

JOINT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

SURETY PLAN

May 1992

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
SURETY PLAN

I. Background

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) have established programs to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons during development, production, deployment, and retirement. The overall safety management of the nuclear stockpile could be enhanced via the application of risk assessment techniques. Risk assessment is a methodology that has been extensively used to characterize the risks to the public from commercial nuclear power reactor operations. The results of risk assessments, which are both qualitative and quantitative, can be used to guide the prioritization of risk reduction and risk management activities.

The performance of risk assessments requires an extensive set of data and models. This set includes: frequencies of projected accidents, severities of the environments resulting from accidents, mechanisms for transfer of environments to the weapon (system response), the weapon's response to the environment, resulting radiological consequences, and the value of positive measures. These data and models will need to be collected or developed prior to, or concurrent with, the performance of each assessment. The effort and resources required to develop the databases and models to support risk assessments will be substantial. It is recognized that resource availability will limit the ability of the Departments to resolve all issues.

In 1991, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) was tasked by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy to prepare a "Joint Surety Plan" between the DoD and DOE that would be focused on the performance of risk assessments, the collection of data, and the development of models needed to support these assessments. This document is the Joint DoD-DOE Surety Plan. Only the DoD and DOE can commit resources to perform the tasks recommended in this Plan.

II. Joint Surety Planning Process

Purpose: The ongoing surety planning process will identify significant issues and initiatives that the NWC believes should receive consideration for resource allocation by the two Departments. The Joint Surety Plan includes qualitative priorities that reflect the NWC's evaluation of the importance of each issue. Some of the

activities identified will have already been initiated by the responsible Department or Service. These ongoing activities are included in the Plan to emphasize that the NWC endorses their resolution.

The Joint Surety Plan documents nuclear weapons issues that have been identified as having the potential to benefit from the application of risk assessment, data collection, and model development. This Plan also outlines the overall division of responsibilities between the two Departments for these activities.

Process: The identification of issues for incorporation in the Joint Surety Plan and the initiation of assessment, data collection, and model development efforts will be a continuous process. The Plan will be reviewed annually by the NWC's Weapons Safety Committee (WSC) for the NWC to determine whether an update is required. If required, Plan updates will (1) provide a "snapshot" of currently on-going activities, (2) document shifts in priorities (e.g., identify past Plan-recommended initiatives that are no longer required), and (3) recommend needed activities.

The Joint Surety Plan will be forwarded by the NWC to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for their information and action. The NWC will request that the DoD and DOE implementation plans be briefed to the WSC by the end of the quarter that follows the Secretaries' receipt of the Plan. The Joint Surety Plan will be reviewed by the WSC at the end of the first quarter of each fiscal year. The NWC, the NWC's Standing Committee, or the WSC may also request periodic briefings on the progress of efforts to implement Plan recommendations.

Assessment, data collection, and model development needs can be identified by the NWC and its two Committees; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy); the DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff); the Military Departments; and the other existing organizations that share responsibility for nuclear weapons safety.

Many assessments, data collection, and model development activities may be initiated independent of this Plan. However, the WSC Executive Secretary, working with the WSC Action Officers group, will track activities throughout the year that are initiated, terminated, or completed for proposed inclusion in the WSC's Direct Report to the NWC. The WSC will be the forum for resolving disagreements over priorities.

III. Responsibilities

The DoD and DOE share responsibility for the safety of nuclear weapons. Lead responsibility for the performance of risk assessments, the collection of data, and the development of models will track the following areas of responsibility: The DOE has lead responsibility during research and development, production, modification, and dismantlement of physics packages, and during transportation and storage/staging of physics packages, warheads, and weapons in DOE custody. The two Departments share responsibility during research and development, production, modification, and dismantlement of warheads. The DoD has lead responsibility during research and development, production, and modification of weapon systems, and during operations, transportation, and storage/staging of warheads and weapon systems in DoD custody. On occasion, joint assessments may be initiated on issues of common concern.

Risk assessments conducted under DoD leadership that involve estimates of warhead response will require the participation of DOE. The DOE will be responsible for providing support to these assessments. Risk assessments conducted under DOE leadership that involve evaluation of the performance or response of DoD systems will require the participation of the DoD. The DoD will be responsible for providing support to these assessments. Each Department will also make available, on request, personnel to support peer review of both DoD-led and DOE-led assessment plans and assessments.

The collection and evaluation of operational data (failure rates, accident frequency, etc.) will be performed by the Department that is responsible for the operation. The two Departments should work cooperatively in those areas where separate resource expenditure would be redundant, and when one Department possesses unique facilities or capabilities that would be beneficial to the efforts of the other.

IV. Prioritized Plan

Overview

The Plan elements are divided into three sections: (A) System Assessments; (B) Issue Assessments; and (C) Data Collection and Model Development Activities. Each section contains descriptions of activities that the NWC recommends be considered for DoD, DOE, or joint DoD-DOE resource commitment. The descriptions that pertain to DoD include a recommendation of the Service that should lead in the performance of the activity.

All descriptions include a qualitative priority that reflects the NWC's interpretation of the significance and/or urgency of the activity. The priorities assigned are defined as follows:

- Priority 1: Most needed. The NWC recommends that work be initiated immediately, or continued if currently ongoing.
- Priority 2: Important. The NWC recommends that ongoing efforts be continued, and new efforts initiated as resources can be made available.
- Priority 3: An identified issue that should continue to be evaluated.

Both Departments have ongoing programs to address the issues identified in the following sections. Ongoing activities are included in the Plan to emphasize that the NWC endorses resolution of the issue.

A. System Assessments

A.1. Representative silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile assessment. Lead: USAF [Priority 1]

It is recommended that risk assessment methodology continue to be applied to consolidate the Air Force's ongoing safety evaluations of the Minuteman III/W78 strategic weapons system into a comprehensive overview assessment. It may be appropriate to include alternate warheads in this study.

The assessment should be focused to identify accident initiators, credible accident sequences and environments, weapon system response (missile, silo, warhead, etc.), magnitude of consequences, dominant risk contributors, and potential risk reduction options

(warhead design, system design, mitigative or containment systems, procedures, emergency response, etc.).

**A.2. Representative sea-launched ballistic missile assessment.
Lead: USN [Priority 1]**

It is recommended that risk assessment methodology be applied to consolidate the Navy's ongoing safety evaluations of the Trident strategic weapon systems into a comprehensive overview assessment.

As with the Minuteman III assessment, the Trident systems assessment should be focused to identify accident initiators, credible accident sequences and environments, weapon system response (missile, launch platform, warhead, etc.), magnitude of consequence, dominant risk contributors, and potential risk reduction options (warhead design, system design, mitigative or containment systems, procedures, emergency response, etc.).

**A.3. Representative aircraft system assessment. Lead: USAF
[Priority 3]**

A PRA is recommended for an aircraft system. However, it is unclear at this time which system would be an appropriate candidate.

B. Issue Assessments**B.1. Fire resistance enhancements. Leads: DOE (warhead technology), USAF/USN (DoD environments) [Priority 1]**

A system-by-system assessment of the enduring stockpile is recommended to evaluate the need for fire resistance enhancement and the relative benefits of various enhancement options. The options considered should include enhancements to the physics package design (e.g., fire resistant pit), warhead design (e.g., case insulation), weapon system design, as well as operational modifications (containment, mitigative systems, improved procedures and training, exposure reduction, emergency response enhancement, etc.).

The assessment should be focused to identify (1) the operational exposure of each system to fire environments, (2) the severity of fire environments for each exposure scenario, (3) the performance of the current physics package/warhead/weapon system design in those environments, and (4) the potential fire resistance improvement offered by each enhancement option. The assessment results would allow the decision-maker to: first, determine whether enhancements are needed and, second, evaluate the various means (by selection among options) of achieving the desired degree of enhancement.

B.2. Multi-point insult. Leads: DOE (warhead response thresholds, DOE environments), All Services (DoD environments) [Priority 3]

An expanded assessment is recommended to determine whether there are credible accidents that can result in multi-point insults (shrapnel, etc.) capable of causing nuclear detonation. The assessment should examine operational configurations, storage, transportation, and retirement/dismantlement staging configurations.

B.3. Command disable safety impact. Leads: DOE, USAF/USN [Priority 3]

A system-by-system assessment is recommended to evaluate whether command disable design features have the potential to degrade safety.

B.4. Long-term storage/staging of retired weapons. Leads: DOE, USAF/USN [Priority 1]

An expanded safety assessment is recommended to examine issues associated with long-term storage and staging of retired weapons and weapon components in DoD and DOE custody.

B.5. Nuclear testing risk. Lead: DOE [Priority 2]

It is recommended that DOE continue to examine the processes used to evaluate the risks of inadvertent yield, violent high explosive reaction, or other plutonium dispersal associated with nuclear testing.

The assessment includes nuclear explosive assembly operations at the Nevada Test Site, on-site transportation of nuclear explosives, ground-zero operations involving nuclear explosives, and testing safety/reliability issues.

B.6. Production risk. Lead: DOE [Priority 3]

It is recommended that DOE continue to examine the processes used to evaluate the risks associated with DOE production activities involving nuclear explosive assemblies.

The assessment includes credible accident initiators (internal and external events), accident environments, facility mitigation effects, staging safety/security/use control issues, and on-site transportation.

B.7. Dismantlement risk. Lead: DOE [Priority 1]

It is recommended that DOE continue to examine the processes used to evaluate the risks associated with DOE dismantlement activities.

The assessment includes credible accident initiators (internal and external events), accident environments, facility mitigation effects, staging safety/security/use control issues, and on-site transportation.

C. Data Collection and Model Development

C.1. Warhead response. Leads: DOE, DoD (environment definition) [Priority 1]

It is recommended that efforts be expanded to characterize the abnormal environment response of warheads that will remain part of the enduring stockpile. This characterization effort should include the development of response models and the validation of these models via testing. The abnormal environments of concern for warhead response include:

- (1) mechanical [impact (single and multi-point), puncture, crush, etc.],
- (2) thermal [radiative, fuel fire, propellant fire, etc.],
- (3) electrical [lightning, static discharge, etc.], and
- (4) other single environments [blast, immersion, etc.].

After warhead response to single environments have been characterized, it is recommended that an effort be initiated to characterize response to significant dual combined environments [impact then thermal, puncture then immersion, impact then electrical, etc.].

Strong emphasis is recommended on the response of high explosive components in realistic weapon configurations (thresholds for detonation, non-detonation explosion, and ignition) and characterization of the plutonium dispersal resulting from such response (percent aerosolized, percent respirable, etc.).

C.2. Transport mode accident models. Lead: (see text) [Priority 2]

It is recommended that efforts be expanded to collect data and develop representative models to characterize accidents associated with air, sea, and ground nuclear weapon transport modes. This effort should include examination of potential accident initiators, accident frequencies, resulting accident severities, and the response of the entire transport system (including any protective shipping container) external to the warhead. This effort will complement the Item C.1. effort (warhead response) described above. Each Service will have lead responsibility for this effort as it applies to their transport vehicles; DOE will have lead responsibility of the effort for DOE-only transport (e.g., safe-secure trucks). This activity

will build on the efforts begun as part of the Joint DoD-DOE Transportation Study, which identified many of these modeling needs.

C.3. Propellant sensitivity. Lead: DoD [Priority 3]

It is recommended that an effort be initiated to collect existing propellant test data into a common DoD database. This data will be used (1) to document existing system capabilities and sensitivities, (2) to determine any additional testing needs to characterize propellant sensitivities, and (3) to serve as an information resource for future propellant evaluation or selection activities.



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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24 OCT 1997

Ref: 97-F-1699/L

Mr. Greg Mello
Los Alamos Study Group
212 E. Marcy Street, Suite 7
Santa Fe, NM 87501

Dear Mr. Mello:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act request of May 30, 1997, for the "DoD/DOE Joint Surety Plan, May 1992." The Department of Energy forwarded part one of your request to this Directorate for review, release determination, and direct response to you.

The document has been reviewed and determined to contain no classified information. A copy of the document is provided for your use. No fees are assessed in this instance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. H. Passarella".

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosure:
As stated



21 NOV 1997

Ref: 98-F-0204

Mr. Jeff Donarski
Federation Of American Scientists Fund
307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, DC 20002

Dear Mr. Donarski:

This letter responds to your October 30, 1997, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

The enclosed document is provided as responsive to your request. There are no chargeable costs for processing your FOIA request in this instance.

Sincerely,

☐ Signed ☐

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosure:
As stated

#897

U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA SINCE 1994

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TAB 1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
BDUs	Battle Dress Uniform (standard work uniform; comprises camouflage shirt and trousers and black boots. Includes baseball-style soft cap or beret).
CA BN	Civil Affairs Battalion
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID)
E-IMET	Expanded International Military Education and Training (courses on civ-mil relations, resource management, and senior level leadership, etc.)
FMF (Demining)	Foreign Military Financing in support of humanitarian demining program
IMET	International Military Education and Training
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
HDO	Humanitarian Demining Operation
JCET	Joint/Combined Exchange Training
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-GA	Joint Task Force Guardian Assistance (deployed to Great Lakes area November-December 1996)
LBE	Load Bearing Equipment (type used by Special Operations soldiers is woodland color vest-style web gear with pouches, canteen, and holster)
MTT	Mobile Training Team (small team of U.S. military personnel who provide in-country training on a specific topic)
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (Department of Defense)
NPGS	Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
NJS	Naval Justice School, Newport, RI
POB	Psychological Operations Battalion
SATCOM	Satellite Communication
SFG	Special Forces Group (Brigade equivalent)
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, Europe
TALCE	Air Force Tactical Airlift Liaison and Control Element

TAB 2

U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA SINCE 1994 SUMMARY

FISCAL YEAR 1994:

E- IMET (Expanded International Military Education and Training): DoD conducted Phase III of the Naval Justice Seminar in Kigali from 17-21 Jan 94 in support of the Arusha Peace Agreement at a cost of \$35.6K. The four instructors wore service Dress B uniform. A total of 33 former Rwandan Government military and civilian officials and 19 military and civilian officials of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) were trained. Of the 19 RPF officials, 12 were Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) officers. The instructors did not transfer any equipment to either the former Rwandan government or to the RPA and re-deployed with all its equipment. Source of funding: FY94 State Foreign Operations, IMET.

JOINT TASK FORCE SUPPORT HOPE: In support of humanitarian relief operations, DoD deployed a total of 2100 U.S. military personnel to the region as part of JTF Support Hope. The JTF Headquarters location was at Entebbe, Uganda, with logistical operations in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire, Nairobi and Mombassa, Kenya, and Kigali. In Rwanda, the JTF was established on 30 July 94 and sustained an 24-hour expanded air-logistics site at Kigali International Airport. Kigali served as the focal point for UNHCR/NGO coordination/activity and the hub for all relief flights in support of humanitarian relief operations. At the height of the operation, there were about 200 JTF U.S. military personnel in Kigali including Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC), a large U.S. Air Force Tactical Airlift Liaison and Control Element (TALCE), other staff and logistical personnel, and a Military Police detachment for force protection of U.S. military personnel. The JTF neither conducted nor was authorized to conduct training or operations with either the former Government of Rwanda or with the RPA. The JTF began drawing down Kigali operations in late August and terminated operations on 30 Sep 94. Upon its departure, the JTF transferred some logistical equipment (water support equipment, tractor trucks, and trailers) to international organizations and re-deployed with all other equipment. It did not transfer any equipment to either the former Government of Rwanda or the RPA. Source of funding: DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M).

EMBASSY SUPPORT: During the period 29 July-10 Aug, two U.S. Army officers (one assigned to the Department of State and one to the Office of the Secretary of Defense) and two Special Forces NCOs accompanied the U.S. Ambassador and staff to Kigali to re-establish the American Embassy. The NCOs set-up and operated temporary Embassy communications, did not transfer any equipment to the RPA, and re-deployed with all equipment. Source of funding: DoD O&M.

FISCAL YEAR 1995:

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM: In January and February 1995, DoD participated in an interagency assessment and an European Command site assessment to determine the parameters, scope, and extent of a humanitarian demining program. During the period 18 July-30 Aug 95, 35 U.S. military personnel established a National Demining Office (NDO) and trained 120 RPA personnel for the NDO at a cost of \$1.2 million. DoD also funded the operations of a U.S. contractor, RONCO, for a demining dog training program including

equipment and services at a cost of \$1.4 million. Personnel wore BDUs with soft cap. With the exception of equipment purchased or acquired in support of humanitarian demining operations (Tab 4), the team re-deployed with all its equipment. Source of funding: DoD O&M (OHDACA-Demining).

E-IMET: DoD conducted Phase II of the Military Justice Seminar at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 24-30 June 95 for eight RPA junior officers and then Phase III (Human Rights and Rule of Law) in Kigali, 11-15 Sept 95, for 30 RPA officers and NCOs at a cost of \$31K. The four instructors wore service Dress B uniform and remained in Kigali throughout the deployment. They did not transfer any equipment to the RPA and re-deployed with all equipment. One RPA officer attended the International Defense Management Course (resource and budget management), Monterey, California, 25 Sep-8 Dec 95, at a cost of \$15K. Both courses are Expanded-IMET. Total FY95 funding: \$50K. Source of funding: FY 95 State Foreign Operations, IMET.

EQUIPMENT SUPPORT TO THE RPA: In support of the humanitarian demining program, DoD provided demining equipment, medical supplies, off-the-shelf communications equipment and other support materials to the NDO. Equipment was used to establish the NDO in Kigali and to train RPA humanitarian deminers. Source of funding: DoD O&M (OHDACA-Demining).

FISCAL YEAR 1996:

E-IMET: DoD conducted Phase IV (investigation and prosecution principles) and V (investigative/court room procedures, dossier preparation, and new genocide law) of the Naval Justice Seminar in Kigali during the periods 29 April-3 May 96 for 34 RPA and Gendarmerie officers and enlisted personnel and 6-17 Sept 96 for 36 military and Ministry of Justice officials. Cost of the two seminars was \$114.2K. The five instructors wore service Dress B and remained in Kigali. They did not transfer any equipment to the RPA and re-deployed with all equipment. One RPA officer attended the International Defense Management Course, Monterey, California, 16 Sep-6 Dec 96, at a cost of \$16.2K. IMET also funded acquisition of one 10-position English Language Laboratory at a cost of \$30K. Total FY96 funding: \$243K. All courses were E-IMET. Source of funding: FY96 State Foreign Operations, IMET.

JOINT/COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING (JCET): Nine U.S. military personnel conducted a JCET during the period 15 Jul-30 Aug 96 for 30 RPA soldiers with a focus on small unit leader training, tactical skills, land navigation, first aid, and basic rifle marksmanship. Tactical skills training focused on tactical patrolling. The basic rifle marksmanship training was conducted over a period of one day at the Gabiro training area in eastern Rwanda and included familiarization and qualification of assigned weapons. During training in Kigali, personnel wore BDUs without LBE or weapons. During the one-day rifle marksmanship training in Gabiro, personnel wore BDUs with vest-style LBE (canteen, first aid pouch) and carried assigned weapons (M4 rifle and 9mm pistol). With the exception of the one-day rifle marksmanship training at Gabiro, JCET personnel remained and conducted all training in Kigali. While in Kigali, the M4 rifles were secured at the JCET training site. For DoD force protection purposes, JCET members carried a 9mm pistol concealed under their BDU shirt. The team did

not transfer any equipment to the RPA and re-deployed with all its equipment. Cost: \$67K. Source of funding: DoD O&M.

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM: Twelve U.S. military personnel conducted refresher humanitarian demining training for 72 RPA personnel as part of the National Demining Office during the period 2 Sept-5 Oct 96 at a cost of \$160K. Training focused on mine clearance, minefield survey techniques, mine marking, land navigation, and medical training. Team also provided assistance in integrating RONCO-trained demining dogs (see FY95 program) into Rwandan demining operations. Nine other U.S. military personnel conducted specialized training for the National Demining Office in the areas of mine awareness and an assessment of earlier humanitarian demining training at a cost of \$38K. Personnel wore BDUs with soft cap or green berets. In accordance with SOCOM policy, demining team members deployed to Rwanda with assigned weapons. The weapons were immediately secured in the American Embassy and were not used for any activity throughout the team's deployment. For DoD force protection purposes, team members carried a 9mm pistol concealed under their BDU shirts. With the exception of equipment purchased or acquired in support of humanitarian demining operations (Tab 4), the team re-deployed with all unit equipment. Source of funding: FY95 State Foreign Operations, FMF (Demining).

EQUIPMENT SUPPORT TO THE RPA: In support of the humanitarian demining program, DoD provided demining equipment to the NDO. These materials supported NDO operations in Kigali and humanitarian assistance program training. Demining funds also purchased office equipment, demining materials, and medical supplies. At the end of the U.S. contract with RONCO, equipment purchased in support RONCO demining operations were transferred to DoD humanitarian demining program for NDO operations. Source of funding: DoD O&M (OHDACA-Demining). As noted above, DoD acquired via FY96 IMET a 10-position English language laboratory.

FISCAL YEAR 1997:

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION MTTs: DoD conducted two MTTs with a focus on training Rwandan civilian and military personnel in operations to assist repatriation of refugees and other displaced civilians, and in planning and conducting public information campaigns supporting refugee repatriation and reintegration. Coincidentally, the teams deployed to Rwanda about two weeks before the mass repatriation from Zaire and formed the basis of JTF Guardian Assistance's CMOC in late November 1996. Source of funding: DoD O&M (OHDACA-Humanitarian Assistance), total of \$176.5K for the following MTTs --

A. Civil Affairs MTT: During the period 2 Nov-10 Dec 1996, a five-person U.S. military Civil Affairs team trained 44 students from the RPA and Rwandan Gendarmerie. Instruction included civil affairs planning, operations, assessments, emergency/ disaster relief, working with NGOs, operations to support displaced civilians, and establishing and managing camps for refugees/Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The team then conducted 5 days of practical exercises which included visits to the border at Gisenyi, and assessments of a UNHCR camp for returning refugees and of a commune level transit camp. During instruction phase, personnel wore BDUs with soft cap. On 16 November, two CA team members visited the Gisyeni repatriation crossing site (the other three remained in Kigali) and then returned the same day to

Kigali. The two team members wore BDUs with soft cap but did not have load bearing equipment (LBE) or weapons. CA team members did not deploy to Rwanda with or carry weapons. Effective 17 November and establishment of a CMOC in support of Operation Guardian Assistance (GA), the CA personnel were attached to the JTF-GA CMOC and remained with the JTF in Kigali through the remainder of their redeployment. Team members wore civilian clothes worked directly with the JTF Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). The team leaders attended most JTF meetings with UN, NGOs, and PVOs. The team did not transfer any equipment to the RPA or Gendarmerie and re-deployed with all equipment. For cost information, see above.

B. Public Information MTT: During the period 2-27 Nov 96, a five-person U.S. military Public Information training team conducted a train-the-trainer program for Rwandan Defense Ministry personnel in planning, developing, and carrying out multi-media information campaigns with an emphasis on refugee repatriation and reconciliation themes. The course consisted of two weeks of classroom training, followed by one week of practical exercises. Subjects included information campaign planning, target audience analysis, media selection, and product development (print, posters, video, and radio). In the practical phase of the training, the U.S. Public Information team and Rwandan Defense Ministry students conducted impromptu interviews with returning refugees at Gisenyi and Ruhengeri concerning the effect of public information messages transmitted by the Rwanda Government and by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe located in Zaire. The team also produced a leaflet and loudspeaker/radio messages for use at the border (note: the RPA does not possess loudspeaker equipment; the team did not deploy with loudspeakers). The products encouraged refugees to return to a safe homeland and sought to counter the ex-FAR/ Interahamwe message that returnees would be killed upon their return to Rwanda. Effective 19 November, the Public Information Team was attached to the JTF's Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) and remained with the JTF throughout the remainder of the redeployment. Training with the Rwandan Defense Ministry ended at this point. Upon their arrival in Kigali, Public Information team members wore BDUs with red berets but without LBE or weapons. A few days after their arrival, however, all team members wore civilian clothes and remained in civilian clothes for the duration their stay in Rwanda. Team members did not deploy to Rwanda with or carry weapons. The team and did not transfer any equipment to the Defense Ministry or RPA and re-deployed with all equipment. For cost information, see above.

JOINT TASK FORCE GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE : In response to a major humanitarian crisis, DoD deployed military assessment and logistics personnel to the Great Lakes region, in preparation for possible U.S. military participation in the Canadian-led Multi-National Humanitarian Force (MNHF). DoD deployed about 325 U.S. military personnel to the region with the main JTF Headquarters at Entebbe, Uganda. The JTF also established a small Forward Headquarters in Kigali, arriving via C-141 aircraft on 14 Nov 96. JTF-Forward's mission was to assess the humanitarian situation, coordinate for the use of facilities and infrastructure, and effect direct coordination with the American Embassy, international (UNHCR, UN Great Lakes Coordinator, WFP) and non-governmental relief organizations (International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services), and Government of Rwanda officials. Throughout the mission, JTF-Forward never exceeded more than 25-30 members in Kigali.

At various times, U.S. military presence in Rwanda included the JTF Commander, his military assistants, a HAST, Surgeon, Public Affairs Officer, a communications team (with SATCOM), and specialists with expertise and responsibilities for logistics, facilities/ infrastructure, contracting, public health and engineering. As noted above, in mid-November, the JTF established a small CMOC and Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) in Kigali. All JTF personnel were U.S. Army and Air Force personnel. Initially, JTF-Forward was billeted in the DCM's residence and subsequently expanded to the Embassy residence of the Public Affairs Officer. At both sites, the JTF established SATCOM communications with JTF-Main in Entebbe. All personnel wore BDUs without LBE. Some wore soft caps and others wore maroon-color berets. All personnel arrived in Kigali with assigned weapons which were immediately secured at the DCM and PAO residences. For DoD force protection purposes, selected personnel carried individual pistols concealed under their BDU shirt. JTF-Forward began to redeploy from Kigali in late November and terminated all Kigali operations by 8 December. The JTF's mandate ended and redeployed from the region on 27 Dec. The JTF re-deployed with all equipment and did not transfer equipment either to the RPA or to the Government of Rwanda.

As a matter of policy and practice, the JTF did not conduct any training of the Rwandan military. JTF contacts with the Rwandan military were strictly limited to official coordination on humanitarian issues through the Defense Attaché Office. On two occasions, CMOC representatives visited refugee repatriation sites and transit centers, including team members of the Civil Affairs and Public Information MTTs. CMOC representatives conducted informal interviews with returning refugees and coordinated with international relief organization officials. On 27 November, CA and Public Information team members, accompanied with their students as observers, traveled to the Nkamira Transit Camp in Gisyeni Prefecture. The students observed the repatriation and assisted in refugee interviews and coordination with international relief organizations. The CMOC representatives did not bring any of their equipment to the refugee repatriation site or transit centers. On this occasion, these U.S. military personnel wore civilian clothes and, for DoD force protection purposes, carried 9mm pistols concealed under their shirt.

The Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) each deployed one liaison officer to the JTF. These two officers, an U.S. Army Colonel assigned to State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and an U.S. Marine Major assigned to OSD's Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance (he was the only Marine officer in Rwanda), arrived with the JTF in Kigali on 14 Nov 96. Both officers wore BDUs upon arrival in Kigali and civilian clothes thereafter. The two officers assisted with coordination efforts among the HAST, American Embassy officials, international and non-government organizations, and Government of Rwanda officials. Of particular note, the Army Colonel accompanied AID's DART team to eastern Zaire during its two day liaison and survey visit in mid-November. He served as State's representative to the DART and traveled to Zaire on a diplomatic passport. The Colonel was the only U.S. military officer to enter Zaire during the JTF mission. The Army Colonel departed Kigali on 20 November, the Marine Major on 26 November.

Source of funding: DoD O&M. State funded all incremental costs of the U.S. Army Colonel assigned to its PM Bureau.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION MTTs: In early 1997, the Rwanda Government requested follow-on civil affairs and public information training to build upon training conducted in the fall of 1996. Source of funding: DoD O&M (OHDACA-Humanitarian Assistance), at a programmed cost of \$127.4K for the following MTTs --

A. Civil Affairs MTT: A four-person U.S. military Civil Affairs training team arrived in Kigali on 15 March to conduct civil affairs training. Upon the team's arrival, the Government of Rwanda informed the team that urgent operational requirements in refugee resettlement and transit areas precluded availability of those students earmarked for the civil affairs training and requested cancellation of the training. Several team members remained in Kigali in support of the humanitarian demining MTT (see below); others returned to home station. During its short stay, the team remained in Kigali and wore BDUs with soft caps or maroon berets but without LBE. In accordance with American Embassy policy, CA team members did not deploy to Rwanda with or carry weapons. The team did not transfer any equipment to the RPA and re-deployed with all equipment. For cost information, see above.

B. Public Information MTT: A three-person U.S. military Public Information training team conducted a public information MTT during the period 15 March-20 April 1997. While the Nov-Dec 96 training focused on the mass refugee repatriation, this instruction was designed to establish a public information capability at both the national and local level, to promulgate a message of national reconciliation, and to help reintegrate recent returnees. The Team trained and helped establish the Rwandan Military Information Platoon which has the mission of producing posters and other media products for dissemination by small teams traveling throughout the country. The Platoon posts its products at refugee transit camps. The team remained in Kigali and wore BDUs with maroon beret. On two occasions in late March and early April 97, Public Information team members visited the Nyakinama commune in Ruhengeri Prefecture. On these occasions, team members wore BDUs with maroon beret but without LBE or weapons. In accordance with American Embassy policy, Public Information team members did not deploy to Rwanda with or carry weapons. The team did not transfer any equipment to the RPA and re-deployed with all equipment. For cost information, see above.

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM: Ten U.S. military personnel conducted train-the-trainer training during the period 28 Mar-24 May 97 with emphasis on staff procedures and skills in the National Demining Office (NDO). The team also established a computer training program in the NDO, revitalized the NDO's data collection center, and conducted mine awareness training. Another 11-person U.S. military team including a 4-man EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) team conducted training for 93 RPA deminers and EOD personnel during the period 25 May-14 July. The teams trained a 4th platoon of humanitarian deminers that included instruction in communications, medical training, and EOD procedures. All NDO and demining training was conducted at the NDO in Kigali. EOD training was conducted at the Rebero training site in eastern Rwanda. All personnel wore BDUs without LBE. For DoD force protection purposes, they also carried 9mm pistols concealed under their BDU shirt. With the exception of equipment purchased or acquired in support of humanitarian demining operations (Tab 4), the team re-deployed with all unit equipment. Cost: humanitarian demining program funded in FY97 at \$1.6 million. Source of funding: FY 97 DoD O&M (OHDACA-Demining).

JCET: Nine U.S. military personnel, currently in Rwanda, are conducting a three phase training activity during the period 15 July-30 Aug with focus on leadership development training for junior officers and NCOs at the RPA training center at Gako in south central Rwanda. In phase I, the team will conduct a Leadership Development course for 30 RPA personnel. The course includes training in the law of war and human rights, military leadership, decision-making, personnel and equipment maintenance, and soldier team development. In phase II, the team will provide instructor training to a cadre of 10 RPA personnel (instructor duties and responsibilities using small group instruction methods) and conduct the basic mountaineering course (rappelling, basic knots, rope bridges) for the remaining 20 personnel. In phase III, the team will advise, assist, and supervise RPA personnel who will conduct a Leadership Development Course for 60 additional RPA personnel. There will be no weapons or any lethal training. All personnel wear BDUs with vest-style LBE and soft caps and do not carry weapons. In accordance with SOCOM policy for all JCET operations, JCET personnel deployed to Rwanda with assigned weapons. While in Rwanda, all JCET weapons are secured at the training site in Gako and are not used in any training or other activity. For DoD force protection purposes, all JCET personnel carry a 9mm pistol concealed under their BDU shirt. The JCET will not transfer any equipment either to the Government of Rwanda or to the RPA and will re-deploy with all its equipment. Estimated cost: \$59K. Source of funding: DoD O&M.

IMET: DoD conducted training with the primary focus on E-IMET courses in FY97 including International Defense Management Course, Military Legal Officer course, civil-military relations, English language instructor and lab maintenance course, quartermaster officer basic course, engineer officer basic course, and medical officer basic course. Two RPA officers attended the Civil-Military Strategy for International Development at Hulbert Field, Florida, during the period 28 Jul-8 Aug 97. IMET also funded installation of a 10-position language laboratory and acquisition of lab training materials (audio tapes, books, dictionaries, etc.) at a cost of \$23K. During the period 19-21 May, two Department of the Army civilians installed the English language lab in Kigali. During the period 26 May-5 June 97, one U.S. Naval officer and one Department of the Navy civilian employee from the Defense International Health Resources Management Program conducted Phase I (an assessment) and IV (development of a health management training program to integrate military with civilian medical infrastructure/ activities for benefit of the civilian population) of the Health Resources Management Seminar in Kigali. During 27 Jul-1 Aug, six instructors from the Naval Justice School conducted Phase VI (training on trial advocacy for civilian and military prosecutors and investigators) of the Naval Justice Seminar in Kigali for 32 military and civilian prosecutors. Both the Health Resources and Naval Justice School personnel wore service Dress B uniform or BDUs and remained in Kigali. For all training activities in Rwanda, teams did not transfer any equipment to the RPA and re-deployed with all equipment. The two member language lab installation team, after installing the English language laboratory in Kigali, also re-deployed with all its equipment. Total FY97 IMET funded at \$300K. Source of funding: FY97 State Foreign Operations, IMET.

EQUIPMENT SUPPORT TO THE RPA: In support of the humanitarian demining program, DoD provided demining equipment, medical supplies, off-the-shelf communications equipment and other support materials to the NDO. Equipment was used at the NDO and in support of humanitarian demining training of RPA humanitarian deminers. All equipment was maintained

at the NDO in Kigali. Equipment purchased in support of RONCO operations, the DoD demining contractor, was transferred to the DoD Humanitarian Assistance program for use at the NDO. Source of funding: DoD O&M (OHDACA-Demining). As noted above, FY97 State Foreign Operations/IMET funded acquisition of English language laboratory instructional materials and a 10-position lab add-on.

TAB 3

US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA, 1994 - PRESENT

(as of 19 August 1997)

Activity/Operation	Dates	Nbr Pers	Unit	Description of Activity/Operation
FY 1994				
E-IMET Training	17 - 21 Jan 94	4	NJS	Naval Justice Seminar, Phase III
Embassy Support	29 Jul - 10 Aug 94	2	3 SFG	Commo support to re-open U.S. Embassy
"	29 Jul - 10 Aug 04	2	DoD/State	Liaison Officers to assist Ambassador
Oper'n Support Hope - Kigali Air-Log Hub	14 Jul - 30 Sep 94 30 Jul - 30 Sep 94	2100 about 200	various various	Support to humanitarian relief operations CMOC, TALCE, security detachment staff & logistics personnel
FY 1995				
Humanitarian Demining	22 Jan - 10 Feb 95	1	3 SFGA	Interagency Assessment team visit
	"	1	96 CA BN	Interagency Assessment team visit
	"	1	6 POB	Interagency Assessment team visit
Humanitarian Demin	18 Feb - 4 Mar 95	4	SOCEUR	EUCOM Integrated Site Survey
Humanitarian Demining	27 Apr - 6 May 95	2	3 SFG	SFG Team Pre-Deployment Site Survey
	27 Apr - 6 May 95	7	SOCEUR	EUCOM Equip Demining Survey
Humanitarian Demining	14 - 24 May 95	1	96 CA BN	Pre-Deployment Site Survey
	14 - 24 May 95	2	6 POB	Pre-Deployment Site Survey
	14 - 24 May 95	1	3 SFG	Demining Liaison NCO to US Embassy
Humanitarian Demining	18 Jul - 30 Sep 95	3	96 CA BN	Establish NDO
		15	6 POB	Mine Awareness products
		17	3 SFG	Demining training for NDO personnel
E-IMET Training	11 - 15 Sep 95	4	NJS	Naval Justice Seminar, Phase III
FY 1996				
Humanitarian Demining	15 - 27 Jan 96	2	SOCEUR	Demining coordination visit
E-IMET Training	29 Apr - 3 May 96	5	NJS	Naval Justice Seminar, Phase IV
General Officer Visit	24 - 25 Apr 1996	10	EUCOM	EUCOM DCINC Visit (General Jamerson)
JCET Falcon Gorilla	10 - 20 May 96	2	3 SFGA	JCET Site/Coordination Survey
"	14 - 17 Jul 96	2	3 SFGA	JCET Advance party coordination
"	17 Jul - 30 Aug 96	9	3 SFGA	JCET Falcon Gorilla
Humanitarian Demining	2 Sep - 5 Oct 96	8	3 SFG	Refresher demining training.
		1	96 CA BN	Plan/implement mine awareness campaign
		1	404 CA	Plan/implement mine awareness campaign
		2	6 POB	Assess previous demining operations
E-IMET Training	6 - 17 Sep 96	4	NJS	Naval Justice Seminar, Phase V

US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA, 1994 - PRESENT

(as of 19 August 1997)

FY 1997				
Civil Affairs MTT	2 Nov - 10 Dec 96	5	96 CA BN	Civil-Military Operations trng; support to JTF Guardian Ass't
Public Info MTT	2 - 27 Nov 96	5	6 POB	Public Information campaign trng; support to JTF Guardian Ass't
Operation Guardian Assistance (JTF-GA)	14 Nov - 27 Dec 96	350 max	Various	Support to humanitarian relief operations; Redeployed 27 Dec 96
- JTF-Forward (Kigali)		25-30 max	Various	JTF-Forward with staff, log, commo, CMOC, JPOTF, public affairs; JTF-Forward terminated ops and departed Kigali on 8 Dec 96
Humanitarian Demin	7 - 20 Dec 96	6	SOCEUR	Demining Coordination Visit
Civil Affairs MTT	15 - 21 Mar 97	4	96 CA BN	Civ-Mil training; RPA operational reqm'ts precluded training
Public Info MTT	15 - 20 Apr 97	3	6 POB	Established and trained Mil Info Platoon
Humanitarian Demining	15 Mar - 2 Sep 97	1	SOCEUR	Demining Liaison NCO to US Embassy
"	28 Mar - 24 May 97	4	3 SFG	NDO staff and skills trng
"	28 Mar - 24 May 97	3	6 POB	Mine awareness training
"	24 Mar - 24 Mar 97	3	96 CA BN	Update NDO data collection center
Humanitarian Demining	21 - 30 Mar 97	3	3 SFG	Demining Site Survey
"	25 May - 14 Jul 97	7	3 SFG	Trained 4th Demining Platoon
"	25 May - 14 July 97	4	EOD	EOD training
General Officer Visit	25-27 May 97	10	EUCOM	EUCOM DCINC Visit (General Jamerson)
E-IMET Training	26 May - 5 Jun 97	2	NPGS	Health Resources Mgmt Seminar, Phases I and IV
JCET Falcon Racer	21 Mar - 1 Apr 97	3	3 SFG	JCET Site/Coordination Survey
"	13 - 15 Jul 97	2	3 SFG	JCET Advanced party coordination
"	15 Jul - 30 Aug 97	7	3 SFG	JCET Falcon Racer
E-IMET Training	27 Jul - 1 Aug 97	4	NJS	Naval Justice Seminar, Phase VI
Humanitarian Demining	20 Aug - 15 Dec 97	1	3 SFG	Demining Liaison NCO to US Embassy

TAB 4

DEMINEING EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1996	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
AMMO, .50 CAL BALL					200	200			
ANTI-HANDLING M-142	338					338			
ANTI-HANDLING M-5	180					180			
BAG, DEMOLITION	43	39	12			94			
BED, CAMP				80		80			
BELT, WEBB					20	20			
BODY ARMOR FRAG M	40		13			53			
BODY ARMOR FRAG S	40		13			53			
BODY ARMOR FRAG XS	40		10			50			
BOOTS, LEATHER				100		100			
BOOTS,HW 7R	30	5	73			108			
BOOTS,HW 8R	30	20	68			118			
BOOTS,HW 9R	30	49	44			123			
BOOTS,HW 10R	30	12	20			62			
BOX, BLASTING CAP			28		20	48			
BROTHER MULTI-FUNCTION				1		1			
BRUSH, PAINT	38					38			
CABLE TELEPHONE DR-8	8	8	12		20	48			
CALIPERS, INSIDE					20	20			
CALIPERS, OUTSIDE					20	20			
CAP, BLASTING INERT	800					800			
CAP, BLASTING M8	200				158	358			
CAP, BLASTING M7	1000				11,872	12872			
CAP, RED BASEBALL	120	50				170			
CASE, ENTRENCHING TOOL					20	20			
CHAIR, CAMP				100		100			
CHARGE DEMO M112	2010				3600	5610			
CHARGE,TNT, 1 lb	1000					1000			
CHARGE,TNT, 1/4 lb	980					980			
CHINSTRAP, HELMET			200			200			
COMPASS, MAG SILVA			5			5			
COMPUTER, BMX LAPTOP	1					1			
COMPUTER, BMX PENTIUM	1					1			
COMPUTER, DELL					2	2			
COMPUTER, GATEWAY		2	2			4			
COMPUTER, TI LAPTOP					2	2			

DEMINEING EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
COMPUTER, LAPTOP					1	1			
COPIER, SHARP	2			1		3			
CORD, 550	4		25			29			
CORD, DETONATING	9000				9000	18000			
CORD, DETONATING INERT	8000					8000			
COTS, MILITARY			14			14			
COVERALLS 42S	60	38	85			181			
COVERALLS 48M	60	36	91			187			
COVERALLS, BLUE				100		100			
CRIMPERS	7	11	8		20	44			
CURTAINS	30					30			
CUTTER, MK 23 MOD 0					54	54			
CUTTER, MK 24 MOD 0					50	50			
CUTTERS, BOLT	12	10	3			25			
CUTTERS, WIRE					20	20			
DEMINEING DOG				18		18			
DESK, DOUBLE DRAWER	1					1			
DESK, SINGLE DRAWER	6					6			
DETECTOR, METAL				15		15			
DETECTOR, MINE PSS-12	39					39			
EAR PLUGS, FOAM			5			5			
FAX MACHINE, BROTHER	2					2			
FILE CABINET 4 DRAWER	1					1			
FILM, X-RAY					10	10			
FLAGS, SURVEY 100/BNDL			100			100			
FLARE TRIP SURFACE	128					128			
FLASHLIGHT, MINI MAG					20	20			
FUSE, BLASTING TIME M700	8000				24,000	32000			
FUZE, TIME INERT	3900					3900			
GENERATOR 27Kva				1		1			
GENERATOR 5Kva				4		4			
GENERATOR, HONDA		2				2			
GPS, ENSIGN TRIMBLE				8		8			
GPS, SCOUT TRIMBLE			8			8			
GPS, TRIMPACK	7					7			
GRENADE, INCEDIARY					54	54			

DEMINEING EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
HELMET GRND L	20	20	3			43			
HELMET GRND M	30		8			38			
HELMET GRND S	40	20	20			80			
HELMET GRND XS	30	14	5			49			
IGNITOR TIME FUZE M80	2100				9900	12000			
KNIFE, DEMOLITION	7	11	6			24			
KNIFE, POCKET	24		45			69			
MACHINE, BLASTING			12			12			
MACHINE, BLASTING MK-1					20	20			
MANUAL/SW ARCVIEW	1					1			
MANUAL/SW DOS 8.2	1					1			
MANUAL/SW MS-OFFICE	1					1			
MANUAL/SW MS-WINDOWS	1					1			
MAP BOARDS	8					8			
MAP, DIGITIZED CD	2					2			
MATTRESS, FOAM				100		100			
MINE BONNETS	500					500			
MIRRORS, INSPECTION					20	20			
MONITOR, 17" SVGA	1					1			
MOSQUITO NETS				150		150			
PLIERS, LINESMAN		11	19		20	50			
PLIERS, NEEDLE NOSE					20	20			
PLOTTER, INKJET HP850C	1					1			
POUCH, EOD TOOL BASIC					20	20			
POWER CONVERTOR, UPS	2			2		4			
PRINTER, LASER BROTHER	1					1			
PRINTER, LASERJET				1		1			
PROBES, MINE	38		19		50	105			
PROTECTION, EYES	120		168			288			
REELING MACHINE RL-39		2	1		20	23			
RIBBON, SURV. YELLOW					50	50			
RIBBON, SURV. BLUE					50	50			
RIBBON, SURV. RED					50	50			
RIBBON, SURV. WHITE					50	50			
SHEARS, METAL		8	30			38			
SHEARS, PRUNING	38	24	9			69			

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
9 % NORM SALINE (BX)			8			8			
0.5% GLUCOSE (BT)				3		3			
0.9% NS 5ML INJ.			4			4			
3X4 NON AD STERILE				1		1			
4X4 NON STERILE			4			4			
50% DEXTROSE INJ.			1			1			
ACE BANDAGE	50		10			60			
ADMINSETS (BX)	20		3			23			
AMOXICILLIN 250MG 100'S			10			10			
AMOXICILLIN 250MG 1000'S				2		2			
AMPI/CLOXICILLIN 10'S				20		20			
AMPICILLIN 500MG 500'S			4			4			
ASA 325MG 50'S	10		30			40			
ASA 500MG 1000'S				2		2			
ATROPINE 1MG INJ.	40					40			
ATROPINE 20ML 4MG/ML			5			5			
AUGMENTIN 250MG 30'S			10			10			
BACITRACIN OPTH	20		15			35			
BACITRACIN TOPICAL			15			15			
BANDAGE SCISSORS	30		15			45			
BASS WOOD SPLINT (BX)				16		16			
BENIDRYL 50MG 1000'S			2			2			
BENIDRYL 50MG/ML INJ.	50		5			55			
BENZOIN TINCTURE (BTL)			1			1			
BISCODYL 5MG 100'S			2			2			
BLNKT,CASUL,LT,WT	40		10			50			
BULB SYRINGE 60CC				1		1			
CATHETERS I.V.	10		7			17			
CATHETERS SCALP				1		1			
CEPECOL X-TRA 648'S			2			2			
CEPHLEXIN 250MG 100'S			10			10			
CHEM. PACKS (COLD)			10			10			
CHEM. PACKS (HOT)				1		1			
CHEST TUBE			3			3			
CIPRO 500MG 100'S			2			2			
CLAIRITHRO. 500MG 60'S				1		1			

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
CLORIQUNE 100MG 100'S				1		1			
CLORIQUNE 40MG INJ.				100		100			
CO-TRIMASOL 480MG 1000'S				1		1			
CO-TRIMASOL 480MG 500S'				3		3			
CONDOMS (BX)				1		1			
COTTON APLICATORS			2			2			
COVER SPOUNGE 4X4				1		1			
CPR BOARD SUPPORT			5			5			
CYCLOBEN. 10MG 100'S				1		1			
CYDEX (GAL)			2			2			
DEPO-MEDROL 1ML INJ.				8		8			
DEXASONE EYE EAR GTT'S				5		5			
DIAL SOAP			1			1			
DIAZIPAM 10MG INJ.				1		1			
DISP. ENVELOPES (DRUG)			1			1			
DISP. LARYNGISCOPE	20		4			24			
THERMOMETER	30		8			38			
DOXYCYCL 100MG 500'S			2			2			
DRESSING 113/4"X113/4"	100		50			150			
DRESSING 4"X7"	300		150			450			
DRESSING 7"X8"	150					150			
DURA TEARS			7			7			
E-MYACIN OPTH			40			40			
E-MYICIN 250MG 100'S			4			4			
E.T. TUBE SZ. 6			1			1			
E.T. TUBE SZ. 7				1		1			
E.T. TUBE SZ. 8			1			1			
EAR PLUGS (BX)			1			1			
EPINEPHRINE 10MG INJ.	20		3			23			
FINGER SPLINTS			1			1			
FLAGYL 250MG 1000'S	12					12			
FLAGYL 250MG 250'S			8			8			
FLEX SUPPORT C-COLLER	30					30			
GLOVES, EXAM (BX)	30		4			34			
GLOVES, SURG SZ. 8 (BX)			2			2			
HANDLE SURG KNIFE	11					11			

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
HIEMLICH VALVE				6		6			
HUMIBID 600MG 100'S				4		4			
IBUPROPHEN 200MG 500'S				1		1			
IBUPROPHEN 400MG 100'S				6		6			
IBUPROPHEN 800MG 500'S			3			3			
INDOMETH 25MG 100'S			1			1			
INSECT REPELENT			12			12			
IODINE IND.			16			16			
IPICAC SYRUP			5			5			
IRRIGATION BASIN (PLASTIC)			20			20			
J-TUBES SIZE 5			2			2			
KO SINGLE DOSE			1			1			
KURLEX			1			1			
LACTATED RINGERS (BX)	24		8			32			
LIGHT, EYE EXAM (BLUE)			10			10			
LINDANE QUELL			18			18			
LITTER	20		10			30			
LOPRIMIDE 2MG 100'S				2		2			
M-3 BAGS			12			12			
M-5 BAGS	20		4			24			
MEPHLOQUINE 250MG 25'S			20			20			
MINOR SURGE CASE	30					30			
MINOR SURGE INST. SETS	30		8			38			
MOLESKIN (BX)				5		5			
MULTI-VIT 100'S			24			24			
MYCELEX TOPICAL			10			10			
N.G. TUBES				6		6			
NDL, HYPO,ASPIR,PNEUMO			1			1			
NEEDLE 18GA. 1 1/2"			2			2			
NEEDLE 20GA. 1 1/2"				3		3			
NEEDLE 21GA. 1 1/4"			6			6			
NEEDLE 23GA. 3/4"			2			2			
NYSTSATIN TOPICAL			40			40			
ORS PACKETS			2			2			
OXEGEN SINGLE USE			9			9			
PEN V w/POT 250MG 100'S			10			10			

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
PEN. VK 250MG 40'S			10			10			
PETROLIUM GAUZE	100		2			102			
PHENERGAN 25MG 25'S			4			4			
POLELESS LITTER				11		11			
PRINCIPEN 250MG 100'S				12		12			
PROVENTIL 17G INHALER			15			15			
QUININE 100MG 1000'S				1		1			
QUININE 300MG 100'S				10		10			
QUININE 600MG INJ.				200		200			
ROBAXIN 500MG 500'S			2			2			
ROBITUSSIN 4OZ			29			29			
ROCEPHIN 250MG INJ.			2			2			
SAM SPLINTS			4			4			
SHARPS CONT.			1			1			
SKEDCO				4		4			
SOLU-CORT. 1ML INJ.			11			11			
SPHIGMOMETER	30		4			34			
STERI STRIP			1			1			
STERILE EAR SOLUTION				5		5			
STERILE IRRIG SOLUTION			1			1			
STERILE WATER 5ML INJ.			2			2			
STETHASCOPE			5			5			
STIFF NECK C-COLLER	9		10			19			
STYLETS				1		1			
SUB-TEMP THERMO				1		1			
SUDO-GEST 60MG 1000'S			2			2			
SULFA/TRIMETH 100'S			5			5			
SUNBLOCK				5		5			
SURGICAL MASKS				2		2			
SURGICAL SCRUB IODINE			5			5			
SUTURES 000 UNARMED				1		1			
SUTURES 3-0 UNARMED			1			1			
SUTURES 3-0 ARMED	5		1			6			
SUTURES 4-0 ARMED			1			1			
SUTURES 5-0 ARMED			1			1			
SYLVADINE TOPICAL			11			11			

COMMO EQUIPMENT

ITEM	1995	1996	1997	RONCO	EOD	TOTAL	ONHAND	OPERATIONAL	REQUESTED
Antenna, 3dB Gain VHF	2		4			6			
Antenna, Portable	30		20			50			
Battery GP300	30		20			50			
Box, Cloning	1		2			3			
Box, Rib	1		2			3			
Bracket, Side Arm	2		4			6			
Cable, Links 25'	25		4			29			
Cable, Andrew	200		400			600			
Cable, Computer interface	1		2			3			
Cable, Maxtrac Program	1		2			3			
Cable, MSF5000 Program	1		2			3			
Case, Nylon	30		20			50			
Charger, Single Unit Rapid	4		3	10		17			
Cable Links 50'	25		4			29			
Connectors For N- Female	7		16			23			
Control Station, Maxtrac	2		4			6			
Control Station Mag. Mount	2		4			6			
Diagnostic, MSF5000	2		4			6			
Duplexer, High Band	2		4			6			
Handset, MSF5000 Test	2		4			6			
High Band Range Oper.	2		4			6			
Manuel, MSF5000 service	2		4			6			
Manuel, Operallons	2		2			4			
Manuel, Service	2		2			4			
Microphone, Desk Paddle	2		4			6			
Motorola GP300	30		20			50			
Polyphaser IS-B50LN-CZ-MA	2		4			6			
Power Supply Option	2		4			6			
Power Supply Newmar	2		4			6			
Connectors For N-Male	7		16			23			
Repeater, MSF5000	2		4			6			
Software, GP300	1		1			2			
Software, Maxtrac	1		1			2			
Software, MSF5000	1		1			2			
Surge Protector 220	2		4			6			
Surge Protector Trip Light	2		4			6			

