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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today US efforts to assist the former Soviet republics in dismantling their nuclear and chemical weapons and in preventing proliferation. The focus of my remarks will be on a number of US initiatives with which we have tried to seize the historic opportunity created by the demise of the Soviet Union to help eliminate the last vestiges of the Cold War and to help bring about lasting and enduring reforms in the former Soviet Union.

The revolutionary events in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union of the last two years are truly unprecedented. In the short span of two years, we have seen the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, and finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.

There is real cause for optimism and hope for the future of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. We are encouraged by the statements and actions of President Yeltsin and other leaders which indicate broad acceptance of democratic values. We can take great pride in our role in promoting this peaceful revolution. It is not simply that we stood with the democratic forces opposing the coup attempt last August. Rather, it is a testament to our dedication over the last five decades to oppose the totalitarian Communist system. This dedication gave hope at the darkest moments and helped ensure that the democratic spirit was still alive when the conditions for effective reform finally emerged.

A Future Based on Cooperation

The demise of the Soviet Union provides an historic opportunity to build on our past efforts and to move to a future based not on confrontation, but on cooperation. The states of the former Soviet Union can become active, constructive participants in the democratic community of nations. Already, we are working with the nations of Eastern Europe and are developing frameworks for greater interaction and cooperation. It remains in our interest to anchor the new states of the former Soviet Union firmly in the West and to ensure that they abandon forever their totalitarian past and join the broader community of nations committed to democratic values. It is this vision -- of a global community of nations with

shared values and principles -- which defines the new world order.

To achieve our goal of a future based on partnership and cooperation, we will need to work with the republics of the former Soviet Union to accomplish two tasks. First, successfully to eliminate the last vestiges of the Cold War. This means ensuring the reorientation of military forces -- most especially nuclear forces -- to non-threatening and non-destabilizing postures. It also means helping to bring about the demilitarization of Soviet society and reducing the potential for proliferation of technologies for weapons of mass destruction. Having torn down the frameworks of the past, the second task will be to help build new institutions and structures capable of sustaining lasting political and economic reforms. This means that the United States and its allies must be prepared to provide their collective advice, technical expertise and support to the democratic reformers in their efforts to build new societies. Our ability to succeed in this second endeavor will be greatly influenced by our success with the first.

I want to focus the bulk of my remarks on US efforts of particular interest to the Department of Defense which are designed to help accomplish the first task. These include initiatives to help ensure the safety, security, disablement, and dismantlement of nuclear forces and chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union. I also want to address one of the potential troublesome consequences of the rapid demilitarization now occurring in the former Soviet Union: that is, the risk of militarily-related technology and expertise flowing out of the republics.

### Nuclear Forces

The end of East-West confrontation has made it possible for the two sides to contemplate both reducing radically the size of their nuclear arsenals and fundamentally restructuring their nuclear postures. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has provided added impetus and given a greater urgency to our task. Our basic approach to dealing with the new republics on nuclear issues was predicated from the very start on the following:

The failed August coup and the triumph of democratic reformers offered the US a window of opportunity to influence decisions on the future composition and posture of nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union. It was vital that we move quickly to seize this opportunity.

The security of tactical nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union was of paramount concern, because the potential for loss of control of these systems -- which are small, widely deployed, and easily transportable -- was the greatest.

A dramatic reduction in the most threatening and adversarial

aspects of nuclear postures, and in the potential for accidents and miscalculations, would be essential elements of a future cooperative relationship.

Development of a single, unified authority for the command and control of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union would help ensure the maintenance of this non-threatening and non-adversarial relationship.

Finally, events provided an opportunity to move beyond traditional arms control approaches, involving drawn out negotiations, to achieve our objectives. By setting an example with unilateral initiatives, we could induce positive developments more quickly than by proceeding with traditional negotiations.

Let me first address US initiatives concerning tactical nuclear weapons.

#### Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In the immediate aftermath of August coup attempt, the US and its NATO Allies were especially concerned about the fate of the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons spread among the republics of the Soviet Union. The threatened breakdown of a centralized military created the potential for the loss of effective control over these weapons.

The President's 27 September nuclear initiative was designed, in large measure, to address this urgent concern. As you will recall, the President called for the global elimination of all US and Soviet ground-launched tactical nuclear systems. He further directed that US tactical nuclear weapons be removed from all surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft bases, and challenged the Soviets to take reciprocal steps.

We had several goals in mind. First, as I have noted above, we sought to encourage what was then the "center" to gain early, effective control over the tactical nuclear weapons that were widely deployed around the Soviet Union and on operational naval vessels. Second, by calling for elimination of ground-launched tactical systems, we wanted to help ensure that the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons would be significantly smaller and safer. Finally, we wanted to give new leaders the incentive to shift their resources away from the business of building and maintaining nuclear weapons toward the business of building civilian economies to sustain democracy.

President Gorbachev responded positively to our proposals on 5 October. He committed the Soviet Union to the elimination of its entire inventory of ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons. He further pledged reciprocal removal of naval nuclear weapons from

their operational platforms, and the removal from operational forces of nuclear warheads for air defense missiles; he committed the Soviet Union to eliminate a portion of these nuclear forces.

Since that time, the states of the former Soviet Union have undertaken important steps toward implementing these commitments, which I will detail in just a minute. We are pleased that these officials have taken a positive attitude in addressing the disposition of tactical nuclear weapons. As a result, we believe that we are well on our way to achieving one of the primary goals of the President's 27 September initiative.

#### Weapon Safety, Security and Dismantlement

As I have stated, concern over the continued safety and security of Soviet tactical systems was a primary reason behind the President's September initiative for mutual elimination of these systems. But along with this concern was an assessment, at the highest levels of the Administration, that we had an opportunity to further enhance US security by working with the Soviets on improving the safety and security for nuclear weapons, including during the dismantlement process. As a consequence, as part of the President's September initiative, we also made an unprecedented proposal to discuss technical cooperation with the USSR on nuclear safety, security, and dismantlement -- what we now term "SSD." I would like to address our efforts in this area, which I believe are now beginning to bear fruit.

During the course of our discussions over the last four months with republic officials, we have pressed them to do four things:

Quickly Consolidate Nuclear Holdings. Driven by our concerns about the physical security of Soviet weapons following the failed coup attempt, we wanted to ensure that these weapons would remain in responsible hands, and out of the hands of third parties, especially terrorist groups.

Rapidly Disable Weapons Slated for Elimination. This would provide an extra factor of safety and reduce the potential for disastrous consequences should the weapons fall into the wrong hands.

Safely Store Nuclear Weapons. We encouraged civilian and military leaders, as a first step, to store weapons at existing centralized defense facilities. In order to further reduce the risks from any unauthorized access or attempted use, we also encouraged authorities, where possible, to remove and store separately components of nuclear weapons.

Accelerate Schedules for Weapons Elimination. We wanted to take advantage of a window of opportunity to gain a firm commitment from political leaders for the earliest possible

destruction of the nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner.

Shortly after the President's speech, Ambassador Bartholomew and I, along with other senior US officials, met in Moscow with officials of the Center, Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan to provide further explanations of the President's initiatives. We invited representatives, to include technical experts, to continue this dialogue in Washington the following month. Our strategy focused on encouraging them to take near-term steps to enhance safety and security and to identify their specific needs to the US, so that we could provide practical assistance that would speed up their weapon elimination program in a safe and secure way.

At the Washington experts' meeting in November, the US provided comprehensive briefings on our approach to safety, security and dismantlement issues. We probed for ways we could provide practical assistance to their dismantlement activities. Frankly, Soviet experts may have been taken aback by our forthright approach to issues that they still considered sensitive. But they did ask us to provide a list of questions for a follow-up meeting in Moscow in December and promised that, for that meeting, they would prepare a list of requirements.

Unfortunately, these officials were either unable or unwilling to respond quickly on SSD in December. Thanks, in part, to Secretary Baker's extensive discussions with key political leaders in the republics, we saw a much more constructive approach in January.

In providing additional detail on the status of their nuclear forces, they told us that by the end of January entire categories of tactical nuclear systems would be withdrawn to Russia to installations near dismantling facilities. They further said that tactical nuclear systems remaining in Ukraine and Byelarus -- which they claim are no longer in the hands of operational units -- would be withdrawn to Russia by 1 July, as called for in the Minsk accord. Russian officials do not want our help in this part of the process, and we do not believe that we could do much to accelerate it.

We also learned something of their procedures for disabling their nuclear weapons. They told us that prior to movement to storage areas, military units disable nuclear weapons to significantly reduce the risks involved in their movement. At the storage sites, they reportedly further disable the weapons to the point where the process is difficult to reverse. We were told that some weapons have already been disassembled into component parts.

US SSD experts stayed in place an additional week to continue detailed discussions. We provided additional briefings and documentation on types of assistance the US could offer, and

discussed some innovative approaches to address the problems identified by the Russians.

During these discussions, we learned more about the possible bottlenecks in the dismantlement process. Control over the weapons must eventually be transferred from the military to the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI), which has been given the destruction task. Part of the problem comes from the fact that MAPI is almost exclusively in the weapons building business; they have never had to dismantle such large numbers of nuclear weapons in short order.

MAPI officials told us that the most significant impediment to speedy dismantlement was their lack of suitable long-term storage facilities and containers for the plutonium and uranium from dismantled weapons. They also identified the need for additional transportation assets, as well as specialized containers for transporting nuclear weapons, components and materials, in order to increase the effectiveness and speed of the dismantlement process.

To begin resolving the storage problem, Russia suggested that US aid, in the amount of \$400 million, could be used to construct an entirely new 20,000-square-meter storage facility. We made clear that, while it was up to Russia to decide its requirement for the ultimate disposition of nuclear materials from dismantled weapons, an additional concept merited consideration. The US suggested that prior to ultimate disposition, plutonium and uranium from dismantled weapons could be stored in existing military nuclear weapons storage facilities, occupying space vacated by dismantled weapons. This approach would allow for the completion of at least initial dismantlement five years sooner than under the current Russian plan.

So, what are the next steps? We are looking at providing specialized rail cars and containers to address Russian needs for additional transportation and container assets. While the rail cars currently exist, they will have to be refurbished, modified and transported to Russia, which will undoubtedly cost several million dollars. Manufacturing specialized containers will also involve a costly assistance package.

In addition, we will continue our discussions about their problems in storing components and nuclear materials from dismantled weapons. We will pursue the ideas proposed by the Russians. We have also described some alternative plans for addressing their requirements which we believe might be less costly.

In another area related to nuclear weapon safety, the US is very interested in exploring the idea of having experts from both sides sit down to discuss how each side would respond to a potential nuclear weapon accident. While this is a complex area

for logistical and security reasons, if such experts discussion prove fruitful, they could lay the basis for possible US assistance and cooperation in the event of a Russian nuclear weapon accident. We are pleased that President Yeltsin has expressed interest in this idea.

In sum, I think the prospects are good for beginning some tangible assistance efforts in the next several weeks. We have taken the first steps toward determining where the bulk of our assistance will be most effective in speeding our goal of the safe and secure destruction of the nuclear weapons that are to be eliminated.

Let me now turn to initiatives which have been designed primarily to address the strategic nuclear equation.

#### Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons

Another way in which we tried to ensure the security of Soviet nuclear weapons and to reduce the potential risks to US security was by encouraging the development of a single, unified operational command for all former Soviet nuclear forces. From the outset, we described single control of nuclear weapons as an essential element for our future relationship.

While we consistently pushed this goal, we understood that the former Soviet republics had to work out their own solution. We believed that suitable arrangements would ultimately be developed, but these had to reflect the underlying political relationships that developed among the republics and with the military.

In the end, we are quite satisfied that an appropriate command and control arrangement has been achieved. While final launch authority is vested with the President of Russia, the Minsk and Alma Ata accords provide that he act only with agreement of the leaders of the other three states in which nuclear forces remain and only after consultations with all other Commonwealth leaders. These strong political consultation arrangements should promote the kind of responsibility which we sought to encourage.

#### Alert Status

Another tangible way to demonstrate that the adversarial nature of superpower relations is coming to a close -- but where some uncertainties and risks for miscalculation still remain -- is to take steps to reduce the alert status of a portion of each country's strategic nuclear forces. On this basis, as part of the September 27 initiative, the President removed US strategic nuclear bombers from alert status, and placed associated nuclear weapons in storage sites. For the first time since the 1950s, not a single US strategic bomber was parked, fueled and ready to fly missions at a moment's notice. He also directed that the US immediately take off

alert the Minuteman II force, which was originally scheduled to be eliminated over a period of several years under the terms of START. President Bush invited the Soviet Union to take reciprocal measures.

Once again, the Soviets responded. In October, President Gorbachev noted that the Soviet Union would remove several hundred missiles from alert status. President Yeltsin indicated last week that Russia is prepared to go much further and to remove from alert within three years all strategic systems scheduled to be eliminated under START. We have urged officials from each of the former Soviet republics in which strategic nuclear missiles are deployed to do their part in facilitating early deactivation of these forces. This would send an important political indication that they want to quickly establish a new friendly relationship with the West.

#### Restructured Nuclear Force Postures

We have also sought to move quickly beyond what is required by START to achieve not only further reductions in the size of our nuclear arsenals, but also the elimination of the most destabilizing nuclear systems -- multiple warhead ICBMs. Perpetuation of Cold War strategic nuclear force structures will only be an impediment to improving relations.

The President's nuclear initiatives of 27 September, and those most recently unveiled during the State of the Union address, were designed to give added impetus to the former Soviet republics to reduce the size of their nuclear posture, as well to restructure it, in light of the absence of any threat from the West. In September, the President terminated several aspects of our strategic modernization program. He called for the cancellation of mobility programs for the small ICBM and Peacekeeper missiles and he terminated the short-range attack missile (SRAM II) program.

In January, he committed the US to go further. He announced that the US would unilaterally: terminate the B-2 program at 20 aircraft; cancel entirely the small ICBM program; cease further production of the W-88 warhead for the Trident II missile; and cease production of the advanced cruise missile beyond those already funded. The President also reiterated his September proposal for the mutual elimination of multiple warhead ICBMs and added that, if Russia agreed to this proposal, the US would significantly reduce the number of warheads planned for deployment under START on the other legs of our Triad.

Both President Gorbachev in October and President Yeltsin late last week seized on key aspects of our proposals and agreed to undertake reciprocal actions, and in some cases go further. We have seen a marked slow down in their strategic modernization programs, although we expect to see continued deployments of land-

based ICBMs. President Yeltsin has announced completion of the Blackjack and Bear H programs. They also have said that no new submarines carrying strategic missiles are likely to become operational within the decade.

Most notable, however, is what the Russians have yet to accept: curtailing the full range of their strategic modernization program and the political and military necessity of eliminating land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads. These will remain top US priorities, which we believe are in the interests of both the US and Russia.

### Missile Defenses

In the last several days, we have seen a significant break from past Soviet policy. I speak of President Yeltsin's desire to pursue a cooperative program to develop a global missile defense system. President Yeltsin's proposal to discuss the role of a defense system, which might integrate both land- and space-based elements is truly historic, and represents an important step forward in our relations.

With significant progress in several technological areas, a limited missile defense capability is a realistic, achievable and affordable concept. The growth in ballistic missile capabilities around the world, and the efforts by many nations to develop weapons of mass destruction, give urgency to that effort. Since some of those potential threats are located close to the borders of Russia, its leaders have a keen interest in seeing the development of effective defenses.

We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves but also to have the ability to provide "extended protection" to all nations that are part of the broader community of democratic values. That is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move beyond the ABM Treaty toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles. We are greatly encouraged at recent developments in Soviet policy and believe we are one step closer to realizing our vision.

### Chemical Weapons

Let me now turn to our efforts in the area of chemical weapons (CW) destruction. Prior to President Bush's May 1991 initiative on chemical weapons arms control, the US made numerous offers of technology and technical assistance to the Soviet Union in an effort to assist them in the destruction of their chemical weapons. Since then, we have made known to the new Russian government our continued willingness to provide assistance. We are therefore prepared to send experts to Moscow to continue CW destruction talks

as soon as the Russians are ready.

President Yeltsin has stated that Russia will honor the commitments of the Soviet Union to destroy its chemical weapons. Russian officials have also given assurances that they are moving ahead on basic political decisions such as the selection of a destruction technology, thus permitting the eventual development of an overall destruction plan. Such actions will enable us to make more directed offers of assistance tailored to their specific needs. Our bilateral discussions have revealed a strong Russian interest in obtaining help with issues like site selection, public relations and risk analysis, but not with destruction per se. We are prepared to consider assisting them in these or any other areas which will enable them to destroy safely their chemical weapons consistent with their international obligations.

These issues have been discussed with the new Russian leadership at the highest levels and we hope to be able to facilitate the efforts of the new government to develop a safe, publicly supported chemical weapons destruction program.

Given the current status of chemical weapons destruction in Russia, it is not possible to say at the present time how much, if any, of the \$400 million authorized by Congress for the destruction of Soviet weapons of mass destruction may be spent in support of CW elimination.

#### Stemming the Outflow of Special Weapons Expertise and Technology

Let me finally focus on the potential dangers and risks from the outflow of weapons-related technology and expertise from the former Soviet Union.

Officials at the highest levels of government in the US and Russia are acutely aware that the current state of affairs within the Soviet military weapons complex may create near-term risks for the proliferation of militarily-related technologies. As the former Soviet Union has begun the process of demilitarizing its society and industries -- a necessary first step in building the new structures to sustain political and economic reforms -- highly skilled workers with sensitive expertise now face the prospect of losing relatively well-paying and very prestigious jobs. There is concern that these individuals could become receptive to offers of high pay and other inducements to sell their knowledge and capabilities to those nations that might threaten international security. Additionally, there is always the danger that military hardware can get into the hands of these same nations.

Consequently, US and Russian authorities have begun to take steps to address the problem. Unfortunately, identifying the problem is easier than solving it. This is especially true with regard to individuals, because in a democratic society it is harder

to constrain the movement of individuals and the knowledge they carry with them.

Recognizing these challenges, the Administration is currently engaged in a three-part effort to combat this potentially pernicious side effect of the tearing down of Cold War structures:

- we have encouraged the new republics to support international agreements and norms on non-proliferation;
- we have offered them our assistance in developing export control and technology transfer regimes; in fact, a team of experts briefed officials during Ambassador Bartholomew's trip in January;
- and finally, we are considering a number of specific programs -- which might include direct purchase of goods and services -- to prevent the diversion of technological, material and personnel resources to nations of proliferation concern.

Here again, we have seen republic officials engage cooperatively on issues of joint concern. President Yeltsin's announcement that he intends to boost the salaries of key weapons personnel is an important step and should help stabilize the situation and reduce incentives for these technicians to engage in illicit activities.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, we stand at a crossroads in history. We have seen the demise of a seventy year old empire, whose very existence defined an era. It was an era of sharp ideological division and of mutual suspicion. It was an era which saw the subjugation of hundreds of millions of people to a political philosophy that denied individuals their most basic rights and freedoms. But now, thanks to our own steadfast efforts for the last forty years and to those people within the Soviet Union who had the courage and will to resist and ultimately bring down the totalitarian state, we have an historic opportunity to close this chapter in world history.

To do so, we must ensure that the last vestiges of the Cold War are dismantled. This means, in particular, that we must achieve the successful demilitarization of what was Soviet society and a reorientation of the military toward postures that are non-threatening and purely defensive.

We must also work with the new leaders of the republics to build truly democratic societies based on respect for human rights and market economies. It means ensuring a fundamental reorientation of the military to the defense of human rights and freedoms. It requires the building of new political and economic

institutions in these republics.

Here we can help, especially with our people -- the vast expertise and knowledge of our private entrepreneurs, local government officials and our financial community. What is needed most is America's greatest strength: the depth of experience of its peoples. At the same time, consistent with the great American tradition of lending aid and assistance to those in distress, we want to provide the humanitarian and emergency assistance necessary to ensure that democracy is given a fighting chance to survive and flourish.

Our historic opportunity may not come again for many generations. We can help Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union move decisively and permanently into the western community of nations. We are beginning the building of new foundations for a future based not on confrontation, but cooperation and partnership. If we succeed, we truly will have taken a decisive step toward establishing a lasting and permanent new world order.