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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HISTORICAL SECTION

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The Evolution of the Attitudes, Thinking, and Planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Regard to U.S. Military Assistance to Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Indochina, Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand.

Speaking to Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman declared that it should be the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," and to "assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." In response to the President's plea, Congress authorized emergency military aid programs to assist Greece and Turkey to meet the Communist threat. Aid to Greece and Turkey marked the beginning of what in fact proved to be a continuous military assistance program. Although aid programs were already in operation in China, Korea, and the Philippines, these were more to fulfill commitments originated during World War II than to meet the challenge of cold war. Not until the autumn of 1949, when Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, were the various uncoordinated military aid programs absorbed into one comprehensive, non-emergency weapon in the cold war.

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Formulation of Basic Aid Policy

The Truman Doctrine generated an extended policy discussion within the U.S. Government that occupied the two years preceding passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. In these policy discussions the Joint Chiefs of Staff played an inconspicuous, but apparently influential, role. Foreign aid policy was evolved primarily by the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and its successor, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC); only in their occasional comments on SWNCC and SANACC papers are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be discerned. Nevertheless, the concept of assistance favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was incorporated in the basic military aid policy devised by the National Security Council (NSC).

Two weeks after the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed one of their committees to make a study to determine which countries, from the standpoint of U.S. national security, should receive U.S. assistance. In response to this directive a study emerged--which, although its conclusions were only "Noted," not "Approved," by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless stated the theme to be developed in their attitude towards U.S. assistance during the decade to follow. Although the conclusions of this study applied to both economic and military aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently devoted little attention to economic aid policy. Their interest lay mainly in military aid, and they seemed content to leave economic aid to civilian agencies.

As set forth in the study, the objective of a sound program of assistance should be to obtain as firm friends of the United States nations located in areas strategically important for fighting an ideological war (i.e., war against the USSR and its satellites) and possessing sound economies and armed forces strong enough to sustain their national independence and furnish real assistance to the United States in wartime. U.S. aid should therefore positively assist allies, or potential allies, to maintain such forces and to achieve or retain sound economies. The mere giving of assistance, that is, assistance not directed towards the attainment of such meaningful results, would not assure the strengthening of the national security of the United States.

Despite the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not formally approved its conclusions, the basic precepts of this study soon became the established position, not only of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also of the U.S. Government. When asked to comment on a paper dealing with global assistance, prepared by a SWNCC subcommittee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that strategic implications, plus the

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considerations that U.S. national security was paramount and U.S. resources not unlimited, made it necessary to apply more specific criteria to individual cases than the SWNCC subcommittee had used. They also stated that countries likely to remain under Soviet influence, for some of which the subcommittee had proposed certain measures of aid, should be excluded on the grounds of U.S. national security. Instead of commenting at greater length on the SWNCC paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent SWNCC a copy of their study, asserting that it provided a sound broad basis for future consideration of the question from the standpoint of national security.²

The approach to the problem of foreign aid thus supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff manifested itself in the basic statement of military aid policy adopted by the NSC and approved by the President on 14 July 1948. This statement, to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, found no objection, emphasized U.S. national security as the chief consideration in undertaking military assistance programs. As set forth in the NSC decision, U.S. security demanded that "certain free nations" resist Soviet-directed Communism. Since some of these countries lacked the industrial facilities to produce intricate modern armaments in the necessary quantities, they would require, in addition to economic aid, military assistance in building and maintaining armed forces adequate to resist Communist subversion from within and Soviet pressure from without, as well as ultimately to increase their military capability to withstand armed attack. U.S. assistance programs would therefore be directed towards strengthening the military capabilities of "certain free nations" in order to accomplish four purposes: (1) to strengthen the security of the United States and its probable allies, (2) to strengthen the "moral and material resistance" of the free nations, (3) to support their political and military orientation towards the United States, and (4) to augment U.S. military potential by improving U.S. armament industries.³

Taking its guidelines from the NSC policy statement, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee drafted a comprehensive aid policy paper, which the Secretary of Defense, on 8 February 1949, referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. In their reply to the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seized upon, and lent their support to, every passage of the paper that meshed with their conviction that the primary return sought by the United States was preservation of the security of the United States and its probable allies. They emphasized that the objective of "improving United States security by IMPROVING THE MILITARY POTENTIAL of those nations opposed to Soviet aggression" should be kept constantly in mind.⁴

Although their chief interest lay in keeping national security the paramount consideration in extending military aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also concerned, during the months preceding enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance legislation (October 1949), with the great magnitude of the aid program that might develop from certain proposals being considered by SANACC. Commenting on a system of priorities drawn up by a SANACC subcommittee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in November 1948, advised the Secretary of Defense that extending aid to all of the countries listed by the subcommittee could produce tremendous commitments. They urged that, before specific decisions were made, the probable effect on the financial and industrial capacity of the United States, and on U.S. ability to meet the requirements of its own armed forces, be carefully assessed. In addition, they pointed out that token aid, which had been assigned by the subcommittee to many of the underdeveloped countries, bore to the recipient the implication of more to come. Finally, they warned that aid spread too thinly might not be adequate anywhere, while on the other hand, aid concentrated where it would best serve U.S. national security might well be all or even more than the United States could provide. These views were published, "as of particular interest from the military viewpoint," with SANACC's decision approving the subcommittee paper.⁵

The tremendous commitments foreseen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did in fact emerge, but as a response to changed world conditions and

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with the active support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Soviet threat to Europe led to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty and the enactment by Congress of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Although intended primarily to arm the signatories of the treaty, this legislation provided the framework for the program of worldwide military aid that was inaugurated less than a year after passage of the act. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), set up under the act, was broadened to include those Far Eastern nations threatened by Communism. The new recipients fell largely into the category of "underdeveloped" countries.

In the policy decisions that heralded this expansion of the aid program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played an important part. The heightened world tension attendant upon the Korean War enhanced the importance of the military viewpoint and gave them a stronger voice in the formulation of foreign policy. Moreover, the creation of formal procedures and machinery as a result of the MDA Act cast the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an increasingly influential role in the formulation and execution of military aid policy. Thus they were able constantly to re-emphasize U.S. national security as the basis of the foreign aid program.

In January 1950, three months after passage of the MDA Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense a set of objectives to serve as the military basis for future MDAP's. They recommended, as the long-range, over-all objective, the "development of conditions which will improve to the maximum extent possible, within economic realities both current and foreseen, the ability of the United States in event of war to implement in conjunction with our allies a long-range strategic concept. Briefly, that concept is that the United States, in collaboration with its allies, will seek to impose the allied war objectives upon the USSR by conducting a strategic offensive in western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East." The Joint Chiefs of Staff also submitted a list of specific long-range objectives that they believed the MDAP should achieve in each area of the world, together with the worldwide advantages that the United States should anticipate receiving in exchange. These benefits closely paralleled concepts incorporated both in the NSC statement of military aid policy and, to a less detailed extent, in the JCS study of April 1947.⁶

This long-range objective--building forces to support the U.S. strategic concept in global war--with some modifications and elaborations, has been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff each year since 1950. However, the progressive extension of the MDAP, after 1950, to include more and more underdeveloped countries raised the question of how much the forces supported by the United States in these countries could be expected to contribute to the execution of the U.S. strategic concept in the event of global war. Most of these countries have had forces barely adequate to cope with internal problems, and certainly none of significance for employment beyond their borders in support of the U.S. strategic concept. This fact was recognized, in a report to the NSC on 19 January 1953, by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Mutual Security.⁷

However, for situations short of global war, i.e., continued cold war or limited hot war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their superiors have recognized important advantages in aid to underdeveloped countries. In continued cold war, subversion has been the greatest danger. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that, except in the special case of Taiwan, the United States strive to create forces capable of performing the primary mission of maintaining internal security. They have hoped thereby to lend stability to the local governments and to help preserve their Western orientation.

The problem of limited hot war has increasingly occupied the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of the Korean conflict. They stated in 1954 that the United States should in the future rely more on its allies to provide forces, particularly ground

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forces, to counter local Communist aggression, and they expanded the long-range objective of the MDAP to include provision of forces "sufficiently adequate, to counter local aggression, if it occurs, in key peripheral areas." According to the concept evolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States would use the MDAP to build and support forces in the key peripheral areas in such a manner as to complement U.S. mobile forces. Types and amounts of aid would be fixed in relation to the military situation most likely to be faced by each country in case of war, and to the mission its forces could best perform. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the forces of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Korea, and the States of Indochina, be developed not only for the mission of maintaining internal security but also for the mission of conducting a limited defense against external aggression.

The significance of this additional mission lies in collective security arrangements providing for U.S. and/or allied support of a victim of aggression. Following the close of the Korean and Indochinese hostilities, the United States took the lead in binding to the free world, either by regional defense pacts or by bilateral security treaties with the United States, all of the Far Eastern and Middle Eastern underdeveloped countries receiving U.S. military aid. In the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the same time that the United States was using the MDAP to develop indigenous defensive capabilities, U.S. military leaders should be engaging in joint planning activities with allied military leaders. This planning would emphasize employment against the aggressor of combined U.S. and indigenous forces. Also, the United States should give its allies some indication of a strategic plan whereby U.S. forces would come to their aid to meet an armed attack. If aggression occurred in any of the key peripheral countries, the forces possessing limited defensive capabilities would fight a delaying action during the period of time necessary to move in U.S. mobile forces and to mobilize the forces of any other countries allied to the victim of aggression.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the post-Korean War years, thus evolved a concept of military assistance to underdeveloped countries that was, in effect, an integral part of the broader concept of U.S. reaction to limited war. They did so mainly under pressure of events in the Far East. It was, in fact, the pressure of events in the Far East that had, in 1950, stimulated the decisions that transformed the MDAP from a program oriented principally towards Western Europe to one that encompassed a large portion of the non-Communist world.

Evolution of Aid Program in the Far East

In the policy discussions preceding passage of the MDA Act, neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor their civilian superiors manifested much concern for the Far East. The lines of cold war were much more sharply drawn in Western Europe and this was the area where, in a global conflict, the United States would take the strategic offensive. Therefore, the efforts of U.S. policy-makers were concentrated principally on plans for re-arming Western Europe. Although China, Korea, and the Philippines were receiving some U.S. aid, the Soviet menace was not as clearly apparent in the Far East. Moreover, in global war the United States intended to remain on the strategic defensive in Asia.

Even as Congress debated the MDA Act, however, it became apparent that the collapse of Nationalist resistance on the Chinese mainland was but a matter of weeks. The success of Communist arms in the Chinese Civil War stimulated concern for the threat to U.S. security posed by the growing power of Communism in Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were perhaps more alarmed at this threat than the civilian members of the NSC, who were at this time drafting new policies towards the Far East. Disillusioned with past attempts to aid Chiang Kai-shek, the NSC tended to regard the situation in Asia as hopeless. Their attitude was apparent in a draft statement of policy calling merely for encouragement of Asian countries threatened by Communism.¹⁰

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, believed that more than mere encouragement was necessary in order to protect U.S. interests in Asia. Taking advantage of a section in the MDA Act authorizing the President to spend \$75 million to combat Communism in the "general area of China," the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a plan for spending this money. They defined the "general area of China" as "not only China proper, but also such areas as Hainan and Formosa, French Indo-China, Burma and Thailand."⁴ Besides recommending aid programs to these countries, they proposed changes in the draft NSC policy that clearly indicated their desire that the United States not merely encourage, but actively support, Far Eastern nations threatened by the Communists.¹² The NSC accepted the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the revised policy statement, approved by the President on 30 December 1949, listed as one of the basic U.S. security objectives in Asia the "Development of sufficient military power in selected non-Communist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism."¹³

Although U.S. policy as approved by the NSC now called for Asian aid programs, the President indicated that whether or not an aid program to the "general area of China" was put into effect would depend on future circumstances. The President's reservations, of course, stemmed from the controversy over the knotty problem of the Chinese Nationalists, who had now taken refuge on the island of Taiwan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, felt that immediate aid to the "general area of China" was necessary. In the early months of 1950 they made several proposals for launching aid programs designed to deter or prevent further encroachment of Communism in the area. At the same time, they made clear their belief that the \$75 million authorized by the MDA Act would be only a modest initial step in what would prove to be a continuing and long-term requirement.¹⁴

The proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were treated with little sense of urgency until the U.S. decision to oppose with force the Communist invasion of South Korea clearly pointed to the necessity of strengthening anti-Communist elements elsewhere in the Far East. By the end of 1950, aid programs were under way in Indochina, Taiwan, and Thailand, and South Korean forces were being rapidly enlarged to fight under the United Nations Command in that country.

Because of the emergency basis upon which the Far Eastern programs were launched, and because of the unusual situations in the recipient countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were compelled to relate military assistance in each country more to the exigencies of the moment than to broad, long-range objectives. During the war years, orderly pursuit of a coordinated regional plan with an ultimate regional objective was virtually impossible. The manner in which these programs developed will become apparent in considering the MDAP in Taiwan, Indochina, Thailand, and Korea.

Aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan

U.S. aid to the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek dates from 1938, when the President, under certain discretionary powers permitted by the Neutrality Act, authorized a loan of \$25 million to China for the struggle against Japan. Throughout World War II the scope of assistance to China grew progressively broader. Besides financial assistance of considerable magnitude, the United States provided the Chinese with Lend-Lease and other types of military assistance in the amount of approximately \$392 million, and established a military mission in Chungking to advise the Chinese on the use of U.S. equipment. In addition, large numbers of Chinese military personnel were trained by U.S. instructors at installations in China, India, and the United States.¹⁵

U.S. aid programs were continued in the post-war years. Initially, this aid was provided to help the Chinese rebuild their shattered economy and rid the country of the Japanese. After the beginning of the Civil War, however, sentiment in the United States grew for helping

the Nationalists, and after 1947 aid was primarily a response to the rising threat of the Chinese Communists. This aid included continuation of wartime Lend-Lease programs, transfer of naval vessels, and creation of military advisory missions. The China Aid Act of 1948 made available, in addition to large sums of economic aid, \$125 million in military assistance.¹⁶

As Chiang Kai-shek's position grew increasingly precarious, debate sharpened within the U.S. Government over the advisability of continued aid to the Nationalists. Early in 1949 the President decreed that, although assistance under the China Aid Act would not be suspended, no effort would be made to expedite shipments.¹⁷ The debate assumed another dimension, however, as the Nationalists began regrouping on Taiwan. This island was of considerable strategic importance to the United States and, unless the United States took prompt counter-measures, was almost certain to fall to the Chinese Communists.

The civilian policy-makers, in late 1948, had turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an assessment of Taiwan's strategic importance to the United States. Although reaffirming the island's strategic importance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated that it was not important enough to U.S. security to warrant committing U.S. armed forces to its defense. A year later, they recommended measures short of committing armed force to deny Taiwan to the Communists. Among these measures was "a modest, well-directed, and closely supervised program of military aid."¹⁸ The State Department, however, had written the Nationalists off as a lost cause, and the NSC declined to accept the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In January 1950, the President announced the suspension of further aid to the Chinese Nationalists.¹⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were still concerned with the threat to U.S. security posed by the growth of Communist power in Asia, and by the almost certain capture of Taiwan by the Chinese Communists. The Nationalists on Taiwan were keeping the Communists occupied and diverting their strength from Southeast Asia, whose importance to U.S. security the NSC had formally recognized by recommending aid programs in that area. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisting the Nationalists seemed a logical way to help hold the line against Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia. Therefore, in May 1950 they renewed their plea that aid be resumed.²⁰

Within two months, the outbreak of the Korean War and the posting of the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan made further debate unnecessary. The United States, now fighting in Korea, was in no position to permit the fall of Taiwan to the Communists. Therefore, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1950 again detailed the strategic importance of Taiwan and again appealed for resumption of military assistance, in order to develop the ability of the Chinese Nationalists to defend Taiwan, the NSC and the President approved.²¹ A survey mission visited Taiwan and laid the basis for developing a materiel program. In May 1951 a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established to superintend the materiel program and to assist in training Nationalist forces.

From the beginning of the aid program on Taiwan, the overwhelming strength of Chiang Kai-shek's army in relation to the strength of the native Taiwanese made internal security a problem of minor significance. In contrast to U.S. military aid programs in most other underdeveloped countries, the MDAP on Taiwan was never intended to build forces to maintain internal security. Throughout the period of the Korean War, it had but one objective, to increase the potential of the Nationalist forces for the defense of Taiwan.²²

Although this remained the stated objective throughout the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind an additional purpose for which Chinese Nationalist troops might be utilized. The possibility of expanded hostilities in the Far East was ever-present during the conflict in Korea. Chinese Nationalist forces constituted a sizeable pool of anti-Communist manpower that might, circumstances permitting,

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be employed outside of Taiwan. Both during and after the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered these forces as a potentially available strategic reserve. After the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Nationalist Government was ratified in February 1955, providing the political basis for making Nationalist forces available for defense of the Far East in general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered them as a readily available strategic reserve. The NSC, in statements of U.S. policy towards Taiwan, also regarded Chinese Nationalist forces as a strategic reserve.²³

The forces deemed necessary to accomplish the objective of defending Taiwan were stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in terms of major units recommended for MDAP support. In 1951, 1952, and 1953 they recommended that the United States support a Chinese Nationalist army of twenty-one divisions and an armored force command, a navy of about eighty-five combat vessels, a small marine force, and an air force of twenty-six squadrons.²⁴

With some minor changes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the same mission and forces for Taiwan throughout the years of the Korean War. In 1953, however, the Eisenhower Administration came to power committed to carrying out new policies in the Far East. These new policies, in turn, compelled a re-examination of the mission of the Chinese Nationalist forces supported by the United States.

In his first State of the Union message, President Eisenhower announced that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be employed to "shield Communist China." In the President's declaration was at least the implication that Nationalist forces supported by the MDAP were now free to take the offensive against the Communist mainland. Within three months, however, the United States, by delaying shipment of jet aircraft to Taiwan, wrung from Chiang Kai-shek a commitment to undertake no offensive operations not sanctioned by the United States.²⁵ Nevertheless, throughout 1953 the NSC was considering a more active role for Chinese Nationalist forces.

Although thinking in perhaps more modest terms than the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also favored building Chinese Nationalist offensive capabilities. On 8 July 1953, they recommended that Chiang's forces be adequate, not only to defend Taiwan, but also to conduct raids against the mainland and against seaborne commerce with the mainland, to offer a constant threat to the mainland, and to add significantly to the military strength potentially available to the free world in the Far East.²⁶ These additions to the MDAP objective were incorporated into an NSC policy statement approved by the President on 6 November 1953. This statement of policy also contained the declaration that the military potential developed on Taiwan by the MDAP would be used in accordance with U.S. national security policies.²⁷

Adoption of the new policy towards Taiwan prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the adequacy of Chiang Kai-shek's forces to carry out the additional missions. On 18 January 1954 they informed the Secretary of Defense that, to accomplish the missions envisaged by NSC policy, these forces would have to be augmented. Budgetary considerations, however, stood in the way of any significant enlargement, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to reconsider their opinion. In reply, they recommended force objectives substantially the same as earlier ones, but made clear that, while these were the maximum possible within budgetary limitations, they were the very minimum necessary to support U.S. strategy. They still believed larger forces to be militarily desirable, in fact, essential, if the missions sanctioned by the NSC were to be carried out. But they were unwilling to recommend that aid programs in other countries be reduced in order to provide the requisite funds. And despite the disparity between force objectives and missions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that it would be "inappropriate" to revise approved NSC policy.²⁸

Throughout 1954 the Nationalists had been engaging in minor offensive operations by launching, with U.S. support, occasional raids

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against the mainland. The Communist attack on the offshore islands in September, however, caused anxiety in Washington lest the United States be drawn into another conflict with Communist China. The President, over the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed that, pending review of U.S. policy in the Far East, the provisions of NSC policy that applied to Nationalist raids be suspended. Sanction for U.S. support of these raids was omitted from a revision of policy in the Far East adopted by the NSC in December 1954, and from a revision of policy towards Taiwan adopted in January 1955. These policy statements, however, did include defense of the Nationalist-held offshore islands in the objective for which the MDAP was developing forces on Taiwan.²⁹

With the offensive missions eliminated by U.S. policy, and consequently from the MDAP objectives recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the emphasis of the MDAP again shifted to building the defensive capabilities of Nationalist forces. From the beginning of the aid program, neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the civilian policymakers were under any illusion that, unaided, Chinese Nationalist forces could defend Taiwan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that, if the Chinese Reds launched a determined assault on Taiwan, the United States would have to furnish substantial air, naval, and logistical support to the Nationalists. The conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Nationalist Government in December 1954 bound the United States to provide this support in the event of such an invasion attempt.³⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no essential change in the objective of the MDAP on Taiwan after the offensive missions were eliminated early in 1955. The current objective, recommended on 18 February 1957, is to assist in organizing, training, and equipping Nationalist military forces in order to maintain and to increase their effectiveness (1) for the defense of Taiwan, Penghu (the Pescadores), and the Nationalist-held offshore islands, (2) for contributing to the collective non-Communist strength in the Far East, and (3) for such other action as may be mutually agreed upon under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty.³¹

To attain this objective, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, as a basis for programming materiel and scheduling training, an army of twenty-one infantry divisions and nine reserve infantry divisions, a navy of eighty-five combat ships, a marine division and LVT battalion, and an air force of twenty-four squadrons and twenty-nine AAA battalions. With minor differences, these force objectives also represent forces in being at various stages of development.³²

As of 30 June 1956, Chinese Nationalist forces were judged to be capable of performing the missions derived from the MDAP objective. In the face of an attempted Communist invasion, Nationalist forces were considered capable of defending Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands if adequate U.S. air, naval, and logistical support were furnished. U.S. observers believed that, for the defensive mission, the combat effectiveness of Nationalist forces was good.³³

The MDAP in Indochina

Like the MDAP on Taiwan, U.S. aid to Indochina had its origins in the disintegration of the position of the free world in Asia during 1950. In both Taiwan and Indochina, the invasion of South Korea was the most important factor stimulating development of the aid program. Although the decision to help the French Union Forces in Indochina antedated the Korean invasion by three months, the scope of the MDAP was broadened and the pace stepped up after the outbreak of war made it clear that Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina were parts of the same problem.

The French had been waging a costly, indecisive campaign against the Viet Minh for four years when, in late 1949, the collapse of

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Nationalist resistance in China freed the Chinese Communists to furnish materiel support to the Viet Minh and to raise the threat of overt intervention in the struggle for Indochina. Thereafter, the French position steadily deteriorated. U.S. officials became alarmed lest all of Southeast Asia fall to Communism.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciated both the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to the United States and the gravity of the situation developing in Indochina, and they took the lead in advocating strong U.S. efforts to prevent a Communist victory in the area. As early as December 1949, they had laid the foundation for an immediate aid program by including Indochina in their definition of the "general area of China," for which Congress had provided \$75 million in the MDA Act. In January 1950, they recommended that the program for spending this money give first priority to anti-Communist forces in Indochina, and that \$15 million be promptly allocated for this purpose. The NSC in February determined that U.S. security interests were threatened in Southeast Asia and that the situation called for "all practicable efforts" to halt the spread of Communism in that area. Indochina, decided the NSC, was the key to Southeast Asia and was under immediate threat. Therefore, on 10 March 1950 the President authorized the inauguration of an aid program in Indochina.⁵⁶

Although the decision had been made, implementation lagged, and during the next two months the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to advise prompt initiation of the program.⁵⁶ It was not until the Korean war provided the necessary impetus that the MDAP in Indochina was treated as a matter of urgency. In July a survey mission visited Indochina and submitted a report that not only covered materiel requirements but also analyzed the problem faced by the French and the adequacy of their response to it. Also in July, the first elements of the U.S. MAAG, whose functions were limited to superintending the materiel program, began arriving in Saigon.

In the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the MDAP in Indochina had two objectives. The first was to help restore and maintain internal security, which involved supporting French and native forces adequate to suppress the indigenous Viet Minh movement. The second was to discourage Communist aggression, which involved supporting sufficient French and native forces to deter the Chinese Communists from overtly entering the war. From 1950 through the middle of 1952 these remained the objectives of the MDAP in Indochina, recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁶

In 1952 the NSC added a third objective--to assist in developing indigenous forces that could eventually maintain internal security without help from French units. From the beginning of U.S. involvement in Indochina, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had attached great importance to building Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian national armies that would have a measure of autonomy but would still serve under French command. They felt that such armies would not only provide fresh troops to relieve veteran French and native units from static defense, but would also be a means of identifying non-Communist Indochinese more clearly with the war effort. The French reluctantly agreed to go along with this proposition, although they steadfastly refused to permit the United States to enlarge the MAAG in order to help train the new armies.⁵⁷

In practical effect, all three of these objectives were, after mid-1953, encompassed in the one over-riding goal of aiding the French to carry out a new plan for winning the war.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this new plan offered some hope of victory, they looked with disfavor upon most French policies and actions in Indochina. They felt that the large MDAP gave the United States some rights in determining the manner of prosecuting the war. They therefore advocated the use of the MDAP as a lever to induce France to adopt political, economic, and military policies more in accord with U.S. views. Although U.S. negotiators

did in fact attach conditions of this type to the MDAP throughout the war, the French rarely fulfilled the conditions.³⁷

During the war years, orderly planning, programming, and end-use supervision of aid to Indochina was a difficult and often impossible undertaking. Materiel requirements naturally fluctuated with the pace and scope of operations and with the fortunes of French arms. Experience taught that the administrative procedures required by the MDAP were too cumbersome and time-consuming to provide satisfactory support to forces engaged in combat operations. Moreover, the large and frequently unpredictable demands of the war often made it necessary to reduce the programs in other countries in order to provide funds for emergency requirements in Indochina. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, to overcome these drawbacks, a special fund for Indochina ought to be set up under the direct supervision of the Secretary of Defense, but the armistice arranged at Geneva in July 1954 ended discussion of the matter.³⁷

In terms of major units, French and native forces receiving U.S. equipment and support varied considerably throughout the war, mainly as a result of organizational changes rather than alteration in the strength of forces. Between 1950 and 1954 combined French and indigenous forces supported by the MDAP varied between 450,000 and 500,000 men of all arms. However, the magnitude of the program is more clearly revealed by the monetary expenditures than by the units supported. The total cost to the United States of the Indochinese war was approximately \$2.8 billion. A little more than half of this amount was spent for economic aid and for financial support of the French budget. The remainder, about \$1.3 billion, was spent under the MDAP.³⁸

When the Geneva Conference ended the Indochinese war, the United States was providing France with equipment and support for both French Union and Indochinese forces of the following general magnitude. The Army consisted of eighty-seven French battalions, sixty-seven Vietnamese battalions, nine Cambodian battalions, and seven Laotian battalions. Although these were forces in being, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated the force objectives mainly in terms of French and indigenous divisions, reflecting their preoccupation with the necessity for divisional organization as the core of the Franco-Indochinese Army. The statement of force objectives also reflected the hope that native divisions would assume an increasing share of the burden from the French. Naval and air forces were principally French. The Air Force operated 272 aircraft in thirteen squadrons, while the Navy had fifty-seven combat ships, including a CVL borrowed from the United States for the duration of the war.³⁹

Following the Geneva Armistice, conditions of near chaos prevailed in all three of the Associated States of Indochina, holding forth dim hope that continued U.S. aid would produce satisfactory results. Nevertheless, the NSC in August 1954 decided that, working through the French only when necessary, the United States would assist Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos to develop forces capable of maintaining internal security. In addition, the NSC decided that the United States, wherever possible, should assume responsibility for training the armies of Southeast Asian countries.⁴⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to have the United States involved in aid programs in countries where conditions made success so problematical. The decision had already been made by the NSC, however, and on 22 September 1954 they recommended force objectives for Viet Nam and Cambodia. At the same time, they cautioned that, because of the very great obstacles to success, U.S. aid should be provided at low priority and without interfering with the MDAP in other countries. They did not recommend forces for Laos because the Geneva Accords prevented the United States from stationing a military mission in that country to supervise end-use. In January 1955, however, the Secretary of State argued that political considerations made an aid program advisable in Laos also, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff acceded. A civilian mission was recruited and eventually sent to Laos to perform the functions of a MAAG.⁴¹ Initial issue equipment for the armies of all three Associated States was taken from stocks already sent to Indochina, and thus was provided at no additional expense to the United States.

In addition to materiel programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also had to deal with the training programs envisaged by the NSC. Because of political instability and the persistence of French influence, they were even more reluctant to commit the United States to training programs than to materiel programs, and they enumerated certain conditions that they believed should be met before the United States decided to train the armies of the Associated States.⁴⁴

These conditions could not possibly be met in Laos, where a French training mission operated under the Geneva Accords, and no serious consideration was given to stationing a U.S. military mission in that country. As for Cambodia, the Secretary of State contended that the conditions defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been met. They agreed, but asked that in negotiating a bilateral agreement with Cambodia the United States insist on the eventual withdrawal of all French instructors and advisors. When Cambodian politics and French opposition entered the picture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the behest of the Secretary of State, agreed to drop this condition. The Cambodian drift towards neutrality prevented the United States from establishing a training mission, although such a mission is still a U.S. objective.⁴⁵

The decision to launch a training venture in Viet Nam was dictated largely by political factors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that no training mission be established until political stability had been restored. The Secretary of State, however, argued that the United States should undertake to train the Vietnamese National Army as a means of bringing about political stability. The NSC and the President decided in favor of the Secretary of State, and an agreement was negotiated with the French to form a joint Franco-American training mission. This mission operated until final withdrawal of French forces from Viet Nam in April 1956, whereupon the United States assumed sole responsibility for training Vietnamese forces.⁴⁶

In addition to materiel programs in Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, the United States continued to allocate aid to the French Expeditionary Corps. This aid, however, was proportionately reduced as French forces phased out of Indochina.

During the two years following the Geneva Conference, a great deal of confusion surrounded the objectives of the MDAP in the Associated States. The NSC in August 1954 decreed that the forces of the Associated States would be assisted for the purpose of maintaining internal security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, believed that limited defensive capabilities were also necessary. For one thing, the NSC had decided that U.S. strategy should rely upon indigenous ground forces to the maximum extent possible. For another, the withdrawal of French forces from Viet Nam was expected to leave a military vacuum unless the Vietnamese were able to take over as the French left. Finally, the fact that the provisions of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty had been extended to protect the Associated States did not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relieve those states of the obligation to help defend themselves. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommended force levels adequate for both internal security and limited defense against armed attack. The NSC and the President, however, ruled otherwise, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to recommend forces adequate for internal security only. In reply they submitted considerably lower force objectives. But they warned that, as the French withdrew, these forces would be able to offer no more than "limited initial resistance" to any invasion by the Viet Minh.⁴⁷

Although for two years the only mission approved by the NSC remained one of internal security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1955 and 1956 recommended that the objective of the MDAP in Indochina be to assist as practicable in organizing, training, and equipping the armed forces of Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam for the purposes of maintaining internal security and providing "limited initial resistance" to attack by the Viet Minh. Moreover, the Vietnamese Army was organized to include divisional combat elements that could eventually be trained for the task of delaying an invasion by the Viet Minh.⁴⁸

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Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff included Laos with Cambodia and Viet Nam in their statement of the over-all MDAP objective in Indochina, the restrictions of the Geneva Accords made the prospects of effective aid to Laos in the near future so dim that they did not recommend force objectives for that country. But aid to Laos had been deemed necessary for political reasons, and they informed the Secretary of Defense that, to maintain internal security, one territorial and one infantry division would be required. In 1957 the Joint Chiefs of Staff dropped their reservations and recommended force objectives for Laos of one territorial and one infantry division, to be developed not only for the mission of internal security but also for that of limited defense against armed aggression.

In September 1956 the NSC finally cleared up the confusion in MDAP objectives that had persisted since August 1954. The forces of Viet Nam and Laos were now to be developed for the missions of maintaining internal security and offering "limited initial resistance" to any Viet Minh invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the request of the President, defined "limited initial resistance" as "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or by delaying in such a manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke the U.N. Charter and/or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considerations of national security require unilateral U.S. assistance, and to commit U.S. or collective security forces to support or reinforce indigenous forces in defense of the country attacked."

Cambodian forces were to be developed for a mission of internal security only. Cambodia had been displaying more and more open friendship towards Red China, and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, had already recommended a re-examination of the objectives of the MDAP in Cambodia. Not only did the NSC take away Cambodia's limited defensive mission, but it provided for termination of all U.S. aid if Cambodia ceased to demonstrate a will to resist subversion and maintain its independence. CINCPAC, however, recommended that Cambodian forces not be substantially altered as a result of the NSC action. He proposed, moreover, that the limited defensive mission be restored. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with CINCPAC. In April 1957 they advised the Secretary of Defense to request the NSC to reconsider its decision and reinstate the defensive mission.⁴⁹

Even before the NSC sanctioned the defensive mission for Vietnamese and Laotian forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended force objectives stated in terms of combat divisions. For Viet Nam, they proposed in 1955 that the United States support three infantry divisions, three territorial divisions, sixteen patrol and landing craft, and five air squadrons. Events in Viet Nam, however, soon led them to enlarge the force objectives. The threat to governmental stability posed by the politico-religious sects made it necessary to integrate more units of the private armies of the sects into the National Army than had been originally planned. At the same time, elements of the sects tried to overthrow the Diem Government, and a civil war broke out that involved most of the National Army in combat operations. Finally, the rapid withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps promised to create the military vacuum at the armistice line that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had foreseen. As a result of these developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1956 added one territorial and one infantry division to the Vietnamese force objectives. Further increases were authorized in 1957, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed force objectives of six light divisions and four field divisions, fourteen combat vessels and two marine battalions, and four air squadrons.⁵⁰

The United States agreed to support a Cambodian force level of 31,000 men. In their latest statement of force objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that this force be organized into one infantry regiment, fifteen infantry battalions, one parachute battalion, a four-vessel navy, and an air force of one composite squadron. Force objectives for Laos throughout the post war years remained one light division to constitute a battle corps and one territorial division for internal security. A composite air squadron was added in 1957.⁵¹

In all three Associated States the emphasis from the beginning has been placed on developing forces capable of assisting in the maintenance of internal security. Once this goal has been reached, emphasis in

Viet Nam and Laos is to be placed on developing forces capable also of defense against external aggression by defensive delaying action.⁵²

In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the capability of the forces of the Associated States to attain the objectives of the MDAP is not yet satisfactory. Although the Vietnamese National Army demonstrated "a fair degree of success" in the war against the sects, it was not judged, in 1956, to be capable of retarding or delaying a Viet Minh invasion without considerable outside assistance. Withdrawal of French forces had left the Vietnamese Navy too small to fulfill expected missions, while the Vietnamese Air Force, in its first year of operation, had yet to demonstrate combat effectiveness. Cambodian forces, because of faulty organization, lack of an adequate logistical base, and ineffective unit and individual training under French tutelage, were not considered capable of suppressing major internal uprisings or of constituting an efficient bulwark against external aggression. Laotian forces were judged capable of maintaining internal security in all parts of Laos except the two northern provinces controlled, since the end of the Indochinese war, by the Communist Pathet Lao. They were considered capable of establishing control over these two provinces if air supply requirements were met from outside sources. Against a Viet Minh attack in force, Laotian forces could offer only "minor limited delay" to the invaders and, thereafter, sustain scattered guerrilla and intelligence activities in the enemy's rear.⁵³

Aid to Thailand

The same reasoning that prompted the United States to come to the assistance of the French in Indochina in 1950 led to the inauguration of the MDAP in Thailand. The Chinese Communist menace to Southeast Asia endangered U.S. security in the Far East. If the French position in Indochina collapsed, Thailand would probably be the next item on the agenda of Communist conquest. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in January 1950, recommended that Indochina receive \$15 million from the appropriation for the "general area of China," they also proposed a \$10 million program for Thailand. The President approved both the Indochinese and Thai programs on 10 March 1950.⁵⁴ Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the MDAP in Thailand, like the programs in other Far Eastern countries, was considerably enlarged. In addition to the materiel program, the United States in 1954 established a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Thailand to assist in training the Thai armed forces.⁵⁵

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially considered using the MDAP to strengthen Thai armed forces as a major bulwark against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, they recommended much less pretentious programs than in Far Eastern countries more immediately threatened. Throughout the period of the Korean and Indochinese wars, their goal was to help equip and train Thai forces adequate to maintain internal security and to resist armed aggression. The forces that they recommended to attain this objective were nine regimental combat teams (2/3 U.S. strength) and three AAA (AW) battalions, a small coastal and river navy, and seven air squadrons.⁵⁶

After the close of hostilities in Indochina, the NSC, apparently without objection from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, revised the U.S. objectives in Thailand and dropped the provision for developing the defensive capabilities of Thai forces. The objectives of the MDAP defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1955 accordingly limited the role of Thai forces to maintaining internal security. However, Thailand had signed the Southeast Asia Pact in September 1954 and was playing an increasingly prominent part in the activities of the pact. At the suggestion of the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-examined the MDAP objective for Thailand. In November 1955 they advised the Secretary of Defense that the United States, by participating in the Southeast Asia treaty, was obliged to assist the other signatories to develop minimum forces necessary to resist external aggression. They therefore recommended that the United States, through the MDAP, strive to build Thai forces capable not only of maintaining

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internal security but also of resisting external aggression and contributing to collective defense efforts under the Southeast Asia Pact. In August 1956 the NSC approved this recommendation and, as in the decision on Viet Nam and Laos, phrased the defensive mission as one of presenting "limited initial resistance" to external aggression.⁵⁷

The force objectives recommended for Thailand by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been fundamentally changed since the MDAP was initiated. However, the latest statement of force objectives indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisage organizational changes that will emphasize the division as the basic combat element of the Thai Army. Current force objectives are three infantry divisions, one regimental combat team, twenty-three combat ships and six marine battalions, and six air squadrons. Estimating the effectiveness of Thai forces as of 30 June 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that, despite weaknesses in logistics, administration, and communications, these forces were capable of maintaining internal security and could be considered a deterrent to armed aggression.⁵⁸

Aid to Korea

U.S. aid to Korea had its inception in the military occupation responsibilities that the United States assumed at the close of World War II. To relieve U.S. troops of civil police functions in South Korea, the United States organized and equipped a Korean national police force in 1945. Following formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, the United States broadened the scope of this aid, and agreed to assist in training and equipping South Korean constabulary forces.⁵⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff could find only moral justification for this aid. They agreed that all of Korea was likely to fall to the Communists after the United States withdrew its occupation forces. Therefore, no amount of military assistance would materially benefit U.S. national security. Nevertheless, they felt that the United States, having equipped the constabulary, was morally obligated to maintain and support it. Accordingly, the NSC provided for continued assistance to the ROK, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in September 1949, defined the long-range objective of U.S. military aid as development of sufficient military strength to enable the ROK to maintain internal security. When U.S. troops left Korea in the summer of 1949, the United States was supporting ROK Army and police forces numbering together about 90,000 men, and a small coast guard. On 1 July 1949, the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAAG) was activated to train South Korean forces.⁶⁰

When the MDA Act was passed three months later, South Korea was included among the countries eligible for military assistance. However, shipment of MDAP materiel was suspended on 20 July 1950, following the North Korean attack. Although the MDAP continued to finance U.S. training activities in South Korea, funds appropriated for the Department of Defense provided equipment and support for the greatly enlarged ROK forces, which were now fighting under the operational control of the United Nations Command. During the war years, the United States furnished about \$3 billion in materiel and services to the South Korean forces.⁶¹

During hostilities the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid plans for post war MDAP support of ROK forces. In 1952 they stated that ROK forces, properly trained, equipped, and positioned, would be an important deterrent to further aggression, and they recommended that the United States plan to develop ROK forces capable of materially

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delaying any advance by North Korean forces. The objective of the post war MDAP, they informed the Secretary of Defense, should be to assist the South Koreans to develop armed strength sufficient to maintain security and to discourage or resist external aggression. They advised that, for planning purposes, force objectives coincide with forces in being--ten infantry divisions, forty-six aircraft, and fifty naval vessels.⁶²

Operational requirements and the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that ROK forces assume increasing responsibility for the ground defense of Korea led during the war to an augmentation of the ROK Army to twenty divisions, which enabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enlarge the objective of the post war MDAP. On the eve of the armistice, they stated that, if hostilities ceased, the United States should program both MDAP materiel and training adequate to build Korean forces strong enough to repel, rather than merely to delay, future aggression by North Korean forces alone. Again, force objectives would be the same as forces in being.⁶³

Following the armistice, the United States, according to plan, resumed the MDA materiel program in South Korea. It was not until November 1954, however, that the United States and the ROK signed an "Agreed Minute" to govern the operation of the MDAP. This document spelled out the size of ROK forces that the United States would equip and support and the details of financing and time-phasing. It also bound South Korea to keep its forces under U.S. operational control while the United Nations Command remained in Korea, and to cooperate with the United States in its attempt to secure the reunification of Korea. A month later the NSC made aid to Korea subject to continued ROK cooperation with the United States.⁶⁴

Each year since 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the United States assist in organizing, training, and equipping ROK forces capable of maintaining internal security and of repelling aggression by any country other than a major power. In addition to performing the missions indicated by this objective, ROK forces were to assist, under the operational control of the United Nations Command, in maintaining the armistice agreement.⁶⁵

The United States has been prevented by the growing strength of North Korean forces from materially reducing assistance to ROK forces. However, in 1955 the NSC called for developing an effective reserve program in order to permit the reduction of regular forces, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended MDAP support of ten reserve divisions in addition to the twenty regular divisions. Some progress has been made in converting active divisions to reserve status, thus permitting a reduction of regular forces and an enlargement of reserve forces. At the same time, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been compelled to meet the buildup of North Korean airpower by increasing South Korean air force objectives from three to nine squadrons. In their latest statement of force objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended U.S. support for a South Korean army of sixteen infantry divisions and fourteen reserve divisions, a navy of sixty-one combat vessels and a marine division, and an air force of nine squadrons.⁶⁶

As of 30 June 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the over-all effectiveness of ROK forces, in relation to their missions, was good. However, since early 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have specified that emphasis should be placed on building air defense and mine warfare capabilities in order to bring the ROK Navy and Air Force to a state of readiness equal to that already attained by the ground forces.⁶⁷

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Summary of Aid to the Far East

With some difference of emphasis, the considerations leading the United States to undertake large-scale military aid programs in the Far East in 1950 were the same as those that applied in Western Europe earlier. The national security of the United States was increasingly threatened by expanding Communism in Asia. In keeping with their long-standing view that military aid should increase U.S. national security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed using the MDAP to meet this threat. Their persistence finally overcame the reluctance of top civilian policy-makers who did not want the United States again to be drawn into the Far Eastern morass. Even after the decision had been made, however, it remained for the Korean War to spotlight the danger and underline the necessity for considerably larger programs than originally planned.

Since 1950, aid to Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, and the states of Indochina, has gone through two stages. The first stage spanned the years of war in Korea and Indochina. Conceived in emergency, the MDAP was executed as an emergency operation from 1950 to 1954. Communist aggression, actual and threatened, shaped the MDAP. In Taiwan and Thailand, the forces supported by the United States were confronted with the immediate threat of aggression. In Indochina and Korea, the forces supported by the United States were actively engaged in combatting Communist armies. Even during the war, however, the other face of the coin became apparent. Without internal stability, the underdeveloped countries were as likely to fall to subversion as to aggression. In the second, or post war, stage of military assistance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff focused their attention on supporting indigenous forces capable of insuring internal security.

Except on Taiwan, where internal security was not a matter of great concern, and in Korea, where aggression has continued to be the paramount threat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the development of defensive capabilities as a task to be accomplished only after internal security had been assured. Nevertheless, following the Korean and Indochinese conflicts, an orderly regional plan for using indigenous forces to help meet the threat of aggression became feasible, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1954 advanced their concept of the form such a plan ought to assume. They visualized using the MDAP to build in the Far East an "integrated military structure of indigenous armed forces." Complemented by the mobile forces of the United States and other associated nations, these forces would materially reduce the demands upon U.S. armed strength in the area. To form the political and economic basis for such a military structure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated, as a long-range goal, a regional security pact linking all of the Far Eastern non-Communist countries with the United States.

Although a comprehensive security pact in the Far East was not possible in the foreseeable future, principally because of long-standing animosities among the prospective members, the United States by the end of 1955 had concluded an extensive network of defensive alliances in the area. Bilateral treaties bound the Philippines, Korea, the Nationalist Chinese Government, and Japan to the United States, while a multilateral pact, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, joined the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. A special protocol to this treaty extended its provisions to protect Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, which were barred from military alliances by the Geneva Accords.

The goals that the United States hopes to attain through this blanket of U.S. sponsored alliances, underwritten by U.S. military assistance, are apparent in both JCS and NSC papers. Most important is an arc of stable, anti-Communist governments, possessing the will and ability to resist subversion, bordering the Communist world from Japan to Pakistan. Second is a workable mechanism for employing indigenous forces, with standardized equipment and common military doctrine, in conjunction with complementary U.S. mobile forces to deter or, if necessary, to repel Communist aggression.⁶⁷

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Thus the JCS concept of military aid to underdeveloped countries received its first application in the Far East. Experience gained in that area affected the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in devising aid programs for the Middle East.

Foundations of Aid to the Middle East

A regional program of military aid developed more slowly in the Middle East than in the Far East, and with less support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although Communist expansion threatened the Middle East-Mediterranean area as soon as World War II was over, the danger was acute only in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, states bordering the Communist empire. Furthermore, the United States deferred to British strategic interests in the area. The Middle East did not figure prominently in U.S. concepts for conduct of a global war.

Iran--The Early Problem

Until 1954, Iran was the only nation in the Middle East other than Turkey to receive grant military aid. Militarily impotent, but rich in oil, it was in 1946 an especially attractive and vulnerable target for Soviet subversion or aggression. But when the USSR tested this vulnerability by delaying withdrawal of its troops from Iranian territory, it provoked a strong reaction from the United States in the United Nations and, more important, caused U.S. policy-makers to begin a peace-time program of assistance to Iran.

The foundation for such a program had been laid in World War II, when the United States sent Lend-Lease aid to Iran and established two military missions, one attached to the army and the other to the gendarmerie, an internal security force. In 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that these missions remain in Iran and that the United States provide Iran with reasonable amounts of materiel that could not be used for aggression. Initiative for an Iranian aid program had come from the State Department, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having in mind the strategic importance of Iran's oil resources and its potential use as a base of operations against the USSR, concluded that token assistance to the Iranian military establishment would probably serve U.S. strategic interests by stabilizing and strengthening the Iranian Government.⁷⁰

Until the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the program of military aid to Iran was limited to the provision of credit for the purchase of equipment. In 1949 this act made Iran eligible for grant assistance, but objectives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Iran did not change significantly. In their view, aid should be used to develop sufficient military power to maintain internal security and to prevent Iran from surrendering to Communism "during the ideological conflict" (i.e. the period of U.S.-Soviet competition short of armed warfare.)⁷¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff also considered that Iran should have the ability to cause some delay to an enemy advance in case of global war, but in view of the difficulty Iranian troops had experienced in the maintenance of armored cars, light tanks, and tank destroyers, they were reluctant to provide heavier and more complicated vehicles.⁷² Development of a defensive capability in the Iranian army was, in their view, a long-range objective.

After Iran nationalized its oil industry in the spring of 1951, touching off two years of political turmoil, JCS statements of military assistance objectives were restricted even more narrowly than before to the maintenance (or restoration) of stability and the improvement of internal security. Communist opportunities for subversion multiplied during the chaotic National Front regime of Premier Mossadegh, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ceased even to suggest development of an Iranian capability to resist external aggression. This question was not to arise again until 1953, after Mossadegh had fallen.

Meanwhile, under pressure from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to consider a regional program of grant military aid to Middle Eastern nations. In November 1951 they had

opposed grant aid for countries other than Turkey and Iran, on the grounds that development of effective Middle Eastern forces capable of supporting United States strategic concepts would require an effort out of all proportion to the military return.⁷³ Within a year, however, they were prepared to support such a program, albeit with reluctance.

The first important step towards a comprehensive Middle Eastern aid program came in April 1952, when the NSC adopted a statement calling for the United States to take an increased share of responsibility for the Middle East and to attempt through various programs, including military aid, to influence the process of political change there. Opposing an increase in the scope and pace of military aid to the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that the NSC proposals should be weighed with due regard to their impact upon other military programs that were of greater importance to U.S. national security.⁷⁴

In May 1952, searching for ways to implement the new NSC statement, the State Department's Policy Planning Staff asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on possible objectives of aid to the Middle East. They replied that, for one thing, aid could be used to "influence Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and the other Arab States to increase their defense capabilities and to make available desired base facilities to the Allies, with the ultimate aim of obtaining military commitments to a coordinated defense of the Middle East." But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were thinking only of aid for which the United States would be reimbursed, and that only in very limited amounts.⁷⁵

They changed their position in November 1952, when they reluctantly joined the State Department in recommending to the Bureau of the Budget a \$100 million grant military aid program for the Middle East. To the State Department, opportunities for use of aid seemed particularly promising at that time. In Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon, corrupt and inefficient anti-Western governments had been replaced by new regimes that gave promise of turning towards the West. Iraqi leaders had expressed interest in strengthening their armed forces. Furthermore, the United States, following the initiative of the State Department, was about to seek the cooperation of the Arab states in forming a Middle East Defense Organization, and the success of this undertaking would probably depend on the amount of military equipment that was forthcoming from the United States.

After reviewing the situation in the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt compelled to agree to the State Department's urgent proposals, but they complained to the Secretary of Defense that they had not had time to give the program comprehensive study. Apparently, they had not changed their position of the previous November--that aid to the Middle East could not be expected to produce forces capable of contributing to the execution of United States global war strategy. Nevertheless, they favored some small grant programs in order to secure military rights and facilities, to improve internal security in Middle Eastern countries, and to provide ultimately for inclusion of indigenous forces in regional defense planning. They emphasized that initial shipments of aid would be in token amounts, because the Middle East had low-priority claim on scarce United States supplies and because Middle Eastern forces would have difficulty in using modern equipment.⁷⁶

That the primary justification for grant aid to the Middle East was political, rather than military, became perfectly clear when the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in January 1953, stated their plan for executing the aid program. In the first phase, they said, aid would be designed to maintain in power governments friendly to the West, to improve their internal security, and to encourage formation of a regional defense organization. Assuming the formation of such an organization, aid would later be used to strengthen the ability of Middle Eastern states to resist Soviet aggression.⁷⁷

Within five months, however, it became clear that U.S.-U.K. plans for a regional defense organization were doomed by Egyptian opposition, and the neat sequence of aid objectives defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be abandoned even before it had begun to be applied. Now the objectives had to be stated in more vague terms: to encourage participation of individual states in planning for regional defense and, later, to improve regional defense by apportioning aid on the basis of studies made by an allied military planning organization in cooperation with Arab states.

But if the objectives of the program had become vague, its guiding principles were stated specifically for the first time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the United States should, in general, support existing forces in Middle Eastern countries, with a view to their modernization rather than their expansion. Aid should contribute initially to the maintenance of internal security and should establish a foundation for the eventual formation of a Middle Eastern defense force. Finally, it should be consistent with the technical ability of the indigenous personnel.⁷⁸ These principles still apply to Middle Eastern aid programs today.

The framework for an aid program had thus been established by mid-1953, but it was still necessary to designate the recipients. The NSC stated in July 1953 that the United States should select for assistance in the Middle East certain key states--those which were most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and those which were geographically located to stand in the way of Soviet aggression. Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan were mentioned for special consideration, over the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who at the time felt that these countries should not be placed in a special category. By November, however, they had changed their views. They concluded then that the security of the Middle East was dependent at least initially upon an effective arrangement for cooperation among the four "northern tier" countries--Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. The United States should encourage Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, and possibly Iraq, to initiate efforts to form a planning association for coordinated defense of the Middle East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned, however, that in allocating assistance to these countries other U.S. military and political requirements in the Middle East should be considered, as well as U.S. military aid commitments world-wide. A formal recommendation that Iraq and Pakistan be found eligible for grant assistance followed in December.⁷⁹

The MDAP in Iraq

In April 1954, the United States concluded an agreement providing for military aid to Iraq. The objective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the program was to provide, consistent with Iraq's ability to absorb equipment, such assistance as was required to strengthen internal security and defense capabilities. Further, if Iraq became a member of a regional multilateral defense organization, an additional objective would be to assist in equipping forces required by the plans of such an organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set the force objective for Iraq at two infantry divisions, based on forces in being in 1954. In practice, the MDAP in Iraq was limited by a U.S.-U.K. memorandum of understanding which provided that Iraq would continue to look primarily to the British for training and assistance.⁸⁰

Statements of MDAP objectives in Iraq have not changed significantly since 1954. In 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified that one objective of the MDAP should be to assist Iraq in developing forces with the capability to "resist external aggression." They have consistently placed primary emphasis, however, on equipping forces for internal security. Development of an Iraqi capability to delay a Soviet attack through the Zagros Mountains would be of value, they observed in 1955, but it would be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.⁸¹

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In stating their concept for the use of combined U.S. and indigenous forces to counter local Communist aggression, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in 1956 that Iraq should place emphasis on the development of a capability for unconventional warfare. They anticipated, however, that Iraq would not agree to a reduction of conventional forces. Their latest statement of MDAP objectives in Iraq does not mention development of this capability, but says that Iraq's forces for resistance to external aggression should be mobile, lightly equipped, and capable of rapid deployment.²²

Iraq's force objectives have been raised to three infantry divisions and one armored brigade. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made the change in October 1956, during the Suez crisis, when they felt it especially important to bolster Iraq's position in the Arab world. Another consideration, they indicated, was the obvious need for additional forces in the Baghdad Pact area. Their action did not, however, indicate a policy of support for Baghdad Pact forces as such. After U.S. hopes for a regional defense arrangement had been realized with the creation of the Pact organization in 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went only so far as to say that the United States "should consider" equipping forces required by Pact plans. Iraq planned to increase its forces whether U.S. support was forthcoming or not.²³

In their latest estimate of Iraqi capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the army could maintain internal security, but in view of personnel and equipment shortages it was not considered capable of defending the country against Soviet attack or of contributing effective forces to the Baghdad Pact in the near future.²⁴

The MDAP in Pakistan

Like Iraq, Pakistan was a beneficiary of the regional aid program developed in 1952 and 1953 primarily to encourage a Middle Eastern regional defense organization. Moreover, the NSC decided to accord Pakistan special consideration because of its marked pro-Western attitude and its key position among the countries of South Asia.²⁵ The United States concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan in May 1954.

MDAP objectives in Pakistan, as stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were to provide such military assistance as was required to maintain internal security and to assist Pakistan in equipping forces that might be required by regional multilateral defense plans. As in other Middle Eastern countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified that provision of such aid must be consistent with the indigenous ability to absorb equipment. Objectives in Pakistan differed from those in Iraq in that they did not include development of forces with defense capabilities, other than those required by regional multilateral defense plans. However, this distinction was dropped in 1956. Since then the Joint Chiefs of Staff have listed as an objective in Pakistan the development of forces with the capability to "resist external aggression," although they continue to place primary emphasis on forces for internal security.²⁶

In 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff set Pakistani forces objectives at four infantry divisions, one and one-half armored divisions, twelve naval vessels, and six squadrons. Army and air force objectives have not been changed, but the naval objective has been increased to seventeen vessels.²⁷

As of 30 June 1956 the Pakistani army was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be adequate for maintenance of internal security. It had a good capability of defending itself against attack by Afghanistan as well as a good probability of initial success in resisting an attack by India against West Pakistan. It was not capable of defending Pakistan's borders against an attack by the USSR, nor would it be even if the MDAP-supported forces were brought to full strength in men and equipment. Naval equipment was obsolete and ineffective, and the air force capability was limited to support of ground elements against a minor military force.²⁸

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The MDAP in Iran

Even after development of a regional aid program for the Middle East in 1952 and 1953, Iran continued to receive favored consideration from U.S. aid planners, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It had been one of the first countries to receive military assistance because its proximity to the USSR made it extremely vulnerable to subversion and aggression. This geographic position also made it the keystone to defense of the Middle Eastern area and hence to the formation of a regional defense organization.⁸⁷

The United States could not realistically consider inclusion of Iran in plans for a regional defense organization until late 1953. By then the Shah had regained a position of strength, and, with a new prime minister, was looking to the United States for aid and counsel. Immediate effects of these developments could be seen in January 1954, in a new NSC statement of policy towards Iran that: 1) stressed the use of military aid to strengthen the Shah, whose only real source of power was the army; 2) made the amount and rate of aid dependent in part on Iran's attitude towards cooperation with Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq; and 3) specified that aid should improve the ability of Iranian armed forces to provide some resistance to external aggression.

The NSC felt that if a pro-Western government continued in Iran and if the capabilities of the Iranian army were increased, the country might in a year or two be willing to "move in the direction of regional security arrangements." U.S. thinking at this time obviously had been influenced by the Shah's statement that it would be useless to discuss multilateral security arrangements until Iran had an army capable of putting up some kind of defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not object to any of the essential aid provisions in the NSC paper, but they did caution that the many weaknesses of the Iranian army could not be easily overcome. In their opinion, considerable time would be needed to obtain any major increase in combat effectiveness. It was also evident from their comments that they were not very sanguine about the possibilities of achieving effective cooperation among the four northern tier countries.⁸⁸

A year later, the NSC again expanded the objectives of the MDAP in Iran, even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff this time entered strong reservations. The NSC action followed a visit to Washington by the Shah in December 1954, during which he told the President that Iran was willing to adapt its strategy to Middle Eastern defense if it had reason to believe that it would soon be able to do its share towards common defense of the area. The U.S. response was reflected in the NSC paper, which stated that one objective of U.S. policy in Iran was the development of Iranian armed forces capable of making a useful contribution to Middle Eastern defense through the conduct of defensive delaying actions.

When they commented on the draft of the NSC paper in January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that aid to Iran should not be expanded significantly until: 1) Iran's role in defense plans for the Middle East had been determined, and 2) Iran had demonstrated its ability to use MDAP materiel effectively. They had first set forth this position in September 1954; they restated it not only in January but again in April 1955. In practice, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prevailed, for the NSC paper recognized that development of significant defensive delaying capabilities in the Iranian armed forces would require "a long-term program involving U.S. expenditures substantially in excess of present levels." It did not indicate that such a program would be undertaken.⁸⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did approve a moderate increase in aid to Iran later in 1955, hoping to encourage its adherence to the Baghdad Pact, which had been signed by Turkey and Iraq in February. This did not, however, indicate any change in their opposition to a much larger program. They ignored an opportunity to make such a change in October, when they stated an appropriate role and mission for the Iranian army

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in defense of the Middle East--thus fulfilling one of the two necessary conditions that they had laid down for a significantly larger MDAP. Their statement included an estimate of the expenditure required to provide the desired Iranian capability, but they told the Secretary of Defense that this estimate was "not intended as a basis for increasing presently programmed MDA support." 72

The role and mission stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Iranian armed forces was to conduct a six-month defensive delaying action in the Zagros Mountains with outside operational and logistical support (including atomic support). This mission was derived from the concept, adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1954, that retention of Turkey, the Zagros Mountain line, and the areas to the south and west of that line would satisfy U.S. military objectives in the Middle East. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff have since replaced this concept with a plan for defense along the Elburz Mountain line. Accordingly, the mission of the Iranian army is now considered to be conduct of a defensive delaying action initially from positions in the Elburz Mountains.) 73

When the Iranian mission was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1955 there were no approved force requirements for defense of the Middle East, and in determining the size of Iranian forces necessary to accomplish the defensive delaying mission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the prevailing MDAP force objectives in Iran. These called for an army of eight light infantry divisions, four light armored divisions, and five independent infantry brigades.

Current force objectives are six infantry divisions, full strength; six infantry divisions, reduced strength; five independent brigades, reduced strength; eleven naval vessels; and five air squadrons. Army force objectives were changed in September 1956 on the recommendation of the MAAG Chief of Iran, who felt that elimination of light armored divisions and incorporation of tanks into the infantry divisions would increase Iran's defense capability and reduce support costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt in November 1956 that Iran's pattern of forces should be changed to emphasize a capability for guerrilla warfare, but they believed that Iranian officials would not agree to a reduction of conventional forces until the United States and Iran undertook combined planning. 74

The extensive consideration given by the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the MAAG in Iran to a defensive role for the Iranian armed forces indicates the special importance that the United States has attached to Iran. It is the only underdeveloped country in the Middle East in which a start has been made towards developing an indigenous defense capability. Nevertheless, it is true that in Iran, as in Iraq and Pakistan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have placed primary emphasis on forces to insure internal security. 75

As of 30 June 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the Iranian Army capable of maintaining internal security and preserving the government in power. It could, they thought, execute very limited delaying actions against an aggressor with a final defense of short duration in the Zagros passes. It was incapable of sustained combat. The Iranian Navy had a limited ability to help maintain internal security and suppress smuggling. The Air Force could assist in the maintenance of internal security but was not capable of opposing an aggressor equipped with a modern air force. 76

Summary of Aid to the Middle East

In the Middle East, much more than in the Far East, the United States has provided grant military assistance with a clearly political purpose. Even though aid was used to help create a regional defense organization, U.S. policy-makers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, frankly acknowledged that the benefits of such an organization would be primarily political and psychological. It was expected to encourage the participating nations to cooperate more

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closely with each other and with the West; it was not expected to reduce significantly the area's military vulnerability.⁹⁷

Development of a capability to resist external aggression has been listed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an MDAP objective in all three countries, but it has been considered as a goal for the indefinite future. Only in Iran has a beginning been made towards its realization, and there, as in Iraq and Pakistan, forces for the maintenance of internal security continue to receive first consideration under the MDAP. These forces contribute to the essential U.S. aim of maintaining in power Western-oriented governments.

Several factors have made it necessary always to consider development of defensive capabilities as a secondary goal. Most important of these factors, and one constantly emphasized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the limited ability of the Middle Eastern nations to absorb military equipment. Another factor is the limitation of United States aid funds, which have not been sufficient to finance long, costly programs in a low-priority area. A third factor has been the lack of regional defense plans agreed upon by both the United States and Middle Eastern countries. Such plans are a prerequisite to the development of Middle Eastern forces as a complement to U.S. mobile forces, in accordance with the concept evolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for meeting local Communist aggression.

Recent developments in the Middle East and in U.S. policy towards the area may result in the removal of some of the obstacles to a long-range program for creation of indigenous defense capabilities. Whereas the Middle East, in relation to other regions receiving military assistance, has often been regarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a poor investment, it has gained in importance as the Communist threat there has increased and British influence declined. One indication of the new importance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff attach to Middle Eastern aid programs was their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, in May 1957, that the United States assume primary responsibility for training and equipping Iraqi armed forces.⁹⁸

Furthermore, since the completion of the Baghdad Pact organization late in 1955, a start has been made towards the formulation of regional defense plans. During the past year the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been commenting on Baghdad Pact military studies. Now the United States has become a member of the Pact's Military Committee, linking it even closer to regional defense planning.

None of these developments, however, has as yet had any significant effect on the aid program in the Middle East. Baghdad Pact military plans continue to reflect the varying national interests of the member states, and while the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had under consideration their own defense plans for the region, they have not acted upon them. Thus, the United States and its partners in the Middle East have not reached an accord on defense plans that might form the basis of a significantly altered MDAP.

Nor has the Eisenhower Doctrine produced any basic changes in the aid program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on 13 June 1957 that the Doctrine would not have any immediate effect on the amount of military aid for the Middle East. Changes would come over a long period of time, they predicted, and affect not so much the size of the aid program as its pattern--particularly if the Middle East members of the Baghdad Pact could set aside their national aims, establish realistic force requirements, and plan toward a common defense against a common enemy.⁹⁹

NOTES

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 2. (TS) SWMCC 368, "Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries," 24 Apr 57, (Doc en, 23 Jul 47), same file, sec 2. (TS) JCS 1769/4, Memo by Adm Leahy, same subJ, 3 May 47 (Doc en, 12 May 47), same file, sec 3.
 3. (TS) NSC 16/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Providing Military Assistance to Nations of the Non-Soviet World," 1 Jul 46, same file, sec 13.
 4. (TS) JCS 1868/57, Note by Secy, "Basic Statement of U. S. Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program," 9 Feb 49, same file, sec 18. (TS) Memo, Donahoe for JCS to SecDef, same subJ, 21 Feb 49, same file. Derived from JCS 1868/59, same file, sec 19.
 5. (TS) Memo, Leahy for JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid Priorities," 1 Nov 48, same file, sec 14. Derived from JCS 1925/1, same file. (TS) SWMCC 360/11, same subJ, 19 Aug 48 (Doc en, 16 Mar 49), same file, sec 13.
 6. (TS) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Military Objectives in Military Aid Programs," 26 Jan 49, same file, sec 33. Derived from JCS 1868/167, same file, sec 32.
 7. (TS) NSC 141, "Recommendation of United States Programs for National Security," 19 Jan 53, CCS 381 U. S. (1-31-50) BP Pt 6.
 8. (TS) Memo, Twining for JCS to SecDef, "MIDA Programs for FY 1953-1958 Which Will Support U. S. Military Strategy," 17 Jan 54, CCS 092 (1-22-44) sec 114. Derived from JCS 2099/348, same file. (TS) Memo, Collins for JCS to SecDef, "MIDA Programming Guidance for FY 1955," 8 Jul 53, same file, sec 91. Derived from JCS 2099/300, same file, BP Pt 18-A.
 9. (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U. S. Aid Programs," 30 Mar 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec 37. Derived from JCS 2099/687, same file. (TS) JCS 2099/786, Rpt by JSEC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Guidance (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 28 Feb 57), same file, BP Pt 16. (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "U. S. Policy in Mutual and Southeast Asia," 21 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2) sec 29. Derived from JCS 1992/583, same file, sec 28.
- Evolution of Aid Programs in the Far East.
10. (TS) NSC 48/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," 23 Dec 49, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 2.
 11. (TS) JCS 1721/42, Rpt by JSEC, "Aid for China," 17 Dec 49, CCS 483 China (4-3-45) sec 7 pt 6.
 12. (TS) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," 29 Dec 49, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 2. Derived from JCS 1992/7, same file.

11. (T) NSC 48/2, same subJ, 30 Dec 49, same file, see 1.

14. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Program of Assistance for the General Area of China," 20 Jan 50, CCS 432 China (4-1-45) see 7 pt 7. Derived from JCS 1721/45, same file. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Military Objectives in Military Aid Program," 26 Jan 50, CCS 692 (8-22-46) see 1. Derived from JCS 1868/167, same file, see 11. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia," 10 Apr 50, CCS 692 Asia (6-25-48) see 3. Derived from JCS 1982/11, same file. (T) Memo, Davis for JCS to SecDef, "Military Basis for Mutual Defense Assistance Program for FY 1951," 19 May 50, CCS 692 (8-22-46) see 14. Derived from JCS 2079/6, same file, see 36.

Aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.

15. State Dept, United States Relations with China (Washington 1949), pp. 26-31.

16. William A. Brown, Jr., and Robert Ogle, American Foreign Assistance (The Brookings Institution Washington 1953), pp. 315-334. (T) Mem., SA, JCS, History of the Formosa Situation (1953), App. pp. 1-8.

17. (R) NSC 22/2, Memo by SecDef, "Current Position of the United States Respecting Delivery of Aid to China," 14 Dec 48. (T) Memo, Dandala for JCS to SecDef, same subJ, 16 Dec 48. (T) M/R JCS 1721/17, 21 Dec 48. All in CCS 432 China (4-1-45) see 7 pt 1. (T) Rec of Actions, 234 NSC Reg, 3 Feb 49, Act No. 188, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) see 1. (T) Memo, Smeers to NSC, same subJ, 8 Feb 49, CCS 432 China (4-1-45) see 7 pt 1.

18. (R) Memo, Leahy for JCS to SecDef, "Strategic Importance of Formosa," 24 Nov 48, CCS 381 Formosa (11-9-48) see 1. Derived from JCS 1966/1, same file. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan not Involving Major Military Forces," 23 Dec 49, same file, see 3. Derived from JCS 1966/24, same file, see 2. (T) M/R JCS 1966/24, 28 Dec 49, same file.

19. State Dept, Dulles, vol XIII (16 Jan 50), p. 79.

20. (R) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Aid to Formosa," 2 May 50, CCS 381 Formosa (11-9-48) see 1. Derived from JCS 1966/25, same file. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid to Anti-Communist Forces on Formosa," 3 May 50, same file. Derived from JCS 1966/27, same file.

21. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "General Policy of the United States Concerning Formosa," 27 Jul 50, same file, see 4. Derived from JCS 1966/34, same file. (T) Rec of Actions, 624 NSC Reg, 27 Jul 50, Act No. 235, CCS 334 NSC (9-24-47) see 2.

22. (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "The Military Basis for the FY 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Program," 7 Feb 51, CCS 692 (8-22-46) see 49. Derived from JCS 2079/77, same file. (T) Memo, Lohr for JCS to SecDef, "Over-all Program Objectives for the FY 1953 Military Material Assistance Program," 4 Aug 51, same file, see 18. Derived from JCS 2079/121, same file, see 57. (T) Memo, Callie for JCS to SecDef, "MIDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 30 Oct 52, same file, see 81. Derived from JCS 2079/242, same file, see 81.

23. (JG) Memo, Bradley for JCS to Beedel, "United States Position with Respect to Formosa," 24 Oct 51, CCS 101 Formosa (11-8-48) see 9. Derived from JCS 1966/62, same file, see 8. (TS) Memo, Luber for JCS to Beedel.

"NSC 146 - U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China," 7 Apr 53, same file, see 18. Derived from JCS 1966/67, same file. (TS) NSC 146/2, "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government," 6 Nov 53, same file, see 13.

24. (JG) Memo, Luber for JCS to Beedel, "Country Force Bases to be Used for Programming the FY 1953 Military Material Assistance Program," 26 Oct 51, CCS 892 (8-22-46) see 61. Derived from JCS 2099/134, same file, see 60. (TS) Memo, Collins for JCS to Beedel, "MADA Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 30 Oct 52, same file, see 83. Derived from JCS 2099/241, same file, see 81. (TS) Memo, Collins for JCS to Beedel, "MADA Programming Outline for FY 1955," 8 Jul 53, same file, see 93. Derived from JCS 2099/300, same file, BP Pt 18-A.

25. (JG) Memo, Arty Beedel Eyes to JCS, "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China," 18 Apr 53, CCS 101 Formosa (11-8-48) see 18.

26. (JG) Memo, Collins for JCS to Beedel, "MADA Programming Outline for FY 1955," 8 Jul 53, CCS 892 (8-22-46) see 93. Derived from JCS 2099/300, same file, BP Pt 18-A.

27. (JG) NSC 146/2, "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government," 6 Nov 53, CCS 101 Formosa (11-8-48) see 13.

28. (JG) Memo, Radford for JCS to Beedel, "Review of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels," 18 Jan 54, same file, see 13. Derived from JCS 1966/80, same file. (TS) Memo, Beedel to Base Army NSC, same subj, 26 Jan 54, same file. (TS) Memo, Beedel to JCS, "Reconsideration of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels and the Size and Timing of the U. S. Military Aid Program for Formosa (NSC Action No. 1027-g), 12 Feb 54, same file. (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to Beedel, same subj, 26 Feb 54, same file, see 14. Derived from JCS 1966/82, same file. (TS) Memo, Twining for JCS to Beedel, "MADA Programs for FY 1955-1958 Which Will Support U. S. Military Strategy," 17 Jan 54, CCR 892 (8-22-46) see 114. Derived from JCS 2099/360, same file, BP Pt 19. (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to Beedel, "Reconsideration of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels," 27 Jul 54, CCS 101 Formosa (11-8-48) see 14. Derived from JCS 1966/85, same file.

29. (JG) Memo, Robert Cutler, Sp Asst to Pres, to Beedel and Beedel, "Par. 10, NSC 146/2, U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government," 26 Aug 54, CFCG 891 China (Aug 54), OGCFA. (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to Beedel, same subj, 1 Oct 54, CCS 101 Formosa (11-8-48) see 15. Derived from JCS 1966/90, same file. (TS) NSC Rec of Action No. 1235, 6 Oct 54, Base JCS files. (TS) NSC 9439/3, "Current U. S. Policy Toward the Far East," 22 Dec 54, CCS 892 Asia (6-25-40) see 98. (TS) NSC 8583, "U. S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China," 15 Jan 55, CCS 101 Formosa (11-8-48) see 47.

30. The treaty was signed on 2 Dec 54 and the Senate consented to ratification on 9 Feb 55. See State Dept, Bulletin, vol XXXII (13 Dec 54), pp. 893-894; vol XXXIII (24 Jan 55), pp. 150-151; vol XXXIII (21 Feb 55), pp. 287-290.

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ning Guidance (O), " 10 Feb 57 (Doc no, 20 Feb 57), CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2)
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32. Ind, (R) App to Encl A to (R) JCS 2099/644, Rpt by JCPMA, "Military
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33. (2nd App to Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National
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Derived from JCS 2099/457, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 34.

The MDAP to Indochina.

34. (TS) JCS 1721/43, Rpt by JOPC, "AM for China," 17 Dec 49, CCS 452
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see 3, (TS) "Memorandum for the President," sent to (TS) Memo, Leahy to
Davis, "Military Assistance for Southeast Asia," 7 Mar 50, same file.

35. (TS) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Strategic Assessment of South-
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36. (TS) Memo, Vandenberg for JCS to SecDef, "Program of Military Assis-
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37. (TS) NSC 124/2, "Guided Status Objectives and Courses of Action with
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CCS 092 (8-22-46) see 93, Derived from JCS 2099/300, same file, BP Pt 18-A,
(TS) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Possible Future Action in Indochina,"
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(TS) Mac, HR, JCS, History of the Indochina Incident (1955), Chs X and XI, See
also (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Forecasting the Participation of the United States
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38. (TS) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Possible Future Action in Indo-
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39. (25) JCS 1992/270. Rpt by JSPD. "Steps Which the United States Might Take to Assist in Achieving the Success of the Marwaro Plan," 12 Jan 54 (Dec en, 15 Jan 54). CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) see 54.
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42. (25) NSC 5429/2. "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East," 20 Aug 54. CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) see 81.
43. (25) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," 22 Sep 54, same file, see 83. Derived from JCS 1992/393, same file. (TS) JCS 1992/412. Rpt by JSPC. "Laotian Force Levels," 6 Jan 55 (Dec en, 21 Jan 55). CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) (2) see 1.
44. (25) Memo, Trivling for JCS to SecDef. "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina," 4 Aug 54. CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) see 77. Derived from JCS 1992/367, same file.
45. (25) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina," 22 Sep 54, same file, see 83. Derived from JCS 1992/393, same file. (TS) JCS 1992/412. "MADAP Survey Report on Cambodia," 6 Oct 55 (Dec en, 18 Oct 55), same file, see 13.
46. (25) Memo, Trivling for JCS to SecDef. "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina," 4 Aug 54, same file, see 77. Derived from JCS 1992/367, same file. (25) Memo, Ridgway for JCS to SecDef. "Message to the French Prime Minister," 13 Aug 54, same file, see 84. Derived from JCS 1992/388, same file. (25) Ltr, SecDef to SecDef, 18 Aug 54, app to (25) JCS 1992/388. Note by Seery. "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina," 3 Sep 54, same file, see 82. (TS) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," 22 Sep 54, same file, see 83. Derived from JCS 1992/394, same file. (TS) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," 19 Oct 54, same file, see 85. Derived from JCS 1992/404, same file, see 84. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Indochina," 26 Oct 54, encl to (TS) JCS 1992/408. Note by Seery, same encl, 26 Oct 54, same file, see 86.
47. (25) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," 22 Sep 54, same file, see 83. Derived from JCS 1992/394, same file. (TS) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," 19 Oct 54, same file, see 85. Derived from JCS 1992/404, same file, see 84. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Indochina," encl to (TS) JCS 1992/412. Rpt by JSPC. "Indochina," 5 Nov 54 (Dec en, 17 Nov 54), same file, see 84.
48. (25) JCS 2099/444. Rpt by JSPC. "MADA Programming Guidance for FY 1957," 14 Mar 55 (Dec en, 16 Mar 55). CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) RP Pt 7. (25) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "FY 1958 MADA Programming Outline," 13 Apr 54, same file, RP Pt 9. Derived from JCS 2079/403, same file.
49. (25) NSC 5612/1. "U.S. Policy in National Security Aids," 5 Sep 54. CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) (2) see 24. (TS) Memo, Balford for JCS to SecDef. "U.S.

Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," 21 Dec 56, same file, see 29. Derived from JCS 1992/583, same file, see 28. (TS) Memo, CIA to JCS, "U.S. Military Aid to Cambodia," 21 Jan 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 34. (TS) JCS 2099/649, Rpt by JSPC, same subj, 19 Oct 56 (Doc en, 10 Oct 56), same file, see 35. (TS) Memo, CMO to JCS, "Mission, Force Level and Major Force Objectives for Cambodian Armed Forces (U)," 2 Feb 57, same file, see 38. (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "Mission of the Cambodian Armed Forces (U)," 3 Apr 57, same file, see 41.

50. (S) JCS 2099/446, Rpt by JSPC, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1957," 14 Mar 55 (Doc en, 16 Mar 55), CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) RP Pt 7. (TS) JCS 2099/510, Rpt by JSPC, "Status of U.S. Programs for Military Assistance as of 30 June 1955," 6 Aug 55 (Doc en, 10 Aug 55), same file, see 14. (TS) JCS 1992/472, Rpt by JSPC, "Revised Force Bases for Vietnam," 17 Aug 55 (Doc en, 19 Aug 55), CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) (2) see 10. (TS dg 8) Memo, Taylor for JCS to SecDef, "Modification of MDA Programming Criteria," 4 Jan 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 22. Derived from JCS 2099/551, same file, see 21. (S) Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 MDA Programming Guidance," 13 Apr 56, same file, RP Pt 9. Derived from JCS 2099/683, same file. (S) JCS 2099/706, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Guidance (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, RP Pt 14.

51. (S) JCS 2099/446, Rpt by JSPC, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1957," 14 Mar 55 (Doc en, 16 Mar 55), same file, RP Pt 7. (TS) JCS 1992/483, Rpt by JSPC, "MDAP Survey Report on Cambodia," 6 Oct 55 (Doc en, 18 Oct 55), CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) (2) see 11. (TS dg 8) Memo, Taylor for JCS to SecDef, "Modification of MDA Programming Criteria," 4 Jan 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 22. Derived from JCS 2099/551, same file, see 21. (S) Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 MDA Programming Guidance," 13 Apr 56, same file, RP Pt 9. Derived from JCS 2099/683, same file. (S) JCS 2099/706, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Guidance (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, RP Pt 14.

52. (S) JCS 2099/706, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Program-
ming Guidance (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, RP Pt 14.

53. (TS) App to Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1956," 11 Sep 56, CCS 381 U.S. (1-31-50) see 66. Derived from JCS 2099/657, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 34.

Aid to Thailand.

54. (TS) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Program of Assistance for the General Area of China," 20 Jan 56, CCS 653 China (4-3-45) see 7 pt 7. Derived from JCS 1721/43, same file.

55. See (TS) Memo, Radford for JCS to SecDef, "Report of the Joint Military Mission to Thailand," 4 Dec 53, CCS 092 Aids (6-25-48) see 51. Derived from JCS 1992/249, same file, see 50.

56. (TS) Memo, Vandenberg for JCS to SecDef, "Program of Military Assistance for the General Area of China," 17 Jan 56, CCS 653 China (4-3-45) see 7 pt 10. Derived from JCS 1721/55, same file. (TS) Memo, Ladd for JCS to SecDef, "Over-all Program Objectives for the FY 1953 Military Material Assistance Program," 4 Sep 51, CCS 092 (8-22-46) see 58. Derived from JCS 2099/121.

same file, see 57. (TR) Luber for JCS to SecDef, "Country Force Bases to be Used for Programming the FY 1953 Military Material Assistance Program," 26 Oct 51, same file, see 61. Derived from JCS 2079/134, same file, see 64.

57. (TR) NSC 5429/2, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East," 20 Aug 54, CCS 092 Acta (6-25-48) see 81. (R) JCS 2079/446, Rpt by JSPC, "MDA Program-ning Outline for FY 1957," 14 Mar 55 (Doc on, 16 Mar 55), CCS 092 (8-22-44) DP Pt 7, (TR) JCS 2079/540, Rpt by JSPC, "Revision of FY 1957 MDA/DP Objective for Thailand," 17 Nov 55 (Doc on, 20 Nov 55), same file, see 20. (R) Memo, Rufford for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 MDA Programming Outline," 13 Apr 56, CCS 092 (8-22-44) (2) DP Pt 9, (TR) NSC 5423/1, "U.S. Policy in Malaya and South-east Asia," 5 Sep 54, CCS 092 Acta (6-25-48) (2) see 24.

58. (R) JCS 2079/704, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Program-ning Outline (W)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc on, 20 Feb 57), CCS 092 (8-22-44) (2) DP Pt 16, (TR) App to Memo, Rufford for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1954," 11 Sep 54, CCS 101 U.S. (1-31-50) see 64. Derived from JCS 2079/657, CCS 092 (8-22-44) (2) see 24.

Aid to Korea.

59. (TR) SWRCC 232/1, "Police Force and National Defense Forces for Korea," 19 Dec 45 (Doc on, 7 Jan 46), CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-45) see 1. Brown and Oyle, American Foreign Assistance, pp. 444-445.

60. (TR) SW-9671, Memo, Luber for JCS to SWRCC, "United States Policy in Korea," 21 Feb 48, CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-45) see 14. Derived from JCS 1483/50, same file. (TR) Memo, Dandfield for JCS to SecDef, "Programs for Foreign Military Assistance," 14 Mar 49, CCS 092 (8-22-44) see 21. Derived from JCS 1849/62, same file, see 20. (TR) 4g R) NSC 8/2, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea," 23 Mar 49, CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-45) see 19. (R) JCS 1040/111, Rpt by JMAC, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 20 Sep 49 (Doc on, 22 Sep 49), CCS 092 (8-22-44) see 29.

61. (R) N/M JCS 2079/16, "Additional Military Assistance to Korea," CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-45) see 21. (R) App A to Bud A to (R) JCS 2079/445, Rpt by JCPMA, "Military Assistance Programs for FY 1957 and FY 1958," 6 Oct 54 (Doc on, 9 Oct 54), CCS 092 (8-22-44) (2) DP Pt 11.

62. (TR) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Post-Berlinian Military Forces for the Republic of Korea," 23 Jan 52, CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-45) see 81. Derived from JCS 1776/276, same file, see 79. (TR) Memo, Collins for JCS to SecDef, "MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 20 Oct 52, CCS 092 (8-22-44) see 83. Derived from JCS 2079/242, same file, see 81.

63. (TR) Doc on JCS 1776/385, "Further Expansion of BOK Forces," 11 Feb 53, CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-45) see 123. (TR) N/M JCS 1776/385, same file. (TR) Memo, Collins for JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Outline for FY 1955," 8 Jul 53, CCS 092 (8-22-44) see 93. Derived from JCS 2079/300, same file, DP Pt 18-A.

64. (R) JCS 1776/499, Memo by Myers, "Proposed Agreed Minute Between the United States and Korea Based on Recent U.S.-Korean Conferences," 27 Sep 54, CCS 103, 21 Korea (3-19-44) see 157. (TR) NSC 5429/5, "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East," 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Acta (6-25-48) see 90.

65. (S) JCS 2099/374, Rpt by JSPC, "MDA Programming Outline for FY 1956," 12 May 54 (Doc en, 19 May 54), CCS 092 (8-22-46) see 111. (TS) App to Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "Development of Defense Information Relating to Certain U.S. Aid Programs (Korea)," 29 Feb 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 25. Derived from JCS 2099/575, same file. (S) JCS 2099/704, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Outline (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, BP Pt 16.

66. (S) JCS 2099/374, Rpt by JSPC, "MDA Programming Outline for FY 1956," 12 May 54 (Doc en, 19 May 54), CCS 092 (8-22-46) see 111. (TS) NSC 5314, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 12 Mar 55, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) (2) see 2. (TS) Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "Printing Force Bases for Korea - FY 57-59," 2 Nov 55, same file, see 6. Derived from JCS 1776/344, same file. (TS) App to Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "Development of Defense Information Relating to Certain U.S. Aid Programs (Korea)," 29 Feb 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 25. Derived from JCS 2099/575, same file. (S) Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 MDA Programming Outline," 13 Apr 56, same file, BP Pt 9. Derived from JCS 2099/603, same file. (S) JCS 2099/704, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Outline (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, BP Pt 16.

67. (TS) App to Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1954," 11 Sep 54, CCS 381 U.S. (1-31-56) see 64. Derived from JCS 2099/637, CC# 992 (8-22-46) (2) see 34. (TS) JCS 2099/435, "MDA Program for FY 1956 (Far East)," 27 Jan 55 (Doc en, 2 Feb 55), same file, see 2.

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68. (TS) Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (NSC Action No. 1029-b)," 9 Apr 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) see 150. Derived from JCS 1776/482, same file, see 149.

69. (TS) NSC 5439/2, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East," 20 Aug 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) see 81. (TS) JCS 2181/189, Rpt by JSPC, "Objectives of the Department of Defense Into National Security Plan," 18 Feb 55 (Doc en, 23 Feb 55), CCS 381 U.S. (1-31-56) see 52. (TS) Encl to Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "Reappraisal of World-Wide MDAP," 8 Nov 55, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 19. Derived from JCS 2099/517, same file, BP Pt 3-A. (S) Memo, Rafter for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 MDA Programming Outline," 13 Apr 56, same file, BP Pt 9. Derived from JCS 2099/603, same file. (TS) NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in National Security Act," 8 Sep 56, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2) see 26. (S) JCS 2099/704, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Outline (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) BP Pt 16.

Iran--The Early Problem

70. (TS) RM-4874, Memo, McFarland for JCS to STRCC, "United States Strategic Interest in Iran," 11 Oct 46, CCS 092 (8-22-46) see 1. Derived from JCS 1714/3, same file.

71. (TS) JCS 1714/9, Rpt by JSPC, "Military Assistance to Iran," 18 Jan 50 (Doc en, 26 Jan 50), same file, see 33. (TS) JCS 1714/8, Rpt by JSPC, same sub), 18 Jan 50 (Doc en, 31 Jan 50), same file.

72. (TS) JCS 1714/8, Rpt by JSPC, same sub), 18 Jan 50 (Doc en, 31 Jan 50), same file.

73. (P) JCS 2099/159, Rpt by JSPC, "Great Military Aid to Near East Countries in Accordance with Section 203 of Proposed National Security Act of 1951," 2 Nov 51 (Doc en, 5 Nov 51), same file, see 62.

74. (P) JSC 1887/1, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel," 28 Apr 52, CCS 092 Palestine (J-3-46) BP Pt 1, (T) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, same subj, 15 Apr 52, same file, see 13, Derived from JCS 1684/66, same file.

75. (P) JCS 1887/56, Rpt by JSPC, "Security of the Middle East," 11 Jun 52 (Doc en, 16 Jun 52), CCS 301 E. M. M. E. A. (11-19-47) see 18.

76. (P) JCS 1887/66, Rpt by JSPC, "Increased Aid for the Middle East Area," 5 Nov 52 (Doc en, 5 Nov 52), same file, see 12, (T) End to JCS 2099/253, Note by SecYr, "Military Assistance to the Middle East," 5 Nov 52, CCS 092 (J-23-46) see 83.

77. (P) Memo, Bradley for JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid for Egypt," 23 Jun 53, CCS 317 (J-26-50) see 6, Derived from JCS 2165/33, same file.

78. (P) JCS 2099/794, Rpt by JSPC, "Three Bases for the Middle East Area," 13 Jun 53 (Doc en, 23 Jun 53), CCS 092 (J-23-46) see 91.

79. (P) JSC 1887/1, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East," 14 Jul 53, CCS 092 Palestine (J-3-46) see 15, (T) JCS 1887/64, Rpt by JSPC, "JSC 1887/1 - United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East," 20 Jun 53 (Doc en, 23 Jun 53), same file, (T) JCS 1887/73, Rpt by JSPC, "Security Arrangements for the Middle East," 4 Nov 53 (Doc en, 13 Nov 53), CCS 301 E. M. M. E. A. (11-19-47) see 16, (T) JCS 2099/312, Rpt by JSPC, "Great Military Assistance to the Middle East," 10 Nov 53 (Doc en, 11 Dec 53), CCS 092 (J-23-46) see 100.

The MDAP in Iraq

80. (P) App A to End B to (T) JCS 1887/318, Rpt by JSPC, "State Department Comments on T. C. S. Memorandum of 30 November 1954, Subject 'Turkiah and Iraq Requests for U. S. Support' (B), " 27 Dec 54, CCS 301 E. M. M. E. A. (11-19-47) see 82, (P) JCS 2099/374, Rpt by JSPC, "JMA Programming Outline for FY 1954," 12 May 54 (Doc en, 19 May 54), CCS 092 (J-23-46) see 111, (T) JCS 2101/152, Rpt by JSPC, "The Semi-Annual Report on the Status of the Mutual Security Program as of 30 June 1954," 16 Aug 54 (Doc en, 18 Aug 54), CCS 301 E. A. (1-31-50) see 44.

81. (P) Memo, Bunker for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 JMA Programming Outline," 13 Apr 56, CCS 092 (J-23-46) (2) BP Pt 9, Derived from JCS 2099/446, same file, (T) JCS 2099/513, Rpt by JSPC, "Scope of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iraq," 23 Aug 53 (Doc en, 9 Sep 53), same file, see 15.

82. (P) Memo, Bunker for JCS to SecDef, "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U. S. Aid Programs," 20 Nov 56, same file, see 37, Derived from JCS 2099/687, same file, (P) JCS 2099/706, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Outline (B), " 18 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, BP Pt 16.

83. (J25) JCS 2099/665, Rpt by Jt Cms on Programs for Military Assistance, "Military Assistance Programs for FY 1957 and FY 1958," 6 Oct 56 (Doc on, 9 Oct 56), same file, DP Pt 13. (S) Memo, Badford for JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 MDA Programming Guidance," 13 Apr 56, same file, DP Pt 9.

84. (J25) App to Memo, Badford for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1956," 11 Sep 56, CCS 301 U.S. (1-31-56) see 64. Derived from JCS 2099/657, CCS 012 (8-22-46) (2) see 34.

The MDAP in Pakistan.

85. (J5) NSC 5409, "United States Policy Toward South Asia," 19 Feb 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) see 58.

86. (J5) JCS 2099/374, Rpt by JSPC, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 12 May 54 (Doc on, 19 May 54), CCS 012 (8-22-46) see 111. (TS) JCS 2099/369, Rpt by JSPC, "Development of Defense Information Relating to Certain U.S. Aid Programs (Pakistan)," 13 Feb 54 (Doc on, 14 Feb 54), CCS 012 (8-22-46) (2) see 24.

87. (J5) JCS 2099/397, Rpt by JSPC, "National Defense Assistance Program for Pakistan," 16 Jul 54 (Doc on, 23 Jul 54), CCS 012 (8-22-46) see 116. (S) JCS 2099/704, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Programming Guidance (U)," 18 Feb 57 (Doc on, 20 Feb 57), CCS 012 (8-22-46) (2) DP Pt 16.

88. (J25) App to Memo, Badford for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1956," 11 Sep 56, CCS 301 U.S. (1-31-56) see 64. Derived from JCS 2099/657, CCS 012 (8-22-46) (2) see 34.

The MDAP in Iran.

89. (J25) Memo, Badford for JCS to SecDef, "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs," 30 Nov 54, CCS 012 (8-22-46) (2) see 37. Derived from JCS 2099/687, same file. (TS) Memo, Badford for JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 3 Oct 55, same file, see 18. Derived from JCS 1714/83, same file, see 17.

90. (J25) NSC 5403, "United States Policy Toward Iran," 2 Jan 54, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) see 11. (TS) Memo, Twining for JCS to SecDef, "NSC 175--United States Policy Toward Iran," 29 Dec 53. Derived from JCS 1714/57, same file.

91. (J25) NSC 5504, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 15 Jan 55, same file, see 15. (TS) Memo, Carney for JCS to SecDef, "United States Policy Toward Iran--NSC 5402/1," 7 Jan 55, same file, see 15. Derived from JCS 1714/78, same file. (TS) JCS 1714/68, Rpt by Ad Hoc Cms on Programs for Military Assistance, "MDA Program for Iran," 23 Sep 54 (Doc on, 24 Sep 54), same file, see 15. (TS) JCS 1714/00, Rpt by Ad Hoc Cms on Programs for Military Assistance, same sub/. 31 Mar 55 (Doc on, 12 Apr 55), same file, see 16.

92. (J25) Memo, Badford for JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 3 Oct 55, same file, see 18. Derived from JCS 1714/83, same file, see 17.

93. (J44, J25) JCS 1087/220, Rpt by JSPC, "Force Requirements for Defense of the Baghdad Pact Area," 20 Jun 54 (Doc on, 11 Jul 54), CCS 301 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) see 38. (TS) NSC 5705/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 8 Feb 57, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) see 19.

94. [S] JCS 2079/704, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Program-
ing Guidance (U)," 10 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) RP
Pt 16. (S) App to Encl to JCS 1714/91, Note by Secys, "Three Base Program for
Iran," 29 Aug 54, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) see 18. (TS) Memo, Rulford for JCS
to SecDef, same subj, 19 Sep 54, same file, see 19. Derived from JCS 1714/92,
same file, see 18. (TS) Memo, Rulford for JCS to SecDef, "Report by the Inter-
departmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs," 30 Nov 54, CCS 092
(8-22-46) (2) see 17. Derived from JCS 2079/687, same file.

95. [S] JCS 2079/704, Rpt by JSPC, "FY 1959 Military Assistance Program-
ing Guidance (U)," 10 Feb 57 (Doc en, 20 Feb 57), same file, RP Pt 16.

96. (TS) App to Memo, Rulford for JCS to SecDef, "Status of National
Security Programs on 30 June 1954," 11 Sep 54, CCS 101 U.S. (1-21-49) see 64.
Derived from JCS 2079/687, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) see 34.

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97. (TS) JMC 1418, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to
the Near East," 23 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (8-3-46) see 17. (TS) Memo, Rulford
for JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 3 Oct 54, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) see 18. Derived from
JCS 1714/83, same file, see 17.

98. (TS) Memo, Rulford for JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Support of the Iraqi Air
Force (U)," 15 May 57, CCS 101 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) see 50. Derived from
JCS 1087/352, same file, see 57.

99. (TS) JCS 1087/363, Rpt by JMCPC, "A Study of the Military Implications
of House Joint Resolution 117 for the Middle East Area (U)," 29 May 57 (Doc en,
13 Jun 57), CCS 101 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) see 59 A.