


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The Creeping Wahhabization in Pukhtunkhwa: The Road to 9/11

(b)(6)

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This article examines the interethnic politics in Pukhtunkhwa between the foreign “Wahhabis” (formerly known as the “Hindustani Fanatics” in India) and the local Pushtun tribesmen in the pre-9/11 era. It seeks to explain the inability of the early Wahhabis to coopt the Pushtuns with their Muslim “umma” narrative, as they sought to wage “jihad” against India and beyond from strongholds in Pukhtunkhwa. It highlights the persistence of the Wahhabis for almost two centuries in trying to “convert” the Pushtun to the sahih (correct) path of Islam (their version); the cultural roadblocks that ensured limited Wahhabi success in cleansing what they viewed as a jahiliyya society of mushriqun (deviant) Muslims who seemed to prefer their tribal identity over a religious one. It identifies the long-term repercussions of the Soviet’s genocidal campaign (1979–1989) that led to the destruction of the traditional social fabric in Afghanistan’s Pukhtunkhwa belt: the provision of an ideological opportunity for the Wahhabists to promote their Muwahiddun (unitarian) version of Islam through generous welfare and educational funding programs. It examines how the arrival of Arab “jihadis” in Peshawar, Pakistan in the 1980s marked the beginning of an indoctrination and co-option process that continues to this day, to the detriment of the Pushtuns’ unique culture, language, and religious traditions/practices.

The sheikh may keep his convent cell; the rose-garden shall be my choice.

Khushal Khan Khattak, seventeenth-century Pushtun warrior poet

What is Wahhabism?

The current insurgency/instability in Pukhtunkhwa,¹ which borders on civil war and evident social and physical disruption of the populace, has its origins in the ideology of Wahhabism and its sister Salafist and Deobandi ideologies.² Wahhabism is the term subscribed to an eighteenth-century Muslim reformist movement that originated in the Najd, which lies in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.³ It was the brainchild of Muhammad ibn Abdul al-Wahhab (1703–1792), hence the term Wahhabis (followers of Wahhab). Although Wahhabism has its doctrinal roots in the specific (Sunni Islam) Hanbali *fiqh* (school of jurisprudence),⁴ as its followers like to stress, the reality is that Sunnis who subscribe to the Hanbali *fiqh* are not, de facto, Wahhabis. Wahhabism is a religious reformation *movement*, and not a *madhab* (school), of Islam. This distinction is important and relevant as it serves to further enunciate the historical limits of Wahhabism’s appeal to Muslims in general, and to adherents of the *Hanbali fiqh* in particular.

Wahhabi interpretations are not only derivative of Hanbali *fiqh* but were also influenced by the writings of thirteenth-century Hanbali scholar in Damascus, Taqi ad-Din Ahmed ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328). Ibn Taymiyyah cursed fellow Muslims from going astray from the right path, that of the *Salaf-e-Saliheen* (Arabic for “pious predecessors”), the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. In his writings, Taymiyyah came to the bitter conclusion that the

destruction of Baghdad and the Abbasid Caliphate there in 1258, at the hands of the Mongol infidels led by Halagu Khan (Ghenghis Khan's grandson), was a sign from Allah that the *umma* (Muslim community) had gone astray from the true, noble, path of the *Salafi*.⁵ Ibn Taymiyyah was an early Salafi in that, like contemporary Salafi ideologues, he argued that Islam had morphed into something less pure and holy and its *umma* no longer reflected the perfect society as Allah wished. He believed this was primarily due to undesirable—even *haram* (forbidden)—*bida* (innovations) that had been adopted over time due to materialistic urges and alien cultural influences. Ibn Taymiyyah preached against Shias, Sufis, Ismailis, and others and warned against any interaction with them. He saw such Muslims as *murtadds* (apostates) and coined, and encouraged, the application of the term *takfir* (the process of excommunication of fellow Muslims based on observed actions/behaviors that appeared to be in violation of the pure example of the *Salaf-e-Saliheen*). Ibn Taymiyyah advocated *takfir* (excommunication) of perceived *murtadd* and *mushriqun* (deviant) Muslims in order to make it *halal* (legitimate) to execute them without then having committed a sin of killing fellow Muslims, which was/is seen as *haram* (forbidden).

Ibn Taymiyyah, through his writings, in effect opened up a Pandora's Box when he advocated the legitimate killing of fellow Muslims. Furthermore, his doctrine down the road was leveraged by the Hanbali fiqh-based Wahhabi reformist movement. The Wahhabis rely heavily on Ibn Taymiyyah and his writings for purposes of legitimacy and promotion of their message as being within the legitimate confines of the Hanbali fiqh of Islam. This message emphasizes the oneness of God/Allah (*tawheed*) and the need to resurrect the Golden Age of Islam (circa seventh through ninth centuries) through replication of those times and by solely adhering to the *Quran* (Muslim holy book) and *Sunnah* (ways of the Prophet Muhammad). Thus, the Gates of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), closed in the tenth-century within all Sunni *fiqh*,⁶ were now wide open for a reexamination/reinterpretation through the ideological prism of seventh-century Islam.⁷

Historically, the appeal of Wahhabi doctrine among Muslims has been limited.⁸ Interestingly enough, its more eager ideological cohorts have, more often than not, been non-Arab Sunnis, especially from the Indian subcontinent beginning in the nineteenth century with the group that came to be known as the "Hindustani Fanatics." While today the terms Salafism and Wahhabism are increasingly used interchangeably, the original Salafi movement—which originated at Egypt's al Azhar in the nineteenth century—sought to reconcile Islam with modernism and was originally a vehicle for an anticolonial struggle.⁹

Pukhtunkhwa's Social Construct: "Doing Pushtunwali"

Pukhtunkhwa means "the land of the Pushtuns." It generally refers to the lands where the Pushtuns are in the majority in present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁰ Another term used by the Greek historian Herodotus to describe their land was "Paktuikē."¹¹ Pushtuns are a distinct ethnic group who are identified by their place of origin, mother tongue (Pushto or Pukhtu), and by their understanding of the ethos of "doing Pukhtu" as in the oral tradition of *Pushtunwali*.¹² The Pushtuns are one of the most tribalized ethnic groups in the world today, with hundreds of tribes ("*qaum/qawm*" in Pushto) within five large loosely linked confederacies (Durrani, Ghilji, Sarbani, Karlanri and Ghurghust), not to mention thousands of sub-tribes ("*khels*").¹³ Living in a generally harsh physical environment (arid or mountainous), the Pushtuns have always been at war either with a foreign invader or among each other over finite resources; thus their reputation as fierce predatory warriors and/or as ruthless mercenaries.¹⁴ Historically, Pushtun unity has always been short lived, and generally has required the proper tangible incentives to maintain some semblance of

cohesion. Furthermore, a Pushtun male is inculcated from birth to fight to protect his family or khel's *zar*, *zan*, and *zamin*¹⁵ in a Hobbesian environment.

Despite an environment characterized by periodic conflict, the various Pushtun entities all place—albeit to varying degrees—a strong emphasis on “doing Pushtunwali” in order to ensure, maintain, and promote their social unit's *nang* (honor). Loss of nang requires generally immediate—or as soon as the opportunity avails itself—recourse to restore the unit's (usually at the family or khel level) *nang* in order to maintain “face” within their social milieu. Historically, practicing Pushtunwali has been fundamental to a Pushtun's identity as the primary social construct that predates—and has taken precedence over—his “Islamic” or “Muslim” identity.¹⁶ It is this ancient unwritten “code of the Pushtuns” that has been the common—even unifying—thread of the Pushtun social construct.¹⁷ It constitutes a compilation of concepts perceived to represent the core of what it means to be a “Pushtun” that have remarkably withstood the test of time, change, and the influx of new ideas. The resiliency of Pushtunwali can perhaps best be explained as being based on the necessity of having specific, widely accepted norms of appropriate behavior in a turbulent tribal society, in order to prevent self-destruction from within by warring factions in conditions bordering on anarchy. Cloaked in concepts of honor and courage that constitute the ideological core of most warrior cultures, the ethos of Pushtunwali resonates with all Pushtuns, male and female, as being an essential component of their identity as a distinct people. However, the male perception of “doing Pukhtu” significantly varies from his female counterparts. Anthropologist Grima recognizing the ethnographic limits of a monolithic, male centric, approach to cultural studies in Pukhtunkhwa, undertook fieldwork that has since provided invaluable insight on Pushtun traditions/mores through the unique prism of the Pushtun female.¹⁸

Willi Steul identified Pushtunwali as a critical social mechanism and writes: Pushtunwali is comprised of the sum total values social norms which determine the way of life peculiar to the Pashtuns. It is an all-embracing regulator for the preservation and conservation of the society and for the behavior patterns of the individual. It is an emic concept which includes everything which a Pashtun should or should not do. It is thus a means of ethnic identification and differentiation in relation to other ethnic groups . . . it can be seen above all as the values *forced* (emphasis added) on the individual if he is to be a respected member of society and enjoy its acceptance.¹⁹

Pushtunwali's unwritten social contract is passed down through example, as in personal conduct/behavior, and through folklore, ancestral stories, and poetry. No Pushtun worth his salt would dream of being caught flouting what are essentially the “Three Central Commandments” of this code of behavior that comprise the foundation of Pushtunwali.²⁰ Although the mores of Pushtunwali have varied a bit through time and from region to region (the “settled areas” to the “tribal/hill country”),²¹ every Pushtun, regardless of locale or other factors, recognized/understood Pushtunwali's three core concepts which are *melmastia*²² (hospitality), *nanawati* (asylum) and *badal* (revenge).

The first, *melmastia*,²³ involves displaying generosity and hospitality towards others. In order to protect one's *izzat* (self respect and/or social prestige) and reputation, a Pushtun is required (ideally in a public forum where all can see) to be generous to his guests.²⁴ The type of *melmastia* offered is readily interpreted by the Pushtun(s) on the receiving end in order to determine two factors about the host (especially one who is not a close kin): his status/wealth and/or the value of the recipient to the host.²⁵ The arrival of a guest signifies

one's own social status and influence within the khel and provision of hospitality creates "a relationship of dependence."²⁶ Hospitality is critical to a Pushtun's honor. The inability to provide some degree of "hospitality" impacts one's izzat and a Pushtun will go to great lengths, especially in a public forum, to offer melmastia.

The second concept is called *nanawati* (asylum), which involves the provision of *panah* (sanctuary) to anyone who requests protection from a pursuing enemy. For example, if a fugitive from justice—regardless of his position and lineage—manages to reach the confines of a person's or khel's settlement and requests *panah*, the Pushtun(s) living there are then honor bound to provide protection to this stranger even if it is at great risk to their persons and/or possessions.²⁷ Refusing to provide protection/sanctuary would—in the eyes of fellow Pushtuns—be interpreted as cowardice, the betrayal of Pushtun ideals and, most egregiously, the failure to "do Pushtunwali." However, the person(s) seeking *panah* do so only under serious duress because asking another Pushtun submissively for protection in a warrior culture is the ultimate humiliation and "loss of face." Once *panah* is granted, the fugitive owes his unconditional loyalty to his protector and agrees to provide martial support/labor as necessary as long as he has *panah*. These dependency ties are useful to a powerful khan or landlord, especially if the caliber of the fugitive brings prestige. For example, if a khan has granted *panah* to a doctor or engineer or a mechanic or other similar professional, his prestige grows in the eyes of his community and thus expands his honor among his people.²⁸ This concept, *nanawati*, has, and continues to be, leveraged with varied success by some of the Wahhabis since the nineteenth century. For example, Osama bin Laden's public recognition of Mullah Omar as the Amir al Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) by swearing *bay'ah* (literally "to sell" in Arabic; but also used as "oath of allegiance") to him served to constitute—in the eyes of Mullah Omar's fellow Pushtun Taliban—a formal (legitimate) request by an outsider for *panah*.

The third, and most significant, of these "commandments" is *badal*. Grima's research reveals critical distinction between how the Pushtun genders perceive/use the term. The Arabic derivative word *badal* actually means "to exchange." For the Pushtun womenfolk, *badal* means much more than just taking revenge. As Grima quotes a Pushtun woman: "Everything is done by *badal* . . . if I come to your house, you come to mine. If I give you five rupees at your son's birth, you give me five rupees at mine."²⁹ For the Pushtun men, *badal* refers to one, and only one thing alone: revenge. For a Pushtun male it involves an "eye for an eye" in order to restore one's or the khel's *nang* (honor), even if it involves taking the life of a fellow Muslim. The aggrieved party seeks to pay back in kind to the aggressor or their blood kin for a violent act committed toward oneself or a close, or not so close, relative from one's khel or qaum. The three main tinderboxes throughout Pushtun history have generally involved disputes over *zar* (gold), *zan* (women), and/or *zamin* (land). For a Pushtun male, the only successful defense of honor is justice in the form of revenge *equal to or beyond* the extent of the original insult so as to reestablish parity or gain an advantage vis-à-vis one's rival.³⁰

Pushtunwali reflects the egalitarian ethos of the Pushtuns who are concomitantly Muslims and Pushtuns, although not necessarily in that order.³¹ But it also provides a window on the contradictory aspects of the Pushtun character such as generosity, greed, hospitality, vengeance, forgiveness, and revenge. As British officials in Pukhtunkhwa quickly discovered, the Pushtuns rugged individualism often translated into treacherous acts of butchery of real or imagined foe (to include fellow Pushtun/Muslims).³² While there was much to admire about the Pushtuns, the British of the Victorian era on the frontier saw a people through their own Western/Christian prism: Pushtun behavior seemed to border on being schizophrenic. On the one hand, Pushtuns would defend a fugitive, be generous to a stranger

and charitable to a beggar, while on the other, they would rob a traveler, kill a cousin, and steal from a neighbor. Although, the British noticed the Pushtuns constantly feuding with blood kin and others, they soon discovered that a Pushtun will quickly set aside significant grievances with members of his own khel or qaum or even with other Pushtun qaums, in order to unite against the foreign enemy, especially the infidel. Another characteristic the British discovered about the Pushtun was their utter contempt for their village mullah on the one hand, and their hero worship of charismatic pirs (holy men) on the other. Known for being extremely superstitious, the Pushtun will go into battle knowing that one dies only when one's time is up . . . but that it did not hurt to wear a *taweez* (amulet) around one's neck in order to ward off "bad luck and ill omens."

Pushtunwali in certain ways is antithetical to Islamic precepts, although a Pushtun will never publicly admit this. Furthermore, Pushtunwali has often taken precedence over Islamic norms of behavior and its centrality to the identity of Pushtuns has often been an anathema to non-Pushtun orthodox Sunni Muslims, particularly the Wahhabi-Salafi-Deobandi ideologues. Further exacerbating relations with other Muslim groups, especially the Arabs, has been the widespread adherence amongst Pushtuns to Sufi traditions (Naqshbandi; Mojaddedi, a subset of Naqshbandi; Qadiri; and Chistiyya) which include praying at sufi pir gravesites, wearing taweez to protect from *jihn* (evil spirits), burial traditions (stones and flags on burial sites),³³ celebrating Eid Milad un Nabi (the Prophet's birthday), etc. Another irritant for some Muslims (especially the Wahhabi Arabs) has been the stubborn adherence by prominent Pushtun tribes (like the Yusufzai of Mardan and the Afridi of Khyber) to an ancient narrative of being Bani Israel,³⁴ a term also widely applied to them by many of their neighboring ethnic groups (Tajiks, Punjabis, Baluchis, Persians, Uzbeks, etc.) through history. Until fairly recently, claiming a Bani Israel lineage through their ancestor, Kais, was a popular Pushtun narrative amongst various Pushtun qaums to include the Barakzai (sons of Barak) Durrani Pushtun rulers of Afghanistan.³⁵ This centuries-old narrative, regardless of its authenticity, did not help to endear the Pushtuns to other Muslim groups—especially Arabs—and those who specifically adhere to the virulently anti-Judaic precepts of Salafi-Wahhabi-Deobandi-Ahle Hadithi versions of Sunni Islam.

Hindustani Fanatics: Wahhabi Penetration of Pukhtunkhwa and the British Response

The earliest introduction of Wahhabi ideology in Pukhtunkhwa³⁶ occurred in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. This did not involve a military invasion by Wahhabi bedouin forces from the Arabian Peninsula; nor did it involve a massive population transfer of same to the Indian subcontinent. Rather, this ideological penetration occurred through the *spread of ideas* from Arabia. In the spring of 1821, 850 Indian Muslims pilgrims, led by Syed Ahmed, a Muslim *talib* (student) from Shah Waliullah's madrassa in Delhi, made the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca via Jeddah.³⁷ Two years later, Syed Ahmed returned to India armed with an ideology known as "Wahhabism" that would cause the British much grief and also would create deep divisions within the Muslim, and later, Pushtun, communities.³⁸

Upon Syed Ahmed's return to India and with the death of his teacher, Shah Abdul Aziz (Shah Waliullah's eldest son and successor) in 1823, leadership of the Delhi Madrassah-i-Rahimiya passed to Aziz's son, Muhammad Ishaq, who was devoted to Syed Ahmed. Shah Muhammad Ishaq's tutelage led to the incorporation of Syed Ahmed's Wahhabi-inspired doctrine into the madrassa's curriculum. It was, however, not long before theological disputes over emphasis and interpretation emerged due to petty conflicts and rivalries. Two

schools emerged due to this power struggle: the Delhi versus the Patna schools, with the latter exhibiting full blown Wahhabi inclinations in all but name.³⁹

It was around this time that Syed Ahmed embraced the idea of the need to replicate the Prophet's example and to perform *hijrat* (pilgrimage/migration). Like the Prophet Muhammad before him, who migrated from Mecca to Medina (formerly Yathrib), Syed Ahmed was convinced that in order to wage jihad it was necessary to leave Dar al Harb (British controlled territory in India) and head for the western periphery where Muslims were in the majority.⁴⁰ Syed Ahmed confidently envisioned the establishment of a "country of faith" (i.e., Dar al Islam) west of the Indus River given that it was populated with fellow members of the umma.⁴¹ Furthermore, the rugged terrain of this Indian frontier region seemed like the ideal locale from which to wage jihad on India. Specifically, the mountains of Buner⁴² were singled out because it was also the place from which Nawab⁴³ Amir Khan of Tonk, Syed Ahmed's old patron, originated. Interestingly enough, Patna in the eastern Indian province of Bihar would serve as Syed Ahmed's clandestine source for logistics and recruitment for the jihad to be waged in the Buner region, notwithstanding the inevitable challenges that the vast distance between the two places posed for waging this "jihad."

On his way to Buner via Sind and Baluchistan, two regions where Muslim chiefs ruled, no support was offered to Syed Ahmed and his Wahhabi brethren. Even when they passed into southern Afghanistan via the Bolan Pass and headed north toward the Khyber Pass and then back east into the western Indian frontier region, they were asked to "move along." They were only embraced by the Yusufzai in the Peshawar region because they were needed as potential allies against the Sikhs.⁴⁴ Syed Ahmed claim that he was a descendant of the Prophet himself and a Hajji⁴⁵ who aimed to wage jihad in India temporarily convinced the skeptical Yusufzai to allow the continued presence of Syed Ahmed and his followers. Thus the Yusufzai elders in a jirga decided to offer these Hindustanis their support (both material and martial) in return for their military help against the Sikhs. It must be emphasized that this "support" was based on pragmatic, not ideological, considerations of the Yusufzai given their ongoing jihad against the Sikh.⁴⁶

When Khadi Khan of Hund switched sides during the Pushtun "holy war" against the Sikhs in the spring of 1827 after suffering heavy casualties amongst his kinsmen, Syed Ahmed as the self appointed Amir ul Momineen (Commander of the Faithful)⁴⁷ saw this as an act of apostasy and marched against Hund. With the intervention of a beloved Sufi hermit from an impoverished background named "Saidu Baba"—who later was to become the Akhund of Swat—Khadi Khan met Syed Ahmed under a truce only to be murdered by the Wahabbi (Hindustani) Fanatics. This treachery was justified by Syed Ahmed as being "legitimate" because under Sharia law, apostasy (the most egregious of sins according to the Wahhabis) was punishable by death. This act by the Hindustani "guests" roused the Pushtuns of the area against them because it went against their Pushtunwali code of conduct. As luck would have it, the Sikh Governor of Peshawar tried to have Syed Ahmed poisoned at this time while he sought refuge amongst the Yusufzai. This brazen attempt of the Sikhs to kill their "guest" incensed the Yusufzai. It also helped save Syed Ahmed's hide from Pushtun "justice" as required by the Pushtunwali concept of badal, which required retribution for the death of a Pushtun, especially at the hands of a non-Pushtun. The Sikh attempt to kill someone they had provided panah, however, was perceived, by the Yusufzai, as a greater infringement upon their nang (honor) as it violated the second commandment of Pushtunwali of nanawati. This assassination attempt by the Sikh again helped to temporarily rally the Yusufzai around the Hindustanis of Syed Ahmed. Galvanized by the code of nanawati that required protection of their "guests," the Yusufzai managed to defeat the Sikhs controlling Peshawar and kill the Governor to avenge their nang. Now, the Khans of



the Yusufzai did a complete about turn: they not only forgave/overlooked Syed Ahmed's treachery toward a fellow Pushtun tribesman, but also agreed to levy special tithes on their tribes to pay for the Hindustani Fanatics-led jihad. Furthermore, they also agreed to implement Syed Ahmed's Wahhabi version of Sharia in their region.⁴⁸

While Syed Ahmed's Hindustani Fanatics continued to grow in numbers as they arrived from the east, the "honeymoon" period with the local Pushtuns lasted only two months. By then the Yusufzai had had enough of their unpleasant and intolerant guests and were fed up with them.⁴⁹ Although agreeable toward paying for jihad against the Sikhs, the strict imposition of Sharia by a Hindustani *qadi* (judge) was the straw that broke the camel's back. Per Pushtunwali tradition, conflict resolution within this tribal structure required reliance of the tribal *jirga* (assembly) system led by respected elders and maliks. A foreigner from Hindustan (Wahhabi) espousing the necessity to having *him*, as a Muslim *qadi* or judge, in order to resolve emerging disputes and criminal conduct by Pushtun tribal members was unacceptable to the Pushtun quams. Historically, the Pushtuns are known as a xenophobic people who resent any foreign attempt to dictate to them how they should lead their lives.

The failure—or inability—of the Hindustani Wahhabis to *understand* the Pushtuns and their cultural traditions in order to leverage them to ensure successful cooption only served to guarantee their long-term inability to embed and convert this self-confident ethnic group. They simply assumed that Pushtuns as Muslims, and therefore part of the umma, would embrace them and their cause, not realizing that for Pushtuns the concept of umma was irrelevant/nonexistent. For Pushtuns, identity was all about *lineage*, which took precedent over any religious affiliation. The final straw for the Yusufzai Pushtuns occurred when the Wahhabis had the audacity to broach the subject of their Pushtun *zan* (women) and the Pushtun tradition of selling their daughters in marriage to other Pushtuns. The Wahhabis declared their opposition to this custom as being "un-Islamic" and issued an edict that any single girls of marriageable age⁵⁰ still unmarried after 12 days should be turned over to the Hindustani *mujahedin* for marriage.⁵¹ This edict, which challenged the very essence of what it meant to be a Pushtun, as enunciated in passed down oral traditions that constitute *nang-i-Pukhtana* (Pushtun's honor)—which it can be argued is just as inflexible as Wahhabi ideology—outraged their Pushtun hosts. The Yusufzai's hospitality/asylum was clearly over as they met in a secret *jirga* and decided it was time to act against their guests in *badal*. They ambushed and killed the Wahhabis at prayer time, while those who survived in Buner were later killed by the Sikhs.⁵²

Syed Ahmed's attempts to rouse the Pushtuns to the cause of jihad ultimately failed as it was militarily crushed by both the Pushtuns and the Sikhs, with Ahmed killed on the battlefield at Balakot in 1831.⁵³ Although Syed Ahmed and his Wahhabi-indoctrinated Hindustani Fanatics followers were militarily crushed, their troublesome—ideological—presence in the Hazara region would remain in the remnants that survived and were reinforced from Patna. They would quickly come to attract the attention of the British. Colonel Younghusband in *The Story of the Guides* writes about the Hindustani Fanatics:

These refugees . . . set about inciting their hot blooded neighbours to join them in disturbing the peace of the border. They harried villages, drove off cattle, killed and wounded British subjects and thus became an additional disturbing feature on a frontier always ready enough for the pleasure of a good fight. Sittana, the stronghold of the Hindustanis, was skillfully surrounded and a fierce hand to hand combat ensued. Their Pathan allies, whose hearts were evidently not in the business showed lukewarm enthusiasm and escaped . . .

but the Hindustanis stood to a man. They fought like fanatics coming boldly and doggedly on.⁵⁴

The Umbeyla Campaign of 1863 was the second British effort⁵⁵ in the Mahabun area to eliminate the den of Hindustani Fanatics that had yet again managed to rouse the Pushtuns to jihad against the *feringhee*.⁵⁶ But, although Reynell Taylor,⁵⁷ the Commissioner of Peshawar and Colonel Alfred Wilde, commander of the famous Corps of Guides⁵⁸ agreed that action must be taken quickly to eliminate the key cause of frontier disturbances—i.e., the Hindustani Fanatics—the British military campaign against the Wahhabi ideologues and their Pushtun supporters once again failed to completely crush the movement. Army records reveal that while seven hundred Wahhabi mujahedin were killed in the fighting, the leader of the Hindustani Fanatics, Amir Abdullah Ali and two hundred of his warriors escaped capture.⁵⁹

The next insurgency that broke out in Pukhtunkhwa against the British (1897–1898) reflected yet again the continuation of the Hindustani Fanatics' incitement of the Pushtuns, with one noteworthy development: the emergence of many charismatic, home-grown "mullahs" such as Mullah Powindah (Mehsud), Said Akbar (Afridi), Mullah Sadullah of Swat (Yusufzai) and Mullah Hadda (Mohmand). It is remarkable that it took a major Pushtun uprising, that spread throughout Pukhtunkhwa and represented a threat in scale second only to the 1857 Indian Mutiny, for the British to finally realize the long-lasting potency of Syed Ahmed's Wahhabi inspired cause. It is, however, important to mention that *none* of these charismatic local (Pushtun) mullahs were adherents of Wahhabism. Rather, these Pushtun leaders perceived themselves as assisting in a jihad against the infidels who had infiltrated and occupied their lands. They did, however, as many had done before, use Islam and the concept of jihad to galvanize their kinsmen against the infidel intruders (the British). Syed Ahmed's adherents did manage to plant specific ideological seeds in Pukhtunkhwa that were derivative of the Wahhabi ideology of Shah Waliullah of Delhi.⁶⁰ However, more significant than this alien ideology of the Hindustani Fanatics was the ability of these foreigners to incite the Pushtuns to jihad against the infidels. Both the Malakand and the Tirah campaigns were major conflicts that tested the British ability to maintain a continued presence in Pukhtunkhwa, east of the Durand line of 1893.⁶¹ Lieutenant Lockhart described the scene at Malakand:

It was a veritable pandemonium that would seem to have been let loose around us. Bands of ghazis (religious warriors) worked up by their religious enthusiasm into a frenzy of fanatical excitement, would charge our breastworks again and again, leaving their dead in scores after each repulse, while those of their comrades who were unarmed would encourage their efforts by shouting . . . ⁶²

Some noteworthy observations on the attempts of the Hindustani Fanatics (Wahhabis) in the Pukhtunkhwa during the nineteenth century include the following: first, support for Syed Ahmed's jihadis along the primarily Pushtun-inhabited Indian frontier wavered and, more often than not, was contingent on whether or not these foreigners enjoyed the tutelage of a specific leader or khan; second, the Pushtun melmastia was short-lived given the religious fanaticism of these foreign entities; third, once strict sharia was imposed by the Hindustani Fanatics and it quickly came into conflict with the laws or traditions of Pushtunwali, the latter always prevailed and the Pushtuns sought the blood of the Hindustanis instead; fourth, the ability to rouse individual Pushtun khels to "the jihad" required forceful, and charismatic, leadership such as displayed by Syed Ahmed.

One consistent theme during the Wahhabis' presence in Pukhtunkhwa was that, notwithstanding the Wahhabis' obvious devotion to jihad to expand the din (faith) into Dar al Harb (the Indian plains), the Pushtuns never fully embraced these Muslim "brothers."⁶³ Furthermore, caught up in their frenzied devotion to the Wahhabist creed as the only true path of Islam in order to wrestle back control of former Muslim lands (Mughal India) from the heathens (British, Sikhs, and Hindus), the Hindustani Fanatics made one fatal miscalculation: they underestimated the deeply embedded importance in Pushtun society of existing tribal mores and customs as exemplified in the Pushtunwali narrative. Their failure to tone down their "devotion," and to work *through the Pushtun system* and not against it, cost them critical support and ensured that they would remain marginalized on the periphery of Pushtun society. These Indian Muslims, raised on the concept of the *umma* superseding all other identities and social ties in urban, non-tribal, environments, were like fish out of water. They looked different, acted differently, and constantly offended their hosts by their Islamic fanaticism in a region where religion was more a given and less on display than was the case with the Wahhabis. Factors that contributed to the locals' tolerance towards these quixotic, perennial outsiders included their bravery in battle and their tenacious faith, coupled with offers to help local Pushtun khels fight off their enemies (Sikhs and/or the British). On the part of the Pushtuns, support for the Wahhabis' jihad(s) was fleeting and contingent on the wavering support of local khels/tribes and their leadership. Without the provision of panah, survival was next to impossible in this harsh environment and would remain the Achilles' heel of the Hindustani Fanatics/Wahhabi movement. The only plausible explanation for the continued—albeit limited in numbers—presence of the Wahhabi-inspired Patna ideology in these environs lay in fact that these "guests" relied on the continued *melmastia* (hospitality) of those individual families or groups who admired the devotion of these foreigners to the *din*.

The Road to 9/11: Melmastia, Money, and the Wahhabis, 1979–2001

Although the British never managed to completely eradicate the ideological menace that the Wahhabi-inspired Hindustani Fanatics posed in Pukhtunkhwa, the threat from these Indian Wahhabi elements remained circumscribed for reasons mentioned earlier. Instead, the British found themselves dealing with various insurgencies and rebellions led by charismatic Pushtuns (such as the Faqir of Ipi)⁶⁴ until their departure from the region in 1947. The year 1979, however, represented the beginning of the end for this status quo due to three tumultuous events in the Middle East. First, the ouster of the Pahlevi Shah by Iran's Ayatullahs led by Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini; second, the violent takeover of the Ka'aba by Juhaiman al-Utaibi and his supporters,⁶⁵ and third, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁶⁶ While most Sunni Muslims were shocked by these disturbing events; these developments—especially the temporary capture of the Ka'aba by local Wahhabi "extremists"—shook the House of Saud and could reasonably be termed "a seismic wake-up call" for them. The Saudi leadership decided that the best defense against a possible overthrow of the Saudi regime from within, or without, required innovative approaches to both the domestic and foreign interests of the kingdom.⁶⁷ Domestically, Saudi rulers capitulated to their ulema in backtracking on—albeit slow—progress in social matters, while, in the realm of political and foreign affairs, the late King Faisal's efforts to create stronger bonds among Sunni Muslim states was accelerated.⁶⁸

Under King Khalid, the Saudis began to take a much more proactive, proselytizing role in the Muslim (Sunni) world by funding various projects such as *masjids* (mosques), Wahhabi-led *madrassas/madaris* (religious day, and boarding, schools), and, most significantly, the *jihad* against the Soviet Union via proxies in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ The change in

emphasis—and the willingness to provide generous funding for both the promotion of its ideology, as well as to eventually match, dollar for dollar, U.S. funding of the Afghan war effort against the Soviets—can also be directly attributed to the grave concern of the Saudis vis-à-vis the new Shia theocracy's declaration (Tehran was committed to “exporting its Islamic revolution”).⁷⁰ Since the 1970s, when Saudi Arabia's oil industry began to generate billions of dollars in annual revenue, the Saudi regime embarked on an ambitious global effort to propagate the *sahih* (true/correct) path of Islam in order to replicate the example of the Salaf-i-Saliheen and to expand their ideological support base. The impact of the Wahhabization effort directed toward the Pukhtunkhwa since the early 1980s cannot be underestimated: it undermined the social—tribal—structure and destabilized an already traumatized region. Worse, it would eventually create a safe haven for al Qaeda and affiliated movements (AQAM) from where AQAM could plan the 9/11 attacks upon the U.S.

Given the historical context, what had changed or was different this time that enabled the resumption of the Wahhabi mission to bring Pukhtunkhwa into its orbit was massive civil unrest and dislocation. Unlike during the nineteenth century, Pukhtunkhwa's social structure experienced massive disruption and instability due to the Soviet invasion—and subsequent occupation—of Afghanistan. The arrival of around three to four million Afghan refugees into Pakistan's Pukhtunkhwa region was unprecedented and offered unique challenges to the social structure. Some of the Afghans, such as the Waziri, Zadran, Afridi, and Mohmand belonged to khels that had blood ties across the Durand line to other khels as members of the same qaum and were able to obtain sanctuary in their kin's territory. But most of the refugees were in the unenviable situation of being forced to settle in squalid refugee camps on the outskirts of towns. This fact did not contradict the Pushtun's tradition of melmastia; rather, the sheer volume of this fleeing refugee populace essentially overwhelmed the melmastia mechanism of Pushtunwali. There were just too many people to sustain indefinitely. Thus, melmastia was selectively offered only to members of one's own qaum or khel in order to preserve the honor of one's group.

The conditions in these camps were ideal for an aggressive Saudi-funded proselytism through Wahhabi- and Deobandi-indoctrinated mullahs because the traditional social structure was impossible to sustain in such crowded conditions, where tribal lineages and identities were intermingled and the social hierarchy characterized by leadership of elders and maliks was notably absent. Furthermore, most of the men in the refugee population were often away fighting the Soviets as mujahedin, or working in the Persian Gulf or in Pakistani cities, and were absent. In such a patriarchic tribal society, conditions bordering on chaos threatened to turn the social hierarchy on its head. In the refugee camps, the generally unpopular village mullah suddenly stepped into this social vacuum and quickly gained social and political clout⁷¹ that had been unimaginable during the pre-Soviet invasion era when the tribal/malik structure was a well-embedded social construct. The flavor of Islam preached in many of these refugee camps quickly came to resemble the rigid tenets of Deobandism (although an offshoot of the Hanafi fiqh, it shared a close resemblance to the ideology of the Hanbali fiqh based Wahhabism). These refugee camps, along with the mushrooming number of Saudi funded charities and madrassas/madaris,⁷² quickly came under the control of the Deobandi/Wahhabi affiliated Islamists with the full backing of Pakistan's ruling dictator General Zia ul Haq's regime.

The second factor that aided the Wahhabization of Pukhtunkhwa during the 1980s, was how the Saudis—through their Arab proxies⁷³ in Pukhtunkhwa—flooded the area with petrodollars in order to propagate their vision of Islam among the Pushtuns. The Saudis' willingness to provide humanitarian and materiel assistance during the jihad against the



atheist communists who occupied Kabul undoubtedly included proselytism efforts. The Saudis also provided generous military funding to select Afghan Mujahedin factions led Abdul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Yunus Khalis, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, thus establishing longstanding ties to critical mujahedin leaders. Furthermore, the Saudi government actively recruited in Pukhtunkhwa for cheap labor in the Khaleej via temporary employment opportunities. By 2001, a sizeable number⁷⁴ of Pushtun males had spent some time working in Saudi Arabia as “guest workers.” It can be surmised that many of these isolated Pushtuns were at some point in time exposed to aggressive Wahhabi proselytism efforts at their job sites.

A third factor that contributed to Wahhabi penetration of Pukhtunkhwa occurred early in the 1980s when the Saudis asked Pakistan’s General Zia for *carte blanche* access for Arabs to travel to Pakistan. As a result, the region soon witnessed the arrival of thousands of Wahhabi/Salafi-indoctrinated Arab men who were “encouraged” by the Arab regimes to travel to the frontlines of the jihad via Peshawar. Other Wahhabi/Salafi-inspired “jihadis” came from across the world and were hard core ideologues with an uncompromising bent. While it can be argued that the Pushtun—who are conservative Muslims prone at times to violence and treachery—resembled these “Afghan-Arabs,”⁷⁵ there were/are some significant differences between the Afghan-Arab fanatic jihadis and the Pushtun mujahedin.⁷⁶ The Arabs really believed that they were Allah’s jihadis and were willing to fight and die for their *din* (faith) of Islam against the Soviet/Russian atheists; the Pushtuns, on the other hand, saw this jihad as a *jang* (war) *to liberate their land from foreign occupiers*. For Pushtuns, it was all about Pushtun *nationalism* and not a jihad in the name of their *din*. For them, however, the concept of jihad served as an important *galvanizing tool* to military action to liberate Afghanistan for *Afghans*.⁷⁷ In fact, the indiscriminate atrocities/actions of the Soviet forces in the Afghan countryside were motivation enough to propel retaliatory action. It can be argued that while the uninvited Arabs acted like fanatics, most Pushtun mujahedin behaved (and they always have) like *pragmatic* fighters. Journalist Randall quotes a Pushtun refugee who told an American teacher:

These Arabs want to die for a cause, they seek martyrdom. We want the Russians out, but we want to live, we are not fighting to die.⁷⁸

Even mujahedin leaders like Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani (who had close ties to the Wahhabis) saw this as a *war of liberation*. This perceptive dichotomy mirrored the pragmatic objectives of the nineteenth-century Yusufzai in their fight against the Sikh and later the British, in comparison to the objectives of their uninvited Hindustani “guests” (to wage jihad in the name of the *din*). It was back to the future except, this time, the Wahhabis had the financial resources to tangibly try to effect ideological, social, and cultural transformations that had eluded them in the past.

Wahhabi/Salafi ideologues and scholars such as Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden,⁷⁹ and Ayman al-Zawahari made their way to Peshawar in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in order to both participate/assist in the ongoing jihad and to also propagate their “true” version of Islam among the heathen Pushtun tribes whom they looked down upon.⁸⁰ The Wahhabis saw tribal loyalty as a form of heresy and a threat to the establishment of a united *umma*. During the early days of Saudi rule and with the help of the Ikhwan,⁸¹ deliberate efforts had been made in the Nejd and others parts of the new Saudi Kingdom to dismantle tribal loyalties through relocation and indoctrination.⁸² Historically, as Islamic scholar Ignaz Goldziher writes, the social order of the Arab tribes based on ancient traditions and the teachings of Islam were incompatible.⁸³

Thus, given the Saudi/Wahhabi influence on the Arab mission (i.e., jihad), those who would come to be called the “Afghan-Arabs”—like the Ikhwan of Arabia before them—saw a two-pronged mission: to destroy the far enemy (the Soviets) *and to cleanse/reform the Pushtun of their heretical, tribal, ways.*

Although some of these Wahhabi/Salafi jihadis managed to marry into certain Pushtun khels and embed themselves; most left the region after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to continue the jihad elsewhere. What they did take with them, however, were contacts to elements in Pukhtunkhwa that they would later rely on as they sought melmastia and/or nanawati.

A fourth contributor to the Wahhabization effort involved numerous state-sponsored, as well as privately funded, Arab aid organizations that sprouted up in Peshawar, such as World Muslim League, Kuwaiti Red Crescent, Saudi Red Crescent, and Azzam’s Maktab al Khidmat. Through humanitarian assistance, these Wahhabi/Salafi elements saw opportunities to coopt the Hanafi fiqh adherents, and “redirect” the Sufi/Pir inspired Pushtuns to seek the sahih (correct) path in order to be saved from *jahiliyya*, (ignorance).

Relations between certain Pushtun entities and these Arab Wahhabi elements were often hostile and bitter, which precluded a more rapid “Wahhabization” of the area as sought by these “jihadis.”⁸⁴ But, unlike the previous attempt in the nineteenth century to convert the Pushtuns to a true Dar al Islam, this time the Wahhabi/Salafi ideologues made significant inroads due to the following variables: the disrupted social structure of Pukhtunkhwa; the unlimited financial resources of the Wahhabis which enabled the essential reordering of the necessary infrastructure (madrassas/madaris, mosques, charity, medical assistance, etc.) to propagate their ideology and to encourage/support “converts”; and, finally, the Pakistani state apparatus did not create obstacles to the Wahhabi/Salafi mission in Pukhtunkhwa because the Pakistani state too had been coopted by the Saudis’ generous financial incentives.

As mentioned, most of the Wahhabi-Salafist indoctrinated foreign “jihadis” left the region following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and either returned to their previous lives or waged internal “jihads” back home (Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Indian Kashmir, etc.) or got involved in the “global jihad” as visualized by Azzam and Zawahiri in Bosnia, Chechnya, Russia, etc. But the expansion of job opportunities and the flow of resources from the Arab Khaleej states (especially Saudi Arabia) to Pakistan continued unabated in pursuit of the *second* objective of the Afghan-Arabs and their paymasters: the Wahhabi mission of *da’wa* to bring *mushriqun* (deviant) Muslims like the Pushtun back to the sahih (correct/proper) path of Islam.⁸⁵ For most Pushtuns, however, the Wahhabi movement was an alien, violent (even by Pushtun standards) cult that threatened both Pushtunwali and the Pushtun’s tribal way of life. Thus, this Wahhabization process of *da’wa*, which involved an ongoing multipronged approach, also continued to include free madrassa education (with room and board for many) in the mushrooming Wahhabi financed madrassas/madaris and the funding of new mosques for Wahhabi indoctrinated imams.

The sudden emergence of the Taliban (plural for “student”) on the Afghan side of the Durand line as a political and military movement in 1994 was a consequence of the *ideological* penetration of Pukhtunkhwa by the Wahhabists and their Deobandi “associates.” Though the Taliban “movement” that emerged, led by the reclusive, one-eyed Mullah Muhammad Omar (a Ghilzai Hotaki from Uruzgan province of Afghanistan) was not a Wahhabist/Salafist entity per se, its modus operandi certainly reflected a hybrid variant that incorporated core Wahhabist ideology and social mores into a weakly adhered-to Pushtunwali. It can also be argued that the rise of the Taliban was a direct by-product of the Saudi funded madrassas/madaris and the “strategic depth” policy of both the Zia and Bhutto



governments.⁸⁶ Furthermore, it was the Wahhabi ulema in Saudi Arabia such as the Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz and the Minister of Justice Sheikh Muhammad Bin Juber who urged the Saudi Royal family to provide support to the fledgling Taliban movement.⁸⁷ In return for the Saudi Kingdom's support (read: funds), the Taliban were eager to prove their "Islamic" credentials. For example, they replicated the Saudi Kingdom's Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice as the primary mechanism through which to implement draconian Shariah (Islamic laws) as interpreted by them.

In 1996, the Taliban—with the active encouragement of both the Saudi regime and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)—offered *nanawati* to Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and their respective entourages due to *pragmatic* considerations *not* ideological ones. Over time, though, Bin Laden managed to get into suspicious Mullah Omar's good graces through charm and long theological conversations wherein they found common ideological ground with Mullah Omar's perceptions of "jihad" widening to incorporate an appreciation for the global vision of his Arab guests. In short, Mullah Omar's religious convictions began to move away from the Pushtun's traditional Sufi flavored version of Hanafi fiqh to a hybrid form that incorporated Wahhabism's more draconian ethos.⁸⁸ This religious shift was not only due to the successful indoctrination efforts of the Taliban's Wahhabi guests (along with offers of generous financial assistance), as its roots lay in the years of indoctrination at Wahhabi/Deobandi madrassas/madaris in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province [renamed in 2010 "Khyber Pukhtunkhwa"], especially the Darl Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak.⁸⁹ Most of the Taliban leadership—many of whom were full time students or teachers at madrassas/madaris—at some point in their lives had been affiliated and/or educated at the Haqqania madrassa, a place known as the "jihad factory." Mullah Omar had even received an honorary doctorate from there.⁹⁰ The impact or success of these Saudi funded madrassas/madaris cannot be overstated: it has meant that the concept of "umma"—i.e., the Wahhabi/Salafi variant—often supplanted traditional sources of identity of these young males to the detriment of Pushtun culture and Pushtunwali as key cultural markers. Worse, these madrassa graduates went home and challenged the established Pushtun social mores and norms, to include defiance of their tribal maliks and elders.

Notwithstanding the imposition of draconian social regulations that essentially prohibited cherished Afghan/Pushtun pastimes such as kite flying, soccer, singing, music, film, photography, television shows, etc., and enslaved women in their homes, the Taliban's Wahhabi-type rule was considered a necessary evil in the Pukhtunkhwa belt on the Afghan side, as it had restored law and order. Those Pushtun tribes—especially ones affiliated with the Durrani confederacy—who wished to overthrow the Taliban and oust their foreign Wahhabi guests, did not have the resources or the backing of a powerful external ally to lead an uprising against the Taliban.

Although the Taliban movement mirrored many of the social and ideological attributes of Wahhabism, the Taliban leadership were (as it rightfully turned out) suspicious of their Arab guests and their motives. It did not take long, however, before these Muslim "guests" came to be deeply resented by the populace. Specifically, it was the arrogance and condescending behavior of the core of bin Laden's followers in Kandahar, coupled with the failure of bin Laden et al. to deliver on their promises of building various civic projects, that served to wear out their welcome rather quickly. Significantly, the Afghan-Arab flavor of Islam did not take root west of the Durand line in the same way it had to its east. This had to do with the fact that since the emergence of the Wahhabist mission in the nineteenth century, its focal point in the Pukhtunkhwa region lay to the east of what is now the Durand line. The majority of the Wahhabi/Deobandi funded madrassas/madaris

were located in Pakistan's side of Pukhtunkhwa. These institutions were the jihadi factories which provided many of the Taliban's foot soldiers.

When American pressure on the Taliban to expel bin Laden intensified after the U.S. African Embassy bombings in 1998, it only served to solidify the uncomfortable relationship between the Arabs and their Taliban hosts. Despite the Taliban leadership's ideological sympathies for their Arab "guests," they had come to view them as a liability and wished to rid themselves of their company. But the Taliban felt publicly cornered by what they perceived was overt American bullying that gave them no face-saving way to rid themselves of their liability. The U.S. failure to understand, and leverage, foundational precepts of Pushtunwali in their diplomatic efforts to force bin Laden's ouster from Afghanistan was a critical misstep that allowed al Qaeda to both thrive in Afghanistan and to prepare for the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil.

Conclusion

The social construct of Wahhabism, which views tribalism as both an anathema and a reflection of jahiliyyah, inevitably collided with the ethos that constitutes Pushtuns' way of life as passed down through the oral tradition of Pushtunwali and its precedents, which predate the arrival of Islam.

Ignaz Goldziher's astute observations in his chapter on "The Arab Tribes and Islam" are just as applicable to the Pushtuns of today:

... Islam was designed to level all social and genealogical differences: competition and perpetual strife between tribes, their mockings and boastings were to cease and there was to be no distinction of rank in Islam between Arabs and Barbarians, free men and freed men ... *In Islam there were only to be "brothers" and "in the community (ummat) of Muhammad" the distinction between Bakr and Taghlib, Arab and Persian, were to cease and to be banned as specifically Jahili.*⁹¹

The Wahhabis and their ideological supporters (to include the Taliban) viewed Pushtun society as "pre-Islamic." Colonel Imam—best known as "the Father of the Taliban"—on his cultural integration into Afghan Pushtun society during his days as an ISI officer, noted the continued survival of pre-Islamic Pushtun customs:

... the Pushtuns have camouflaged the Pushtun culture (with Islam), except the Taliban, who have always practiced Islam in its true spirit.⁹²

Wahhabi-influenced proxies in the form of Syed Ahmed in the 1820s to Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in the 1980s to the Taliban in the 1990s all conspired to bring the "jahiliyyah Muslim" brethren back to the "correct" path of the Salaf-e-Saliheen. Thus this ongoing process can be defined as an internal (Muslim) Wahhabi led jihad⁹³ as it reflects their determined efforts to *purify Islam*, which sought/seeks to remove bi'da (accretions) and jahiliyyah (ignorance) from Dar al Islam, and to unify the umma. From the very beginning of the Muslim conquest, the Pushtuns have been viewed as being problematic and/or intransigent. It was in fact at the hands of the Pushtuns that the Arab armies of conquest suffered their first significant military defeat.⁹⁴

The Pushtuns' stubbornness and refusal to change their mores or tribal customs after conversion to Islam was/is yet another irritation in the eyes of the Wahhabis. The fact that the



Pushtuns are publicly proud of declaring a preference for Pushtunwali further incensed the Wahhabis. Until the establishment/encouragement of the Taliban (Deobandi indoctrinated talibs at Saudi-funded madrasas in the NWFP [now named “Khyber Pukhtunkhwa”] and Baluchistan), the overwhelming majority of Pushtuns continued to adhere to their pre-Islamic traditions and to their tribal lineages. Furthermore, the average Pushtun did not buy the Muslim “brother” line; rather, they proudly identified with their clan and then with their tribe. Pushtun xenophobia has not excluded Muslims and frequently has even included other Pushtuns who were not closely related. Even more egregious in the eyes of the Wahhabis, some of these “Muslim” brothers stubbornly retained an ancient narrative of being Bani Israel as a source of pride of lineage, much to the Wahhabis disgust. The Taliban, with the financial backing and support of their Wahhabi/Salafi “guests”—namely Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri—sought to implement Sharia and to ban jirgas (an essential mechanism of Pushtunwali). When they had difficulty doing so, they cleverly started substituting Arabic terms/words for Pushto lexicon with some success over time. For example, the use of “jirga” was officially replaced by the term “*shura*” (Arabic for “council”).

Ironically, it was the atheist Soviet Union’s genocidal strategy—which relied extensively on depopulating and/or exterminating Pukhtunkhwa’s population west of the Durand line—that ultimately helped the cause of the Wahhabi-Salafi-Deobandi entities funded by the Saudis. The weakening of the Pushtun tribal structure and extensive population dislocation on the Afghan side of Pukhtunkhwa created the conditions (a failed state) that enabled the Taliban to seize power. As Deobandis, the Taliban leadership led by Mullah Omar was sympathetic to the Wahhabis and thus offered bin Laden and Zawahiri panah (sanctuary). The rest, as they say, is history.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this article, Pukhtunkhwa is geographically defined as comprising the areas where the Pushtuns/Pukhtuns comprise the majority of the populace. Traditionally, “Pukhtunkhwa” has included the territory which straddles the Durand Line that arbitrarily demarcated the Indian subcontinent from Afghanistan in 1893. This artificial—albeit political—boundary divided some of the Pushtuns’ *qaums* (tribes), Zadran, Wazir, Mohmand, Afridi, Muhammadzai, who simply ignored the invisible “Durand Line,” which was a 100-year “lease” or agreement between the Amir Abdur Rehman and the British Crown.

2. See Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 29, no. 3 (April–May 2006): 207–239; Christopher Blanchard, *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 2008, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21695_20080124.pdf; Stephen Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and its Role in Terrorism* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002); Vincenzo Oliveti, *Terror’s Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences* (Birmingham, UK: Amadeus Books, 2002); R. Upadhyay, “Islamism: A Historical Background: The Saudi Angle,” South Asia Analysis Group, June 29, 2009, available at <http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3282.html>; Talip Kucukcan, “Some Reflections on the Wahhabiyyah Movement,” *Hamdard Islamicus*, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995): 67–82.

3. For more on this “reformation” movement, see David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2006).

4. Sunni Islam—which is the largest denomination at around 85% of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims adherents—has four Schools of Jurisprudence (*fiqh*): Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. The Hanafi *fiqh* is the most widely followed *madhab* (school). The influence of the Hanbali *fiqh* is concentrated primarily in the Arabian Peninsula, and is the most austere of the four schools of Sunni

jurisprudence. Historically, it has had the fewest adherents amongst Muslims. It has been written that this fact reflects the more rigid and restrictive features of Hanbali interpretations of how a Muslim should lead his/her life. For a detailed discussion on Sunni fiqh see Christopher M. Blanchard, *Islam: Sunni and Shiites*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 2009, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21745_20090128.pdf

5. The contemporary Salafi (Arabic for “predecessor”) movement’s foundational tenet is that Islam as practiced by Prophet Muhammad and his companions represented “the ideal man” behaving as Allah would want him to and this early society reflected this perfect state. Salafism seeks to revive a practice of Islam that more closely resembles the religion during the time of Prophet Muhammad.

6. While scholars of Islamic jurisprudence such as Joseph Schacht (1902–1969) recognized that the “gates of *ijtihad*” were “closed” within Sunni schools of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) around the tenth century (which signified that all necessary examination, and interpretation, of the Quran and Hadith had been accomplished by Muslim scholars, thus further inquiry was unnecessary), more recent scholars of Islamic law have challenged this assessment arguing that *ijtihad* remains an essential component (*farz*) of the Sunni Muslim tradition, despite the emphasis on blind obedience (*taqlid*). See, for example, Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (1984): 3–41. Such contemporary scholars can be called “neo-mutazilites.”

7. Wahhabis/Muwahhidun reject the notion that the gates of *ijtihad* are now closed because, due to numerous accretions of innovations (*bida*), some interpretations of Islamic doctrine need to be reevaluated to prove that such practices sharply diverge from those of the *Salaf-e-Saliheen* and must therefore be rejected.

8. In contemporary times, public criticism by Sunni Muslim clerics of Wahhabism has been virtually nonexistent, which raises a number of important questions: Is this silence due to the rise of “petro-diplomacy” and/or is this due to effective terror and intimidation tactics? A few Muslim critics in the West have included Italian-born Dr. Abdul Hadi Palazzi, leader of the Italian Muslim Assembly, Hisham Kabani of the Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA), Stephen Schwartz’s Center for Islamic Pluralism, and Dr. Zuhdi Jasser’s American Islamic Forum for Democracy.

9. For more on the “salafi” see Quitan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” *Middle East Policy*, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2001): 18–38.

10. “Pukhtunkhwa” is the term used by Pushtuns to describe their homeland, which straddles the Durand Line between present day Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a region where the Pushtuns have predominated for over two thousand years. In Pakistan, Pushtuns are in the majority in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa; they are also found in large numbers in urban centers of the Punjab (especially Lahore and Rawalpindi) and Sind (Karachi). They are also beginning to demographically challenge the Baluchis on their own home turf of Baluchistan as the numbers of Pushtuns there continue to substantially rise due to a number of factors. In Afghanistan, they are concentrated in the Eastern provinces such as Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Nangarhar, Zabul, etc., and in the Southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah. They are also found in isolated pockets in the north such as in Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan due to forced resettlement of Ghilji khels by Amir Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century. The sizeable Pushtun diaspora in the West from the Soviet invasion/occupation of Afghanistan is spread throughout Europe and also certain urban centers of the United States.

11. James W. Spain, *The Way of the Pathans* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 29.

12. Benedicte Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 3–6.

13. See Bernt Glatzer, “The Pashtun Tribal System,” in Gerog Pfeffer and Deepak K. Behera, eds., *Concepts of Tribal Society (Contemporary Society: Tribal Studies)*, vol. 5 (New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002), 265–282.

14. A gem of a book on Pushtun tribal fighting/warrior culture is General Sir Andrew Skeen’s *Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North West Frontier of India* (London: Wellington Works, 1932). Other books on Pushtun warfare are Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*



From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2002); Charles Chenevix Trench, *The Frontier Scouts* (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1985). For Pushtun warfare tactics during the Soviet occupation see Lester Grau, ed., *The Bear Who Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan* (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Ali Ahmed Jalali and Lester Grau, *Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters* (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Co., 2001).

15. In Pushto, *zar* is gold, *zan* is women, and *zamin* is land. Historically, the social construct has required the defense of said property. Women in Pushtun society were/are considered for all intents and purposes the property of their family and *khel*, whose honor and chastity must be protected at all costs.

16. See Vern Liebl, "Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 2007): 493–512; Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1958); Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); Spain, *Way of the Pathans*; Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (Austria: Akademische Druck, 1969); Frederik Barth, *Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans* (London: The Athlone Press, 1959).

17. For more details on the Pushtun "character," see Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 116–120; Caroe, *Pathans*, 144–146; Charles Allen, *Soldier Sahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who Tamed India's Northwest Frontier* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000), 95–98.

18. Grima, *Performance of Emotion*.

19. Willi Steul, *Pashtunwali: Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz* (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 308, as quoted in Grima's *Performance of Emotion*, 3.

20. For more on Pushtunwali see James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1963), 63–69; Spain, *Way of the Pathans*, 46–48, 129–130; Tanner, *Afghanistan*, 126–127; Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, 165–178; Rashid Ahmed, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 112; Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan* (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 34, 58–61; Charles Miller, *Khyber* (New York: MacMillan, 1977), 99–100; Allen, *Soldier Sahibs*, 95–96.

21. Akbar S. Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). Ahmed has argued that only Pushtuns living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) can fully exercise Pushtun law because the conditions in the FATA are conducive to "doing Pushtunwali" in that they live outside the jurisdiction of the state and its judicial systems and are thus free to practice their unique variant of "justice" in cases involving *badal*. Ahmed points out that in the settled areas (non-tribal region of the North West Frontier Province [now known as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa]) where the State's judicial tentacles are well embedded, the populace is expected to rely on the police and the courts to resolve criminal cases. They do not, in short, have the freedom (from the State) to practice Pushtunwali. As a result, the Pushtuns of the settled areas like Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera, Charsadda, Dera Ismail Khan, etc., are perceived by their FATA Pushtun brethren as falling short in being the "ideal Pushtun" who practices his way of life as tradition dictates. These perceptions create friction and insecurity between the various Pushtun factions since it suggests a hierarchy with the more "authentic" Pushtun at the top (from Khyber, South and North Waziristan); while the rest are "questionable" Pushtuns who do not, or cannot, fulfill all the requirements of Pushtunwali. In an egalitarian, acephalous society such as the Pushtuns, even the notion or hint of some sort of hierarchy is repugnant but not improbable, especially when it comes to "de-tribalized" Pushtuns.

22. Pushtuns' most famous seventeenth-century warrior poet, Khushal Khan Khattak, wrote on Melmastia: "It goes to waste if you feed yourself alone; It gives satisfaction to have your meal in company."

23. For an example of melmastia in action see David Lyon's *Butcher and Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan* (London: Random House, 2008), 88–89.

24. The person(s) may be known or unknown, friend or foe, kin or not, but melmastia is expected once the individual(s) have crossed your doorstep/gate and into your compound or abode.

Not only is hospitality to be provided, but also *panah* (refuge) if requested. The members of this household/compound de facto become honor bound to provide and protect for their “guests,” at least in theory as understood as comprising the fundamental tenets of Pushtunwali.

25. Spain, *Way of the Pathans*, 47. Spain writes about how a distinguished malik’s influence is often reckoned by the number of people, i.e., men, he can feed/entertain. Thus, the width of a malik’s *dustikar* (table cloth) and people attending usually indicate a man’s importance. Furthermore, if the host offers a *khanjar* (dagger) or other such weapon or a Quran to his guest(s), this is indicative of the highest status the host(s) accords his guests to include a guarantee of sanctuary/protection. The obverse is if the guest is accorded *no* token of hospitality like a glass of water or some other token/display of hospitality. Such a situation is indicative of a hostile situation for a Pushtun will always at least make some symbolic display of hospitality to “save/protect face.”

26. Grima, *Performance of Emotion*, 4.

27. In 2005, the ability of U.S. Navy Seal Marcus Luttrell to survive the extraction attempts of a “Taliban” faction in Kunar is one example of nanawati in action. The Pushtun villagers who found him (injured, alone, and hiding) and took him into their village were implementing the stipulations of nanawati by providing him with *panah* (sanctuary). The villagers saw from his wounds and his successful attempts to evade capture, a fellow warrior who now sought their protection. Refusing to help him and/or to betray him would have sullied their honor and reputation. By protecting him and ensuring his safe return to his own people, they had in their own eyes preserved their honor and done “Pushtunwali.” It is likely that a second, secretly hoped for by some tribal members, benefit might be some sort of reward from his “people,” the U.S. military. For more on Seal Team 10’s ordeal and Luttrell’s account as the sole survivor see Marcus Luttrell’s *Lone Survivor: The Eye Witness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2007).

28. Grima, *Performance of Emotion*, 5.

29. *Ibid.*, 70. For Pushtun women the concept of *badal* was distinctive and was based on a form of equalized reciprocity between the womenfolk. This does not, however, mean that Pushtun women are not sympathetic to leveraging the male interpretation of this term according to Pushtunwali (revenge) when circumstances they (the women) perceived necessitated acts of revenge in order to restore honor, such as murders, robbery, and in the rare case of rape.

30. Barth, *Political Leadership*, 82. In addition to these three, foundational tenets of Pushtunwali, there are many additional concepts that comprise the tenets of “doing Pushtunwali.” These include *itbar* (Pushto for “trust,” the foundation of Pushtun society. All business contracts are transacted on the basis with verbal guarantees based on *itbar*. Violation of *itbar* is considered conduct unbecoming of a Pushtun and dishonorable and contrary to norms of Pushtunwali); *sialy* (equality); *roogha* (reconciliation or compromise); *barabary* (equivalence); *jirga* (assembly); *lashkar* (armed militia); *bota* (means “carrying away” as in seizing property for “reimbursement” for unpaid debt); *baramta* (from Persian word *baramad*, meaning restitution by holding hostages for ransom till the accused returns the claimed property); *teega/kanray* (cessation of bloodshed between conflictual parties as in a truce); *ghundi* (from Pushto word *ghund*, meaning a political party but is a term used for “alliance” between two Pushtun sub-khels or even qaums to promote joint interests with an outside party and/or align together in blocs or *ghunds* to safeguard their common interests in the face of an external threat); *tarr* (a mutual agreement/accord to devise protocol for a particular issue between two khels or families); *ashar/balandra* (shared cooperative tasks); *hamsaya* (literal meaning is “neighbor” but in Pukhtunkhwa involves the abandonment of a man’s home due to poverty or a blood feud and seeking protection/shelter from an elder of the tribe); *zhemana* (commitment); *meerata* (provision of justice via a *jirga* to punish members of a khel for deliberately killing weaker family members to gain their inheritance, land, etc. Usually a *jirga* immediately assembles to decide the course of action, which generally involves the establishment of an *arbaki* or a *lashkar* to go after the fugitives/culprits and bring them to justice); and *soola* (truce between aggrieved parties), etc.

31. Charles Allen, *God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad* (Cambridge, MA: DeCapo Press, 2006), 2.

32. What the British and other “foreigners” perceived as “treacherous” behavior on part of the Pushtuns, in the eyes of the Pushtun, such behavior was only treacherous in *jang* (war) when it negatively impacted one’s immediate family or clan’s interests. Any acts committed in *jang* to promote one’s kin’s interests are actually considered necessary, even commendable, with one caveat: excessive, unnecessary brutality is frowned upon by most Pushtuns.

33. Allen on page 4 writes: “(in Pushtun areas) . . . the graves of Taliban martyrs . . . were notable for being covered with a whitewashed stone surrounded by green flags on poles and marked with a notice inscribed in *Arabic* (emphasis added) which Rahimullah translated for me: ‘Haji Mullah Burjan, military commander of the Taliban Islamic Movement was martyred at this spot leading an attack against miscreant and illegal Rabbani forces at the Silk Gorge, while trying to bring sharia to Afghanistan.’”

34. This narrative is especially favored by the largest Pushtun tribe, the Yusufzai (sons of Joseph) of Mardan, the Barakzai (sons of Barak) of Kandahar, and the Afridi of Khyber/Tirah. For more on this narrative see H. W. Bellew, *An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan* (London: The Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, 1891), 190–197; Caroe, *Pathans*, 3–5, 10, 68. See also Itzhak Ben-Zvi’s *The Exiled and the Redeemed* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1957), 209–226. On p. 214, Ben-Zvi writes:

The Afghan tribes, among whom the Jews have lived for generations, are Moslems who retain to this day their amazing tradition about their descent from the Ten Tribes. It is an ancient tradition, and one not without some historical plausibility. A number of explorers, Jewish and non-Jewish, who visited Afghanistan from time to time, and students of Afghan affairs who probed into literary sources, have referred to this tradition . . . that this tradition, and no other, has persisted among these tribes is itself a weighty consideration. Nations normally keep alive memories passed by word of mouth from generation to generation, and much of their history is based not on written records but on verbal tradition.

35. On page 213 of his biography, Amir Abdur Rahman, a Barakzai (“sons of Barak”) Durrani and Head of the Afghan State (1880–1901) writes: “Afghans are all Mahomedans of the Sunni sect . . . according to Afghan historians they are descended from the Israelites. They take their name of ‘Afghans’ from the word ‘Afghana’; some of them being descended from Afghana, King Solomon’s Commander-in-Chief; and others from Jeremiah, the son of Saul.” For more see Abdur Rahman, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, ed. Sultan Muhammad Khan, vol. I and II (London: John Murray, 1900). See also T. Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland 1880–1900* (London: Methuen and Co., 1901), 54.

36. For a more comprehensive assessment on the activities of the Hindustani Fanatics (aka Wahhabis of India), see William Wilson Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London: Trubner and Co., 1876); Allen, *God’s Terrorists*; M. Mohar Ali, “Hunter’s Indian Musalmans: A Re-Examination of its Background,” *Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, no.1 (1980): 30–51; Charles Allen, “The Hidden Roots of Wahhabism in British India,” *World Policy Journal*, vol. 22, no. 2 (2005): 87–93.

37. Shah Waliullah, born in 1703, was a contemporary of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. Although Waliullah was neither a Nejd nor an Arab, but an Indian from Delhi, their paths crossed in Medina where both relocated in order to study Islam. Both shared at least one teacher. Also an Indian immigrant, Muhammad Hayat of Sind—a Naqshbandi Sufi along the lines of the hardliner Sheikh Ahmed Sirhandi—taught a great many students in Medina to include al Wahhab and Waliullah. As a consequence of their studies, they encouraged *ijtehad* through a reexamination of religious law. While Wahhab went back to the Najd where he had little if any competition as a “learned scholar” (with the exception of his father and brother, both of whom repudiated his interpretation of what became “Wahhabism”), Shah Waliullah returned to Delhi where Waliullah operated in a highly informed religious milieu where his ideas were both challenged and tempered through debate. See Allen, *God’s Terrorists*, 48–51. Shah Waliullah’s eldest son, Shah Abdul Aziz, would become Syed

Ahmed's teacher in Delhi. Like Waliullah, Syed Ahmed would visit Mecca and Medina on a Haj pilgrimage and stay in Medina to study under the Wahhabis.

38. Ibid., 41.

39. Ibid., 77.

40. The attraction of Pukhtunkhwa to the Hindustani Wahhabis lay in the fact that the inhabitants were overwhelmingly Muslims, in stark contrast to the Indian plains where Hindus constituted the majority of the populace. Thus, in their eyes, Pukhtunkhwa was part of Dar al-Islam and a legitimate launching pad for jihad against Dar al Harb (Land of War) and/or Dar al Kufr (Land of Infidels).

41. Allen, *God's Terrorists*, 81.

42. Ground zero of the Hindustani Fanatics was a place called "Sittana" that was located on the eastern slopes of Mahabun Mountain, now submerged under water after the Government of Pakistan built the Tarbela Dam there.

43. The title "nawab" or "nawaab" is derived from the Arab word *naib*, which means a deputy. Muslim rulers preferred this as then they could be referred to as the deputies of God on earth and hence not infringing on God's title, i.e., Lord and master of this earth. The term nawab is often used to refer to any Muslim ruler in north India.

44. As luck would have it, Syed Ahmed's arrival in the Peshawar valley coincided with the Yusufzai and other Pushtun tribes' recent defeat by a punitive Sikh column. This was a critical factor in their acceptance of Syed Ahmed's group as potential allies (read: soldiers) against the Sikhs.

45. A Haji is someone who has completed the Haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, the holiest of Islam's two religious sites (the other being Medina).

46. Allen, *God's Terrorists*, 81.

47. This is the first known instance of a Muslim figure in the Pukhtunkhwa region who publicly declared himself "Amir ul Momineen." The next known personage to do so in this region was Mullah Omar (a Hotaki Pushtun from Uruzgan). On April 4, 1996, Mullah Omar wrapped himself in "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed," taken from its shrine for the first time in sixty years, and declared himself to a crowd in Kandahar that he was now Amir ul Momineen (Commander of the Faithful).

48. "Sharia" is an Arabic word meaning "way" or "path." It refers to an Islamic concept, the wide body of Islamic religious law, and thus refers to the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on Islamic principles of jurisprudence (*fiqh*).

49. Allen, *God's Terrorists*, 87.

50. In the Muslim world the "marriageable" age of females was based on the onset of puberty.

51. It can be postulated that the Hindustani fanatics merely wanted to satiate their sexual urges through marriage with the only females available in the area and/or that this was a strategic attempt to embed their movement and its alien ideas within a rigid tribal construct by marrying into these Pushtun tribes.

52. Allen, *God's Terrorists*, 88–91.

53. Ibid., 89–90.

54. Col G. J. Younghusband, *The Story of the Guides* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918), 89–90.

55. The first military engagement between the Hindustani Fanatics and the British occurred in 1853 near Sattana. Inayat Ali led these Wahhabi ideologues, who were quickly defeated. The lesson Ali learned from this defeat was that they (the Hindustanis/Wahhabis) should not attack the well-trained British troops until they had a better preparation and an exit strategy. For more on this see N. C. Asthana and Anjali Nirmal, *Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities* (Jaipur: Prem C. Bakliwal, 2009), 64.

56. *Feringhee* is the Pushtun and Indian term for the British. It means "foreigner/outsider," yet it is generally only applied to European non-Muslims and at times has been considered a derogatory term.

57. Ernest Gambier Perry, *Reynell Taylor, C.B., CSI: A Biography* (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Co., 1888), 261–296.

58. For an excellent classic on the Corps of Guides see Younghusband, *Story of the Guides*.
59. *Ibid.*, 102–107, for more on the Guides actions in the Ambeyla campaign of 1863.
60. Allen, *God's Terrorists*, 218.
61. For a first-hand account of the Tirah campaign, see Colonel C. E. Calwell, ed., *Tirah, 1897* (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1911). For more on the Malakand campaign see Winston S. Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898).
62. Viscount Fincastle and P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, *A Frontier Campaign*, as quoted in Younghusband, *Story of the Guides*, 212.
63. While the Pushtuns were quick to call their military engagements “jihads,” their motives significantly differed from those of the Hindustani/Wahhabis in that the Pushtuns used the term “jihad” to legitimize their generally predatory or protective actions and also to galvanize their kin to undertake these campaigns.
64. For more on the Faqir of Ipi see Milan Hauner, “One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 16, no.1 (Jan. 1981): 183–212.
65. For a more comprehensive analysis of Juhayman’s siege of Mecca see Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca* (New York: Doubleday, 2007); Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 39, no. 1 (2007): 103–122; Sandra Mackey, *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987), 229–239; Robert Lacey, *The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud* (New York: Avon Books, 1981), 478–491.
66. Mackey, *Saudis*, 234–237.
67. For more on Saudi Arabia see Mackey, *Saudis*; John Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Robert Baer, *Sleeping with the Enemy: How Washington Sold Its Soul for Saudi Crude* (New York: Three River Press, 2003); Gene Lindsey, *Saudi Arabia* (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1991). Two books that are a bit dated but still useful are William Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); and Lacey, *Kingdom*.
68. Mackey, *Saudis*, 327–329.
69. Gregory Feifer, *The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan* (New York: Harper Collins), 131–132; Robert Kaplan, *Soldiers of God: With the Mujahidin in Afghanistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 110, 126, 131, 233; Kurt Lohbeck, *Holy War, Unholy Victory* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1993), 128–129, 184; George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 236–239.
70. Iran’s pan-Islamism under Ayatollah Khomeini did not extend to the Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia. Under his leadership the Iranian government cut ties to Saudi Arabia. Khomeini declared that Iran may one day resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. or Iraq, but never with Saudi Arabia. Iran did not reestablish diplomatic relation with Saudi Arabia until March 1991, after Khomeini’s death.
71. The mullah (not to be confused with alim or the ulema) has traditionally been reviled and/or has been less respected than the general male Pushtun populace and was seen as a grasping, conniving, illiterate member of society. This all changed in the 1980s, especially in refugee centers where dislocated members of various clans and tribes were forced to live. Thanks to the generous funding of Muslim charities from the Khaleej (Persian/Arabian Gulf) Arabs, these Mullahs were paid to spread the sahih (correct) word as espoused by the Wahhabi movement in the camps. This mission was generously funded through charitable assistance in these camps where only the most impoverished and desperate Pushtuns (and other Afghans) were forced to reside.
72. Some of the largest Afghan refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) were Kacha Garhi, Jalozaï, Old Shamshatoo, and Panian.
73. Two of the most well-known recipients of generous Saudi funding included Dr. Abdullah Azzam and his Maktab al Khidmat, and Osama bin Laden.
74. There are no official figures readily available on the number of Pushtun males who have worked in Saudi Arabia between 1974 and 2001; however, some estimates place the number of

Pakistani (to include Pushtun) men who have worked in the Gulf at 10 percent of the population. Pakistan's overall demographic figures have ranged from 70 million in the mid-1970s to over 160 million today. In short, this figure is high.

75. Throughout the 1980s, the "Afghan Arabs" called themselves by the Arabic term *ansar*, which means "supporters." The term *ansar* was first used to describe a small group of Muslims who supported the Prophet Muhammad against his enemies more than 1,400 years ago. The locals and the Americans, however, took to calling these foreign Arabs in Peshawar and the NWFP "Afghan Arabs" and the name stuck. After helping the Afghans to defeat the Russian-allied government, most Afghan Arabs went home.

76. Lexicon regarding self-identification of the fighters during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is revelatory: The Pushtun insisted on calling himself a "mujahedin," which in Arabic and Pushto translates to "freedom fighter" of the *din* (faith); while the "Afghan Arabs" insisted on calling selves "jihadis" (holy warriors). This dichotomy reflected the intent of both sides fighting the same enemy: one had pragmatic end goals; the other fought a religious war.

77. Ahmed Rashid applies the term "tribal jihad" to describe the struggle of the Pushtun and their ulema vice the *ideological* jihad led by the Islamists. See *Taliban*, 18.

78. Jonathan Randall, *Osama: The Making of a Terrorist* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 81. To this writer, who spent two years (1987–1989) in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (then called the NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as a contractor with USAID based in Peshawar's University Town, it was readily apparent that the Pushtuns in Pukhtunkhwa did not care for the Arabs and their "intensity." While they were glad to receive *any* assistance in the form of weaponry, medical supplies, etc., the Pushtun mujahedin did not want the Arabs involved in *their* war against the Russians. They felt the Arabs with their bravado but limited skills would get them all killed. They saw them as more of a liability than any kind of asset. Finally, to most Afghan mujahedin, these Muslim "brothers" were still foreigners/outside and were not to be trusted. Association with them was thus limited and/or only by accident or because of the allure of petro-funded moneybags that these Arabs dangled at them.

79. For more on Osama bin Laden see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkeley Books, 2003), 21–36; Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, *Growing Up bin Laden: Osama's Wife and Son Take Us Inside Their Secret World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009).

80. For more on the behavior of the Arab "jihadis" vis-à-vis Pushtuns and Westerners see Randall, *Osama*, 68–81.

81. The Ikhwan (Arabic for "brothers") was the main military force of the House of Saud's founder, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. It played a key military role in his successful attempt to found the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These recruits were from Arabia's Bedouin tribes, yet they played a pivotal role in dismantling and/or relocating Arabian tribes in their quest to strengthen the Muslim umma. They believed that tribalism was incompatible with strict conformity with Islam. Ibn Saud rose to power on this Ikhwan movement. When they became too powerful, Ibn Saud crushed them and then reorganized this militia to form Saudi Arabia's National Guard.

82. Allen, *God's Terrorists*, 243.

83. Ignaz Goldziher, "The Arab Tribes and Islam," in S. M. Stern, ed., *Muslim Studies* (London, UK: Aldine Transaction, 2006), 40.

84. Rashid also explains that the traditional Wahhabi/Salafi antipathy toward Sufism from the movement's inception in the eighteenth century inevitably influenced their dealings with Pushtun leaders/groups who were devout Sufi adherents and/or were traditional tribal-based parties. This "dislike" was returned in kind by ordinary Afghans/Pushtuns who by and large despised the Wahhabi creed. See Rashid, *Taliban*, 85.

85. As Rashid writes: "The 'Islamists,' i.e., Hikmatyar, Rabbani, Sayyaf, Haqqani, denigrated their own tribal structure and sought to pursue a radical political ideology in order to bring about an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan" (*Taliban*, 19). Unlike Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani's more moderate National Islamic Front (NIFA), they had no desire to reinstate Barakzai rule under the popular exiled Zahir Shah.



86. See Rashid's seminal work on the Taliban, *Taliban*. For more on Pakistan's strategic depth policy vis-à-vis the Taliban see Rashid, 186–188.

87. *Ibid.*, 201.

88. The Taliban's ideological shift to the orthodox was reflected in their views on Sufi shrines which had long been venerated by Afghans. For example, in Herat people were banned from visiting its numerous Sufi saints' shrines; see *ibid.*, 113.

89. For an excellent piece on the "education" of the Taliban see Jeffrey Goldberg, "Inside Jihad U.: The Education of a Holy Warrior," *New York Times Magazine*, June 25, 2000, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/25/magazine/inside-jihad-u-the-education-of-a-holy-warrior.html>

90. Although the Haqqania madrassa is affiliated with the Deobandi movement, its ideology and end goals are almost identical to Wahhabism and Salafism: Expansion of Dar al Islam through jihad and da'wa and restoration of the Caliphate.

91. Goldziher, "Arab Tribes and Islam," 54.

92. "U.S. Trained 'Colonel Imam' Discusses bin Laden, Stinger Missiles and the Taliban," *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 7, issue 29 (September 25, 2009), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35538&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1

93. The Arabic word "jihad's" root is "jhd." The word itself has been leveraged to define *warfare* in the name of Allah in order to spread the din. However, the actual meaning of "jihad" is "struggle, strive, or effort." Thus, the Wahhabi's persistent efforts within the so-called Muslim "umma" can rightfully be called a "jihad" *within* Islam.

94. The most determined resistance the Arab armies first faced during their period of conquest after the death of Prophet Muhammad was in the lands of the Sassanian Empire in an area east of Sistan, in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces of modern Afghanistan. In fact, the harshness of the fighting/response of the inhabitants (Pushtuns) provoked the only full-scale mutiny recorded among Arab troops at this time (698 CE). The early Muslims (Arabs) were cognizant that this was the route to the vast riches of India but this mutiny effectively ended the first Arab attempt to penetrate India via what is now Afghanistan. See Hugh Kennedy, *The Great Arab Conquest: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In* (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007), 194–195.