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# JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (JSOP)

for

FY 1970 - 1974, PARTS I-V (U)

The provisions of JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 74 are applicable to this document. Accordingly, a semi-annual report as of 1 January and 1 July, of the sighting of this document is required and will be forwarded within 30 days after the "as of" date to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff (ATTENTION: Chief, Documents Division)

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 20301, D.C.

(JSOP-70)  
Parts I-V

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(JSOP-70) (U)

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\* To be published and forwarded separately.

JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN FOR  
FY 1970 - 1974 (JSOP-70) (U)

PART I - PURPOSE

1. Time Period. This Plan covers the mid-range period begin- 1  
ning on 1 July 1969 (M-Day) and extends for five years there- 2  
after. 3

2. Purpose. The purpose of the Joint Strategic Objectives 4  
Plan for FY 1970-1974 (JSOP-70) is to translate national 5  
objectives and policies into military objectives, to prescribe 6  
strategic concepts for the employment of forces, to define basic 7  
undertakings to achieve these objectives and concepts, and to 8  
provide: 9

a. Information to commanders of unified and specified 10  
commands, and planning and program guidance to the military 11  
services, for the mid-range period under conditions of cold, 12  
limited, and general war. 13

b. The Secretary of Defense with military advice 14  
for the development of the FY 1967 budget, justification for 15  
departmental FY 1967 program objectives as they pertain to 16  
major combatant forces, and a reassessment of military 17  
aspects of the previously approved annual increment of 18  
the Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and 19  
Financial Program. 20

c. Intelligence estimates of potential enemy capabil- 21  
ities, including capabilities of communist satellite 22  
countries, and estimates of future force levels of 23  
selected Free World countries, for use in the development 24

of military strategy for the attainment of national objectives during the mid-range period; and planning guidance which will provide a basis for the development and accomplishment of intelligence support commensurate with planning, operational, and strategic concepts.

d. Logistic planning guidance as a basis for the development of Service logistic plans and programs to support JSOP objective force levels.

e. General nuclear weapon planning guidance and nuclear weapons damage considerations.

f. Planning guidance for the conduct of counter-insurgency, unconventional, and psychological warfare.

g. Planning guidance for the development, control, and use of chemical, biological, and radiological materials.

h. Planning guidance for the development of requirements for appropriate maps, charts, and geodetic analyses.

i. Communications and electronics planning guidance to support the strategy and basic undertakings of the plan.

j. An estimate of strategically desirable and reasonably attainable force objectives for Free World allied countries as the military basis for the establishment of a US position with respect to military assistance, and for the development and review of NATO and other allied mid-range plans; and a military estimate of the minimum country forces (Force Guidelines) to achieve US objectives in nonaligned Free World countries.

k. Advice and assistance on research and development matters by preparing statements of:

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- (1) Broad strategic guidance to be used in the preparation of an integrated Department of Defense program; 1
- (2) Broad military capabilities desired; and 2
- (3) The military importance of these development activities which are essential to support the strategic concept, the military objectives, and the needs of the commanders of unified and specified commands. 3
- l. Planning guidance for command and control systems in support of military operations and administration. 4
- m. Planning guidance for development and employment of space systems in support of military objectives, strategy, and basic undertakings. 5

PART II - STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

1. General. This appraisal summarizes the world situation likely to affect warfare, military strategies, and the global balance of military power from the present through FY 1974. It contains a brief analysis of the communist threat and probable trends in the world situation which affect the security, objectives, and stability of the United States and other Free World nations. More detailed information is contained in the Intelligence Annex (Annex A). While advances in science and technology will continue to affect the development of weapons and conduct of warfare during the period, the major powers and other technologically advanced nations will continue efforts to reduce their vulnerability to attack, to protect and improve their military forces, and to improve their relative technological, political, and economic postures. For factors influencing specific technological developments during the period of the plan, see appropriate annexes.

2. Development of the World Situation.

a. The world situation will continue to be influenced by (1) the struggle between communist nations on the one hand and the free societies and other nations who share similar interests on the other; (2) the struggle of newly emergent and underdeveloped nations for self-determination, increased international status and influence, and a greater share of the world's material wealth; (3) the conflicts of interests and traditional rivalries between nations and ethnic groups; (4) the internal struggles

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within Free World nations which tend to move them away 1  
 from Free World orientation; and (5) varying degrees of 2  
 discord. 3

b. The Soviet Bloc will increase pressures on the 4  
 Free World as opportunities present themselves, and will 5  
 relax pressures when it is to its advantage to do so. 6  
 Any signs of US or Allied weakness in critical situations 7  
 will intensify Soviet tactics aimed at achieving advantages; 8  
 the employment of communist military power will remain a 9  
 constant threat. The Asian communists will seize every 10  
 opportunity to undermine US standing; when they judge 11  
 that circumstances permit, and attendant risks are ac- 12  
 ceptable, they will supplement political warfare with 13  
 organized and externally directed and supported guerrilla 14  
 action by indigenous forces, as well as by higher intensity 15  
 military action. Communist China and the Soviet Union, 16  
 individually and possibly in concert, will continue to 17  
 instigate and support what they term "wars of liberation," 18  
 with the aim of weakening the position of the West and 19  
 establishing communist-oriented governments. Means used to 20  
 support dissidents will probably range from political and 21  
 economic assistance to providing military equipment, training, 22  
 and advisors. Other communist nations and communist parties 23  
 in the Free World nations, with the support and encourage- 24  
 ment of the Soviet Union and/or Communist China, will 25  
 attempt increasingly to embarrass and harass the United 26  
 States and nations of the Western Alliance. The Soviet 27  
 and CHICOM estimates of relative US-Soviet-Communist 28  
 Chinese strength and their evaluation of Western 29  
 reactions to Sino or Soviet probes will be equally 30

important to their decision as to the courses of action 1  
to pursue. 2  
c. Both the Soviet Union and the United States can be 3  
expected to continue their advocacy of general and 4  
complete disarmament, but basic differences will continue 5  
to block any substantive agreement. Disarmament conferences, 6  
along the lines of the current Eighteen Nation Disarmament 7  
Conference, will in all probability continue. Recognizing 8  
that agreement on a comprehensive general and complete 9  
disarmament treaty cannot be achieved in the foreseeable 10  
future, both East and West are expected to continue to seek 11  
agreement on separable, more limited measures following the 12  
precedent established by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 13  
"Hot Line" Agreement, and the UN resolution prohibiting the 14  
orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in space. A major 15  
bar to the adoption of substantive proposals has been the 16  
unwillingness of the USSR to agree to adequate verification 17  
measures necessitating inspection on or over Soviet territory. 18  
There is little possibility that the USSR's position on 19  
verification will make possible major disarmament agreements 20  
during the period of this plan. A basic objective of Soviet 21  
disarmament policy has been, and is expected to continue to 22  
be, elimination of the nuclear threat at the outset of 23  
disarmament without materially reducing the preponderant 24  
conventional capability of the USSR. As long as the Soviets 25  
hold to this position, any substantive disarmament agreement 26  
would be possible only at the expense of United States 27  
nuclear superiority. Unilateral measures coincident with 28

fulfillment of military requirements or budgetary considerations are expected to be announced by both sides from time to time for their political impact as steps toward peace, and in the hope that the announcement will stimulate a similar response by the other side. Such measures might include shut-down of fissionable material production, destruction of obsolescent equipment, and total or selected cessation of weapon system production. Each side may seek propaganda advantages by selecting measures which the other side will find politically difficult or undesirable to implement. The pace, nature, and scope of arms control and disarmament measures during the period will be dependent largely upon the economic burden of armaments, concern over stability of the world balance of power, emergence of nuclear capable third powers, and the mutual desire to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. In any case, it is possible that - in order both to achieve stabilization and to meet world pressures for reducing the danger of war - the two sides will undertake tacit agreements resulting in some degree of arms limitation.

d. During the period of this plan the neutralists will fall into different degrees of neutrality and on many issues will tend to have conflicting positions among themselves. Nevertheless, the aggregate effect of neutralism favors the communists because the latent fear of the aggressive policies of the communist nations leads neutralists to condone communist actions which they would condemn in the West.

It is probable that the period will be marked by an  
intense East-West struggle to attain degrees of influence  
over the neutralists. Thus neutralism frequently will  
prolong existing tensions or create new ones. If the  
present trend toward neutralism of some nations which  
are currently western oriented is not reversed, it will  
become so strong that during the period of this plan it  
may draw some nations away from the West. This develop-  
ment might come about through revolutions in countries  
such as Iran or South Vietnam with seizure of power by  
neutralist forces, through decisions by existing regimes  
in quest of the supposed benefits of neutralism, or  
through loss of confidence in the ability and/or willing-  
ness of the United States to support them and safeguard  
their sovereignties. The neutralist posture of some of  
these countries may produce serious security problems for  
the United States. Aside from the possibility of their  
withdrawing from Western alliances and of their efforts  
to balance Western with Soviet or Chinese influence,  
there will be continual pressures imposed on the United  
States for economic aid and political support; denuncia-  
tions of colonialism; concessions on disarmament; and  
withdrawal from positions of predominance or influence.  
Pure neutralism, as a principle, is fundamentally incom-  
patible with the Soviet objective of complete world  
domination. Nevertheless, neutralism will provide the  
communists with greater opportunities for penetration  
and subversion. Particularly in the new states, the  
communists will energetically foster neutralist leanings  
and seize upon rivalries among nations and tribes, upon  
the need for economic and technical aid, and upon the  
naivete and weaknesses of inexperienced leaders. They

will thus increasingly attempt to capitalize on the fact 1  
 that when a previously pro-West nation becomes neutralist, 2  
 it symbolizes a defeat for the West. This provides the 3.  
 communists with more direct opportunities to subject 4  
 these neutralist nations to new pressures and inducements. 5

e. Khrushchev, Mao Tse-Tung, de Gaulle, Chiang-kai-Shek, 6  
 Ho Chi Minh, Franco, Salazar, and Tito are all in their 7  
 70's. The personality of each one plays an exceedingly 8  
 important role in the policy formulation of the government 9  
 which he leads. It can be conservatively assumed that 10  
 by 1976 at least half of these leaders will have disappeared 11  
 from the world scene, and others may no longer be involved 12  
 in the effective control of the government in their nation. 13  
 In each country there are elements desirous of changing 14  
 the patterns of governmental authority. Thus, the departure 15  
 or fall from power of these leaders may be marked by 16  
 internal struggles for power, adjustments in national 17  
 objectives and tactics, and changes in international 18  
 relations. 19

f. Newly emergent nations will continue to be character- 20  
 ized by extreme nationalism, internal dissension, instability 21  
 in political and economic institutions, and a tendency to 22  
 concentrate disproportionately on external affairs to 23  
 assert their independence and bid for world status. 24  
 Political, military, social, and economic vulnerabilities 25  
 will offer the communists opportunities, at relatively 26  
 minor risk, for supporting subversive insurgency, for 27  
 political, psychological and economic exploitation, 28  
 including restrictive trade agreements, and for the supply 29  
 of arms and technicians. It is expected that many new 30

nations will identify themselves with "revolutionary" 1  
 and "anti-imperialistic" causes. However, Free World 2  
 assistance, disenchantment with Soviet and CHICOM forms 3  
 of assistance, and the political, economic, military and 4  
 cultural ties between former colonial powers and 5  
 their former colonies will tend to counter communist 6  
 efforts. Success of Western efforts to prevent a com- 7  
 munist alignment among these new nations will depend 8  
 largely upon the methods, resoluteness, and initiative 9  
 displayed by Free World nations in combating communist 10  
 subversion and persuasion. Full communist control of a 11  
 nation, once established, is unlikely to end except 12  
 through introduction of outside military assistance or 13  
 forces. The communists will continue to employ threats 14  
 and alternating belligerency and tractability in the 15  
 attempt to gain advantage. They will continue to use 16  
 to their advantage the United Nations Organization and 17  
 impede peacekeeping arrangements, unless it serves their 18  
 purposes to do otherwise. 19

g. The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably continue to 20  
 have its ups and downs, and in certain circumstances 21  
 relations between the two states might improve considerably. 22  
 However, the rift is so deep and the national interest of 23  
 each party so heavily engaged that there is now virtually 24  
 no chance of reconciliation under the present leaders. 25  
 The international movement may now be on the eve of a 26  
 formal split, but whether or not this step is taken, the 27  
 bitter struggle for control and influence over the 28

Communist parties will continue. Further tension in 1  
state relations between China and the USSR also seems 2  
likely, especially on the common frontier. The demise of 3  
either or both of the present leaders would offer some 4  
prospect of temporary amelioration of the dispute, but 5  
it is believed that the fundamental differences between 6  
the two powers would remain. 7

h. The international communist movement as a whole is 8  
likely to be characterized by increased dispersion of 9  
authority and by more independent conduct by various 10  
parties. Although Soviet power remains a major factor 11  
in Eastern Europe, further manifestations of autonomous 12  
and nationalist behavior will probably occur. Among 13  
world-wide communist parties a trend toward regionalism 14  
is foreseen in the Far East, and perhaps in 15  
Western Europe and Latin America. The Sino-Soviet 16  
competition for influence will in some cases lead to 17  
further splits within individual parties. At the same 18  
time the USSR and Communist China will remain powerful 19  
sources of material support for their respective followers, 20  
and will retain considerable operational influence. For 21  
the noncommunist world this situation offers important 22  
advantages and some dangers. The assertion of divergent 23  
national interests by communist powers offers an oppor- 24  
tunity for the West to deal profitably with some of them 25  
individually. The Sino-Soviet conflict increasingly is 26  
absorbing the energies of the USSR and Communist China and 27  
diverting them from sharp contentions with the major Western 28  
powers. Among the non-governing communist parties, a few 29  
have already suffered severe setbacks as a result of the 30  
conflict. On the other hand, some communist parties will 31

become more effective and will gain greater freedom of 1  
 action and respectability because of their more independent 2  
 status. While in some countries the parties will tend 3  
 to lose their rationale and elan, in others they will 4  
 probably emerge as more formidable revolutionary organiza- 5  
 tions, though more national than international in character. 6  
 Regardless of internal quarrels, Communists will retain 7  
 an underlying enmity toward the West if only because their 8  
 convictions are in so many respects incompatible with 19  
 traditional Western concepts of political and economic 11  
 life. 12

i. Technological and scientific advancement is expected 13  
 to continue at a rapid pace within the Soviet Union. 14  
 Soviet propaganda will capitalize on any success, such as 15  
 those in space, and will cite any significant advance 16  
 as proof of the superiority of the communist system. 17

j. In economic strength, the United States is presently 18  
 well ahead of other countries. The Common Market area 19  
 and Japan will continue to show impressive economic gains 20  
 although some slowing of the rate of economic growth is 21  
 expected. The quality, diversity and technological level 22  
 of production in Communist China, although improving, will 23  
 remain considerably below that of Japan, the USSR and the 24  
 industrial nations of the West. Soviet Bloc policy will 25  
 continue to emphasize growth and expansion of the bases 26  
 of national power. Bloc economic planning will include 27  
 continued maintenance of great military strength, con- 28  
 tinued efforts to enlarge its penetration of world markets, 29  
 and expansion of trade and aid programs to selected under- 30  
 developed countries and prospective satellites. 31

k. The socio-politico-economic bases of the USSR and Communist China will continue to contain inherent though slow-acting weaknesses potentially vulnerable to exploitation by the United States and its allies.

1. The period under review may witness various changes directly influencing the future of NATO. Critics of NATO will be increasingly active, seeking and examining alternatives to the present concepts, organization, and power relationships in the Alliance. New national leaders will undoubtedly emerge, perhaps bringing new policies and proposals. Future developments within the Common Market (EEC) will have implications for NATO. Such questions as independent nuclear capability and nuclear sharing are issues which will present complex problems within the Alliance. France can be expected to continue to press forward her concepts of regional groupings of "independent national forces," while nevertheless continuing assurances of wartime support of the Alliance. West Germany is likely to continue her efforts to establish bilateral, logistical and other arrangements with various nations, and may seek to reduce remaining treaty restrictions on armaments imposed by the Western European Union (WEU). Problems of defense arising out of member-nations' military commitments outside of the NATO area may place a strain on NATO's force levels. Individual nations will no doubt exercise an increased freedom of action and there may be changes in the present NATO Treaty arrangements. Within the NATO area, current trends suggest the development of European policies less responsive to US leadership.

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Similarly, there may be criticisms or agitation for changes 1  
 in other Alliances of which the United States is a member. 2  
 The continuing strength and cohesion of US military 3  
 alliances will depend to a large degree upon the ability 4  
 of the United States to recognize and cope with the divisive 5  
 forces threatening our mutual security arrangements. 6

m. Yugoslavia will continue to take positions on many 7  
 matters which coincide with those of the USSR and which 8  
 give considerable support to the Bloc; it will not abandon 9  
 its basic policy of nonalignment. Yugoslavia is unlikely 10  
 to become a member of the Warsaw Pact and would probably 11  
 seek to remain nonbelligerent in any East-West confrontation. 12

n. Sweden and Finland are expected to maintain their 13  
 present nonalignment. Spain, while continuing to desire 14  
 closer ties with NATO, will be preoccupied with internal 15  
 problems, particularly with regard to raising the level 16  
 of its economy. 17

o. Trends. There are certain discernible world trends 18  
 affecting the development of strategy. Although the 19  
 evolution of these trends cannot be predicted with pre- 20  
 cision, the United States must be aware of them and give 21  
 them appropriate consideration. Among these trends are 22  
 the following: 23

---

(1) Many independent actions by current allies and 24  
 newly emerging nations may induce modifications to 25  
 Western policies and posture. Changes in the communist 26  
 policies and power alignments may have equal and 27  
 probably greater impact on the world situation. The 28  
 Soviet and Chinese Communist split will probably continue, 29  
 and the European satellites will continue to have a greater 30  
 measure of latitude in their own management. The Mao Tse 31  
 Tung-Ho Chi Minh-Che Guevara concepts of the "wars of 32  
 national liberation" will continue to be exploited in 33  
 rural peasant societies all over the world. In Cuba, in 34  
 North Vietnam, in Algeria, this concept has been success- 35  
 ful. In many countries in Latin America, Africa, and in 36  
 Southeast Asia, the Communists can be expected to continue 37  
 their efforts. 38

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(2) There will be continuing pressure towards neutrali- 1  
zation in Southeast Asia, which, should it occur, would 2  
present an inevitable opportunity for Communist acquisi- 3  
tion of power in that part of the world. 4

(3) Control of world events probably will become more 5  
diffused with a proliferation of centers of influence, 6  
with possible unexpected turns. Cuba will continue to be 7  
a Latin American political influence, even though mili- 8  
tarily confined and economically weak. France, Communist 9  
China, and Egypt will continue to exert influence in 10  
their respective spheres. Africans are groping toward 11  
some kind of cohesiveness, and, if successful, may exert 12  
some common influence on world issues. 13

(4) The rate of development during the period of this 14  
plan of the latent power potential of India and Communist 15  
China and their relationships with Japan will be critical 16  
factors in the future of Asia. If these states grow in 17  
influence in relation to their potential, and, although 18  
unlikely, if either or both achieve an economic and poli- 19  
tical accommodation with Japan, Asia may develop an inter- 20  
national political system that is less dependent on the 21  
West. The relative influence of the United States and 22  
the USSR may thus increase correspondingly. 23

(5) The shift to polycentrism will be at the tolerance 24  
of the United States and the USSR. The world power struc- 25  
ture may contain several centers of political power, but 26  
at the same time will remain largely bipolar in terms of 27  
military power. Many of these new, and militarily weak, 28  
centers of influence will be vulnerable to internal com- 29  
munist subversion or internal instability. 30

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(6) The nature of the communist threat has altered; 1  
 it is now becoming more diffused and world-wide. Con- 2  
 tinued failure of some Allies to meet force goals, the 3  
 inability to reach agreement on new strategic concepts, 4  
 and the trend toward national control of forces, are 5  
 significant indications that the current NATO military 6  
 concept will continue to have diminished acceptability. 7  
 US military concepts should take into account: 8

(a) the increased European potential to defend 9  
 itself conventionally and to support European interests 10  
 world-wide when these are threatened; 11

(b) the continued European reliance on the US 12  
 nuclear arsenal along with the lesser capabilities 13  
 of Great Britain and France; and 14

(c) the continued reliance on the cohesive common 15  
 link of maritime communications. 16

(7) The emergence of new nations and the rehabilita- 17  
 tion of old ones, all with a high emotional content of 18  
 nationalism, probably will mean a continuation rather 19  
 than a diminishment of US overseas base problems. 20  
 Exceptions to this would include such places where 21  
 the continued presence of US forces is needed to serve 22  
 the national interests of the countries concerned or 23  
 of the governments now in power in those countries. 24  
 An overseas base will be tolerable to the host country 25  
 only to the extent that the interests of the host and 26  
 tenant coincide. 27

(8) As the power structure of the world moves from 28  
 bipolarity to polycentrism, the interests of the many 29  
 nations around the world may diverge. The basic problems 30  
 will be political and ideological and often overlain with 31  
 national ego and emotion. In this environment, it would 32

appear that the US military apparatus should be able to 1  
 meet the full spectrum of possibilities with a strategy 2  
 of flexible response. 3

3. Regional Appraisal. 4

a. General. It can be expected that communist policies 5  
 and actions will be marked by subversion and opportunism. 6  
 Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders undoubtedly will 7  
 continue to seek, instigate and support new developments 8  
 favorable to their interests, particularly in Africa, 9  
 Latin America, SE Asia, and the Middle East. Both Communist 10  
 China and the Soviet Union will continue to compete in 11  
 establishing a strong influence in Africa, in stimulating 12  
 and exploiting leftist and revolutionary movements in 13  
 Latin America, and in encouraging the growth of a radical 14  
 anti-American mass movement in Japan and elsewhere as 15  
 expediency dictates. The USSR and Communist China will 16  
 use forms of enticement and pressure which they consider 17  
 advantageous and appropriate to a particular time and 18  
 circumstance. These pressures will include political, 19  
 diplomatic, cultural and economic initiatives as well as 20  
 propaganda and the threat of military action. Both the 21  
 Soviets and the Chinese Communists will continue to drive 22  
 aggressively for the control of peoples and areas through 23  
 subversion and infiltration to capture and exploit local 24  
 movements and issues. Above all, the Soviets intend to 25  
 build up their national base of power and their "great 26  
 nation" image in the belief that they can improve their 27  
 over-all position. 28

b. European Area. The Soviet Bloc is expected to con- 29  
 tinue to take actions designed to improve their over-all 30  
 military posture, intimidate and divide the West. They 31  
 will seek to: 32

- (1) confirm the division of Germany; 1
  - (2) consolidate communist rule in Eastern Europe; 2
  - (3) gain Western acceptance of the permanence and 3  
legitimacy of communist regimes; 4
  - (4) limit the resurgence of West Germany as a potent 5  
military power; 6
  - (5) bring about the withdrawal of US military power; 7
  - (6) discourage increases in allied military capability; 8
  - (7) frustrate NATO nuclear arrangements and prevent 9  
the further proliferation of allied nuclear capability; 10
  - (8) reduce the credibility of the allied response 11  
in critical situations; 12
  - (9) weaken and bring about the dissolution of NATO; 13  
and 14
  - (10) increase the political participation of communist 15  
parties in the national political life of some Western 16  
European countries. 17
- c. Middle East. The prime objective of the USSR is to 18  
expand Soviet Bloc influence in the Middle East in order 19  
to exercise control of the area. To achieve this objective 20  
attempts will be made to: 21
- (1) Eliminate important western positions and 22  
influence in the area; and, deny the Middle East and its 23  
resources to the West; 24
  - (2) Dissolve CENTO; 25
  - (3) Exploit the Arab nationalist movement to their 26  
advantage; 27
  - (4) Obtain access to Africa through the Middle East; and 28
  - (5) Control strategically important communications 29  
routes in the area. 30
- The Soviet Union will continue to face setbacks in attempting 31  
to achieve their objectives in the area and will remain 32

1 alert for diplomatic moves or local communist action arising  
 2 from the intricate political rivalries in the area. The  
 3 Soviets will be willing to assist the UAR to achieve those  
 4 objectives common to both countries including resist-  
 5 ance to presence of US and UK in the Middle East. The  
 6 UAR can be expected to continue its drive for Arab unity  
 7 under its leadership. It is believed that Communist China  
 8 will not achieve a significant position in the area within  
 9 the mid-range period.

10 d. Africa. The Soviet Union and Communist China will  
 11 continue to develop economic, cultural, and diplomatic  
 12 relations with African nations, seeking to penetrate and  
 13 subvert their political structure and influence their  
 14 alignment.

15 (1) Frustration of the Communist objectives of  
 16 developing socialist states aligned with the Soviet  
 17 Union or Communist China, and the creation of demo-  
 18 cratic political institutions supported by a viable,  
 19 free enterprise economy will be a most difficult  
 20 struggle. If this goal is to be attained, it will be  
 21 due to a program of helpful guidance and material  
 22 support from various western powers extending some of  
 23 the traditional influence of the former colonial regimes  
 24 which have engendered a loyalty to the West and an  
 25 aversion to Communist dictatorial schemes.

26 (2) Most of the independent states of Africa have to  
 27 a degree been penetrated by communist movements or  
 28 agents. In those countries disrupted by internal strife  
 29 such as the two Congos and Sudan, and in those states  
 30 disrupted by hostilities with their neighbors such as  
 31 Somalia and Algeria, Communist inroads have been

substantial. In newly emerging states and those dominated 1  
 by over-eager dictators, such as those in Guinea and 2  
 Ghana, communists have been invited into positions of 3  
 authority or influence. 4

(3) The blandishments of the Soviets and Chinese 5  
 communists will undoubtedly be effective in many African 6  
 states in the future, particularly as independence is 7  
 observed to carry more responsibilities and fewer 8  
 benefits than anticipated. Communist cadres and agents 9  
 now exist in North, West, Central and East Africa and 10  
 their influence and success in individual countries will 11  
 continue during the mid-range period. Communist penetra- 12  
 tion within the area will be enhanced through the 13  
 training of revolutionary leaders in Communist China 14  
 and the Soviet Union. 15

e. Asia and the Far East 16

(1) Despite Sino-Soviet rivalry, the USSR and Com- 17  
 munist China are expected to continue their efforts to 18  
 supplant Western influence in Asia and undermine the 19  
 government and politico-economic institutions of non- 20  
 communist or neutral Asian nations. Efforts of the 21  
 communists to denigrate the effectiveness and to bring 22  
 about the dissolution of SEATO will continue. Communist 23  
 China will continue efforts to achieve recognition as 24  
 a major world power and the dominant power in Asia. In 25  
 contrast, Asian national leaders probably will be more 26  
 reluctant to assume a strong stand in opposition to 27  
 Communist China unless they have guarantees of swift, 28  
 successful and unequivocal Western protection. Even 29  
 with such guarantees, however, the countries of SE Asia 30

will be strongly influenced by their appraisal of the 1  
 actual circumstances in which the loss of any territory 2  
 in SE Asia to the communists might occur, particularly 3  
 with respect to the attitude and actions of the United 4  
 States. 5

(2) Indonesia probably will attempt to maintain a 6  
 neutralist position and seek a balance in relations 7  
 with major communist and non-communist nations. 8  
 Indonesia will continue to use available means to 9  
 achieve hegemony over additional island territory in 10  
 the area, particularly Portuguese Timor and Malaysian 11  
 Borneo, while simultaneously attempting to spread her 12  
 influence in SE Asia. Indonesia will continue to rely 13  
 on the USSR for substantial military assistance and 14  
 aid and on opportune arrangements with Western or with 15  
 other communist nations. In view of growing Indonesian 16  
 economic difficulties, it cannot be ruled out that 17  
 Sukarno may elect to precipitate an external involve- 18  
 ment to avoid internal crises which might topple his 19  
 regime and upset the Indonesian communist and non- 20  
 communist political groupings. 21

(3) The Soviets desire to build up good will and 22  
 enhance Soviet prestige in India against the time when 23  
 prospects for communist acquisition of power are con- 24  
 siderably improved. While India appears determined to 25  
 check Chinese expansion in the Northern border areas, she 26  
 remains more preoccupied with Pakistan. The Indians, 27  
 while accepting US and British assistance, are unlikely 28  
 to invite direct US or UK military presence in the area 29  
 unless there is a renewal of hostilities in the Sino- 30  
 Indian border region. 31

(4) Prospects for settlement of the India/Pakistan Kashmir dispute, while increasing slightly since Nehru's death, remain dim. A by-product of this dispute and of the general Indo-Pakistani hostility could have far-reaching effects in spheres of immediate US interests. The prospect of continuing US/UK military aid to India has caused strong resentment in Pakistan. To counter both the presumed threat from India and the perennial danger of pressure from the USSR, Pakistan probably will continue to improve her relations with Communist China. It is doubtful, however, that Pakistan will go so far as to withdraw from SEATO or CENTO despite her threats to do so.

(5) The USSR's political relations with Japan are likely to remain at an impasse. The USSR will continue to reject Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles and to insist upon abrogation of the defense treaty with the United States as a precondition for normalizing Soviet/Japanese relations with a peace treaty. The USSR would probably relax somewhat its present unyielding position, however, if it detected in Tokyo signs of a willingness to loosen ties with the United States.

(6) The communists desire to establish control in Laos and South Vietnam at an early date. The USSR is not disposed to make heavy sacrifice or to jeopardize other objectives vis-a-vis the West in order to make immediate advances in an area which is of more direct concern to North Vietnam and Communist China. The USSR is likely, therefore, to refrain from military actions and seek to avoid a US/USSR confrontation rather than accept the risks involved in a substantial effort to

sustain the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong. The threat of 1  
large-scale intervention by CHICOM military forces will 2  
continue behind the communists' activities in this area 3  
as well as in Korea. Communist infiltration, subversion, 4  
support and control of so-called "wars of national 5  
liberation" in SE Asia could increase. The CHICOMs 6  
are not likely, however, to resort to direct intervention 7  
as long as they calculate that their ends can be 8  
achieved through means short of overt war. They will 9  
not hesitate, as illustrated by their actions in Tibet 10  
and on the Sino-Indian border, to resort to overt 11  
military action when they believe it is necessary and 12  
when in their opinion the risk of military confrontation 13  
with the United States is low. Effective action to 14  
halt infiltration, insurgency and subversion will 15  
continue to be an urgent requirement. While military 16  
limitations and concern over retaliation by the United 17  
States will deter Communist China from attempting a 18  
military conquest of Taiwan, they could undertake 19  
certain limited military action in the Taiwan Straits 20  
area to test Nationalist Chinese defenses and to probe 21  
US determination. 22

f. Latin America 23

(1) Latin America will continue to be a primary 24  
target for Soviet and ChiCom penetration. Their 25  
efforts will almost certainly intensify during the 26  
period, and they will continue to push their campaign to: 27

(a) Isolate the United States from its traditional 28  
allies; 29

- (b) Nullify hemispheric unity; 1
  - (c) Infiltrate and subvert vulnerable countries; 2
  - (d) Strengthen and exploit their present foothold 3
- in Latin America. 4

(2) The Soviets and ChiComs will continue to use 5  
 Cuba as a base from which to expand communist influence 6  
 further into the Western Hemisphere and as a significant 7  
 factor in world-wide negotiations. Cuba will be closely 8  
 watched by Latin American and other nations as a measure 9  
 of the relative strength and resolution of the United 10  
 States and the Soviet Union. Periodic crises will 11  
 almost certainly continue to occur in Latin America 12  
 throughout the period. For the most part, based on the 13  
 assumption of continued US support, the area will 14  
 almost certainly remain US-oriented, although in the 15  
 face of internal and external Communist pressures, 16  
 some nations can be expected to adopt an increasingly 17  
 independent position. In addition to the already 18  
 established Cuban communist government, the coming to 19  
 power of a communist government by one or more of the 20  
 Latin American republics during this time frame is 21  
 possible. In this precarious political situation, the 22  
 communists will seek advantage in whatever promising 23  
 revolutionary developments occur. 24

4. The Soviet Bloc Threat 25
- a. General. While striving to improve Soviet Bloc 26  
 security, especially that of the USSR, the Soviet rulers 27  
 will attempt to advance toward their over-all objective 28  
 of achieving a communist world under Soviet leadership. 29

b. Soviet Economic Problems and Outlook 1

(1) A number of serious long-run problems in the 2  
 Soviet economy have recently reached an acute stage. 3  
 Over-all growth is lagging, various sectors of the 4  
 economy are intensifying competition for scarce 5  
 resources, agricultural production is falling far 6  
 short of needs, large wheat purchases in 1963 have 7  
 greatly aggravated the hard-currency deficit, and 8  
 gold stocks are nearing a critically low level. This 9  
 situation is due in part to chronic Soviet mismanage- 10  
 ment, but mainly to the burdens imposed on the economy 11  
 by a series of programs too ambitious for available 12  
 resources. The demands of defense and space have 13  
 greatly encumbered economic growth since 1958. 14  
 Recently, industry has been adversely affected, as 15  
 well as agriculture and the production of consumer 16  
 goods. 17

(2) Soviet leaders have now launched a new effort 18  
 to cope with their most intractable economic problem-- 19  
 the stagnation of agriculture - through a large 20  
 expansion of the chemical industry, especially for 21  
 the production of fertilizer. They apparently expect 22  
 to finance this program from the expansion they 23  
 anticipate in the economy, from cutbacks in some 24  
 non-defense programs, and from large and long-term 25

Western credits. But it is also thought that the Soviets 1  
will make every effort to hold down defense and space 2  
expenditures so as to release scarce resources for 3  
investment in the civilian economy. 4

(3) While defense expenditures could decline, it is 5  
thought more likely that they will continue to grow, 6  
though at a slower pace than in the recent past. In 7  
the short term, the Soviet leaders have the option of 8  
reducing force levels, but in the long term they must 9  
consider the advisability of curtailing or stretching 10  
out one or more programs for advanced weapons. 11

(4) The Soviets will make sustained efforts to 12  
expand trade with the West, and particularly to obtain 13  
large and long-term Western credits. This will help 14  
foster continued restraint in the tone of Soviet 15  
foreign policy, though not major concessions of 16  
substance. 17

c. Attitude Toward War 18

(1) Soviet thinking about military policy is 19  
influenced by a general outlook which asserts that 20  
historical forces are moving inexorably in the direction 21  
of communism. Soviet leaders see military power as 22  
serving two basic purposes: defense of their system 23  
and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the most 24  
important objectives of Soviet military policy is to 25  
deter general war while the USSR prosecutes its foreign 26  
policies by means short of actual hostilities involving 27  
Soviet forces. Military power is constantly brought 28  
into play in direct support of these policies, through 29  
the threats which give force to Soviet political demands, 30  
through the stress on its growing power which is 31

intended to gain respect for the Soviet state and its 1  
 communist system, and through the military aid and 2  
 support rendered to allies, friendly but neutral regimes, 3  
 and anti-Western movements. As long as the relative 4  
 strategic balance of forces is in favor of the West, 5  
 it is highly unlikely except through miscalculation 6  
 or misadventure, that the Soviets would initiate 7  
 general war. There is, however, good evidence that 8  
 the Soviets, in recognition of this imbalance, are 9  
 striving to enhance their capabilities relative to 10  
 the West. 11

(2) The Soviets wish to have the forces to fight wars 12  
 effectively should they occur. Except for so-called 13  
 "wars of national liberation," their political outlook, 14  
 their military programs of recent years, and intel- 15  
 ligence on their current intentions all suggest that 16  
 the Soviet leaders do not regard war as desirable. 17  
 They realize their deterrent must be credible in the 18  
 sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. 19  
 Moreover, they recognize that deterrence may fail in 20  
 some key confrontation in which, despite their best 21  
 efforts to retain control over risks, either they or 22  
 their opponents come to feel that vital interests are 23  
 under challenge. Against this contingency they wish 24  
 to have a combination of offensive and defensive 25  
 capabilities which will enable them to seize the init- 26  
 iative if possible, to survive enemy nuclear attack, 27  
 and to go on to prosecute the war successfully. 28  
 Although logically they must think that a deliberate 29  
 Western attack on them is improbable, they appear to 30  
 have genuine apprehensions. 31

(3) Devoted as they are to the need for implacable 1  
 struggle against the "capitalist" world until communist 2  
 domination is assured, and to the view that power - 3  
 in its broadest economic, military and political sense - 4  
 is the key ingredient in this struggle, the Soviets 5  
 see their priority objective as constantly trying to 6  
 change the East-West balance of power and the world 7  
 conception of that balance in their favor. To this 8  
 end they persistently endeavor to enhance the components 9  
 of their economic, military, and scientific strength 10  
 and no less important, their political position in 11  
 the world arena. Soviet boasts of military prowess 12  
 and superiority over the West are designed to back up 13  
 their political initiatives by exploiting present and 14  
 future Soviet power potential. At the same time, the 15  
 Soviets do what they can to undermine and denigrate 16  
 the power of the West in these respects. 17

(4) Fundamental hostility toward the non-communist 18  
 world defines one limit of Soviet foreign policy; so 19  
 long as it persists, the USSR will regard international 20  
 issues as opportunities progressively to weaken and 21  
 undermine its opponents, and not as occasions for 22  
 conciliation which would protect the interests of all 23  
 parties. The other limit, which puts a check upon this 24  
 aggressiveness, is the Soviet leaders' awareness that 25  
 their own nation and system would face destruction in 26  
 a general nuclear war. Both their statements and 27  
 their actions in recent years have demonstrated their 28  
 unwillingness to run any considerable risks of this 29  
 eventuality. This does not mean, however, that they 30  
 would always estimate the risks correctly, nor does 31

it mean that they would abandon interests they con- 1  
sidered vital in order to avoid grave risk of nuclear 2  
war. Barring the development of a decisive weapon 3  
system, the Soviets almost certainly consider that 4  
neither side will deliberately initiate a general war 5  
or react to any crisis in a manner which would gravely 6  
risk such a war, unless vital interests were considered 7  
to be in jeopardy. 8

(5) It is believed that the Soviets are unlikely, 9  
as a matter of general policy, to assume the military 10  
and political risks involved in using their own forces 11  
in overt military operations to achieve local gains. 12  
They would probably employ Soviet forces, as necessary, 13  
if some Western military action in areas adjacent to 14  
a communist country threatened the integrity of the 15  
Soviet Bloc itself. Even in the latter case, however, 16  
they would attempt to use their forces in a way 17  
calculated to achieve their local objectives, to end 18  
hostilities rapidly and to control risks of escalation. 19  
At a much lower level, they will almost certainly en- 20  
courage and support the use of force by pro-communist 21  
forces when they believe that a local situation is 22  
ripe for forceful exploitation and that the challenge 23  
to Western interests is not direct enough to involve 24  
uncontrollable risks of a direct encounter between 25  
United States and Soviet forces. 26

(6) This estimate of Soviet views on general and 27  
local war is generally consistent with their officially 28  
announced positions. They also distinguish a category 29  
of "Wars of national liberation, or popular uprisings." 30

They are carefully vague, however, in discussing the forms their support would take, and in particular, have neither promised nor hinted that Soviet forces would join in the fighting. Soviet actions, however, indicate that it is not their intent to usher in a new phase of vigorous Soviet incitement of such conflicts everywhere or of maximum military assistance to "national liberation" forces.


(7) It seems likely that Soviet emphasis on "national liberation" warfare, is intended in part to meet Chinese criticisms of the USSR. Despite Chinese pressures, it does not appear that the USSR will give full political and material support nor commit its prestige to all armed anti-Western movements in the under-developed areas. It is believed that the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard.

d. Future Trends in Soviet Military Programs.

(1) Strategic Attack Forces. In the buildup of strategic strike forces, the Soviets have recently been placing major emphasis upon weapons for inter-continental attack, particularly ICEMs. It is believed that the Soviet ICEM force will grow in numbers and improve in quality, as will their missile submarine force, and they will continue to possess a significant though reduced force of bombers. In the ICEM force, qualitative improvement will be emphasized; it is believed that the Soviets will introduce follow-on systems characterized by better accuracy, larger payloads,

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better reliability, and easier handling and maintenance. 1  
 It is believed that they will also attempt to improve 2  
 survivability by deploying a greater proportion of their 3  
 ICBMs in hard sites, by providing their submarines with 4  
 the recently developed submerged launch ballistic mis- 5  
 siles which have longer range than their present sur- 6  
 face launched missiles, and by increasing the readiness 7  
 of their strategic forces. 8



Similarly, 17  
 the Soviet Union probably would have a significant capa- 18  
 bility for retaliation even after an initial US attack. 19  
 It is believed that Soviet strategic attack forces 20  
 intended for Eurasian operations are nearing 21  
 planned levels. The large missile forces deployed 22  
 primarily against Europe will probably remain at 23  
 about their present size, but survivability will 24

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be enhanced through hardening and possibly by the 1  
introduction of ground mobile systems. The medium 2  
bomber force will probably decline in size over the 3  
next several years, but capabilities will probably 4  
improve with the continued introduction of supersonic 5  
aircraft. Thus, the Soviets will maintain massive 6  
forces for strategic attack in Eurasia and will 7  
improve the quality of these forces. 8

(2) Strategic Defense Forces. Although the Soviets 9  
are aware of planned reductions in US bomber forces, 10  
this threat will remain a matter of great concern for 11  
the period of this estimate. The massive defenses 12  
deployed over the past several years provide a measure 13  
of the Soviets' concern with this problem, and evi- 14  
dence indicates that the Soviets are continuing to 15  
strengthen these defenses. The total number of inter- 16  
ceptor aircraft will probably decline, but a larger 17  
percentage of the remaining force will be all-weather 18  
types. Deployment of the SA-3 for low-altitude 19  
defense probably will continue in order to supplement 20  
the existing medium and high altitude defenses around 21  
the more important targets and astride what the Soviets 22  
consider to be the more likely peripheral penetration 23  
routes. It is possible that more attention will be 24  
given to sheltering the civil population from fallout, 25

but in view of construction needs in the economy, it is  
doubted that a large-scale shelter program will be  
undertaken. The Soviets might hope through development  
and deployment of an antimissile system to offset US  
strategic superiority to some extent. The available  
evidence leads to the conclusion that the Soviets have  
not yet been successful in developing effective and  
reliable systems for defense against strategic missiles.  
It is believed that the Soviets would not regard as  
acceptable for wide-scale deployment any ABM system  
that does not have continuous readiness and an almost  
instantaneous reaction time together with a very high  
level of accuracy, reliability, and discrimination.  
Considering the effort devoted to ABM development, it  
is possible, though by no means certain, that the  
Soviets will achieve such a system within the period  
of this appraisal. When and if a satisfactory system  
is developed, the Soviet leaders will have to consider  
the great cost of large-scale deployment. They would  
almost certainly wish to defend key urban-industrial  
areas and they may seek to defend some portion of their  
ICBM force in order to strengthen their deterrent.  
Beyond these generalizations, the extent to which they  
would commit resources to ABM defenses cannot be  
estimated.

(3) Soviet Ground Forces. The Soviet ground forces  
are formidable and modern, with a large number of combat  
strength divisions backed up by a large mobilization  
potential. All presently existing divisions have been  
at least nominally converted to one of three types:

tank, motorized rifle, or airborne. The modernization  
program has made heavy demands on resources in short  
supply in the USSR, and it is believed that Soviet  
ground force capabilities are still adversely affected  
by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in  
equipment. During the past several years, the Soviets  
have reduced the total number of their divisions and  
have also reduced the proportion maintained at high  
levels of combat readiness. It is estimated that the  
total number of Soviet divisions lies in the range  
110-140 and that 60 - 75 of these are now maintained  
at combat strength, i.e., at 85 percent or more of  
total authorized wartime personnel strength. The  
remainder are at either reduced strength (60-70 percent  
of authorized personnel) or at cadre strength (25 percent  
or less). The modernization of Soviet ground forces  
will continue. The extent of improvement, however, will  
be closely related to trends in total size; the larger  
the forces which the USSR elects to retain, the more it  
will have to contend with obsolescence and shortages.  
The Soviets may, therefore, choose to maintain a smaller  
number of ground divisions which could be kept at a  
higher state of readiness. If the Soviets decide that  
they must seriously respond to the contingency of non-  
nuclear warfare, they will probably provide increased  
combat support as well as increased service support.  
Present trends in the ground weapons development program  
point to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility.  
The Soviets could probably have the numbers of tactical  
nuclear weapons which they would consider requisite

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for theater forces within two or three years, unless 1  
priority is given to air and missile defense warheads. 2  
Soviet procedures for the control and use of such 3  
weapons are likely to improve significantly. More and 4  
better general purpose vehicles and increased reliance 5  
on pipelines will reduce somewhat the Soviet dependence 6  
on rail lines for logistic support. In recent years, 7  
Soviet theater forces have acquired important tactical 8  
missile capabilities, including unguided rockets and 9  
ballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxic 10  
chemical bombs and warheads have been provided for 11  
tactical use; it is believed that their release is 12  
kept under strict political control. During the past 13  
year, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat 14  
their expectation that any major conflict in Europe 15  
would either be nuclear from the start or would inevitably 16  
escalate. Their recent writings indicate that some 17  
thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear 18  
war in Europe. While Soviet capabilities to conduct 19  
non-nuclear warfare remain formidable, efforts to gear 20  
their theater forces for nuclear operations have had 21  
some adverse effects on conventional capabilities. 22

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(4) Strategic Deployment Capability. In recent years, 23  
the USSR has increased its concern with areas remote from 24  
its borders, and the Cuban venture shows that it can deploy 25  
small ground and air contingents to distant areas and main- 26  
tain them once deployed. However, there is no evidence that 27  
the USSR has established any special military component 28  
trained and equipped specifically for independent small- 29  
scale operations, and it is severely limited in airlift, 30

sealift, and naval support suitable for distant, limited  
 military operations. It is possible that over the next  
 few years the Soviets will seek to improve their capa-  
 bilities for such operations through the designation and  
 training of appropriate forces, and the development of  
 equipment specifically for their use and logistic support.  
 They may attempt to overcome their geographic disadvantages  
 for applying such forces by negotiations with neutralist  
 countries to utilize available facilities for refueling  
 and maintenance of Soviet military aircraft or naval ships.

(5) Naval Forces. Much of the impetus for change in  
 the Soviet Navy has come from the USSR's concern over the  
 threat posed by US carrier task forces and missile  
 submarines. The Soviets now have operational about 45  
 ballistic missile submarines - nine of them nuclear-powered-  
 which carry a combined total of about 125 short-range  
 (350 nm) missiles designed for surfaced launching. The  
 USSR is developing longer range missiles for launching  
 from submerged submarines. In addition, the Soviets have  
 developed submarine-launched cruise missiles, which are  
 probably designed primarily for use against ships but  
 could be employed against land targets. In mid-1967, the  
 Soviets will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-  
 powered ballistic missile submarines, and about 20 nuclear-  
 powered cruise missile submarines. By that time, they  
 will probably have initiated routine submarine patrols  
 within missile range of the United States. The USSR's  
 capabilities to conduct naval warfare in the open seas  
 rest primarily upon the submarine force, which is capable  
 of mounting a large scale torpedo attack and mining  
 campaign against allied naval targets and sea communications

in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. 1  
Its capabilities for operations near the continental 2  
United States are more limited, but are growing. 3  
Capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved 4  
by the conversion of jet bombers to employ anti-ship 5  
missiles, by the introduction of submarines equipped with 6  
cruise-type missiles, and by increased air reconnaissance 7  
of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation. The 8  
Soviets have also placed increasing emphasis on improvement 9  
of ASW forces in coastal areas and in the open seas. It 10  
is believed the Soviet Navy is capable of carrying out 11  
fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas, but that 12  
it has a negligible ASW capability in the open seas. 13  
Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting 14  
to this problem, it is believed that over the next five 15  
years, the USSR will be able to achieve only a limited 16  
capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain 17  
surveillance on submarines operating in the open seas. 18

(6) Tactical Aviation and Missiles. It is believed 19  
that the Soviets will continue to modernize Tactical 20  
Aviation, improving its ground attack capabilities in par- 21  
ticular. It is expected that the rate of modernization will 22  
increase over the next few years, and that tactical air- 23  
craft with much improved range and payload characteristics 24  
will be introduced. It is expected that there will be a 25  
gradual decline in total numbers of tactical aircraft. 26  
The numbers of guided missiles in Soviet theater forces 27  
will probably remain about constant, but new and improved 28  
systems will probably be introduced. It appears likely 29  
that additional free rocket launchers will be assigned 30  
to divisions. Field force air defense capabilities will 31

improve over the next few years through the modernization 1  
of Tactical Aviation and probably through the introduction 2  
of the SA-3 or follow-on SAM systems into ground forma- 3  
tions. It is believed that a transportable AEM system 4  
for field force defense against ballistic missiles having 5  
ranges of several hundred n.m. could probably achieve 6  
operational status during 1964. There is no basis for 7  
determining the extent to which such a system may be 8  
deployed, but it seems likely that considerable improve- 9  
ment of defenses against aircraft would be a prerequisite 10  
to deploying an AEM vulnerable to aircraft attack. 11

(7) Nuclear Weapons. In the extensive 1961-1962 12  
nuclear test series, the Soviets probably satisfied their 13  
most pressing weapons test requirements. Research and 14  
development in this field over the next few years will 15  
probably continue to focus upon the exploitation of 16  
these test results, and their translation into weapons. 17  
The Soviet weapons stockpile still consists largely of 18  
weapons developed from tests conducted before the 19  
moratorium of 1958. It is estimated that, in general, 20  
a minimum of about two years is required after testing 21  
before a new nuclear weapon begins to enter stockpile. 22

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Thus, some weapons developed in the 1961-1962 test series 23  
are probably now entering inventory, with priority 24  
probably given to strategic weapons, particularly ICBM 25  
warheads. Probable trends in stockpile weapons include 26


higher yields for strategic weapons and a broader  
 spectrum of weapons for tactical use. As the stockpile  
 of fissionable materials grows, restrictions on the  
 availability of weapons for tactical use and for  
 strategic defense will ease.

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(8) Chemical Warfare. It is believed that the USSR  
 now possesses a substantial chemical warfare capability  
 based on extensive stocks of CW agents, a variety of  
 chemical munitions, including warheads for tactical  
 rockets and missiles, and a wide range of defensive  
 equipment. The Soviet CW research and development  
 program continues to be active on a scale generally com-  
 parable with that in the US. Current efforts are focused  
 on developing new toxic agents and munitions for their  
 delivery. The lack of a satisfactory method for timely  
 nerve agent detection remains a major weakness. Many  
 studies potentially applicable to discovery and de-  
 velopment of nonlethal incapacitating agents are in  
 process, and a new agent of this type could appear at  
 any time.

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(9) Space Weapons.



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However, it is

believed that the USSR almost certainly is investigating  
 the feasibility of space systems for offensive and  
 defensive weapon systems. Soviet decisions to develop  
 military space systems will depend on their expected costs  
 and effectiveness as compared with alternative systems,  
 possible political advantages or disadvantages, and the

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Soviet estimate of US intentions and capabilities in com- 1  
parable fields. For accomplishing military missions it 2  
is believed that within this decade, orbital weapons will 3  
not compare favorably with ICEMs in terms of reaction 4  
time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average life, 5  
and positive control. In view of these considerations, 6  
the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet 7  
endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons 8  
in space, it is believed that the Soviets are unlikely 9  
to develop and deploy an orbital weapon system of military 10  
significance within the period of this estimate. If they 11  
should nevertheless do so, developmental testing should 12  
be observable at least a year or two prior to their 13  
attainment of an accurate, reliable system. In the 14  
defensive weapons field, it is believed that the Soviets 15  
intend to develop a capability to counter US military 16  
satellites. By modification of existing equipment, includ-17  
ing air defense early warning radars and ballistic 18  
missiles, the Soviets probably could develop a limited 19  
anti-satellite capability within a few months after a 20  
decision had been made to do so. [REDACTED] 21

[REDACTED] 22  
The Soviets could also be working toward a system designed 23  
specifically for satellite interception, but it is 24  
almost certain that no such system is operational at 25  
present. The use of co-orbiting satellites or other 26  
advanced techniques during the period of this estimate 27  
seems much less likely. 28

(10) Soviet Bloc leaders probably continue to view 29  
their combined military power as adequate to meet military 30  
situations in Eurasia in which the nuclear capabilities 31  
of the Western Powers are not involved. They probably 32

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also conclude that they possess sufficient military power to deter the West from launching general war except under extreme threat to vital national or common interests. They almost certainly conclude that in the event of general war their military power would be unable to prevent unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union.

e. Deterrence. The Soviets see the present situation as one in which both sides are deterred from deliberately initiating general war or from knowingly initiating courses of action which would involve grave risk of such a war. They undoubtedly recognize the superiority of the United States in strategic power, but they are confident that they possess a credible deterrent based on both their massive capabilities against Eurasia and their growing intercontinental striking forces. Thus, the Soviet leaders do not regard the deliberate initiation of general war as a feasible course of action either for themselves or for the West. Moreover, despite increased Soviet attention to the possibility of limited wars with the West, it is believed that they will remain very reluctant to commit their own forces to such wars. In this situation the Soviets would take the opportunity to ~~conduct aggressive maneuvers of many sorts and to undertake~~ a comprehensive effort aimed at attaining a military technological breakthrough.

(1) In strategic terms, this line of policy suggests that presently, and for some time to come, the Soviet strategic forces will be numerically inferior to those of the US and more vulnerable to attack. The Soviet leaders must recognize, therefore, that the US would enjoy a considerable advantage should it strike first, and that the relative invulnerability, the fast reaction time, and the mobility of US strategic power make a Soviet first strike completely irrational. Nevertheless, in assessing

the military balance, the Soviets are confident that they possess a credible deterrent based on both their massive capabilities to devastate Eurasia and their growing inter-continental striking power. Thus, the Soviets see the present situation as one in which both sides are deterred from deliberately initiating general war or from knowingly initiating courses of action which would involve grave risk of such a war. The increasing nuclear capability of the US and USSR will continue to have a restraining influence on both sides and will influence the type of conflict and tend to reduce the level and intensity of conflict which might occur.

(2) Soviet decisions as to force structure and military programs over the next several years are likely to be made in the context of a situation in which, although the US enjoys a clear strategic advantage, a condition of rough mutual deterrence exists. The Soviets will seek to improve their strategic capabilities vis-a-vis the US; however, policy decisions will be influenced by the continuing strain on economic resources, and the pressure arising from competition with the US in scientific and technological developments with military applications.

Such decisions will be greatly influenced also by the Soviet estimate of the political situation, the opportunities which it affords, and the contribution which military power can make to the realization of these opportunities.

(3) It is believed that in these circumstances the primary concern of Soviet policy will be to continue to strengthen their deterrent against US attack primarily through a gradual buildup of ICBMs, hardening of sites, and increased mobility through missile submarines. At one time the Soviets may have considered an attempt to achieve capabilities sufficient to neutralize US strategic forces in a first strike, and they almost certainly have

also considered the lesser goal of achieving rough parity 1  
 with the US in intercontinental weapon systems. In the 2  
 aftermath of Cuba they may have considered a substantial 3  
 increase in their military effort. Evidence does not 4  
 indicate, however, that the Soviets are presently attempt- 5  
 ing to match the US in numbers of intercontinental 6  
 delivery vehicles. Recognition that the US would detect 7  
 and match or overmatch such an effort, together with 8  
 economic constraints, appears to have ruled out this 9  
 option. On the other hand, available evidence on the 10  
 development of large nuclear warheads and compatible 11  
 delivery vehicles strongly suggests that the Soviets 12  
 may be seeking to improve their position relative to 13  
 the West by increasing the destructive power of their 14  
 numerically inferior intercontinental strategic attack 15  
 forces. 16

(4) Continuation of present lines of policy will 17  
 ensure the Soviets of a growing credibility for their 18  
 deterrent. However, the dynamism of Soviet policy 19  
 depends to a great extent on the proposition that the 20  
 balance of forces in the world is shifting in favor of 21  
 the Communist world. The Sino-Soviet rupture has already 22  
 badly damaged this thesis, as has the inability of the 23  
 Soviets to match the West in military power. It is con- 24  
 ceivable that at some point a Soviet leadership would 25  
 come to believe that they had to forego their expan- 26  
 sionist aims, unless they could greatly improve their 27  
 relative military strength, or at least refurbish the 28  
 world's image of this strength. They might even 29  
 be willing to make new economic sacrifices or assume 30  
 some risks in order to accomplish this. What precise 31

programs they might undertake in pursuit of such an aim  
cannot now be stated, but it cannot be ruled out that  
changes in the scale or character of Soviet programs  
could come about in this way.

(5) On the question of how a general war might begin,  
most Soviet military writings assume deliberate,  
surprise attack by the US, although some consider  
escalation from limited war and a few allow for the  
possibility that general war would begin accidentally.  
The criticality of the initial period of a nuclear war  
and the importance of surprise have led some military  
writers to advocate a form of pre-emptive action by the  
USSR: i.e., a "spoiling" or "blunting" action launched  
coincident with or slightly before an enemy attack.  
However, known doctrinal discussions do not consider a  
Soviet first strike. In the standard scenario, the  
USSR survives a nuclear attack, regains the initiative,  
and goes on to prosecute the war.

(6) Current Soviet doctrine holds that a general war  
will inevitably involve the large-scale use of nuclear  
and other weapons of mass destruction, beginning with a  
strategic exchange which may decide the course and out-  
come of the war in its initial phase, a relatively  
brief but not clearly defined period of time. To the  
Soviets, the importance of this phase implies the  
necessity to use all available forces at the outset of  
a general war; the doctrinal writings which are available  
have noted and rejected such US concepts as controlled  
response and damage limiting strategies. Moreover, no  
restraint is evident in targeting concepts for the initial  
phase of a general war; while enemy nuclear striking

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forces are evidently to be the primary targets of Soviet nuclear strikes, powerful nuclear blows are also to be directed against communication and control centers, industrial and population centers, and groupings of enemy armed forces.

(7) Despite the primary role attributed to nuclear and missile forces, current Soviet doctrine envisions the commitment of large theater forces virtually at the outset of a general war. It is argued that, even if the war is relatively short, large forces of all types would be required to defeat comparable enemy forces, to overrun base areas, and to occupy territory in Eurasia. Moreover, it is also held that the conflict may be protracted rather than brief and that, in this case, extensive theater campaigns would be required. Thus, current Soviet doctrine supports a military policy emphasizing strategic attack and defense capabilities, but supports as well the maintenance of large general purpose forces for use in all phases of general war.

(8) It is believed that debate continues, not only over subsidiary propositions, but over central tenets of doctrine as well. Certain key issues, such as the decisiveness of the initial phase, evidently remain unresolved. Moreover, certain vital questions seem to have been ignored. For example, while purporting to deal with a global war in which all types of weapons are employed, the current military writings to which there is access, concern themselves almost exclusively with theater forces in Europe. Adequate consideration is not given to the effects of a strategic nuclear

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exchange on subsequent operations. Virtually no atten- 1  
tion is given to the way in which a general war might 2  
be brought to a successful conclusion; it seems to be 3  
assumed either that US society would collapse as the 4  
result of the initial nuclear attack, or that in a long 5  
war the Soviet system would prove the more durable. 6

f. Miscalculation. Soviet strategy recognizes that, 7  
while general war is unlikely, it cannot be excluded as 8  
the result of miscalculation by either side or as the 9  
outcome of a crisis in which both sides become progres- 10  
sively committed. The Soviets are unable to be certain 11  
in advance what the circumstances surrounding the begin- 12  
ning of a general war would be. A miscalculation could 13  
occur if the Soviets misjudged either the importance to 14  
the West of an issue and the actions which the West might 15  
take in support of its position, or even the consequences 16  
of the policies being pursued by a third party associated 17  
with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, such a crisis 18  
might arise should the West miscalculate in a similar way. 19

g. Pre-emptive attack. If the Soviet leaders were 20  
ever absolutely certain that the West was irrevocably 21  
committed to an imminent strategic nuclear attack against 22  
them, there is little question that they would themselves 23  
strike pre-emptively. Such certainty, however, on the 24  
part of any country about the intentions of another is 25  
extremely unlikely. The Soviet leaders probably conclude 26  
that it would be impossible to count upon incontrovertible 27  
advance evidence that the enemy was irrevocably committed 28  
to an imminent attack. Moreover, for the Soviet Union, 29  
the compulsion to strike first, when the threat of hostile 30  
attack is still ambiguous declines as US missile systems 31  
become more important and less vulnerable and the advantage 32

to be derived from a first strike consequently decreases. 1  
 This trend of Soviet thinking is suggested by assertions 2  
 that an aggressor cannot neutralize the retaliatory capa- 3  
 bility of a powerful opponent. Nevertheless, a surprise 4  
 attack - that is to say, one delivered in a period of no 5  
 particular tension and after entirely secret military 6  
 preparations - is the only one which would give the Soviet 7  
 Union a chance of destroying any significant part of the 8  
 Western nuclear strike capability before it could be 9  
 launched. Therefore, in spite of its unlikelihood, it 10  
 remains a possible, though improbable course of action 11  
 for the Soviet Union. 12

h. Escalation. A number of Soviet statements in recent 13  
 years have expressed the view that limited war involving 14  
 the major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into 15  
 general war. While such statements are intended in part 16  
 to deter the West from local use of force, this official 17  
 view also reflects a genuine Soviet fear of the consequences 18  
 of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving 19  
 Soviet and US forces. This probably also extends to 20  
 involvement of Soviet forces with certain allied forces 21  
 in highly critical areas, notably Western forces in the 22  
 European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their 23  
 own forces to achieve local gains in some area adjacent 24  
 to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either 25  
 because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for 26  
 some other reason, would not make an effective military 27  
 response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as 28  
 necessary if some Western military action on the periphery 29  
 of the Soviet Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc 30  
 itself. Should the USSR become directly involved in a 31  
 limited war with the US or Allied forces, it is believed 32

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
that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately 1  
 into general war, but that they would probably employ 2  
 only that force which they thought necessary to achieve 3  
 their local objectives. They would also seek to prevent 4  
 escalation both by restraints in the employment of their 5  
 own forces and by political means. In view of the increas- 6  
 ingly grave consequences of escalation, it is believed that 7  
 over the next few years the Soviets will remain very 8  
 reluctant to commit their own forces to limited warfare 9  
 against Western forces. Despite recent Soviet references 10  
 to the possibility of limited war involving tactical nuclear 11  
 weapons, it is considered highly unlikely that the USSR would 12  
 introduce such weapons into a limited conflict. The Soviet 13  
 doctrinal debate, as far as it is known, has not dealt with 14  
 limited war; it is therefore possible that discussion has 15  
 been limited by official attitudes. Public Soviet statements 16  
 have usually insisted that a limited war which involved the 17  
 major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into general 18  
 war. Official pronouncements to this effect have almost 19  
 certainly been designed in large part to deter the West 20  
 from the local use of force, but they probably also reflected 21  
 Soviet fears of becoming involved in limited war. The Soviets 22  
 now appear to be modifying their position to allow for the 23  
 possibility that even a limited war involving the major 24  
 nuclear powers would not necessarily escalate to general 25  
 war. They may now be persuaded that in the present strategic 26  
 situation, the initial military reactions to a local crisis 27  
 would be limited, and that it is therefore, not in the Soviet 28  
 national interest to be doctrinally committed to inevitable 29  
 escalation. 30

5. Chinese Communist Threat 31



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b. Modernization of Armed Forces. The modernization of the armed forces, which was progressing steadily until about 1960, has practically ended, except for the continued introduction of radar and certain other electronic equipment. Domestic fabrication of fighter aircraft and submarines has ceased and inventories are being reduced by deterioration and cannibalization. In general, the Army has been less affected than the other Services.

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c. Advanced Weapons




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(2) The Chinese communists have given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. If the normal number of difficulties are encountered a plutonium device might be tested in late 1964 or 1965,

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or even later depending upon the extent of difficulties. 1  
Beginning the year after a first detonation, the single 2  
reactor thus far identified could produce enough material 3  
for only one or two crude weapons a year. The Chinese 4  
have a few bombers which could carry bulky weapons of 5  
early design. 6

(3) Communist China is probably concentrating on a 7  
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system of basic- 8  
ally Soviet design, either the 630 mile SS-3, or the 9  
1,020 mile SS-4. The earliest date either missile would 10  
be ready for deployment is believed to be 1967. It is 11  
unlikely that a compatible nuclear warhead would be 12  
available until 3 or 4 years after a first detonation. 13



d. Domestic Production. Communist China almost certainly 1  
 intends to achieve domestic production of all necessary 2  
 weapons and materiel for its armed forces. It has a long 3  
 way to go before reaching this goal, however. The Chinese 4  
 at present are probably unable to produce even MIG-17s 5  
 entirely by themselves, and it will be a number of years 6  
 before they can design and produce more advanced types of 7  
 military aircraft. Indeed they may have chosen instead to 8  
 concentrate their limited resources on missiles. Their 9  
 wholly domestic naval shipbuilding capacity is likely to be 10  
 restricted to surface ships of the smaller types during 11  
 the next few years. 12


e. Military Policy. The decline in the relative effective- 13  
 ness of Communist China's military equipment and weapons is 14  
 likely to temper its policy, especially in circumstances 15  
 where it might confront US armed power or sizable US- 16  
 equipped Asian forces. However, the Chinese Communist 17  
 Army will continue to be the strongest in Asia and will 18  
 provide a powerful backing for Chinese Communist foreign 19  
 policy. The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably place addi- 20  
 tional demands on Chinese military dispositions and capa- 21  
 bilities, since one of the consequences of China's new 22  
 "independence" from the USSR will be the need to keep a 23  
 closer watch than previously on the long China-Russian 24  
 border which the Chinese still consider a "difficult" and 25  
 "unsettled" question. Her slowly developing nuclear weapon 26  
 and missile capability will increase an already considerable 27  
 military advantage over Asian neighbors. However, for the 28  
 foreseeable future she will not approach the advanced weapons 29

might of the United States or USSR, particularly in the field of long-range striking power. For this reason, among others, the CHICOMs would be unlikely to attribute a decisive importance to modern weaponry. They would probably continue to rely primarily on a huge ground force and, unless confident of Soviet support, would try to avoid hostilities which might escalate into nuclear war. Considering the chances of retaliation, it is difficult to conceive of any situation in which Communist China would be likely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the next decade or so.

f. Foreign Policy

(1) Communist China's foreign policy objectives are the preservation of the regime and the protection of its existing boundaries. For these purposes the CHICOMs are willing to go to war, almost regardless of the odds. If US or Allied troops approached its borders through Laos, North Vietnam, or North Korea they would almost certainly be ready to commit their forces openly, unless in the particular circumstances they saw greater advantage in more covert military operations. The acquisition of Taiwan falls in the second rank of objectives--those for which they are fully prepared to use overt military force, but only when the prospects of success are judged to be high. To achieve this goal, they are prepared to run fewer risks and are particularly anxious to avoid direct conflict with the United States. They almost certainly will not attempt to seize by military force either Taiwan or any of the major offshore


islands which they believe the United States would help defend.



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g. Spread of Communism. For the broader and longer range goal of spreading communism throughout the underdeveloped world, Communist China is probably not prepared to accept any substantial risk, although it must be noted that it tends to estimate the risks involved in supporting "wars of national liberation" much lower than does Moscow. It apparently does not intend to undertake overt conquests of foreign lands in the name of communism, but intends to let indigenous revolutionaries do the fighting and "liberating".

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PART III - MILITARY OBJECTIVES

1. National. The basic United States national objective 1  
 is to preserve a free and independent nation, assuring its 2  
 security and fundamental institutions. Implicit therein is 3  
 the development of a free world community which lends itself 4  
 to this objective. The goal of US policy is to foster and 5  
 develop an evolving international community within which con- 6  
 stitutional government and a free society can continue to 7  
 flourish. US military power and the will to use it must be 8  
 at the center of this community, linked to the power that can 9  
 be generated elsewhere in the free community, and organized 10  
 to cover the full spectrum of force. US military power and 11  
 that of our allies must be coordinated closely with other 12  
 forms of national power: economic, political and ideological. 13  
 The evolving international community the US seeks to promote 14  
 requires now, and for the foreseeable future, an ability and 15  
 readiness to use force in this wide sense for several purposes, 16  
 including two which are basic: 17

a. To deter or deal effectively with all forms of 18  
 aggression against or within the frontiers of the free 19  
 community. 20

b. To support US diplomatic and other efforts to pro- 21  
 tect and advance US and Free World interests. 22

2. Military 23

a. Basic Military Objectives. The basic military 24  
 objectives of the United States are to: 25

(1) Protect and defend the United States. 26

(2) Deter or deal effectively with a direct nuclear 27  
 assault against the United States or other vital areas. 28

- (3) Deter aggression and prevent unintentional outbreak of war. 1
  - (4) Deter or deal effectively with any nonnuclear attacks on the free community or areas vital to its survival in conjunction with allied and friendly forces as available. 2
  - (5) Conduct hostilities so as to achieve US objectives; minimize damage to the United States and its allies; force a conclusion of hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States and its allies. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve its wartime objectives while limiting the destructiveness of warfare. Hostilities should be waged at the lowest scale of conflict commensurate with the achievement of US objectives. 3
  - (6) Ensure freedom of the seas. 4
  - (7) Support friendly peoples against subversion and insurgency designed to undermine their governments and fragment their societies. 5
  - (8) Support diplomatic and other efforts to work toward peaceful adjustments of disputes and differences, to minimize conflicts within the free community and otherwise to promote US objectives. 6
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- b. Cold War. The military objectives in cold war are to deter or act effectively against expansion by communist or other powers whose objectives are inimical to US interests; to improve military readiness posture for conflict in order to be prepared to win in cold, limited, and general war, using weapons and forces appropriate to the situation; and to assist selected

vulnerable nations in developing their capabilities for internal security, self defense, and collective security. Derivative objectives are to:

- (1) Develop and maintain military forces in a high state of readiness strategically located throughout the world and, in addition, maintain a mobile, flexible force posture of augmentation forces.
- (2) Develop and maintain effective and appropriate reserve forces.
- (3) Develop and maintain an effective early warning system for the defense of the United States.
- (4) Develop and maintain effective defense against aircraft, missile, space, and submarine systems.
- (5) Develop and maintain a survivable US military command and control system.
- (6) Assist allied and friendly nations in developing capabilities to resist subversion and external aggression by other states acting independently or as proxies for major communist powers.
- (7) Continue research and development activities to maintain a superiority in military technology.
- (8) Assist allied and friendly nations by providing military support for civic action programs.
- (9) Assist allied and friendly nations in counterinsurgency operations, by:
  - (a) Developing forces for employment in counterinsurgency operations.
  - (b) Providing training, operational assistance, and military reinforcement to friendly countries threatened by insurgency.

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- (c) Providing appropriate military intelligence regarding foreign military and paramilitary forces. 1  
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- (d) Supporting civilian counterinsurgency programs conducted by other governmental agencies. 3  
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- c. Limited War. In addition to the cold war objectives which are applicable, the US military objective in limited war is to defeat the enemy swiftly and effectively in a manner and on a scale most advantageous to the United States, and at the same time maintain an adequate general war posture. Derivative objectives are to: 5  
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- (1) Control the scope and intensity of the conflict to minimize the risk of escalation, recognizing that this may require controlled and deliberate intensification of the conflict to obtain US objectives. 11  
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- (2) Deny critical land areas and air space to the enemy. 15  
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- (3) Control and exploit critical sea areas and deny their use to the enemy. 17  
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- (4) Retain or achieve control of essential sea, air, and ground lines of communications (LOC). 19  
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- (5) Conduct military operations so as to limit unnecessary damage in the area of conflict, especially when nuclear weapons are employed. 21  
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- (6) Make maximum use of indigenous forces and resources. 24  
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- (7) Be prepared to fight in direct conflict with Soviet or Communist Chinese forces. 26  
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- (8) Protect the interests of the friendly people involved. 28  
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d. General War. In addition to cold war and limited war objectives which are applicable, the US military objective in general war is to defeat the Soviet Bloc alone or in combination with Communist China and its supporters in such manner as to force termination of hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States and to assure that the United States has sufficient residual strength to retain its position as a dominant world power. Derivative objectives are to:

(1) Defend the United States against enemy attack, and assist allied nations in their defense.

(2) In co-equal priority, maintain the capability to destroy or neutralize, on a selective basis if required, the military capabilities of the enemy, as necessary to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the maximum extent practicable, and to destroy on a selective basis and under all conditions the war supporting and urban/industrial resources of the enemy.

PART IV - STRATEGIC CONCEPT

SECTION A - GENERAL

1. The strategic concept forms a basis for the develop- 1  
 ment of objective force levels and the employment of these 2  
 forces in the support of US military objectives. The 3  
 accomplishment of US military objectives and the military 4  
 potential of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China are prime 5  
 considerations in the development of the strategic concept. 6  
 The strategic concept combines a strategy of flexible and 7  
 controlled military actions to counter the threat posed by 8  
 enemy powers. Such a strategy affords the opportunity for 9  
 selection from a wide range of military options. The most 10  
 significant recent changes in the strategic environment 11  
 include the downward reappraisal of the Soviet conventional 12  
 threat, the continued growth and improvement of Soviet 13  
 strategic and tactical nuclear forces, troubled political 14  
 relationships within NATO, growing US capability to deploy 15  
 US forces and to reinforce forward deployed and allied forces, 16  
 the development of a situation of rough mutual deterrence, 17  
 increased interest in arms control and disarmament measures 18  
 and the potential evolution of new centers of influence. 19

2. A US military posture will be maintained which in 20  
 conjunction with allied forces, will provide over-all military 21  
 superiority for the Free World and afford an adequate basis 22  
 for military operations to defeat enemy forces at any level of 23  
 enemy aggression. The US forces shall be configured, deployed 24  
 and employed to protect the United States and her allies, to 25  
 deter both limited and general war and, if deterrence fails to 26

assure the attainment of US objectives and the termination of 1  
 hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States; to 2  
 support successful management and termination of limited or 3  
 general war; to support cold war operations as required for 4  
 the attainment of US objectives, to provide optimum military 5  
 support and flexibility for the conduct of worldwide US political 6  
 economic, diplomatic and military negotiations; and to convince 7  
 any potential adversary that any aggressive military or para- 8  
 military actions can and will be countered by prompt and 9  
 effective US response. These forces will comprise the best 10  
 possible combination of modern, flexible and balanced forces 11  
 capable of prompt military initiative in support of US policies 12  
 over a wide range of military actions. 13

3. It is a first charge on US military policy to make grossly 14  
 unattractive and unprofitable a direct Communist assault on the 15  
 United States or on other areas vital to US interest, notably 16  
 Western Europe. While maintaining a strong over-all deterrent, 17  
 increased emphasis will be given to achieving a posture which 18  
 permits a wider range of military actions in order to achieve 19  
 national objectives. To this end, improved conventional 20  
 capabilities and the visible presence of forward deployed land, 21  
 sea and air forces backed up by total US power will continue to 22  
 be vital to the maintenance of stability and security in over- 23  
 seas area threatened by communist aggression. 24

4. It is essential that the best possible force structure 25  
 be available to support the full range of military objectives. 26  
 The force structure developed in this plan represents force 27  
 objectives which are considered both essential and reasonably 28  
 attainable in the mid-range period. These objective, 29

expressed in terms of major combatant forces, combined with 1  
the strategy enunciated, are available for translation into 2  
Service program objectives, which, in turn, will generate ser- 3  
vice objectives for supporting units and facilities, manpower 4  
levels, and procurement goals. 5

5. The effectiveness of US military forces and strategy 6  
in the mid-range period will be influenced by a variety of 7  
factors, including rapid US and foreign developments in science 8  
and technology, new and improved weapon systems, improved combat 9  
techniques, adequacy of US intelligence, reliability and 10  
military capabilities of allies, and availability of foreign 11  
bases. However, the decision on the composition of a suitable 12  
force structure must be based upon the evaluation of information 13  
currently available. For this reason, the structure developed 14  
must be inherently flexible in order to respond to new intel- 15  
ligence information, unexpected break-throughs in technical 16  
fields, radically new weapon systems, changed combat techniques, 17  
and the possible realignment of alliances. 18

6. The US military objective force levels reflect the 19  
principle of collective defense and the contribution to 20  
collective security which allied forces can make. Emphasis 21  
will be given to the attainment of US and allied force 22  
levels which will enable NATO to defend the NATO area. 23  
Essential elements of a successful strategy in NATO include 24  
the presence of sufficient NATO forces in position on D-Day 25  
to prevent Western Europe from being overrun, an effective 24  
interdiction program to slow down Soviet reinforcement, adequate 25  
active and reserve forces in the US and other NATO countries, 26  
sufficient strategic mobility to move US forces rapidly to 27  
Central Europe, and adequate CONUS and overseas logistical 28  
bases and logistical support. There is a need for the improve- 29  
ment of the NATO capability to respond to non-nuclear aggression 30  
without initial resort to nuclear weapons. The US should 31  
provide leadership in the Alliance toward achieving these goals. 32

Implicit in the success of such leadership is the require- 1  
 ment that the NATO Allies make an appropriate effort in 2  
 their own defense, and hence US force commitments to NATO 3  
 should not exceed MC 26/4 force levels. 4

7. During the mid-range period, the US military posture 5  
 will provide for: 6

a. Deployed forces. 7

b. Combat ready forces based in the United States. 8

c. Adequate offensive and defensive forces to protect 9  
 the United States from attack, and to limit damage thereto 10  
 to the maximum extent practicable. 11

d. Reserve forces with graduated levels of readiness 12  
 to provide appropriate augmentation of active forces. 13

e. Adequate airlift and sealift. 14

f. A logistic base adequate to meet the requirements 15  
 of cold, limited and general war operations. 16

8. The United States will maintain deployed, highly 17  
 mobile forces and a world-wide system of bases together 18  
 with the arrangements necessary for their support. This 19  
 requires international agreements necessary to ensure 20  
 adequate base rights, access and overflight rights where 21  
 required, and a responsive command and control system of 22  
 minimum vulnerability. Additionally, this requires a 23  
 military logistics base adequate and sufficiently flexible 24  
 to meet the requirements of this strategy. Maintenance 25  
 of necessary overseas bases and mobile support will permit 26  
 adequate response to the threat. They will be of sufficient 27  
 size and capability to support US and allied forces in their 28  
 preparation for and the conduct of war. It is recognized 29  
 that the United States may not retain some of the current 30  
 bases in the mid-range period, in view of growing national- 31  
 istic tendencies. Therefore, every effort will be made 32  
 to obtain re-entry rights to those bases being evacuated; 33

to convince other Free World nations that US overseas bases 1  
 are equally as beneficial to them as to the United States; 2  
 and to convince them that in providing US base rights in 3  
 strategic areas, they give powerful support to peace and 4  
 free world security. Efforts will be made to retain 5  
 required bases or acquire other suitable bases and to obtain 6  
 additional rights to use foreign military and civil facilities 7  
 as required. Adequate mobile logistic support and, where 8  
 feasible, selective pre-stocking and pre-positioning of 9  
 materiel will be maintained to permit rapid response and 10  
 support initial combat operations until resupply can be 11  
 effected. In regard to base access and over-flight rights, 12  
 however, consideration must be given to alternatives in 13  
 the event such rights are denied or withheld. 14

9. US forces must have a quick reaction capability to 15  
 keep conflict at the lowest level of intensity possible, 16  
 and to secure quickly and decisively areas which facilitate 17  
 the attainment of US objectives. In addition to pre-deployed 18  
 forces, this reaction time will depend on airlift and high 19  
 speed sealift. Airlift and sealift will be provided to 20  
 permit rapid deployment of tactical forces for sustained 21  
 operations in cold or limited war to any area of the world 22  
 without unacceptable degradation of our capability to fulfill 23  
 general war missions. Lift objectives for the mid-range 24  
 period will be based upon the requirements of military 25  
 operations envisaged in this plan. 26

10. While an appropriate balance between active and 27  
 reserve forces should be achieved to provide for the most 28  
 efficient use of both, the size of the active forces should 29

be sufficient to require only minimum reliance on reserve 1  
elements in the initial phases of war. The total reserve 2  
forces will contain a group of selected reserve forces 3  
capable of augmenting active forces rapidly. These selected 4  
reserve forces will be provided adequate logistic support 5  
and maintained in a high state of readiness for combat within 6  
a short time after call to active duty. Reserve forces will 7  
be trained, equipped and available to: 8

- a. Augment active forces in contingencies which 9  
require rapid but limited mobilization. 10
- b. Provide reinforcements in the event of protracted 11  
local conflicts. 12
- c. Augment or replenish combat-ready forces. 13
- d. Provide an expanded base for large-scale mobilization. 14
- e. Perform a supporting role in civil defense as a 15  
secondary mission. 16
- f. Assist in recovery and reconstruction measures. 17

11. Emphasis will be placed on the utilization of the 18  
resources of the armed forces to conduct unconventional 19  
warfare, psychological operations and counterinsurgency 20  
operations and to reinforce and support political, economic, 21  
technical and cultural programs for the achievement of 22  
national objectives. Counterinsurgency planning will be 23  
directed toward the objective of preventing or defeating 24  
communist-inspired insurgency in each threatened area before 25  
a crisis limits the alternatives and makes the use of major 26  
force imperative. The development and utilization of 27  
indigenous forces is of primary importance in the accomplish- 28  
ment of this objective. 29

12. The United States will pursue and utilize research 1  
and development programs to maintain superiority in military 2  
technology, both nuclear and nonnuclear, to enhance the 3  
essential credibility of our military posture and increase 4  
its responsiveness to US political and military objectives. 5  
Emphasis will be given to the development of new ground, 6  
naval, and air weapon systems and to tactics for their 7  
employment, as well as improvements in the reliability, 8  
accuracy, flexibility, survivability and responsiveness of 9  
existing forces. The United States will pursue actively 10  
programs to exploit outer space as necessary to achieve 11  
scientific, political and military goals. In addition, the 12  
United States will pursue programs to develop military 13  
capabilities to protect the United States from attack 14  
through or from outer space. With respect to nonnuclear 15  
capabilities, continued emphasis and high priority will 16  
be given to research and development to improve US capa- 17  
bilities in sustained nonnuclear combat, and to develop 18  
weapons designed to assist less developed countries to cope 19  
with guerrilla and internal or external threats. 20

13. With respect to military aid, US policy, guided by the 21  
over-all requirements of US military strategy, must take 22  
account of the factors listed below, in addition to the 23  
military requirement of US strategy in the nations or areas 24  
involved. The application of these complex criteria will be 25  
worked out on a country-by-country basis, taking into account 26  
regional circumstances, the relevant political and psycho- 27  
logical factors, and the area requirements of our military 28  
plans and concepts. 29

- a. The character of the military threat confronting these nations and the degree to which their defense is, in fact, contingent on US and allied forces, rather than on their own.
- b. The potential for constructive action by military elements within these societies.
- c. The appropriate allocation of resources (local and United States) as between military and civil purposes.

ARMS CONTROL

14. General and complete disarmament in a peaceful world is an aim not likely to be realized in the period of this plan, although efforts to achieve this goal will continue. Separate limited arms control measures, designed to reduce international tensions and the risk of war, may be successfully negotiated. The objectives and the strategic concept of this plan would require modification to the extent dictated by the provisions of any disarmament or arms control agreement which may be negotiated. However, any comprehensive disarmament or limited arms control agreements must be properly balanced, safeguarded, and verified by aerial reconnaissance and other means. Such agreements must permit the United States to maintain force levels and structures sufficient to employ a range of military options adequate to deter or defeat aggression should the agreement be abrogated, so that the security of the United States and its allies is in no way jeopardized.

SECTION B - CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT - GENERAL

1j. The concept of employment for US forces provides for conducting military operations on a scale and in a manner which will attain our military objectives and force the enemy to terminate military operations on terms advantageous to the United States.

a. Consistent with this concept, military operations will be conducted in a manner which will:

- (1) Indicate our determination.
- (2) Apply effective military pressures.
- (3) Provide a wide range of alternative military courses of action.
- (4) Permit the assumption of the offensive at the earliest practicable moment.

b. This concept of employment is influenced by the considerations that:

- (1) US nuclear and nonnuclear forces and capabilities combine to give the United States a freedom of action and the opportunity to choose from a wide variety of courses of action.
- (2) The United States and its allies will maintain the over-all military superiority necessary to permit bold, flexible action to achieve their objectives.
- (3) The US must capitalize on the tactical and strategic mobility of its forces and the technological superiority and lethality of its weapons to oppose and defeat enemy forces that may have numerical manpower superiority.

c. Military operations will not necessarily be confined to the initial area of engagement. When the situation requires, the conflict will be expanded to other areas and mediums of engagement. At all stages of the operation US forces will be prepared to initiate

or respond to higher intensities of war including 1  
general war. 2

d. The United States will risk the alienation of 3  
neutral and nonaligned nations, the loss of allied 4  
support, expansion of hostilities to other areas and to 5  
higher intensities, and even general war in order to 6  
defeat aggression whenever vital US interests are 7  
threatened. 8


16. US military forces in concert with allied forces 9  
will be employed to achieve military objectives worldwide 10  
in support of US national objectives in cold, limited and 11  
general war as appropriate. Operations will be conducted 12  
for the purpose of defending the Western Hemisphere and 13  
maintaining the integrity of the Free World. In imple- 14  
menting this concept US forces in the event of hostilities, 15  
will conduct offensive operations at the earliest possible 16  
time. To this end, US forces and allied forces will 17  
execute the following geographical concept: 18

a. Defense of the European-Turkish area, undertaken 19  
by the United States in conjunction with its allies, 20  
will be conducted as far forward as possible and will 21  
provide for the active defense of the general line of 22  
Norway, Western Germany, the Alps, Yugoslavia, Greece 23  
and Turkey. Should the foregoing strategic concept 24  
fail, the United States with remaining allies will hold 25  
the general line of the Trondheim-Stavanger areas in 26  
Norway, the British Isles, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy 27  
and Allied areas in the Balkans and East Turkey as far 28  
forward as practicable. This will require the occupa- 29  
tion or seizure, maintenance and control of essential 30  
bases and LOC. 31


b. In the Middle East and Southern Asia, the United 32  
States and its allies will defend as far forward as 33

possible along the northern frontiers of the CENTO area 1  
 hold the approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden areas and 2  
 the Persian Gulf, and ensure continued availability of 3  
 Middle East bases, resources and the LOCs thereto. In 4  
 the event of a national decision to aid India, the US 5  
 and its allies will assist in her defense. Initially, 6  
 defense of these areas will be accomplished primarily 7  
 by allied and indigenous forces unless US forces have 8  
 been previously deployed. In the event of general war, 9  
 outside support will be limited initially to that accruing 10  
 through the accomplishment of general war tasks by US 11  
 and allied forces in adjacent areas, with such addi- 12  
 tional US support as may be made available by the Joint 13  
 Chiefs of Staff through MAAO and Mission personnel, 14  
 unconventional warfare and nuclear and conventional 15  
 air operations. 16

c. In the Western Pacific, the United States and 17  
 its allies will hold in Southeast Asia as far forward 18  
 as possible and along the general line Philippines- 19  
 Taiwan-Okinawa-South Korea and Japan 20



These operations, in conjunc- 23  
 tion with preparations to conduct offensive operations 24  
 will require the maintenance and control of bases, 25  
 resources, and LOC in the Pacific area. In the event 26  
 of general war, 27



Philippines. The defense of Southeast Asia will be 1  
 accomplished by indigenous forces assisted by US and 2  
 other allied forces to the extent practicable in the 3  
 light of other commitments. 4

d. In Latin America and in Sub-Sahara Africa the 5  
 political and military situation may deteriorate 6  
 rapidly at the onset of general or limited war in 7  
 other areas. The US will take full advantage of exist- 8  
 ing friendly military and paramilitary resources in 9  
 these areas to defeat subversion, infiltration and 10  
 insurrection. 11

17. In implementing the concepts of this plan, US 12  
 forces will be guided by the military objectives and the 13  
 following: 14


a. Conduct operations in such a manner as to force 15  
 the enemy to terminate hostile actions on terms 16  
 advantageous to the United States. 17


b. Assume the offensive at the earliest practicable 18  
 time. 19

c. Make every feasible effort subject to para a 20  
 above to prevent small-scale conflicts from escalating 21  
 into broader conflicts or general war. 22

d. Make every feasible effort to keep the conflict 23  
 at a nonnuclear level while remaining prepared for US 24  
 and/or enemy initiation of the use of nuclear weapons 25

e. When authorized by the President: 26

(1)  27



- (2) Meet nuclear aggression with appropriate nuclear response. 1
- f. Conduct military operations in such a manner as to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the maximum extent practicable. 2
- g. Limit destructiveness in enemy areas insofar as practicable, and when in US interests, in the conduct of military operations. 3
- h. Exploit the potential of dissident groups and divisive influences. 4
- i. Exploit opportunities to free populations from communist domination and to achieve favorable positions from which subsequent operations may be conducted as required. 5
- j. Reinforce deployed forces at the maximum rate consistent with the situation and US capabilities. 6
- k. Intervene, where appropriate, in "wars of national liberation" in support of US interests. 7
- 18. Unconventional warfare conducted in limited and general war will support the basic strategy and will exploit the resistance potential in areas which are denied, overrun, or likely to be overrun by enemy forces. Operations may require predominant use of indigenous personnel with preplanned assets under the direction of US personnel. These personnel will assist dissident indigenous elements in the development, organization, training, support and direction of guerrilla warfare and subversion against hostile states to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity and morale of the enemy, and to assist in establishing allied political controls 8

SECTION C - COLD WAR

21. Cold War is a state of international tension wherein 1  
 political, economic, technological, sociological, psy- 2  
 chological, paramilitary and military measures short of 3  
 overt armed conflict involving regular military forces 4  
 are employed to achieve national objectives. 5

22. The primary military responsibility in Cold War 6  
 is to develop and maintain a credible and demonstrated 7  
 readiness and capability to prevail in limited and general 8  
 war and thereby provide a deterrent to aggression. In 9  
 addition, planning for conduct of military operations 10  
 during Cold War will reflect, to the maximum extent 11  
 practicable, the advantages inherent in the world-wide 12  
 distribution of US military forces, including the close 13  
 association of Service units and personnel with other 14  
 people and organizations of the world. 15

23. US armed forces during Cold War will be prepared to 16  
 wage limited and general war. The basic contributions of 17  
 the US armed forces in the Cold War are to: 18

a. Display a position of evident and credible 19  
 military power adequate to convince the Soviet Union 20  
 and Communist China that any use of military force 21  
 for aggression is an unacceptable course of action. 22

b. Utilize resources, as appropriate, to deter or 23  
 defeat communist subversion and insurgency. 24

c. Support collective military security objectives 25  
 for those nations whose ability to contribute is im- 26  
 portant to the United States and/or require assistance 27  
 to withstand the threat of overt or covert aggression. 28  
 29

d. Exploit opportunities to liberate those peoples 1  
under Communist control who are desirous of freedom. 2

24. Counterinsurgency is a major military activity conducted 3  
during the cold war and it may also be conducted during 4  
limited and general war in areas remote from the scene of 5  
active armed conflict. US armed forces will be prepared to 6  
participate, overtly or covertly, in paramilitary and coun- 7  
terinsurgency operations, and to reinforce and support 8  
political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural 9  
programs for the achievement of US national objectives. 10

a. US military counterinsurgency activities will be 11  
conducted to support the attainment of basic US objectives 12  
and to strengthen the Free World by supporting the 13  
development of an adequate counterinsurgency capability 14  
in indigenous military forces and the prosecution of 15  
complementary civic action programs and psychological 16  
operations. 17

b. In friendly countries faced with a threat of internal 18  
or external aggression, military counterinsurgency acti- 19  
vities may include planning, training, support, and operational 20  
assistance and/or reinforcement with US military forces; 21  
including mobile training teams. US MAAGs/Missions 22  
constitute the primary US medium through which military 23  
counterinsurgency assistance is programmed, applied and 24  
evaluated. 25

25. Military intelligence efforts during Cold War will con- 26  
centrate on the collection, production and dissemination of 27  
intelligence designed to provide essential information with 28  
respect to other nations' force composition, capabilities and 29  
vulnerabilities, breakthroughs in technical fields, radical 30  
new weapon systems, changed combat techniques, possible 31  
realignment of alliances, important personalities, potential 32  
areas of conflict or instability, and the provision of a 33  
maximum of tactical and strategic warning. 34

## SECTION D -- LIMITED WAR

26. Limited war is armed conflict short of general war, 1  
exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement 2  
of the military forces of two or more nations. 3
27. Limited wars may occur simultaneously in widely 4  
separated areas and may or may not be preceded by a period 5  
of tension sufficient to permit adequate augmentation, 6  
reinforcement or deployment of forces. Limited military 7  
operations initially conducted at sea and in the air may 8  
precede or occur concurrently with the reinforcement or 9  
deployment of forces. With such assistance as may be 10  
available from indigenous or allied forces, US forces 11  
will take the offensive or hold as practicable pending 12  
the rapid deployment of additional US or allied forces 13  
required to assure defeat of the enemy forces and the 14  
achievement of military objectives. 15
28. Limited war operations will be conducted in such a 16  
manner as to avoid unacceptable degradation of US capabili- 17  
ties to achieve general war objectives. 18
29. The limited war posture of the United States encom- 19  
passes all US military forces capable of contributing to 20  
the limited war effort and will include: 21
- a. Forces deployed on the periphery of communist 22  
countries and in other selected areas in such strength, 23  
composition and disposition as to: 24
- (1) Insure continued access to strategic areas 25  
and demonstrate the determination of the United 26  
States to honor its commitments and to respond to 27  
aggression with appropriate means. 28

- (2) Force indirect aggression to a level openly military in character when such action is in the interests of the United States. 1
- b. US based forces, capable of selective, swift and effective response to support deployed forces or conduct independent operations as required. 2
- c. Forces with special capabilities for counter-insurgency, unconventional warfare and psychological operations, both overt and covert. 3
- d. Selected elements of the reserve forces maintained in a high state of readiness and capable of rapid mobilization and deployment. 4
- e. Forces with a broad range of nuclear capabilities for the attainment of limited objectives. 5
- f. Appropriate means for the timely movement of forces to areas of conflict and for their support. 6
- 30. With respect to our allies, the United States will, as appropriate: 7
- a. Provide military assistance to friendly indigenous forces involved in a limited war, and continue assistance to other nations where it advances US interests and security to do so. 8
- b. Conduct limited war in a manner which enhances allied solidarity and effectiveness, discourages future armed aggression and tends to control the scope and intensity of the conflict so as to minimize the risk of escalation. 9
- c. Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples and territories previously lost through communist military or political aggression. 10

d. Protect the interest of friendly peoples, to include the planned survival in certain areas of the communist nations of known dissident people who can disrupt, on a continuing basis, the enemy's rear areas.

31. Adequate US and allied forces should be maintained not only to accomplish prescribed general war tasks, but also in situations less than general war, take the offensive or hold as appropriate in order to defend allied and friendly peoples and areas.

a. In determining the scale and character of US general purpose forces needed to meet this requirement five conceivable types of Sino-Soviet nonnuclear action or attack should be considered:

- (1) Subversive insurgency.
- (2) Lesser forms of aggression, at any level up to major assault.
- (3) Major assault, based on full use of forces in being which are deployed or readily deployable to the area under attack.
- (4) All-out assault, based on full mobilization and use of all manpower and materiel reserves.
- (5) A war at sea associated with the above action.

b. The scale and character of these general purpose forces also should reflect the latent possibility that either side may elect to employ tactical nuclear weapons at any time during any of these types of attack.

32. US general purpose forces, while maintaining current or comparable overseas deployments, should be sufficient in quantity, quality, mobility, and logistic support to provide in conjunction with our allies the following:

- a. The option for US and allied forces appropriately reinforced to defend, without the use of nuclear weapons, against major nonnuclear assault (see subparagraph 31 a (3)) by Soviet Bloc forces against NATO forces, for the period

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of time necessary to establish that communist forces can 1  
 be successfully held in Western Europe at that level of 2  
 conflict, thereby bringing Soviet leaders up against the 3  
 escalatory risks involved in pursuing military aggression 4  
 against NATO. Credibility and flexibility in exercising 5  
 this option should be enhanced by providing US and selected 6  
 allied forces with tactical nuclear capabilities for use 7  
 if required (see paragraph 33). 8

b. The requirements for the successful conduct of opera- 9  
 tions arising from any one likely major military contingency 10  
 outside the NATO area, without resort to the use of nuclear 11  
 weapons, except as indicated below, while retaining the 12  
 capability to accomplish subparagraph 32a. 13

(1) If hostilities break out in the NATO area while 14  
 engaged in this contingency, it is expected that the 15  
 contingency operation would be reduced to the extent 16  
 necessary to provide forces for NATO while retaining, as 17  
 a minimum, vital strategic base areas and approaches 18  
 thereto. 19

(2) If the United States is already engaged in hostili-20  
 ties in NATO, conduct of operations arising from a major 21  
 military contingency will be conditioned by the scope 22  
 of the NATO requirements and, as a minimum, will provide 23  
 for the defense of vital strategic base areas and 24  
 approaches thereto. 25

(3) If Soviet Bloc or CHICOM forces intervene 26  
 with such force that US objectives could not 27  
 be achieved by nonnuclear operations, the use of nuclear 28  
 weapons would be required. 29

c. The ability to maintain control of required land and 30  
 sea bases, sea areas, and essential air and ground lines of 31  
 communications with nonnuclear weapons, if possible, but be 32  
 prepared to use nuclear weapons, if necessary to accomplish 33  
 this objective. 34

- c. Forces capable of providing for the defense of the United States against attack from the ground, air, sea, or space. 1 2 3
  - d. Suitable forces deployed to selected strategic areas of the world as a demonstration of US determination to honor its commitments and respond to aggression. 4 5 6
  - e. Reserve forces capable of reconstituting and augmenting active forces, and of performing necessary assigned civil defense functions as an important but secondary mission. 7 8 9 10
  - f. Forces with special capabilities for counter-insurgency, unconventional warfare and psychological operations both overt and covert. 11 12 13
  - g. Survivable command and control systems capable of insuring the means for rapid, reliable, and flexible response to any form of enemy aggression. 14 15 16
38. The onset of general war probably will be characterized by the delivery of intensive nuclear blows by both sides. 17 18
- Planned general war operations and deployments of military forces would be affected to a major degree by the outcome of initial offensive and defensive operations. Initial operations will include offensive and defensive operations to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the maximum extent practicable, to degrade further enemy nuclear attack, to retard enemy forces and their support, and execute offensive operations to destroy the Soviet urban/ industrial base, if necessary, to achieve a strategic advantage from which to force enemy capitulation at the earliest possible time. Offensive opportunities created by the initial nuclear attacks will be exploited. Offensive 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

and defensive employment of joint and combined military 1  
 forces and recovery and reconstitution of forces and the 2  
 logistic base will be accomplished to exploit the strategic 3  
 advantage gained by the nuclear operations and to minimize 4  
 any gains which may have been made by the Soviet Union. 5  
 Regardless of conditions under which general war is initiated, 6  
 the United States will maintain a military capability to 7  
 accomplish its general war objectives. 8

39. The strategic nuclear delivery forces will have the 9  
 capability to strike decisively even after absorbing an 10  
 all-out attack on the United States. The employment of a 11  
 mix of strategic nuclear delivery forces will permit a range 12  
 of options at varying levels of intensity of attacks against 13  
 alternate target systems. These forces will be capable 14  
 of discriminate and controlled use under unified or specified 15  
 command, responsive to the strategic direction of the Joint 16  
 Chiefs of Staff and the highest level of civil control. 17

40. The mid-range period will require the best possible 18  
 combination of land and sea launched missiles and manned 19  
 bombers coupled with appropriate defensive forces to assist 20  
 in limiting damage to the United States. Missiles, because 21  
 of their quick reaction, penetration capabilities, and early 22  
 time on target will be most effective in attacking those 23  
 parts of the enemy target systems that are time-sensitive, 24  
 fixed, soft or semi-hardened, and of known location. Bombers 25  
 and other aircraft will continue to be needed to accomplish 26  
 strategic warfare tasks and, in particular, to attack 27  
 hardened and imprecisely located targets. 28

41. The US forces probably will not expend all ready 1  
 strategic nuclear weapons on initial strikes. In the 2  
 conduct of initial strikes, provisions will be made for 3  
 withholding a portion of the force to be released in part 4  
 or in whole under certain attack options or conditions of 5  
 war. The survival potential of the missile launching 6  
 submarine at sea and the hardened ICBM would make them 7  
 particularly suitable as components of the survivable 8  
 strategic reserve. 9

42. Survivable command, control and communications and 10  
 reporting systems, will provide controlled, coordinated 11  
 and informed direction of US forces and combined operations. 12  
 They will provide, insofar as feasible, that the conduct 13  
 and termination of operations of strategic nuclear delivery 14  
 forces are continuously and sensitively responsive to 15  
 decisions by the President or authorities designated by 16  
 him. These forces will be kept continuously under control 17  
 by the appropriate authorities acting through the Joint 18  
 Chiefs of Staff. This control will be exercised before, 19  
 during and after a nuclear attack. Airborne, sea-based 20  
 and underground control centers will be provided where 21  
 desirable and feasible to ensure effective control. 22

43. Operations following the initial nuclear offensive 23  
 will be conducted as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 24  
 to the extent that communications and control structures will 25  
 permit. However, commanders must be prepared, in the event 26  
 of interrupted communications or loss of centralized control 27  
 elements, to continue operations, including nuclear, chemical 28  
 and biological warfare, in consonance with approved plans, 29

over-all US military objectives and their own analysis of 1  
 the situation. The United States and its Allies will 2  
 continue to conduct joint and combined offensive operations 3  
 to defeat remaining enemy military forces and attain US 4  
 and Allied war and post-war objectives. The presence of 5  
 Free World forces in Sino-Soviet territory will be required 6  
 to establish a measure of control over the Sino-Soviet 7  
 population. 8

44. It is necessary that active and passive defense of the 9  
 United States be provided against enemy attack by land, 10  
 sea, air and space, and that our defensive posture emphasize 11  
 forces and measures capable of defending against a joint 12  
 attack by all weapon systems. Minimizing military and 13  
 civil damage can only come from a highly effective combina- 14  
 tion of offensive forces, ABM, air defense forces, ASW 15  
 capability, intelligence, and civil defense. While recogniz- 16  
 ing the desirability of doing so, it will not be possible 17  
 to provide an absolute defense of the United States; however, 18  
 it is necessary that increased emphasis be placed upon 19  
 active and passive defense measures to include: 20

- a. Early and reliable warning of attack. 21
- b. Survivability and defense of US based retaliatory 22  
 striking forces, and other forces using the United States 23  
 as their primary supporting base. 24
- c. A combination of active and passive defense measures 25  
 to limit damage or destruction to our logistical structure, 26  
 industrial base and populations. 27
- d. Effective anti-ballistic missile, air defense, and 28  
 anti-submarine warfare systems. 29

45. To limit damage from a missile attack, timely warning 1  
 will be crucial, particularly to alert manned bombers, soft 2  
 elements of US missile forces, defense forces, and urban 3  
 populations. Missile detection systems will be improved 4  
 and deployed as necessary to optimize detection and warning 5  
 of ballistic missile attack. Satellite based detection and 6  
 warning systems will be deployed to extend the warning time, 7  
 complement land and sea-based systems, and improve credi- 8  
 bility in warning data required. 9

46. An effective active defense against missiles, as 10  
 feasible, will be necessary as an element of over-all US 11  
 active defense capabilities to reduce the effects of enemy 12  
 missile attacks. In combination with available US active 13  
 and passive defense capabilities, damage to the United States 14  
 from such attacks will be reduced by offensive operations 15  
 by US forces, planned redundancy in systems and numbers of 16  
 strategic weapons, hardened US ICBM sites and the concealment, 17  
 mobility and dispersal of other strategic delivery systems. 18

47. Defense against satellite weapons may be required. 19  
 Systems for detecting, tracking and identifying satellites 20  
 will be provided and a capability for destroying or 21  
 neutralizing threatening satellites will be developed 22  
 as necessary. 23

PART V - BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

SECTION A - GENERAL

1. Within the context of the stated purpose of the plan, 1  
 the purpose of Part V is to provide planning guidance for 2  
 assigned responsibilities of the military services and 3  
 definitive basic undertakings envisaged for the commanders 4  
 of unified and specified commands necessary to attainment 5  
 of the military objectives (Part III) in accordance with 6  
 the strategic concept (Part IV). 7

2. The Director of Strategic Target Planning, as an 8  
 agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will develop and main- 9  
 tain the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the 10  
 Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for attack of 11  
 targets in the NSTL. These tasks will be performed in 12  
 conjunction with the commanders of unified and specified 13  
 commands. 14

## SECTION B

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF THE MILITARY SERVICES

3. Cold, Limited and General War. 1
- a. Organize, train, equip and provide the combat 2  
forces and supporting structure necessary for the 3  
attainment of the US military objectives. 4
- b. Support mutual defense arrangements which will 5  
give the United States and its allies the capability 6  
and resolution to deal positively and effectively with 7  
any level of Sino-Soviet threat. 8
- c. Establish and maintain a world-wide system of 9  
bases required to support US and allied strategy. 10
- d. Develop and maintain a military logistics base 11  
sufficiently flexible to meet the requirement of cold, 12  
limited and general war in accordance with the guidance 13  
in Annex B. Provide logistic support for the objective 14  
force levels consistent with the strategic concept and 15  
the basic undertakings of the commanders of unified 16  
and specified commands as contained in the JSOP. 17
- e. Develop and maintain the capability required to 18  
meet assigned intelligence functions and responsibilities. 19  
Service capabilities will be designed to contribute to 20  
the coordinated DOD intelligence effort, particularly 21  
in providing analysis from multiple professional points 22  
of view of Soviet Bloc and Communist Chinese capabilities, 23  
vulnerabilities and possible courses of action. This 24  
capability must provide the maximum possible advance 25  
warning of impending attack or contemplated aggression 26  
and the means for rapid evaluation and dissemination of 27  
vital information. It should also provide for the early 28  
detection of communist subversive activity, or communist 29  
inspired insurgent actions. 30

- f. Pursue a dynamic research and development program 1  
to insure the most effective armed forces and US 2  
military posture. To this end: 3
  - (1) Utilize the basic and most advanced research 4  
capabilities of the nation, both private and 5  
governmental, to discover and take advantage of 6  
new possibilities for the improvement of US 7  
military technology. 8
  - (2) Expedite by all practicable steps the trans- 9  
lation of research and development into new and 10  
improved weapons and equipment required by the armed 11  
forces. 12
- g. Assist selected allies in developing and producing 13  
their own advanced weapon systems and in attaining the 14  
highest degree of self-sufficiency in maintaining and 15  
supporting these systems. 16
- h. Increase mutual support with allies in selective 17  
research and development for military application and 18  
facilitate the exchange and utilization of Free World 19  
scientific and technological resources. 20
- i. Develop and maintain capabilities for unconventional 21  
warfare and psychological operations to exploit existing 22  
dissidence and disaffection among peoples of the Soviet 23  
Bloc and Communist China and create resistance and 24  
guerrilla activities behind enemy lines and within his 25  
home territory. 26
- j. Within programmed resources and as appropriate, 27  
develop and maintain a capability to participate 28  
overtly or covertly in paramilitary and counter- 29  
insurgency operations. 30

- k. Provide a capability to defend against and to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such weapons will enhance the offensive and defense effectiveness of the armed forces. 1  
2  
3  
4
- l. Provide reserve forces to augment active forces as required by this plan. 5  
6
- m. Provide for logistic support of free world forces from US resources in accordance with MAP or international logistics arrangements, or, where vital US interests are involved. 7  
8  
9  
10
- n. Expand the production base and production rate when appropriate. 11  
12
- o. Provide, as appropriate, for the survival, recovery, and reconstitution of US military forces and their support, as may be necessary, to meet general war requirements. 13  
14  
15
- p. Prepare a plan, or plans, to assist as appropriate in the survival, recovery, and reconstitution of the US production base with priority on those elements essential for military operations. 16  
17  
18  
19
- q. Provide military assistance to selected nations in which an increased military capability is important to collective security and US interests. 20  
21  
22
- r. Plan for and be prepared to provide emergency assistance to the extent that higher priority missions permit, in civil defense, recovery and reconstitution tasks. 23  
24  
25  
26
- s. Develop and maintain a world-wide military command and control system, as survivable as feasible. 27  
28

- t. Develop and maintain communications-electronics 1
- capabilities to provide command and administrative 2
- support to insure the most effective military posture. 3

SECTION C

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS ENVISIONED AS APPLICABLE TO COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

- 4. Cold, Limited and General War 1
  - a. Contribute to the deterrence or defeat of aggression by the show of force, the threat of force or the use of force in an appropriate manner or degree when and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2-5
  - b. Demonstrate obvious US interest and readiness to discharge its mutual security and treaty obligations. 6-7
  - c. Exploit US military capabilities in overseas areas in coordination with other US agencies overseas to assist in preventing communism or other movements inimical to US interests from gaining political control of independent nations, in neutralizing the international communist apparatus, and in bringing about acceptable changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Bloc and Chinese communist regimes. 8-15
  - d. Be prepared to participate, as directed, overtly or covertly, in unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, and psychological operations. 16-18
  - e. Be prepared to employ the CIA forces assigned in accomplishing tasks in the fields of clandestine intelligence, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. 19-22
  - f. Take such actions as necessary to convince our allies that US strategy and policy serve their security as well as that of the United States. 23-25
  - g. Plan for and implement approved Military Assistance Programs and international logistic arrangements as directed. 26-27

h. Be prepared to provide forces and support to other commanders of unified and specified commands as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. Be prepared to commit forces which will have an appropriate capability and which could be made available for commitment to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

j. Maintain the security of their commands, prepare plans to attain military objectives in their areas and conduct operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

k. Wherever practicable, plan to protect the interests of friendly peoples. This may well include the planned survival in certain areas of known dissident peoples who can disrupt the enemy's rear areas.

1. Plan to limit damage within the area of conflict consistent with achievement of military objectives.

m. Carry out planning and implementing responsibilities for the evacuation of United States noncombatant and certain non-US persons in accordance with applicable guidance.

n. Provide appropriate support to allied and indigenous forces.

o. Utilize to the maximum, allied and indigenous forces and resources in carrying out assigned basic undertakings.

- p. When directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, act  
swiftly and effectively to defeat and/or suppress  
aggression, applying force in a manner and on a scale  
best calculated to attain United States objectives. In  
limited war, avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons  
if practicable, weighing the advantages of their use  
against the risk of escalation of conflict. 1
- q. Deter limited war by demonstrating United States  
intent and readiness to make all such conflicts  
unprofitable. 2
- r. Conduct military operations in implementation of  
plans when and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3
- s. Assist and support limited war actions of other  
commanders when and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of  
Staff. 4
- t. Maintain the security of forces assigned and  
protect the United States, its possessions, and US  
bases against attack or hostile incursion. 5
- u. Coordinate plans with other commanders who have  
contiguous fields of responsibility and cooperate with  
and support them as appropriate in the accomplishment  
of their assigned mission. 6
- v. Establish, or seize, maintain and control essential  
bases, land or sea areas, air spaces, communications and  
LOCs as directed. 7
- w. In general War, attack targets in consonance  
with the SIOP and other approved plans as directed by  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Program no attacks against  
SIOP targets unless provided for by the SIOP. 8

- x. Establish and maintain an effective intelligence collection and production capability designed to provide the best possible and most effective analysis of possible enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action, and the means for rapid evaluation and dissemination of vital information. This capability must also provide for an effective counter-intelligence capability to deny to possible enemies information vital to United States security. 1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9
  
- y. Provide for and maintain effective joint communications-electronics policies and programs to ensure that adequate communications are available to support contingency operations. 10  
11  
12  
13

SECTION D

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS ENVISIONED AS APPLICABLE TO DESIGNATED  
COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDS

- 5. Commander in Chief, Alaska 1
- a. Cold, Limited, and General War 2
- (1) Defend Alaska, with emphasis on installations 3  
            in the Fairbanks-Kodiak-Anchorage area. 4
- (2) Conduct operations to detect and prevent or 5  
            disrupt enemy attempts to establish lodgments within 6  
            the area of ALCOM. 7
- (3) Coordinate planning and operations with 8  
            appropriate adjacent Canadian commanders in 9  
            accordance with existing Canada-US agreements. 10
- (4) Provide military forces to meet national 11  
            commitments in the defense of Canada and the United 12  
            States in accordance with appropriate Canada-US 13  
            defense plans. 14
- (5) As the Commander, Alaskan NORAD Region, under 15  
            CINCINORAD or CINCONAD as appropriate: 16
- (a) Exercise operational control over all air 17  
                defense forces for the air defense of Alaska. 18
- (b) Exercise operational control over that 19  
                portion of the DEW line that is located within 20  
                the Alaskan NORAD Region. 21
- (c) Maintain and operate the Aleutian extension 22  
                of the DEW system and insure that plans for, and 23  
                operation of, this portion of the DEW system are 24  
                responsive to the needs of CINCINORAD or CINCONAD, 25  
                as appropriate. 26

6. Commander in Chief, Atlantic

1

a. Cold War

2

(1) Be prepared to:

3

(a) Defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea.

4

5

(b) Defend the Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal.

6

7

(c) Counter communist aggression or internal uprisings in the LANTCOM area, including the mounting of operations to neutralize Cuba.

8

9

10

(d) Maintain the security of US possessions and bases in the Caribbean and Atlantic and protect the sea communications in the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the southwestern Indian Ocean.

11

12

13

14

(e) Conduct submarine, antisubmarine, amphibious and mining operations; control and protect US shipping throughout the Atlantic Ocean, the western portion of the Indian Ocean and their contiguous waters.

15

16

17

18

19

(f) Provide military forces to meet national commitments in the Canada-US regional area.

20

21

(g) Prevent or disrupt enemy attempts to establish lodgements within LANTCOM area of responsibility.

22

23

24

(h) Conduct NATO operations in accordance with NATO policy.

25

26

(2) Assist in the maintenance of a defense structure for the NATO countries against attack by the USSR and

27

28

its satellites and provide forces as directed to NATO  
to meet US military commitments.

(3) Be responsible for the seaward extension of  
the DEW System from Greenland to the United Kingdom,  
insuring that the operation of these elements of the  
early warning system is responsive to the needs of  
CINCNORAD (or CINCONAD, as appropriate).

(4) Be responsible for the sea surveillance system  
in the LANTCOM area and dissemination of information  
therefrom.

b. Limited War. Conduct appropriate basic under-  
takings for Cold War and the following:

(1) Conduct operations to seize or neutralize  
enemy or potential enemy bases of operations.

(2) In the event of limited war in areas other  
than LANTCOM, protect sea communications in the  
LANTCOM area and defend the Atlantic approaches to  
the Panama Canal.

(3) Under the provisions of the Inter-American  
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, provide military  
assistance in re-establishing peace in event of an  
armed attack or other aggression against any other  
signator.

c. General War. Conduct appropriate basic under-  
takings for Cold War and Limited War and the following:

(1) Support CINCNORAD (or CINCONAD, as appropriate)  
in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Chiefs  
of Staff and mutual agreements by the commanders  
concerned.

(2) Destroy those target systems and major enemy concentrations whose destruction will have an immediate effect on the retardation of the Sino-Soviet offensives. 1  
2  
3  
4

(3) When directed, attack targets or target systems in accordance with the concept for the employment of nuclear delivery forces as set forth in the SIOP. 5  
6  
7

(4) Exploit offensive opportunities. 8

(5) With respect to NATO operations: 9  
10

(a) Pass operational control of designated US forces to allied commanders upon assumption of operational control of assigned forces by NATO commanders and continue to exercise directive authority in the furnishing of logistic support to these forces. 11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16


(b) In the event SACLANT is delayed in assuming operational control of assigned forces, conduct military operations in consonance with appropriate portions of SACLANT's EDP and the Canada-US Basic Security Plan. 17  
18  
19  
20  
21

(c) In the event the NATO strategic concept fails: 22  
23

1. Execute emergency plans for the security of US forces, for the protection of allied shipping placed under SACLANT control, and for offensive operations against the Soviet Bloc and Communist China. 24  
25  
26  
27  
28

2. Support USCINCEUR in controlling or denying the use of the exits to the Baltic. 29  
30

- (6) Retain the Azores, Antilles, Bermuda and Iceland as the bases of operations. 1  
2
- 7. Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command 3
- a. Cold War 4
- (1) Be prepared to: 5
  - (a) Defend the Continental United States, 6
    - including Alaska and US installations in Greenland, 7
    - against aircraft, missiles and space systems if 8
    - unilateral US action is required. 9
  - (b) Assist in the defense of Mexico against 10
    - air attack in accordance with approved plans and 11
    - agreements. 12
- (2) Maintain and operate that portion of the DEW 13
  - system and EMEWS located in Greenland. 14
- b. Limited and General War. In addition to conducting 15
  - the basic undertakings for Cold War, without duplicating 16
  - the functions and responsibilities of CINCNORAD, CINCONAD 17
  - will: 18
    - (1) Exercise operational command over all US 19
      - forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available. 20
    - (2) Coordinate, implement and control purely 21
      - national actions, in defending the Continental United 22
      - States, including Alaska, against air attack if 23
      - unilateral US action is required. Primary emphasis, 24
      - not necessarily in order of priority, will be on 25
      - the defense of: 26





- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4 (e) Selected facilities of the Key Facilities
- 5 List not included under the installations and areas
- 6 listed above to the extent that forces are available.
- 7 (3) Defend US installations in Greenland against
- 8 air attack.
- 9 (4) Assist in the defense of Mexico against air
- 10 attack, in accordance with approved plans and agreements.
- 11 (5) Provide military forces to meet national
- 12 commitments in the Canada-US regional area.
- 13 (6) Defend against space systems.
- 14 8. Commander in Chief, US European Command
- 15 a. Cold War
- 16 (1) Be prepared to:
- 17 (a) Conduct prescribed military operations in
- 18 the defense of Western Europe.
- 19 (b) Take action to counter communist aggression,
- 20 incursions, infiltrations, insurgency and other
- 21 similar acts.
- 22 (c) Assist nations within the CINCEUR area of
- 23 responsibility to resist communist encroachment.
- 24 (d) Assist Yugoslavia in the event of attacks
- 25 on her by elements of the Soviet Bloc.
- 26 (e) Assist in the defense of Spain.
- 27 (f) Assist any revolutionary outbreak that
- 28 may occur within communist-dominated territories
- 29 within USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.
- 30 (g) Conduct NATO operations in accordance
- 31 with NATO policy.

- (2) Assist in the maintenance of a defense structure for the NATO countries. Provide military forces to meet US commitments to NATO as directed. 1  
2  
3
- (3) Maintain US position in Berlin to include land and air access. 4  
5
- (4) Participate, as required, in tripartite and quadripartite actions on Berlin and conduct unilateral operations in order to maintain, consistent with the defense of NATO countries, the US position in Berlin. 6  
7  
8  
9
- b. Limited War. Conduct appropriate basic undertakings for Cold War and the following: 10  
11
  - (1) In event of limited war other than in the area of USEUCOM, intensify readiness of the US forces in the NATO area. 12  
13  
14
  - (2) Conduct military operations, including amphibious operations, provided for in approved contingency plans or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 15  
16  
17
- c. General War. Conduct appropriate basic undertakings for Cold War, Limited War and the following: 18  
19
  - (1) Destroy those target systems and major enemy concentrations whose destruction will have an immediate effect on the retardation of Soviet attack. 20  
21  
22
  - (2) ~~When directed, attack targets or target systems~~ in accordance with the concept for the employment of nuclear delivery forces as set forth in SIOP and other approved plans. 23  
24  
25  
26
  - (3) Exploit offensive opportunities. 27
  - (4) With respect to NATO operations: 28
    - (a) Pass operational control of designated US forces to allied commanders upon assumption of operational control of assigned forces by SACEUR, 29  
30  
31

and continue to exercise directive authority in 1  
the furnishing of logistic support to these forces. 2

(b) In the event SACEUR is delayed in assuming 3  
operational control of assigned forces, conduct 4  
military operations in consonance with appropriate 5  
portions of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan. 6

(c) Additionally, in the event that the NATO 7  
strategic concept fails: 8

1. With the assistance of allies, provide 9  
for holding as far forward as possible along 10  
the general line of Norway (the Trondheim and 11  
Stavanger areas), the British Isles, the 12  
Iberian Peninsula (along the Pyrenees), Italy 13  
(along the French and Italian Alps), Yugoslavia 14  
and Greece (along the general line Ljubljana 15  
Gap - Dinaric Alps - the mountains of 16  
Herzegovina and Montenegro - the Greek border) 17  
and Turkey (along the Demirkapi - Catalca 18  
Line in West Turkey and the Erzurum line in 19  
East Turkey). 20

2. Conduct delaying actions and such phased 21  
withdrawals as feasible, west and south to the 22  
line of the Pyrenees. 23

3. Execute strategic demolitions, as required. 24

4. Control or deny the use of the exits to 25  
the Baltic and Turkish Straits. 26

5. Conduct operations as directed. 27

9. Commander in Chief, Pacific 1
- a. Cold War 2
- (1) Be prepared to: 3
- (a) Defend the United States against attack 4  
through the Pacific Ocean. 5
- (b) Defend the Pacific approaches to the Panama 6  
Canal. 7
- (c) Conduct submarine, antisubmarine, amphibious 8  
and mining operations; control and protect shipping 9  
throughout the Pacific Ocean, the eastern portion 10  
of the Indian Ocean, and their contiguous waters. 11
- (d) Counter communist aggression or subversive 12  
insurgency and assist in maintaining the security 13  
and integrity of both Free World and neutral nations 14  
in PACOM area. 15
- (e) [REDACTED] 16
- (f) Provide forces and support to CINCUNC in 17  
the defense of Republic of Korea; be prepared to 18  
conduct such defense in the event the UN resolution 19  
should be abrogated or terminated. 20
- (g) Assist any revolutionary outbreak that may 21  
occur within Communist China, North Korea, North 22  
Vietnam, or other communist-held areas. 23
- (h) Defend Taiwan and the Penghus and, if 24  
directed, the Offshore Islands in coordination 25  
with the forces of the Nationalist Government of 26  
the Republic of China. 27
- (i) Maintain the security of US possessions 28  
and bases in the Pacific Ocean and protect the 29  
sea communications in the Pacific Ocean, the 30  
Bering Sea and the eastern Indian Ocean. 31

(2) Be responsible for the seaward extension of the DEW system from Umnak Island to Midway Island and insure that the operation of this extension of the early warning system is responsive to the needs of CINCNORAD (or CINCONAD, if appropriate).

(3) Be responsible for the sea surveillance system and dissemination of information therefrom.

b. Limited War. Conduct appropriate basic undertakings for cold war and the following:

(1) Conduct operations to seize or neutralize enemy or potential enemy bases of operations.

(2) In the event of limited war in areas other than PACOM, protect sea communications in the Pacific Ocean and Alaskan Waters and defend the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal.

(3) Provide forces to SEATO or support SEATO in the defense of Southeast Asia; conduct such defense in the event a SEATO command is not operative.

(4) Under the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, provide military assistance in re-establishing peace in event of an armed attack or other aggression against any other signator.

c. General War. Conduct appropriate basic undertakings for cold war, limited war and the following:

(1) Destroy those target systems and major enemy concentrations whose destruction will have an immediate effect on the retardation of the Sino-Soviet offensives.

(2) When directed, attack targets or target systems in accordance with the concept for the employment of nuclear delivery forces as set forth in the SIOP and other approved plans.

(3) Exploit offensive opportunities.

(4) Employ US forces in conjunction with allied forces in order to:

(a) Hold along the general line Southeast Asia,




(b) Assist appropriate allies in the defense of Taiwan, the Penghus, Indonesia, Malayasia, Australia, and New Zealand.

(c) Retain Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines as major bases of operation.

(d) Provide US support as practicable to facilitate operations by indigenous forces against Communist-held Asia.

(e) Contain CHICOM and Soviet forces, and neutralize enemy supporting bases in Communist-held-Asia.

(f) Defend in Korea



(5) Support CINCNORAD (or CINCONAD, as appropriate), 1  
 in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Chiefs 2  
 of Staff and mutual agreements by the commanders 3  
 concerned. 4

(6) Provide military forces to meet national commit- 5  
 ments in the Canada-United States Regional area. 6

10. Commander in Chief, US Southern Command 7

a. Cold War. Be prepared to: 8

(1) Conduct the local defense of the Panama Canal. 9

(2) Conduct operations to detect and prevent or 10  
 disrupt enemy attempts to establish lodgments within 11  
 the area of USSOUTHCOM, and to seize or neutralize 12  
 such lodgments, if established. 13

(3) Counter uprisings in USSOUTHCOM area which 14  
 threaten the use of the Panama Canal. 15

(4) Take action to counter communist aggression, 16  
 incursions, infiltrations, insurgency, and other 17  
 similar acts. 18

b. Limited War 19

(1) Conduct undertaking specified in 10a above. 20

(2) Coordinate with CINCPAC and CINCLANT, and with 21  
 British, Venezuelan, Dutch, and other national authori- 22  
 ties specifically designated by the Secretary of 23  
 Defense, in the protection of sources of strategic 24  
 materials and supporting installations, paying par- 25  
 ticular attention to the threat of sabotage and 26  
 minor raiding action. 27

(3) Under provisions of the Inter-American Treaty 28  
 of Reciprocal Assistance, provide military assistance 29

in re-establishing peace in event of an armed attack  
or other aggression against any other signator.

c. General War. Conduct undertakings specified in 10a  
and 10b above and other tasks as directed by the Joint  
Chiefs of Staff.

11. Commander in Chief, US Strike Command/US Commander in  
Chief, Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa South of the  
Sahara

a. In his capacity as Commander in Chief, United States  
Strike Command

(1) Cold War

(a) Provide a general reserve of combat-ready  
forces to reinforce other unified commands as  
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Exercise operational command of forces  
assigned to discharge the functional responsibili-  
ties for training, including joint training exer-  
cises, and for the development of appropriate  
recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
regarding doctrine and techniques for the joint  
employment of forces assigned. In fulfilling  
these functional responsibilities, CINCSTRIKE will  
~~not exercise those functions of command concerning~~  
~~control of intelligence and communications asso-~~  
~~ciated with area responsibility.~~

(c) Be prepared to deploy domestic disturbance  
forces; such deployment will be as directed by the  
Chief of Staff, US Army, acting as the executive  
agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Limited War. During limited war, perform as  
applicable, those tasks listed under cold war, and as  
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) General War. In the event of general war, 1  
 continue to perform the appropriate tasks listed 2  
 under cold and limited war and as directed by the 3  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4

b. In his capacity as US Commander in Chief, Middle East, 5  
Southern Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara 6

(1) Cold War 7

(a) Be prepared to conduct contingency opera- 8  
 tions in the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa 9  
 South of the Sahara (MEAFSA Area) as directed by 10  
 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including support of 11  
 non-Communist governments in event of internal 12  
 uprisings, show of force, and blockade operations 13  
 as well as higher intensity situations. 14

(b) Establish liaison with US Representative 15  
 to the Permanent Military Deputies Group (PMDG) 16  
 of the CENTO and insure that US unilateral plans 17  
 for the MEAFSA area, take into account the military 18  
 plans of CENTO. 19

(c) Coordinate planning with the UK as directed 20  
 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 21

(d) Be prepared to conduct, in coordination 22  
with other appropriate commanders of the unified 23  
and specified commands, joint exercises related 24  
 to the MEAFSA area. 25

(e) Conduct cold war activities, including MAP. 26

(2) Limited War. During limited war perform, as 27  
 applicable, those tasks listed above under cold war, 28  
 and: 29

Execute contingency operations in the MEASA area 30  
 as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 31

(3) General War. In the event of general war, continue to perform the appropriate undertakings listed under cold and limited war and conduct operations in the MEAFSA area in support of the strategic concept for defense of the Middle East.

12. Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

a. Cold War. Maintain and demonstrate a high state of readiness for general war and be prepared to support limited war operations of other commanders.

b. Limited War.

(1) Be prepared to increase status of alert.

(2) Be prepared for the global employment of conventional and/or nuclear weapons as required in demonstration of US determination to resist aggression.

(3) Continue to maintain a ready and effective general war posture.

(4) Attack targets or target systems which support limited war plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands, utilizing conventional and/or nuclear weapons as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. General War. In addition to appropriate basic undertakings for Cold and Limited War:

(1) When directed, attack targets or target systems in accordance with the concept for the employment of nuclear delivery forces as set forth in SIOP.

(2) Consistent with the performance of the primary mission, be responsive to requests of the commanders of the other unified and specified commands in accomplishing destruction of target systems and major enemy concentrations in order to assist in the retardation of the

Sino-Soviet offensives.