

JOINT PUB 3-07.3



**JOINT
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES
FOR
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS**




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
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29 April 1994

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JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine (or doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures) to govern the joint activities and performances of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine (or JTTP) for joint operations and training. This publication also provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

2. Application

a. Doctrine (or JTTP) and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance may also apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. In applying the doctrine (or JTTP) set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. This authority is, by law, subject to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, chapter 6, which is the section that details the authority of combatant commanders. Commanders of the unified commands exercise combatant command (command authority)(COCOM) over their assigned forces. Service component commanders are subject to the orders of combatant commanders and,

subject to the combatant commander's direction, are also responsible to the Military Departments and Services in the exercise of their administrative and support responsibilities.

c. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine (or JTTP) should be followed except when, in the commander's judgment, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

3. Scope. This publication sets forth joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for conducting peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in both UN and non-UN-sponsored situations. It covers an overview of PKOs, the framework for peacekeeping, C2, planning considerations, employment, training, and supporting functions for PKOs.

4. Basis. The following documents were used in developing this publication:

a. United Nations Participation Act of 1945 as amended (Pub. L. 79-264).

b. United Nations Charter, Article 29.

c. Executive Order 10206, "Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes."

d. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (Pub. L. 87-195), Part II, Chapter 6.

e. Title 10, United States Code.

f. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces."

g. Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

- h. Joint Test Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations."
- i. Joint Pub 2-01, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Operations" (Initial Draft).
- j. Joint Pub 2-01.2, "JTTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations."
- k. Joint Test Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
- l. Joint Test Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations."
- m. Joint Pub 3-07, "Military Operations Other Than War."
- n. Joint Pub 3-07.1, "JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense."
- o. Joint Pub 3-07.2, "JTTP for Antiterrorism."
- p. Joint Pub 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations" (Initial Draft).
- q. Joint Pub 3-54, 21 August 1991, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security."
- r. Joint Test Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."
- s. Joint Pub 4-01.1, "JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations" (Final Draft).
- t. Joint Pub 4-01.2, "JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations" (Initial Draft).
- u. Joint Pub 4-01.3, "JTTP for Movement Control" (Final Draft).
- v. FM 7-20, "The Infantry Battalion."
- w. FM 8-10, "Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations."
- x. FM 8-10-6, "Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures."
- y. FM 8-42, "Medical Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict."

z. FM 10-63/AFM 143-3/FMFM 4-8, "Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations."

aa. FM 46-1 (Coordinating Draft), "Public Affairs Operations."

bb. FM 63-6, "Combat Service Support in Low Intensity Conflict."

cc. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict."

dd. MCM-144-93, "Implementation of the Unified Command Plan."

ee. DA Circular 11-88-2, "Policies for the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers."

ff. DA Circular 11-90-4, "The Sinai Multinational Force and Observers."

gg. DA Pamphlet 700-15, "Logistics Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces."

hh. NWP-9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, "The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations."

ii. ABCA Armies Combat Development Guide to the Year 2000, Chapter 6 - International Peacekeeping Operations.

jj. United Kingdom, The Army Field Manual, Volume V, Part I, Peacekeeping Operations.

kk. Australia, Army Manual of Land Warfare, Volume 3, Part I, Peacekeeping Operations.

ll. Canada. Peacekeeping Operations - The Military Observer's Handbook.

mm. Nordic Ministers of Defense, Nordic UN Stand-by Forces, third edition (Stockholm, 1986).

nn. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, second edition (New York, 1990).

oo. International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook, (New York, 1984).

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CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. Since World War II, the United States has participated in and supported many different PKOs, including most of those sponsored by the United Nations (UN) as well as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai and the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. Military PKOs support diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The single most important factor for a PKO to have the potential for success is the consent to conduct the operation by the state or states involved and all significant parties to the dispute.

2. Peacekeeping. US doctrine has defined peacekeeping as "Military or para-military operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."

3. Description of Peacekeeping

a. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, codified in title 22, US Code, authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for PKOs and other programs to further US national security interests.

b. PKOs take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the belligerents, the sponsoring organization, and potential force contributing nations concerning which nations will provide peacekeeping forces as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute. These operations are conducted in accordance with agreements among the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping efforts often involve ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant.

c. The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of international PKOs. However, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League have also acted to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions. Similarly, some nations have negotiated multilateral agreements to create peacekeeping

missions independent of any permanent international forum. Although there have been instances of other types of operations--such as the loose coalition of national units known as the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut--these operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the UN. In some cases, unilateral interventions, such as Indian forces in Sri Lanka, have been termed "peacekeeping," but fall outside the use of the term as defined by US doctrine.

4. The Development of Peacekeeping

a. Modern peacekeeping efforts evolved after World War II with the establishment of the United Nations. Although the UN Charter did not address peacekeeping, the UN gradually developed peacekeeping doctrine. The term "peacekeeping force" was used in 1956 when the UN established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the disengagement of forces after the invasion of Egypt, in the Suez War, by Great Britain, France, and Israel.

b. The United States has supported numerous UN and non-UN-sponsored peacekeeping efforts with logistical support, financial support, observers, and forces. The United States is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world.

5. Roles. There are three broad roles the US may perform in PKOs: providing financial and logistic support, providing individual observers or staff personnel, and providing peacekeeping forces.

a. Peacekeeping Support

(1) This document uses the term "support" although other documents (e.g., Joint Test Pub 3-07) use the term "logistics." The term support is broader in scope and therefore allows the mission to be expanded into financial resources (funding) and logistics (materiel, transport, etc.).

(2) Financial support is the principal form of US support to international peacekeeping operations, especially to UN-sponsored peacekeeping. Although participating countries may fund the operation in certain cases, the UN, through the contributions of its members, funds the costs in others.

(3) The United States may also provide logistic support in the form of equipment and supplies as well as airlift and sealift to support a PKO. This includes support for the contingents that will actually conduct the operations as well as for US forces.

b. Observer Missions

(1) US military personnel may perform a wide variety of functions in support of peacekeeping. Examples of these functions include acting as observers or as functional area experts under the command of the UN or some other organization.

(2) Military observers (MILOBs) observe, record, and report implementation of the armistice and any violations thereof. They also carry out such tasks as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations. Observer groups usually operate under an open-ended mandate that, in the case of a UN operation, can only be terminated by the UN Security Council. Typical MILOB missions include:

(a) Observing and reporting any alleged violation of the protocol that established the PKO.

(b) Investigating alleged cease-fire violations and/or alleged boundary incidents.

(c) Conducting regular liaison visits to peacekeeping units within their area of responsibility.

(d) Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of belligerent forces within their area of responsibility.

(e) Periodically visiting forward positions to observe and report on the disposition of forces.

(f) Receiving relief aircraft and ships and supervising the loading and unloading of relief supplies.

(g) Assisting civil authorities in such functions as supervision of elections, transfer of authority, partition of territory, or the temporary administration of civil functions.

(h) Verifying the destruction of certain categories of military equipment; e.g., ballistic missiles; nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

(3) MILOBs, by their presence, are often sufficient to deter breaches of the cease-fire and armistice agreements. Although their work is rewarding, it can also be monotonous, frustrating, and dangerous. They must understand that their up-to-date and impartial reports provide useful evidence and help eliminate the paralyzing claims and counterclaims put forward by partisan interests. MILOB missions are particularly useful in verifying compliance with provisions of the demilitarized zone and arms limitation agreements.

c. Peacekeeping Forces. The United States may provide combat, combat support, and combat service support units in support of PKOs. Personnel may be committed individually; i.e., serve on a multinational staff, as a team (such as a medical team), or as part of a unit. Units may be deployed intact or organized after arrival in the peacekeeping area of operations. A typical peacekeeping force contingent is a combat unit in a peacekeeping role supported by logistic and communications units. Peacekeeping force units may include ground, air, space, or maritime forces, or a combination of all of these.

6. Overall PKOs and Tasks. There are three operations and six tasks that may be associated with any peacekeeping effort and may be supported by ground, air, maritime, and space operations. The three operations are: peace observation, internal supervision and assistance, and monitoring the terms of the protocol. The six tasks are: supervision of free territories, supervision of cease-fires, supervision of withdrawals and disengagements, supervision of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, supervision of demilitarization and demobilization, and maintenance of law and order.

7. Ground Operations. The ground force assigned peacekeeping duties has the primary mission of manning observer groups and providing peacekeeping forces to monitor and enforce the terms of the protocol that established the PKO. These elements can supervise the separation of the armed forces of the hostile groups in a conflict and the disengagements, cease-fires, and withdrawal of the combatants. To accomplish these tasks, the peacekeeping

force will most likely be required to establish buffer zones and monitor the cease-fire lines.

a. The peacekeeping force deploys to separate the opposing sides and establish a buffer zone. Its presence reassures each party to the conflict that the other is not violating the truce. The peacekeeping force controls and surveys the line of demarcation. It facilitates the disengagement of forces, discourages infiltration and confrontations, and assists in resolving local disputes.

b. Ground operations may also involve peace observations and the reporting of military and paramilitary units within a specified zone in order to ensure that:

(1) Authorized units of the belligerent parties are not increased above the strength stipulated by the parties involved.

(2) Existing fortifications are neither reinforced nor enlarged, except as necessary to protect the peacekeeping force.

(3) There is no increase of arms and supplies apart from those agreed on.

(4) The armistice demarcation line (ADL) and the buffer zone are not overflowed by aircraft from the opposing sides.

c. The force can also provide internal supervision and assistance by:

(1) Contributing to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

(2) Assisting civil authorities in such functions as supervision of elections, transfer of authority, partition of territory, or the temporary administration of civil functions.

(3) Providing initial assistance and support to refugees and/or displaced civilians.

8. Air Operations

a. An air component can make a significant contribution to all peacekeeping forces and observers. Air operations are particularly useful in patrolling difficult and undeveloped terrain, areas heavily mined or containing

unexploded ordnance, or monitoring no-fly exclusion zones, e.g., Bosnia or Iraq. The air component's ability and flexibility in covering large areas in a short amount of time is an asset for both ground and maritime operations. Additionally, the air component's contributions to peacekeeping can be in the nature of airlift; logistics; surveillance; reconnaissance; command, control, and communications (C3); intelligence; aerial refueling; search and rescue; and medical evacuation.

b. The threat of hostile anti-aircraft fire is sometimes compounded by hazardous geographic or climatic conditions, especially when operations are conducted over remote developing nations. An even greater threat to future peacekeeping air operations is posed by the proliferation of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.

c. Airlift is a vital US contribution to a UN-sponsored peacekeeping effort. Airlift is characterized by speed, range, and flexibility. Although primarily used to lift cargo and personnel, it can also be used in an aeromedical evacuation role.

d. Air elements can provide surveillance of cease-fire and armistice lines, military deployment limitations, military withdrawals or disengagements, and civilian movement in and out of disputed areas and demarcation lines. These air surveillance assets are also useful in providing surveillance of the belligerent parties.

e. Airborne reconnaissance can be used to collect information that can provide a means to observe a cease-fire. Through surveillance and reconnaissance, such varied data as meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, electronic, and communications are obtainable. Strategic, operational, and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance have the ability to provide timely notification of any increase in potentially hostile capabilities.

f. Air traffic control supporting the peacekeeping effort ranges from providing liaison personnel for host-country facilities, to the employment of mobile tower and navigational aids and landing systems. Joint Pub 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone," provides additional information on airspace control during PKOs.

g. Air assets can acquire intelligence data that can be essential to decisionmaking during PKOs. This

intelligence data can assist in assessing actions that may occur, reducing the risk of surprise and enhancing operational effectiveness.

h. Aerial refueling assists in the rapid deployment and employment of peacekeeping forces and can also provide logistic support to peacekeeping forces.

i. With the ability to cover vast amounts of area in a short amount of time, air operations play a key role in any search and rescue mission.

j. Aircraft provide an expeditious means to quickly evacuate personnel to a medical facility.

9. Maritime Operations

a. Maritime involvement in PKOs may involve supporting sealift, surface forces (often with organic aircraft for coastal surveillance operations), submarine forces, amphibious forces, or provision of individual observers.

b. The use of naval forces in PKOs may be somewhat more limited in scope than that of land forces. It may also extend beyond simply establishing a physical presence between the naval ships of the belligerent parties. To be most effective, naval forces should have access to the territorial waters adjacent to the parties in the conflict. The psychological and stabilizing effect of a visible naval presence is significantly reduced if there is a requirement to conduct PKOs from beyond the limits of the territorial waters. Additionally, the response time for dealing with flare-ups would be markedly increased by the inability to operate within the territorial waters.

(1) Naval vessels may further contribute to the maintenance of peace by providing a staging platform for personnel and equipment destined for PKOs ashore and for sustaining this force. This is particularly significant in the early stages of the operation before significant shore-based assets have been flown in. Similarly, amphibious deployment of ground forces is necessary where adequate landing facilities are unavailable or the tactical situation renders their use impractical.

(2) Naval vessels engaged in PKOs may be tasked with accompanying neutral shipping into and out of the danger area adjacent to territories of the parties in

a conflict. The same is true for ships of the parties in a conflict that continue commercial shipments from their ports. Such shipments, and the peacekeeping forces that accompany them, require an agreement between the parties in the conflict that the escort policy is in effect. In the absence of any agreement, protection offered by peacekeeping forces in this role is for the purpose of providing safety for neutral merchant shipping. This protection is authorized under the international law concept of collective self-defense.

(3) Naval vessels assist in the maintenance of peace by providing neutral territory aboard which representatives of the parties in the conflict may meet for supervised negotiations.

(4) Naval vessels engaged in PKOs may be tasked with maritime interception operations, which may include the stopping, boarding, searching, and possible diverting or redirecting of commercial and/or military vessels to enforce sanctions.

c. The open sea beyond a coastline provides a near equivalent of a prohibited border zone on land, and comparatively simple controls within territorial seas can simplify the problem of identification. The degree of physical protection is dependent on the ease with which operatives can make landings. A rugged coastline with inaccessible cliffs and treacherous offshore currents obviously needs less observation than an easily approached area with wide beaches offering good access to the interior. Observation and surveillance of an irregular coastline is difficult, and peacekeeping forces must use surveillance devices and reconnaissance.

d. The employment of maritime sea and air surveillance is used to effect close and continuous observation of areas above, on, and below selected areas of the world's seas and oceans. Maritime surveillance is used to ensure compliance with provisions of the terms of reference (TOR), and to provide early warning of potentially dangerous or hostile actions to friendly forces. Additionally, maritime forces can be employed in the role of visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) to ensure compliance with provisions of the TOR.

e. Coastal control is the employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore area or, conversely, to deny the use of an offshore area to parties not

authorized to enter in accordance with specific peacekeeping truce agreements. Offshore areas for PKOs will normally refer to agreed on territorial seas, as international waters (beyond a nation's territorial sea limits) are not subject to peacekeeping controls as would be an inland buffer zone or land area marked by demarcation lines. Coastal control is accomplished by conducting surveillance and intercept operations.

f. Offshore assets, primarily petroleum production platforms and deep water offshore port facilities, require protection. These assets are vital not only because of their gas and petroleum production, but also for their potential use as remote heliports, surveillance platforms, and logistic support bases.

g. Harbor defense is the protection of harbor approaches, harbors, anchorages, and ports from external threats. Harbor defense measures include surveillance, intercept, and vessel movement control. Port security is safeguarding vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats such as accidents, civil disturbances, sabotage, and disasters. Port security also includes port safety; both are closely related, mutually supportive, and often concurrently conducted.

h. Mine countermeasures, a concern for all naval peacekeeping efforts, are specialized area procedures designed to ensure access to, or transit of, oceans and waterways. Mine countermeasures include all means used to prevent or reduce the danger from mines to surface ships and submarines.

i. Search and rescue (SAR) is the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.

j. The US Coast Guard (USCG) can provide the following capabilities in support of PKOs:

- (1) Conducting and coordinating Maritime Interception Force (MIF) operations and boardings to enforce embargoes and sanctions.
- (2) Providing port security and port safety services.
- (3) Providing coastal sea control and harbor defense services.

- (4) Monitoring and enforcing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).
- (5) Environmental defense pollution prevention, mitigation, monitoring and response.
- (6) Escorting vessels.
- (7) Managing vessel traffic, including traffic control and aids to navigation.
- (8) Reflagging merchant vessels to US flag.
- (9) Training in USCG mission areas (law enforcement, fisheries, SAR, environmental protection, port safety and security, waterway management, and maritime safety).
- (10) Conducting port visits to demonstrate US Government support and resolve.
- (11) Planning, coordinating, and executing maritime SAR.
- (12) Providing patrol boat squadrons in support of coastal patrol, surveillance, and interdiction operations.

10. Space Operations. Space forces are tasked with providing support to PKOs. Space force involvement will consist of military satellite communications (MILSATCOM), navigation, environmental monitoring, mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G), and surveillance operations.

a. Communications. In many areas where PKOs are likely to occur, existing communications infrastructure may not support the needs of the peacekeeping force. The peacekeeping forces must have the capability to communicate over long distances between assigned land, sea, and air forces as well as to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The peacekeeping force may also be required to establish a backbone communications infrastructure that will support political needs. Satellite communications support can be provided by the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) System, Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and the Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) System. In addition, MILSATCOM can be augmented by leased commercial satellite communications.

b. Navigation. Global Positioning System and other space positioning and navigation (Pos/Nav) systems support PKOs by providing highly accurate three dimensional location capability, velocity determination, and time reference. Such Pos/Nav systems allow peacekeeping forces to know the location of friendly forces, where they are going, and how they should get there. This is extremely important in areas where maps are out of date or nonexistent, physical landmarks are sparse, or local magnetic variations may not be reliable.

c. Environmental Monitoring. Space derived weather data is crucial to PKOs. It helps to assess the impact of weather on mission planning, route selection, communications, observation, and reporting.

d. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. MC&G data can provide the peacekeeping force products in the form of hard and soft copy maps, gravity values, sea surface topography measurements, hydrographic charts, and digital feature analysis. In addition, satellite systems can provide supplemental updates on port conditions, river stages, recent construction, vegetation analysis, ice coverage, and other ground features.

e. Surveillance. Space systems allow commanders to observe areas of operation and interest at great distances. They can provide the peacekeeping force the ability to observe and monitor the operations of opposing combatants. Derived data can provide location, disposition, intention, and detection.

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CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEKEEPING

1. Approval Process--UN-Sponsored

a. There is no general agreement on what constitutes an authority for peacekeeping. However, Article 29 of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Observer missions and peacekeeping forces are within the context of Article 29. Thus, the Security Council is normally the authority for mandating and terminating UN PKOs. However, the UN General Assembly has authorized two PKOs: the UN Emergency Force I in 1956, and the UN Security Force in west Iran in 1962.

b. The Secretary General is responsible to the Security Council for the organization, conduct, and direction of the PKO. The Security Council decides the PKO's mandate, although the General Assembly may do so on rare occasions. The Secretary General is also charged with keeping the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the PKO and, under guidelines established in October 1973, also informs the Security Council of all matters that might affect the PKO's nature or effectiveness.

c. The Secretary General is given a measure of discretion within the terms of the PKO's mandate because of the need for some latitude and flexibility in day-to-day dealings with the PKO.

d. The United States participates in UN PKOs in accordance with the UN Participation Act of 1945 (Pub. L. 79-264), codified in 22 US Code, section 287. When the decision is made by the appropriate political authority for the United States to support a UN-sponsored PKO, the United States may employ any element of national power to conduct PKOs to assist the UN and the parties in conflict. For the Department of Defense, the appropriate political authority is the NCA. PKOs range from supporting diplomatic efforts designed to resolve the causes of the conflict, to positioning military forces or observers between the parties in a conflict. This broad range of operations involves a correspondingly broad approach to coordination within the US Government structure.

(1) National Security Council (NSC). The first step in translating national-level decisions and guidance into operational plans and specific guidance to Government agencies and departments begins at the NSC. The Deputies Committee of the NSC (NSC/DC) is supported by a Peacekeeping Core Group and regional and functional committees that advise on matters related to their region or functional area. During a PKO, the NSC/DC may activate an interagency response group to coordinate US activities.

(2) Department of State (DOS). DOS is the lead Government agency in executing US foreign policy and has lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI peace operations in which US combat units are not participating. DOS receives support from many Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, to carry out PKOs. DOS involvement extends from policy formulation to mission execution at the host-nation and Country Team levels. The US Mission to the United Nations (USUN) consolidates requests for support and submits those requests to the Bureau of International Organizations (BIO) at the US DOS. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is the principal adviser and focal point along with the DOS BIO, which acts as principal liaison between DOS and the Department of Defense.

(3) Department of Defense

(a) The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI peace operations in which there are US combat units and for all Chapter VII peace operations. Requests involving DOD support (logistics, military observers, or forces), will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) (ASD(S&R)), the Military Departments, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) are key staffs for administration and supervision of DOD peacekeeping activities. The Department of Defense communicates guidance and tasking to the appropriate combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies either through the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff or the designated executive agent.

(b) DOD requests for USCG assets to support peacekeeping operations are submitted through an interdepartmental memorandum to the Department of Transportation (DOT).

(c) The Department of Defense will coordinate with DOS to ensure that the Services are reimbursed for services and assets provided in support of UN peacekeeping.

(4) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides overall guidance to combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The entire Joint Staff monitors aspects of PKOs. The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) contributes US military peacekeeping guidance, and the Operations Directorate (J-3) monitors current PKOs. Often, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs that a joint action cell be formed to organize, coordinate, and monitor the support required. This cell will develop written taskings and coordinate these taskings with affected CINCs, Chiefs of the Services, and heads of other DOD agencies.

(5) Combatant Commanders. MCM-144-93, "Implementation of the Unified Command Plan" stipulates that

"The commander of a unified command that includes a general geographic area of responsibility is responsible for commanding US forces conducting peacekeeping operations within the commander's geographic area of responsibility, whether as a unilateral US action or as part of a multinational coalition; and, unless otherwise directed by the NCA, supporting US forces under the direction of a multinational peacekeeping organization."

Normally, a geographic combatant commander will have COCOM over forces assigned to a PKO being conducted in that CINC's area of responsibility (AOR). Whether assigned COCOM or not over peacekeeping forces operating in the AOR, the CINC will usually provide administrative, personnel, operational, logistic, health service, intelligence, and C3 support through

one or more of the component commanders or other supporting combatant commanders to these operations in accordance with CJCS order. This support may also include assisting forces of other nations when such support is in accordance with diplomatic agreement. Because of the broad nature of PKOs, the entire geographic combatant command staff may be involved in planning, monitoring, or coordinating support to peacekeeping activities.

(6) Executive Agent. The executive agent, when designated by the Secretary of Defense, serves as a point of contact for US participation in a specific PKO. When a PKO is conducted in a geographic combatant commander's AOR, the executive agent must keep the combatant commander informed. In general, an executive agent is employed to provide administrative and logistic support to a UN PKO. These usually include: personnel records management (to include efficiency reports and notification of personnel actions), and finance and ensuring the well-being of deployed personnel.

2. Approval Process--Non-UN-Sponsored

a. The United States may participate in PKOs sponsored not by the UN but by regional organizations or friendly countries. PKOs depend on the consent of the parties in a conflict, the host nation, and the agreement of other powers that perceive their interests may be affected. Consequently, the UN is not always an acceptable or practicable sponsor of PKOs.

b. The decision to conduct these operations will be made by the NCA. The procedures used within the NSC, DOS, and Department of Defense to develop specific tasks and coordinate actions with the affected combatant commanders, Chiefs of the Services, and heads of DOD agencies would be the same as those for a UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission.

c. The reasons for the United States to participate in a PKO outside the UN are:

(1) Lack of agreement in the UN Security Council that would lead at least one of the five permanent members to veto the establishment of the operation. Any one of the five permanent members may block approval with a veto. For example, the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty presumed a UN force and

UN observers would monitor the security arrangements. However, faced with Arab opposition and a threatened Soviet veto, the mandate for UN Emergency Force II expired and the force and observers began to withdraw. Although the UN tried to establish a postwithdrawal UN force and observers, the President of the Security Council indicated it was not possible. On 18 May 1981, Egypt and Israel, with the assistance of the United States, opened negotiations leading to the creation, on 3 August 1981, of the MFO. Although the continued peaceful situation between Egypt and Israel is primarily a result of the 1979 peace treaty, the reassurance the MFO provides remains an important element in maintaining the peace.

(2) The attitude of some developing nations toward a UN peacekeeping force would favor another international organization to sponsor the effort. While the developing nations often find a UN peacekeeping force a convenient means of controlling a dangerous local conflict, they also have reservations. For example, some African nations regarded the UN operation in the Congo as thinly disguised western interference and have favored the OAU as a sponsor for peacekeeping.

(3) Article 52 of the UN Charter recognizes the right of regional organizations to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, provided arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

d. To be effective, a PKO outside the UN must have:

(1) The support of a regional power or a multinational group.

(2) A properly constituted political organization through which policy directives, as well as financial and administrative matters, can be coordinated and channeled to the force commander. This may be a regional organization such as the MFO Headquarters in Rome. A committee of ambassadors obtaining separate instructions from their own governments may be necessary in an emergency to launch an operation. This committee should be replaced as soon as possible by an organization tailored to the requirement.

(3) A designated military commander with an integrated headquarters. This could be a combined headquarters composed of members representing the units of a multinational force.

(4) The consent of the parties in a conflict and of the host countries, and preferably wide enough international support, or at least tacit acceptance, to avoid interference that may be perceived as damaging.

(5) Logistic and financial support.

3. Peacekeeping Considerations. PKOs differ fundamentally from internal security because a peacekeeping force does not act in support of a government--it is entirely neutral. Once a peacekeeping force loses its reputation for impartiality, its usefulness is destroyed. There are certain conditions that must be present for PKOs to work well. These conditions are:

a. Consent, cooperation, and support of the authorities of the parties in the conflict.

b. Political recognition of the PKO by most of, if not the entire, international community.

c. A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission, with specified and understood rules of engagement (ROE).

d. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force and observers to carry out their responsibilities.

e. An effective command, control, communications, and computers (C4) system.

f. Well-trained, balanced, and impartial forces.

g. An effective and responsive all-source intelligence gathering capability (because of the sensitivity of this type of support, it should be referred to as information).

h. An effective and responsive logistic support system.

4. Political Considerations. It is important to understand how political factors influence the tactical execution of PKOs. Specifically, the mandate, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), TOR, and ROE are directed by the political process. The legal status of the force and observers must be secured through specific agreements. In addition, force protection

methods must be developed for each PKO. The tactical commander must comply with instructions and inform the chain of command of the tactical implications of a political decision. Political and military leaders must meet regularly to understand each other's perceptions and to coordinate on proposed solutions to problems.

a. Mandate. The peacekeeping force will operate with a mandate that describes the scope of operations. The sponsoring bodies usually consist of several countries; their agreement should frame the mandate for the peacekeeping force in such a way that it does not give advantage to any side. For these reasons, the agreement may be imprecise and susceptible to different interpretations by the parties in the conflict as well as by the countries contributing to the PKO.

(1) The basis for all UN PKOs is the mandate developed by the UN Security Council. This mandate is based on negotiations with the parties in the conflict, including the host country, and parties that are both potential contributors of contingents and acceptable to the host nation.

(2) The mandate may:

(a) Nominate the force commander and ask for the Security Council's approval.

(b) Recommend the size of the force.

(c) List those countries that are prepared to provide contingents immediately and those with which negotiations are still proceeding.

(d) Outline proposals for the movement and maintenance of the force, including countries that might provide transport aircraft, shipping, and logistic units.

(e) Propose a time limit for the operation.

(f) Make recommendations concerning the financing of the force.

(3) Appendix B is a sample UN mandate.

b. Status of Forces Agreement

(1) SOFA proceeds from the mandate. With the advice of the concerned military commander, the diplomatic elements establish stationing agreements that are often referred to as SOFAs. These agreements between the host nation, sponsor, and contributors will establish the detailed legal status of the PKO. As a minimum, the SOFA should include the following main points:

- (a) The neutral status of the PKO and its members.
- (b) Entry and departure permits to and from the host nations.
- (c) Identity documents.
- (d) The right to carry arms as well as the authorized type of weapons.
- (e) Freedom of movement, both on and off duty, for members of the PKO.
- (f) Legal jurisdiction over members of the PKO.
- (g) The use of airports, harbors, and road networks in the host nation.
- (h) The right for the peacekeeping force to operate its own communications system.
- (i) Postal regulations and customs clearance procedures.
- (j) Authority to fly UN and national flags.
- (k) Uniform regulations.
- (l) Permission to operate vehicles without special registration.
- (m) Applicability of "The Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations."
- (n) Matters of jurisdiction.
- (o) Military police actions and authority.
- (p) Tax and duty regulations.

(q) General supply and maintenance matters (imports of equipment; commodities; local procurement of provisions; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants).

(r) Matters of compensation (with respect to the host-nation's property).

(s) The force has authority to gather, record, and report such information as is necessary to ensure the protection and security of the force and to monitor all regional forces and/or activities to record and evaluate their compliance and noncompliance with the mandates or agreements being monitored by the force.

(2) Appendix C is a sample SOFA.

c. Terms of Reference

(1) Based on an analysis of the mandate and the situation, TOR are developed to govern implementation of UN participation in the PKO. TOR, which may be subject to approval by the parties in a conflict, describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the US military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the peacekeeping force. The draft TOR is coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it is forwarded through the Department of Defense to DOS for final approval. NCA will then issue an execute directive.

(2) Although the parties in the conflict may agree on both the mandate and the truce (because it is politically and militarily expedient for them to do so), they may have different and/or hidden agendas. They may interpret the TOR to suit their own purposes. This point is important because the peacekeeping force may find itself deployed in a situation where the TOR are far less precise than is desirable from a military point of view; therefore, peacekeeping force commanders should ensure that the standing operating procedures (SOP) (covered in Chapter V), provide sufficient detail to augment the TOR.

(3) Appendix D is a sample TOR. Annex A to Appendix D is the TOR for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL). Annex B to Appendix D is the TOR for US military participation in and support to the MFO.

d. Rules of Engagement

(1) Another political factor involves the ROE employed during PKOs. Commanders must assess the threat, to include both conventional and nonconventional means, and make recommendations for specific ROE through the chain of command. The PKO ROE must be clearly stated in simple language. Depending on the security situation, PKO ROE should normally be written so that the use of force is authorized for self-defense only. The use of force is usually justified in self-defense only when members of the PKO are threatened with death or bodily injury. While negotiations are being held to gain the consent of the parties in the conflict for interposition by the peacekeeping force, care must be taken to ensure that all parties understand the PKO ROE.

(2) All troops must be briefed upon arrival in the area of operations and kept up-to-date on the following points:

- (a) SOFA or similar legal documents.
- (b) ROE as promulgated by the US unit commander.
- (c) The potential threat.
- (d) Closing checkpoints to prevent entry into the buffer zone.
- (e) Deployment to positions.
- (f) How to act in foreseeable emergencies when force may have to be used.
- (g) How to handle individuals seeking political asylum or humanitarian assistance (HA).

5. Legal Status

a. The legal status of a PKO, its military and civilian personnel, and property, must be secured by a legal instrument with the host government. The type of agreement depends on the degree of accord between the parties in the conflict and with the UN, or any non-UN

controlling body. In Cyprus, a large measure of accord is reflected in a SOFA that has the standing of a treaty. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) or a diplomatic exchange of notes may be used. A diplomatic exchange of notes may be made directly between governments in the case of non-UN forces, or unilaterally and in parallel between the host governments and the UN. For exchanges between governments in the case of non-UN forces, the Secretary of State, for the United States, has given blanket authority (under Circular 175) to US embassies to negotiate and conclude a diplomatic exchange of notes. The agreement balances two fundamental factors: the independence of the PKO versus the government authorities of the host government, and freedom of movement.

b. Normally, military and civilian personnel of a PKO remain under the criminal jurisdiction of their own nations. The legal instrument should provide for the handing over of members of the force from the host government to their respective contingents for disciplinary action. Although members of a PKO enjoy a considerable measure of protection, even when off duty, they must respect the laws, regulations, religions, and mores of the host nation and other parties, and refrain from all political activity and other activity inconsistent with the requirement of strict neutrality. Members of the PKO remain subject to their national contingent's code of military law.

6. Identification

a. UN Peacekeeping Forces. All members, vehicles, boats, aircraft, patrols, positions, and demarcation lines must be clearly marked in the following manner:

(1) Personnel. Blue helmet liner or blue beret with UN badge, blue brassard or armband, shoulder patch, blue scarf, and identity card. If time permits, the UN will make a partial issue of these items before the contingent leaves its home base; however, UN identity cards will be issued on arrival in the area of operations. Four passport-size photographs for each individual should be obtained before departure.

(2) Vehicles. Every vehicle must display a UN flag and have the UN insignia painted on it in accordance with UN regulations. Vehicles will usually be painted white.

(3) Boats. Watercraft must conform to the same standards as vehicles, using the design of the craft to enhance insignia recognition.

(4) Aircraft. Assigned aircraft must also conform to the same standards as vehicles and boats, with the exception of a UN flag. Aircraft design is also used to enhance recognition. Supporting intertheater aircraft may not conform to these marking standards for reasons of practicality. Intertheater aircraft will normally bear their national military or commercial markings.

(5) Patrols. Dismounted patrols, in addition to other means of identification, should, if practical, display a small UN flag.

(6) Positions. All headquarters, military and domestic installations, observation posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and positions must be very visible, usually painted in white, fly the UN flag, and have the UN insignia painted prominently on the walls. If there is an air threat, or a perceived air threat, the appropriate markings should also be painted on the roofs. Positions should be illuminated at night.

(7) Demarcation Lines. Lines separating forces must be clearly marked.

b. Non-UN Peacekeeping Forces. These forces will normally use their own colors and insignia or markings that clearly identify them as the peacekeeping force. Previous and current non-UN peacekeeping forces have used the following:

(1) The MFO in the Sinai used terra-cotta color berets, white helicopters, white vehicles, armbands and badges, MFO flags, and other identifying markings. Observers wore orange overalls and hats.

(2) The MNF in Beirut displayed national contingent flags on its vehicles as well as national flags on brassards or uniform sleeves.

CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. UN Force Headquarters

a. UN peacekeeping forces are under UN control, vested in the Secretary General, who is responsible to the Security Council. This arrangement recognizes the key role of the Security Council in establishing a PKO, while it allows the Secretary General some flexibility and discretion in implementing Security Council resolutions.

b. There is no standard staff organization common to all UN force headquarters. Minor differences reflect local requirements or the preferences of the officers who created the headquarters. The staff is grouped into three main categories: force commander's personal staff, military staff, and civilian staff.

(1) The force commander's personal staff normally consists of a military assistant, a political adviser, a legal adviser, a public affairs officer, an interpreter, and liaison officers from the armed forces of the parties in the conflict.

(2) The military staff normally consists of a chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff, and an operations staff (intelligence [known as information gathering vice intelligence to preserve neutrality], plans, training, engineer, communications, air traffic control, security, police operations, observer groups, administration, logistics, and health services).

(3) The civilian staff, provided by the UN Secretariat in New York, at a minimum consists of a chief administrative officer (CAO). The CAO is responsible for the direction of all administrative matters having financial implications as well as for the overall direction of the force's administration. The CAO deals directly with the Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities (OFOESA) at UN Headquarters in New York.

c. The force commander is appointed by, and responsible to, the Secretary General who coordinates and obtains the consent of the Security Council. The force commander conducts day-to-day operations but refers all policy

matters to the Secretary General. The force commander is normally selected from the nations that traditionally contribute peacekeeping forces and whose qualifications are acceptable to the Security Council. The force commander must also be acceptable to the host nation and all the parties in the conflict.

d. Staff size must be closely controlled because of economy (the General Assembly will question any alleged or perceived extravagance when voting on a force's budget) and because host nations may be concerned about large operations and information staffs.

e. When a peacekeeping force includes an observer group in its mission, the force headquarters staff may be expanded to provide oversight for the observers.

2. Military Command and Control

a. UN-Sponsored Operations. UN-sponsored operations have the following command relationships:

(1) The most effective command relationship has one force headquarters and one force commander responsible for the PKO. The force commander usually will be given operational control (OPCON) over US military units assigned to the peacekeeping force and have general responsibility to ensure that parent forces take all necessary action for the good order and discipline of the force. The force commander may make investigations, conduct inquiries, and request information, reports, and consultations.

(2) A national contingent consists of a nation's entire contribution: its units as well as its staff officers on the force headquarters. National contingent commanders report directly to the force commander.

(3) When large peacekeeping forces are spread over a wide area, it may be necessary to require the addition of a UN brigade or higher headquarters. Additions such as these are particularly important where the complexity of the situation demands increased staff support.

(4) Each unit commander is ultimately responsible for supervising and coordinating the accomplishment of his mission, communicating changes to the mission,

and responding to committed units' needs and requirements.

(5) The national contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary action within their own contingents in accordance with their national codes of military law. Authority for national contingent commanders to carry out their national laws in the host country's territory should be included in the SOFA for the PKO. In the event of a major disciplinary breach, the force commander will discuss the case with the contingent commander and may refer the matter, through the Secretary General, to the troop-contributing government concerned.

(6) Appendix E shows a notional chain of command for UN PKOs.

b. Non-UN-Sponsored Operations. Non-UN-sponsored operations may be set up in a number of ways. The decision will largely depend on the time available, political factors, and the willingness or ability of the parties to cooperate. Ways these extemporaneous operations may be set up include:

(1) A single headquarters to coordinate both political and military activities.

(2) Two headquarters: one to control military operations, and one for political direction. This arrangement requires increased attentiveness to preserve unity of effort.

Appendix F illustrates the chain of command of a non-UN PKO.

c. Command and Control of US Military Units and Individual Observers

(1) The geographic combatant commander should always have COCOM over US forces assigned to PKOs in the CINC's AOR. In rare situations when this does not occur, such as when an executive agent is designated, the combatant commander will usually provide support as directed by the NCA. Since these operations may impact other operations being conducted in the CINC's AOR, the executive agent must keep the combatant commander informed.

(2) On a case-by-case basis, US military units are assigned under the OPCON of a peacekeeping force commander. These units fall under OPCON upon entering the area of the PKO.

(3) The US contingent commander, who is the senior US officer, provides the link between US units under OPCON of the peacekeeping force commander and the geographic combatant commander who provides national support (as required) for the US contingent of the peacekeeping force.

Appendix G illustrates the chain of command for a US peacekeeping contingent.

3. Commanders' Directives

a. The force commander's directive should clearly outline who is empowered to give orders to contingents and under what circumstances. A unit commander must be assured that the orders have the authority of the force commander and the sanction of the UN Secretary General, or, in the case of a non-UN PKO, the appropriate authority. As a corollary, unit commanders cannot accept orders from other sources, whether they come from the host nation or the parties in a conflict except in the limited sphere of discipline and matters of domestic concern. An exception may occur in a non-UN force when national contingents are placed directly under their ambassadors to the host nation.

b. National contingent commanders may issue their own directives based on an analysis of the force mandate and the force commander's directive. Although each directive is unique, the subjects that each commander's directive should cover are:

(1) Authority, by the force commander, for appointment as a peacekeeping unit commander.

(2) Appointment of subordinate commanders, especially those detached from the main body.

(3) Decision on who is authorized to issue instructions and directives to the unit as well as under what circumstances.

(4) The degree of command and control the force commander has over national contingents by covering such topics as the:

(a) Power of the force commander to direct operations.

(b) Applicability of national laws and regulations to personnel within contingents.

- (5) Subunit AORs and tasks.
- (6) Methods of operation and deployment.
- (7) Reserve forces.
- (8) States of readiness.
- (9) Succession to command.

c. Although the following items will have been negotiated with UN Headquarters, or the non-UN force headquarters, before the contingent's deployment, they should be repeated in the unit commander's directive:

- (1) Location of unit headquarters.
- (2) Unit composition.
- (3) Identification; i.e., the wearing of UN or non-UN identification headgear, badges, and armbands and the marking of vehicles and positions.
- (4) Duration of duty.
- (5) Relationship with the host government and its local administration, armed forces, and police.
- (6) Powers of search and seizure and rights of entry into property.
- (7) Relations with local forces and liaison with mediation missions.
- (8) Relations with the media and circumstances when information on operational and domestic matters may be given to the media and through whom.
- (9) Security against possible attacks as well as information and communications security.
- (10) Regulations and restrictions to be observed off duty.

4. Special Considerations. US commanders of peacekeeping forces must understand the nature of PKOs and their effects on the members of the command. Some considerations include:

- a. Resolving disputes at the lowest possible level.
- b. Accepting UN-provided supplies common to all contingents rather than demanding US supplies.
- c. Remembering that not everyone is suitable for every type of duty. Commanders may need to exercise judgment in determining who is selected for, or removed from a PKO.
- d. Recognizing that there are profound and legitimate differences in the world view, cultural norms, work ethic, and standards of professionalism among the many national contingents that make up and support international peacekeeping forces. These differences must be accepted and respected if the international force is to be effective.
- e. Being aware of the potential adverse effect of their force's presence on the local economy. Commanders should resist developing elaborate base camps and support facilities. The policy on hiring local civilians should include consideration of prevailing wages. Leave and pass policy should also consider economic factors. Differences in disposable income among national contingents could be balanced by regulating the amount of US dollars American personnel are allowed to convert to local currency. Consideration should also be given to establishing a rest and recreation program outside the area of conflict.
- f. Understanding thoroughly the existing ROE by all concerned.
- g. Centralizing control to ensure uniform reaction to incidents and preclude hasty actions by inexperienced peacekeepers. Since a commander cannot foresee every eventuality or predict how incidents may develop, junior leaders should be allowed to exercise initiative within the general framework of force policy directives and SOP.
- h. Ensuring that subordinates keep their superiors informed of situations as they develop and suggest possible courses of action in sufficient time to be evaluated and acted on where required. Timely anticipation of a serious crisis may allow a superior commander or the force commander to go to the scene to

take charge. However, situations may occur where an incident develops so quickly that the subordinate on the scene must immediately take action before the situation becomes uncontrollable. If this occurs, a detailed, written report should be submitted as soon as possible.

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CHAPTER IV

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Guidelines

a. US personnel and forces, as part of PKOs, must prepare for worldwide deployment. Military forces of the belligerent parties will range from light infantry and insurgent forces to heavily mechanized or armored formations with large amounts of artillery, and naval and air forces of various sizes and capabilities. The organization, tactics, equipment, and capabilities of potential hostile forces will vary considerably; however, expect forces everywhere to be equipped with weapons that range from primitive to modern systems. The modern systems will be able to deliver conventional munitions, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), mines, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, flechettes, and C3 countermeasures.

b. The most important guideline to remember is that planning for a PKO is continuous. Differing peacekeeping mandates preclude a single "once-and-done" planning effort. This is compounded by the fact that there may not be sufficient time to write a complete plan before deployment. The following is a list of factors a peacekeeping planner must consider: mission, employment and sustainment, mission conditions, types of operations, force structure, C2 (Chapter III), intelligence architecture, force protection, technology, small unit considerations, personnel qualifications screening (Chapter VI), public affairs (PA) (Chapter VII), and contingency planning.

c. Reviewing the history and lessons learned from previous PKOs provides personnel with insight into situations they may face in the performance of their peacekeeping mission. These personnel must understand:

- (1) What the peacekeeping force is expected to do.
- (2) The political, economic, and military situation in their AOR.
- (3) The local customs, religions, ethnic, and tribal factions, in order to avoid confrontations with the local populace.
- (4) The importance of security as well as the operations security (OPSEC) process, threats to

personnel and physical security (particularly terrorist threats), hostile intelligence service threats, OPSEC planning guidance, and permissible OPSEC measures.

(5) The ROE as well as appropriate actions to take concerning infringements and violations of agreements.

d. An important aid in preparing personnel for their peacekeeping responsibilities is an area handbook. The purpose of an area handbook is to provide each individual with a single document detailing not only the considerations listed above, but virtually everything an individual needs to know about a specific AOR. Appendix H is a sample format for an area handbook.

e. It is extremely important to remember that habitual contact with only one of the parties in a conflict may lead to continued animosity among the parties. It is essential that the peacekeeping force maintain neutrality.

2. Employment. A peacekeeping force may be employed in one of two ways. Either each national contingent is allocated to a specific AOR, or the national contingents rotate among the areas. The pros and cons of each form of employment are explained below.

a. Allocation of National Units to AORs

(1) The key advantage of this form of employment is that each national contingent builds a depth of knowledge of the area and community in its respective sector. This results in continuity in collecting and processing information. Additionally, useful relationships are developed with the local authorities of the host government, police, and leadership of the parties in a conflict. Peacekeepers become well-acquainted with the local forces and are able to recognize and prohibit military personnel of the opposing forces who attempt to pass through checkpoints dressed as police or civilians.

(2) When national contingents are allocated a specific sector, their personnel can exploit the benefits of continuity by becoming well-acquainted with the terrain and community in their area of operations. Handing over both the accumulated

information records of an area of operations and its positions is easier when the relieving unit is of the same nationality.

(3) The disadvantage of this form of employment is the risk that national contingents may develop their own interpretation of force policy in their areas. For example, differences in the past have led to charges of inconsistency against the peacekeeping force. Habitual contact with only one of the parties in a conflict may also lead to continued animosity among the parties. When this occurs, the peacekeeper's mission becomes more difficult. A peacekeeping force is intended to be completely neutral and equally accessible to all parties in the conflict. If real or perceived inequities exist, the parties in the conflict must have recourse to request an exchange of peacekeeping forces.

b. Rotation of National Units Among the Areas of Responsibility

(1) The key advantage of this form of employment is that each national contingent obtains a solid working knowledge of more than one area. Rotation may also be required where friction develops between a contingent and a party in the conflict or where relations become too familiar.

(2) There are two disadvantages to this form of employment. First, a national contingent may not have sufficient time to acquire any depth of knowledge of the area or community. This may occur when useful background information gathered by a national contingent is not effectively passed to succeeding national contingents. Second, because national contingents are usually on comparatively short peacekeeping tours, coupled with the fact that there is no standard length of tour common to all peacekeeping forces, rotation of national contingents among the various areas may be difficult to schedule.

3. Mission Conditions. The mission conditions influence the priority of information gathered for the mission analysis. During the initial phases of the deployment of a peacekeeping force, intelligence collection is focused on gathering information to support the force. As familiarity with the area grows, emphasis shifts to collection of information to support the mission.

a. A modified form of intelligence preparation of the mission area is necessary to plan a PKO. This should include an analysis of the conflict and parties in the conflict, host nation, civilian population, government, and military and civilian facilities available to support the peacekeeping force, geography, terrain, climate and weather, and the environmental and medical threats to the force. In urban areas, the analysis should include port facilities, key intersections, bridges, tall buildings, and subterranean utility tunnels. It should also include an analysis of the multisource intelligence threat posed by the belligerent parties as well as the potential threat from international terrorists and radical elements.

b. All members of the peacekeeping force must understand the nature of the conflict, as well as the military capabilities and intentions of the parties in the conflict. The members of the peacekeeping force must also have an awareness of the population and its culture, language, politics, and religion, and what they might expect from the population; e.g., support, indifference, or hostility.

Appendix J contains more detail for intelligence and information requirements and planning.

4. Force Structure. Force structure depends on the size of the area, the forces mandated, and other factors such as lines of communications (LOCs), terrain, threat, and logistic requirements.

a. Infantry forces, with some augmentation, are organized, equipped, trained, and suited for the nature of PKOs. Mechanized and armored forces may be required for some PKOs because of mobility and protection. The mandate determines the mission, and an analysis of the mission determines the exact augmentation and composition of a deployed unit. For example, an air component, particularly one trained in forward air controller techniques, can significantly enhance the observation capabilities of most PKOs.

b. The strength of the force depends on its mandate and the size and nature of the area it has to control. At one end of the scale, the UN Yemen Observation Mission had one reconnaissance unit and an authorized strength of 189 personnel to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. At the other end of the scale, the UN Operation in the

Congo had an authorized strength of 19,828 personnel to provide internal supervision and assistance.

c. One significant peacekeeping component is the infantry battalion that can hold positions, provide continuous presence and observation, staff checkpoints, interpose units, and patrol. Armored reconnaissance units are particularly useful when the situation is fluid and/or embraces a large area. Normally, only small arms and light machineguns are included. Light and medium mortars are used primarily for illumination. Inclusion of any other weapon system would probably require prior coordination and approval to ensure compliance with the mandate. Air detachments can provide evidence of infringements of cease-fire and arms limitation agreements, and the rapid transport of personnel and equipment, often in response to rapidly developing situations. Their use increases the probability of detecting violations, provides a deterrent to major infringements, and enhances security. This deterrence encourages an atmosphere of confidence among the parties in the conflict and adherence to the agreement. Naval forces provide similar capabilities when infiltration by sea is a major concern.

d. Another force having the requisite training, experience, and equipment to perform peacekeeping missions is the military police. While having firepower, mobility, and communications necessary to conduct the operations, military police also have a wealth of experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances without escalating the tension. Their signature as a police force, rather than a combat force, often defuses tension between the peacekeeping force and the parties in the conflict.

e. A peacekeeping force must be task organized to accomplish the mission. The force structure must be the result of an in-depth assessment of the mission environment that considers the political realities of the peacekeeping area of operations. Where clashes in urban areas may give rise to lawlessness, the peacekeeping force must be structured to cope with that situation. It may have broad police powers under the TOR as agreed to by all parties in the conflict. If border clashes between regular forces of disputing parties are the prime threat to renewal of violence, then the peacekeeping force must have the appropriate structure, strength, and designated area of control that is sufficiently large in order to deter the parties in the conflict. Therefore,

the basic force structure and appropriate augmentation depend on each particular situation. Language qualifications and the use of liaison parties should also be considered when task-organizing forces. Other force structure considerations are to ensure that the force is:

- (1) Large enough to defend itself and establish a visible presence.
- (2) Flexible and mobile enough to concentrate forces in response to a local threat.
- (3) Balanced so that no one national element dominates the others.
- (4) Organized to facilitate the logistic support needed to preserve its effectiveness.

f. In a crisis, the goal of the reserve force is to demonstrate a multinational solidarity, reflecting the collective resolve of the UN, or some other international sponsor group, that the transgressor cannot afford to ignore. A reserve force enables the commander to respond to contingencies. It often consists of either an armored reconnaissance unit or infantry units. Since it is desirable to represent all the national contingents contributing to the force, the reserve force may be composite in nature; i.e., composed of sections from different national contingents.

(1) Deployment. The reserve force will normally deploy in a high-profile, nontactical manner with the UN or force flag displayed on each vehicle and with each vehicle's headlights on.

(2) Logistics. The amount of ammunition, fuel, and rations the reserve force brings with it, as well as the replenishment method, will be included in the force's SOP. The US law, international MOU, or reciprocal agreements that provide legal authority for providing supplies to other peacekeeping participants should be included in the logistics portion of the SOP.

(3) Command and Control

(a) If the force commander has substantial reserves, subordinate commanders can be directed or permitted to commit all their reserves. Otherwise, the force commander may retain

authority to commit reserves. The reserve force may be employed in one of the following two ways:

1. Under the command of the force headquarters to accomplish a specific task.

2. Under the tactical control (TACON) of a unit commander to carry out a specific mission that is usually limited in time, function, or location.

(b) If the reserve force is to operate in more than one area, it will remain under the command of the force headquarters. Whenever the reserve force is placed in support of a unit, the unit headquarters will normally be responsible for sending liaison officers, with radios, to the reserve force headquarters.

(4) Possible tasks for the reserve force include:

- (a) Providing an international presence or show of force.

- (b) Supporting a threatened area in the buffer zone. If one particular national contingent is singled out for harassment, a multinational show of force demonstrates that the force will not tolerate the situation.

- (c) Interposing between hostile parties before a tense situation escalates.

- (d) Implementing one of the force's contingency operation plans.

- (e) Forming a fighting force to support or extricate peacekeeping force elements that are in danger.

5. Force Protection. Experience has shown that force protection must be a high priority for a deployed peacekeeping force. The US national contingent commander is responsible for setting and enforcing minimum standards of physical security for US forces in coordination with the peacekeeping force commander and the geographic combatant commander. Critical components of the force protection program such as PKO ROE, weapons, ammunition access, and offensive activities may be established by the mandate. A principal item of support for force protection is

counterintelligence and intelligence, particularly as it applies to the prevention of terrorist attacks and the safety of peacekeeping forces. Because of the sensitivity of this type of support, it should be referred to as information. The following subparagraphs outline the specific force protection issues personnel assigned to a PKO must understand.

a. Terrorism poses serious problems for peacekeepers. The peacekeepers' task of overt observation makes them vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism (offensive measures to prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism) is outside the scope of a PKO. Antiterrorism (defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability to terrorism) is essential to a force protection program. Precautions must be taken to protect personnel, positions, headquarters, and accommodations. Key personnel are potential hostages because they may possess sensitive information about the local political situation, host-nation deployments, commercial contracts, and financial matters. Key personnel are also the targets of terrorists wishing to make a political statement by abducting members of a particular national contingent. Care must be taken to guard against attacks with mines, car bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, or mortars. If possible, buildings that are easy to approach undetected should not be used, and the number of people billeted in any one building should be limited to preclude a lucrative target for terrorists. When practicable, off-duty personnel should remain billeted aboard amphibious shipping. Personnel affiliated with administrative or other functions not essential to the daily conduct of operations ashore, should also remain aboard amphibious shipping unless the threat to shipping is greater than to facilities ashore.

b. Security for arms and ammunition should be the same as it is for normal military operations.

c. Other security considerations are as follows:

(1) Peacekeeping forces have no means of checking the credibility of local employees who may be bribed or pressured to provide information on politically sensitive matters or on the opposite side's forces. Therefore, commanders must exercise great care when discussing peacekeeping force matters and handling documents in the presence of local nationals.

- (2) Official personnel who visit the host nation should receive security briefings before their visits as well as security debriefings after their visits.

Appendix J contains guidance for intelligence support to the peacekeeping force and personnel.

6. Technology. Technology in and of itself is not the solution in a PKO. The ultimate source of information concerning infringements and violations of agreements lies with the individual and how the information is interpreted. However, technology can certainly enhance the conduct of PKOs. For example, still and video cameras can enhance the observation mission by providing visual documentation of cease-fire violations or other incidents. Some other examples of technology applications are:

- a. Lightweight body armor.
- b. Accurate ground maps and a GPS.
- c. Modular tactical force protection equipment.
- d. Effective countermine equipment.
- e. Surveillance systems, particularly airborne sensor systems using diverse imaging techniques.
- f. Effective night vision equipment.
- g. Intelligence fusion systems.
- h. Communications and communications security systems.
- i. Sensors and metal detectors.

7. Small Unit Considerations

a. The small unit leader in garrison normally deals with only a portion of the unit for a few hours each day. However, during PKOs, the leader, unit, and other personnel will be together for lengthy periods of time each day. The unit leader is responsible for conducting the unit's portion of the mission, including maintaining discipline, morale and welfare, training, logistic support, health service support (HSS), and personnel service support of the unit. The actions of the unit leader may be the most significant factor in the overall success of the peacekeeping mission.

b. The nature of the peacekeeping mission demands a high standard of discipline, particularly, self-discipline. Commanders at all levels must be conscious of this and must accomplish the following:

- (1) Brief all personnel to ensure that they understand the situation, ROE, etc.
- (2) Issue clear, concise, and simple orders.
- (3) Motivate all personnel to maintain a high standard of discipline.
- (4) Maintain high standards of cleanliness and care and maintenance of all weapons, equipment, and uniforms.

c. A peacekeeping mission is meant to be visible to all concerned. Because of this, the force is scrutinized by the local populace as well as by the other contingents. The force must therefore reflect vigilance, readiness, and competence in its duties. Individuals in isolated observation posts and checkpoints may become bored with the daily routine; therefore, innovative leadership is required to maintain morale. Rotation of units between observation posts and checkpoints, as well as out of sector, can help avert boredom. Exchanges, at various levels and of varying size among personnel and units of different contingents, provide interesting and educational breaks in the routine, while promoting intercontingent harmony and understanding. Large events, such as sports competitions, may require increased security measures.

d. Transportation of personnel and supplies is important for a unit occupying a large sector. Units often deploy by helicopter into and out of observation post areas, but may use ground transportation as well. If transportation assets fail, the mission may be jeopardized. Therefore, the small unit commander must ensure that proper periodic maintenance is accomplished and contingency plans are prepared to deal with alternate means of transportation should the primary mode fail.

e. As observation posts and checkpoints are often located away from medical treatment facilities, all personnel must be proficient in first aid (self aid, buddy aid). Selected individuals should be trained in combat lifesaver skills. Further, to ensure the health of the command is maintained, leaders should implement

and monitor preventive medical programs focused on countering the medical threat. These programs include, but are not limited to: water quality assurance, field sanitation, personal hygiene and protective measures, immunizations, acclimatization, and pest management. Disease and nonbattle injuries may result in more personnel losses than combat injuries. Stress control programs should also be instituted to counter the isolating effects and boredom experienced in PKOs.

f. The local telephone system, if available, should be used to reduce administrative radio traffic.

g. Generators, backup generators, and independent fuel supplies should be immediately available for emergency use.

8. Contingency Planning

a. States of Readiness

(1) The force headquarters will establish states of readiness usually covering key personnel, the reserve force, staffing of normal positions and temporary observation posts, increased patrolling, reinforcement of checkpoints, issue of reserve ammunition, and a viable evacuation plan. The states of readiness may vary from force to force, but UN forces normally have three states of readiness: normal vigilance, increased vigilance, and full alert. Each increase in the state of readiness will be complemented by restrictions on leave, training, and movement.

(2) Changes in the states of readiness are normally implemented only by the force commander. However, in an emergency, a sector commander may order a higher state of readiness, but must immediately inform the force headquarters. Changes in the states of readiness can be announced by radio using a codeword(s) to denote the state of readiness, or by using colored banners. Regardless of how the announcement is made, written confirmation should be provided to all concerned as soon as practicable.

b. Evacuation Plan

(1) A peacekeeping force may need to be evacuated in the event war breaks out or if the host nation withdraws its consent to the mandate. The evacuation

may be ordered only by the appropriate authority; e.g., the UN Security Council, multinational organization, or allied governments. The force commander is then responsible to the UN Secretary General, or the equivalent in a non-UN force, for the safe and speedy evacuation of all members of the peacekeeping force, its dependents, accredited visitors, and observer groups in the area, and, if appropriate, all UN-affiliated organizations.

(2) The force headquarters staff is responsible for ensuring that the evacuation plan is current. This plan must include appropriate egress routes by land, sea, and air.

(3) Each national contingent commander must consider, and plan for, the possibility that members of the force may need to be evacuated unilaterally. In this instance, the national contingent commander must coordinate with the force headquarters to determine if the contingent's positions and tasks are to be handed over to another contingent or abandoned. The US national contingent commander will coordinate unilateral evacuation plans with the geographic combatant commander.

(4) In all instances, the evacuation plan must include specific instructions for destroying critical items, equipment, and other assets (less medical) that cannot be removed.

c. Natural Disasters. Force contingency plans need to include procedures to deal with earthquakes, floods, forest fires, hurricanes, and/or tornadoes if the peacekeeping force will operate in an area susceptible to any of these natural disasters.

d. Refugees and Displaced Civilians. Refugees and displaced civilians can cause problems for the peacekeepers as shown by operations in Beirut and with the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Responsibilities of the peacekeeping force commander to handle these issues must be carefully defined under the TOR.

CHAPTER V

EMPLOYMENT

1. General. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the principal factors that must be considered when conducting PKOs. The source documents for determining the specifics of these principal factors are the mandate and TOR. These factors include: guidelines, SOP, separation of parties in the conflict, area presence, integration of the reserve force, freedom of movement, patrolling, observing, reporting, and carrying of weapons. Once established, the factors of employment must be acceptable to all parties in the conflict as well as the peacekeeping force.

2. Guidelines

a. Each PKO should be under the command of one headquarters and should have the proper support necessary to accomplish the mission. The types of actions that are often required are: interpositioning forces, patrolling, observing, reporting, PSYOP, civil affairs (CA) operations, maritime operations, engineering operations, and HA operations.

b. It may be necessary for the peacekeeping force to coordinate not only with military agencies, but also with several civil agencies. Examples of these civil agencies include, but are not limited to: port and river authorities, customs authorities, and police.

3. Standing Operating Procedures

a. SOP are required to regulate the conduct of operations and logistics. The drafting and dissemination of SOP will be one of the first duties of the force headquarters staff upon arrival in the area of operations. Relevant extracts from the TOR, ROE, and force commander's directives will be repeated in this SOP, as well as any other matters the force commander wishes to add that are consistent with peacekeeping force policy. Each PKO is unique and will require SOP to cover all particular points and conditions that require guidance. The overall force SOP will be augmented as required by national contingent commanders and/or subordinate unit commanders.

b. As a minimum, the SOP must include ROE, observation and checkpoint routines, communications procedures, reporting formats and procedures, and resupply procedures.

c. The SOP should state that photography must be controlled in the peacekeeping area of operations. The TOR may restrict photographs of either side's position, and state that cameras may not be displayed near these positions. Violations of these controls may result in accusations of espionage.

d. The SOP should also include vehicle and personnel search procedures, HSS considerations and medical evacuation requests, lists of persons allowed to enter peacekeeping installations, media guidance, and contact restrictions with local forces and the populace. The SOP should be based on area handbooks produced by the force headquarters. Appendix K is a sample format for SOP.

4. Separation of Parties in the Conflict. The key factor before any operations can be undertaken is the separation of the parties in the conflict. This requires the interposition of the force between the belligerents, the establishment of a buffer zone, and the continual monitoring of the protocol.

a. The interposition includes separating the parties in the conflict, observing the area of separation and control, and supervising the agreements reached between the parties.

(1) The interposition of a peacekeeping force calls for careful and accurate timing. The force should interpose as the parties in the conflict disengage, if at all possible, to take advantage of the lull in hostilities and to accurately impose the mandate. However, if the interposition occurs after the withdrawal or disengagement, it should be accomplished as soon as possible to prevent clashes that could lead to renewal of the fighting and a general breakdown in the cease-fire arrangements.

(2) The sequence of interposition is as follows:

(a) Negotiation of a cease-fire and consent for the interposition of peacekeeping forces.

(b) Delineation of demarcation lines, both on the ground and on a map.

(c) Interposition of the peacekeeping force.

(d) Supervision of the withdrawal or disengagement of the belligerent forces behind ADLs.

(3) The peacekeeping force must:

(a) Establish supervision over the main air and sea routes, roads, and key supervision sites in order to monitor attempts by either side to gain an unfair tactical advantage.

(b) Mark and continually inspect the demarcation lines to lessen the chances of a violation.

(c) Mark as a minimum and clear when directed unexploded ordnance; e.g., mines, and other obstacles that may hinder patrolling by the peacekeeping force.

(d) Establish an efficient communications system to ensure that an incident can be reported immediately.

(4) Interposition is risky for the peacekeeping force but is valuable in separating two belligerent parties or in defusing sensitive and/or explosive situations. The peacekeeping force must be credible and completely impartial in order to interpose successfully.

b. After the belligerents have been separated, a buffer zone must be established to ensure that the belligerent parties remain separated. The buffer zone is usually based on either a simple cease-fire line or an armistice demarcation line. Regardless of which is used, it must clearly mark the agreed forward limits of the belligerent parties. Because the buffer zone is essentially a demilitarized zone, the forces of the belligerent parties are not permitted to enter the area. However, the zone is still the sovereign territory of at least one of the parties in the conflict; therefore, access to the area for certain local civilians; e.g., farmers or fishermen, must be negotiated on an individual basis. Normally, free access to the buffer zone is restricted to members of the peacekeeping force and observer group.

c. After the buffer zone is established, the civil authorities can negotiate the armaments limitations for each side. The usual arrangement is for the belligerents

to agree on equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces in the areas immediately adjacent to the buffer zone. Larger forces may be allowed beyond the buffer zone, but the agreement will specify an upper limit for the number and type of formations, tanks, and antiaircraft weapons and artillery (by caliber), permitted in each area. The peacekeeping force and observer group will monitor each side's continual compliance with the armaments limitations.

5. Area Presence. At times, the situation that requires the insertion of peacekeeping forces is one in which there is no obvious demarcation between the parties in a conflict. This could be the result of an environment of chaos, where various warring factions are vying for dominance, but no single authority has yet established control. In these instances, the peacekeepers' main function is to establish a strong presence, the forceful nature of which does not allow guerrilla-like activities by the parties in the conflict. Active patrolling, vigorous responses to incidents, checkpoints, close liaison with all involved parties, and constant vigilance throughout the mission area are key factors in the successful prosecution of peacekeeping efforts in these situations.

6. Integration of the Reserve Force. In the event of a crisis situation, it may be necessary to prevent undue political and military pressure from falling on any one national contingent. The burden for taking essential but unpopular action should fall as evenly as possible among the force to demonstrate political solidarity and equal commitment, as well as to avoid the victimization of any one contingent. This is the primary purpose of the reserve force. The commander should consider these implications when a reserve force is task-organized. The reserve force should consist of units, personnel, and equipment from all national contingents equitable to their contribution to the PKO. Naval forces, aviation, communications, logistics, and other support elements will be formed in a similar manner.

7. Freedom of Movement

a. The members of a peacekeeping force unquestionably require free access in their area of operations in order to conduct their various tasks. Specifically, they must be able to patrol, observe, and ultimately report their findings.

b. Likewise, selected members of the civilian population must be permitted access to their land. Such access is

normally permitted only during daylight hours. This restriction provides safety for the civilian population as well as for the members of the peacekeeping force.

8. Patrolling

a. Patrolling in both land, air, and maritime environments is a key function in most PKOs. It is performed to gather information, investigate problems, supervise the provisions of the treaty, and establish a presence. To be effective, patrols need complete freedom of movement. The belligerent parties may impose restrictions on patrolling due to perceived threats to the security of one of the belligerents. These restrictions are included in the status of forces agreement. The mere presence of a peacekeeping patrol, or the likelihood one may appear at any moment, helps deter potential breakers of an armistice agreement. The presence of peacekeeping troops in a tense situation has a reassuring and calming effect in troubled areas.

b. Patrolling may be conducted on foot, in vehicles, or aboard boats, light aircraft, or helicopters. Patrolling must be overt--a patrol must be easily recognized by all sides. Its members must wear distinctive items that clearly indicate they are members of the PKO. Vehicles, boats, light aircraft, and helicopters must be painted in the colors of the force and prominently display its insignia. The peacekeeping flag must be carried by a foot patrol and be displayed by all vehicles in a mounted patrol.

c. Patrolling may be confined to daylight hours in areas in which armed confrontations continue to occur. When limited visibility makes identification difficult, the two opposing sides may be nervous and therefore apt to fire without hesitation. Even so, the peacekeeping mandate may require the commander to dispatch patrols in these conditions. The procedures and ground rules under which patrols operate must be clearly defined and known by all, including the belligerent parties.

d. Patrols form one of the primary sources from which a peacekeeping force gathers its information and complements the reports of observation post personnel, liaison officers, and general day-to-day observations. Patrols may be organized to supplement the information provided by observation posts in a buffer zone. In large areas of operation where the ground cannot be covered by static observation posts, it may be necessary to patrol

periodically to ensure that breaches of the agreement are discovered and rectified before they acquire a legitimate status by default.

e. Patrols are dispatched to take a closer look at an activity that an observer has reported that may violate the armistice agreement.

f. Patrols that are designed to separate the parties in an actual or potential confrontation are called "interposition patrols" or "standing patrols." These patrols cease to operate when the situation returns to normal.

g. The usual task of escort patrols is to protect farmers, fishermen, or others who are on their way to and from work where the route passes close to a hostile party.

h. Supervisory patrols are sent to ensure action that has been agreed to by the peacekeeping force and one or more of the belligerent parties is carried out and completed.

9. Observing

a. Observing and subsequent reporting are essential functions for all PKOs. Proper analysis of these reports is critical. The observers must monitor everything that happens within range of observation. The observers must provide timely and accurate reports on every situation or incident that develops. Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the cornerstone of all successful PKOs; e.g., maps, field sketches, diagrams, video tapes, pictures, and references to specific agreements or instructions. Likewise, inaccurate and biased reporting can adversely affect the operational situation, thus damaging the image and credibility of the peacekeeping force.

b. Observation tasks commonly cover the status of military installations and associated activities within the operational area, infringements of international agreements or conventions, observance of armistice demarcation and cease-fire lines, and observance of local agreements and understandings that were approved by the parties in the conflict.

c. Observation requires comprehension of both the facts and their implications. The observer should pass information to the next higher echelon without delay.

d. Observers must exercise the utmost discretion with respect to all matters of official business. They should not communicate any information known to them by reason of their official position, except in the course of their duties or by authorization of higher authority. Observers should not, at any time, use such information to private advantage.

e. Observers are normally unarmed. Their observation posts are manned exclusively by either military officers or civilians. Two or more observers, normally from different countries, staff each post. Administrative support in the field is provided by the force under whose OPCON they function.

f. Information can be gathered in a number of ways, including deployment of observation posts; deployment of units in sensitive areas; staffing of checkpoints; extensive patrolling; aerial and naval intelligence; and fact finding, inspection, and investigation.

g. Observation posts are one of the primary ways for observers (either individual MILOBs or peacekeeping forces), to execute their duties. Observation posts should be located to give maximum visibility of the area, have the optimum conditions for communications, and be clearly recognized by the ground, naval, and air forces of the parties in the conflict.

(1) The location and type of every observation post is authorized by the peacekeeping force commander or by the chief of staff of an observer mission when the latter is operating on its own. Changes in status must also be authorized by these authorities.

(2) Permanent observation posts should be staffed on a 24-hour basis with primary and alternate means of communications; e.g., radio and telephone. The posts must be clearly marked with the force flag and insignia painted on the walls and roof. A permanent post will only be abandoned with the force commander's authority or when the unit commander considers the lives of the observers to be in jeopardy. Appendix L is a sample diagram of an observation post.

(3) A temporary observation is a post to which observers may be sent to provide coverage by day or overnight to meet special requirements. It should have an operational telephone and a radio. Temporary

observation posts will be marked in the same way as permanent posts and should be protected by ready force positions.

(4) Unmanned observation posts are permanent or temporary posts that are no longer required for the purpose for which they were originally established. They are retained either to maintain a peacekeeping presence or to meet an unforeseen contingency. The telephone is usually removed and, in the event of reoccupation, observation post personnel may have to initially rely on the radio for communications. The post is marked with the force's insignia and flies its flag to maintain a presence.

(5) All observation posts (permanent, temporary, or unmanned), are allotted a serial number or name. If the post is abandoned, the number or name is not used again in order to avoid confusion. In the case of numbered posts, the designation usually identifies the type, the sector in which it is located, and its serial number. Observer mission posts are usually given names to distinguish them from neighboring peacekeeping force observation posts.

h. The following are the duties in an observation post:

(1) In a peacekeeping force, an observation post is usually staffed by a squad. This provides sufficient personnel for observation, rest, some recreation and, as a last resort, defense.

(2) Observation posts will observe, verify if possible, and report:

(a) Movements of the military forces of the belligerent parties. Should this involve unit identifications and other information of a sensitive nature, the observation post commander will record the time of the sighting and send the report by secure means.

(b) Shootings, hostile acts, or threats made against the peacekeeping force or civilians.

(c) Improvements to the defensive positions of the belligerent parties.

(d) Overflights by military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the buffer zone or area of separation has been restricted.

(e) Violations of the armistice agreement until the cause of the violation has been removed or rectified.

(3) All events will be recorded in the logbooks kept at the observation post and its controlling headquarters. These logbooks provide evidence for protests and reports.

i. When coming on watch in an observation post, a designated person must:

(1) Obtain a thorough briefing of all recent activities from the shift being relieved.

(2) Read the observation post logbook.

(3) Ensure that all items on the observation post equipment checklist are accounted for and in working order.

(4) Conduct a radio and telephone line check before the previous shift leaves.

(5) Count live ammunition carefully. The observer coming on shift should account for every round; this check may provide vital evidence in the event of a shooting incident.

j. Force headquarters will normally give guidance on the extent to which observation posts are to send patrols to investigate incidents or to move to another position to get a better view. The policy for the dispatch and control of patrols sent from observation posts to investigate incidents may be specified in force SOP or provided at the discretion of unit commanders.

k. The peacekeeper needs to cultivate the capacity for being vigilant and alert, which does not diminish with time. Techniques to remain alert will vary with the individual, but ultimately must aim at improving the quality of information observed and reported. Observers must be active and overt in seeking information, without appearing threatening or stepping outside the bounds of the peacekeeping charter.

10. Reporting

a. The reporting function of a PKO goes hand-in-hand with the observing function--both are of primary importance.

b. Each PKO has its own formats for routine situation reports that are supplemented by special report forms for particular incidents. On joining a PKO, the unit or individual will receive the appropriate SOP that include the proper styles and formats for the required reports. Observation reports should be completed in an accurate and timely manner since the reports may be used to investigate specific matters.

c. Normally, reports on all matters that concern the operation of peacekeeping forces are submitted to the force commander or the commander's staff. Reports on operations are sent by units or contingents to their own governments as prescribed by their national chain of command. This reporting will be essential if there is a major disagreement on a matter that would require national contingent commanders to deal directly with their own government.

11. Carrying of Weapons

a. Individual weapons are carried by members of a peacekeeping force when they:

(1) Staff observation posts, checkpoints, liaison posts, defensive positions, and standing patrols.

(2) Participate on patrols.

(3) Perform escort duties.

(4) Perform duty as vehicle guards and/or convoy escorts.

(5) Are charged with the safe custody of peacekeeping force property, supplies, cash, or documents.

(6) Conduct inspection and liaison visits to the belligerent parties in the conflict.

b. Members of a peacekeeping force will not normally carry arms when:

(1) They are performing nonoperational duties.

(2) Civilian police are attached to the peacekeeping force.

(3) They are outside the buffer zone, area of separation, or area of operations.

(4) They are off duty.

(5) Conducting observer duty.

c. The peacekeeping force commander will determine the amount of ammunition to be carried by each individual and maintained on observation posts and positions, and to be held in reserve in accordance with the perceived threat.

d. Additionally, the peacekeeping force commander will determine during which specific situations weapons will be loaded in accordance with the perceived threat and within the PKO's ROE. The commander must balance mission accomplishment with the responsibility to protect peacekeeping force personnel.

12. Systems Design

a. Few conventional techniques will prove useful to the peacekeeping force. Fortifying bases will not guarantee security (fortification may not be allowed by the mandate or in the TOR). The parties in the conflict may desire nonthreatening actions and posture by the peacekeeping force and could become suspicious whenever these desires are not met.

b. Security measures must counter any expected threats without causing distress to the local populace. Information gathering must identify those elements of the parties in the conflict that may threaten members of the PKO. Peacekeepers must be warned about those elements particularly when they occupy remote observation posts. Despite clear warnings, responses by the peacekeeping force must be both measured and balanced in order to maintain the peacekeepers' neutrality.

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CHAPTER VI

TRAINING

1. Personnel Selection

a. Personnel selected for a PKO should be capable of operating under the stress and strains of this unique task. Units and personnel operate in alternating periods of tension and boredom in a manner different from what is normally expected of military personnel. Peacekeepers must have the capacity of patience and restraint. They must combine an approachable, understanding, and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. A professional demeanor that stresses quiet diplomacy and reasoning will achieve more than arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion, or sarcasm. Personnel must be able to positively cope when each side seeks to press its position and then reacts vocally when stopped.

b. Leaders selected for peacekeeping duty should be credible and decisive, display a high degree of professionalism, and be impartial. Because of the likelihood of independent actions, leaders at all levels must be able to make mature decisions based on sound judgment. They should have the capacity to accommodate frustrations. They must be able to quickly learn the local area politics, habits, characteristics, and customs.

2. Preparation. Peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude and approach by the individual to a set of circumstances different from those normally found on the field of battle--an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action. On the other hand, many facets of normal military training apply to PKOs.

3. Predeployment Training

a. General. To accomplish peacekeeping, individuals and units need training in various skills and techniques before deployment to change their focus from combat-warriors to soldiers who use force only in self-defense. The urgent need to deploy peacekeeping forces to establish a cease-fire often precludes a complete and lengthy training program. However, with prior planning, a training program can be developed that will assist commanders to prepare for these missions. Appendix M is a list of most of the pertinent schools for

peacekeepers. Training of individual units is the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services.

b. Leadership Skills. Good leadership is very important at every level from the unit commander to the most junior leader. Peacekeeping requires skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. Emphasis must be placed on developing these leadership skills.

c. Personal Qualities. Training of individuals for peacekeeping duties should emphasize patience, flexibility, self-discipline, professionalism, impartiality, tact, and inquisitiveness.

(1) Patience. Except for the infrequent serious incident, nothing happens quickly. An attempt to hasten the pace in negotiations may prejudice the outcome. This is true not only at the higher levels, but also at the lower levels where local difficulties are often resolved by company grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers.

(2) Flexibility. It is necessary to look at all the facets of a problem and to use one's ingenuity to explore every feasible course of action or solution that does not violate the mandate.

(3) Self-Discipline. Alert and professional bearing, good behavior on and off duty, and courtesy promote the prestige of a force. If the parties in the conflict hold a force in high esteem, the parties are more likely to regard its advice and respect its authority in a crisis. Good discipline makes a force's task easier.

(4) Professionalism. A strong sense of professionalism must be demonstrated in every activity--on and off duty. Where a force has a reputation for accuracy and competence, the parties in a conflict are more likely to accept the force's protests regarding violations and avoid confrontations. However, the credibility of a peacekeeping force can be significantly damaged by unprofessional activities during off-duty status, which can affect its relationship with the parties in the conflict.

(5) Impartiality. A force must guard against unequal treatment and avoid controversial, off-the-record remarks that may reach unintended

audiences. These comments may lead to a demand for the offender's removal and, if reflecting a prejudice believed to be widely held in a national contingent, to pressure for the withdrawal of the entire national contingent.

(6) Tact. The official parties in a conflict are likely to be sensitive and apt to take offense to any imagined slight. Tact is necessary in all dealings with the parties but needs not detract from an essential honesty of purpose and firmness when appropriate.

(7) Inquisitiveness. The individuals should question, with caution, everything that occurs within their AOR. The normal routine of daily life should become so familiar that they notice even small events that could be of importance if matched with information from other observers.

d. Language and Customs Training. Leaders, and indeed all members of a PKO, can be more effective if they are able to communicate in the language of the host country. This language training may be optional and consist of only basic key phrases. However, each person must receive training on the customs of the local population.

e. Common Military Skills. Many of the skills that enable a unit to accomplish its primary mission are applicable in peacekeeping. C2, reporting, patrolling, first aid, personal hygiene and field sanitation, and physical fitness are skills that can contribute to success in a PKO. Training to enhance these skills should be a part of any predeployment training program that should include, as a minimum, the following common military skills: intelligence; observing and reporting; communications; patrolling; navigation; explosive ordnance safety precautions; locating, identifying, and marking mines; and NBC defense.

(1) Counterintelligence. An important aspect of training for a peacekeeping mission is to understand that the peacekeeping force is a potential target of foreign intelligence and hostile indigenous terrorist activities. The purpose of the DOD counterintelligence (CI) program is to protect installations, materiel, operations, information, and personnel from espionage, sabotage, and other clandestine intelligence activities, as well as from threats

posed by international terrorists and hostile indigenous activities. To accomplish this mission, the CI organizations of the military Services, comprised principally of the US Army Military Intelligence, US Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, conduct CI investigations; employ offensive CI operations; and collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate information of CI significance. They also prepare, in support of DOD operations and security programs, studies and analyses of the multidiscipline intelligence threat posed to DOD resources by foreign intelligence services as well as hostile indigenous entities posing a threat. Coordination with the supported geographic CINC's CI Support Officer (CISO) in the theater of anticipated deployment should occur during training exercises. The CISO serves as the CI focus within the combatant command and is best situated to provide direction to DOD peacekeeping force personnel. This coordination, as well as ongoing coordination during deployment, will increase the peacekeeping force's CI posture. Follow-up coordination upon completion of mission requirements in the form of an after-action lessons learned session will enhance the CI program.

(2) Observing and Reporting. Observing and reporting are the primary functions of a peacekeeping force.

(a) Individuals must be familiar with the standard reporting formats that include the following reports: situation, shooting, overflight, and aircraft sighting. Personnel should learn to recognize aircraft, vessels, vehicles, dress, and equipment of all sides. A comprehensive training program uses graphic training aids, scale models, and flash cards.

(b) Learning to function properly in an observation post is essential. Small units must learn the typical layout of an observation post and checkpoint as well as the general daily duty routine at an observation post. A unit may live and work on an observation post for days at a time, thus isolated from its parent organization.

1. Training should emphasize security and patrolling.

2. Individuals who staff checkpoints along major roads must be taught to slow and observe traffic without stopping it. This procedure will allow them to observe and report traffic passing from one zone to another.

3. Vehicles and personnel entering and exiting installations should be stopped and searched for contraband and explosives. Personnel must learn not only how to search, but also how to search courteously without undue force.

(3) Communications. Communications are an essential part of knowing what is going on and, therefore, being in a position to influence events. Training must concentrate on proper radio and telephone procedures, use of standard and nonstandard equipment, antennae theory, and communications security measures.

(4) Patrolling. Small units must be knowledgeable in patrolling techniques. Training in the proper conduct of reconnaissance patrols requires review and reinforcement. Organization of patrols, selection of patrol routes, and the patrol debriefing format must be understood. Stealth and concealment are not as important as they are in combat because the peacekeeping mission stresses presence, reliability, and visibility of the peacekeeping force. Land navigation principles and road marches can be integrated into this training.

(5) Explosive Ordnance. Training provided by the local Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment before deployment will familiarize personnel with different types of land mines and how to extricate themselves from a minefield. This includes US and other nations' mines as appropriate to the mission. The thrust of the training is to enable the individual to recognize, mark, and report unexploded military ordnance, including mines and other conventional munitions, and to understand that unexploded ordnance, no matter how old it appears, is dangerous. The training should also include familiarization with other types of explosive ordnance (e.g., grenades, flares, mortar rounds) as

well as the proper procedures to follow to avoid injury.

(6) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical. Training in the methods of identifying and handling the effects of the use of NBC weapons is important for any PKO. Peacekeepers must be able to recognize the different types of chemical or biological agents that may be used and be able to take the appropriate action to ensure not only their safety but the safety of others.

f. A peacekeeping exercise should be conducted after completion of training. Appendix N contains a sample peacekeeping exercise.

4. Sustainment Training. Once deployed, the force will be able to continue its peacekeeping mission training. Time permitting, the force may also train in items that require recurring emphasis; e.g., common tasks.

a. Training may be restricted by an agreement between the parties in the conflict. However, once the force is formed, it may be possible to establish a schedule that enables the force to train on a regular basis.

b. Planning for sustainment training should be a part of the force's predeployment activities. If time is available and the resources are known before deployment, a detailed training schedule can be prepared. Training must be organized and planned before deployment based on the time and resources available.

c. The commander must continually emphasize the neutrality of the force. Casual contact between the force and personnel of either side in the conflict could result in one side accusing the force of favoritism, and therefore should be avoided. If the force loses its neutrality, its usefulness is seriously degraded. However, contact between different contingents of the force pays dividends in terms of cohesion and interoperability. This contact aids in welding the contingents into a more cohesive unit and is achievable through small unit exchanges, intercontingent competitions, conferences, and social events.

d. The highest standards of leadership must apply during training and operations. This development of the leadership potential of the section and subsection commanders should be emphasized throughout the training program.

e. The unit commander can plan to conduct training that will allow it to perform its primary mission when not involved in a peacekeeping mission. This requires the unit to incorporate basic military skills training and small unit tactical training into the routine of normal day-to-day peacekeeping activities. Because of political concerns, this training requires flexibility and imagination to complete this important task without causing concern among the parties in the conflict. However, to conduct sustainment training for combat operations simultaneously with training for peacekeeping operations, may give Service members confusing signals and/or frames of reference and can seriously alter their expected behavior.

f. For a multinational and perhaps multilingual force to operate effectively, it must periodically train together. Although the mobile reserve commander and subordinate officers must reconnoiter likely crisis points with discretion, they should perform training where it is unlikely to alarm the local population and the parties in the conflict.

5. Post-Peacekeeping Mission Training

a. Planning for mission specific training should be part of the force's predeployment activities. Before the peacekeeping mission, training is provided to transition the combat ready individual to one constrained in most, if not all, actions. At the conclusion of the peacekeeping mission, certain actions are necessary to return the individual to a combat-oriented mind set.

b. Unit commanders must allow sufficient time after a peacekeeping mission for refresher training and for redeveloping skills and abilities that have unavoidably been affected by the nature of any PKO. This will require a training program to hone skills necessary to return the unit to combat ready status.

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CHAPTER VII

SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS

1. Logistics

a. The most important support function for a PKO is logistics--equipping and sustaining the force. Logisticians must be involved in the planning of a PKO from the very beginning to ensure success. Logistic support for PKOs is unique and complex, and contracting for host-nation support (HNS) may be necessary. As such, contingency contracting personnel should deploy with the first group of personnel; if an advance party is deployed, then logisticians and preventive medicine personnel should be part of this element. Logistic support includes, but is not limited to, functions and services, supplies, petroleum products, materiel, ammunition, maintenance, transportation, explosive ordnance disposal, health services, and engineering.

b. The UN, or force headquarters for non-UN PKOs, is responsible for all logistic aspects of the mission. This responsibility does not include giving the peacekeeping force commander directive authority for logistics for assigned US peacekeeping forces unless the UN peacekeeping force commander is a US geographic combatant commander. However, there may be cases, such as short-notice deployments, when each national contingent of the peacekeeping force must be able to sustain itself for an initial period of up to 90 days. As such, US forces assigned to PKOs should determine, before deployment, the degree of self-sufficiency required based on the mission, area of operations, and availability of HNS. In these situations, once the peacekeeping force's logistic system is established, the requirement for each national contingent to sustain itself is greatly reduced.

c. The United States has provided logistic support to international PKOs when no US personnel were assigned or detailed to the force and may continue to do so. However, when US personnel are members of the peacekeeping force, the assignment and rotation of logisticians should be staggered to maintain the continuity of logistic support operations.

d. For UN operations, the UN will issue an "aide-memoire" providing detailed guidance as to the logistical support that will be provided by the UN and

the procedures by which the UN will reimburse the participating nations for support. These procedures must be followed.

e. The following logistic problems will need to be addressed for each PKO:

(1) There is no guarantee that any nation's equipment will be compatible with equipment provided by other nations participating in the PKO. Additionally, each nation may use different organizational structures as well as different rationing systems. These issues result in a lack of compatibility and interoperability, but can be minimized and even eliminated if one nation coordinates the entire logistic effort. However, political concerns may preclude the force being logistically supported by one nation. Before using or purchasing non-US materiel, logisticians must ensure availability of repair parts, maintenance training, technical manuals, and contractor maintenance support.

(2) Moving heavy equipment into and within the area of operations may be difficult, especially in a large, underdeveloped country with few usable airfields and cargo handling facilities. Also of concern in this area are availability of aircraft, staging facilities, and overflight clearances. While the use of sealift may solve some of these problems, correspondingly long shipment times may create other problems. In some cases, expanding existing facilities or constructing new ones may be necessary. If the host country cannot support port clearance operations at either aerial or sea ports of debarkation, US forces qualified to perform these tasks should be sent to the area of operations before the scheduled arrival of equipment.

(3) Procuring food and essential supplies from the host nation to sustain the peacekeeping force can present a variety of problems, particularly before scheduled resupply actions. These problems may be compounded by language differences, finances, accountability systems, and differences in sanitation and hygiene standards. Water and food purchased on the local economy must be inspected, treated, and continually monitored by veterinarians and preventive medicine specialists. However, a hybrid logistics structure, which uses a combination of scheduled

resupply and local purchase actions, can be beneficial. The latter provides the opportunity for developing contacts for information as well as building goodwill with local merchants.

(4) The PKO staff needs to have the capability to perform and/or coordinate myriad logistic functions to include:

- (a) Local acquisition and contracting.
- (b) Finance and exchange of foreign currency.
- (c) Receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply.
- (d) Transportation.
- (e) Maintenance.
- (f) Mortuary affairs.
- (g) Food services.
- (h) Water processing, storage, and issue.

f. Peacekeeping force logisticians should determine if previously established SOFAs or bilateral HNS agreements contain logistic support provisions that may be applicable for sustainment of PKOs. If SOFAs do not exist, then logisticians need to be actively involved in their formulation. Activation of HNS agreements during PKOs may require bilateral government approval depending on terms of the agreement.

2. Airlift and Sealift. The UN Office of General Services is responsible for support of PKOs, including contracting. The UN procures on the world market and utilizes international transportation to ship directly to the force area. If UN-contracted transportation assets are inadequate or not available, the UN will seek to use a combination of contractor and US lift assets to reduce UN mobility costs. Those intratheater lift assets specifically assigned to the peacekeeping force are under the OPCON of the peacekeeping force commander; however, intertheater lift assets are not. Intertheater lift is one of the main US contributions to a UN-sponsored peacekeeping effort. For specific guidance on how to request airlift and sealift, refer to Joint Pubs 4-01.1, 4-01.2, and 4-01.3.

3. Communications

a. The communications support for a peacekeeping force will not be appreciably different from the support provided to any military operation. Particular attention must be given to the regional threat when determining communications support. Depending on the level of threat and the geographic disposition of the supported units, different types of transmission modes may be needed to attain required connectivity, including the employment of both commercial and military communications systems. The planning process should include representatives from the UN or regional collective security organization, any nations providing communications assets to support the operation, and the host-nation government. The lead organization must ensure that a communications planning process is initiated early to eliminate duplication of effort, pool critical communications assets, and determine the interoperability requirements among peacekeeping forces. In addition, US forces may be tasked to provide tactical communications to various elements of the peacekeeping force.

b. For a UN-sponsored PKO, the peacekeeping force headquarters is responsible for providing communications between the force headquarters and the UN Headquarters in New York. In the initial stages of a PKO, diplomatic links between the host government and the UN may be used.

c. Non-UN peacekeeping forces normally establish their own communications links. Consideration should be given to requesting the services of CJCS-controlled tactical communications assets that provide deployable, versatile, and secure communications.

d. The guiding principle for both UN and non-UN PKOs is effective and interoperable communications systems. Interoperability is best achieved through the maximum use of commercial communications systems in UN PKOs and the use of interoperable, standardized communications systems of regional organizations or single nation communications systems in non-UN PKOs.

e. The peacekeeping force communications officer should coordinate with the parties in the conflict, the host-nation governments, and the host-nation's armed forces as applicable on the:

- (1) Use of civil communications facilities.

(2) Frequency allocation to avoid interference with civil, military, and air traffic control communications.

(3) Interoperability of communications equipment between national contingents.

f. Any negotiation or conclusion of international agreements for communications and information support systems is contingent on the scope of procedural authority, if any, delegated to the peacekeeping force and its communications officer.

g. The PKO communications officer must work closely with the host nation and the UN or sponsoring regional organization for frequency allocations in support of the operation. Because frequencies are controlled by the host government, a potential operations security vulnerability exists. Therefore, information (such as belligerent parties' locations, size, or strength; identity of units; major equipment deployments; and any matters relating to the deployment of the reserve force), must always be encoded to preclude a compromise. Such a compromise may also jeopardize the neutrality of the peacekeeping force.

h. Communications codes and procedures should be standardized as much as possible. A system of liaison officers among national contingents may be required if equipment is not interoperable. This task is the responsibility of the force communications officer.

i. When observer groups operate in the area of peacekeeping forces, the observer groups are responsible for providing communications links for the following:

(1) Between observer group headquarters and observation posts and patrols.

(2) Liaison with the peacekeeping force.

j. Each national contingent of a peacekeeping force is responsible for providing its own internal communications systems. Because these systems are for national use only, the nation's native language and radio procedures are used. There are normally four methods national contingents may use to communicate with their own governments:

- (1) The UN force headquarters link to UN Headquarters in New York, or with subsidiary UN communications and radio relay centers, then via international communications links, as appropriate.
- (2) Civil channels.
- (3) Diplomatic communications from their own embassy.
- (4) Secure military communications direct to national headquarters.

4. Personnel Services. This function deals with various support issues such as personnel administration (including tour length, passport and visa requirements, deployed mailing address, and leave policy), postal services, morale, welfare, and recreation opportunities, religious matters, legal matters, HSS, Red Cross, etc. Details can be included in the area handbook as discussed in Chapter IV and Appendix H, or can be published in a separate document. The peacekeeping force commander should refer to the "Guidelines for Nations Contributing Troops," which is published for each individual UN peacekeeping mission. This document will prescribe the specific guidance for the troop contributing nations for the operation in such areas as tour lengths, UN pay and allowances, troop rotation policy, and other details.

5. Finance Operations. In addition to providing finance services for assigned personnel, finance elements may also provide commercial vendor services, contractor payment, currency conversions, and compensation payments for validated claims against the peacekeeping force.

6. Psychological Operations

a. The successful conduct of PKOs often depends on the continued cooperation of all parties to the cease-fire and security agreement, the impartiality and objectivity of the peacekeepers, and the support of world opinion. An integrated PSYOP strategy can assist in fostering and maintaining these factors. Because of the sensitivity of PSYOP, all PSYOP themes and programs must be cleared by proper authorities prior to utilization.

b. PSYOP can play an important role in fostering cooperation between the parties in the conflict, along with their supporters, and the peacekeeping forces. Tactically, PSYOP can assist the peacekeeping forces in keeping the peace through persuasion rather than

intimidation. Through such local information programs as radio and television newscasts, PSYOP can help ensure that the peacekeeping objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the parties in the conflict and their civilian populations. In any war-torn area, one can expect a large influx of displaced personnel. PSYOP can help amplify any HA and CA programs provided to these personnel in order to promote a favorable attitude on the part of the populace and the parties in the conflict. These assistance programs always merit careful consideration for both negative as well as positive political impact and must be given in a totally impartial manner. In addition, PSYOP can help promote acceptance of a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and compliance with security agreements by influencing attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior. Such efforts can help counter rumors and disinformation, and may even resolve some problems between the parties while they search for a long-term solution to their conflict.

c. More importantly in the operational and strategic sense, PSYOP can help project to regional participants and the world community a favorable image of an impartial and capable peacekeeping force. In the world of public opinion where perception reigns, the successful conduct of a PKO in a volatile situation will tremendously enhance the peacekeeping force's image as an impartial player and as a viable and credible participant in future events in that region. Therefore, the creation and projection of such an image should be an integral operational and strategic objective.

7. Civil Affairs

a. CA support during PKOs is based on the provisions of the agreements between all parties.

b. Before any peacekeeping deployments, CA personnel can provide training to sensitize the peacekeepers to the importance of total impartiality and objectivity in their mission. CA personnel can also familiarize peacekeepers with the dynamics of the political situation in the operating area, local culture, mores, religions, and taboos. Such training programs help peacekeeping personnel increase their effectiveness and gain credibility and respect for the local populace.

c. When tasked and resourced, CA personnel can support PKOs by:

(1) Accomplishing liaison with local authorities, representatives of international organizations, and US Government agencies.

(2) Assisting in the development and dissemination of an area handbook to deploying personnel.

(3) Supervising and assisting with dislocated civilian activities and refugee camp operations.

(4) Providing assistance in securing humanitarian relief supplies.

(5) Assisting in maintaining cognizance of civilian movements in and out of disputed areas and along ADLs.

8. Public Affairs

a. This section discusses PA primarily from the viewpoint of the UN, its peacekeeping forces and observer missions, and those who devise peacekeeping initiatives. However, the same principles considered here apply to non-UN forces' interests in the field of public information.

b. PKOs are carried out, especially in the initial phases, under the full glare of public scrutiny. Using satellites and modern communications technology, media representatives are able to distribute reports and pictures faster than the news can be released by either the peacekeeping force or observer group. Incidents, sometimes embellished or slanted towards a partisan viewpoint, can appear on television the same day and in print the next morning to excite audiences in the countries that are parties to the dispute as well as their allies.

c. It is important to develop a working relationship with the media while at the same time maintaining OPSEC. When information is withheld, journalists often resort to speculation, often near enough to the truth to be accepted by large sections of the public and even by governments. The Secretary General needs to maintain absolute discretion about his or her confidential relationship with governments. At the same time, the parties in a conflict may find it advantageous to leak part of the story to the press in order to build public support for their own position; on occasion, these

activities grow into a fully orchestrated media campaign. In these circumstances it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Secretary General to set the record straight without destroying his or her position of confidence with the governments with which he or she is dealing.

d. The aim of the UN is to foster good public relations through an effective media information service. This encourages accurate and objective reporting on the operation of PKOs.

e. UN policy is to provide facilities to the media to observe and report on the peacekeepers' role as well as any activity or incident that may be of interest to the general public. Peacekeeping unit commanders should allow media representatives access to facilities only with prior approval of force headquarters. Such access may be denied by the force headquarters when the media's presence may aggravate a tense situation. However, a viable information process is necessary to ensure that the Secretary General is informed of incidents before hearing or reading about them in the media. It is important that the information sent to UN Headquarters, or the authority controlling any non-UN peacekeeping force, is both timely and accurate.

f. The hallmarks of PA activities must be impartiality and truth. Information from the forces in the field is distributed over a worldwide network to national governments. The UN and its peacekeeping forces should avoid arguments with the media about the veracity of press statements by relying on the authenticity of factual and unbiased reports from UN forces and missions.

g. The responsibilities of the force PA officer cover three broad areas. These responsibilities are to:

(1) Higher headquarters:

(a) Summarize relevant reports in the local media.

(b) Report accounts of incidents involving the force that are likely to attract diplomatic or media attention, accompanied by any statements made by members of the force.

(c) Provide printed and pictorial coverage of the operation as a whole, and the national

contingents' particular roles, for distribution by the headquarters to information centers in member countries.

(2) Force commander:

(a) Advise the force commander on all aspects of PA, including media relations, internal information programs, and community relations activities.

(b) Prepare a daily press folder for the force commander. Include in the press folder a digest of press reports and comments, and news releases from the parties in the conflict and other UN agencies in the area.

(c) Publish a magazine to be read by members of the force.

(d) Assist the media in providing prompt and accurate coverage of the force's activities.

(e) Protect the force against the effects of misquotation, misunderstanding, rumor, and malevolent propaganda.

(f) Relay information, reports, and trends in public opinion concerning the force to the force commander so that timely action can be taken to deal with hostile attitudes or shortcomings in the force.

(g) Maintain a constant flow of news from the contingents' home countries to the peacekeepers to maintain morale.

(h) Coordinate the receipt and distribution of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) signals for US forces.

1. AFRTS is an activity of the American Forces Information Service, under the direction of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and can provide the peacekeepers with information concerning family support matters and coverage of worldwide news, events, and military information, 24 hours a day, via

satellite transmission in both radio and television.

2. Requests for current information on acquiring AFRTS access, support, and delivery systems should be addressed to:

Director
American Forces Information Service
601 Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007 USA

(3) World:

(a) Brief visiting journalists on military matters and arrange visits with national contingents.

(b) If allowed by the SOP, authorize photography in the area on behalf of the force commander.

(c) Be available to answer questions from the media. Although the UN Information Center, or other similar headquarter organization, carries a large responsibility for dealing with the media, the PA staff must provide prompt and accurate answers to reporters.

(d) Confine answers to questions on the aim and purpose of the force to the terms of the protocol that established the force.

h. The US military members of a peacekeeping force may talk with media representatives only when the following conditions are met:

(1) The visit has been authorized by both the force headquarters and the US contingent commander.

(2) Military personnel have consented to be interviewed and the contingent or unit PA officer is present.

(3) The discussion is limited to the facts. Those interviewed should neither speculate nor express opinions on either political or controversial issues.

(4) Matters of a classified military nature and those not cleared for public release will not be discussed.

(5) All interviews will be considered as "for-the-record," and those interviewed will allow themselves to be identified.

i. Members of the PKO should be counseled not to write to the media giving information or comments on the force, its role, or anything concerning the parties in the conflict that would endanger the impartiality of the PKO.

9. Engineer Missions. These missions in PKOs range from facilities construction to minefield clearance. The size and composition of the engineer unit will vary depending on the specific tasks that the unit must perform. If the force is moving into an area with no facilities, the requirement for construction engineering skills will depend on whether the force will construct its own facilities, another country's engineers will construct them, or the work will be contracted. If the peacekeeping force moves into existing facilities, the requirement for construction skills will depend on who is tasked to maintain the facilities. Although the requirement for combat engineers may be small, there is a possible need for this type of force to construct barriers, provide assistance and training in engineering skills, or conduct countermine operations, either in contested areas or along peacekeeping force patrol routes. The majority of engineer operations fall into one of two categories: sustainment engineering, and combat engineering support.

a. Sustainment engineer missions include those tasks that support the force through the construction and repair of billeting, support, and logistic facilities, as well as LOCs. These tasks may include the construction, maintenance, and operation of electrical and sanitation utilities as well as locating water sources, operating reverse osmosis water purification units, and drilling wells, if necessary, for water supply. Sustainment engineering support must be in accordance with agreements between the parties in the conflict and the host nations, as applicable, and must comply with title 10, USC 401 unless support is provided under section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC 2348).

(1) The purpose of sustainment engineering is to provide an adequate support base for the peacekeeping force. The base must provide secure and healthy living conditions. It must provide sufficient

administrative and maintenance space for the units supporting the force, and secure storage for all associated supplies and materiel.

(2) Specific engineer sustainment missions include:

- (a) Base camp construction.
- (b) Air bases, ports, and other logistics facilities construction.
- (c) LOC construction.
- (d) Potable water source development.
- (e) Base and LOC maintenance.

(3) There are several construction missions essential for PKOs. These missions include constructing observation posts, checkpoints, and roadblocks.

b. Combat engineering tasks (e.g., mobility, countermobility, and survivability) may be conducted by US engineer units in support of PKOs. Engineer missions specifically related to PKOs include:

- (1) Constructing command posts, bunkers, and observation posts.
- (2) Constructing force protection structures such as earth revetments, wire obstacles, and defensive positions.
- (3) Clearing fields of observation.
- (4) Demolishing fortifications.
- (5) Clearing or marking minefields (including minefield fence maintenance).
- (6) Clearing mines and boobytraps.
- (7) Backup support for explosive ordnance identification, marking, removal, or demolition.

10. Military Police. Military police supporting forces performing PKOs can perform or assist in functions, including POW exchange, staffing checkpoints, liaison with police forces of the parties in the conflict, traffic control, and

force protection operations. Military police force structure and training are well-suited for peacekeeping roles.

11. Health Service Support

a. HSS is a significant challenge during PKOs for the following reasons:

(1) Peacekeeping forces normally do not have adequate organic medical support.

(2) Continuity of medical support functions may be difficult because of continuous unit rotation.

(3) Forces are often in remote locations far from LOCs making medical resupply, patient evacuation, hospitalization, and hospital services difficult and slow.

b. Regardless of the size of the peacekeeping force, a surgeon and medical planner should be considered to ensure that all HSS functions (evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, veterinary services, etc.), and health care are planned and coordinated before the operation. These medical personnel should be considered for deployment with the force to ensure continuous and adequate medical support.

c. Appendix O contains detailed HSS guidance for PKOs.

12. Humanitarian Assistance. The attitude of a host government may vary from helpful cooperation to forbidding a peacekeeping force from providing any aid to its citizens. In the latter case, a peacekeeping force is justified in providing assistance in a buffer zone based on humanitarian grounds. Even if HA missions are not included in the mandate, these missions must be considered by the peacekeeping force. HA tasks may include:

a. Investigating reports of missing persons.

b. Providing emergency medical treatment and medical assistance and education programs for the prevention of disease.

c. Resupplying minority communities separated from their compatriots by a buffer zone.

d. Transferring minority populations when requested by the minority population itself, or as required for the

security of this population group, or for imperative military reasons.

e. Providing goodwill (e.g., organizing meetings between members of a minority community with relatives on the other side of the buffer zone; handing over of letters, parcels).

f. Repatriating POWs and returning human remains, mail, or property. Although methods may vary from force to force, the essentials for a hand over procedure must include the following:

(1) An intermediary, acceptable to both sides and with independently established communications, negotiates the hand over. In some cases, the force itself may provide the channel, using its staff or the liaison officers from the two parties. In other cases, an independent body such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has representatives in most capitals, may be more acceptable to the parties concerned.

(2) An organization must be established to enable the intermediary to effect a hand over. It should include:

(a) A supervisory element to coordinate with the intermediary and confirm exactly who or what is to be handed over and the procedure to be used. The element must brief the procedure to the senior liaison officers of the two parties, as well as the appropriate sector commander, to ensure safe passage for the people and/or the convoy. Finally, it will ensure that the required personnel and resources are available.

(b) The sector commander through whose AOR the exchange is to be made will be responsible for providing escorts for the POW exchange; transport across the buffer zone; transfer of human remains; the security of the area; and communications between the supervisory element, UN Military Observers, and the checkpoints on either side of the buffer zone.

(c) The force headquarters will make additional resources available as required. The resources may include extra transport, medical cover (including ambulances), military police for

traffic control, or additional communications equipment.

(3) A procedure must be established to properly handle each type of hand over. Appendix P contains detailed hand over procedures.

g. The relationship between the peacekeeping force and its neighboring communities must be cultivated to ensure an atmosphere of cooperation. The force may be dependent on host-country local nationals to support the laundry and dining facilities, and for electricity, sanitation, and other services. The on-duty and off-duty conduct of all members of the peacekeeping force must always reflect complete neutrality to enhance the efforts of the peacekeeping force.

13. Counterintelligence. CI assets will assist in the implementation and conduct of the Force CI plan. The CI plan will implement measures to protect the force against acts of espionage, intelligence activities, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, and assassinations. The CI plan will be applied to but not limited to four major areas: military security, civil security, embarkation security, and CI operations. As with the CI plan, CI operations will be focused on the protection of the force via the deterrence, detection, exploitation, and neutralization of hostile collection and espionage operations, as well as acts of subversion, sabotage, terrorism, and assassinations.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS OF PEACEKEEPING

1. There is no universally accepted definition of the term "peacekeeping." The absence of one specific definition has resulted in the term being used to describe almost any type of behavior intended to obtain what a particular nation regards as peace. Because the United States participates with other nations in peacekeeping operations, it is important for US military personnel to be aware of the different definitions of peacekeeping. A Presidential Decision Directive on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations sets forth the following definition of peacekeeping:

"The deployment of neutral military and/or civilian personnel with the consent of the state or states involved and, more recently, of all significant parties to the dispute in order to assist in preserving or maintaining the peace. These are traditionally non-combat operations (except for the purpose of self-defense) and are normally undertaken to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement of the dispute."

The Presidential Decision Directive uses the term "peace operations" to mean the entire spectrum of activities aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts. Although the entire spectrum of peace operations includes both peacekeeping and peace enforcement (under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter), it is important to operationally differentiate between the two to enable military commanders to better prepare their units for their assigned mission. Peacekeeping, as defined in this publication, is:

Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

2. This definition of peacekeeping is more restrictive than others, because it defines a situation in which there is consent of the belligerents to an effort to maintain a negotiated truce. Despite the fact that the UN has been using the term "peacekeeping" for over 30 years, it has yet

to produce an official definition of the term. The unofficial UN definition of peacekeeping, as described in the book, The Blue Helmets, is ". . . an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict."

3. A more comprehensive definition was developed by the International Peace Academy (International Peace Academy, by the American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Armies) Combat Development Guide 2010, Peacekeeping Operations, dated 7 December 1990, which states:

"Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."

4. The above definition includes elements of foreign internal defense (prevention and containment), and operations to restore order, which are a subcategory of contingency operations. Although the United States performs these foreign internal defense functions, and may do so in support of diplomatic efforts to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts, it does so outside the doctrine for peacekeeping.

5. The peacekeeping function of the UN is considered to be distinct from the enforcement powers that have been used, for example, in Korea, Kuwait, and Somalia. Regional peacekeeping differs from regional enforcement actions in significant ways.

a. Regional peacekeeping is not directed at enforcing anything beyond the negotiated cease-fire or armistice. It is directed at restoring law and order in situations where government action has broken down or collapsed.

b. Since it is not an enforcement action under Article 53 of the UN Charter, but rather a peacekeeping operation under Article 52, the states involved need not obtain prior approval of the Security Council for the action. The reporting requirements of Article 54 apply to both operations; therefore, the UN Security Council must be kept fully informed of the PKOs undertaken.

c. Regional PKOs must be taken as a last resort. Every reasonable effort to achieve peaceful settlement of the local conflict must be attempted.

d. Regional peacekeeping must result from an invitation from the lawfully constituted government, provided one exists.

e. Regional peacekeeping actions must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN.

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APPENDIX B

SAMPLE UN MANDATE
RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
AT THE XXTH MEETING (DATE)

The Security Council, noting that the present situation with regard to (country[ies]) is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution.

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the 'peaceful intentions' signed at New York on (date).

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its article 2, para 4, which reads: 'All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.'

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in () and (), or to endanger international peace.
2. Asks the Governments of () and (), which have the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in their countries.
3. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Governments of () and (), of a United Nations' Peacekeeping Force in those countries. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of () and (). The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its (the peacekeeping force's) operation.
4. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the

maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

5. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Governments of () and (). The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

6. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Governments of () and (), a mediator, who shall use his best endeavors with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting () and (), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the peoples of () and () as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

The following example was proposed by Canada as a standard SOFA for use by the UN. This SOFA is a legal document written from the Canadian viewpoint and, as such, may use different spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and terminology from that used in US documents. It is included in this publication, without changes, because it is an excellent example of a possible SOFA. However, any SOFA proposed for use to govern US forces must be reviewed by appropriate US legal authorities to ascertain consistency with US law and policy. The remainder of this appendix is the verbatim Canadian proposal.

Introduction

1. The purpose of a status of forces agreement is to establish the legal position of a peacekeeping force and of its members in a host country, and to define the relationship of the force and of its members with the government and the citizens of the host country. On the basis of a status of forces agreement between the United Nations and a particular host country, appropriate detailed regulations can be drawn up to cover the special needs and circumstances of the situation affecting the status of forces in that country. Such sets of regulations, to cover administrative and operative activities of the peacekeeping force, are supplementary to the status of forces agreement itself.

2. The elaboration of, and attainment of, a general understanding on a standard status of forces agreement now would have considerable advantages in terms of ensuring efficient arrangements for the organization of future peacekeeping operations. In addition, Member States would be aware in advance of the sort of arrangements that could affect them directly if they had occasion to be involved with a peacekeeping operation, either as a host country or as a country contributing personnel to such an operation.

Definitions3. Definitions.

a. Civil Authorities means all state and local, civil authorities of the government of the host country who may be required or called upon to perform functions relating to the Force.

b. The Commander means the Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force.

c. The Force means a United Nations Peacekeeping Force.

d. The Government means the government of the host country.

e. Host country means a country the government of which has consented to the presence of the Force on its territory.

f. Member of the Force means a member of the military service of the Participating State placed under the command of a commander by that State, or a civilian who is not a national of, nor ordinarily resident in, the host country, who is placed under the command of the commander by a Participating State, or the United Nations.

g. Participating State means a member of the United Nations that contributes military or civilian personnel to the Force.

International Status of the Force and its Members

4. Members of the Force shall respect the laws and regulations of the host country and shall refrain from any political or other activity in the host country incompatible with the international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit for these Arrangements or any subsequent arrangements which may be entered into between the host country and the United Nations or any authority duly authorized by the United Nations. The Commander shall take appropriate measures to ensure the observance of the obligations.

5. The Government undertakes to respect, and to ensure respect of, the exclusively international character of the Force and the international nature of its command and functions.

Entry and Exit - Identification

6. Members of the Force shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection and restrictions on entering or departing from the host country. They shall also be exempt from any regulations governing the residence of aliens in the host country, including

registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right of permanent residence of domicile in the host country. For the purpose of such entry or departure each member of the Force will be required to have only:

a. An individual or collective movement order in the language of the Participating State and in French or in the English language issued by the Commander or an appropriate authority of the Participating State to which such a member belongs; and

b. A personal identity card issued by the Commander under the Authority of the United Nations showing the full name, date of birth, rank and number (if any), service and photograph of the member concerned.

Provided, however, that in the case of the first entry, a personal military identity card issued by the appropriate authorities of the Participating State concerned will be accepted in lieu of the Force identity card mentioned in b of this paragraph.

7. A member of the Force may be required to present, but not to surrender, his identity card upon demand of such host country authorities as may be mutually agreed between the Commander and the Government. Except as provided in paragraph 6 of this agreement the identity card will be the only document required for a member of the Force.

8. If a member of the Force leaves the service of the Participating State to which he belongs and is not repatriated, the Commander shall immediately inform the Government, giving such particulars as may be required. The Commander shall similarly inform the Government if any member of the Force has absented himself for more than twenty-one days. If an expulsion order against an ex-member of the Force has been made, the Commander shall be responsible for removing the person concerned from the host country.

Arms

9. Members of the Force may possess and carry arms in accordance with an order issued by the Commander.

Freedom of Movement

10. The Force and its members together with its service vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the host country. The Commander, shall, to the extent he considers practical,

consult with the Government with respect to large movements of personnel, stores, or vehicles to be made on roads used for general traffic. Upon receipt or a request made by or on behalf of the Commander, the Government will supply the Force with such maps, and other information, including location of dangers and impediments, as may be useful in facilitating movements of the Force. The Government will not establish restricted areas which inhibit the freedom of movement of the Force and thereby prevent it from carrying out the mission for which it was established. Buffer and demilitarized zones will be established where necessary and they will be clearly described in agreements between the Force Commander and appropriate authorities of the host country.

Use of Roads, Waterways, Port Facilities, and Airfields

11. The Force shall have the right to use roads, bridges, canals, and other waters, port facilities, and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls, or charges either by way of registration or otherwise, throughout the host country.

12. The provisions of para 10 and 11 shall apply to aircraft and vessels owned or chartered by Participating States when being used to obtain or to transport personnel or equipment destined for or being removed from duty with the Force. The Force shall have the right, without interference, to make provision for such additional facilities as are required by the Force to effectively conduct its operations and maintain the Force in being.

Communications and Postal Services

13. The Force enjoys facilities in respect of communications provided in Article III of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Commander shall have authority to install and operate a radio sending and receiving station or stations to connect at appropriate points and exchange traffic with the United Nations Radio Network, and to authorize the installation and operation of communications between national contingents and their home governments for the purpose of maintaining direct communications on national administrative matters, subject to the provisions of Article 47 of the International Telecommunications Convention relating to harmful interference. The frequencies on which any such station may be operated will be duly communicated by the United Nations to the Government and to the International Frequency Registration Board. The right of the Commander is likewise recognized to enjoy the priorities of government telegrams

and telephone calls as provided by the United Nations in Article 39 and Annex 3 of the latter Convention and in Article 62 of the Telegraph Regulations annexed thereto.

14. The Force shall also enjoy, within its area of operations, the right of unrestricted communications by radio, telephone, telegraph, or any other means, and of establishing the necessary facilities for maintaining such communications within and between premises of the Force, including the laying of cables and land lines and the establishment of fixed and mobile radio sending and receiving stations. It is understood that the telegraph and telephone cables and lines herein referred to will be situated within or directly between the premises of the Force and the area of operations, and that connection with the host country's system of telegraphs and telephone will be made in accordance with arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the host country.

15. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to make arrangements through its own facilities or through those of national channels for the processing and transport of official and private mail including parcels addressed to or emanating from the Force and its members. The Government will be informed of the nature of such arrangements. No interference shall take place with, and no censorship shall be applied to, the official and private mail addressed to or emanating from the Force and its members, by the Government. In the event that postal arrangements applying to private mail of members of the Force include operations involving transfer of currency, or transport of packages or parcels from the host country, the conditions under which such operations shall be conducted in the host country will be agreed upon between the Government and the Commander.

United Nations Flag

16. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to display within the host country the United Nations Flag on its headquarters, camps, posts, or other premises, vehicles, vessels, and otherwise as may be decided by the Commander. Other flags or pennants may be displayed only in exceptional cases and in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Commander. Sympathetic consideration will be given to observations or requests of the Government concerning this last-mentioned matter.

Uniform

17. Uniform wear.

a. Members of the Force shall normally wear their national uniform with such identifying United Nations insignia as the Commander may prescribe.

b. Members of the Force may wear civilian dress at such times and on such conditions as may be authorized by the Commander. Instructions relating to the wearing of civilian dress shall be notified to the Government by the Commander who shall give sympathetic consideration to observations or requests made by the Government concerning this matter.

Vehicle, Vessel, and Aircraft Markings, Registration and Operation Permits

18. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force shall carry a distinctive United Nations identification mark and license which shall be notified by the Commander to the Government. Such vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall not be subject to registration and licensing under the laws and regulations of the host country. Host country authorities shall accept as valid, without a test or fee, a permit or license issued by the Commander for the operation of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force.

Privileges and Immunities of Members of the United Nations Secretariat

19. Members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force remain officials of the United Nations entitled to the privileges and immunities of Articles V and VII of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. With respect to the locally-recruited personnel of the Force, however, who are not members of the Secretariat, the United Nations will assert its right only to the immunities concerning official acts, and exemption from taxation and national service obligations provided in sections 18 (a), (b), and (c) of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Privileges and Immunities of the Commander and the Officers of His Headquarters Staff

20. The Commander shall be entitled to the privileges, immunities, and facilities of sections 19 and 27 of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Officers serving on the Commander's Headquarters Staff and such other senior field officers as he may

designate, are entitled to the privileges and immunities of Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Privileges and Immunities of the Force

21. Privileges and immunities of the force.

a. The Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the status, privileges and immunities of the Organization in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The provisions of Article II of the Convention shall also apply to the property, funds, and assets of Participating States used in the Force. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to import free of duty equipment for the Force, and provisions, supplies, and other goods for the exclusive use of members of the Force and members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force, excluding locally recruited personnel; such right includes the right of the Force to establish, maintain, and operate at headquarters, camps, and posts, service institutes providing amenities for such members. The amenities that may be provided by service institutes include goods of a consumable nature such as confectionery, tobacco, tobacco products, and spirits, and articles of a non-consumable nature normally sold in military canteens notwithstanding the availability of such merchandise in local commercial outlets. In order that duty-free importation for the Force may be effected with the least possible delay, having regard to the interests of the Government, a mutually satisfactory procedure, including documentation, shall be arranged between the appropriate authorities of the Force and the Government. The Commander shall take all necessary measures to prevent any abuse of the exemption and to prevent the sale and resale of such goods to persons other than those aforesaid. Sympathetic consideration shall be given by the Commander to observations or requests of the Government concerning the operation of service institutes.

b. Amenities by way of gifts or free issues of a consumable nature sent to national contingents by Participating States and gift parcels sent by relatives and friends as soldiers' comforts shall be imported free of duty into the host country and shall

not affect the quotas, if any, established by agreement between the Commander and the Government.

c. Movement Control Staffs of the Force or Participating States shall have the right to board and inspect vessels and aircraft used by the United Nations in connection with the transportation of personnel and equipment of the Force.

Jurisdiction

22. The following arrangements, paragraphs 22 to 32 inclusive, respecting criminal and civil jurisdiction shall apply having regard to the special functions of the Force and to the interests of the United Nations, and not for the personal benefit of the members of the Force.

Criminal Jurisdiction

23. The military authorities of the Participating State shall have the right to exercise within the host country all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the Participating State over all persons subject to the military law of that State, and the military authorities of the Participating State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of the State with respect to any criminal offenses committed by such person in the host country.

Civil Jurisdiction - Claims

24. Civil jurisdiction - claims.

a. Any claim made by:

(1) A resident of the host country in respect of any damage alleged to result from an act or omission of a member of the Force relating to his official duties;

(2) The Government against a member of the Force; or

(3) The Force or the Government against one another, that is not covered by paragraphs 30 and 31 of this agreement, shall be settled by a Claims Commission established for that purpose. One member of the Commission shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, one member by the Government, and a chairman jointly by the

Secretary-General and the Government. If the Secretary-General and the Government fail to agree on the appointment of a chairman, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either to make the appointment. An award made by the Claims Commission against the Force or a member thereof or against the Government shall be notified to the Commander or the Government, as the case may be, to make satisfaction thereof in the currency of the host country.

b. Members of the Force shall not be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the courts of the host country or to other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties.

c. The United Nations and Government shall make provision for the appropriate mode of settlement of disputes or claims arising out of contract or other disputes or claims of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party other than those in this paragraph and in paragraphs 30, 31, and 46.

25. The Claims Commission, established under paragraph 24, shall settle claims in accordance with the law of the host country. The adjudication of a claim by the Claims Commission shall be conclusive and binding on all parties concerned.

26. Any person who has a claim against a member of the Force arising out of an act or omission in the host country not done in the performance of official duty, may refer his claim to the Claims Commission established pursuant to paragraph 24. Similarly, a member of the Force who has a claim against a resident of the host country arising out of an act or omission in the host country, may also refer his claim to the Claims Commission. Such a claim or other non-duty claims of which the Claims Commission becomes aware shall be reported to the Force or the Government, as appropriate, by the Claims Commission together with an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force or of a resident of the host country, and the reasonableness of the amount claimed. Where appropriate, the Force or the Government, as the case may be, shall co-operate in obtaining a settlement of such claims.

27. Subject to agreement between the United Nations and the Government, cases not falling under paragraph 24 and

those not referred to the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 may be decided by the courts of the host country.

28. With respect to claims against members of the Force:

a. The courts, the Claims Commission, or other authority of the host country shall grant members of the Force sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights. If the Commander certifies that a member of the Force is unable because of official duties or authorized absence, to protect his interests in a civil proceeding in which he is a participant, the court, the claims agency, or other authority shall, at the request of the Commander, suspend the proceeding until the disability has been eliminated. Unless the court, the claims agency, or other authority of the host country in its or his discretion orders otherwise, a suspension made pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed 90 days.

b. Where a judgment made against a member of the Force by a court of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force, given by the Claims Commission, under paragraphs 24 and 26 of this agreement has not been acted upon within a reasonable time, the Government may, without prejudice to the claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Secretary-General to obtain satisfaction.

c. Property belonging to a member of the Force which is certified by the Commander to be needed by such member for the fulfillment of his official duties shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision, or orders, other property belonging to a member of the Force which is not subject to seizure under the law of the host country shall also be free from such seizure.

d. The personal liberty of a member of the Force shall not be restricted by a court or other authority of the host country in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision, or order, to compel an oath of disclosure, or for any other reason.

29. With respect to claims by members of the Force, where a judgment made against a resident of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of the resident of the host country, given by the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 of this Agreement, has not been

acted upon within a reasonable time, the Secretary-General may, where appropriate and without prejudice to the claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Government to obtain satisfaction.

30. All differences between the United Nations and the Government arising out of the interpretation or application of these Arrangements which involve a question of principle concerning the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 30 of the Convention.

31. All other disputes between the United Nations and the Government concerning the interpretation or application of these Arrangements which are not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement shall be referred for final settlement to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, one by the Government, and an umpire to be chosen jointly by the Secretary-General and the Government. If the two parties fail to agree on the appointment of the umpire within one month of the proposal of arbitration by one of the parties, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either party to appoint the umpire. Should a vacancy occur for any reason, the vacancy shall be filled within 30 days by the method laid down in this paragraph for the original appointment. The tribunal shall come into existence upon the appointment of the umpire and at least one of the other members of the tribunal. Two members of the tribunal shall constitute a quorum for the performance of its functions, and for all deliberations and decisions of the tribunal a favorable vote of two members shall be sufficient.

Notification and Certification

32. Where any civil procedure is instituted against a member of the Force before any court of the host country having jurisdiction, notification thereof shall be given to the Commander who shall certify to the court whether or not the matter giving rise to the proceeding is related to the official duties of such member. Where the Commander certifies that the matter is related to the official duties of such member such proceedings shall be terminated.

Military Police - Arrest - Transfer of Custody - Mutual Assistance

33. The Commander shall take all appropriate measures to ensure maintenance of discipline and good order among members of the Force. To this end, military police designated by the

Commander shall police the premises referred to in paragraph 42 of these Arrangements, areas where the Force is deployed in the performance of its functions, and other areas as the Commander deems necessary to maintain discipline and order among members of the Force. For the purpose of this paragraph, the military police of the Force shall have powers of arrest over members of the Force.

34. Military police of the Force may take into custody any person who is not a member of the Force who is found committing an offense or causing a disturbance on the premises referred to in paragraph 42, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authority of the host country for the purpose of dealing with such offense or disturbance.

35. The authorities of the host country may take into custody a member of the Force, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Force:

- a. When so requested by the Commander; or
- b. In cases in which the military police of the Force are unable to act with the necessary promptness when a member of the Force is apprehended in the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offense that results or might result in serious injury to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally protected rights.

36. When a person is taken into custody under paragraph 34 or paragraph 35b, the Commander, or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, may make a preliminary interrogation, but may not delay the transfer of custody and shall immediately inform the Commander or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, that the person is in custody. Following the transfer of custody, the person concerned shall be made available upon request for further interrogation. However, such an interrogation will be done in the presence of a military policeman of the Force or a responsible member of the Force.

37. The Commander and the authorities of the host country shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses in respect of which either or both have an interest, in the production of witnesses, and in the collection and production of evidence,

including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over, of things connected with an offense. The handing over of any such things may be made subject to their return within the time specified by the disposition of any case in the outcome of which the other may have an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the provisions of paragraphs 34 and 35 above. The Government will ensure that private and public buildings may be searched by the police of the host country who will search for property stolen from the Force and its members and the Government will ensure the prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation to the Force or its members which, if committed in relation to the host country armed forces or their members, would have rendered them liable to prosecution. The Secretary-General will seek assurances from Governments of Participating States that they will be prepared to exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offenses which may be committed against citizens of, or other persons in the host country, by members of their national contingents serving with the Force.

Members of the Force - Taxation, Customs, and Fiscal Regulations

38. Members of the Force shall be exempt from taxation on the pay and emoluments received from their national government or from the United Nations. They shall also be exempt from all other direct taxes except municipal rates for services enjoyed, and from all registration fees and charges.

39. Members of the Force shall have the right to import free of duty their personal effects in connection with their arrival in the host country. They shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the host country governing customs and foreign exchange with respect to personal property not required by them by reason of their presence in the host country with the Force. However, the Government shall waive or refund customs duty on reasonable quantities of personal property imported by members of the Force for export as gifts or to be taken with the member when he completes his tour of duty in the host State. Members of the Force on departure from the host country may, notwithstanding the foreign exchange regulations, take with them such funds as the appropriate pay officer of the Force certifies were received in pay and emoluments from their respective national Governments or from the United Nations and are a reasonable residue thereof. Special arrangements between the Commander and the Government shall be made for the implementation of the Government and members of the Force. Particulars of the regulations of the host country concerning the rights of

members of the Force to import duty-free articles for the personal use of the individual are set out at Appendix (to be provided by host country).

40. The Commander will co-operate with customs and fiscal authorities of the host country in ensuring the observance of the customs and fiscal laws and regulations of the host country by members of the Force in accordance with these or any relevant supplemental arrangements.

Disposal of Nationally-Owned Materiel

41. Materiel owned by the Force or by a Participating State may be removed from the host country as a right, but it may be disposed of in the host country only in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in that regard between the Commander and the Government.

Premises of the Force

42. The Government, in agreement with the Commander, shall provide to the Force without cost such areas or buildings in reasonable condition for headquarters, camps, or other uses as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfillment of the functions of the Force. The Force shall have the right to effect such construction, alterations, repairs, and improvements as are necessary. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain the territory of the host country, they shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Commander. The entry upon such premises by any person including civil authorities shall only be permitted by or under the authority of the Commander. Under normal conditions areas and buildings vacated by the Force shall be left in a reasonable state of repair. However, this last condition shall not apply if the Force is required to vacate the areas or buildings through circumstances beyond its control.

Water, Electricity, and other Public Utilities and Services

43. The Force shall have the right to use water, electricity, and other public utilities and services at rates not less favorable to the Force than those to comparable consumers. The Government shall, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtaining water, electricity, and other public utilities and services required, and in the case of interruptions or threatened interruptions of service, will give the same priority to the needs of the Force as to essential Government services. The Force shall have the

right where necessary to generate, within the premises of the Force, either on land or on water, electricity for the use of the Force, and to transmit and distribute such electricity as required by the Force. To the extent necessary to provide for the Force and/or the local population the Force shall have the right to operate waterworks and other public utilities and services.

Provisions, Supplies, and Services (Local)

44. The Government will, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtaining equipment, provisions, supplies, and other goods and services required from local sources for its subsistence and operation. Sympathetic consideration will be given by the Commander to requests or observations of the Government respecting purchases on the local market in order to avoid an adverse effect on the local economy. Members of the Force and United Nations officials may purchase locally goods as necessary for their own consumption, and such services as they need, under conditions not less favorable than for citizens of the host country.

Locally-Hired Personnel

45. The Force may hire local personnel as required. Where necessary, the Government shall be responsible for obtaining the personnel to fulfill the labor requirements of the Force. The terms and conditions of employment for locally-hired personnel shall be prescribed by the Commander and shall generally, to the extent practicable, follow the practice prevailing in the locality. The Government shall not require such employees to perform any duties inconsistent with the United Nations mission during their period of employment with the Force.

46. Disputes concerning terms of employment and conditions of service of locally-employed personnel shall be settled by administrative procedures to be established by the Commander after coordination with appropriate authorities of the host country.

Medical, Sanitary, and Health Measures

47. Where medical or dental facilities of the Force are inadequate, the Commander may enter into arrangements with the Government for the provision of such facilities locally. The Commander and the Government will co-operate with respect to sanitary services and health, particularly with respect to the control of communicable diseases in accordance with

international conventions, and such co-operation shall extend to the exchange of relevant information and statistics.

Deceased Member's Disposition of Personal Property

48. The Commander shall have the right to take charge of and repatriate a deceased force member who dies in the host country. The commander shall turn over the decedent's personal effects to authorities of the decedent's participating state for proper disposition.

Supplemental Arrangements

49. Supplemental details for the carrying out of this agreement shall be made as required between the Commander and appropriate authorities designated by the Government.

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE TERMS OF REFERENCE

The TOR may be in either letter or message format and are sent from the UN Secretary General to the Commander of the Mission when the Commander is appointed. The TOR must be reviewed by appropriate US legal authorities prior to acceptance by US forces. The TOR may contain some or all of the following sections:

Section A. Greetings from the Secretary General and an expression of confidence in the commander.

Section B. UN authority under which the mission was created. This may be a quotation from the resolution relevant to the task of the mission; e.g., to ensure the supervision of the armistice and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the national boundaries that existed before the conflict.

Section C. Statement explaining the type of mission to be accomplished; i.e., observation, mediation. In addition, the statement may detail the primary duties of the force; e.g., "UNXYZ" is an observation mission with the primary duty of observing and reporting.

Section D. Statement of secondary duties and appropriate guidance. For example, the military observers, in supervising the observance of the armistice, will do all that they reasonably can to persuade local commanders to restore the armistice in cases where fighting has occurred. Observers have no power or authority to order an end to the fighting. Where their persuasive efforts fail, their recourse is to report fully on the entire circumstances, their efforts, and the results.

Section E. Instructions as to the method of reporting to the UN, channels of communications to use, etc.

Section F. Information regarding provision of logistic support and administration of the mission; e.g., the logistic, communications, and administrative needs of the mission will be provided by the UN Field Service.

Section G. Instructions concerning relations with any other UN Missions or agencies in the area.

Section H. Statement regarding the current status of negotiations with host countries concerning freedom of movement, UN immunities, etc.

Section I. Specific instructions on methods of operation such as:

a. Uniform--standard UN headgear.

b. Weapons--observers will not carry weapons.

c. Chain of command--the observers are to serve as individuals, not as national teams. The observers are under the direct orders of the Commander and will take neither orders nor advice from their national governments in the performance of UN duties.

d. Advice or guidance on deployment--deploy as closely as possible to the armistice line.

Section J. Instructions, including public relations and contact with the people of the host country.

Section K. Miscellaneous points regarding the situation; e.g., the need for NBC protective equipment.

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX D

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE
UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

The TOR for UNIFIL are as follows:

- a. UNIFIL will determine compliance with paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978).
- b. UNIFIL will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.
- c. UNIFIL will establish and maintain an area of operation, the extent and establishment of which will be determined in consultation with the parties concerned.
- d. UNIFIL will use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation is not used for hostile activities of any kind.
- e. In the fulfillment of this task, UNIFIL will have the cooperation of the military observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX D

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
US MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN AND SUPPORT TO
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS

The following was taken from Department of the Army Circular 11-90-4, Appendix C, and is included in this publication as an example of TOR for a non-UN-sponsored PKO.

1. Purpose. These TOR govern the implementation of US military participation in the MFO that was established by Protocol on 3 August 1981 to supervise the security arrangements as delineated by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, dated 26 March 1979.
2. Mission. The primary mission of the Department of Defense is to provide US military units and/or personnel to serve as elements and/or members of the MFO and to provide logistic support to the MFO as a whole. The primary mission of the Department of the Army, as DOD's Executive Agent, is to provide the most qualified military units and personnel available to accomplish those tasks as specified. The secondary mission of the Executive Agent is to function as the organization responsible for arranging administrative, operational, logistic, and associated C3 support for the US military units and personnel authorized and/or required by DOD regulations but not provided for by the MFO.
3. Command Relationships
 - a. US military units designated to participate in the MFO will be placed under the OPCON of the Commander, MFO upon entering his area of responsibility (Sinai). Combatant command of US military units will be retained by the appropriate combatant commander as recommended by the Executive Agent and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - b. Commanders of US military units under the OPCON of the Commander, MFO, will retain command of their subordinate and attached elements. As specified by paragraph 7, of the annex to the Protocol, the US military contingent commander is charged with responsibility for disciplinary actions under his command. Accordingly, each US commander will retain full authority to implement disciplinary actions under the specifications of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to include expanded authorities as may be deemed

appropriate by the Executive Agent.

c. US military personnel assigned to serve with the MFO but who are not members of specific military units (e.g., personnel assigned as members of the MFO Commander's staff), should be assigned to the appropriate US unit for administration, quarters and rations, and, where appropriate and commensurate with their grade, UCMJ. At the discretion of the Executive Agent, such personnel may be placed under command of the senior US military member of the MFO Commander's staff.

4. Organization. US military units assigned to participate in the MFO will be drawn from Service rolls; MFO-only units will not be created as special entities. This does not preclude, however, task organizing existing units, to meet specific operation requirements and/or political restrictions that exist or which may be imposed.

a. Current requirements (as of August 1990), are for the United States to provide an infantry battalion task force and a logistic support element with a total aggregate strength of approximately 1,015 military personnel. Exact task organization of these elements will be agreed between the Executive Agent and the MFO, and with the concurrence of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)).

b. No DOD personnel will agree to additional restrictions on US military participation as to personnel strengths, organization, and/or equipment without the express concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD(ISA).

5. Logistics. US logistics requirements are to provide logistics support to the entire MFO. The level of logistics support provided by the US logistics support element will be agreed between the Executive Agent and the MFO. Every effort will be made to maintain the logistics readiness posture of the deployed US military units at a level consistent with their normal CONUS posture. In all cases, normal supply and support procedures should be used to the maximum extent possible.

6. Budget. Those costs normally attributed to and budgeted for US units and personnel participating in the MFO will be absorbed by the unit's parent Service budget. Those extraordinary costs incurred by the Service to deploy and support their participating units to and in the Sinai will be reimbursed by the MFO through the Executive Agent. Those

costs incurred by a Service to deploy and/or support non-US elements participating will be reimbursed by the MFO budget through the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will establish the necessary budgeting, billing, and accounting procedures as agreed between the Executive Agent and the Comptroller, in accordance with DOD fiscal instructions.

7. Training of Other National Contingents. The Executive Agent is authorized to provide training to other national contingents of the MFO as may be requested by the Director General.

8. Other Services. The Executive Agent is authorized to provide administrative and technical support and services to the MFO as deemed necessary to ensure adequate support to the MFO in general and to US military units and personnel in particular.

9. Coordination and Liaison

a. The Executive Agent is authorized direct coordination with those USG agencies and commands as deemed necessary and appropriate.

b. Liaison with the MFO headquarters will be established as agreed between the Executive Agent and the Office of the Director General with the concurrence of ASD(ISA) and the DOS.

10. Responsibilities of US Military Personnel

a. US military personnel assigned to the MFO will perform such duties as assigned by the Commander, through their US unit commander as appropriate, and in consonance with the rules and regulations as established by the MFO Commander in consultation with the contributing countries.


b. No classified US military information of any nature, the release for which is not contained in appropriate directives, will be released to foreign nationals by US personnel assigned to the MFO.

11. Public Affairs. DOS will remain the lead US agency for PA activities regarding all aspects of the MFO. The Executive Agent's PA offices may conduct routine PA activities (respond to news media inquiries, internal and troop information programs, etc.) relating only to previously released aspects of US military participation in the MFO. Key personnel and construction announcements, or other significant new material will be coordinated in advance with

the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs) (OATSD(PA)) and the DOS PA.

APPENDIX E

NOTIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR A UN
PEACE OPERATION




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
APPENDIX F

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR NON-UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MFO HEADQUARTERS - ROME, ITALY



THE FORCE




Note: US forces performing peacekeeping operations under the direction of multinational peacekeeping organizations will be assigned to a combatant commander unless otherwise directed by the NCA.

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APPENDIX G

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR A
US PEACEKEEPING CONTINGENT



- 1 May or may not be US
- 2 Will always be US
- 3 Normally consists of a Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and an operations staff
- 4 Normally consists of a military assistant, a political adviser, a legal adviser, a public affairs officer, an interpreter(s), and liaison officers from the armed forces of the parties in the conflict
- 5 Provided by the UN Secretariat for UN-sponsored operations

_____ Peacekeeping Operational Control
 - - - - - Combatant Command (command authority)
 Coordination/Liaison (as required)

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APPENDIX H

SAMPLE FORMAT OF AN AREA HANDBOOK

1. As discussed in Chapter IV, the purpose of an area handbook is to assist personnel in transitioning to their assignment as a member of a PKO.

2. Although an area handbook will vary from PKO to PKO, the following table of contents, taken from the Sinai Area Handbook for members assigned to the MFO on the Sinai Peninsula, illustrates the types of items appropriate for an area handbook.

a. Maps

- (1) Transatlantic route.
- (2) Persian Gulf area.
- (3) Sinai Peninsula.

b. Multinational Force and Observers

- (1) Organization.
- (2) Functions and responsibilities.
- (3) Size and organization.
- (4) Criminal jurisdiction.
- (5) Military police.

c. Location and Topography

- (1) Geographical location.
- (2) Terrain.
- (3) Effect of the terrain on MFO operations.

d. General Climatic Data

- (1) Climatic regions.
- (2) Seasons.
- (3) Precipitation.

- (4) Temperatures.
- (5) Sky conditions.
- (6) Visibility.
- (7) Surface winds.
- (8) Severe weather.
- (9) Sandstorms.
- (10) Flash floods.
- (11) Effects of weather on MFO operations.

e. Sinai Peninsula

- (1) General information.
- (2) Bedouin population in Zone C.

f. Desert Operations

- (1) General.
- (2) Acclimatization.
- (3) Camouflage.
- (4) Noise and light discipline.
- (5) Navigation.
- (6) Maintenance.

g. Desert Survivability

- (1) General.
- (2) Sun, wind, and sand.
- (3) Buddy system.
- (4) Water conservation.
- (5) Dangerous insects and animals.
- (6) Desert hazards.

- (7) Treatment of specific medical problems.
- (8) Field sanitation.
- (9) Personal hygiene.

h. Egyptian Armed Forces

- (1) General information.
- (2) Organizational diagrams.
- (3) Uniforms; rank and branch insignia.
- (4) Egyptian military equipment identification charts.
 - (a) General information.
 - (b) Armor.
 - (c) Armored personnel carriers (APCs).
 - (d) Artillery.
 - (e) Air defense artillery.
 - (f) Helicopters.
 - (g) Fixed-wing aircraft.
 - (h) Small arms.
 - (i) Antitank weapons.
- (5) Arabic culture and customs.
- (6) Basic Arabic phrases.

i. Israeli Armed Forces

- (1) Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
- (2) Organizational diagrams.
- (3) Uniforms; rank and branch insignia.
- (4) Israeli military equipment identification charts.
 - (a) General information.

- (b) Armor.
- (c) APCs.
- (d) Artillery.
- (e) Air defense artillery.
- (f) Helicopters.
- (g) Fixed-wing aircraft.
- (h) Small arms.
- (i) Antitank weapons.

(5) Hebrew culture.

(6) Hebrew phrases.

j. Nations and Organizations Supporting the MFO

k. Rules of Engagement

l. Minefields

m. OPSEC

n. Predeployment Training

o. Notes (this section allows each person to record notes).

3. As stated in Chapters IV and VII, various personnel topics are also appropriate for an area handbook and should be included as appropriate. These other topics are: tour length; passport and visa requirements; deployed mailing address; leave policy; morale, welfare, and recreation opportunities; Red Cross; etc.

APPENDIX J

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. General

a. The Intelligence Community must define the counterintelligence and intelligence requirements for supporting the military commitment as early as possible. This is crucial because the predeployment and planning phases of the operation require optimum support. Additionally, once deployed, a unit may have little or no capability to receive either external counterintelligence or intelligence support. These requirements should be developed in conjunction with the operational planning and submitted through appropriate command channels. In formulating collection plans, collection managers must consider the ability of the deploying unit to receive and store intelligence materials, the timeliness of collection systems, other national priorities, and the availability of on-the-shelf intelligence publications. Intelligence support must always be focused on operational planning considerations as reflected in Chapter IV.

b. PKOs increase the role of the counterintelligence and intelligence officers in both training and operations. The nature of peacekeeping demands complete mental reorientation on the part of personnel involved in the operations. The counterintelligence and intelligence officers should be prepared to help affect this change. Once deployed, a unit may continue to receive support tailored to the operational requirements of the PKO, and at an appropriate level of classification. Individuals assigned to observer groups may receive little or no support.

2. Intelligence Guidelines

a. Once deployed, the commander's authority to conduct intelligence operations may be severely restricted; therefore, the intelligence section may have to be submerged in the force structure. Commands may have only limited authority, or possibly no authority, to receive, process, and store classified intelligence information such as signals intelligence and imagery intelligence products. In these cases, commanders focus on operational reporting from within the command as well as whatever intelligence support might be available from the

multinational headquarters, the parties in the conflict, and/or the host nations.

b. Threat capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining information requirements. It is difficult for a commander to make a decision when the picture is not reasonably clear. The list of possible threat capabilities must be reduced to a smaller list of the most probable ones. Much of the information gathering in PKOs will be directed towards the civilian population, sympathizers, terrorist groups and their weapons, and/or evidence of foreign support. However, the intelligence officer must decide what specific information is required in order to avoid surprise and offensive actions against the peacekeeping forces.

c. There may also be requirements for production of economic, political, sociological, medical, or scientific information. If so, specialists in any of those fields may be required. In every case, the timeliness of the information required is of the utmost importance in support of PKOs.

3. Interoperability and Connectivity

a. To ensure the safety of assigned forces, the commander must have the capability to disseminate critical indications and warnings to all echelons quickly. This connectivity must extend among individual Services as well as among other nations or international organizations involved. Planners should include provisions for interoperability and connectivity of communications for passing emergency information.

b. A robust theater architecture must be in place to provide accurate and timely all-source information to the user. Since resources available in remote operating areas are generally constrained, any architecture must carefully control information flow to avoid overtaxing or bottlenecking limited in-theater personnel and equipment.

c. Of special importance, this information must be formatted clearly and be at an appropriate classification level to ensure its releasability to all operational forces involved. Authority to downgrade classification or to sanitize information, when required, should be provided to the appropriate operational echelon. Release of US classified information to a non-US peacekeeping force should, if required, occur in an orderly,

time-sensitive fashion. Existing release procedures should be used whenever possible. Some watch centers may be empowered to make an emergency release decision in a timely manner. Any US classified information released to a non-US peacekeeping force must be properly marked to indicate that it is releasable.

4. Security of Command

a. Mission success and the security of the command depends almost entirely on the observational skills of the personnel and the leadership of the small unit or team leader. In the absence of other systems, human intelligence may be the only source of information; personnel and patrols on land, sea, or air become the primary source of timely information. The intelligence officer recommends all reconnaissance efforts, supervises the processing and dissemination of reports in coordination with the operations officer, and recommends redirection of patrols to fill gaps. The system is the first line of defense against any threat and is a critical factor in determining mission success.

b. The intelligence officer is often looked upon as the historical expert. Members of the force will likely look to the officer for information concerning the threat, economic conditions, history, social conditions, and the political situation.

c. The counterintelligence and intelligence officers will be required to define the threats to the safety of the peacekeeping force. The key is to reorient personnel perspectives. The root causes of the conflict must be emphasized and the effect on the parties in the conflict should be illustrated; this may serve to create empathy for both sides. Finally, the conflict must be defined in the context of US interests, stressing that the peacekeeping force is neither for nor against either side. These contributions will reinforce the neutral perspective needed in PKOs.

5. Counterintelligence

a. The purpose of CI support to PKOs is to identify threat information for use in force protection of deployed US peacekeeping forces against espionage, intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorism, or assassinations. CI provides warning and threat analysis of operations conducted by foreign intelligence services

and/or organizations and groups hostile to deployed US forces.

b. An early involvement of CI is essential to provide area threat assessments of the CI security environment for the proposed US force before and during main force deployment. CI analysis must provide an accurate assessment of the hostile foreign intelligence threat and indigenous intelligence threat capabilities. The concept of support seeks, where possible, to use existing collection, production, reporting, and dissemination procedures for CI support of deploying and deployed US forces.

c. All US national-level agencies involved in providing intelligence support to US forces should provide CI information to a centralized location based on requirements identified in CI planning. The command CI officer must be involved in the planning and execution of any CI support to PKOs involving US personnel. Service CI agencies will be tasked to participate as required.

6. Predeployment Intelligence Planning

a. At the beginning of the predeployment planning phase, commanders as well as counterintelligence and intelligence officers should determine intelligence requirements and the direction of the counterintelligence and intelligence effort. The effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander's understanding of the relative importance of counterintelligence and intelligence in accomplishing the mission.

b. During this phase, the counterintelligence and intelligence officers should develop a staff estimate (written or oral), which is an appraisal based on available counterintelligence and intelligence with a view to identifying any threats and determining possible or probable courses of action. It also provides information about the impact of such factors as weather, climate, geography, and socioeconomic conditions. The intelligence estimate and its counterintelligence appendix must be dynamic; the situation constantly changes, as do the counterintelligence and intelligence needs of the commander.

c. Counterintelligence and intelligence planning is also concerned with providing information necessary for planning by other staff sections, particularly

operations. Interaction between the counterintelligence and intelligence functions and the other staff elements must begin at the earliest stages of planning and continue throughout the operation. Constant interaction and feedback between counterintelligence, intelligence, and operations personnel are critical to achieving focused support and mission success. To acquire the necessary predeployment operational planning information, the counterintelligence and intelligence officer must identify elements of essential information and take the necessary action to satisfy these requirements through the appropriate counterintelligence and intelligence channels. Particular attention should be paid to researching on-the-shelf intelligence publications and open sources for planning information. Review of available MC&G products of operational area must begin immediately to allow sufficient lead time for production and distribution by the Defense Mapping Agency.

d. The intelligence officer must develop collection plans for the operational phases using organic capabilities. Given the nature of PKOs, developing collection plans may involve extensive use of overt human intelligence such as refugee interviews, and exploitation of open source publications such as newspapers. Depending on the operational environment, intelligence officers should consider using the talents and skills, particularly languages, of any member of the peacekeeping force when developing collection plans.

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APPENDIX K

SAMPLE FORMAT: STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. Introduction. Include a short introduction to the political and military situations in the peacekeeping area of operations.
2. Administrative Instructions
 - a. Amendment Sheet. Used to maintain a record of changes to the SOP.
 - b. Distribution List. Indicates which portions of the SOP are issued on a general distribution basis and which portions are issued on a restricted distribution basis.
3. Command and Control
 - a. Explains the status, authority, and responsibilities of the force commander, subordinate commanders (if applicable), national contingent commanders, sector commanders, and unit commanders.
 - b. Outlines the national contingent commanders' responsibilities to the force commander and to each of the national contingent commander's government authorities on national matters.
 - c. Outlines responsibilities of key civilian personnel.
 - d. Schedules times as well as attendance requirements at operational briefings and logistics meetings.
 - e. Establishes NBC warning and reporting systems.
4. Organization
 - a. Structure of the peacekeeping force headquarters.
 - b. Responsibilities of levels subordinate to the commander.
5. Operations
 - a. Mandate
 - (1) Aim. Lists the role and purpose of the peacekeeping force as it relates to the specific mandate.

(2) Scope. Defines limits within which the force must operate.

b. Tasks. Lists the authorized methods for interposition of forces, buffer zone operations, patrolling, observing, and reporting.

c. Freedom of Movement. Explains the rights of the peacekeeping force members as well as any restrictions concerning their movements in the peacekeeping area of operations. Specifics may include:

(1) Restrictions on movement and specific circumstances under which restricted areas may be visited.

(2) Identification requirements.

(3) Procedures to follow in the event a peacekeeping force member is stopped. Also, actions to take at a roadblock.

(4) Instructions for patrols operating in the buffer zone if they are stopped or otherwise prevented from performing their duties.

(5) Actions peacekeeping force personnel may take if members of the belligerent parties attempt to search them and/or their vehicles.

(6) Authorities for transporting nonpeacekeeping force individuals in the force's vehicles; e.g., for emergency medical care.

(7) Procedures used during hijack situations.

(8) Incident reports that must be submitted if a violation occurs concerning the force's freedom of movement.

d. Weapons and Ammunition

(1) Authority to carry weapons while patrolling, performing escort duty, protecting property, etc.

(2) The amount of ammunition each individual may carry (usually one 20-round magazine), how the ammunition will be carried (e.g., in the pouch), and when a loaded magazine may be attached to the weapon.

e. Use of Force. The following points may be appropriate:

- (1) Definitions of force and use of force.
- (2) Situations when peacekeepers may use force.
- (3) The manners in which firearms are to be used.

f. Entry, Search, and Arrest. Since most peacekeeping forces have military and/or civil police units, explain the circumstances when these police powers may be used.

g. Night Operations. A reminder to be overt, whom to inform and the method to use, and what actions to take if stopped while conducting peacekeeping duties at night.

h. States of Readiness. What they are and how they are announced.

i. Reports. The who, what, when, where, and how of each report format. One report format is SALUTE, which means the following subjects are included in the report: size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment.

j. Protest Procedures. How the peacekeeping force notifies one of the belligerent parties of an infringement, the channels of communications to use, and which report to send to higher headquarters.

k. Aviation. Flight notification and clearance procedures, tasking procedures, flying restrictions, and accident investigation procedures.

l. Naval and Water Operations. Overall defensive plan; contingency plans for situations where tide, current, or weather affects the afloat base; base patrols; and security of berths and anchorages.

m. Special Instructions. Force, contingent, or unit headquarters may require peacekeeping force members to carry cards with instructions on what to do in the event of:

- (1) Entry into the buffer zone by a member of a nonpeacekeeping military force or by civilians.
- (2) Rules for the use of force in self-defense.

6. Support

a. Logistics. List the subjects for which the chief logistics officer will publish directives.

b. Identification. Explain distinctive dress, vehicle markings, and how to carry the UN or force flag.

c. Personnel Services. Explain procedures for strength reporting, leaves, jurisdiction for courts-martial, and graves registration.

d. Casualty Reporting. Missing persons, hostages, deaths, etc.


e. Communications. Explain the use of communications systems provided by the UN or peacekeeping force headquarters, the host government, or national contingents. Also, discuss frequency allocation policy, relay and rebroadcast facilities, call signs, cryptography, message forms, and message traffic handling.

f. Finance. Include any special accounting procedures required by the force headquarters.

g. Public Information. Media relations including clearance for press visits, briefing and interview policies, etc.

h. Internal Information. Include arrangements for the reception and distribution of AFRTS signals, or other electronic news source signals; the production, printing, and distribution of a force newspaper, newsletter, or magazine; and procurement of any other form of internal information deemed necessary by the US national contingent commander.

APPENDIX L
SAMPLE DIAGRAM OF AN
OBSERVATION POST



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APPENDIX M

PERTINENT SCHOOLS FOR PEACEKEEPERS

DENMARK

UN MILITARY POLICE COURSE (UNMILPOC) (2 Weeks)

Training for UN Military Police Officers. UNMILPOC provides training for officers who will be assigned to a military police unit within a UN area of operation. Upon completion of the course the student should be able to:

- a. Maintain law, order, and discipline within the authority given by the UN.
- b. Work with local police and health authorities to establish regulations for residence permits and freedom of movement on deploying into a new area of operation. Additionally, be able to assist the commanders in preparing and issuing such regulations.
- c. Establish traffic regulations and control measures to deal with traffic accidents as well as general and specific traffic code violations.
- d. Perform military police administration, including preparing and submitting reports, statistical summaries, etc.
- e. Cooperate with local police authorities, military police units from other UN contingents, and UN civilian police forces.
- f. Organize police tasks in conjunction with the control of large-scale demonstrations and riots.

Training of UN Military Police Noncommissioned Officers. UNMILPOC provides training for noncommissioned officers who will be shift commanders in military police units within a UN area of operation. Upon completion of the course the student should be able to:

- a. Maintain law, order, and discipline within the guidelines given by the UN military police unit.
- b. Implement traffic control measures, including regulations, speed checks, etc.

c. Perform various tasks related to the duties of a military police station; e.g., making reports, taking statements.

d. Cooperate with local police authorities and personnel from other military police units.

e. Identify special tasks for UN police forces at large-scale demonstrations and riots.

UNMILPOC training of officers and noncommissioned officers is conducted in English. Further information on UNMILPOC can be obtained from:

Danish UN Department
Jagerspris Hovedgaard
DK-3630 Jagerspris
Denmark

FINLAND

UN MILITARY OBSERVERS COURSE (UNMOC) (3 Weeks)

UNMOC prepares officers for service as UN Military Observers at any UN mission, but particularly for current UN operations. The following topics are covered:

a. UN organization as well as past and present peacekeeping activities.

b. Observer duties and communications procedures.

c. Background information such as political, social, religious, and other factors prevalent in the observer mission areas.

d. Climatic, topographical, and environmental circumstances under which operations may be conducted.

e. Peacekeepers' attitudes.

f. The English language.

Further information concerning details of this course can be obtained from:

Ministry of Defence
UN Division Box 31
SF-00131 Helsinki
Finland

NORWAY
UN MOVEMENT CONTROL COURSE (UNMOVCC) (2 Weeks)

UNMOVCC prepares personnel for service with the UN Movement Control Organization in a theater of operation. The main subjects are: UN organization and operation, movement control activities, air, water, and railroad transport, and communications.

UN LOGISTICS COURSE (UNLOC) (2 Weeks)

UNLOC prepares personnel for service in the logistics branch. The main subjects are: logistics principles and procedures relating to UN PKOs; international disaster relief; and engagement in, as well as experience from, UN operations.

UNMOVCC and UNLOC are conducted in English and take the form of lectures, team work, and case studies. Further information can be obtained from:

Headquarters Defence Command
UN Office
Oslo Mil/Huseby
Oslo 1
Norway

SWEDEN
UN STAFF OFFICERS COURSE (UNSOC) (105 Lessons)

UNSOC prepares students for duty assignments as staff officers in the headquarters of UN military peacekeeping forces (missions) and in national contingents (battalions). The main subjects are:

- a. Introduction to an international staff system.
- b. Knowledge of UN conflict control operations.
- c. UN organization and functions.
- d. Roles of UN military forces. Relations between UN forces and the local population, including political, economic, racial, and religious issues.

e. Operational and administrative principles and procedures to be adopted when establishing and conducting a PKO.

UNSOC is conducted in English. Further information can be obtained from:

UN Division
Army Staff
Box 80002
S-104 50 Stockholm
Sweden

UNITED STATES
USAF SPECIAL OPERATIONS SCHOOL
(Hurlburt Field, FL 32544-5000)
CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS COURSE (CCC) (MAC 146000)
(5 Days)

The purpose of the CCC is to improve the communications and problem-solving skills of DOD personnel who provide training or administrative assistance to, or negotiate with, foreign military personnel. The CCC is divided into two instructional areas:

- a. Area I (100) Strategies and Behavior Basic to Effective Cross-Cultural Communications. The objective is to illuminate fundamental strategies for identifying and overcoming barriers in the intercultural communications process.
- b. Area II (200) Regional Studies. The objective is to familiarize students with the major cultural factors that affect the values, attitudes, motivation, perceptions, and behavior of people within selected major cultural groups.

DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (MAC 147000) (5 Days)

This course provides a basic awareness and appreciation of the psychology, organization, techniques, operational capabilities, and threat posed by terrorist groups on an international and regional basis. Strong emphasis is placed on protective measures that can be employed to minimize the threat. Further information concerning the above two courses can be obtained from:

USAFSOS/EDRS
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544-5000

DSN 579-7988 or Commercial (904) 884-7988

US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School
Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM AWARENESS COURSE (3A-F40/011-F21)
(5 Days)

This course teaches students how to minimize the vulnerability to terrorist identification, selection, and attack; how to react to a terrorist assault; and how to survive in a hostage situation. The scope of the course includes terrorism and terrorist operations, self-protection measures, and hostage survival techniques. Further information can be obtained from:

US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School
ATSU-GP-BSE
Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000
DSN 236-8919 or Commercial (919) 396-8919

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APPENDIX N

SAMPLE PEACEKEEPING EXERCISE

1. Peacekeeping Exercise. The climax to predeployment training should be a peacekeeping exercise. After establishing observation posts and checkpoints in a field environment, the key objective for the unit is to conduct operations as if it were in an actual peacekeeping situation. The following are highlights of a well-planned, well-executed peacekeeping exercise:
 - a. Normal ground and air traffic from other units in the training area provides the "incidents" to observe and report.
 - b. Each small unit gains experience in observing and reporting.
 - c. Personnel become familiar with reporting formats.
 - d. A rotation-type exercise focuses training on communications and reporting procedures, fire prevention, maintaining and operating electrical generators, improvement of fighting positions, reporting of visitors, resupply operations, and the general layout and routine of an observation post.
 - e. Drivers' training includes an orientation of different types of driving conditions. An established driving course should be used.
 - f. A standardized briefing for official visitors is developed.
 - g. Physical training, individual training, stand-to, and other functions are conducted.
2. Exercise Scope. The exercise should include:
 - a. When and how to use force.
 - b. How to treat people seeking protection within a US post.
 - c. How to act when armed groups request the extradition of people under US protection.
 - d. Normal alert, increased alert, and full alert procedures.
 - e. Patrolling.

- f. What to take on patrol (identification card, recognition signals, etc.).
- g. How to act when patrols are fired on.
- h. How to choose a location for a roadblock.
- i. What to do with seized weapons.
- j. Procedures to use to stop vehicles and/or people.
- k. Roadblock procedures, including how to check:
 - (1) A vehicle by allowing only one private vehicle within the roadblock.
 - (2) Under cover of other weapons.
 - (3) A loaded van or truck in a separate location.
 - (4) Liaison officers and their vehicles.
 - (5) A private vehicle by using the systematic approach; i.e., use mirrors and flashlights, check gas tanks and spare wheels.
 - (6) Civilians by using a scanner without being detected by other civilians. Women should be treated with respect and searched by females whenever feasible.
- l. Establishing and operating a slowdown checkpoint, the purpose of which is to slow, but not stop, traffic for observation.
- m. NBC protection and decontamination procedures.
- n. Hijack scenarios.
- o. PA interface with the local populace as well as with media representatives.
- p. Cantonment site.
- q. Disarmament.
- r. Demobilization operations.
- s. Election support operations.

APPENDIX O

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. General

a. The primary mission of medical assets in PKOs is to provide appropriate HSS to the peacekeeping force. Joint medical planning and execution is especially critical in these types of operations because it is likely the force will consist of elements from more than one of the Services, and/or may be a multinational force.

b. Due to the inherent neutrality of the peacekeeping force, it is important for medical units and personnel to adhere to the parameters of their stated mission. Independent, unplanned medical civic assistance programs should not be undertaken by the medical element of the peacekeeping force. However, even if HSS for host-nation citizens is not included in the peacekeeping force mandate, the joint force medical planner must consider the resources necessary to provide HA to persons located in any part of the buffer zone. Additionally, HSS plans must consider the contingency implications of potential sequels. For example, if the PKO is established as a result of a conflict resolution process, then the HSS structure may be a major part of the force structure based upon the perceived need to treat refugees and other displaced persons.

c. For these reasons, it is imperative the peacekeeping force planning cell include an HSS planner to provide staff surgeon planning support.

2. HSS Planning Considerations for Peacekeeping Operations

a. Just as each PKO is unique and requires a specifically tailored organization to meet mission requirements, the HSS structure must be tailored from existing resources. The HSS package for a peacekeeping force is also limited by the scope of its mission. Preventive medicine measures must be employed and receive command emphasis to minimize the medical threat. The disease and nonbattle injury rate is more significant on these operations than are combat wounds. Stress factors in PKOs may cause stress disorders. These disorders include misconduct reactions which may threaten success of the peacekeeping mission. Effective training of key personnel, as well as employment of mental health and

stress control personnel, can help prevent or manage these complications.

b. The HSS support package for peacekeeping operations is specifically tailored to meet the needs of, and be compatible with, the size of the supported force. For successful HSS operations, the HSS planner must ensure that:

(1) The size and composition of the HSS element is sufficient to provide adequate care. This may include consideration of the organizational structure and individual training of selected HSS units. For example, the medical sets, kits, and outfits of many hospitalization units have generally been constructed to support anticipated combat-based treatment requirements. Additionally, the personnel tables of these units may have been designed to provide the HSS specialties most often associated with trauma management. Analysis of the commander's plan, the medical threat, and the peacekeeping force mandate may require addition of selected Class VIII supplies, medical equipment, and personnel to meet mission needs.

(2) Sufficient numbers and types of hospital beds have been provided based upon the commander's plan and medical threat assessment.

(3) Logistic links of resupply of Class VIII supplies, pharmaceuticals, blood products, and medicinal gases are well-defined.

(4) Medical evacuation means and routes are planned for, as well as effecting the necessary coordination with other Services and allied nations.

(5) Veterinary support is sufficient for surveillance of foodstuffs and care of government owned animals.

(6) A mass casualty plan is prepared and provision is made for practicing the plan.

(7) Alternate sources of HSS are considered, and if appropriate, incorporated into the plan. These alternate sources may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Diplomatic flights for medical evacuation or resupply.

(b) Embassy and HN physicians, if available.

(c) Allied nations' capabilities for emergency care, hospitalization, and ancillary services support.

(8) HSS to joint services has been coordinated to ensure synchronization of effort, elimination of unnecessary redundancies, and confirmation of total force coverage.

(9) If hospitalization support is not available within the immediate area, plans must be coordinated with the units providing this support. In light of the potential terrorist threat in PKOs, it is imperative hospitalization support (location, characteristics, laboratory, blood supply, and capacity), be available in the event of a mass casualty situation.

(10) Contingency plans are prepared for HSS in the event of the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force or the escalation of hostilities.

(11) The implications and resource requirements of any potential HA mission have been considered.

(12) All base development, construction, and real estate requirements necessary for the deployment and employment of the HSS force have been identified to the peacekeeping force command authority.

(13) Plans include requirements for basic personal protective measures, immunizations, chemoprophylaxis, immunoprophylaxis, insect control, and other appropriate measures.

(14) Dental predeployment screening is accomplished, and the appropriate levels of in-country dental care is provided or coordinated for the force.

3. Medical Threat Information. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, 21701-5004, is one source for medical threat information.

a. The AFMIC is a joint agency of the Military Departments. It is the primary scientific and technical production center for foreign general medical intelligence and medical scientific and technical intelligence within the Department of Defense. Its products include:

- (1) Medical Capabilities Studies that are prepared on most countries. They identify environmental factors, medical capabilities of both military and civilian medical sectors, indigenous infectious diseases, and poisonous flora and fauna.
- (2) Disease Occurrence Worldwide is prepared monthly. This publication presents current intelligence and information on military significant diseases throughout the world.
- (3) Scientific and technical intelligence products are prepared on military-significant research and development of medical relevance within foreign military and civilian scientific communities.
- (4) The Weekly Wire is an electronic message that transmits current medical intelligence items of interest to the medical planner.
- (5) The Medical Facilities Handbook is a four-volume reference set on hospital facilities within major geographical areas worldwide. Each volume provides an alphabetical listing of major medical facilities within every foreign country. Specific information provided on hospitals includes location, bed space, available medical capabilities, emergency capabilities, x-ray, laboratory and ambulance services, plus other relevant information.

b. AFMIC can respond to time-sensitive quick reaction intelligence production requests from the user community provided the task can be completed in a maximum of 40 staff-hours of analytical work.

c. AFMIC has an Emergency Operations Center that can respond to crisis situations to support military medical operations. Upon activation, this center is staffed on a 24-hour basis.

d. AFMIC support can be obtained through intelligence channels or, should the situation demand, by direct contact with the Center. The following information is provided in the event direct contact is required.

- (1) Letter address:
Director, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
ATTN: AFMIC-OPS
Building 1607, Fort Detrick
Frederick, MD 21701-5004

- (2) Message address:
DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD//AFMIC-ZA//
- (3) Telephone numbers:
 - (a) Director's Office
DSN: 343-7511
Commercial: (301) 663-7511
 - (b) Tie-line from the District of Columbia area:
393-1839, extension 7511 or 7603
FTS: 935-7511
 - (c) AFMIC Medical Intelligence Integration Officer
DSN: 227-8233
Commercial: (202) 697-8233
 - (d) Secure Phone:
KY2201, STU II: ID No. 03305
DSN: 343-7511
 - (e) Commercial: (301) 663-7511

e. Additional information concerning AFMIC intelligence products can be found in DOD 6420.1R, and US Army Field Manual 8-10-8.

4. Preventive Medicine Support in Peacekeeping Operations

a. Peacekeeping forces are generally under strict size constraints; therefore, it is essential a complete analysis of the medical threat be done. This analysis ensures the medical assets are adequate for the needs of the deployed forces. Predeployment training on field sanitation and personal hygiene measures, as well as command emphasis on preventive medicine, is necessary.

b. Environmental disease, field hygiene and sanitation, and other preventive medicine issues impact on the health of US forces employed in PKOs. Historically, the occurrence of disease, non-battle injury, and environmental injuries have debilitated a deployed force to the point of adversely affecting the mission.

(1) Foodborne and Waterborne Diseases. In areas of poor sanitation, locally procured foods pose a high risk of disease for peacekeeping forces. Public health standards for food preparation to which US forces are accustomed are often absent in foreign countries.

Further, food handlers are often carriers of disease that can be readily transmitted to unsuspecting patrons. Peacekeeping forces cannot be assured of the safety or quality of local water supplies; therefore, drinking water should be treated to US military standards (usually five parts per million (ppm) chlorine residual). Adequate water disinfection supplies (iodine tablets and calcium hypochlorite, should be readily available and used as needed. Locally procured ice poses the same health risks as food and water and, therefore, should be avoided. Finally, the possibility of terrorist attacks on, or contamination of, peacekeeping force food and water sources should not be taken lightly.

(2) Environmental Injuries. Heat-related injuries can quickly diminish personnel effectiveness. Cold-weather injuries are preventable by using proper protective clothing and warming areas. Minimizing time spent outdoors is another way to prevent cold-weather injuries. Dehydration also increases the risk of injury; therefore, the enforcement of a liberal water consumption policy is important in cold climates as well as in hot climates.

5. Combat Stress Control and Mental Health Service in Peacekeeping Operations. Mental health officers can assist commanders in completing predeployment unit effectiveness surveys, providing training and consultation related to stress management and unit cohesion and completing mental health screening and evaluations. During PKOs, the focus is on mental health assessment and consultation.

6. Veterinary Support in Peacekeeping Operations

a. Veterinary support may be required in a PKO to ensure procured food is safe.

b. Veterinary support may also be required if military working dogs are used in a PKO.

c. If HA operations are within the mandate of the peacekeeping force's mission, veterinary services can contribute to the success of the mission. For example, improving the local population's health through programs such as immunizations for zoonotic animal diseases; public health and sanitation training; and training in food hygiene, safety, and inspection techniques.

APPENDIX P

HAND OVER PROCEDURES

The following are suggested procedures for accomplishing the hand over of POWs, human remains, and parcels and mail.

1. The hand over of POWs must be carefully coordinated and well-organized to prevent confusion and delay. A disruption in the hand over could result in the peacekeeping force feeding and accommodating several hundred POWs. A narrow section of the buffer zone should be chosen so that the prisoners can be transferred on foot for better control. The supervisory authority should:

a. Contact the intermediary (a peacekeeping force member or other neutral persons agreed to by all sides), to ascertain the number of prisoners to be handed over. Determine if there are any sick or wounded prisoners who need an ambulance or other form of transport.

b. Inform the force commander of the number of escorts, ambulances, and vehicles required.

c. Ensure that the receiving party has the necessary transport marshaled just outside the buffer zone in the vicinity of the agreed checkpoint. The receiving party's authorized representatives will be allowed inside the buffer zone to proceed to the hand over point.

d. Secure the area with armed peacekeeping soldiers who will remain at a discreet distance.

e. Close the checkpoints, and the road between them, to all unauthorized traffic and visitors.

f. Meet the prisoners with the intermediary at the arrival checkpoint, organize them into groups of 10, separate those requiring transport from those able to walk, obtain the necessary documentation (nominal roll of prisoners), and sign a receipt for them.

g. Escort the marching prisoners with unarmed peacekeeping soldiers across the buffer zone to the receiving party at the agreed hand over point (usually near a checkpoint). Unarmed escorts will

accompany the ambulances and vehicles transporting prisoners who are unable to walk.

h. Hand over the prisoners, and a copy of the nominal roll, to the receiving party's representatives in the presence of the intermediary. Obtain a receipt.

2. The hand over of human remains should be carried out quickly, efficiently, and with due respect for the dead. If POWs are to be handed over in the same operation, the dead should be transferred first. However, to avoid emotional scenes and possible demonstrations, the two should not be handed over simultaneously. The supervisory staff ensures that:

a. The receiving party has a suitable vehicle at the checkpoint just outside the buffer zone.

b. The peacekeeping force keeps the checkpoints on either side of the hand over area clear of vehicles and visitors not connected with the hand over.

c. The peacekeeping force provides a work detail if necessary.

d. The supervisory staff and the intermediary meet the vehicle bringing the remains to the checkpoint.

e. After the intermediary has signed a receipt for the remains and completed other required documentation, the work detail will transfer the remains to a force vehicle.

f. The force vehicle, accompanied by the supervisor's staff and the intermediary, drives across the buffer zone to the checkpoint and the receiving party's vehicles.

g. The work detail transfers the remains to the receiving party's vehicle and the intermediary obtains a receipt.

h. The transfer is recorded on the logbooks at each checkpoint. Also recorded are the names of the supervising officer and the intermediary.

3. Although the hand over of parcels and mail is a relatively simple operation, it must be planned in detail. The intermediary will normally send a vehicle

from each side to a parking lot at one of the checkpoints where the mail will be transferred from one vehicle to the other by a work detail provided by the peacekeeping force. A record of the number of letters or parcels handed over should be obtained from the intermediaries to guard against subsequent claims. If the exchange of parcels and mail is part of a larger hand over operation, no attempt should be made to conduct both simultaneously.

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APPENDIX Q

USER'S EVALUATION REPORT
ON JOINT PUB 3-07.3

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this pub. Please fill out the following: User's POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic? _____

b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated? _____

c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved? _____

d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs? _____

e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How? _____

3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use? _____

b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them? _____

4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). _____

5. Other _____

6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

(FOLD)

JOINT DOCTRINE CENTER
BLDG R-52
1283 CV TOWWAY STE 100
NORFOLK, VA 23511-2491

(FOLD)

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(FOLD)

JOINT DOCTRINE CENTER
BLDG R-52
1283 CV TOWWAY STE 100
NORFOLK, VA 23511-2491

(FOLD)

GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A&P	administrative and personnel
ABCA	American, British, Canadian, and Australian
ADL	armistice demarcation line
ADMIN	administrative
AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFSATCOM	Air Force Satellite Communications System
AOR	area of responsibility
APCs	armored personnel carriers
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASD(SO-LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)
ASD(S&R)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements)
BIO	Bureau of International Organizations
BN	battalion
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CAO	chief administrative officer
CCC	Cross-Cultural Communications Course
CI	counterintelligence
CINC	commander of a combatant command; commander in chief
CISO	CI support officer
CIV	civilian
CMO	Chief Military Observer
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONUS	continental United States
COS	Chief of Staff
DCMO	Deputy Chief Military Observer
DFC	Deputy Force Commander
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
EEZ	exclusive economic zones

FC	force commander
FLTSATCOM	fleet satellite communications
FOD	Field Operations Division
GPS	Global Positioning System
HA	humanitarian assistance
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	Headquarters
HSS	health service support
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
INF	infantry
J-3	Operations Directorate
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
JFC	joint force commander
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LA	legal adviser
LIC	low intensity conflict
LOCs	lines of communications
LOG	logistics
MC&G	mapping, charting, and geodesy
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MIF	Maritime Interdiction Force
MILOBs	military observers
MILSATCOM	military satellite communications
MNF	Multinational Force
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NSC	National Security Council
NSC/DC	Deputies Committee of the National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OATSD(PA)	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFOESA	Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities
OPCON	operational control
OPS	operations
OPSEC	operations security
OSPA	Office for Special Political Affairs

PA	public affairs
PIO	press information officer
PKO	peacekeeping operation
POW	prisoner of war
PSYOP	psychological operations
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	senior adviser
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAR	search and rescue
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	standing operating procedures
SP	support
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
TACON	tactical control
TOR	terms of reference
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNLOC	UN Logistics Course
UNMILPOC	UN Military Police Course
UNMOC	UN Military Observers Course
UNMOVCC	UN Movement Control Course
UNSOC	UN Staff Officers Course
UNTSO	UN Truce and Supervision Organization
USCG	US Coast Guard
USUN	US Mission to the United Nations
VBSS	visit, board, search, and seizure

PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

armistice. In international law, a suspension or temporary cessation of hostilities by agreement between belligerent powers. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military

forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (This term and definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 2-01.2)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (This term and definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0)

executive agent. A term used in DOD and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a DOD Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope

of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection. Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life, or result in a great loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary or nonmilitary action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status of forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)

United States country team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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