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~~HISTORY OF THE  
ENERGY TARGET PLANNING STAFF  
DURING 1950-1951~~

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HISTORY OF THE  
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF  
SIOP-4P-5B, January 1975 - September 1978 (C)

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FOREWORD

(S) This is the thirteenth history of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) since it was established on 16 August 1960. It covers the period of 1 January 1975 through 30 September 1978 for SIOP-4 Revision P, SIOP-5, SIOP-5 Revision A and SIOP-5 Revision B. This history was prepared in accordance with Joint Administrative Instruction 210-1, dated 23 June 1977.

(U) Administrative errors found in the original writing of the thirteenth history prompted the complete rewriting of the history. Therefore, this rewrite supersedes Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff SIOP-4P-5B, January 1975 - September 1977 (OPR: SAC/HO, dated 15 Feb 1979, Control No. 79-HA-73) which should be destroyed. *048(15 Feb 79)*

(U) The classification of ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~ and the exemption from the General Declassification Schedule are established to conform with the classification of the source documents.

(U) This history was prepared for the JSTPS by Mr. Charles K. Hopkins of the Strategic Air Command historical staff.

  
OTTO L. KOVAR, Jr.  
Colonel, USAF  
Secretary of the Joint Staff

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
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Introduction

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(U) As an organization, the JSTPS functioned as an agency of the JCS.<sup>3</sup> On 1 July 1975, the senior service member positions were eliminated and a new Air Force position, Secretary of the Joint Staff, was created. These actions were taken because representation of the

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Services had increased and the newly created position could handle most of the duties formerly falling to the senior service members, while the two divisions could absorb the rest of these duties.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 23 July 1976, the organizational terminology of the JSTPS was upgraded to reflect more accurately its relationships with other JCS and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. The Director (JD) remained as before, but what was formerly the Deputy Director (JDD) now became Vice Director (JV). The status and service relationships of the two officers heading the staff remained as defined by Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates when he directed establishment of the JSTPS in 1960. The two major divisions of the staff were raised to directorate level, thus becoming the NSTL Directorate and the SIOP Directorate, reflecting the two major products of the organization.<sup>5</sup>

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While SIOP-5A was being planned, their terminology was simplified to National Target Base (NTB) and the SIOP Reconnaissance Plan (SRP).<sup>6</sup>

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~~(TS)~~ As its name shows, the JSTPS dealt with the whole process of strategic target planning.


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(U) Between 1 January 1975 and 30 September 1978, there were changes in all key personnel. General Richard H. Ellis succeeded General Russell E. Dougherty as Director (Also as CINCSAC) on 1 August 1977. Vice Admiral Frank D. McMullen, Jr., replaced Vice Admiral Robert Y. Kaufman on 16 November 1976 as Vice Director. Brigadier General James C. Enney (USAF) became Chief of the NSTL Division on 30 April 1976 in succession to Rear Admiral Joseph W. Russell (USN). Major General Andrew B. Anderson, Jr., (USAF) remained Chief of SIOP Division until Major General Jerome F. O'Malley (USAF) succeeded him on 4 June 1975. Major General George D. Miller (USAF) became Deputy Director for the SIOP on 17 January 1977.<sup>8</sup>

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
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Concepts TOP SIOP-4P

~~(TS)~~ Certain premises existed as the basis of war planning;



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For SIOP-4, through its Revision P, the JSTPS received its guidance from the (b)(1) which set forth the basic objectives of war planning in the following words:<sup>10</sup>

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\*(U) For the remainder of key personnel changes, consult Appendix N, this history. See the subsequent section of this history on "SACEUR Coordination with the SIOP" for more information on coordinated forces.


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


~~(TS)~~ The JSTPS, therefore, had to



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~~(TS)~~ SIOP-4P was planned under the



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the revision would be put into effect.<sup>16</sup> The JSTPS was constantly working on several different revisions simultaneously. During part of the time covered here, the staff was actually working on two separate war plans and their respective revisions at the same time.<sup>17</sup>

SIOP-4P

~~(TS)~~ Early in 1973, SIOP-4 Revision P was envisioned as the semi-annual SIOP revision which would replace SIOP-4-0 at mid-year 1974. By this time, the JSTPS was already heavily involved in studying NUWEP guidance and, generally, shifting over to preparation of SIOP-5. As each day passed, it became more obvious that the staff would have to devote to the new plan much of the time and effort that would normally have gone into the regular SIOP-4 revision. A schedule for work on SIOP-4P dated 21 May 1973 showed by last minute changes that it was adapted for use on SIOP-4-0X instead.<sup>18</sup> By the end of October 1973, the JCS had formally approved extension of SIOP-4-0.<sup>19</sup> Normally, a meeting of the Strategy Panel of the JSTPS would be convened about 15 months before the effective date of a SIOP revision. However, another record dated 2 November 1973 showed that such a meeting for SIOP-4P was held in abeyance, the actual preparations being accomplished by lower level working group meetings.<sup>20</sup> By the end of August 1974, the JSTPS advised all concerned as follows:<sup>21</sup>

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(S) SIOP-4 Revision PAPA will be effective 1 Jan - 31 Dec 75. During this time frame, JSTPS will be heavily involved in the development of SIOP-5. Due to this involvement, SIOP-4P will be maintained through message changes, with no major document regeneration or briefing planned at mid-revision point (1 Jul 75).

(S) Those documents not included in message changes (e.g., Annex F, Appendix I, Tab A--FLFRS; the SIOP Almanac) will be regenerated, as required, during the life cycle of Revision PAPA."

(S) When the JSTPS was preparing the final revision of SIOP-4, the major enemy threat facing the United States was (b)(1)

(b)(1) This situation had been prevalent for a number of years and was likely to continue for the foreseeable future.


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(b)(1)



\*(U) The names indicated the superficial appearance of the facilities associated with these systems.

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~~(S)~~ Targeting priorities were as traditionally prescribed by

(b)(1) guidance.



(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)












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SIOP-5


~~(TS)~~ SIOP-5 was to go into effect on 1 January 1976; it was a new war plan because it followed new guidance, the (b)(1) This guidance described the purposes of the SIOP in the following manner. 42

(b)(1)






(b)(1)



~~(S)~~ Both concepts aimed first and foremost at deterrence of conflict and, in the event deterrence failed, assurance that the United States would emerge from the conflict with greater power and influence than any adversary.



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(TS) By 1 January 1975, although the final revision of the older war plan had just become effective, the JSTPS had already become quite familiar with the new concept. The NCA, Department of Defense, JCS, and JSTPS had been reviewing the NSTAP since 1970 with a view toward revising it to provide more flexibility. In the process, the JCS, with participation by other segments of the Department of Defense, had actually drafted a proposal for changes in the NSTAP guidance. In December 1971, this proposal was even given a name,

(b)(1)

but, in the long run, it never got beyond the proposal stage though its main thrust was in the same direction as (b)(1) eventually took.<sup>51</sup>

(TS) After several years of review and evaluation, the President signed (b)(1) on 17 January 1974. This formalized the framework for planning use of nuclear weapons with the increased flexibility so long desired. On 4 April 1974, the Secretary of Defense provided the JCS with the (b)(1) and on 15 July 1974, the JCS forwarded this planning guidance to the JSTPS as a Staff Memorandum (SM-390-74). Therefore, the JSTPS had just under 15 months for formal preparation of SIOP-5, although it was already familiar with the general concept.<sup>\*52</sup>

(b)(1)

\* (U) For more details on development leading up to (b)(1) and SIOP-5, see History of JSTPS for SIOP-4 Revisions N/O/OX, 2 Sep 77.

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(U) Because computers performed virtually all of the calculations used in SIOP planning, an examination of growth in these systems reliably reflects the heightened complexity of the plan itself. The Program Assisted Console Evaluation and Review (PACER) system continued to provide the computer support needed to maintain the installation data base from which the targets in the SIOP are built. A computer complex called the Strategic Target and Missile Planning System, or STAMPS, was used to support analysis, target development, missile planning, and numerous aspects of war plan analysis. To handle SIOP-5 planning, STAMPS had to be upgraded to several times its initial capacity. A computer that had comprised a portion of the predecessor to STAMPS was the IBM 360/50. It was replaced by the larger and faster IBM 370/158 (STAMPS) in 1974, just prior to the SIOP-5 planning surge. Even so, the NSTL Directorate had to continue to call on the services of another powerful computer, the IBM 360/85 (also known as System 70). In a study of the automation support requirements of SIOP-5, computer experts of SAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Data Systems (DCS/AD) found a need for two IBM 370/168 computers, each having still larger capacity than the IBM 370/158. However, only one of the additional computers could be obtained during the period covered due to complexities of procurement.

(U) Another computer system, Data Processing Central (DPC), though once one of the biggest and finest systems, was obsolete for planning SIOP-5. Consequently, the SIOP aircraft force applications were upgraded

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to the third-generation capabilities of a Honeywell 6070 funded as a component of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

(U) The move to SIOP-5 constituted a major learning process for those involved in ADP support. Particularly was this so in the planning of SIOP-5B. For this revision, Headquarters SAC ACS/AD had to redesign aircraft application from top to bottom and put 12 to 15 people to work on this, full time, starting 18 months prior to the revision.<sup>64</sup> The redesign provided war planners with interactive planning tools which allowed them to cope more effectively with the increasing intricacies of the planning considerations.

(U) Physical handling of computer products between the various computers consumed time, effort, and manpower that could very well be saved. Those involved with computer systems looked forward to acquiring one system that could do all the work without intermediate steps. Such a system was possible within current technology; it would have three times the capacity of current systems. As of the time SIOP-5B went into effect, however, ACS/AD people were still awaiting a decision on procuring such a system.<sup>65</sup>

(U) Members of the NSTL staff summed some of the computer problems and requirements in the following words:<sup>66</sup>

"Adding the referenced peripheral equipment and terminals will provide the needed capabilities only if an appropriately sized main frame(s) is installed. On-line response has been satisfactory for only short period of time after each of the previous upgrades of the STAMPS. Since the advent of the single STAMPS main frame configuration, batch and on-line contention has continued to be a problem which requires substantial human intervention and less-than-optimum operating environment. Based on past

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experience, known requirements, additional terminals required, and projected increases in data volume and processing, it is estimated that a three-to-five fold increase in input/output/data communications capability will be required during the 1978 to 1982 period. . . ."

~~(TS)~~ All in all, the new concept made SIOP-5 much harder to plan than SIOP-4 had been. Even so, the amount of time allowed for the planning cycle was as before, 15 to 18 months. Actually, the first target date which the JSTPS had to meet occurred 15 months prior to the effective date of the SIOP or revision. This was the date when the commitment of forces from the CINCs was due. At the same time, the SIOP Directorate would provide targeting of weapons committed to

(b)(1)

Six months of lead time was now needed to (b)(1)

targeting. For example, to meet a deadline of 1 October, (b)(1)

(b)(1)

had to be firmly

fixed no later than the preceding 1 April.

(b)(1)

The planning cycle was somewhat simplified, however, because a semi-annual update was no longer needed as less extensive updates and interim changes kept the plan effective.<sup>67</sup>

(b)(1)

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(U) On 12 January 1976, the Vice Director of Strategic Target Planning and the Chief of Staff, Headquarters SAC, took steps "to help ensure that future (war) plans could be developed, analyzed, documented, and maintained within the limits of expected resources." To this end they directed formation of a Systems Analysis Team composed of highly qualified specialists from SAC ACS/AD. The team produced a complete, detailed study of the SIOP planning process and all the procedures that supported it and published its report in July 1976.<sup>68</sup>

(b)(1)

The problems were manageable, however. In the final analysis, SIOP-5 was a much more flexible plan than SIOP-4. Furthermore, as SIOP-5 went to Revision A and then to Revision B, it improved progressively. Actually, there were few significant changes between SIOP-5 and SIOP-5A, compared to the major changes between the latter and SIOP-5B.<sup>69</sup>

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Development of SIOP-5

~~(TS)~~ For some time before the JCS issued formal guidance for SIOP-5, on 15 July 1974, the JSTPS had been involved with preparations for the new plan. This involvement, it will be recalled, was the reason for the extension of SIOP-4-0 as SIOP-4-0X. Accordingly, the staff had considerable familiarity with what would be required but, even so, it could only embark upon formal planning after receipt of guidance, so slightly less than 18 months was available for this purpose.<sup>70</sup> As it worked on the new plan, the JSTPS sent to the JCS periodic progress reports for development of SIOP-5.<sup>71</sup>

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
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(b)(1)



~~(TS)~~ These considerations were pertinent to the next step taken by the JSTPS, which was to begin the actual targeting. For the JSTPS, this phase of the targeting process was really two distinct steps performed in logical sequence. The first was (b)(1) which meant the distribution of (b)(1)

(b)(1)

] The second was (b)(1)

(b)(1)


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(b)(1)

guideline.<sup>78</sup>

(b)(1)



\*(U) For further details, refer to History ~~(TS)~~, "JSTPS for SIOP-4, Revisions N/O/OX, July 1973-December 1974 (U), " p 45 (75-HA-419).

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




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1 January 1976. Possible delays had loomed earlier in the process. For example, force changes had necessitated reaccomplishing the computation of preplanned damage expectancy. However, it proved possible to cope with these problems as they arose and, fortunately, to increase computer capacity enough to deal with them in time. The method of preparing periodic progress reports also proved useful to the JSTPS for monitoring scheduled progress and preventing delay.<sup>88</sup>

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


(b)(1)



(U) To carry out the actual coordination for SACEUR, a small international SHAPE office headed by a USAF colonel was attached to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt AFB. Its task was to translate SHAPE data into SIOP language and the converse for products going back to SHAPE. Additionally, the SACEUR Representative's Office maintained continuous liaison on all facets of SHAPE/JSTPS/SAC relationships. 113

~~(TS)~~ Through the efforts of the



(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

OE  
b(3)








\* (U) Megatonnages above have been rounded to the nearest digit and may not exactly total; for the Target Data Base, consult Appendix O; See Table 2 for recapitulation of (b)(1) Guidance Objectives, Table 3 for recapitulation of Attack Objectives, and Table 4 for synopsis of SIOP-5 targeting.

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~~(S)~~

(b)(1)



SIOP-5A

~~(S)~~ Revision A to SIOP-5 replaced its predecessor, the first SIOP-5, on 1 November 1976.<sup>123</sup> Actually, the JSTPS planned for revisions of SIOP-5 to last a full year, and when the fiscal year changed to run from October through September of the following year, a decision was made that each SIOP revision would coincide with the





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fiscal year.<sup>124</sup> SIOP-5A would, then, have normally gone into effect on 1 October, but as early as March 1976, the JCS was informed there would be a month's delay.

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

005  
b(3)

Obtaining all the confirmations and understandings necessary for this increase stretched the planning cycle by an extra month.<sup>125</sup>

~~(TS)~~ In all major respects, SIOP-5A was similar to its predecessor because it followed the same guidance. National objectives set forth in the guidance were the same as before, with "deterrence" taking top priority. Guidance provided

(b)(1)

~~(TS)~~ Although guidance remained the same, the JSTPS had by now accumulated a great deal more experience in following it. Furthermore, some of the planning initiatives which the staff had started earlier were coming to fruition in time to be included in Revision A.

(b)(1)

~~(TS)~~ For SIOP-5A, the target data base listed

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SIOP-5B Planning

~~(TS)~~ SIOP-5B was to take the place of SIOP-5A effective 1 October 1977, a schedule to which JSTPS planners adhered.<sup>136</sup> The same NUWEP guidance that had been in effect since 1 January 1976 governed Revision B. It directed preparation of a war plan that would, first and foremost, provide deterrence of nuclear conflict. If deterrence failed, the war plan must assure that the United States emerge from any conflict in a position of power and influence relative to its enemies.

(b)(1)

~~(TS)~~ General Russell E. Dougherty, Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP), on 10 September 1976 suggested to the JCS some changes in the guidance. This proved to be too late for them to be adopted in time for SIOP-5B. They were, however, of interest.

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(b)(1)

~~(S)~~ By August 1976, when the Revision B planning cycle began, the JSTPS had accumulated not only additional familiarity in meeting the guidance, but also experience in improving the SIOP-5A war plan over its predecessor. The staff made additional improvement to SIOP-5B, mainly

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by carrying further forward techniques already used to improve SIOP-5A. Accordingly, the major advances in the new revision were in more efficient use of available weapons.<sup>141</sup>

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)



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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

\*(U) See Table 2 for recapitulation of (b)(1) guidance objectives, and Table 3 for recapitulation of SIOP attack options, this history. (b)(3)

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






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(b)(1)



Summary


~~(S)~~ Deterrence was the primary purpose of the SIOP; it had fulfilled this purpose. Progress was necessary; changing the war plan from SIOP-4 to SIOP-5 was the result of new viewpoints as to how nuclear war might be conducted. As a plan, (b)(1) (b)(1) even though it did cause extra work and difficulties for the planners.

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
(b)(1)



~~(TS)~~ Each SIOP revision was subjected to extensive analysis as its planning cycle neared completion. Shortly after it went into effect, the more rigorous test of wargaming was applied. The results tended to show that the war plans which JSTPS produced could, in fact, achieve the stated objectives of the guidance. The new guidance aimed at giving National Command Authorities more options than before, plus simple execution; SIOP-5, 5A, and 5B gave them these features. To their findings, however, planners appended a crucial proviso:



(b)(1)



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



















































































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## APPENDIX L

### SIOP-4P, 5 AND 5A WAR GAME BRIEFINGS

| <u>SIOP #</u> | <u>COMMANDER BRIEFED</u> | <u>DATE</u>       |
|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| SIOP-4P       | Joint Chiefs             | 16 July 1975      |
| SIOP-4P       | CINCLANT                 | 17 July 1975      |
| SIOP-5        | Joint Chiefs             | 4 August 1976     |
| SIOP-5        | Service Secretaries      | 29 September 1976 |
| SIOP-5        | CINCEUR                  | 3 November 1976   |
| SIOP-5        | CINCPAC                  | 10 November 1976  |
| SIOP-5        | CINCAD                   | 15 December 1976  |
| SIOP-5A       | Joint Chiefs             | 29 June 1977      |
| SIOP-5A       | CINCLANT                 | 22 September 1977 |

Note: Tabulated Results of War Games are Available from JPS

OPR: JPS

DATE: 17 Nov 77

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APPENDIX M  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF  
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE  
NEBRASKA  
68113

JPM

21 NOV 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR JPTM

Subject: Information for JSTPS History

1. Reference JPT memo, undated, subject as above, which requested that information for JSTPS history be forwarded to JPTM.
2. In January 1976, the JV and SAC/CS directed the formation of a team of highly qualified analysts to document the SIOP planning process and produce a model of the manual and automated procedures that support it. As a result of the objective findings of this team, it was determined that the Program Management Branch of the Combat Plans Division could serve the JP community more efficiently and effectively if they were directly under JP control. On 23 July 1976 the Program Management Branch was elevated to the Division level and designated JPM.
3. The function of JPM is to act as the SIOP Directorate single manager for coordinating the design, planning, modification and efficient use of computer programs and systems in support of SIOP planning. To assist the SIOP Directorate in the recognition, definition and coordination of future electronic data processing (EDP) software/hardware requirements to staff EDP requirements in coordination with users by assisting in the preparation of formal Data Automation Requirements (DARs). To coordinate with other agencies to determine the additions and/or changes to existing programs necessary to produce the SIOP. To monitor the design and development of software/hardware (including modifications to existing programs and EDP systems) during the acquisition, integration, and validation phases to insure compatibility with operational requirements. To process parametric data inputs and maintain the data bases used in SIOP Directorate planning functions. With the assistance of users, monitor/conduct operational program and system integration testing. To coordinate the development of documentation and instructional manuals which define program and system operations. To maintain the communications link between the SIOP Directorate and the SAC Assistant Chief of Staff/Data Systems (SAC/AD), Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC) and civilian software agencies.

*Eugene E. Bittrolff*

EUGENE E. BITTROLFF  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Ch, Prgm Mgt Div/JSTPS

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APPENDIX N

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL, JSTPS

1 January 1975 - 30 September 1978

| <u>Position</u>                     | <u>Name</u>                  | <u>Service</u> | <u>Dates:</u> From | To   |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|--------------------|--|
| Director                            | Gen Russell E. Dougherty     | USAF           | 1 Aug 74 -         | 31 Jul 77  |
|                                     | Gen Richard H. Ellis         | USAF           | 1 Aug 77 -         |  |
| Vice Director                       | VADM Robert Y. Kaufman       | USN            | 1 Sep 74 -         | 15 Nov 76  |
|                                     | VADM Frank D. McMullen, Jr.  | USN            | 16 Nov 76 -        |  |
| NSTL Directorate                    | RADM Joseph W. Russel        | USN            | 30 Jun 73 -        | 29 Apr 76  |
|                                     | BGen James C. Enney          | USAF           | 30 Apr 76 -        |  |
| SIOP Directorate                    | MGen Andrew B. Anderson, Jr. | USAF           | 15 Jan 73 -        | 3 Jun 75   |
|                                     | MGen Jerome F. O'Malley      | USAF           | 4 Jun 75 -         | 16 Jan 77  |
|                                     | MGen George D. Miller        | USAF           | 17 Jan 77 -        |  |
| <u>Senior Service Members</u>       |                              |                |                    |  |
| Army                                | (b)(1)                       | USA            | 21 Jan 75 -        | 27 Jun 75 (position deleted)                           |
| Navy                                | (b)(1)                       | USN            | 28 Jun 74 -        | 8 Jun 76 (position deleted)                            |
| Marine Corps                        | (b)(1)                       | USMC           | 2 Sep 72 -         | 13 May 75 (position deleted)                           |
| Air Force                           | (b)(1)                       | USAF           | 10 Apr 73 -        | 30 Jun 75 (position changed to Sec of the Joint Staff) |
| <u>Secretary of the Joint Staff</u> |                              |                |                    |  |
|                                     | Col Gerald M. Adams          | USAF           | 1 Jul 75 -         | 1 Jun 76   |
|                                     | Col William M. Kottas        | USAF           | 2 Jun 76 -         |  |

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APPENDIX N

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL, JSTPS

1 January 1975 - 30 September 1978

NOTE: The organizational terminology was realigned to upgrade the level of duty for assigned personnel to more accurately depict the actual relationship of JSTPS organizational elements with other JCS and DOD counterparts.

Also, the senior Service member positions were deleted in July 1975 because previous increases in Service representation obviated the requirements for these billets. A Secretary of the Joint Staff position (USAF) was created to handle some of the duties associated with these positions. The remaining duties were absorbed by the directorates.

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