were worse than Caamano's because of over-crowding, but they found no evidence of deliberate mistreatment. They also visited Santiago and San Francisco de Macois to investigate charges of GNR atrocities.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2257 to State, 052325Z Jun 65, JCS IN 91532.

6 Jun 65 During the night of 5-6 June, the 82nd Airborne Division initiated a plan to increase the illumination in front of its positions, thus making it more difficult for snipers to fire into the ISZ. The Constitutionlist government protested to the UN and to Secretary General Mora that US troops were setting up military equipment and barbed wire within the Constitutionlist zone. General Alvim explained the operation to Mora and re-affirmed the right of the IAPF to take such action to protect its forces. General Palmer, however, ordered the work discontinued until the IAPF's liaison officers could discuss it with Caamano.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2280 to State, 071850Z Jun 65, JCS IN 92887. (S-EXDIS) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 080405Z Jun 65, JCS IN 93441.

All remaining US Marine Corps personnel reembarked and departed the area of the Dominican Republic, thus completing Phase II of USCOMDOMREP's withdrawal plan. The strength and composition of the IAPF was then as follows:

UNITED STATES FORCES IN DOMREP

US ARMY

HQ USCOMDOMREP	311
82d Abn Div	7,549
Non-Divisional Troops	4,385
TOTAL US ARMY	<u>12,245</u>

USAF

Hq CTF 121 (Advon)	18
507th TAC Cont Gp and Supporting Units	561
Det 1st Air Commando Wg	8
TOTAL USAF	<u>587</u>

US NAVAL FORCES IN AREA

<u>Unit</u>	<u>On Station</u>
Combatant & Support Ships	18

LATIN AMERICAN FORCES IN DOMREP

Brazil	1,129
Costa Rica	21
El Salvador	3
Honduras	250
Nicaragua	159
TOTAL LATIN AMERICAN	<u>1,562</u>

(TS) NMCC OPSUM 181-65, 7 Jun 65, 3-4.

The special OAS committee continued its efforts to achieve a political settlement. It met with Imbert, who emphasized the apolitical character of the GNR and the Constitutionalist's record of refusing to negotiate. The committee also met with Caamano, who stressed his willingness to step down for a leader who would rule under the 1963 constitution. The committee also talked with Latin American ambassadors and with UN Representative Mayobre.

Ambassador Bennett reported that Juan Bosch continued to broadcast speeches over the Constitutionalist radio system. Bennett noted that Bosch was trying to boost Constitutionalist morale, claiming that he had "millions of supporters in US who feel their government did wrong."

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2278 to State, 071148Z Jun 65, JCS IN 92625 and 2269 to State, 062330Z Jun 65, JCS IN 92164.

7 Jun 65 Although the Dominican contending forces remained quiet, the IAPF increased its military activities. At 1100 hours it conducted a show of force, airlifting by helicopter two rifle platoons of the US 82nd Airborne Division to reinforce a roadblock in the city. The platoons remained in position for one hour before being redeployed to San Isidro. The IAPF also ordered Brazilian Army and Marine forces to relieve elements of the 82nd Airborne Division in the eastern part of the ISZ, thus placing the eastern part of the ISZ and the National Palace entirely in Brazilian hands. Deciding that guarding the embassies was a police mission, the IAPF relieved the 82nd Airborne Division of such duty, except in the case of the US Embassy.

The IAPF also made some progress in negotiating with the Constitutionlists to neutralize the electric plant and to allow tankers to discharge at their normal terminal on the east bank of the Rio Ozama.

(Ø-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 080440Z Jun 65, JCS IN 93442. (Ø) Msg, Santo Domingo 2278 to State, 071148Z Jun 65, JCS IN 92625. (Ø-EXDIS) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 080405Z Jun 65, JCS IN 93441.

(Ø) Msg, Santo Domingo 2294 to State, 082315Z Jun 65, JCS IN 94779.

8 Jun 65 The IAPF continued its "show of force" in Santo Domingo. One battery of the 82d Airborne Division occupied two positions in the LOC, simulated fire missions, and then withdrew. In an unrelated incident a truck carrying three US soldiers blundered through a Brazilian check point into Constitutionlist zone and was captured. Caamano announced that the men would be released the next day. A USAF C-130 flying over Santo Domingo was fired on by Constitutionlists using automatic weapons, but was not hit.

(Ø-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 080440Z Jun 65, JCS IN 93442. (Ø-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 090514Z Jun 65. (Ø) Msg, Santo Domingo 2294 to State, 082315Z Jun 65, JCS IN 94779. (Ø) Msg, Santo Domingo 2308 to State, 091145Z Jun 65, JCS IN 95319.

The JCS, concerned with further deployments and withdrawals of US forces in the Dominican Republic, authorized CINCLANT, subject to coordination with the Ambassador and with the Commander, IAPF, to deploy the 29th Ordnance Detachment (approximately 49 persons) to the Dominican Republic. The JCS also approved a proposal of USCOMDOMREP, concurred in by CINCLANT, to modify the plan for withdrawal of US forces from the Dominican Republic. USCOMDOMREP recommended reducing the number of men to be withdrawn in Phase III to approximately 1,525 (instead of 2,000). The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that General Palmer be authorized to discuss Phase III withdrawals with General Alvim and with the OAS Committee during 9-12 June, and to execute Phase III on or about 13 June 1965.

(S-Gp 3) JCSM-443-65, "Forces in the Dominican Republic (U)," 8 Jun 65, encl to (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/23, same subj, 9 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 3586 to CINCLANT, 082300Z Jun 65. (The JCS recommendation was overtaken by JCSM-476-65, see 18 June.)

In an afternoon speech to his followers, Caamano repeated the demands previously laid down by the Constitutionalists as conditions for a political settlement. Ambassador Bennett reported that the tone of his speech reflected the increasingly aggressive Constitutionalist attitude recently noted by observers.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2307 to State, 090740Z Jun 65, JCS IN 95225.

9 Jun 65 The Constitutionalists released unharmed the three US military personnel (one officer and two enlisted men) who had strayed into their zone on the previous day.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 100433Z Jun 65, JCS IN 96339.

General Palmer informed CJCS by telephone that Ambassadors Bennett and Bunker were opposed to any overt move to withdraw additional US forces until after 14 June, the sixth anniversary of the abortive Cuban-sponsored invasion against Trujillo and the anniversary of the founding of the APCJ. As a result, CJCS authorized General Palmer to discuss "on a quiet basis" with General Alvim the Phase III withdrawal plan, avoiding decisions or publicity until after 14 June.

(S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/24, "Phase III withdrawal of Forces from the Dominican Republic (U)," JMF 9128.4 (25 May 1965). (S-Gp 4) Msg, CJCS 3646 to USCOMDOMREP and CINCLANT, 092238Z Jun 65.

A hopeful sign occurred in the political situation when the GNR signed a pledge to respect the American Delegation on Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 (Caamano had signed the pledge the previous day). This encouraging development was overshadowed by Constitutionalist reports charging the GNR with a series of executions of prisoners between 22 May and 5 June at Haras Nacionales, north of Santo Domingo. The Constitutionlists provided Chairman Bianchi of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission with a map showing the grave sites of twenty, and possibly more, prisoners shot by the GNR. Bianchi visited the sites, but stated that he was unable to find positive evidence without digging.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2322 to State, 101144Z Jun 65, JCS IN 96899.

10 Jun 65

The military situation remained calm in Santo Domingo while Constitutionalist charges of GNR prisoner executions dominated the news reports. The Constitutionlists captured a US soldier when he inadvertently crossed into their zone, but he was released later in the day. IAPF negotiations with the Constitutionlists for the expansion of the ISZ around the Santo Domingo power plant broke down. Without this expanded buffer zone, General Palmer was unwilling to risk passing that facility to the control of Latin American troops.

(S) Telecon Item, NMCC to White House, 110940Z Jun 65, (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 110350Z Jun 65, JCS IN 97986.

In response to CJCS instructions of 9 June, General Palmer discussed with General Alvim the withdrawal of two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division (Phase III of USCOMDOMREP's plan for US troop withdrawal approved by the JCS on 27 May). General Alvim was reluctant to reduce the US force until the political future of the Dominican Republic was more certain, and he suggested withdrawal of the battalions to Puerto Rico rather than to CONUS. General Palmer informed CINCLANT that there would be some merit to a two-stage withdrawal of the battalions first to Puerto Rico and later to CONUS. Palmer also suggested Washington-level pressure on non-participating Latin American countries for contributions to the IAPF.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 102205Z Jun 65, JCS IN 97726.

Chairman Bianchi of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission requested from GNR Foreign Minister Vicioso information relating to Constitutionalist charges of GNR prisoner executions. The GNR had ordered a thorough

investigation to avoid a repetition of similar acts, but denied responsibility for them, blaming a small group of armed civilians. Meanwhile, Secretary General Mora instructed the OAS Secretariat to send a special mission of three criminologists to Santo Domingo to investigate the executions and informed UN Secretary General U Thant of his action. After visiting the atrocity area, UN representative Mayobre reported to U Thant that he saw indications of recent executions, and he called for a complete pathological and technical investigation of the site. Throughout the day, GNR sources presented the IAHRG with information of Constitutionalist atrocities during the early days of the revolution.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2346 to State, 110442Z Jun 65, JCS IN 97965. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2351 to State, 110727Z Jun 65, JCS IN 98104. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2344 to State, 110429Z Jun 65, JCS IN 97966. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2352 to State, 110653Z Jun 65, JCS IN 98109. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2348 to State, 110618Z Jun 65, JCS IN 98047.

In anticipation of Soviet attacks in the UN Security Council on this matter, the State Department prepared to denounce atrocities by both sides and to point out to the Security Council that this would be the inevitable result if the IAPF and the OAS withdrew from the Dominican Republic. To support this position, the State Department requested Ambassador Bennett to submit details on atrocities by both groups for inclusion in a statement for a meeting of the Security Council. The Department also instructed Bennett to appeal to both sides to honor their pledges to respect human rights and to give every assistance to the IAHRG.

(S) Msg, State 1408 to Santo Domingo, 10 Jun 65, JCS IN 97329. (S) Msg, State (unnumbered) to Santo Domingo, 10 Jun 65, JCS IN 99834.

Although its efforts were overshadowed by the charges of GNR atrocities, the special OAS three-man committee continued to seek a political solution. The committee met with the Imbert and Caamano groups and found the latter to be nervous, irritable, and "offensively intransigent" on the constitutional issue. The Constitutionlists refused the committee's request to reopen the banks and to reestablish public services in the Constitutionalist zone.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2357 to State, 111122Z Jun 65, JCS IN 98557.

Ambassador Bunker informed the Secretary of State that intensive investigations of the past week had convinced him that a political formula meeting US "requirements" and acceptable to the various factions in the Dominican Republic would be "virtually impossible to achieve." He concluded that the only solution to the current political impasse was the formation of a provisional government of technicians to serve until the people could elect a permanent government under the supervision of the OAS.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 2323 to State, 101630Z Jun 65, JCS IN 97155.

11 Jun 65

There was no progress in political negotiations and little military activity in the Dominican Republic. A battalion of the IAPF Latin American Brigade relieved the 2d Battalion of the US 325th Infantry in the west central section of the ISZ (from Avenida Maximo Gomez to Avenida Alma Mater). In compliance with IAPF orders, US troops secured two areas northeast of Santo Domingo reported to contain graves of GNR execution victims. In one area they found a burned body and a skull. The troops also searched two additional locations, but withdrew when they found no graves.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 120410Z Jun 65, JCS IN 99695.

CINCLANT requested JCS approval for the redeployment of 214 US personnel from support units no longer required in Santo Domingo. He also sought standing authority to redeploy, when appropriate, individuals in limited numbers from miscellaneous units.

CINCLANT submitted the following comments on General Palmer's 10 June suggestions relating to the Phase III withdrawal: 1) the two battalions should be returned to CONUS as soon as possible after 14 June; 2) there was no significant advantage in the interim location of the battalions in Puerto Rico; and 3) he saw no objection to raising with the OAS the question of US/Latin American force levels in the IAPF, but thought that there was little possibility of additional contributions.

(S) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 112044Z Jun 65. (S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 112016Z Jun 65, JCS IN 99109.

In response to rumors of impending country-wide Constitutionalist violence on 14 June, the OAS Committee authorized General Alvim to send IAPF detachments

into the interior of the country if serious, uncontrollable incidents should occur.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2404 to State, 140630Z Jun 65, JCS IN 11233.

The OAS committee met with UN representative Mayobre and later with members of the Latin American diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo, but there was no progress in the negotiations for a political settlement. Both sides remained intransigent, the Constitutionalist denouncing any formula based on a new interim government and national elections. CINCLANT reported that Constitutionalist demonstrations were scheduled for 14 June. There were also reports concerning the circulation of an APCJ document calling on the people to prepare for an armed struggle throughout the country.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2364 to State, 112355Z Jun 65, JCS IN 99353. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2378 to State, 121155Z Jun 65. (S-Gp 1) Msg, CINCLANT to USCOMDOMREP, 120100Z Jun 65, JCS IN 99757.

While in agreement with Ambassador Bunker's 10 June ideas for the formation of an interim government in the Dominican Republic, the State Department concluded that it would be "extremely difficult to hold general elections within the time available this year." The Department requested Bunker's estimate of the prospects for the formation of an interim government and of the time required to obtain the necessary agreements for its installation.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, State 1427 to Santo Domingo, 11 Jun 65, JCS IN 07444.

12 Jun 65 Public excitement increased in anticipation of 14 June demonstrations. Throughout the day Santo Domingo was filled with reports, radio broadcasts, and rumors of violence planned by the GNR and the Constitutionalist. The GNR tightened security throughout the country and arrested a number of radical leftists. Ambassador Bennett reported a noticeable sharpening of the Constitutionalist anti-US line, not only in its radio and press, but also in statements by Constitutionalist officials and PRD leaders.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2386 to State, 122350Z Jun 65, JCS IN 10548. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2393 to State, 131110Z Jun 65, JCS IN 10859. (S-Gp 1) Msg, CINCLANT to USCOMDOMREP, 130148Z Jun 65, JCS IN 10663.

GNR troops interfered with two IAPF MP patrols in the northern part of Santo Domingo. US officials reported that the GNR were apparently challenging the right of the IAPF troops to move outside the ISZ, the LOC, and base areas. The IAPF made it clear to the GNR that it reserved the right to move forces anywhere in the Dominican Republic as required by its mission.

(S) Telecon Item, NMCC to White House, 131102Z Jun 65.

13 Jun 65

A quiet Santo Domingo braced for violence in connection with the 14 June anniversary of the APCJ. General Palmer ordered all US units in the ISZ and the LOC to assume an increased state of readiness and placed the 2d Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry, on a three-hour standby alert at San Isidro to provide a second rapid-reaction force for the 82d Airborne Division. The OAS three-man committee confirmed in writing its previous authorization to General Alvim for the dispatch of IAPF detachments to the interior should serious disorders occur.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 140345Z Jun 65, JCS IN 11199. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2408 to State, 141140Z Jun 65, JCS IN 11429.

A GNR rally in Santo Domingo drew a large and enthusiastic crowd, which entered the ISZ with IAPF approval and marched to the OAS headquarters at the Hotel Embajador where it was greeted by Secretary General Mora. In a series of speeches conspicuously lacking any anti-US tone, Imbert and other GNR leaders stressed their devotion to democracy and anticommunism. A Constitutionalist rally scheduled for the same day was postponed until 14 June at the reported insistence of the APCJ.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2400 to State, 132330Z Jun 65, JCS IN 11147. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2403 to State, 140405Z Jun 65, JCS IN 11207. (S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 140429Z Jun 65.

In Washington, former Dominican President Balaguer informed the State Department of his support for an "administrative" government for the Dominican Republic and suggested that informal approaches should be made to other nations that might support such a government.

(S) Msg, State 1433 to Santo Domingo, 13 Jun 65, JCS IN 11249.

14 Jun 65

Despite the many rumors of violence scheduled for 14 June, Santo Domingo was relatively calm. Constitutionalist forces fired on Brazilian Marine positions along the eastern boundary of the ISZ at midnight 13-14 June. After a sporadic exchange of small arm fire, a Constitutionalist representative apologized to IAPF Headquarters stating that the firing had been a mistake and that Constitutionalist policy was not to attack any Latin American troops. In the first incident of its kind, a booby-trapped jeep exploded in the early morning when the driver started the engine. Seven civilians were killed in the blast, which occurred in the northern section of the city.

(C) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150340Z Jun 65.
(S) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150530Z Jun 65.

Deputy Secretary Vance directed General Palmer by telephone to discuss with General Alvim on 15 June Phase III withdrawal of US troops (2 battalions of the 82d Abn).

(S) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150530Z Jun 65.

A Constitutionalist rally, postponed from the previous day, drew an enthusiastic crowd of about 8,000. The speeches were anti-American in tone and demanded violence. Caamano called on the people "to fight with him to the end or until we win, without one step backward."

(C-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 2414 to State, 150150Z Jun 65, JCS IN 12324.

Ambassador Bunker informed the State Department that the emphasis of the OAS three-man committee's proposals for a political solution in the Dominican Republic should center on an agreement for elections. He feared that another attempt to create a provisional government without prior agreement to the election principle would embroil the committee in the same disputes over personalities and politics that had plagued previous efforts. He added that in putting forward the election proposal the committee would also urge the immediate establishment of an apolitical government for the interim period. To provide such a government with the necessary legal authority, the committee had been considering an "institutional act" to spell out prerogatives and functions. Bunker hoped to have the agreement of the committee to this proposal by 16 or 17 June and to present it to Imbert, Caamano, and the public on the next day.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 4) Msg, Santo Domingo 2405 to State, 140430Z Jun 65, JCS IN 11218.

15 Jun 65 At 0730 hours Constitutionalist troops opened fire on US Cavalry Reconnaissance elements screening the Rio Ozama and at 0750 on US forces in the LOC with small arms, machine guns, mortars, tank guns, and bazookas. At General Alvim's direction, US troops advanced from their positions around the power plant. At 1100 they extended the LOC two blocks west and four blocks south to out-flank the main source of fire and to provide a buffer zone around the power plant. Having been outflanked, the Constitutionalist withdrew several blocks. At 1225 the Constitutionlists fired on Brazilian positions in the ISZ and at the National Palace. At 1645, again at General Alvim's direction, US troops advanced several blocks against little resistance. At 1730 the OAS Committee approved General Alvim's actions and granted the IAPF authority to retain the approximately 30 block area acquired in the two-phase operation. The day's operations cost the IAPF 2 US KIA, 28 US WIA, and 1 Brazilian WIA. Constitutionalist losses were estimated at 77 killed and 45 wounded.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 160725Z Jun 65, JCS IN 14310. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 170650Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15908.

UN representative Rikhye, who, General Palmer reported "had a particularly busy day trying to sabotage the OAS," was in the Constitutionalist zone during the early morning attack and tried to "sabotage" the OAS by sending a flash message to the UN repeating Caamano's charge that "North American" forces had started the fight. Rikhye justified the hasty report on the grounds that he supposedly could not get in touch with General Alvim, General Palmer, or the OAS Committee. Rikhye appeared at General Alvim's headquarters about 1300 with an offer to mediate between the Constitutionlists and the IAPF. Alvim informed him that mediation was not a responsibility of the UN, but of the OAS, and that the cease-fire was between the Imbert and Caamano forces.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 160725Z Jun 65, JCS IN 14310.

General Alvim reported the attack to the OAS Committee and requested that it protest to the Constitutionlists this "flagrant" cease-fire violation. The Committee approved Alvim's actions, authorized the IAPF to retain the extension of the LOC, and forwarded General Alvim's report to the UN Secretary General. Meanwhile, Caamano and Aristy broadcast statements charging "savage aggression" by interventionist forces and vowing to fight to the end.

(U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2426 to State, 152140Z Jun 65, JCS IN 13717. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2443 to State, 161208Z Jun 65, JCS IN 14501.

The GNR took no part in the day's action, and Imbert denied Constitutionalist charges that two GNR frigates had fired on their zone.

(~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 2438 to State, 160250Z Jun 65, JCS IN 14094.

Because of the situation in Santo Domingo, General Palmer did not raise the question of reduction of US forces with General Alvim, as Deputy Secretary Vance had requested the previous day. General Palmer hoped to discuss the subject with Alvim in the near future when "an auspicious time" presented itself. Mr. Vance agreed.

(~~8~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 160725Z Jun 65, JCS IN 14310.

16 Jun 65

At 1530 hours Constitutionalist forces opened heavy fire against US troops in the area south of the power plant. US forces held fire until the OAS Committee had adjourned its meeting with Caamano in the Constitutionalist zone at 1700 hours. At 1900 hours the Constitutionlists fired on Brazilian troops in the Palace area and along the eastern boundary of the ISZ. US forces suffered 1 KIA and 4 WIA during the day and Brazilian casualties totalled 4 WIA.

(~~6~~-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 170650Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15908. (~~8~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 2459 to State, 162320Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15478.

General Alvim submitted a detailed report to the OAS Committee on the 15 June violations. The Committee forwarded the report to the UN Security Council, stating that the defensive measures adopted by General Alvim had been discussed and approved by the Committee prior to their initiation; that the IAPF would hold the new position established on 15 June pending satisfactory assurances from Caamano that such violations would not recur; and that the GNR had not been involved in the 15 June actions.

(U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2450 to State, 161830Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15119.

CINCLANT concurred in General Palmer's proposal for the organization of a battalion headquarters and a headquarters company capable of controlling three

separate Latin American infantry companies in the Dominican Republic. CINCLANT requested the JCS to provide the necessary equipment for the headquarters when it was approved and manned by the OAS.

At the same time the JCS ordered the return of the USNS GEIGER to normal operations. The GEIGER had been lying off the Dominican Republic to assist in evacuation of US troops.

(C-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 160314Z Jun 65, JCS IN 14251. (S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 162104Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15387. (S-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 4034 to CINCLANT, 162110Z Jun 65.

The OAS Committee met with Caamano and Imbert. Imbert pledged that his forces would abide by OAS wishes and refrain from attacking Caamano under any circumstances. Ambassador Bunker reported that Caamano, although maintaining that US troops had started the firing on 15 June, was still amenable to a negotiated solution. Because the negotiations were at a critical stage, with the Committee planning to announce its scheme for a political solution in the next 24 hours, Bunker and General Alvim asked General Palmer to try to maintain quiet for the next 48 hours.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2459 to State, 162320Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15478. (S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 170650Z Jun 65, JCS IN 15908.

The Soviet delegate proposed that the UN Security Council go to Santo Domingo for an on-the-spot examination. US representative Yost told the Council that the Soviet proposal would only make the OAS task in the Dominican Republic more difficult. Yost called the Constitutionalist attack the most flagrant and serious violation of the OAS cease-fire to date and, like the Soviet complaint to the Security Council, had been timed to follow the Constitutionalist rally of 14 June.

(U) NY Times, 17 Jun 65, 18.

17 Jun 65

After the heavy firing of the previous two days, Santo Domingo was relatively calm. In consonance with Bunker's effort of the previous day, General Palmer ordered US forces to return fire only when absolutely necessary. US troops returned fire only twice during the day. In another incident, two US soldiers were captured when they strayed into the Constitutionalist zone. Caamano offered to exchange them for 30 of his troops detained

by the IAPF, but General Palmer was in no hurry to arrange the release of the two soldiers since they were captured through their own misconduct. It was important, he said, not to let the incident influence the impending OAS negotiations.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 180200Z Jun 65, JCS IN 17246. (S-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 180258Z Jun 65, JCS IN 17348. (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2470 to State, 171315Z Jun 65.

General Palmer requested CINCLANT to deploy immediately one tank platoon (5 tanks) with appropriate headquarters, service, and maintenance elements to the Dominican Republic. The advantages of a US tank platoon in the IAPF would: increase combat power; add capability in street fighting; provide greater psychological influence; and be useful in combined arms training. The presence of the tank platoon would also aid in persuading General Alvim to accept a further reduction of US forces in the Dominican Republic.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 171627Z Jun 65, JCS IN 16538.

CINCLANT requested JCS authority to redeploy the A/229 Assault Helicopter Company to CONUS.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 171902Z Jun 65, JCS IN 16964.

General Alvim again protested to the OAS Committee the unprovoked Constitutionalist attacks of 15-16 June, and the Committee passed the protest on to the UN. Meanwhile, General Palmer reported to CINCLANT that the APCJ, which was not fully under Caamano's control, was responsible for the 15-16 June firing in Santo Domingo.

(U) Msg, Santo Domingo 2480 to State, 182010Z Jun 65, JCS IN 17168. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 180200Z Jun 65, JCS IN 17246.

18 Jun 65

The OAS Committee presented its proposal for a political solution to the Dominican crisis to Caamano at 0930 and to Imbert at 1100 and then released it to the press. The proposal provided for the following actions:

1. General Elections under OAS supervision within six to nine months.
2. Opportunity for all leaders of democratic political parties abroad to return to the Dominican Republic and to participate in the elections.
3. Immediate termination of the armed struggle with the return of all members of the regular armed forces to their barracks and the dissolution of irregular forces.
4. Surrender to the OAS of all arms in the hands of the civilian population.
5. Resumption of the nation's normal economic life.
6. Formation of a provisional government to serve until the elections and preparation of an institutional act to serve as a provisional charter until the people could decide the constitutional issue in a constitutional assembly to meet after the election.

To carry out this program, the OAS Committee proposed: the creation of a new OAS electoral commission to work with the Dominican Central Electoral Board in organizing and supervising the Dominican elections; the continuation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Republic to assure respect for political rights throughout the electoral period; and the immediate establishment of an expanded program of economic and technical assistance for the Dominican Republic.

(e) Msg, Santo Domingo 2500 to State, 182225Z Jun 65, JCS IN 18572. (e) Msg, Santo Domingo 2475 to State, 180005Z Jun 65, JCS IN 17089.

Reaction of both sides to the proposal was cautious. Caamano characterized the plan as containing "positive elements," but requested three or four days to study it. He also requested withdrawal of IAPF forces from the advanced positions taken along the LOC on 15 June. Imbert stated that his government could accept "almost all of the proposal" although some points would require further discussion.

(e) Msg, Santo Domingo 2496 to State, 181635Z Jun 65, JCS IN 18075. (e) Msg, Santo Domingo 2497 to State, 182019Z Jun 65, JCS IN 18310.

The State Department was concerned that the OAS proposal did not deal with the Communist problem, but Ambassadors Bunker and Bennett noted that existing

Dominican laws made Communist parties illegal and that they "plan to make certain" that the Committee's "Institutional Act" of the interim government would retain those laws. Further, they would try to influence the committee to exert influence on the new OAS electoral commission to assure an "anti-Communist viewpoint." With regard to the question of whether Communists could stand for election as candidates of non-Communist parties, the US Ambassadors "intend" that the "institutional act" would permit the deportation of known Communists. "We also mean to see," they reported to Washington, that the provisional government was composed of "firm anti-Communists."

(S-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, State 1478 to Santo Domingo, 18 Jun 65, JCS IN 17624. (S-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, Santo Domingo 2490 to State, 181010Z Jun 65, JCS IN 17639.

Meanwhile, in response to General Palmer's request of the previous day, CINCLANT sought JCS authority to deploy one tank platoon with appropriate headquarters, service, and maintenance elements to the Dominican Republic.

The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that efforts should be continued to obtain General Alvim's agreement to the withdrawal of two US airborne battalions (Phase III withdrawal) from the Dominican Republic. The JCS saw no advantage in General Alvim's suggestion that the two battalions be located in Puerto Rico on an interim basis, nor did they favor discussion of US-Latin American force levels within the IAPF with the OAS in Washington. The JCS also recommended approval of CINCLANT's 11 June recommendations for immediate redeployment of 214 support personnel no longer required in Santo Domingo and for standing authority to redeploy limited numbers of support personnel in excess of requirements in the Dominican Republic.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 181548Z Jun 65, JCS IN 18030. (S-Gp 3) JCSM-476-65, "Phase III Withdrawal of Forces from the Dominican Republic (S)," 18 Jun 65, derived from (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/24, same subj, 15 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). (For SecDef reply see 23 Jun 65.)

The Constitutionlists released the two US soldiers captured the previous afternoon.

(S) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 190330Z Jun 65.

19 Jun 65 General Palmer informed CINCLANT that three battalions of the 82d Airborne Division were in a training status with no current operational mission and that a fourth

battalion at San Isidro could be relieved by Dominican forces. Although General Alvim did not favor further US force reductions pending agreement on a political solution, General Palmer intended "to persevere" with him on this subject.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 200252Z Jun 65, JCS IN 20122.

20 Jun 65 Reaction to the OAS proposal of 18 June was cautious. Caamano announced his intention to negotiate on the basis of the proposal, stating that the proposal "could resolve the Dominican political problem peacefully." PRD sources agreed that the Constitutionalist had accepted the proposal in principle and predicted a PRD victory in the elections. There was no further GNR comment since the Imbert statement of 18 June, and GNR military leaders were also noncommittal, awaiting Constitutionalist reaction to the proposal.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 2517 to State, 200015Z Jun 65, JCS IN 20277. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2524 to State, 210055Z Jun 65, JCS IN 20696. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2532 to State, 210550Z Jun 65, JCS IN 21131.

The OAS committee continued its consultations with Dominican leaders on the formation of an interim government. It met with the civilian members of Caamano's negotiating team and informed them that once a provisional government had been formed, the IAPF would be reduced to the minimum necessary to maintain peace in the pre-electoral period.

(C-Gp 4) Msg, Santo Domingo 2555 to State, 221850Z Jun 65, JCS IN 23276. (S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 2552 to State, 221345Z Jun 65.

21 Jun 65 The Constitutionalist accused US forces of looting and drunken behavior in their zone, of confiscating all groceries in the possession of anyone attempting to enter the zone, and of harassing civilians. General Palmer declared these allegations false.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2547 to State, 220115Z Jun 65, JCS IN 22349.

General Palmer discussed with General Alvim the desirability of reducing US forces in the IAPF, but Alvim was opposed to any further US withdrawals prior

to a political agreement. Alvim agreed, however, that once a political agreement was achieved, the IAPF could be reduced to: 1) a US brigade force of three airborne infantry battalions, one 105mm howitzer artillery battalion, one air mobile company, one combat engineer company, and one medium tank platoon, plus appropriate signal, medical, and MP elements; 2) a Latin American brigade of one Brazilian Army battalion and two composite Latin American battalions; 3) a US logistic command appropriate to the total IAPF and certain other US forces, such as psywar, special forces, civil affairs, and MPs, necessary for a balanced IAPF. Both Palmer and Alvim agreed that the Dominican Republic might remain unstable for several years and that IAPF troops might have to remain longer than the proposed six- to nine-month period pending elections.

(S) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 220250Z Jun 65.

General Palmer also recommended to General Alvim the institution of vehicular IAPF patrols into the Dominican countryside. He proposed that daylight patrols with positive radio communications be sent out in three directions from Santo Domingo (east toward La Romana, north toward Santiago, and west toward Barahona) with the purpose of showing the OAS flag, sampling popular sentiment, supporting law and order, and exercising the right of IAPF to unlimited access in the Dominican Republic.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 220515Z Jun 65, JCS IN 22304.

23 Jun 65 Deputy Secretary Vance approved the JCS recommendations of 18 June for the immediate redeployment of 214 support personnel no longer required in Santo Domingo and for standing authority for CINCLANT to redeploy support personnel in excess of requirements in the Dominican Republic.

CINCLANT while concurring in General Palmer's 22 June recommendations on troop reductions in the Dominican Republic, stated that serious consideration should be given to delaying the withdrawal pending some positive indication of early acceptance of the OAS proposal, and that it was not necessary to place the withdrawn battalions on short reaction time at Ft. Bragg.

(S) Memo, Dep SecDef to CJCS, "Phase III Withdrawal of Forces from the Dominican Republic (S)," 23 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). (Later summarized in (S) 1st N/H of JCS 2338/24, 25 Jun 65, same file.) (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 231947Z Jun 65, JCS IN 24908.

In Santo Domingo, Caamano met with the OAS Committee and presented his reply to its proposal for a political solution. He recommended the following modifications: withdrawal of the IAPF not later than one month after the installation of the provisional government; reincorporation of all Constitutionalist military personnel into the armed forces at their previous ranks; surrender of all arms to the provisional government rather than to the OAS; and inclusion of the "Economic and Ethico-Social gains of the people" (the heart of the 1963 constitution) in the "Institutional Act" and ratification of the Act by the "Present Congress" (apparently the Bosch Congress of 1963). Caamano also requested amnesty for his followers to include freedom from penal responsibility for all actions connected with "recent events" except for common crimes. Ambassador Bennett commented that the Constitutionalist reply, while submitted in the form of modification to the OAS proposal, embodied all the conditions consistently advocated by the Constitutionalist as indispensable to a political solution.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2568 to State, 232315Z
Jun 65.

Later in the day, the Committee met with Imbert to hear his reply to the proposal. Imbert offered "to expand [the GNR'S] membership or install consultative commission," and he suggested the following changes in the OAS proposal: elections to be held in nine months; immediate withdrawal of the IAPF upon the adoption of the proposal; reincorporation into the armed forces of only those who had not violated the military Code of Justice; surrender of all arms collected by the OAS to the Dominican armed forces within 15 days; "desirability" of deporting Communists; and the adoption of a constitution before the elected government took office. Ambassador Bennett noted that the GNR, like the Constitutionalist, tried "to save most of its previous position," but its response seemed "less forthcoming" and had a marked vindictive tone.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2577 to State, 241130Z
Jun 65, JCS IN 25761.

24 Jun 65

The JCS authorized General Palmer to discuss with General Alvim the withdrawal of US forces from the Dominican Republic on the scale, and according to the schedule, recommended by Palmer on 22 June. The JCS also directed the immediate redeployment of the 214 support personnel no longer required in Santo Domingo and redeployment, on a continuing basis, of limited numbers of support personnel in excess of requirements.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 4502 to CINCLANT and USCOMDOMREP,
241506Z Jun 65. (S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 4526 to CINCLANT,
242000Z Jun 65.

In a separate action, the JCS requested the Secretary of Defense's approval of CINCLANT's 17 June recommendation for the return of Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, to the CONUS.

(S-Gp 3) JCSM-495-65, "Redeployment of Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion (S), " 24 Jun 65, derived from (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/26, "Redeployment of Company A, 229th Helicopter Battalion from the Dominican Republic (U)," 22 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (17 Jun 65).

25 Jun 65

In San Francisco de Macoria, a group of armed civilians overran the national police station and attacked the army barracks at the edge of the city. Heavy firing took place throughout the morning, but by afternoon, the GNR reported the situation under control. US helicopters flew an IAPF inspection team to San Francisco de Macoria, but the team received little cooperation from the local police and military authorities. General Palmer reported that 100 armed civilians had participated in the attack and that 8 had been killed and 37 wounded. Ambassador Bennett informed the State Department that available intelligence indicated heavy Communist involvement in the attack.

In Santo Domingo, mobs of up to 3,000 persons looted warehouses and stores in the Constitutionalist zone. Ambassador Bennett reported that another 3,000 persons passed through one checkpoint into the Constitutionalist zone with empty bags, apparently to join the looters.

(S) Msgs, Santo Domingo 2600 to State, 252245Z Jun 65, JCS IN 28114; 2613, 261140Z Jun 65, JCS IN 38950. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 260405Z Jun 65, JCS IN 28621. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2619 to State, 262330Z Jun 65, JCS IN 29437.

In accordance with the JCS instructions of 24 June, General Palmer discussed with General Alvim the question of further US troop withdrawals from the Dominican Republic. As result, they agreed to the following: an announcement on or about 3 July, that a two-battalion brigade of the 82d Airborne Division (1,400 men) would be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic; completion of the withdrawal of one of the battalions on or about 10 July; and an indefinite withdrawal date for the second battalion. The date set for the withdrawal of the second battalion would depend on the situation at the time of the withdrawal of the first battalion.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 252330Z Jun 65, JCS IN 28195.

Commenting to the State Department on the various forms of provisional government that the OAS Committee might suggest, Ambassador Bunker favored a government headed by a single executive, since Dominican experience had proved the collegiate form of government unsatisfactory, and recommended against a provisional congress or legislative council. He favored, therefore, a provisional government with a president, a non-political cabinet, and an advisory committee of eminent persons and technicians.

(S-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 2612 to State, 260630Z Jun 65, JCS IN 28875.

26 Jun 65

In Santiago, Police fired into a rock-throwing crowd and wounded three civilians. There were similar incidents in the northern towns of Gurabo, Licey, and Pimentel, resulting in three deaths. Ambassador Bennett reported that an "uneasy peace" reigned in towns where the Constitutionals had been active; military and police patrols were much in evidence and a curfew was being enforced.

(S-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 2629 to State, 271155Z Jun 65, JCS IN 29823. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2631 to State, 272310Z Jun 65, JCS IN 30072.

The Paraguayan contingent (183 personnel) for the IAPF arrived in Santo Domingo and was placed under the operational control of the Latin American Brigade.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 270102Z Jun 65, JCS IN 29544.

27 Jun 65

The Dominican countryside was tense but quiet, with the exception of an incident at Loma de Jea where four Constitutionals were killed. In Santo Domingo, looting continued in the Constitutionalist zone, but General Palmer reported that Caamano's troops were trying to control the looters.

The IAHR team of criminologists, investigating alleged atrocities in the Dominican Republic, reported the discovery of five more bodies near the GNR Victoria Penitentiary.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2638 to State, 281130Z Jun 65, JCS IN 30415. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 280253Z Jun 65, JCS IN 30161. (U) Wash. Post, 28 Jun 65, 12.

In the political pause following the first round of talks on the OAS proposals for a provisional government, Ambassador Bunker submitted a lengthy assessment

of the situation to the State Department. Bunker concluded that the Committee's 18 June proposal was still the best available solution. He considered the GNR's refusal to stand aside in favor of a provisional government the major difficulty facing the Committee, but he was encouraged by reports that a new provisional government was acceptable to the GNR military leaders, and he hoped they would exert pressure on Imbert to step down. He added, however, that the GNR military leaders were "as anxious as Imbert for a solution by force," and they feared Imbert's removal "could open way for their own." Bunker believed, therefore, that restructuring the military establishment was essential, but he saw no prospects for radical changes in the military leadership in the near future. He considered the GNR's dependence on US financial assistance a source of "major leverage," but he expected to use this leverage only if "absolutely necessary." He reported that the Constitutionalist were still resisting the OAS proposal on the issues of communism, the control of the military, and popular approval of the Institutional Act, but he thought that these problems could be resolved once a provisional government was established. The Committee had concluded that Hector Garcia Godoy was the best choice to head the provisional government, and Bunker stated that if Garcia would give the Committee a firm commitment on "handling the Communist problem," a provisional government might be established during the next week. Bunker planned to schedule elections nine months after the provisional government took office with campaigning restricted to the last three months of that period.

(~~8~~-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 2628 to State, 270530Z Jun 65, JCS IN 29668.

28 Jun 65

Looting continued in the Constitutionalist zone of Santo Domingo, and Caamano's troops fired tear-gas grenades into a crowd of 400 persons. The Constitutionalist radio blamed the looting on persons infiltrated by the GNR.

(~~8~~-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 2646 to State, 282330Z Jun 65, JCS IN 31201.

CINCLANT concurred in 25 June proposal for the withdrawal of a two-battalion brigade (1,400 men) of the 82d Airborne Division.

At the same time, the Secretary of Defense asked the Secretary of the Army if it would be possible to replace the 82d Airborne Division battalions in the Dominican Republic with nonairborne battalions.

(~~8~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to CJCS, 281240Z Jun 65, JCS IN 30583. (~~8~~) Memo, SecDef to Under SecArmy, 28 Jun 65, encl to (~~8~~-Gp 4) JCS 2338/29, "Deployment of US Army Troops in the Dominican Republic (U)," 1 Jul 65, JMF 9128.4 (22 Jun 65). (For Army reply see 1 July.)

The State Department agreed with Ambassador Bunker's 27 June assessment of the Dominican situation. On the Communist issue, the Department instructed Bunker to stand firm against Constitutionalist demands for a "no-deportation" guarantee, legal recognition of the APCJ, and laws which might impede control of Communist subversion. The Department considered Hector Garcia Godoy acceptable if the Committee decided to propose him as president. With regard to Imbert's sensitivity about stepping down, the Department suggested that the Committee obtain a commitment from the provisional government to issue a statement as its first official act, praising Imbert's services.

(S-Gp 2) Msg, State to Santo Domingo, 282300Z Jun 65.

Former Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer arrived in Santo Domingo and announced his support for the OAS proposal calling on the Constitutionalist and GNR leaders to step aside for a provisional government. He pledged his party's cooperation in the formation of the provisional government, but stated that he would not take office in that government since that would disqualify him for high office in the elections to follow.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2645 to State, 282230Z Jun 65, JCS IN 31090. (U) NY Times, 29 Jun 65, 1.

29 Jun 65 The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendation of 25 June for the return of Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, to the CONUS. As a result, JCS authorized CINCLANT to return the unit to normal operations.

(S) Memo, Dep SecDef to CJCS, "Redeployment of Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion (S)," 29 Jun 65, attached to (S-Gp 3) JCS 2338/26-1, 30 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (17 Jun 65). (S-Gp 3) Msg, JCS 4798 to CINCLANT, 292156Z Jun 65.

In response to an Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, request, the JCS reviewed the current force objectives listed in JSOP-70 for a possible restructuring of the Dominican armed forces. The JCS concluded that the objectives for Dominican forces listed in JSOP-70--development of a small, effective joint service counter-insurgency force capable of reinforcing the national police in maintaining civil order and combatting guerrilla insurgencies--provided a sound basis for rebuilding the Dominican military forces once order was restored. The JCS added that the development of a

separate, unified constabulary-type force would strengthen the power of the military establishment vis-a-vis the civilian government; they considered such a force unnecessary, provided the police and military forces were adequately equipped and trained.

(S-Gp 4) JCSM-500-65 to SecDef, "Dominican Republic Military Forces (U)," 29 Jun 65, derived from (S-Gp 4) JCS 2338/21-1, same subj, 18 Jun 65, JMF 9128.4 (21 May 65).

30 Jun 65

In reply to the repeated requests that IAPF lines along the LOC be withdrawn to pre-June 15 positions, the OAS Committee informed Caamano that IAPF forces would retain "for the present" their current positions. The Committee cited the following justification for its decision: the vital importance of maintaining the security of the IAPF in light of the casualties sustained in past weeks; the IAPF responsibility for observance of the cease-fire; and the need for unimpeded functioning of the city's power plant, which was included in the 15 June LOC extension.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 2673 to State, 302400Z Jun 65, JCS IN 34445.

USCOMDOMREP recommended to CINCLANT strength and organization figures for US units to perform peace-keeping functions as part of the IAPF during the period of a provisional Dominican government, pending OAS-powered elections, and to advise and train the Dominican Armed Forces during the same period. General Palmer recommended the retention of 6,744 US officers and men in the Republic: 1) an airborne infantry brigade of three infantry battalions, one artillery battery, one engineer company, one reconnaissance platoon and one tank platoon; 2) one air mobile company, and 3) a logistical support element to support the entire IAPF. General Palmer also recommended a command organization for the residual force consisting of a CG and headquarters, USDOMREP, to assume both the long term mission of USCOMDOMREP and the tactical command of US forces in the Dominican Republic. (CINCLANT referred USCOMDOMREP's recommendations to the JCS on 26 July. For his own comments see item, 28 July.)

(S-Gp 4) Ltr, USCOMDOMREP USFDR-CG to CINCLANT, 30 Jun 65, attached to (S-Gp 4) JCS 2338/32, 3 Aug 65, JMF 9128.4 (26 Jul 65).

Meanwhile, in Santo Domingo Secretary General Mora and Alexander Firfer, Director of the AID mission, signed an agreement whereby AID granted the OAS \$17 million for emergency and recovery programs in the Dominican Republic. The OAS Committee stated that up to \$8 million would be used for emergency public salary payments with the remaining \$9 million available for recovery programs in both the public and private sectors.

(let) Msg, Santo Domingo 2664 to State, 300600Z Jun 65, JCS IN 33463. (U) NY Times, 1 Jul 65, 11.

JULY

1 Jul 65 The Acting Secretary of the Army informed the Secretary of Defense that his staff was preparing a plan for a "tailored army contribution" to the IAPF consisting of a 3500-man US Army Brigade with an additional force support element of about 4,700 troops for service support of the entire IAPF. This support troop figure was based on an assumed 5,000-man Latin American contribution to the IAPF. Since a Latin American commitment of this magnitude seemed unlikely, the Acting Secretary explained that the force support figure would be revised later.

(S) Memo, Acting SecArmy to SecDef, "US Army Force for Peacekeeping Role in Dominican Republic (U)," encl to (S-Gp 4) JCS 2338/30, same subj, 7 Jul 65, JMF 9128.4 (22 Jun 65).

2 Jul 65 Constitutionalists attacked the police headquarters at Ramon Santana, northeast of San Pedro de Macoris; two police and two attackers were killed, and three police were wounded. Ambassador Bennett reported that with this exception the Republic remained calm.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 22 to State, 030550Z Jul 65, JCS IN 37584.

The OAS committee presented Imbert and Caamano a draft of a proposed institutional act for the interim government. The draft act included the following provisions: elections for president, vice president, a national congress, and municipal authorities to be held nine months after adoption of the act; a three-month political campaign to precede the elections; the convening of a constitutional assembly within four months of the elections, with the new congress deciding the composition and functions of the assembly. The institutional act was to remain in effect until the new congress acted to amend or replace it, pending final approval of a constitution by the constitutional assembly.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 030510Z Jul 65.

3 Jul 65 President Johnson announced that two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division (1,400) men would be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic. The President said that he had ordered the withdrawal on the advice of Generals Alvim and Palmer and with the concurrence of the OAS Committee.

(U) NY Times, 4 Jul 65, 12.

In reply to General Palmer's 17 June request for the deployment of a tank platoon (7 tanks) to the Dominican Republic, the CJCS informed CINCLANT that the JCS were "reluctant to introduce these weapons, particularly at this time." General Wheeler added, however, that the desirability of deploying a tank platoon would be reconsidered when further reduction of US forces in the Dominican Republic appeared appropriate.

(~~e~~-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 5165 to CINCLANT, 031555Z
Jul 65.

5 Jul 65 A US MSTs tanker entered the Rio Ozama to deliver fuel oil for the Santo Domingo power plant. Although the OAS refused a GNR offer of naval protection, a GNR corvette accompanied the tanker to dockside and then stationed itself at the inner bend of the river with manned guns pointed at the city. The OAS committee and Secretary General Mora protested this action to the GNR, and the corvette was withdrawn. The tanker discharged its fuel and departed without further incident.

The US Embassy reported that Santo Domingo was rife with rumors of impending GNR military action against the Constitutionalists, and mortar shells landing near a church in the Constitutionalist zone and injuring three persons gave credence to the rumors. The OAS Committee directed an IAPF investigation of the incident. In a separate move the OAS met with GNR military chiefs and Garcia Godoy in further efforts to produce a provisional government.

(~~s~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 51 to State, 060604Z Jul 65, JCS IN 39886. (~~s~~-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 53 to State, 060700Z Jul 65, JCS IN 39944.

The IAPF continued to grow. Paraguay agreed to contribute a 29-man communications platoon to the IAPF in addition to the Paraguayan combat contingent already in Santo Domingo.

(~~s~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 51 to State, 060604Z Jul 65, JCS IN 39886.

6 Jul 65 Heavy firing broke out at 2300 against the Latin American IAPF forces along the eastern perimeter of the ISZ. The Latin American troops returned fire and the exchange continued for a half hour, but no casualties were reported on either side. Constitutionalist headquarters charged that GNR agents had started the firing, but an IAPF investigation determined that the Constitutionalists

had instigated the incident. Ambassador Bennett reported that the attacks might have had several purposes, but he believed that the Constitutionalists wanted primarily to test the morale and reliability of the Latin American troops.

Both the Constitutionalists and the GNR presented to the OAS Commission proposals for a constitutional act. USCOMDOMREP reported that the Constitutionalist draft, based almost exclusively on the 1963 Constitution, would keep the Bosch regime in existence; would allow no deportation of any individuals from the country; would require the IAPF to leave within one month; and would require the integration of all Constitutionalist military into the Dominican services at their Constitutionalist appointed rank. General Palmer commented, that the Constitutionalist draft was "unacceptable," and he expected the OAS to so inform Caamano.

General Palmer added that the GNR draft act remained within the spirit of the OAS proposals. Of particular importance the General noted, the GNR proposal included a provision keeping the police under the control of the armed forces.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 072348Z Jul 65, JCS IN 42419.

7 Jul 65

At 0100 hours Constitutionalists threw a grenade and fired 20 rounds at 82d Airborne Division positions in the center of the LOC. US troops returned the fire, but no casualties resulted. Later in the day, the Constitutionalists released a US soldier who had wandered into their zone the previous evening.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 072348Z Jul 65, JCS IN 42419. (S) Msg, Santo Domingo 72 to State, 080537Z Jul 65, JCS IN 42667.

The IAPF investigation of the 5 July charges of mortar shelling of the Constitutionalists zone indicated that no mortar rounds were actually detonated. An examination of shell fragments from the alleged firing proved that the shells had not been fired recently. General Palmer concluded that the Constitutionalists had fabricated the story of the shelling to enlist UN and world support.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 072348Z Jul 65, JCS IN 42419.

The OAS Committee continued meetings with Dominican leaders of all political factions to discuss its proposed institutional act.

8 Jul 65 In response to Ambassador Bunker's request, General Alvim postponed the institution of daily IAPF reconnaissance patrols into the interior of the country until the OAS committee could consider the political implications of such action and give appropriate guidance on the matter.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 95 to State, 092130Z Jul 65, JCS IN 45438.

The OAS committee formally proposed to Caamano the names of Hector Garcia Godoy and Eduardo Read Barreras as President and Vice-President of the provisional government. After a meeting with his Constitutionalist colleagues, Caamano announced that an "important" decision had been made, but would be reviewed at another meeting of Constitutionalist leaders before being announced to the people.

(S-EXDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 88 to State, 090453Z Jul 65, JCS IN 44202. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 91 to State, 090519Z Jul 65, JCS IN 44277. (Garcia Godoy was a career diplomat who had been appointed Foreign Minister in the short-lived Juan Bosch Government. He was also a successful business man, the head of the Dominican tobacco industry, and despite his many years in the Dominican foreign service under Trujillo was considered by all a non-political figure. (From NY Times, 4 Sep 65, 6.))

The OAS commission of criminologists completed its investigation of atrocities in the Dominican Republic. Its final report constituted a strong indictment of the GNR for noncombatant killings. In view of the current critical stage of political negotiations, however, the OAS Committee requested that the OAS not publish the report at this time. Consequently, the commission merely announced that it had submitted its report to Washington.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 80 to State, 081750Z Jul 65, JCS IN 43578. (S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 91 to State, 090519Z Jul 65, JCS IN 44277.

9 Jul 65 Mortar firing from the northern area of Santo Domingo was reported. One round exploded in the LOC and three in the Constitutionalist zone. One Dominican civilian was wounded in the LOC; there were no US casualties.

In accordance with the President's 3 July announcement, the first of two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division began withdrawing from the Dominican

Republic with an estimated completion date of 11 July. Withdrawal of the second battalion and a brigade headquarters was "tentatively" scheduled to begin on 12 July.

(TS) NMCC OPSUM 159-65, 10 Jul 65, 1.

The OAS Commission listened to the first reactions of the Dominican factions to the Commission's proposed composition of the provisional government. Imbert and other GNR leaders "expressed unhappiness" with Garcia Godoy as provisional president and questioned the need for a vice president. Imbert submitted a list of 21 possible candidates, and told the OAS Committee that he was still considering turning the government over to the military.

The Constitutionlists accepted Garcia Godoy and Read Barreras but with reservations. Before final acceptance they wanted to learn the candidates' views on the OAS draft institutional act and on a Constitutionalist counter-proposal then being prepared on "constitutional provisions."

(S-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 103 to State, 100525Z Jul 65, JCS IN 46122.

10 Jul 65

A crowd of civilians attacked three national policemen when they attempted to make an arrest in the LOC. One of the policemen panicked and fired into the crowd, wounding two persons. US forces broke up the fight; in the process one of the policemen was wounded.

The IAPF investigated the 9 July mortar incident, but was unable to find the firing site or determine the identity of the mortar crew. Both Imbert and his military leaders denied involvement.

(S-EXDIS) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 110150Z Jul 65, JCS IN 46799.

Ambassador Bennett reported on the latest developments in the OAS Commission's quest for a political solution. The Commission met with GNR and Constitutionalist military and political leaders during the day. Bennett noted that the GNR military chiefs had said they would support Garcia Godoy as provisional president if agreement was reached on the following: a disposition of the Constitutionalist officers acceptable to the GNR; retention of command by the present GNR military chiefs until the elected government took office; and deportation of all Communists.

Imbert had repeated his contention that a government (the GNR) already existed. At any rate, an agreement on the Institutional Act must precede the establishment of a provisional government. He added, however, that he was "not against" Garcia Godoy as provisional president, but that before the installation of the provisional government it was essential to resolve the situation in the Constitutionalist zone and the disposition of the Constitutionalist military and the "hardcore" Communists. Caamano and his group had no objection to an early meeting with the Committee and Garcia Godoy to consider the remaining problems.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 114 to State, 110545Z Jul 65, JCS IN 46924.

11 Jul 65

As the result of continuing incidents in the LOC between civilians and GNR police, the IAPF increased its MP and reconnaissance patrols in the LOC, routing all GNR police vehicles around the LOC through the northern part of the city.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 120109Z Jul 65, JCS IN 47410.

The 1/508 Airborne Infantry Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, completed its withdrawal from the Dominican Republic. This left the IAPF with the following force strength:

UNITED STATES FORCES

US Army	10,490
USAF	429
MAAG	35
Total	<u>10,954</u>

LATIN AMERICAN FORCES

Brazil	1,146
Costa Rica	21
El Salvador	3
Honduras	250
Nicaragua	156
Paraguay	183
Total	<u>1,759</u>

(S) NMCC OPSUM 160-65, 12 Jul 65, 3. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 120109Z Jul 65, JCS IN 47410.

12 Jul 65 The OAS Committee and Garcia Godoy met with the GNR and Constitutionalist factions in separate meetings. Imbert presented the Committee a memorandum containing the same points he and his military chiefs had enumerated on 10 July. Caamano submitted a 28-point "general agenda" as a basis for further discussions. Caamano responded favorably to the suggestion that military representatives of both sides meet with the Committee to work out details of the amnesty, provisions involving the armed forces, and the surrender of weapons.

(~~e~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 136 to State, 130615Z Jul 65, JCS IN 48763.

Ambassador Bunker informed the State Department that "many difficult problems" remained to be negotiated in Santo Domingo, and he was not "sanguine" that matters would be resolved by 4 August when the Inter-American conference met in Rio de Janeiro. He stated that "it would be highly undesirable for the Rio meeting to be confronted with major unresolved aspects of the Dominican situation," and he recommended postponement of the conference.

(~~e~~) Msg, Santo Domingo 126 to State, 122042Z Jul 65, JCS IN 48360.

14 Jul 65 The IAPF initiated four joint IAPF/GNR police patrols in the LOC. Each patrol consisted of one vehicle with US and Honduran MP's and a second vehicle with GNR police. The Constitutionalist immediately protested to the OAS Committee.

Two Brazilian soldiers of the IAPF "inadvertently" strayed into the Constitutionalist zone during the day in a jeep, and were captured. Later, the soldiers were released with their equipment, including the jeep. The Constitutionalist had retained the arms and vehicles of captured IAPF personnel in previous similar incidents.

(~~s~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150118Z Jul 65, JCS IN 51516.

General Palmer relieved the Headquarters of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and the 1st Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, of all assigned missions, in preparation for redeployment to CONUS.

(TS) NMCC OPSUM 163-65, 15 Jul 65, 1.

15 Jul 65 The Paraguayan communications platoon (20 men and equipment) arrived in Santo Domingo. These additional troops raised the number of Paraguayans serving with the IAPF to a total of 212.

(TS) NMCC OPSUM 164-65, 16 Jul 65, 1.

16 Jul 65 The Headquarters of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and the 1st Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, began departing for CONUS. A total of 751 personnel and 170 vehicles were to be returned to CONUS by a combined airlift and sealift to be completed on 21 July.

(TS) NMCC OPSUM 165-65, 17 Jul 65, 2.

UN Security Council President Morozov summoned the Council to meet on 20 July to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic. Morozov called the meeting at the request of Ruben Brache, the representative of the Dominican Constitutionalists, who had charged the IAPF with backing the GNR in a "plan of aggression." Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General reported to the Council that the situation in the Dominican Republic was "potentially explosive," and was becoming worse because of economic paralysis and military repression.

(U) NY Times, 17 Jul 65, 3.

19 Jul 65 In accordance with the JCS authorization of 29 June, the Provisional Helicopter Company, 82d Airborne Division, assumed the duties of Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, which began loading aboard the LSD SPIEGEL GROVE at Haina for redeployment to CONUS.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 200246Z Jul 65, JCS IN 57873.

20 Jul 65 Approximately 20 rounds of 81mm mortar fell on the Constitutionalist zone near the eastern part of the LOC at 0205, killing one civilian and wounding another. The alleged source of the firing was the GNR-held northern section of Santo Domingo. Two IAPF investigating patrols questioned eye witnesses who claimed that the firing came from the Haiti School, north of the LOC. The patrol also found fragments of several 81mm rounds. The incident was reported to the OAS Commission which drafted a letter of protest to the GNR.

General Alvim used the occasion to renew his request for US counter-mortar radars. General Palmer told General Alvim that these radars were high-priority items and questioned their usefulness in a crowded city area, but said he would continue efforts to procure them.

(~~e~~-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 210219Z Jul 65, JCS IN 59591. (~~2~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 210232Z Jul 65, JCS IN 59557.

Redeployment of Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, to CONUS was completed. Three aircraft with personnel of Headquarters, Helicopter Co, 32d Airborne Division, 782d Maintenance Battalion (-), and Company D, 307th Medical Battalion (-), departed Santo Domingo for CONUS, completing Phase III redeployment.

(~~2~~-Gp 4) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 202130Z Jul 65, JCS IN 59178.

In the UN Security Council the IAPF was asked to withdraw from Santo Domingo by both Ruben Brache, the Dominican Constitutionalist representative, and Dr. Guaroa Velazquez, the GNR spokesman. US Ambassador Francis T. P. Plimpton stated that withdrawal would result in resumption of civil war.

(U) NY Times, 21 Jul 65, 1.

21 Jul 65 Santo Domingo was quiet with the exception of firing by Paraguayan troops of the IAPF to disperse a rock-throwing Constitutionalist crowd. General Palmer reported that "further evidence" clearly indicated that General Wessin's force was the guilty party in the 20 July mortar incident.

Generals Alvim and Palmer requested a meeting with the OAS Committee for 26 July to discuss the military situation in the Constitutionalist zone and Caamano's use of the negotiation period to improve his defenses. They also planned to discuss the question of the disposition of hard-core Constitutionalist prisoners held by the IAPF; the negotiation of a one-block extension to the ISZ; and the question of how to curb the distribution of the Constitutionalist newspaper, La Patria.

(~~2~~-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 220154Z Jul 65, JCS IN 60986.

The OAS Council voted 14 to 5 to postpone indefinitely the Inter-American Conference that had been scheduled to begin 4 August in Rio de Janeiro. A major consideration in the decision to postpone the Conference was the Council's view that, since settlement of the Dominican situation appeared remote, a meeting during the crisis would be unsuitable.

(U) NY Times, 22 Jul 65, 8.

22 Jul 65

The OAS Committee submitted a formal protest to the GNR on the 20 July mortar incident.

(C) Msg, Santo Domingo 215 to State, 221533Z Jul 65, JCS IN 61769.

General Palmer recommended to CINCLANT that the US deploy a tank battalion to the Dominican Republic as soon as possible. He also recommended that the present artillery battery be expanded to a battalion. These deployments would permit redeployment of an airborne infantry battalion. General Alvim concurred, estimating that these reinforcements would permit the withdrawal of an airborne infantry battalion in early August.

General Palmer also recommended that the Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, be phased out as soon as the table of distribution for a smaller, lower-ranking US headquarters had been approved by higher authority.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 221350Z Jul 65, JCS IN 61982.

In a meeting with the Constitutionalist negotiating commission, Ambassador Bunker obtained agreement on the following: the OAS could provide electoral assistance to the new government; human rights would be observed in accordance with OAS and UN declarations; the provisional government would settle Constitutionalist and GNR debts and have a free hand in selecting economic development programs; and constitutional problems would be resolved by the permanent government's assembly. Ambassador Bennett added that this agreement "clears away the underbrush of minor problems." Still to be solved were the major disagreements over the future of the IAPF and the Dominican army and the disarmament of Dominican civilians.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, Santo Domingo 229 to State, 230520Z Jul 65, JCS IN 62980.

In a meeting of the UN Security Council, representatives from Jordan, France, and Uruguay expressed concern over the GNR's cease-fire breach on 20 July, Uruguay adding that the UN could not long remain indifferent to the atrocities for which the GNR was responsible. The Council decided to review the Dominican Republic problem on a continuing basis, the next meeting being set for 26 July.

(U) Msg, USUN 141 to State, 230006Z Jul 65, JCS IN 63058.

24 Jul 65 The Constitutionalist marked the beginning of the fourth month of the Dominican crisis by firing on US and Latin American troops along the LOC. Only the Latin American troops returned the fire. No casualties were reported. Shortly after the incident, a Constitutionalist officer reported to IAPF Headquarters that "some irresponsible drunks" had started the fight.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 252 to State, 250558Z Jul 65, JCS IN 65686. (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to State, 260105Z Jul 65, JCS IN 66210.

25 Jul 65 Eduardo Read Barreras announced that he would not serve as either vice president or cabinet minister in the provisional government because he believed the problems facing such a government were "too difficult." Specifically he feared that the provisional government would be unable to control the military or prevent reprisals and repression.

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 256 to State, 252210Z Jul 65, JCS IN 66188.

27 Jul 65 The OAS Committee delivered a revised draft of the proposed institutional act to Caamano and Imbert and discussed with both factions the problem of the vice presidency. Ambassador Bennett reported that the discussion with Imbert had been generally inconclusive and indicative of the GNR's obstructionist attitude. Further, Imbert had convinced the Committee that he intended to "hang on if possible," insisting that the GNR was the provisional government.

Caamano promised to study the new draft and asked the Committee to sound out Imbert on two proposed vice-presidential candidates. Caamano expressed a willingness, in the event Imbert rejected both, to agree to

the Committee's proposal to eliminate the post of vice president. Caamano also stated that his government was prepared to leave military problems to the provisional government.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 276 to State, 280535Z
Jul 65, JCS IN 69312.

29 Jul 65 The OAS Committee and Garcia Godoy met with Caamano and his advisers for further discussions on the proposed institutional act. The Committee took under advisement minor changes proposed by the Constitution-
alists who reiterated their confidence in Garcia Godoy's ability to resolve problems concerning the armed forces. Garcia Godoy stated that it was unrealistic to expect the provisional government to take office without a clear understanding by both sides on "how problems would be handled."

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 289 to State, 300500Z
Jul 65, JCS IN 72447.

31 Jul 65 The Department of State asked Ambassadors Bennett and Bunker and General Palmer to estimate what action would be required, assuming that a provisional government would be established in the Dominican Republic with Caamano's consent, to restore order in the Constitutional zone. The Department asked: could order be restored by the provisional government alone using purely administrative measures such as stopping food deliveries into the zone, cutting off utilities, or stopping all movement of persons in or out of the zone? If military pacification proved necessary, should it be undertaken by the IAPF, the regular Dominican forces, or in a combined operation?

The Department also wanted an estimate of the measures necessary to restore order in the zone if a provisional government were formed without Caamano's consent and an estimate if the government were formed without Imbert's approval.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, State 165 to Santo Domingo,
31 Jul 65, JCS IN 74896.

The strength and composition of the IAPF after the completion of Phase III of USCOMDOMREP's withdrawal plan was as follows:

UNITED STATES FORCES IN DOMREP

US ARMY

HQ USCOMDOMREP	285
32d Abn Div	5,541
Non-Division Troops	3,585
TOTAL US ARMY	<u>9,411</u>

USAF

HQ CTF 121 (Advon)	2
Supporting Units	344
Det 1st Air Commando Wg	8
TOTAL USAF	<u>354</u>

MAAG

TOTAL MAAG	36
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TOTAL	9,801 (c)
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LATIN AMERICAN FORCES IN DOMREP

Brazil	1,146
Costa Rica	21
Honduras	250
Nicaragua	156
Paraguay	213
	<u>1,786 (c)</u>

(25) NMCC OPSUM 178-65, 2 Aug 65, 1.

AUGUST

1 Aug 65 Responding to the State Department's questions of 31 July, Ambassadors Bunker and Bennett and General Palmer noted that if a provisional government took office, even with Caamano's consent military force would still be required to reduce sporadic resistance by isolated hard-core extremists. Such military action should be undertaken by the IAPF, because to use Dominicans alone, or, in conjunction with the IAPF, would merely exacerbate hatreds and harden resistance.

The US officials considered that the installation of a provisional government without Caamano's approval was highly improbable. Bennett and his colleagues concluded that, in the unlikely event that such a government was formed, IAPF operations would be necessary to sweep the Constitutionalist zone or to undertake a phased reduction of the area, depending on the type and strength of resistance.

The US officials also concluded that a provisional government could be installed without Imbert's approval, but would require the support of the GNR military and police. Without the cooperation of these groups, no provisional government could govern, unless the US or OAS were prepared to intervene on a "massive scale."

(S-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, Santo Domingo 311 to State, 020321Z Aug 65, JCS IN 75663.

2 Aug 65 Ambassadors Bennett and Bunker informed the Department of State that they planned to "handle the Communist problem" through private agreement with Provisional President Garcia Godoy. They had prepared a draft memorandum of understanding for him to sign that provided: 1) the provisional government would "exercise all powers and resources at its disposal to check the growth and eliminate the influence of Communism and Castro-Communism in the Dominican Republic"; 2) no "Communists, Castroites or Castro-Communist sympathizers" would hold critical positions in the provisional government; 3) the National Department of Investigations would be given responsibility for organizing and coordinating all antisubversive activities; 4) appropriate US agencies would assist this Department by training personnel and establishing an adequate police communications system; 5) important information on subversive activities would be furnished directly to the provisional president by the US Ambassador; 6) the National Department of Investigations would keep Communists, Castroites and their sympathizers under close surveillance; 7) the provisional president would be furnished a list of all Dominican Communists and Castroites who had entered the country illegally and would arrest them under the law prohibiting the use of false identification documents; 8) the provisional president would issue a decree imposing heavy penalties for the illegal possession of weapons; 9) the provisional president would issue a decree prohibiting organization of political parties whose aims were incompatible with representative democracy; 10) the provisional president would issue a decree establishing a special committee on freedom of speech and press

to draw up a code of conduct, and to report violations to the provisional president.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 324 to State, 030120Z Aug 65, JCS IN 76799.

3 Aug 65 The GNR armed forces and police leaders broadcast their latest position on key military and amnesty issues. The communique called for outlawing Communism and exiling principal Communist leaders, exiling Constitutionalist officers at double pay during the term of the provisional government, with the elected government "to decide next steps"; reintegration of pro-Constitutionalist enlisted men into the armed forces; and amnesty for civilians and ex-military men on the Constitutionalist side except for Communists and common criminals.

Ambassador Bennett reported that the communique had been issued without consulting the OAS Commission. As a result, the Commission assumed that the GNR's "military attitude had hardened."

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 334 to State, 040515Z Aug 65, JCS IN 78617.

4 Aug 65 In view of recent evidences of growing GNR intransigence concerning the OAS proposals for a provisional government, OAS and US officials met with GNR leaders. Ambassador Bennett met with Imbert, urging him "in unequivocal terms" to step down and assist in establishing a provisional government. He told Imbert that the United States supported the OAS Committee in its program for the Dominican Republic, and warned him that the GNR could expect no more financial support from the United States. In a separate conversation with Imbert, Ambassador Bunker repeated the same warning.

The OAS Committee met with the GNR Service Chiefs to seek their support for the provisional government. Ambassador Bunker explained the Committee's opposition to the deportation of Communists on the ground that it would merely allow those deported to obtain training and funds from Communist-bloc countries. Bunker also emphasized that no more OAS "emergency assistance" would be forthcoming until an internationally recognized provisional government had been installed.

The reaction of the military commanders appeared favorable. They did not repeat their previous insistence that Communists be deported, and they claimed to have told Imbert that the only government they would support was a provisional government established by the OAS.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 353 to State, 060503Z Aug 65, JCS IN 81867. (S-LIMDIS-Gp 3) Msgs, Santo Domingo 350 to State, 052352Z Aug 65, JCS IN 81874, Santo Domingo 342 to State, 050506Z Aug 65, JCS IN 80377.

7 Aug 65

After repeated efforts, the OAS Committee finally succeeded in getting a meeting between representatives of Caamaño and Imbert to discuss military problems. Although the results of the meeting proved inconclusive, the officials did agree to further consultations with more representatives of each side in attendance.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 374 to State, 080615Z Aug 65, JCS IN 84601.

At the request of the State Department, Ambassador Bennett forwarded the texts of existing Dominican statutes outlawing Communist parties and the 14th of June Movement. Ambassadors Bennett and Bunker advised against relying on these statutes as a means of controlling Communism because they were popularly associated with past regimes labeled by the Left as "repressive" or "unconstitutional." The Ambassador concluded that the provisional government would be in a stronger position to deal with Communist parties under laws emanating from Article 27 of its Institutional Act.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, State 188 to Santo Domingo, 5 Aug 65, JCS IN 80530. (S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 360 to State, 070538Z Aug 65, JCS IN 86355. (S-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 373 to State, 080500Z Aug 65, JCS IN 84592.

Assistant Secretary of State Mann commented on Bennett and Bunker's 2 August plan to deal with the Communist problem. He advised against a "private agreement" with Garcia Godoy because it would eventually become public knowledge, placing the United States "in interventionist light" and might destroy Garcia Godoy's usefulness. Mann suggested that the Ambassadors: 1) show Garcia Godoy the draft memorandum of understanding and tell him that it expressed the US desired course of action; 2) seek a verbal understanding between the OAS Committee and Garcia Godoy covering high points of the problem; and 3) seek agreement with Garcia Godoy on the text of a letter that he would send to his Minister of the Interior and Director of Investigations on how to control the Communists.

Mann concluded that the provisional government's ability to deal with Communism would depend "to large extent on will of Garcia Godoy," and he asked if Bennett and Bunker were satisfied that Godoy had made no commitments that would impede his ability to deal effectively with the Communists.

Bennett and Bunker replied that it was their "current impression that Garcia Godoy may well measure up when it comes to will and firmness of purpose in office." They agreed to take the

specific steps suggested by them, but mentioned that they could not give absolute assurance that the Communist problem would be effectively handled under the provisional government.

(~~S~~-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 373 to State, 080500Z Aug 65, JCS IN 84592. (~~S~~-EXDIS-GP 2) Msg, State 181 to Santo Domingo, n.d., JCS IN 85855.

9 Aug 65

The OAS Committee presented its solution to the Dominican civil war to both sides in the form of the "Institutional Act" previously negotiated with them and an "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" presented to the two sides now for the first time. The Committee also distributed the documents widely to the Dominican population.

The "Institutional Act" provided for a provisional government consisting of a president and cabinet, with the president exercising full legislative powers except in such matters as declaration of war, approval or repudiation of international treaties, creation or suppression of courts, changes in military organizations, and declaration of a state of siege or national emergency. The Act also provided for general elections within nine months, with political campaigning limited to the three months immediately preceding the election. All parties "whose principles were compatible with representative democracy" might participate in these elections. The Act guaranteed to the Dominican people "all rights consecrated in the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

The "Act of Reconciliation" consisted of 10 articles: 1) the GNR and the Constitutionalist accepted the provisional government presided over by Garcia Godoy as the sole and sovereign government of the Dominican Republic; 2) the two parties accept the "Institutional Act" as the constitutional instrument under which the provisional government would exercise its functions; 3) the provisional government would, on the day it took office, proclaim a general amnesty and release all political prisoners; 4) immediately following the inauguration of the provisional government, the Constitutionalist zone would become part of the security zone established by the "Act of Santo Domingo"; 5) the provisional president would be responsible for maintaining order in the security zone and might call on the IAPF as required; 6) the provisional government would establish centers in the security zone for the collection of arms in possession of civilians; 7) the Constitutionalist government would deliver arms now in the possession of civilians under their jurisdiction to the provisional government; 8) as soon as the provisional government was installed all members of the armed forces who participated on the Constitutionalist side would rejoin their units without reprisals and at the rank they held on 23 April 1965; 9) no officer or enlisted man would be subject to punishment of any kind for acts,

except common crimes, committed since 1 April 1965; and 10) the provisional government would initiate negotiations with the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers regarding functions of the IAPF, as well as the manner and date of its withdrawal.

(2) Msg, Santo Domingo 378 to State, 080155Z Aug 65, JCS IN 84665. (~~2~~-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 377 to State, 080216Z Aug 65, JCS IN 84664. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 361 to State, 081817Z Aug 65, JCS IN 84969. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 309 to State, 092050Z Aug 65, JCS IN 85993.

Initial reaction by both Dominican factions to the OAS proposals was unfavorable. The GNR broadcast a statement calling for rejection of imposed foreign solutions, while Caamano, at a press conference, claimed the Committee proposal had caught him by surprise. He asserted that questions of amnesty, military reintegration, and the IAPF had been excluded from the negotiating agenda by common consent and would now require further study. At a meeting between Garcia Godoy and the Constitutionalist negotiating committee during the afternoon, Hector Aristy singled out articles 4 and 10 of the Act of Reconciliation for bitter attack and also objected to article 8.

(~~2~~-Gp 1) Msg, Santo Domingo 393 to State, 092329Z Aug 65, JCS IN 86593. (~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 390 to State, 100700Z Aug 65, JCS IN 86625.

The Department of State, with DOD approval, asked the Country Team to estimate what actions were required to modernize the Dominican armed forces. The modernized force was to be capable of maintaining internal security, providing a measure of coastal surveillance against smuggling, and guarding the Haitian border. Specifically, the Department of State wanted to know: was a single unified service feasible; could the annual cost of the Dominican armed forces be cut to one half the previous average annual cost; could the personnel strength of the Dominican armed forces and police be cut by as much as one half?

(~~2~~-Gp 3) Msg, State 204 to Santo Domingo, 9 Aug 65, JCS IN 86358.

10 Aug 65

Imbert agreed to accept the OAS Committee program embodied in the "Institutional Act" and the "Act of Dominican Reconciliation." In Ambassador Bunker's opinion, Imbert's decision represented a final recognition on his part that without further financial aid and support the GNR could no longer survive.

(~~2~~-LIMDIS-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 399 to State, 102204Z Aug 65, JCS IN 87853.

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~~(S-EXDIS-Gp 2)~~ Msg, Santo Domingo 400 to State, 101706Z Aug 65, JCS IN 87893.

11 Aug 65

Efforts by Garcia Godoy and the OAS Committee to overcome Constitutionalist objections to the "Act of Reconciliation" failed. During a morning meeting with Garcia Godoy, the Constitutionalist stood firm in their previously announced opposition to articles 4, 8, and 10.

In an afternoon meeting with the OAS Committee negotiations came down to the "gut" issue: the composition of the military high command. Ambassador Bunker came away from the meeting with the impression that the other issues--procedures for dismantling the zone, the future of Constitutionalist military personnel, and problems relating to the IAPF--could be resolved through some form of compromise. The Constitutionalist, however, were adamant in their insistence that the present GNR military leaders must leave their posts before the provisional government could be installed.

~~(S-EXDIS-Gp 2)~~ Msg, Santo Domingo 416 to State, 120440Z Aug 65, JCS IN 89750. ~~(S-Gp 3)~~ Msg, Santo Domingo 418 to State, 120600Z Aug 65, JCS IN 89831.

12 Aug 65

Hope for a Dominican settlement under the OAS Committee plan appeared dim. The Constitutionalist foreign minister, Jottin Cury, telegraphed the UN Secretary General, requesting an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to "take cognizance" of the "dictatorial manner" in which the CAS was attempting to establish a provisional government including "genocidal military officers" responsible for "systematic opposition to any democratic standards in our country." Cury said he also wished to alert the Security Council to the possibility that the IAPF might try to compel the Constitutionalist to accept a provisional government containing such officers by force.

~~(S-LIMDIS-Gp 4)~~ Msg, USUN 341 to State, 121822Z Aug 65, JCS IN 91266.

The OAS Committee met again with the Constitutionalists to discuss differences concerning the "Act of Dominican Reconciliation." They continued to insist on removal of the GNR military leaders, but seemed willing to compromise on the other points. Specifically, the Constitutionalists agreed to a meeting with a representative of the IAPF to discuss revision of Paragraph 4, dealing with liquidation of their zone.

(8-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 424 to State, 130545Z Aug 65, JCS IN 91515.

The JCS asked CINCLANT whether he wished to change the residual US force structure recommended by USCOM-DOMREP on 30 June. This force structure had been based on the assumptions that the IAPF would remain in the Dominican Republic for 12 to 18 months and would be asked to train Dominican forces. Specifically, the JCS asked what modifications, if any, should be made to the residual force structure and headquarters JTD's in view of the possibility that these assumptions might prove wrong.

The JCS also asked what changes would be necessary if political circumstances were to preclude introduction of a tank company and artillery battalion; what should be the phased withdrawal to achieve the recommended force strength of approximately 7,000; and what alternatives were there to the command and control recommendations proposed by USCOMDOMREP.

(8-Gp 4) Msg, JCS 8093 to CINCLANT, 121836Z Aug 65.

14 Aug 65 Ambassador Bunker reported that the Constitutionalists seemed to be weakening in their demand for the removal of GNR military chiefs prior to installation of a provisional government. In a negotiating session with the OAS Committee, the Constitutionalists offered "possible acceptable" language changes to Articles 5 and 8 of the Act of Reconciliation. The Committee, however, found the Constitutionalist proposal on Article 4 unacceptable and continued to insist on absorption of the Constitutionalist zone into the ISZ under the protection of the IAPF.

(8-EXDIS-Gp 2) Msg, Santo Domingo 441 to State, 152214Z Aug 65, JCS IN 94905. (8-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 440 to State, 150520Z Aug 65, JCS IN 94244.

15 Aug 65 The OAS Committee, Garcia Godoy, and two Constitutionalist representatives concluded, after a long discussion, that a complete scenario for dismantling and disarming the Constitutionalist zone (Article 4) would have to be worked out prior to final agreement

on the "Act of Reconciliation." It was agreed that the Committee would meet with representatives of the IAPF and the Constitutionalist to deal with the question.

(8-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 444 to State, 100422Z Aug 65, JCS IN 95020.

General Palmer Forwarded to CINCLANT his views on the questions the JCS asked CINCLANT on 12 August. General Palmer recommended that no changes be made in the proposed US residual force structure submitted to the JCS on 30 June. He did, however, recommend an alternative to the command structure of the residual force: the CG and Hq, 82d Airborne Division, should be replaced either by a joint Hq, USCOMREP, or the augmented headquarters of the US residual brigade as determined by the JCS. As a transitional step, General Palmer recommended that the CG and Hq, XVIII Airborne Corps, be withdrawn and relieved by the CG and Hq, 82d Airborne Division. (For CINCLANT's comment see 21 August.)

(8-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 151908Z Aug 65, JCS IN 14655.

16 Aug 65 Constitutional Foreign Minister Jottin Cury sent a second message to the president of the UN Security Council repeating the charges made in his message of 12 August and requesting the Security Council "to intervene in an appropriate manner." The Soviet representative requested that the Security Council meet on the Dominican Republic.

(8-Gp 4) Msg, USUN 388 to State, 161817Z Aug 65, JCS IN 95770. (U) NY Times, 17 Aug 65, 31.

17 Aug 65 The OAS Committee completed revisions of the "Act of Reconciliation" to meet the Constitutionalist objections while still retaining the principles of the original proposal. The major change was in Article 4, drafted in consultation with the IAPF command and stating simply that immediately following installation of a provisional government, all contending forces would begin withdrawing "their defenses" in zones under their control. When disarmament of the Constitutionalist zone was completed, the IAPF would withdraw from its present positions to a location determined by the provisional government.

(8-Gp 4) Msg, Santo Domingo 453 to State, 180035Z Aug 65, JCS IN 98026. (8-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 170020Z Aug 65, JCS IN 96028.

At the request of Reuben Bracne, the Constitutional representative in New York, the Security Council postponed a meeting on the Dominican Republic indefinitely.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USUN 409 to State, 180140Z Aug 65, JCS IN 98266.

18 Aug 65

The OAS Committee met again with the Constitutionalists to discuss a revision of Article 4 of the "Act of Reconciliation." The Constitutionalists proposed that, because their people feared the IAPF, the OAS force should withdraw a few blocks, creating a neutral zone while the Constitutionalist forces destroyed their defenses and withdrew to barracks. The Committee rejected this proposal, but agreed to a meeting between Constitutionalist officers and representatives of the IAPF at OAS headquarters to discuss disarmament and the demilitarization of the Constitutionalist zone.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 466 to State, 190510Z Aug 65, JCS IN 99775.

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(S-EXDIS-Gp 1) Msg, Santo Domingo 461 to State, 182200Z Aug 65, JCS IN 99740.

19 Aug 65

The OAS Committee met with Constitutionalist and IAPF officers to discuss Article 4 of the "Act of Reconciliation," but were unable to reach an agreement. The Constitutionalists offered no new proposals but merely repeated their demands of 18 August, which were still unacceptable to the OAS Committee and the IAPF command.

Later in the day, the IAPF submitted a proposal to the OAS Committee and Garcia Godoy providing for the dismantling of GNR and Constitutionalist defenses in the areas under their control as soon as the provisional government was installed. The IAPF troops would withdraw to their encampments, leaving lightly manned observation posts along their present lines. Existing checkpoints would be maintained but would be jointly manned by IAPF and provisional government troops, including former Constitutionalist personnel. There

would also be similarly manned, pending orders to check on the disarmament process. All arms in the hands of civilians would be turned in to the Dominican police within 72 hours. After the provisional president was satisfied that demilitarization of the zone had been completed, the IAPF would dismantle all of its present positions and move to positions determined in consultation with the provisional government.

The OAS Committee accepted this proposal and planned to present it to the Constitutionalist as the maximum concession the Committee was prepared to make.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 471 to State, 200507Z Aug 65, JCS IN 11681; (S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 200207Z Aug 65, JCS IN 11746.

20 Aug 65 The OAS Committee presented the revised Article 4 of the "Act of Reconciliation" to the Constitutionalist, along with a copy of a communication from the Committee to the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, stating its intention to recommend adoption of a resolution on IAPF withdrawal. This draft resolution provided that "the manner and date of withdrawal of the IAPF will be determined by the provisional government together with the 10th MFM, at the initiative of the president of the provisional government when he considers it desirable." This draft resolution was intended to overcome Constitutionalist objections to Article 10 of the "Act of Reconciliation."

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 484 to State, 210100Z Aug 65, JCS IN 13152.

21 Aug 65 CINCLANT concurred in USCOMDOMREP's recommendations of 15 August on residual force structure, with certain reservations. Assuming that the IAPF would remain in the Dominican Republic for 12 to 18 months, CINCLANT recommended that the CG and Hq, 82d Airborne Division, should assume USCOMDOMREP's mission and headquarters effective only upon the establishment of a provisional government. He also recommended that the CG and Hq, XVIII Airborne Corps, be withdrawn to CONUS when relieved and that a JTD Hq USCOMDOMREP be approved and established as expeditiously as possible to assume the long term mission of USCOMDOMREP.

(S-Gp 4) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 211602Z Aug 65, JCS IN 14584.

22 Aug 65 Following two days of bitter debate, the PRD members of the Constitutionalist government finally managed to obtain governmental consent, over the strong objections of Cury and Aristy, to the revised Article 4 of the "Act of Reconciliation." Constitutionalist acceptance was made contingent, however, upon a charge

specifying that IAPF check points would be manned only by IAPF troops and not jointly as proposed in the Committee draft. In consultation with the IAPF command, the Committee agreed to accept the change.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 489 to State, 212306Z Aug 65, JCS IN 14314. (S) Msgs, Santo Domingo 493 to State, 230104Z Aug 65, JCS IN 15359 and 500, 230907Z Aug 65, JCS IN 15411.

23 Aug 65

The Constitutionalist announced that when signing the Act of Reconciliation, they would make a formal reservation to the effect that, contrary to the resolution of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers creating the IAPF, the Dominican Provisional Government would possess the exclusive and sovereign right to decide the date of withdrawal of the IAPF from Dominican territory. The Constitutionalist also sent messages to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela requesting them to instruct their delegates to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to seek a change in the resolution acknowledging "the right vested in the Provisional Government to decide regarding the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from Dominican territory by virtue of the powers inherent in a free and independent state."

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 504 to State, 240143Z Aug 65, JCS IN 16574, (U) Msg, Santo Domingo 505 to State, 240146Z Aug 65, JCS IN 18420.

Constitutionalist acceptance of the Act of Reconciliation did not, however, lead immediately to installation of the provisional government. Imbert, when presented with the amended version of the Act, declined to sign it at once on the ground that the changes would require legal study. Reacting to Imbert's statement, President Johnson informed Ambassador Bunker that it was time to "apply maximum persuasion" to get Imbert to sign the Act.

(U) Wash Post, 24 Aug 65, 6. (S) Msg, State 278 to Santo Domingo, 23 Aug 65, JCS IN 16793.

24 Aug 65

The need for "maximum persuasion" of Imbert by the United States became evident when the GNR military chiefs insisted upon a number of changes in the revised Act of Reconciliation to specify that the Provisional Government would be responsible for public order in the Constitutionalist zone, to set a time limit on the disarmament process, to provide that surrendered weapons be returned to national arsenals, and to guarantee that "promotions" given Constitutionalist officers would not be recognized.

Ambassador Bunker, moving to apply "maximum persuasion," told the GNR military leaders that the revised draft represented a rejection of all the major Constitutionalist objectives and was actually a stronger document than the original version. Bunker also explained that Garcia Godoy had developed sound plans for handling the Communist problem and had agreed to accept US expert assistance. The military chiefs, however, seemed distrustful of Garcia, fearing that he had entered into some secret understanding with Caamano detrimental to the armed forces.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 520 to State, 250550Z Aug 65, JCS IN 18651.

25 Aug 65

Replying to the State Department request of 9 August, the Dominican Country Team submitted its views and recommendations on future Dominican security forces. The Country Team recommended: 1) development of an armed force capable of maintaining effective security against violence in cities that could not be handled by the police, guerrilla outbreaks in the countryside, movement of arms and persons across land, sea, and air borders for subversive purposes, and contraband activities originating from abroad; 2) establishment of a clearly defined relationship between the armed forces and the police in which the latter would perform normal police functions and the former would deal with situations the police could not control; 3) development of a competent professional officer corps that was resistant to Communist infiltration, dedicated to preservation of the unity of the armed forces, and determined to support the policies of a freely elected democratic government; 4) development of policies and information programs in the Dominican security force to counter public criticism; 5) reduction of interservice antagonisms that diminished the armed forces capability to provide the government with a stable power base; and 6) limitation of expenditures to the minimum required to discharge security functions.

The Country Team recommended resuming the long-range MAP for the Dominican Republic. The program called for the attainment of FY 1970 force objectives of one Army brigade, 12 Navy patrol vessels and 53 Air Force aircraft; development of a well-trained and equipped police force with an academy staffed by US-trained Dominicans; and the establishment of a centralized security forces procurement system. In addition, the Country Team recommended that: the Armed Forces Training Center and the Naval Academy be merged into a single tri-service academy; the Armed Forces Training Center combat forces be integrated into the Army; the police be reduced from 9,000 to 5,000; civic action programs be designed to improve the public image of the security forces; and administrative reforms be designed to combat corruption and gradually reduce the size of the security forces.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 524 to State, 251830Z Aug 65, JCS IN 20461.

28 Aug 65 [

Bias

(8-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 552 to State,
290010Z Aug 65, JCS IN 24633.

As an additional form of pressure on Imbert and his military commanders to accept the Act, Ambassador Bunker recommended to the Department of State that President Johnson make a public statement praising the OAS Committee's proposal in its present form and expressing the conviction that its adoption would lead to a fair, honorable, and democratic solution of the Dominican conflict.

(EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, Santo Domingo 549 to State,
282037Z Aug 65, JCS IN 24346.

29 Aug 65 In response to Ambassador Bunker's recommendation, President Johnson, at a press conference, urged the GNR to accept the OAS Committee proposals. The President said, "The time for agreement is now. . . . Any who continue to oppose the O.A.S. solution are not friends of peace."

(U) NY Times, 30 Aug 65, 8.

30 Aug 65 A prolonged military engagement broke out between the Latin American Brigade of the IAPF and the Constitutionalists, who began the fight with small arms fire directed at Brazilian troops in the area of the National Palace. The fighting spread south along the Brazilian lines to the sea. In addition to small arms, the Latin American troops used machine guns, 106 and 57mm recoilless rifles, and 3.5-inch rocket launchers.

During the fight, between 30 and 40 mortar rounds were fired on the Constitutionalist zone. By use of counter-mortar radar, the IAPF learned that the rounds had been fired from GNR territory north of the LOC. Subsequent investigation by the GNR military command fixed the blame on General Wessin's Armed Force Training Center troops who were not under effective control of the GNR high command. To prevent a recurrence of the fighting, the IAPF and GNR organized joint patrols to investigate any mortar firing in the area north of the LOC.

(S-EXDIS-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 302300Z Aug 65, JCS IN 26671.

Imbert and the other members of the GNR resigned in favor of the OAS-proposed Provisional Government, but without having signed the Act of Reconciliation.

The GNR military chiefs, however, assured Ambassador Bunker that they wanted to push ahead with the OAS Committee proposal and the installation of the Provisional Government as soon as possible. Bunker, in reporting this last information to the Department of State, said that President Johnson's press conference statement had "made a strong impression here and [had] helped greatly in giving the situation its presently more favorable aspect."

(S) Msg, Santo Domingo 563 to State, 310104Z Aug 65, JCS IN 26620. (S-LIMDIS) Msg, Santo Domingo 565 to State, 310319Z Aug 65, JCS IN 26800.

USCOMDOMREP recommended to CINCLANT that a tank company be deployed to the Dominican Republic as soon as possible to become a part of the US residual force and that an airborne infantry battalion be withdrawn as soon as deployment of the tank company had been approved. Ambassadors Bennett and Bunker concurred in the recommendation, and Bunker had obtained OAS Committee approval for the deployment. General Alvim had agreed to release an airborne infantry battalion prior to arrival, but with a firm commitment of a tank company.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 301850Z Aug 65, JCS IN 26300.

31 Aug 65 The two opposing Dominican factions gave official approval to the Act of Reconciliation, thereby paving the way for installation of a provisional government. Caamano and his chief aids signed for

the Constitutionalist. In view of a signature by the GNR, which had resigned, the GNR armed forces chiefs signed a declaration stating they accepted the Act and would support Garcia Godoy as Provisional President.

The Act, in its final form, contained the following 10 provisions:

1. The 'constitutional government' accepts the provisional government presided over by Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy as the sovereign and sole government for the establishment and consolidation of political peace as well as for the recovery of the national economy.

2. The parties accept the Institutional Act [proposed basic law regulating the powers of the legislative and executive branches] that is subject to the present accord as the constitutional document under which the provisional government will exercise its functions. No previous constitution will be in effect while the aforementioned Institutional Act, whose text is an annex to the present accord, is operative.

3. On the day of its installation the provisional government will decree the general amnesty foreseen in Article II of the Institutional Act, and will take the necessary measures to free all political prisoners.

4. Immediately after installment of the provisional government the contending forces will begin the process of withdrawing their defense forces in the zones at present under their control. The inter-American peace force will withdraw to its encampments, leaving in the present lines only barbed-wire positions and reduced posts of vigilance.

The demilitarization and disarmament of civilians will start at once in the constitutionalist zone. The present checkpoints will be operated during the disarmament period by elements of the inter-American peace force.

The posts of vigilance and the checkpoints of the inter-American peace force will be withdrawn as soon as the provisional government has effected the demilitarization of the [constitutionalist] zone and the disarmament of civilians. The Provisional government will take all necessary measures to verify enactment of the provisions of this article.

The provisional President will indicate the areas whereto the inter-American peace force will move until the date of its departure from the country is determined.

5. The provisional government will be responsible for maintaining public order in the entire national territory, and to this end will take all measures that it deems necessary.

6. As soon as it is installed, the provisional government will establish special points for recovery of arms in the hands of the civil population. These points will be in charge of persons designated by the provisional government. The provisional government will decide when the recovered arms will be returned to the arsenals of the nation.

7. The present 'constitutional government' will take all necessary measures to assure that within a prudential period after installation of the provisional government all weapons at present in the hands of the civil population under its control will be delivered to the established posts in conformity with the preceding article. The provisional government will take such measures as are necessary to recover arms that have not been delivered voluntarily.

8. After installation of the provisional government the armed forces will return to their barracks and place themselves under the orders of their Commander in Chief, the provisional President. Those armed force members who have participated in the present conflict will be reintegrated into the armed forces without discriminations or reprisals.

9. In conformity with the declaration of general amnesty, no officer, other rank or other armed forces personnel may be subjected to court martial or punished for actions committed after April 23, 1965, with the exception of common crimes.

All members of the armed forces who want to go into retirement may do so in conformity with procedures laid down by the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, and with the pension payments due them. All armed forces members who desire to leave the country may do so with the guarantees of the case and with the assistance of the provisional government.

10. The provisional government will at once start negotiations with the 10th consultative meeting of foreign ministers as to the modalities and the date of the withdrawal of the inter-American peace force from the national territory. . . .

(C) Msgs, Santo Domingo 581 to State, 010205Z Sep 65, JCS IN 28281; 583, 010443Z Sep 65, JCS IN 28621; 584, 010514Z Sep 65, JCS IN 28515. (U) NY Times, 1 Sep 65, 10.

CINCLANT recommended that the JCS approve the deployment of one medium tank company for inclusion in the US residual force for the Dominican Republic as outlined by USCOMDOMREP on 30 August. He added, however, that the company should not be deployed until a provisional government had been established. He also recommended that one airborne infantry battalion be redeployed from the Dominican Republic to CONUS as soon as the tank company was authorized.

(S-Gp 3) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 311600Z Aug 65, JCS IN 27480.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS, SEPTEMBER 1965 - SEPTEMBER 1966

Garcia Godoy was inaugurated Provisional President of the Dominican Republic on 4 September 1965. The new president immediately faced the formidable task of enforcing the provisions of the Act of Reconciliation. Despite the mounting opposition of both factions, the new government did make some progress during September and October. On 4 September Caamano dissolved the Constitutionalist government and on 9 September General Wessin y Wessin left the country for Florida. On 25 September, the second anniversary of his exile, Juan Bosch returned to Santo Domingo, and on 14 October, in compliance with the provisional agreements, Caamano withdrew his 1,400 man force from the city in preparation for its reintegration into the regular army.

The IAPF, numbering approximately 8,200 men, was on duty in the area. The residual US force structure had not finally been decided on until 25 September. At that time the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of Assistant Secretary of State Mann, approved the structure recommended by USCOMDOMREP and CINCLANT (see items 30 June and 28 July), which had been endorsed by the JCS on 4 September.

Opposition to the provisional government, especially from the political right, created an explosive situation in late October. The right-wing military leaders refused to allow Caamano's forces to be integrated into the army and accused Garcia Godoy of being too liberal with the Communist and left-wing factions. Riots broke out in the center of Santo Domingo, and the country was rife with rumors of a right-wing coup. Rival labor unions clashed on the Santo Domingo waterfront, and troops from the former GNR units swept through Santo Domingo and occupied the Ozama Fortress. Garcia Godoy tried to defuse the situation. He had the IAPF occupy portions of central Santo Domingo, and on 27 November the government arrested 48 persons for trying to engineer a coup. Finally on 6 January Garcia Godoy, in a major effort to control the situation, exiled the military leaders of both factions. In the ensuing months the Provisional President returned his country to relative calm by placating first one faction then the other by a series of appointments, exiles, recalls, and promotions.

Campaigning for the 1 June elections began in March. The major candidates were the former presidents Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer. Balaguer won with a 225,000 plurality; his party also captured 22 of the 27 senate seats and 48 of the 74 house seats. Bosch accepted the results, but refused a cabinet position in the new government, which was to be inaugurated on 1 July.

The Council of the OAS met on 24 June to draw up a timetable for the withdrawal of the IAPF. The withdrawal was to begin on 30 June and be completed within 90 days of Balaguer's inauguration. On 30 June the first contingents (units from the 82d Airborne Division) left the Dominican Republic, and finally, on 21 September, the last units of the IAPF (115 men of the USAF) flew out of San Isidro airfield.

(C-Gp 4) JCSM 674-65 to SecDef, "Residual Force Structure, United States Forces Dominican Republic (U)," 4 Sep 65, derived from (C-Gp 4) JCS 2338/32-3, same subj, 2 Sep 65. (C) Memo, DepAsst SecDef/Admin to CJCS, same subj, 25 Sep 65, attached to (C-Gp 4) 1st N/H of JCS 2338/32-3, 29 Sep 65. All in JMF 9128.4 (26 Jul 65). (U) NY Times, 23 Sep 66, 3. (U) Keesings Archives, 1965-1966.

APPENDIX

REFUGEE EVACUATION

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Evacuated</u>
27 April	1,172
28 April	215
29-30 April	1,510
1-3 May	253
4 May	120
5 May	1,047
9 May	120
Total	4,437 (2,711 US)

(c) Cumulative Casualties Incurred by US Military Forces in the Dominican Republic - 28 April 65-13 January 66

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
Army	15	134
Marine	9	28
Navy	2	2
Air Force	0	1
Total	26	165

LATIN AMERICAN FORCES - DOMREP

<u>Initial Arrival Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Initial Strength</u>
14 May	Honduras	250
15 May	Nicaragua	166
15 May	Costa Rica	21
23 May	Brazil	23 (advance party)
26 June	Paraguay	184

Latin American Forces in DOMREP as of 17 January 1966

Brazil	1,136
Costa Rica	21
Honduras	249
Nicaragua	158
Paraguay	215
Total Latin American Forces	1,779

