



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Ms. Karen Mansfield
SAIC/CTRAC 2-7-6
1710 Goodridge Drive
McLean, VA 22102

Dear Ms. Mansfield:

This responds to your March 26, 1996, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request addressed to the Joint Staff. Our April 25, 1996, interim response refers.

The enclosed document is provided as partially responsive to your request. Mr. Edmund F. McBride, Chief, Information Management Division, Joint Staff, an Initial Denial Authority, has determined that the deleted information is exempt from release because it is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958. In this instance, the information is classified according to Sections 1.5(a) which concerns military plans. Therefore, this information is withheld pursuant to 5 USC § 552 (b) (1).

You have a right to appeal Mr. McBride's decision to withhold this information. Any such appeal should offer justification to support a release, and must be received in this Directorate within 60 calendar days of this letter's date. Our address is: Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Room 2C757, 1400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1400.

The administrative cost of processing this request is \$75.92, of which **\$25.92** is chargeable. This chargeable rate consists of: one half hour of search and one half hour of review and excising at the professional rate of \$25.00 per hour (\$25.00), and 46 pages of printed publications at \$0.02 per page (\$0.92).

Please indicate our reference number, **96-F-0809**, on a check or money order payable to the U.S. Treasurer in the amount of **\$25.92**. To avoid interest charges, payment must be received in this Directorate within 30 calendar days of this letter's date.

Sincerely,

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review


#868

Enclosure:
As stated



**CHAIRMAN
OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

#868



**Report to the Congress
1996
FORCE READINESS
ASSESSMENT**

March 1996



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

4 March 1996

**The Honorable Albert Gore
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510**

**The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker,

The enclosed 1996 Force Readiness Assessment is submitted to Congress in accordance with section 376 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. As requested in the legislation, the report examines 10 specific areas of military capability and provides an overall assessment of the ability of the Armed Forces to carry out the full range of assigned missions.


Your continued interest in readiness is very much appreciated. Each successful employment of US forces over the last 2 years has illustrated that readiness of the Armed Forces is the linchpin of the Nation's military capability. Although the issues in this year's Force Readiness Assessment are similar to those included in the 1995 report, it is becoming increasingly difficult to balance the requirements of current readiness against the need to modernize and recapitalize US forces for the future.

As previously highlighted, current readiness is contingent upon predictable funding of readiness accounts, personnel and quality of life programs, and rapid restoration of operations and maintenance funds used during contingency operations.

Achieving future readiness requires funding of modernization, force enhancements, and infrastructure. Adequate investment is required to maintain our technological edge and obtain the capabilities necessary to support a more effective but smaller force. The Armed Forces can no longer afford delays to increases in procurement accounts. Preservation of future procurement funding is critical to ensuring the readiness of US forces into the next century.

As always, a key element of both current and future readiness is the quality of the men and women in uniform. Updated weapons systems and sophisticated equipment derive utility only when operated by highly motivated, properly trained people. Military service places unique stresses on Service members and their families. In return for the numerous sacrifices they make, our people deserve fair compensation, adequate housing, stable retirement, and dependable health care. Continued congressional support for initiatives that will allow Service men and women to maintain a reasonable quality of life is welcome.

Readiness remains the top priority of the Department of Defense. US global interests demand no less. With adequate funding of readiness accounts for both current and future requirements, the readiness of the US Armed Forces can be maintained and the Nation can continue to prosper under the security provided.



JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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CJCS FORCE READINESS ASSESSMENT

(FY 1996 Report to Congress)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The readiness of the US Armed Forces remains the top priority. As the size of the military is reduced, we must ensure that remaining forces are ready to execute the National Military Strategy across the full range of missions to include nuclear deterrence. The ability to assist in the achievement of national strategic objectives depends on fielding military forces that are adequately equipped, manned, trained, and motivated to meet the challenges and threats of a changing world. Maintaining a ready force becomes more difficult as commitments increase and fiscal resources are reduced.

Several recent initiatives to enhance the readiness of our forces have matured over the last year. The Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), whose membership includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs, has continued to expand its scope by examining the results of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) in its monthly meetings. The JMRR, a key component of the Chairman's Readiness System, is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has evolved over the last year into an effective forum for examining the near-term readiness of the Armed Forces to carry out the National Military Strategy. The results of the JMRR-based briefing to the SROC will become the basis for the quarterly readiness report that Congress has requested in the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill. Additionally, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), also chaired by the Vice Chairman, continues to develop its Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) to investigate potential improvements to military capabilities.

The readiness assessment that follows this executive summary addresses readiness concerns and issues for the period through FY 1997 in the following areas:

Personnel Readiness. People are the linchpin of readiness. Although people alone do not make a ready force, a ready force is not possible without fully trained, quality people. To maintain the high level of quality currently in the Armed Forces, we must be willing to compensate military personnel for the unique and demanding service they perform for the Nation. In return for many sacrifices, our Service members and their families deserve adequate pay, affordable and accessible medical benefits, a stable retirement system, and safe, adequate housing. Continued congressional support for our men and women in uniform is most welcome. (Page 6)

Training, Exercises, and Education. The effectiveness of joint training and exercises continues to improve as the Joint Training System moves toward full implementation in FY 1998. Similarly, maturation of US Atlantic Command (USACOM) as the joint force trainer and force provider of most forces based in the continental US (CONUS) and the growing involvement of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in joint exercises are leading to greater improvements in joint training, exercises, and doctrine. Continuing support of Professional Military Education (PME) is key to preserving the intellectual capability to operate in today's diverse strategic environment. (Page 10)

Equipment Modernization. As in the past, technologically superior equipment is crucial to US readiness and combat success. Continued modernization and recapitalization of the force are critical elements of future US military readiness. However, as overall defense spending has been reduced, procurement accounts have been the bill payer for other readiness-related spending. We can no longer afford to push procurement into the outyears. Leveraging technology, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and command, control, communications, and computers (C4), will provide a greater overall capability in a resource constrained environment. To be successful in modernization efforts, we will have to find innovative and revolutionary approaches to reducing overall costs. (Page 16)

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). Flexible, assured, securable, fully interoperable, and where required, survivable C4 for joint operations is critical to the execution of the National Military Strategy. Experience in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR shows that involvement in contingency operations could impact US ability to support two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). Continued support for satellite and space launch follow-on systems and ground terminal upgrades will lessen joint warfighting risk. The ongoing revolution in information technology clearly highlights the growing importance of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) to our warfighting capability. Actions are ongoing to determine innovative, affordable approaches to enable dominant battlefield awareness, the use of precision force, and assured C4I across the full range of military operations. (Page 17)

Intelligence. As indicated in last year's report, intelligence collection, analysis, production, dissemination, personnel, readiness, and capabilities have been significantly affected by the post-Cold War resource-constrained environment. This environment has led to increasing emphasis on synergistic and flexible resource management strategies to provide efficient and effective intelligence support to the warfighter. Even so, both the Intelligence Bottom-Up Review (IBUR) and the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) indicate that current ISR force structures would have

difficulty supporting two MRCs without significant tradeoffs in ISR capabilities. (Page 20)

Logistics. Although the US military continues to maintain the logistics capability to support the two-MRC requirement, there is growing awareness of risk due to dual tasking of some key logistics units, capabilities, and resources. In addition, the cumulative effect of multiple contingency operations places global demands on logistical units and supply stocks that are then not readily available for deployment in the event of multiple MRCs. In such an event, scarce logistical assets may require lengthy withdrawal, regeneration, and redeployment. The time necessary to extract forces and equipment and execute reconstitution may impact the execution of two MRCs. (Page 23)

Wartime Sustainability. Inventory drawdowns eliminate obsolete parts and consumables and increase reliance on innovative acquisition practices and the US commercial infrastructure. Even as stock levels approach target inventories to sustain the force for two MRCs, contingency operations continue to drain resources. Deferred replenishments, underfunded war reserves, and delays in reimbursement erode sustainability in equipment and parts inventories. Declining inventories resulting from equipment rendered unserviceable due to excessive wear or needed maintenance, equipment loaned or leased to allies, obsolescence, and delays in the funding of new war reserves and repair parts degrade US sustainment capability. Maintenance and replenishment are keys to sustainment. (Page 26)

Munitions. Current munitions inventories are adequate to support requirements, although cross-leveling among Services and repositioning will likely be necessary for fighting a second MRC. In the near-term, there are shortages of some of the newest preferred munitions. The posture will improve for these weapons as the production pipeline matures. Downsizing has adversely affected some sectors of the munitions industrial base. Continued management involvement and information exchange between the military and the industrial base are keys to successfully managing reduced budgets and overcoming hardware production challenges. (Page 28)

Mobility. Over the past few years key studies such as the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) have provided direction for sizing strategic airlift and sealift fleets. Continuing analysis is helping to refine intertheater and intratheater mobility requirements, directly affecting mobility force structure and asset procurement decisions. The Services have programmed for needed strategic airlift and sealift, increased pre-positioned Army equipment overseas, improved overseas and CONUS infrastructure to enhance force projection, needed air and ground mobility within overseas

theaters, a modernized amphibious force, and an effective logistics over-the-shore capability. In the area of spacelift, limitations in current capability support the requirement for a series of next generation expendable space launch vehicles to meet user demand. (Page 30)

Installations, Real Property, and Facilities. Installations and the facilities they support are the backbone of readiness. As we downsize CONUS infrastructure and reduce overseas presence, upkeep of our remaining installations becomes more important. Although we seek to reduce overhead costs as we follow through on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, the continued growth of the large Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) places the future health of our warfighting infrastructure at risk. We must make prudent investments today to ensure that the remaining infrastructure will have the future capability to support a smaller, more capable force. (Page 36)

Conclusion. US forces remain ready to execute the National Military Strategy. "First-to-fight" forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall force readiness is constant at historic levels. There remain, however, concerns about key joint force enablers such as mobility, modernization, C4, and intelligence. We will continue to monitor these key warfighting areas as we assess the two-MRC risk through the JMRR/SROC process. Today's significant challenge is to maintain a well-trained and educated, well-equipped, and well-cared for force. Another major challenge is to maintain an effective balance between current readiness, with its associated high activity level of contingency support, and the modernization of forces essential to future readiness and enhanced capability. While maintaining a high state of readiness is essential to managing risk in the near-term, long-term readiness demands a significant increase in procurement dollars both in the FYDP and outyears. Continued strong funding support will ensure that our quality people retain a technological superiority on the battlefield, and that US forces can respond quickly and effectively to accomplish US national policy objectives. (Page 40)

CJCS FORCE READINESS ASSESSMENT

(FY 1996 Report to Congress)

1. GENERAL

a. **Readiness Remains Our Top Priority.** Readiness of the Armed Forces is key to the Nation's military capability. As the size of the military is reduced, we must ensure that remaining forces are ready to execute the national military strategy across the full range of missions, to include nuclear deterrence. The maintenance of readiness to achieve the National Military Strategy requires careful balancing of commitments and resources.

b. **Focus on Readiness.** Several OSD and Joint Staff mechanisms are in place and have matured to the point where they are making a valuable contribution to monitoring and improving near- and long-term readiness:

(1) **Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC).** The Deputy Secretary of Defense uses the SROC for a monthly assessment of unit status and joint readiness. Membership includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs, the Under Secretaries of Defense and of the Military Departments, and other OSD officials with an interest in readiness. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness serves as the executive secretary for the SROC. The agenda includes discussion of significant readiness issues from all the Services, CINCs, and Combat Support Agencies.

(2) **Chairman's Readiness System (CRS).** The central component of the CRS is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Membership includes the Service Vice Chiefs, the Joint Staff Director for Operations, the Service Operations Deputies, and representatives from the CINCs and Combat Support Agencies. The JMRR provides a comprehensive review of current unit and joint readiness that results in an assessment of preparedness to support the National Military Strategy. Many items on the SROC agenda are provided by the JMRR, which also provides a common set of definitions and measures for analysis of unit and joint readiness. Through the JMRR, CINCs can now report their preparedness to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support units into an effective joint force to accomplish assigned missions.

(3) **Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs).** The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), also chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Service Vice Chiefs as

members, is supported by the JWCA's. The Joint Staff conducts these assessments in conjunction with the Services, OSD, Defense agencies, and others to recommend improvements to warfighting capabilities, including the near-term readiness of our forces. JWCA results are reviewed by the JROC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CINCs and are one source of input to the Chairman's recommendations on current and future programs to the Secretary of Defense.

c. **Investing in Readiness.** Adequate and predictable funding of readiness accounts is essential to ensure the readiness of US Armed Forces remains high. Increased responsibilities under expanding conventional military roles generate substantial expenditures to organize, equip, train, and employ forces today. We must also invest today in equipment modernization, personnel, and facilities to ensure future readiness to support the national security objectives and retain technological superiority over potential adversaries. A concerted effort is being made to reduce life-cycle costs by employing emerging technologies and processes to reduce current and future operating costs. Fiscal constraints, coupled with today's resource demands, should not force decision makers to borrow from their investment and operating accounts and mortgage the force of the future to meet today's obligations.

2. READINESS OF THE US ARMED FORCES

a. **US Forces Must Remain Ready.** US Armed Forces remain the most capable in the world and are prepared for quick, effective response across a wide range of environments. Training opportunities are maximized to ensure force readiness with demonstrated success in operations such as DENY FLIGHT in the former Yugoslavia and PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq. Operation UNITED SHIELD, the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia, reaffirmed the fact that we are one of the few nations, if not the only one, capable of bringing to bear the combat and logistic forces necessary to conduct operations with minimal risk. Although the Armed Forces are frequently employed in peacetime contingency operations, their primary focus must remain on readiness to fight and win the Nation's wars.

b. **Readiness Concerns.** The current force structure is based upon the requirement for the Armed Forces to win two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs) while maintaining a credible and effective strategic deterrent. Such a requirement is a challenge, given programmed force reductions. Maintenance of readiness in a smaller, more capable force is increasingly crucial to our success. The combination of proliferating military contingency operations and programmed force reductions has an effect on the readiness of the Armed Forces. There are several areas of concern.

(1) Impact of Contingency Operations. The United States must remain ready to undertake a wide range of contingency operations to support US global interests. Current involvement throughout the world affects readiness in resources, manpower, equipment, and training. During FY 1995, unprogrammed contingency operations cost approximately \$2.2 billion. Cost estimates for continuing contingency operations in FY 1996, including operations in Bosnia, are \$2.7 billion. Congress provided funding for \$647.1 million of the \$2.7 billion in the FY 1996 DOD Appropriations Bill and required the Department of Defense to include the projected costs of operations that will continue into the next fiscal year in the FY 1997 budget submission. The Department of Defense will include costs of known operations (e.g., Southwest Asia) in the President's Budget request to Congress. For emergent operations and for budgeted operations whose costs exceed forecasts due to operational requirements, congressional supplemental funding of contingency operations is essential to preclude degrading the readiness of our forces. If supplemental funding is tenuous, the Services must fence O&M funds for contingencies and thus reduce funds for readiness. Other impacts of contingency operations are decreased service life of equipment, increased maintenance requirements, a larger depot maintenance backlog, and lost training opportunities.

(2) Equipment Modernization. Long-term readiness demands a significant increase in procurement dollars both in the FYDP and outyears to guarantee retention of a qualitative combat edge. Technology gives US forces the warfighting leverage to win on the modern battlefield with a greater overall capability from fewer numbers of systems. Fiscal constraints limit the ability to balance current readiness, force structure, and modernization. Failure to adequately fund modernization efforts may sacrifice the readiness and capability of tomorrow's force. See also section 5, Equipment Modernization.

(3) Personnel Readiness. People remain the key to current and future readiness. Although the number of people in US forces continues to decline, the number of deployments they support continues to grow. Clearly, these men and women, especially those in critical specialties, are asked to do a great deal very often. To retain our people and recruit others of similar caliber, we must continually commit to the welfare of our force and their families. In return for their service, our members deserve fair and adequate compensation, a dependable level of health care, adequate housing, and a stable retirement system. See also section 3, Personnel Readiness.

(4) **Mobility.** The ability to project and sustain US combat power is highly dependent upon mobility readiness. The 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) validated previously determined baseline sealift requirements and identified the need for modest enhancements to pre-positioned equipment and airlift capacity. The 1995 Strategic Airlift Force Mix Analysis (SAFMA) and C-17 Tactical Utility Analysis provided input to the Defense Acquisition Board resulting in a November 1995 decision to buy 80 more C-17 aircraft. Programmed strategic mobility enhancements will provide needed strategic airlift and sealift, pre-position Army equipment overseas, improve both CONUS and overseas infrastructure to enhance force projection from CONUS bases, provide needed mobility within overseas theaters, modernize our amphibious force, and ensure a logistics over-the-shore capability. With regard to spacelift, limitations of our current spacelift ability support the requirement for a new generation of expendable launch vehicles to meet user demand. For more details, see section 11, Mobility.

(5) **Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** The ongoing revolution in information technology clearly shows that C4 and ISR are vital components of our warfighting capability that are growing in importance. However, Combat Support Agencies report some areas of concern with C4 and ISR deficiencies that drive up risk in a second MRC. Of interest are satellite communications (SATCOM) capability, the growing demand for connectivity, and guaranteed access to and use of the radio frequency spectrum. For more details, see section 6, C4.

3. **PERSONNEL READINESS.** People are the linchpin of readiness. Although quality people alone do not make a ready force, experience shows that there cannot be a ready force without quality people. Therefore, we must attract and retain the right people and develop them as joint warfighters.

a. **Recruiting and Retention--Foundations of Readiness.** Modern systems are only as sound as the people we attract, train, and retain to operate and maintain them. The degree of readiness found at every level of our Armed Forces today is the result of a long-term commitment to quality--quality as reflected in the education levels and aptitude of Service accessions and as refined in the training and support provided to our Service members. That commitment to quality has allowed us to safely restructure our force without compromising our ability to meet any challenge to US national security.

(1) **Recruiting--Key Investment in Future Readiness.** We continue to achieve accession quality and quantity goals despite declining propensity-to-enlist trends, keen competition for high-quality young men and women, spartan recruiting resources, and accession requirements that are rising as the size of the force stabilizes. We met the challenge in FY 1995, the result of an \$89 million increase in advertising funds and an extraordinary effort by the recruiting force; but success had its cost. Recruiter surveys indicate increased stress and quality of life concerns, and lower morale among this select group of professionals. To sustain the success of recruiting programs, extensive studies of enlistment propensity, resource allocation, and recruiter quality of life are under way; and we will aggressively apply the results of the studies.

(2) **Retention--Preserving our Quality Force.** US Armed Forces today are the best trained and best equipped in the world--the result of a long-term commitment to recruit quality, and an equally strong commitment to ensuring a career in the military remains attractive to Service members and families. Although active duty military end-strength decreased almost 27 percent between FY 1987 and FY 1995, most of that reduction was accomplished through voluntary separation incentive programs, normal attrition, and reduced accessions. In FY 1995, we retained the skilled leaders and technicians needed to meet experience and force structure requirements; and reenlistment rates show overall healthy patterns. Retention of quality personnel in numbers sufficient to ensure combat readiness remains a top priority and will require a continued commitment of resources to quality of life initiatives, compensation, and incentive programs.

b. **Remembering the Commitment to Our People.** Service members are placed in a unique environment that completely subordinates them to the Nation's needs. The commitment is around the clock. Their standards are the very highest, and we require frequent, personal sacrifices from them--sometimes at the risk of their very lives. Through all of this, they ask for very little in return. There is a long legislative history that recognizes the uniqueness of military service, and we need to continue to maintain that perspective to allow our people to focus on the mission without distractions from concerns about family, finances, health care, or career.

(1) **The Four Fundamentals: Pay, Medical Benefits, Retirement, and Housing.**

(a) Pay has not kept up with private sector wage growth, but the efforts of the Administration and Congress to provide the full pay

raise allowed by law have slowed the growth of the pay gap. This pay gap needs continued attention.

(b) We must properly size our military medical community to meet operational requirements and also ensure that affordable, accessible, and quality health care continues to be all beneficiaries.

(c) A modest, inflation-protected retirement is a key retention incentive; and we must continue cost-of-living adjustments to maintain its effectiveness and keep faith with those who have served. We have already made significant changes to the retirement system over the past fifteen years which will hold down future costs. In each case, these changes grandfathered those people currently serving. We must stop looking at the retirement system each year as a potential bill payer. Sooner or later, this will have an impact on retention and recruitment and, therefore, readiness.

(d) Much of our military housing, both family dwellings and barracks, is in a deplorable state. To help correct this problem at an affordable cost, we request support of Secretary Perry's housing privatization initiatives.

(2) What We Must Do. We must provide a quality of life that compensates Service members and their families for the rigors of military service and competes successfully to retain quality people. However, despite a long-standing departmental leadership commitment to quality of life, slow supplemental funding for unprogrammed contingency costs impacts quality of life programs. Often, base operations that directly support people become bill payers for unprogrammed operations costs. We need to protect quality of life program funding and focus further attention on those areas that help members and families during frequent deployments.

(3) PERSTEMPO. Although it appears an issue of relatively limited scope when comparing the numbers of affected Service members to the size of the total force, excessive PERSTEMPO has a potential impact far beyond the simple numbers. Heavy demands continue to be placed on specific skills and units in portions of the force. To counter this, the Services have systems in place to track PERSTEMPO, and personnel trends are reported in the JMRR. PERSTEMPO impacts are now routinely considered in the operational planning process. Substitution among active duty capabilities and improved access to and innovative use of Reserve Components (RC) are initiatives being pursued to address areas of high utilization.

(4) The Role of the Selected Reserve (SELRES). SELRES units and individuals provide many of the capabilities needed for regional contingencies and crises that are not generally available in the current Active Component (AC) force structure. Efforts to expand recall authority and increase flexibility for using RC forces short of mobilization are straining employer-employee relationships. SELRES members who once expected to be gone 2 weeks per year during peacetime may be called upon to be gone 30 or more days for training. They are also being increasingly relied upon to reduce AC OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO in support of operations and exercises. The employment of the RC in these missions is essential to the success of the Total Force, but must be balanced this with the need to maintain appropriate levels of unit and individual mobilization readiness.

(5) Civilian Work Force--An Increased Reliance for Support. In an environment where multiple concurrent contingency operations are becoming the norm, the augmentation and support provided by civilians are critical factors in determining US warfighting capability. There is an increased reliance on civilians for support to forward areas of operation. The continued downsizing of the Armed Forces serves as a catalyst for redefining the roles, missions, and limitations once associated with the civilian work force. Civilians not only provide continuity and free military personnel to perform their warfighting roles, but also possess skills not available within military occupational specialties. The civilian work force must receive the same commitment and support provided to the Armed Forces. Policies and systems must be in place that provide pay and benefits that are competitive with the private sector and ensure career enhancement, stable retirement plans, and affordable health insurance.

c. The Challenge. The continued readiness of the force is predicated upon our ability to both attract and retain quality personnel. This goal was accomplished in FY 1995 by demonstrating a commitment to the forces already on-board, and by funding recruiting efforts at the appropriate level. FY 1996 will present even greater challenges, particularly if global commitments increase. By meeting the commitment to our people, employing the RC wisely, and maintaining and improving benefits critical to a respectable quality of life, we will build on the success of earlier years and lay the foundation for continued readiness.

4. JOINT TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND EDUCATION. The importance of joint training, especially as it supports the unified commander, continues to be validated through current operations and was a prevalent theme throughout the 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). The Joint Training System (JTS) continues to become more robust

as it nears its FY 1998 full implementation target. Central to the success of the JTS are a number of critical programs and resources that have, as their primary focus, the accomplishment or facilitation of joint training. These elements of the JTS include the CJCS Exercise Program; US Atlantic Command's Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC); The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) at Fort Monroe; the Joint Training Simulation Plan; and the Joint Exercise Management Package and its associated "lessons learned" capability. The challenges of today's strategic landscape also demand a robust professional military education system that produces leaders responsive to the CINCs' warfighting and operational support needs while simultaneously developing visionary Service, joint, and national strategies. Support for these programs must be maintained if CINC requirements are to be adequately supported.

a. **Joint Training System.** The first priority of the Secretary of Defense is readiness and the JTS is an important mechanism that allows us to reach that goal at the joint level. Key components of the JTS are the Joint Training Manual, Joint Training Policy, the Joint Training Master Plan, and the Universal Joint Task List. The JTS defines a multistep approach to identify requirements and plan, program, conduct, and assess joint training events.

(1) **Better Lessons Learned Campaign.** The goal is to ultimately improve the joint warfighter's ability to articulate, act on, and share lessons learned. Modernized equipment and an enhanced process will provide more timely and easily accessible data and feedback to the end users. An interface with readiness reporting is also being examined. These updates will help refine the planning and assessment phases of the JTS, resulting in a positive impact on joint training and improved warfighting capabilities.

(2) **CJCS Commended Training Issues.** Priority training issues commended to the CINCs for inclusion in their FY 1996 and FY 1997 exercise program include combat identification, Joint Task Force (JTF) command and staff training, and command and control of joint air operations. Also commended for inclusion (no later than FY 1998) are theater missile defense; information warfare; fire support coordination; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense; joint ISR support to operations; strategic mobility; medical support and readiness; and interface between commands.

(3) **Joint Training Trends.** The emphasis of joint training has been focused on training common joint tasks performed by multiple commands within the full range of military operations at the national strategic and operational level. USACOM, supported by the JWFC, has been designated the CJCS executive agent to coordinate the effort

of the combatant commands in developing requirement-based common joint tasks. These tasks will serve as the foundation of USACOM's Joint Training Program for the Service components. USACOM will increasingly use the JTASC to conduct JTF command and staff training. Further, USACOM-sponsored field training events will focus on interoperability requirements derived from geographic command specific needs.

b. CJCS Exercise Program. The CJCS Exercise Program provides the principal mechanisms on which the JTP relies. It consists of the Chairman-sponsored exercise program (CSEP) and CINC-sponsored exercises. About half of the exercises are associated with increasing readiness to execute deliberate plans. The other half are focused on humanitarian assistance, enhancing contact with foreign militaries, and maintaining strategic access and presence. The total number of exercises within the CJCS' program has increased since DESERT STORM, due to changes in the strategic landscape, reduced overseas-based forces, and CINC-unique JTF training programs. However, the overall level of effort expended on exercises has not significantly increased. See Appendix A, Figure A-1. The continuing high number of Partnership for Peace and "In the Spirit of" Partnership for Peace exercises under the President's Warsaw Initiative contributes to lifting the exercise tempo to a high level. The challenge is to increase the focus on required joint capabilities but not at the expense of Service core competencies. Accordingly, we are striving for greater synchronization of single-Service exercises with joint exercises.

(1) CJCS-Sponsored Exercise Program (CSEP). CJCS-sponsored exercises will focus on two legs of the National Military Strategy: Fight to Win, and Deterrence and Conflict Prevention. This program is designed to anticipate and respond to the current political situation, force structure changes, anticipated budget reductions, increased coalition operations, and a growing number of nontraditional missions. In the absence of a national-level interagency exercise program, the CSEP provides a baseline series of exercises that other Government departments and agencies outside the Department of Defense can use to support interagency coordination and training.

(2) CINC-Sponsored Exercises. This second, and considerably larger subset of the CJCS Exercise Program, must be structured to improve readiness, yet remain sensitive to OPTEMPO concerns. To that end, joint exercises for forward-deployed forces will take advantage of forward-stationed and rotational forward-deployed units and apply Service OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO standards. Joint exercises for forces apportioned to the regional CINCs will occur under USACOM's

sponsorship. The focus will be on those units not trained by geographic commands.

c. **Joint Warfighting Center.** The JWFC supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs to prepare for joint and multinational operations in the development and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises. The emphasis of JWFC's FY 1996 joint training support is on assisting USACOM and the combatant commands to develop requirements-based training plans. For FY 1996, JWFC is scheduled to directly support the execution of 22 exercises, using distributed simulations and interactive computer technologies. Training and doctrine development capabilities will continue to be enhanced during the year to achieve full operational capability. In addition to exercise support, JWFC provides leadership in the areas of joint training courseware development, joint doctrine development/revision, modeling and simulation (M&S) support to joint training, and future joint warfighting concepts. JWFC is also the proponent for the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS), the future M&S tool that the CINCs will use to meet training readiness goals. JSIMS will be fielded in 1999 and is focused on CINC/JTF level training across the spectrum of potential missions.

d. **Professional Military Education (PME).** PME is a force multiplier and is the basis of our leader development programs. The officer and noncommissioned officer corps must be professional and possess a high degree of intellectual quality coupled with technical proficiency. The continued successes of US military forces in diverse joint and multilateral operations throughout the world clearly demonstrate the tremendous benefits of PME.

(1) **Responsive to Change.** The PME system has been responsive to this changing strategic environment. In response to the evolving nature of military operations, we continue to enroll an increased number of senior international military officers and DOD and interagency civilians. Additionally, Reserve Component graduates from senior-level schools have increased over 30 percent since the force drawdown began in 1989. In March 1995, a CJCS blue ribbon panel on PME reaffirmed the need for both Service and joint education and recommended that the Department of Defense move toward a seamless professional development system for the 21st century, integrating education, training, and operational experiences.

(2) **Continued Commitment to PME.** Enrollment of US military officers in intermediate and senior schools has remained fairly steady to meet joint and Service requirements based upon the National Military Strategy and future force needs. PME contributes

significantly to the quality of the officers leading our military force and has been a force multiplier during our military successes. A continued national commitment to the current level of Service and joint professional military education is an extremely prudent investment in the future readiness of the US military.

e. **Security Assistance.** Security assistance programs are important to the enhancement of US presence throughout the world. These programs promote active engagement and forward presence by improving the defense capabilities of allies and friends while demonstrating US commitment to defend common interests. Key security assistance programs include International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Excess Defense Articles, and the Warsaw Initiative better known as Partnership for Peace. The exposure gained from these programs contributes significantly to the ability to improve interoperability with friendly forces and serves to establish lasting associations between US and foreign leaders. Funding for security assistance programs should be continued at or above FY 1996 levels.

5. **EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION.** In the past, technologically superior equipment was crucial to readiness and combat success. Continued modernization and recapitalization of the force are critical elements of future US military readiness. Leveraging technology, particularly in the areas of ISR and C4I, will provide a greater overall capability with fewer numbers of warfighting systems. If modernization efforts are to be successful, we will have to find innovative, if not revolutionary, approaches to reducing overall costs.

a. **Funding.** Efforts to maintain current readiness have necessarily resulted in decrements to other appropriations, particularly the investment accounts. For several years, procurement accounts have been, and continue to be, the readiness bill payer. History shows that funds programmed for procurement tend to evaporate as the outyears come into the budget year focus. See Appendix A, Figure A-2. We are now showing an increase in procurement funding in the outyears. The level of procurement and recapitalization programmed in the later years of the current FYDP program must be maintained and increased, and then sustained in the outyears.

b. **Strategy.** In the years ahead, the greatest enhancement in our joint warfighting capability will accrue from investment in modernization and in the development of the emerging "system of systems": the synergistic interaction of advances in sensors and data processing capabilities in the areas of ISR, command and control (C2), and precision force use. As weapon systems reach the end of their useful life, replacement on a strict

one-for-one basis becomes more and more expensive and could eventually undercut our capability. When feasible, we should retire older systems whose modernization provides only marginal improvements in capability and pursue introduction of new systems that will provide a quantum leap in capability and interoperate with the emerging "system of systems."

c. **JWCA.** JWCAAs analyze key relationships and interactions between joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improving joint warfighting effectiveness. They identify gaps, redundancies, or voids in capabilities required to meet national guidance and make specific recommendations in order to ensure the best capability is available for the resources allotted. This past year JWCA teams focused their efforts on a number of modernization issues. Their findings, reported to the JROC and the CINCs, resulted in recommendations for modernization and recapitalization in areas such as helicopters, trucks, munitions, and aircraft. The JWCA process continues to assist the Chairman in the development of the Chairman's Program Assessment and the Chairman's Program Recommendation. These two documents are a key part of the Chairman's advisory role to the Secretary of Defense for programming and budgeting issues.

6. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS (C4).

Although the United States presently has the world's most sophisticated C4 networks, efforts must continue to achieve information supremacy in order to effectively respond to complex political and military demands. The challenge is an unprecedented commitment to the revolutionary concept of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) as a capability that provides a force with the strategic, operational, and tactical edge over every potential enemy. The opportunity lies in the ability to rapidly infuse advanced C4I capabilities into every aspect of the force to guarantee its ability to consistently operate inside the enemy's decision cycle, thereby preventing his ability to respond. Because information is so critical to this evolving strategy, we must ensure that US forces can access interoperable, secure, reliable, flexible, survivable, and mobile C4I capabilities on a global scale for mission execution and support. To successfully do this, C4I systems must also have guaranteed access to and use of the radio frequency spectrum not only for command and control but also for weapon systems employment and execution. In addition, information resources must be afforded the necessary protection against threats posed by information warfare.

a. **Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM).** MILSATCOM systems have become indispensable and can provide unmatched flexibility, survivability, and capacity. Current satellite systems are unable to accommodate the growing demand for connectivity. CINCs

must depend on commercial means to augment MILSATCOM and to provide the surge capacity needed for contingency operations. Mobility places a special demand on C4 capabilities. Mobile forces must not be tethered to systems that restrict movement, speed, sustainability, or survivability. For the power projection force, MILSATCOM, including the Global Broadcast Service, will continue to be a fundamental warfighting enabler. Increasingly, CINCs are becoming dependent upon MILSATCOM, augmented by commercial satellite communications capabilities, for the global connectivity needed by national command and control systems, and for connectivity with deployed tactical force elements in-theater. MILSATCOM capabilities will continue to improve as a result of ongoing modernization efforts; however, funding shortages or delays in modernization programs, such as follow-on systems and terminal upgrades, would put C4 support to joint force operations at risk.

b. Global Command and Control Systems (GCCS). Force readiness continues to improve by increasing the warfighter's battlefield knowledge. Continued fielding of GCCS brings the warfighter closer to attaining real-time battlefield knowledge through modern information processing and situational awareness technology. GCCS will provide the warfighter a fused picture of the battlespace and the capability to deploy and employ forces. GCCS has been fielded to the CINCs, components, and Service headquarters for assessment prior to declaring the initial operating capability. After a rigorous GCCS user assessment period and correction of major deficiencies, the present Worldwide Military Command and Control System will be disconnected.

c. C4 Support for Two MRCs. Decisions by the United States to provide theater communications support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for Bosnian peace implementation forces could impact our ability to simultaneously support two MRCs elsewhere in the world. This is primarily the result of the expected NATO demands on our ultrahigh and superhigh frequency satellite systems. Actions are ongoing to minimize risk associated with full C4 support to two MRCs when involved in other contingency operations. Clearly, the short-term solution will involve an increased dependence on commercial satellite leases and land-based links and systems. Continued support for satellite and space launch follow-on systems and ground terminal upgrades will lessen joint warfighting risk.

d. C4 Readiness. The C4 community has made great strides to ensure focus on near-term readiness and future modernization through active participation in the JWCA and JMRR processes. For example, we are developing the ability to extend broad bandwidth from any commercial entry point to a deployed JTF and terminate that bandwidth at devices

that can supply bandwidth-on-demand to the warfighter. Concurrently, the Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear C3I Review examined the post-Cold War threat to include possible attack scenarios and various potential threats and their C4 implications. Continued active support to the JWCA, JMRR, and nuclear review processes keeps us focused on the joint C4 goal of providing relevant, real-time information-based capabilities to the warfighter.

7. **INTELLIGENCE.** As indicated in last year's report, intelligence collection, analysis, production, dissemination, personnel, readiness, and capabilities have been significantly affected by the post-Cold War resource-constrained environment. This environment has led to increased emphasis on synergistic and flexible resource management strategies to provide efficient and effective intelligence support to the warfighter. Although congressional funding for collection and dissemination initiatives has supported these resource management strategies, both the Intelligence Bottom-Up Review (IBUR) and the JMRR indicate that current ISR force structures would have difficulty fully supporting two MRCs without significant tradeoffs in ISR capabilities. These factors, coupled with future challenges such as information warfare, will only continue to highlight the importance of intelligence resource management.

a. **Intelligence Collection.** Joint warfighting relies heavily on the effective synergism of national technical and tactical intelligence reconnaissance systems to meet diverse mission requirements. Intelligence required to support the efficient and precise employment of forces and munitions, as well as the growing emphasis on counterproliferation and counterterrorism needs, demands more advanced collection capabilities integrated into a dynamic system of systems. US collection capabilities, from national to tactical levels and across all disciplines, are stressed by geopolitical events, budgetary pressures, and personnel reductions. Realizing all collection requirements will not be satisfied, the military intelligence community remains committed to a balanced and synergistic collection strategy to provide the best collection effort possible.

b. **Intelligence Analysis and Production.** The value of collected information is directly proportional to the ability to assimilate, exploit, integrate, properly assess, and display information before it is disseminated to the user. Traditional order of battle, data base production and maintenance, military capabilities assessments, as well as science and technology intelligence analysis, must be better integrated to compensate for fewer trained and experienced analysts. Recapitalization of the analytical work force and willingness to embrace new information management technologies are essential to close the widening gap between collection capability and the ability to analyze and

disseminate intelligence data in a timely manner. The diverse nature of the international environment demands constant shifting of intelligence analytical resources, often to areas where little substantive knowledge exists. Another challenge is to develop intelligence production strategies capable of rapid transition from crisis to crisis.

c. Dissemination of Intelligence. Several new systems have been fielded to support rapid and comprehensive dissemination of relevant intelligence to the warfighter at the theater and JTF level. However, deficiencies remain within Service components of the JTF and especially within mobile tactical units. We must improve timely support to the warfighter from overhead and theater systems. Dissemination of intelligence below the JTF level requires high-capacity, interoperable intelligence dissemination systems. Direct broadcast satellite technology has great potential for the development of common, interoperable systems that can disseminate large volumes of intelligence and other information. The challenge is to avoid inundating consumers with large amounts of uninterpreted, often times conflicting, intelligence data.

d. Intelligence Personnel. Despite recent drawdowns, defense intelligence analytical personnel retain the capability to support most core missions. However, with reduced manpower, support to varied missions will become more contingent on the ability to balance a mix of high-demand skills within the current work force while taking full advantage of analytical support tools. Intelligence support to information warfare, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and targeting, as well as collection management, represents pivotal areas where our skills mix is vital to the ability to support the dynamic and increasingly technical requirements of future warfare. The use of specialists from intelligence Reserve forces under the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center concept will help to offset the impact of work force drawdowns.

e. Measuring and Improving Intelligence Readiness and Capability. The military intelligence community continues to participate in both the JWCA and the JMRR. Support to the warfighter is the focus for assessing our capability. Maintaining sufficient intelligence resources to support US forces in two MRCs remains a key concern. The goal is to strengthen our ability to support such demanding scenarios by tailoring collection, analysis, and dissemination resources that efficiently and effectively support the warfighter's intelligence priorities. Better use of modeling and simulation to replicate intelligence capability in training, exercises, acquisition, and force planning should reduce uncertainty and improve US force readiness with training and planning against a range of adversary capabilities. The Military Intelligence Board recently endorsed a USACOM initiative for better intelligence support in training and

exercises. Modeling and simulation efforts will result in a significant improvement in intelligence play during exercises.

f. Intelligence Support to Information Warfare. Precision-guided weapons and advanced warfighting strategies challenge the intelligence community to provide the warfighter a greater degree of more precise data than ever before. Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the emerging area of information warfare. Information warfare is action taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processing, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information-related resources. Technological advances, greater connectivity to and dependence on commercial networks, and enhanced data sharing with allies will increase the vulnerability of our information infrastructure. Defending against attacks on our own information places great demands on the intelligence and communications communities for detailed insights into adversary intentions, predispositions, capabilities, methods, and technologies to conduct information warfare.

8. LOGISTICS. Although the US military continues to maintain the logistics capability to support the two-MRC requirement, there is a growing awareness of risk due to dual tasking of some key logistic assets, such as intratheater distribution units and maintenance support assets. Concern for two-MRC support is heightened by worldwide demand on the United States military to support contingency operations, as global partners call upon the United States to act as both leader and partner in resolving conflicts, mitigating hostilities, and brokering world peace. Ever-increasing taskings strain financial, personnel, and physical resources. Moreover, vulnerability of unprotected stateside infrastructure to information warfare attack may impact logistic support to theater CINCs. Replenishment of resources, consumed through excessive wear or attrition of assets left or transferred-on-site following contingency operations, is imperative to ensure the readiness of US forces.

a. Logistics Capability to Support Two MRCs. The US military is unmatched in its logistics force structure capacity. Although the capacity of the total force is adequate to support a two-MRC capability, there are some key logistic functions where shortfalls may increase risk and lengthen MRC plan execution timelines. A major manifestation of this problem is dual tasking of logistics units against both MRC requirements. This problem is being defined through the integrated dual-MRC time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) analysis process. Additionally, the demands placed on logistics capabilities by continuous and far-reaching contingency operations reduce our ability to respond immediately to two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Even when total worldwide asset quantities are adequate, significant time may be

required to extract, regenerate, and redeploy forces and assets from ongoing contingency operations.

b. Logistic Support for Contingency Operations. Although many global military requirements are being met by coalition forces, the United States is the only world power capable of providing rapid and sustained logistic support of large forces in remote locations. Consequently, we often assume significant responsibility to provide equipment, support services, and infrastructure to support numerous simultaneous operations. Support services include, but are not limited to, transportation (e.g., sealift, airlift), theater movement (e.g., trucks, airlift), engineering services, facilities construction and maintenance, contracting for supplies/services, and civil affairs services (police units, public affairs, military advisers, etc.). Contingency operations are most often unplanned and, therefore, require immediate funding through Services' O&M accounts until recoupment is achieved through UN repayment, reprogramming, or supplemental funding. In particular, diversion of O&M funds has an immediate impact on training, logistic replenishment, and maintenance, because these missions may be deferred pending funding availability.

c. Equipment Availability. The superior quality of US weapons systems and the skills of our personnel have allowed the United States to maintain a high state of equipment readiness. However, continuous use of equipment in contingency operations results in greater wear and tear, and requires increased maintenance and consumption of repair parts. Attrition by transfer-on-site following contingency operations decreases inventories. In order to maintain front line unit equipment, technicians, equipment, and repair parts are diverted from other units, thereby degrading the readiness of those units to deploy. Declining inventories and continuous use degrade readiness, particularly when next generation replacements have not been fully identified, funded, or are not in production. Deferred depot level maintenance on major systems because of operational necessity results in lengthy and expensive overhaul upon return of those assets to CONUS. In some cases there is a downward trend in mission-capable rates as older weapon systems near the end of their service lives. This trend is of greater consequence as we defer maintenance to support contingencies and delay new acquisitions.

d. Maintenance Backlog. Growth of unfunded depot maintenance was contained by the FY 1995 congressional funding increase. See Appendix A, Figure A-3. Variation in requirements caused solely by force structure reductions has stabilized, allowing the Services to reevaluate the projections of requirements for Program Objective Memorandum (POM)-

98. Until that process is complete, accurate forecasts of backlogs in the outyears cannot be completed.

e. **War Reserves.** Sufficient depth is required in Service inventories to ensure a two-MRC capability. The Services are running inventory models to identify shortfalls, with the Army reporting the most significant deficiency thus far. Contingency operations may consume assets needed for potential MRCs. The Services will require funding to overcome existing deficiencies in war reserve inventory. The availability of facilities to house and maintain pre-positioned equipment and supplies is as important as materiel inventories. Under burdensharing concepts and host-nation support agreements, coalition partners and allies share costs for facilities to house war reserve materiel. US contributions must continue in order to ensure protection of US assets positioned overseas and demonstrate US commitment to partnerships with contributing nations.

f. **Visibility and Protection of Assets.** Reducing inventories prior to improving inventory and logistics management systems increases the risk of supply shortfalls. Although timely arrival of assets is contingent on lift capacity, lack of real-time in-transit visibility encumbers the ability to effectively divert en route and receive inbound cargo. Asset visibility systems and transportation infrastructure programs must be fully funded to guarantee equipment, parts, and support service availability to forces. Future technologies, systems, and programs designed to advance and interface joint Service and CINC logistics management systems are critical to wartime sustainability and peacetime contingency planning.

g. **Support Personnel.** Active duty and Reserve support personnel have responded swiftly and positively to the growing demand for their skills in support of contingency operations. As downsizing decreases the personnel base, the demand on Active forces through increased PERSTEMPO may impact morale and has the long-term potential to influence retention rates. OSD is the sponsor of an initiative to partially offset the OPTEMPO demands on Active components through increased use of Reserves for current operations. In addition, the United States has the option to employ contracted logistics support to supplement military logistics assets. Although this alternative is expensive, its tradeoff may be an industrial base to support both peacetime and wartime logistics objectives. The experience gained in contingency operations may better prepare the service sector to support logistics requirements of the military for future operations, including war.

9. **WARTIME SUSTAINABILITY.** Sustainability is the ability to provide the forces, materiel, infrastructure, and lift necessary to support and maintain

all forces in theater for the duration of the conflict. It is also described as "readiness over time."

a. **DOD Supply Inventory.** The Department of Defense has reduced its stocks of repair parts and consumable items from a value of \$104 billion in FY 1990 to \$76 billion at the end of FY 1994 (using FY 1995 constant dollars). This drawdown continues through wholesale disposal of obsolete stocks and consumption of materiel during training and contingency operations. As the Services buy more commercial items, order using direct vendor delivery, and refine demand forecasts, less inventory is required in reserve. Inventories are being sized based on two-MRC requirements; however, support of contingency operations frequently forces the Services to expend O&M funds for unprogrammed requirements. If supplemental funds are not immediately available to replenish O&M accounts, delayed ordering lengthens the logistics pipeline, even in those instances where materiel is commercially available. Time-to-replenish materiel reserves is the most critical element to regaining or sustaining mission readiness of the supply inventory.

b. **Supply Impact of Contingency Operations.** Sustained contingency operations have the effect of exhausting supplies, repair parts, and equipment with little time for replenishment or repair. Upon return from contingency operations, increased levels of maintenance and overhaul are required to restore equipment to full operational status. Repair parts, tool, test bench, and supply inventories require rebuilding, sometimes delaying maintenance if inventories are not readily available through DOD or commercial sources. Technicians may require refresher training if tasked during contingency operations to nontechnical assignments, thereby delaying maintenance work by these personnel. Equipment leased or loaned to coalition forces may require extensive maintenance or may not be returned, thereby requiring the Department of Defense to replenish these inventories. Because DOD funding is based on preparedness to fight two MRCs, it is essential that supplies and equipment consumed during contingency operations be quickly replaced to ensure sustainability of US forces.

10. **MUNITIONS**

a. **Requirements.** Munitions requirements are calculated by Service models that work within a common capabilities-based framework. This methodology ensures that sufficient munitions are available to adequately address the mid- to far-term requirements directed in the Defense Planning Guidance.

b. War Reserve Inventories. Generally, current munitions inventories are adequate to support requirements, although cross-leveling among Services will likely be necessary for fighting a second MRC. In the near-term, there are shortages of some of the newer, most modern weapons identified as MRC requirements. The posture will improve for these weapons as the production pipeline matures. In-theater shortages of starter stocks for precision-guided munitions will be resolved through a combination of accelerated CONUS delivery, cross-leveling of munitions or hand off of targets when appropriate, and use of less capable substitute munitions. Risk increases when using substitute munitions due to reduced accuracy, lethality, or standoff capability, thereby potentially increasing both attrition of friendly delivery platforms and collateral damage in the target area. Programmed acquisitions that will enhance warfighting capabilities include Sensor-Fuzed Weapons, brilliant antitank munitions, Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Weapons. Selected munitions identified as excess to US requirements are aggressively being marketed for foreign military sales or are being demilitarized.

c. Industrial Base. Downsizing has also had a ripple effect on the munitions industrial base, particularly at the second and third tier vendor level. Constrained budgets, smaller procurements, and reduced requirements, coupled with limited commercial application, are forcing hard decisions and streamlining in the management of the total ammunition industrial base. It is critical that a munitions industrial base capable of responding to regeneration and modernization be preserved. Continued management involvement, coupled with the comprehensive exchange of information between the military and the industrial base community, is key to successfully managing shrinking budgets and overcoming hardware production challenges.

d. Training. Funding shortfalls have led to the drawdown of some war reserve assets to support readiness training. This results in projected shortfalls for those munitions assets. The Services have so far been able to satisfy annual training requirements with assets bought with money derived from reprogramming actions and with assets drawn from war reserves. Continuing budgetary constraints will erode future readiness and/or war reserve sustainment capability.

e. Nuclear Stockpile Maintenance. Effective stockpile stewardship is a key component of US nuclear capability, especially in an environment of no nuclear testing. The maintenance of a safe and reliable stockpile is a national interest. DOD and the Department of Energy's joint responsibilities for ensuring confidence in the safety, reliability, and

performance of the nuclear stockpile, without nuclear testing, are being developed in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.

11. **MOBILITY.** A robust mobility capability is essential to meeting post-Cold War demands with fewer forces and a reduced overseas presence and infrastructure. The ability to project and sustain combat power overseas continues to be critical to attaining US national security objectives. The mobility triad of airlift, sealift, and strategically pre-positioned equipment provides the needed edge in meeting force deployment and sustainment requirements. Mobility readiness is a key element of the US defense focus, and programmed strategic mobility enhancements will better posture selected forces for early deployment to potential conflicts. In addition, spacelift is a key mobility function. A robust spacelift capability is required to ensure access to space necessary to sustain the entire spectrum of space-based missions.

a. **Strategic Mobility Requirements.** Over the past several years three major efforts have shaped strategic mobility requirements: the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) that was completed in January 1992, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) that took place in 1993, and the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) conducted during 1994 and completed in March 1995. The MRS provided a baseline for strategic mobility readiness requirements which culminated in airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning procurement planning and programming. The BUR developed a national strategy resulting in a new, reduced force structure capable of winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The BUR necessitated the MRS BURU, which validated the 2001 sealift baseline requirements previously determined in the MRS and identified the need for modest enhancements to pre-positioned equipment and airlift capacity. Airlift requirements developed by the MRS BURU provided the basis for the Strategic Airlift Force Mix Analysis (SAFMA) in 1995, which considered a possible aircraft mix of the C-17 and commercial design aircraft to meet strategic lift requirements. To assist in determining this mix, a separate Tactical Utility Analysis was also conducted to evaluate the impact of peculiar requirements of a combat theater that could not be accommodated by commercial design aircraft. These studies provided input to the Defense Acquisition Board resulting in a November 1995 decision to buy 80 more C-17 aircraft and no commercial design aircraft.

b. **Strategic Mobility Trends**

(1) **Sealift.** The MRS BURU established a 10 million square feet requirement for organic strategic surge sealift. Given existing sealift assets, acquisition of 11 Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off (LMSR) and five Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ships

remains critical to achieving this capability. An additional eight LMSRs are required to meet pre-positioning requirements; five of these are ship conversions with deliveries expected in FYs 1996-1997. The LMSR acquisition program is scheduled for completion in FY 2001. The acquisition of five additional ships to meet the 36 RRF RO/RO ship requirement constitutes a vital near-term effort at improving strategic surge sealift capability and remains a key element of the sealift program. A restriction prohibiting purchase of RRF ships from foreign shipyards imposed by the FY 1996 Authorization Act effectively prevents the Department of Defense from procuring the required five RRF RO/RO ships in a timely manner, given that the only suitable used vessels available for purchase are foreign built. RRF ships must be procured and maintained at readiness levels commensurate with the lift requirements of the plans to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Funding for RRF ship procurement and O&M to maintain ship readiness levels is an important element of the Department of Defense National Defense Sealift Fund. The President's Budget now contains \$70 million for RRF acquisition and \$289 million for O&M requirements.

(2) **Airlift.** US strategic airlift requirements are met using organic aircraft and commercial aircraft capacity arranged under Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) agreements.

(a) The Air Force is replacing the aging C-141 aircraft with the C-17 and continues to complete the initial buy of 40 C-17s. A November 1995 Defense Acquisition Board Decision approved purchase of an additional 80 C-17 aircraft to meet requirements identified in the MRS BURU and follow-on studies. The Air Force has been flying the C-17 for almost 2 years, and operational results show the aircraft to be highly capable and reliable. In making the C-17 acquisition decision, less expensive commercial aircraft (Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft) were seriously considered but found to be incapable of carrying outsize cargo loads and not practical in meeting the flexibility required by the warfighting CINCs. The C-17 will become the Nation's core airlifter, replacing the C-141 and providing a robust mobility capability essential to meeting post-Cold War demands. Poor reliability and the high operation costs of the aging C-5A fleet are also cause for concern. Modernization or replacement of the C-5A fleet must be examined to determine the aircraft's long-term ability to fulfill strategic airlift requirements.

(b) FY 1996 CRAF agreements currently meet Stage I, II, and III passenger requirements. However, as a result of a reduced commitment by a major carrier, existing cargo requirements have

not been met at this time. Efforts are underway to alleviate this shortfall. Aeromedical evacuation agreements have resulted in better capacities than last year, but large shortfalls continue to exist in meeting Stage II and III requirements. Historically, the program relied on the B-767 aircraft for aeromedical evacuation; but alternative aircraft, such as the DC-10, appear to offer potential and are being considered. The Department of Defense continues to aggressively refine incentives for commercial air carriers to bolster participation and to better meet strategic airlift requirements.

(3) **Spacelift.** US national spacelift assets are aging and represent technology that has not kept pace with scientific developments. The congressionally mandated DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan highlighted the need for the next generation of expendable launch vehicles. Currently, we are exploring the concept of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV), which will facilitate launch of a wide variety of payloads of various weights to low, medium, and high orbits. This will be achieved by producing standard core vehicles that can be supplemented with "strap-on" boosters to increase lift capacity. The commonality achieved by standardized parts that can be tailored to precisely lift a given payload into a particular orbit will enable increased efficiencies at reduced costs.

(4) **Afloat Pre-positioning.** All Services maintain warfighting equipment and supplies and/or munitions pre-positioned on ships at sea. Pre-positioning in key areas of the world allows for storage free from foreign basing requirements and rapid closure of forces to potential trouble spots.

(a) With the addition of two container ships in FY 1995, the Army continued planned expansion of the Army Pre-positioning Afloat Program (AWR-3), increasing from 12 to 14 ships. Future plans expand this fleet to 16 ships with an increase of 1 million square feet for storage of combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) equipment. This fleet provides an afloat capability to project a heavy combat brigade and required CS/CSS elements into a theater on short notice. In the first 18 months of operation, elements of Army Pre-positioning Afloat (AWR-3) have deployed once to Kenya and twice to the Persian Gulf to meet contingencies. In addition, based on lessons learned during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, AWR-3 ship loads have been reconfigured to enhance the rapid buildup of combat power ashore.

(b) The Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) is made up of pre-positioned ships and a fly-in echelon that form

self-sustainable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The 13 ships of the MPF are organized into three squadrons, each capable of supporting a brigade size force, and are based in Guam, Diego Garcia, and the Mediterranean Sea. The MPF has a proven record as demonstrated by operations in Somalia and in response to events in Southwest Asia (SWA). Key lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD led to the MPF Enhancement Program, which will add one ship to each of the three squadrons and increase the force projection and crisis response package available to the CINC.

(c) The Air Force Afloat Pre-positioning Force (APF) consists of three ammunition ships that provide rapid response stocks to the first MRC. Two ships are normally based at Diego Garcia and one is assigned to the Mediterranean Sea. The APF is in the midst of a restructuring that significantly increases the quantity of preferred munitions available to a CINC early in a contingency.

(5) **Pre-positioning Ashore.** Potentially hostile activities in and around the Persian Gulf continue to validate the need for pre-positioned ground combat equipment in SWA. The first of three brigade sets planned for the region, an armor brigade set, was pre-positioned in 1994-1995, with a second armor brigade set and division base scheduled to be in place by FY 2000. An initial battalion-size task force of this brigade is on the ground now. The third brigade set, a mechanized brigade, is being planned. Currently, four heavy brigade sets of pre-positioned equipment are maintained in Central Europe, with plans for reduction to two sets. This reflects a significant reduction from the six sets pre-positioned during the Cold War years. Redistribution of equipment from Europe will fill unit equipment sets in other global pre-positioning locations. We continue to reexamine requirements in Europe to meet operational necessities and comply with budgetary constraints. An armor brigade set is being pre-positioned in South Korea and is scheduled for completion in FY 1997/98. Pre-positioning strengthens deterrence, shortens response time in a crisis, and enhances warfighting capability in potentially volatile regions.

(6) **Intermodal Efforts.** Programs are in place that collectively will improve the flow of personnel, unit equipment, and supplies from their locations in the United States, through the ports of embarkation and throughput bases, to their ultimate destinations. These improvements include expanding rail and airheads at contingency force locations, constructing a containerized ammunition facility on the West Coast, purchasing and pre-positioning railcars to move heavy and oversized loads, and purchasing and positioning intermodal containers to better handle small items of unit equipment

and supplies. Container handling requirements continue to be refined and required capabilities developed. Such efforts will allow better use of the commercial transportation infrastructure, upon which mobility so heavily depends.

c. **Intratheater Mobility.** Forces deploying into an overseas theater must be quickly integrated into the battle. Intratheater lift requirements are currently being refined and programs evaluated to ensure that needed flexibility is provided to move and support forces within a theater. Dual-tasking of key ground transportation assets to more than one MRC, especially within the Army force structure, is a serious concern. This problem is being examined through both Service and joint analysis. Current progress must be continued in the Army's efforts to field its Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, providing needed common-user type vehicles for all Services operating within a theater. The C-130 aircraft will continue as the mainstay of the theater airlift fleet, providing services such as resupply, unit relocation, and aeromedical evacuation. Ongoing analysis and recent experience in Bosnia show that the C-17 aircraft can serve a very useful role in augmenting the C-130 in the theater, quickly moving heavy and outsize loads such as tanks and missile systems around the battlefield.

d. **Amphibious Mobility.** Recapitalization of our amphibious force continues to provide needed modernization and essential capabilities. The Navy currently maintains an amphibious fleet to meet the lift requirements of two and a half Marine Expeditionary Brigades. The FY 1997 budget and associated FYDP sustain a force of 39 active and 2 reserve ships. The age of the fleet averages 18 years in FY 1996, growing to 21 years by FY 2001. Two new LHD (multipurpose assault ships) and one new LSD (dock landing ship) will join the force by FY 1998, with another new LHD, authorized in FY 1996, scheduled for delivery in FY 2001. The LPD-17 amphibious transport dock ship program, consisting of 12 ships, in combination with the newer LSDs and LHDs, will constitute the core of the modernized amphibious force.

e. **Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS).** World events that focus attention on locations such as Somalia and Rwanda remind us that world-class ports will not always be available for use. US forces may have to rely on watercraft to off-load the Marine Assault Follow-On Echelon and Army pre-positioned ships when port facilities are damaged, inadequate, or non-existent. Ongoing analysis continues to demonstrate a need for improved LOTS systems capable of contending with rough seas while maintaining a high rate of productivity. The ability to conduct joint LOTS operations that combine Army and Navy capabilities remains highly desirable. A study of equipment and unit interoperability is under way and will assist in making the right procurement decisions in the future.

Continued research and development is required to enhance existing joint LOTS capabilities, to include rough sea operations.

12. INSTALLATIONS, REAL PROPERTY, AND FACILITIES. Military installations and the facilities they support are bases for power projection. As we downsize CONUS infrastructure and reduce overseas presence, it becomes increasingly important that remaining installations be maintained in prime operating condition as fighting platforms, en route infrastructure, and suitable places for our personnel to live, work, and train. Maintenance of existing facilities and new construction to support state-of-the-art equipment, weapons systems, and the quality of life of our people are vital to readiness. Today's environment dictates prudent investment to modernize and maintain this infrastructure.

a. **Quality of Life.** Senior leaders list support for military personnel as one of their prime concerns. People are our most important investment. Unfortunately, quality of life program execution is put at risk when funds are diverted to pay for nondiscretionary facility repairs or contingency operations. As one foundation of recruitment and retention, strong quality of life programs enable Service members to place confidence in their government's concern for their well-being and that of their families.

b. **Support for Forward Presence.** Readiness is closely tied to force projection, but decreased funding has endangered overseas military construction in recent years. En route infrastructure, required to facilitate the timely flow of forces to distant theaters, is critical to force projection. Overseas installations and pre-positioning at strategic locations provide deterrence through regional presence and decrease mobility requirements during crises. NATO common-funded, Japanese, and Korean burdensharing programs help provide needed overseas facilities. However, in the summer of 1995, the Senate Appropriations Committee rescinded \$33 million of 1995 NATO Security Investment Program appropriations, increasing the cost of ongoing projects, delaying access by US forces to facilities under construction, and delaying the start of new US-interest infrastructure projects. The rescission halted this common-funded program from April 1995 until the FY 1996 DOD Appropriation and Authorization Bills were enacted. Under host-nation agreements, US allies in SWA continue to provide payment-in-kind support. MILCON funding for the storage of valuable pre-positioned assets, especially in SWA, must be supported in order to facilitate the rapid deployment of US forces.

c. **Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).** With the 1995 BRAC decisions complete, the Department of Defense continues to downsize its infrastructure. BRAC allows the Services to reduce nonessential infrastructure if bases designated for closure are not singled out for

special programs designed to leave facilities open. Retaining unnecessary installation functions diverts funding from other activities and serves to maintain levels of excess capacity. Concurrently, operational readiness must be sustained throughout the BRAC implementation to ensure smooth transition of bases designated for realignment and closure. Together with readiness, quality of life for personnel assigned to these bases must be paramount.

d. Facility Stewardship. As reflected in Figure A-4, Appendix A, the large installation Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) continues to increase, jeopardizing efforts to control costs for repair or replacement of facilities. These costs are in addition to day-to-day recurring maintenance, minor repairs, and emergent major repairs. Unfunded minor maintenance can culminate in catastrophic failure in major facilities and infrastructure such as refrigeration plants, power plants, and airfields. Migration of other operational dollars to ensure facilities maintenance can result in decreased funding for training or other critical mission needs. However, without investment in installation maintenance, we cannot ensure a safe and productive environment in which our personnel can live, train, and maintain equipment to ensure the continued readiness of US forces.

13. RISK ASSESSMENT. The classified risk assessment is included in Appendix B.

14. CONCLUSION. US forces remain ready to execute the National Military Strategy. The "first-to-fight" forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall force readiness is constant at historic levels. There remain, however, some concerns in key joint force enablers such as mobility, modernization, C4, and intelligence. We will continue to monitor these key warfighting areas to assess the two-MRC risk through the JMRR/SROC process. Today's significant challenge is to maintain a well-trained and educated, well-equipped, and well-cared for force. Another major challenge is to maintain an effective balance between current readiness, with its associated high activity level of contingency support, and the modernization of forces essential to future readiness and enhanced capability. Although maintaining a high state of readiness is essential to managing risk in the near-term, long-term readiness demands a significant increase in procurement dollars both in the FYDP and outyears. Continued strong funding support will ensure that our quality people retain a technological superiority on the battlefield, and that US forces can respond quickly and effectively in support of US national policy objectives.

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necessity maintenance functions diverting from other activities
and access to maintain levels of readiness. Community
and other facilities must be sustained throughout the life of
maintenance to ensure smooth transition of bases during the
assignment and resource. Together with readiness quality of
personnel assigned to these bases must be maintained.

Facility Readiness As reflected in the AAF Appendix A, the
large installation Method of Maintenance and Repair (MMA) continues
to increase, requiring efforts to control repair or replacement
of facilities. The costs are in addition to day-to-day routine
maintenance, minor repairs, and emergency repairs. Included
minor maintenance can contribute to catastrophic failure in major
facilities and infrastructure such as navigation plans, power plants,
and utilities. Migration of other operations and bases to ensure facilities
maintenance can result in decreased funding for training of other critical
mission needs. However, without investment in facilities
readiness we cannot ensure a safe and productive environment in
which our personnel can live, train, and maintain equipment to ensure
the continued readiness of US forces.


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CONCLUSION The forces remain ready to ensure the National Military
Strategy. The first to fight, forces maintain a high level of readiness, which
ensures for readiness is constant at historic levels. These readiness levels
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and intelligence. We will continue to monitor these force enablers
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CJCS FORCE READINESS ASSESSMENT (FY 1996 Report to Congress)


APPENDIX A SUPPORTING FIGURES

Figure A-1. CJCS Joint Exercise Program Summary




Bottom Line: Joint Exercises Remain Healthy

Figure A-2. Procurement Trends




Bottom Line: Procurement Continually Pushed to Outyears

Figure A-3. Unfunded Depot Maintenance Backlog



Bottom Line: Growth of Maintenance Backlog has Stabilized

Figure A-4. Real Property and Repair Backlog




Source: OSD O&M Overview. Published annually in support of the President's Budget. (O&M funded facilities only, excludes DBOF, RTD&E, family housing. Prior year data not normalized for DBOF transfer.)

Bottom Line: The Large Backlog Continues to Grow

GLOSSARY

APF	Afloat Pre-positioning Force
AWR-3	Army Pre-positioning Afloat
BMAR	backlog of maintenance and repair
BRAC	base realignment and closure
BUR	Bottom-Up Review
CINC	commander in chief
CONUS	continental United States
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRS	Chairman's Readiness System
CS	combat support
CSEP	CJCS-Sponsored Exercise Program
CSS	combat service support
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
DBS	direct broadcast satellite
DOD	Department of Defense
FRAC	Force Readiness Assessment to Congress
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
IBUR	Intelligence Bottom-Up Review
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment
JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSIMS	Joint Simulation System
JTASC	Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center
JTF	joint task force
JTS	Joint Training System
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment

JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
LHD	amphibious assault ship with internal dock
LMSR	large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off
LOTS	logistics over the shore
LPD	amphibious transport dock ship
LSD	landing ship, dock
MILCON	military construction
MILSATCOM	military satellite communications
MPF	Maritime Pre-positioning Force
MRC	major regional contingency
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MRS BURU	Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update
M&S	modeling and simulation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, chemical, and biological
O&M	operations and maintenance
OPTEMPO	operations tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PERSTEMPO	personnel tempo
PME	professional military education
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
RC	Reserve Component
RO/RO	roll on/roll off ship
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SAFMA	Strategic Airlift Force Mix Analysis
SATCOM	satellite communications
SELRES	Selected Reserve
SROC	Senior Readiness Oversight Council
SWA	Southwest Asia
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
UJTL	universal joint task list
USACOM	US Atlantic Command



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CJCS FORCE READINESS ASSESSMENT (FY 1996 Report to Congress)

APPENDIX B RISK ASSESSMENT (U)

Today's US Armed Forces and those that are programmed in the FY 1997-2002 defense program are adequate to accomplish our national security objectives. In the assessments below, risk is defined as the likelihood of failing to accomplish theater strategic objectives. The period of the assessment directed by law extends through FY 1997.

1. (S) **Military Operations Other Than War.** [REDACTED] in conducting the foreseen level of military operations other than war, including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or peace enforcement operations. It is likely that we will be conducting multiple, simultaneous operations of this type throughout the assessment period. The cumulative impact of ongoing operations will make the execution of each additional operation more difficult.

2. (S) **Single Major Regional Contingency (MRC).** The risks associated with the successful conduct of a single major regional contingency range [REDACTED]

3. (S) **Two MRCs--The Most Demanding Challenge.** The risk associated with the execution of two nearly simultaneous MRCs [REDACTED] Although we noted in last year's assessment that the risk would most probably move [REDACTED] the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), created just last year, has given us a better understanding of the deficiencies that drive up risk. The JMRR process has also provided clearer insight into the impact of ongoing operations on our ability to execute two MRCs. Concerns reported in the JMRR include: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Maintaining a high state of readiness is essential to adequately manage our risk in the near-term.

Classified by: MG Stephen Silvasy

Reason: 1.5(a)

Declassify on: 7 February 2006

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