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HISTORY OF THE
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
SIOP-4 N/O/OX, July 1973 - December 1974 (U)

2 September 1977

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FOREWORD

This is the twelfth history of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) since its establishment on 16 August 1960. It covers the period of July 1973 through December 1974, the term of Revisions N, O, and OX of SIOP-4. It has been prepared in accordance with Joint Administrative Instruction 210-1, 10 May 1972.

The classification of ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~ and the exemption from the General Declassification Schedule are established to conform with the classification of the source documents.

This history was prepared for the JSTPS by Mr. Charles K. Hopkins of the Strategic Air Command historical staff.

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
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I Roster of Key Personnel, JSTPS, 1 July 1973 - 31 December
1974

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HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET
PLANNING STAFF

Introduction

~~(TS)~~ The mission of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was to prepare and maintain, on a day-by-day basis, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) selected for attack in a nuclear war and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for the attack of these targets by committed or coordinated forces.¹ Assumed enemy awareness of the SIOP's existence and its damaging potential acted as a barrier to the outbreak of nuclear war. Contribution to "deterrence" was perceived as a major purpose of the SIOP--a plan which was supported by the U.S. Navy's submarine-launched missiles, the land-based missiles and bombers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), and such fighter-bombers and missile systems committed to the plan by unified commanders.²

(U) The JSTPS functioned as a staff agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from which it received directions. Above the JCS was the Department of Defense, with the chain of command culminating at the highest level in the National Command Authorities (NCA). The JSTPS, however, was collocated with Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC) at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.³

(U) This arrangement dated from August 1960 when Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. founded the JSTPS in what he later referred to as his most important decision. It was part of his decision to collocate it with Headquarters SAC in order to gain the advantages of SAC expertise and computer abilities, already highly developed at that time. It was also part of the same decision that the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), should always serve as Director of the JSTPS, while the Deputy Director would invariably come from another service. In point of fact, a flag officer of the U.S. Navy had always filled the latter position. The remainder of JSTPS personnel were drawn from all the military services.⁴

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(U) By 1960, advances in nuclear technology had led to the possession of nuclear weapons by various U.S. commands whose plans for their respective use were apt to conflict with each other. Unraveling such conflicts became increasingly burdensome and in this respect, as well as others, the advanced technology led to duplication of effort. The JSTPS was created in order to provide centrally controlled operational planning for the use of nuclear weapons in achievement of national objectives.⁵

~~(TS)~~ For several years after the JSTPS started operation, a new SIOP was prepared, at least in theory, each fiscal year (FY). As time went on, however, fluctuations in the numbers and types of nuclear weapons available,

[REDACTED] (b)(1) necessitated revision of the SIOP at six-month intervals. A policy change to alphabetically designate the six-month revisions took place in 1967, when SIOP-4 was in effect.⁶

~~(TS)~~ Eventually SIOP-4 went into Revision O, but then it proceeded with an extension of Revision O, known as OX, for a six-month period terminating on 31 December 1974. The 18-month period between 1 July 1973 and 31 December 1974 was, therefore, very much of an interim or changeover period as regards SIOP planning. It was well before SIOP-4N had run its course that the JSTPS received authoritative word that SIOP-5 would, in fact, replace SIOP-4 in the relatively near future. As early as 1970, the President had made public statements indicating a change of thinking as regards employment of nuclear force, and he reiterated similar thoughts in the intervening years.⁷

~~(TS)~~ So Revision N was, in a very real sense, the last of the previous series of regular six-month SIOP revisions and just about as it went into effect, the JSTPS people realized that they had entered an interim period as regards SIOP planning. That this was indeed the case was quickly confirmed by the nature of the tasks which the JCS soon started giving the JSTPS. It was the additional workload associated with these tasks that resulted in the six-month extension

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of Revision O. These special tasks were involved in one way or another with the anticipated change from SIOP-4 to SIOP-5.⁸

~~(TS)~~ Though a SIOP revision was effective for a period of six months, the complete life cycle of any revision, including planning, was approximately two years; that is, planning for a revision started at a point from 15 to 18 months before it was to go into effect. There were numerous steps in the planning process and it so happened that they had to follow a well-defined order, that is, that one specific step would have to be completed, or nearly so, before the next could begin. Many of the processes were of a mathematical nature, too, so the JSTPS had to allow not only for initial calculations, but also for computer time to check their accuracy.⁹

~~(TS)~~ A natural outcome of this situation was that the planning period between two different SIOPs would also require a long lead time. A normal SIOP revision involved a workload sufficient to occupy the JSTPS on a continuing basis. The move from an old to a new SIOP with differing concepts involved, in addition, extra studies, some of them quite extensive, to pretest the validity of the new concepts. There were also additional meetings. The JCS instructed the JSTPS to perform much of this extra workload in addition to its normal production of SIOP revisions.¹⁰

~~(TS)~~ SIOP-5, with its new concepts, represented a major change in nuclear war planning. Previously, the basic concepts had remained pretty much the same. The comparatively minor changes that had occurred, and would continue to occur, had been occasioned primarily by two factors: (1) changes in the number and kinds of weapons available, and (2) growth of the enemy target system.¹¹

~~(TS)~~ By the time Revision N became effective, Revision O was well into the planning stage, but even before it went into effect, the JSTPS knew that the next logical step would be an extension of this revision, rather than a new one. The JSTPS looked upon the extension frankly as a "patch-on-an-inner tube" type of makeshift arrangement

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occasioned by the additional workload associated with planning for new basic concepts. The simile was quite apt. The extension had just about the same relation to a complete revision that a tire patch has to a new inner tube. While an extension would do the job, as would the patch, successive extensions would tend to weaken the entire plan, just as a tube with too many patches would be weak and have to be replaced with a new tube. In making an extension, the JSTPS added merely the weapons and targets appearing since the current revision went into effect.

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(U) To appreciate the differences between SIOP-4 and SIOP-5 and, specifically, what was involved in SIOP-4 Revisions N, O, and OX, it is necessary to discuss what was involved in a SIOP at somewhat greater length than heretofore.

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were regarded as posing the potential threat of nuclear warfare against the United States. This being so, it was necessary to program the nuclear weapons of the United States and its allies in such a manner as to assure that the United States would survive any such conflict under conditions more favorable than those of its adversaries. For this purpose it was necessary to plan in advance what facilities would be struck in the adversary countries, in what order, how much damage would have to be inflicted to attain the objectives and so forth. These requirements led, in turn, to a need for priorities, for a National Strategic Target List (NSTL), and for ways and means of calculating the probable damage to be expected, or damage expectancy (DE) as it was called--all forming portions of the JSTPS' work. In fact, the formulation and keeping of the NSTL was an integral part of the SIOP itself.¹³

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~~(TS)~~ To provide a guideline to the JSTPS in formulating the SIOP, the JCS had issued the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP).¹⁴ Since 1970 the NCA, Department of Defense, JCS, and JSTPS had been reviewing the NSTAP extensively with a view toward

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on 1 January 1976.¹⁸

~~(TS)~~ Therefore, the technical planning for SIOP-5 got underway approximately simultaneously with putting SIOP-4 Revision OX into effect. Planning for the new SIOP-5 actually started somewhat prior to the effective date of Revision OX with a series of meetings. These required the presence of a substantial number of the knowledgeable people on the JSTPS staff who would otherwise have been fully occupied with formulating the "normal" SIOP revisions, and as such was a further illustration of the disruptions which were introduced into the normal planning cycle by the advent of a new SIOP.¹⁹

~~(TS)~~ In addition to and in connection with its responsibilities for the SIOP and NSTL, the JSTPS also maintained a National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB), from which the NSTL was developed.

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(U) The organization of the JSTPS was consistent with its responsibilities. At the top were the Director (JD) and the Deputy Director (JDD), whose status and provenance had been defined by Secretary Gates. Its two major divisions, the SIOP Division (JP) and the NSTL Division (JL), reflected its primary products.²¹

(U) During the 18-month period covered here, the strength of the JSTPS remained stable at 326 people, a large number of them "dual hatted" and therefore serving at one and the same time as members of SAC as well as of the JSTPS. The staff consisted of 221 officers, 80 enlisted, and 25 civilians.²²

(U) Changes in JSTPS key personnel included the two top officials. On 1 August 1974, General Russell E. Dougherty became Director in succession to General John C. Meyer, who retired. The Deputy Director, Vice Admiral Kent L. Lee, USN, was replaced on 16 July 1973 by Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, USN, who was replaced, in turn, on 1 September 1974 by Vice Admiral Robert Y. Kaufman, USN. As Chief of SIOP Division, Major General Andrew B. Anderson, Jr., USAF, replaced Major General Eugene Q. Steffes, Jr., USAF, on 15 January 1974. The CINCSAC Representative to the JSTPS, Major General Ray B. Sitton, USAF, was replaced on 17 September 1973 by Major General Harry M. Darmstandler, USAF, who himself was replaced on 1 July 1974 by Major General John W. Burkhart, USAF.²³

(U) The U.S. Navy Senior Service Member, Captain Louis C. Dittmar, USN, replaced his predecessor, Captain Will M. Adams, USN. About a month later, the U.S. Army Senior Service Member, Colonel William P. Schneider, USA, retired and this position remained vacant for the remainder of Calendar Year 1974. Colonel John C. Wright, USAF, replaced Captain Albert E. Knutson, USN, as CINCPAC Representative on 21 March 1974. Colonel Wallace D. Horton, USAF, replaced Colonel Don Carlos LaMoine, USAF, as CINCEUR/SACEUR Representative on 7 July 1973. Other key JSTPS personnel remained unchanged through the end of Calendar Year 1974.²⁴

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Concepts

~~(S)~~ As between SIOP-4 and SIOP-5, there were basic differences in concept which the JSTPS had to consider during the time it was formulating SIOP-4, Revisions N, O, and OX covered here.

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~~(S)~~ As things stood on 1 July 1973, and indeed as long as SIOP-4 was in effect,

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(U) In his Annual Report on Foreign Policy in February 1970, President Richard M. Nixon stated:²⁹

Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?"

(U) A year later, he repeated the same thought.³⁰

I must not be--and my successors must not be--limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when that response involved the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population. It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning solely on some finite--and theoretical--capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.

(U) He reiterated statements calling attention to a need for this type of policy change in subsequent reports to Congress in 1972 and 1973. Thus was set in motion the progression from the concepts embodied in SIOP-4 to those forming the basis of SIOP-5 and at the

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same time, (b)(1)

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(TS) Upon receiving the President's direction to change this policy, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird created a special panel headed by Dr. John S. Foster, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and including Assistant Secretaries of Defense Albert C. Hall, Intelligence; G. Warren Nutter, Internal Security Affairs; Gardner L. Tucker, Systems Analysis, as well the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas C. Moorer. Secretary Laird issued instructions to the Foster Panel in January 1972 which stated:³²

The Panel should submit a report to me of its findings and recommendations, together with its proposed guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons and the identification of issues to be resolved in order to establish the guidance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should report to me their comments on the Panel Report, the issues, and the proposed guidance.

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In February 1972, shortly after the Secretary of Defense had issued his instructions to the Foster Panel, the JCS requested JSTPS to analyze proposed revisions to the NSTAP.³³ The basic objective was still deterrence of attacks against the United States and its allies,


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* (U) See section "Planning Ahead," this history, for more detail about the four objectives.

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(TS) Although the fact was not among the findings of JSTPS in connection with the JCS requests related above, it was very pertinent to the time factor that the United States had three Secretaries of Defense in close succession, during the time the new nuclear policies were in their formative stage. Secretary Melvin R. Laird resigned as of 29 January 1973, to be succeeded by Mr. Eliot R. Richardson on 30 January. The latter then moved to the post of Attorney General on 30 April 1973 and was succeeded as Secretary of Defense on 1 May 1973 by Dr. James R. Schlesinger. Meanwhile, the (b)(1) concepts had to wait to be examined by each Secretary in turn before receiving final approval. 44


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SIOP FORCES


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~~(TS)~~ Opposing the SIOP forces were the strategic offensive and defensive forces of potential enemy nations, (b)(1)

(b)(1) often referred to as the "threat." These likewise consisted of three weapon systems, but in contrast to the United States SIOP forces, the opposition was much more heavily dependent on missile forces than manned bombers.⁴⁸

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~~(TS)~~ The threat posed for the offensive and defensive weapons of adversary countries was determined using the most up-to-date

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ational Intelligence Estimates (NIE) supplemented by the best intelligence information supplied by Joint or Service Agencies, the unified and specified commands, and by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).⁵⁰ For the period of SIOP-4 Revisions N, O, and OX, there was an increase in missile forces, especially SLBMs, and a slight decline in the Soviet bomber force* by January 1974. A part of the increase in the threat force was attributed to new ICBMs being outfitted with the multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). Another part was the steady growth of the defensive forces in the form of more sophisticated SAMs and progress in Soviet radar installations.⁵¹

~~(TS)~~ There were also available to the JSTPS an



(b)(1)

On the other hand, some of the

(b)(1)

between April and June 1974. Adequate advance knowledge of this fact, however, enabled the JSTPS to plan ahead

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As a result, the



~~(S)~~ This

[Redacted]

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in SIOP weapons starting with SIOP-62.

[Redacted]

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~~(S)~~ These changes posed problems for JSTPS planners.

[Redacted]

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~~(TS)~~ Still another type of problem which the JSTPS faced was one occasioned by the



(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

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(S) Though the number of (b)(1) to or coordinated with the SIOP showed (b)(1) (b)(1) there were a number of shifts in the nature of the units, aircraft, and missiles designed to deliver the weapons. The

(b)(1)

of the latter model. The change from (b)(1) was also mentioned.

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(S) In any event the

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is planned

(S) In addition,

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In its study on the

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adoption of the

(b)(1)

~~(S)~~ Considering the many complications inherent in planning weapons against SIOP targets, the JSTPS was naturally very cautious about any attempts, however well motivated,

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~~(TS)~~ Opposed to the SIOP forces were the threat forces which likewise increased, but in different proportions and aspects as compared to SIOP forces.

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(b)(1)

plus aggressive
research and development programs which seemed on the

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SIOP-4, REVISION N

(U) Revision N of SIOP-4 went into effect on 1 July 1973, so planning for this event was already underway in the early half of 1973. Among the first actions taken by the JSTPS on the occasion of considering a SIOP revision, or a new SIOP for that matter, was to convene as often as necessary meetings of its in-house groups of experts, the Strategy Panel and the Strategy Working Group. Only the latter was convened, however, for Revision N. These groups considered a wide range of topics bearing on the strategy for the new plans, with due attention to anticipated changes in SIOP and threat forces. The topics considered covered a whole spectrum from philosophical discussion to the actual reentry vehicle configurations of a particular weapon system. These meetings provided a forum for the discussion of various problems arising from the initiation of each new SIOP revision, a fair hearing for a wide range of views, and for the resolution of differences of opinion.⁶⁷

(S) In connection with Revision N, the Working Group discussions centered around two main topics.⁶⁸ The first topic was

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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

~~(16)~~ The second main topic centered around a thorough review

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These considerations were pertinent to assure that hostilities would be ended on terms favorable to the United States.⁷⁰

~~(15)~~ As each planning cycle moved forward, schedules were published for the various planning steps involved. In the case of Revision N, for example, calculation of (b)(1)

(b)(1) was scheduled to start on 31 July 1972, for submission to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) on 20 September 1972. Other steps included: starting force application on 1 October 1972 and forwarding Poseidon data to (b)(1)

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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

SIOP-4, REVISION 0

~~(S)~~ Before 1972 was finished, schedules were already being disseminated for the preparation of Revision 0 to SIOP-4 which would become effective 1 January 1974. By this time, the JSTPS was also aware of the forthcoming transition to SIOP-5 and realized that Revision 0 would not be a routine, six-month revision in the same sense as Revision N. Before long JSTPS realized that Revision 0 probably would be extended. Thus the staff scheduled the various steps of the planning sequence for Revision 0 in the same manner as for any normal six-month revision, all the while with an eye to the probability that what it was planning would have to be prolonged.⁹³

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(S) Computations for (b)(1) were scheduled to start on 1 February and be completed on 2 March 1973. Meanwhile, other planners would start mating and ranging on 15 February, completing this step on 13 April 1973. Force application was scheduled to start on 2 April and (b)(1) would be completed on 15 June, with the (b)(1) tape going to (b)(1) on 30 June 1973. The JSTPS intended to request the CINCs, as soon as possible, to extend their Revision 0 force commitments to 31 December 1974. Thereupon, the staff would amend the (b)(1) as necessary and extend Revision 0 for the remainder of the Calendar Year 1974.⁹⁴

(S) In July 1973, the JCS tasked the JSTPS to develop a capability for analyzing and planning (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(S) Early in September 1973, then, the JSTPS asked the CINCs whether the force commitments which the latter had forecast for Revision P (originally scheduled for 1 July-31 December 1974) would be the same if Revision 0 were to be extended for another six months. Because of the workload received from the JCS, the JSTPS intended to ask for a six-month extension of Revision 0, rather than move into a full-fledged new SIOP revision.⁹⁶ An extension would save the JSTPS work by allowing it to (b)(1) which would be changed, or added. For a complete revision, the JSTPS would have been required to (b)(1). The extension would also save the JSTPS much paperwork as well as many manhours which, for a SIOP revision, would have been expended in meetings.⁹⁷

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the proposal was not favorably considered.⁹⁸ And no wonder, because the JSTPS was already preparing to convene its Strategy Panel and Working Group in early November 1973 to consider problems involving

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both the future SIOP, (b)(1) as well as Revision O and its extension. Normally, the JSTPS would have convened its Strategy Panel at this time to consider SIOP-4 Revision Q which was already being converted into Revision P due to the anticipated extension of Revision O. Instead, however, it convened the Strategy Working Group to consider remaining work on Revision O as well as for analysis and assessment of the impact on planning (b)(1)

(b)(1) By this time, the revised NSTAP had been renamed NNTAP and, although it was still uncertain as to when it would formally take effect, the JSTPS, in addition to its other work, also had to make an analysis of some phases of the (b)(1). These were the activities occupying the JSTPS' attention prior to the effective date of Revision O, SIOP-4.⁹⁹

~~(TS)~~ As under the previous SIOP revision, the major threat facing the United States during SIOP-40 was to be

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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

SIOP-4 MID-REVISION O, EXTENDED

(S) Since the next major increment of planning was for the JSTPS to extend the existing revision, the beginnings of Revision O Extended (OX) were, in essence, the same as those of Revision O. The JSTPS expressed its intent to request a six-month extension of this revision at least as early as February 1973 when scheduling the development of preplanned damage expectancy for Revision O. On the other hand, during this time, data was being compiled for Revision P, which would otherwise have gone into effect between 1 July and 31 December 1974. The CINCs, therefore, were preparing enough data to be used for a complete revision, but the JSTPS used only so much of it as reflected changes in weapons, that amount necessary for an extension, thereby saving considerable work, while at the same time having available enough data for a complete revision.¹¹⁶

(U) The next major planning effort for JSTPS would be to extend Revision O, an extension which would be called Revision OX. However, an early schedule which the JSTPS disseminated internally with specific reference to Revision OX was dated 21 May 1973 and showed, by last minute changes, that it had originally been prepared with Revision P in mind. According to this schedule, 15 August was set as the date to start figuring out the ranges for the bombers and mating them with tankers, this process to be completed by 15 October 1973. Force application was to start on 2 October. (b)(1) application to be complete on 17 December.

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application was to be finished on 9 March and aircraft application on 30 March 1974.¹¹⁷

~~(S)~~ By 29 October 1973, when the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) made a formal recommendation to the JCS to extend Revision O until 31 December 1974, a great deal of the work necessary for this undertaking was well along the road to accomplishment. The JSTPS had already received the assent to such a move, as well as most of the necessary data, from the CINCs involved. At the mid-revision change on 1 July 1974, the staff would accommodate the differences between the forces originally committed for Revision O and those more recently committed for Revision P. It would produce documentation satisfactory to all recipients but it would require much less time than that required for a regular semiannual revision. At this juncture, JCS approval of the Director's recommendation was a foregone conclusion.¹¹⁸


~~(S)~~ Extension of the in-effect revision vice preparation of a normal revision resulted in time savings which could be applied to the analyses and reviews required to assure successful implementation of the forthcoming SIOP-5. As of February 1973, the JSTPS was still considering the possibility that SIOP-5 might go into effect as early as 1 January 1975.¹¹⁹ It was 15 July 1974 before the JCS set 1 January 1976 as the date for starting with SIOP-5.¹²⁰

~~(S)~~ Essentially, then, effort that normally would have gone into Revision P went, instead, into two channels. Of the forces committed to Revision P, JSTPS programmed into Revision OX only so much as represented a difference from those initially committed to Revision O, thereby gaining manhours and computer time to devote to preparations for SIOP-5. For example, when the Strategy Panel would normally have been convened in November 1973 to work on Revision P, the lower level Strategy Working Group met instead at that time to discuss problems pertinent to the extension.¹²¹

~~(TS)~~ These problems were interrelated and arose from the fact that [REDACTED] (b)(1) [REDACTED] April

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~~(S)~~ Although a full and extensively detailed "Revision Report" normally was submitted as each SIOP revision was completed, a significantly reduced briefing format was substituted for the

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Extended Revision O report. This did, as usual, pinpoint the use of (b)(1) but in a fashion that was a considerable departure from the accustomed prescription.¹²⁸


~~(TS)~~ It was, however, possible to (b)(1) figures for SIOP-40X comparable to those given for Revisions N and O by use of this, extensively supplemented by other sources using still varying formats.



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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

~~(TS)~~ Targeting remained quite close to that of six months previously, as did application. Changes were minor,



(b)(1)

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The SIOP (or JP) Division (JSTPS/JP) of the JSTPS prepared the actual CRP to agree with the SIOP, while the various CINCs assigned their forces and established timings to meet the objectives of the NSRL. The CRP was revised together with the SIOP.¹⁴⁸

(S) A wide variety of aircraft were used in the (b) and the equipment with which they (b)(1) likewise varied according to the type of aircraft.

(b)(1)

The number of aircraft and sorties committed to the (b)(1) Revisions N and O, as compared with Revision M, but with some recovery for Revision OX. There was, however, a

(b)(1)

for Revision M to 16 for Revisions N and O, and then climbed to 22 during Revision OX. It was also for Revision O Extended that CINCSAC first committed its (b)(1) The numbers of primary and (b)(1)

with Revision M included for comparison, are shown in the following tables:¹⁴⁹

Revision	Vehicles*	Primary Sorties/DGZs	Total Sorties/DGZs
M	(b)(1)		
N			
O			
OX			

* (S) (b)(1)

** (U) 1 October 1974.

*** (U) 15 November 1974.

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Changes in CRP-Committed Vehicles by Command as Compared with Revision M

Command	Rev M	Rev N	Rev O	Rev OX	Rev OX (1 Oct 74)*					
<u>CINCSAC</u>	(b)(1)									
RC-135-D										
RC-135-C/T/U										
RC-135 C/T/U/KC-13										
RC-135/C/D/U										
RC-135 C/D/M/U/V										
RC-135 C/D/M/U/V										
KC-135R										
RC-135M										
SR-71 A										
U-2 R										
AQM-34 Drone										
Total										
<u>CINCEUR</u>						(b)(1)				
EA-3B										
EP-3										
EC-121										
RC-130B	(b)(1)									
<u>CINCLANT</u>										
RF-8C										
RA-5C										
<u>CINCPAC</u>	(b)(1)									
RA-5C										
RF-8G										
RA-3B										

(S) Throughout the duration of Revisions N, O, and OX to SIOP-4, weapon systems (b)(1) were undergoing conversions.

(b)(1)

(S) Simultaneously, (b)(1) and the replacement of (b)(1) missiles,

* (S) There was a change in numbers of (b)(1) forces only, during Rev OX on 1 Oct 74.

** (S) (b)(1) on 15 November 1974.

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(b)(1)

Planning Ahead

~~(S)~~ As SIOP-4 Revisions N, O, and OX were successfully planned and put into effect, the JSTPS continued to plan ahead for the change to SIOP-5. Before this change should come into being, however, there was still to be another revision to SIOP-4. This would be Revision P. As previously noted, the JSTPS was working on the extension of Revision O at the time when planning for Revision P normally would have gotten underway, so that it eventually went into effect on 1 January 1975, six months later than would otherwise have been the case.¹⁵²

~~(S)~~ By the end of August 1974, the JSTPS informed the CINCs that it had been decided to extend Revision P to be effective throughout the entire Calendar Year 1975. This was to be done because the JSTPS would be too heavily involved with preparation for SIOP-5 during that time to formulate another full-fledged revision of SIOP-4. From the start, the JSTPS planned that Revision P would be in effect for one year. There would be, however, a "mid-revision" as it was called, primarily by means of message changes, with the minimum amount of republishing of documents and briefings, limiting them solely to those which were unavoidable.¹⁵³

~~(S)~~ Less than a month later, the JSTPS was anticipating changes of considerable magnitude at the mid-revision point because of recent decisions by the Secretary of Defense.

(b)(1)

Planning for the extension of Revision P, therefore, would have to involve (b)(1)

(b)(1)

On 25 September 1974, the JSTPS published the following schedule for certain planning actions for Revision P:¹⁵⁴

(b)(1)

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, the JSTPS continued to devote a major portion of its efforts to studies and analyses of the new criteria for SIOP-5, as directed by the JCS.¹⁵⁵ In June 1973, the JCS had published guidance for developing the newest concepts,

(b)(1)

~~(S)~~ On 17 January 1974, the President signed (b)(1)

(b)(1) thereby formalizing the framework for

(b)(1) for which

he had been asking.¹⁵⁸ On 4 April 1974, Secretary of Defense (b)(1)

(b)(1) directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

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develop preparatory guidance for the new (b)(1)

(b)(1)

The Secretary also directed that the

(b)(1)

It was then on 15 July 1974 that the JCS issued its guidance based on the new policy.¹⁵⁹


~~(TS)~~ Accordingly, the JSTPS had just under 18 months for the actual planning of SIOP-5, even though the staff had already expended a great amount of time and effort in analyzing and reviewing it. The JSTPS, on 29 October 1974, disseminated a schedule for certain planning actions for SIOP-5 as outlined below:¹⁶⁰

(b)(1)

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
(b)(1)



Summary

(U) For the JSTPS, the 18 months between July 1973 and December 1974 was the beginning of a transition period. It marked the move from SIOP-4 to SIOP-5, separate nuclear war plans with different concepts at their bases. During this time the JCS gave the JSTPS many responsibilities for preliminary analyses and reviews bearing on the forthcoming plan. In the meantime, the JSTPS continued to have complete responsibility for revising and updating the current war plan. Revision N of SIOP-4 went into effect, on schedule, on 1 July 1973 and Revision O followed this course at the appointed six-month interval. In mid-1974, however, the JSTPS extended Revision O, rather than plan a complete new revision. By this expedient it gained time and manpower which it sorely needed to devote to advance preparations for the new nuclear war plan.

(b)(1)



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(b)(1)



Source: Hist ~~(TS)~~, "JSTPS for SIOP-4 Revisions L and M, July 1972 - June 1973, (U)," (HA-75-12); Manual ~~(TS)~~, "Planning Manual for SIOP-4N, (U)," 1 Jun 73, (73-B-0897); Manual ~~(TS)~~, "Planning Manual for SIOP-40, (U)," 1 Dec 73, (73-B-1627); Manual, ~~(TS)~~, "Planning Manual for SIOP-40X, (U)," 1 Jun 74, (74-JPP-204).

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APPENDIX D

DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WEAPONS
SIOP-4 Revisions M, N, O, and OX

Alert
Rev M Rev N Rev O Rev OX

Delivery Vehicles

CINCEUR
CINCSAC
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
SACEUR
SACLANT

Total

CINCEUR
CINCSAC
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
SACEUR
SACLANT

Total

Weapons

CINCEUR
CINCSAC
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
SACEUR
SACLANT

Total

CINCEUR
CINCSAC
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
SACEUR
SACLANT

Total

(b)(1),(b)(3) 42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

DOE
(b)(3)

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative and Criminal~~
~~Sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination~~
~~Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~"RESTRICTED DATA"~~
~~"This material is Restricted~~
~~Data as defined in the Atomic Energy~~
~~Act of 1954. Its dissemination or dis-~~
~~closure to any unauthorized person is~~
~~prohibited."~~

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Rev M Rev N Rev O Rev OX

Megatonnage

Total

CINCEUR
CINCSAC
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
SACEUR
SACLANT

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)


Total

DOE
b(3)

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative and Criminal
Sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.~~

Source: Hist (TS), "JSTPS for SIOP-4 Revision L/M, July 1972-June 1973 (U)," (74-HO-0007); Ltr (TS), Brig Gen E.O. Steffes, JPP for JS, "Information for the SAC Historian to use in Preparation of the SIOP-4 History (U)," 3 Dec 73, (173-J-1079); Ltr (TS), Capt W.A. Miller, JPPF for JS, "Information for the SAC Historian to use in Preparation of the SIOP-4 Rev Oscar, Jul 74 (U) (your Memorandum, 30 Apr 75)," 8 May 75 (75-JPP-138); Rpt (TS), "JSTPS Presentation Revision Report, SIOP-40 (U)," 1 Jan 74 (74-A-0580).

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
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(b)(1)



Source: Memo ~~(TS)~~, JLT to DJL, "Information for the SAC Historian to use in Preparation of the SIOP-4 History (U)," 30 Oct 73 (74-J-0099); Memo ~~(TS)~~, DJLT to DJL "JL Historical Data for SIOP-4, Rev Oscar and CY 74 (U), 3 Jun 75 (75-JLT-011).

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APPENDIX I

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL, JSTPS

1 July 1973 - 31 December 1974

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Dates: From</u>	<u>To</u>
NATO Representatives				
(b)(6)		Air Force	30 May 72	
		Air Force	26 Apr 73	
		Air Force	31 May 73	
		Air Force	31 May 73	

Source: Chart (U), JSTPS(JS), "Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (U)," 5 Aug 74

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