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Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics
Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 9 January 2002

Colombia



1. (U) Situation Review


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09 Jan 02

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Colombia: Still Room for Improvement at Joint Task Force-South's (JTF-S) Joint Intelligence Center

(S//NF) Since it started in December 1999, the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center has provided valuable support to Joint Task Force South counterdrug operations by producing target intelligence packages. [REDACTED]

(S//NF) Since August 2001, the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center (COJIC) has [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] During these operations, [REDACTED] laboratories. [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ The COJIC has smooth internal processes, capitalizing on specialized training and 2 years' experience, but institutional rivalries hamper its effectiveness in supporting JTF-S operations.

~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~

Assessment

~~(S//NF)~~ The COJIC's value to future JTF-S operations will depend on [redacted]. The [redacted] intelligence conference — reportedly the first in a series of such events — demonstrated the center's capabilities to the brigades it serves. [redacted] will face the task [redacted].

Colombia: Focus on [redacted] ~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~ Comment: [redacted]

2. Status of Principals' Decision Memorandum (NSC)

(U) Copies of the NSC decision memorandum on Colombia policy and the draft decision memo for the Secretary are attached.

3. Operational Updates

**CO CD OPS
19 Dec 2000 -
3 Jan 2002**



T-65

OV-10

Spraying operations: 19 Dec 01 - 03 Jan 02

T-65's - Putumayo Dept (521 ha)

OV-10's - Caqueta Dept (1252 ha)

Results to date: 19 Dec 00 - 03 Jan 02 (~97,000 ha)

- ★ Bolivar
- ★ Narino
- ★ Cauca
- ★ Huila
- ★ Santander
- ★ Guaviare
- ★ Putumayo
- ★ Caqueta
- ★ Vichada

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04 Jan 02

**JTF-S INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS:
19 Dec 01 – 25 Dec 01**



FOUO

- **Operation Grey Cloud**
 - BACNA 3 – Putumayo
 - 14 base labs
 - 2312 kilos Coca leaf
 - BACNA 1 – Putumayo
 - 5 base labs
 - 2200 gallons gas
 - 188 Kg Coca leaf
- **Operation Dragon**
 - BACNA 1 – Putumayo
 - 3 Base lab
 - 110 gallons gas

04 Jan 02

**JTF-S INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS:
19 Dec 00 – 03 Jan 02**

Detailed Results

19 Dec 00 – 03 Jan 02

- 818 labs destroyed:
 - 21 HCL labs & 798 base labs
- 119 people detained
- 155 kilos cocaine
- 13 kilos crystallized coca
- 2951 + kilos coca base
- 130,199 + lbs coca leaf
- \$168,350 (USD Equivalent)
- 85,772+ gal gasoline / diesel
- Essential chemicals
(various amounts / types)
- ~44,000 hectares sprayed in
Putumayo and Caqueta.

FOUO

04 Jan 02

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Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics
Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 16 January 2002

Colombia



1. (U) Situation Review

(S) [Redacted]


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16 Jan 02

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Peace Negotiations Ongoing (U)

~~(S)~~ The ongoing negotiations are aimed at developing a detailed timetable for discussions on substantive issues: cease fire, protection of civilians, stop to infrastructure attacks, and an end to kidnapping. According to [REDACTED] the next five days will entail negotiations; he stressed that there is extreme distrust between the parties.

~~(S)~~ Comment: [REDACTED]

Containerized Cargo for Drug Trafficking - Port of Buenaventura

~~(S/NF)~~ While exploiting internal security vulnerabilities at the port of Buenaventura, Colombian drug-trafficking organizations increasingly are using commercial maritime shipping containers to

smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United States. Readily available cocaine in western Colombia, along with recent interdictions at other Colombian ports and on fishing boats in the eastern Pacific, has made Buenaventura a particularly attractive port for containerized drug smuggling.

~~(S//NF)~~ Colombian authorities have made three large cocaine seizures on fishing vessels in the eastern Pacific, totaling more than 27 metric tons. Although traffickers still use fishing boats to ship cocaine, they believe [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] law enforcement units have stepped [REDACTED] Despite their small amounts, container [REDACTED] to 600 kilograms in 2001. [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ Since Bogota started the US-brokered port security program in 1996, interdictions at Colombian ports generally have increased. In 2001, Colombian authorities made several cocaine seizures in outbound containers. [REDACTED]

Assessment

~~(S//NF)~~ To avoid interdictions in the ports of Cartagena and Barranquilla, Colombian drug traffickers will rely more on commercial containerized shipping from less secure Buenaventura to smuggle drugs into the United States. Although traffickers still will use fishing vessels and go-fast boats to smuggle cocaine and heroin, maritime containers will be their choice until Colombia improves counterdrug enforcement in Buenaventura.

[REDACTED] ~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S/NF)~~

~~(S/NF)~~ Comment:

2. Principals' Decision Memorandum and Principals' Committee Meeting (NSC)

State has concurred in the Principals' Decision Memo (also providing clarification of funding requirements figures).

NSC can update on status of other agencies' responses to the Decision Memo, as well as requests for a Principals' Committee Meeting to consider Colombia issues, especially in light of continuing issues.

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Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
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Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 23 January 2002

Colombia



1. (U) Situation Review

(S)

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
[REDACTED]

23 Jan 02

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Colombia: GOC and FARC Reach Agreement (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ On 20 January, President Pastrana publicly announced that the Despeje was extended until 10 April. The future of the Despeje will be reevaluated by the GOC again on 7 April pending progress on the negotiations; progress on the negotiations will be made public.

~~(S/NF)~~ FARC must allow political candidates to enter the Despeje; International team will oversee the peace process; Self Defense forces will be a major issue of future discussions; GOC will work on the FARC's social issues agenda.

~~(S/NF)~~ Redeployment of the COLMIL to the Despeje is expected; FARC continues to conduct terrorist acts countrywide.

~~(S/NF)~~ Comment: The FARC must now demonstrate to the international community its sincerity or lose legitimacy. The future of any peace will hinge on controls over the Self Defense forces.

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Seeking Solutions to the Energy Infrastructure Crisis (U)

~~(S)~~ Intense insurgent attacks have caused long-term disruption in national energy distribution and severely damaged the local and national economies. The insurgents increasingly favor such attacks, and Bogota's response, although innovative, appears insufficient to solve the problem.

Energy-Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

~~(S)~~ In 2001, attacks left numerous crude oil pipelines and electric power transmission lines inoperable for weeks and even months. Before last year, insurgents bombed the Cano Limon-Covenas crude oil export pipeline an average of 60 times annually over a 15-year period. Last year, the bombings surged to 169 from January through November. Similar increases in energy-infrastructure attacks occurred elsewhere, notably in rural departments.

Groping for a Strategy

~~(S)~~ The attacks produced staggering financial losses from unrealized petroleum sales and idle factories, forcing Bogota to focus on what some consider an intractable problem. The government appeared to pursue a dual-track strategy encompassing political and security efforts. Initially, it tried to negotiate a bombing halt by the insurgent groups, pointing out that such attacks violate international humanitarian law. Government officials concentrated mainly on the National Liberation Army (ELN), obtaining a temporary halt to attacks against the crude oil pipeline infrastructure in exchange for agreeing to negotiate. However, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) stepped up strikes against the pipelines, and the ELN reneged on its promise to halt attacks, prompting Bogota to turn more toward a security strategy.

Insurgent Gamble: Loss of Power Creates a Powerless Government

~~(S)~~ The ELN and the FARC have sought to weaken the economy and pressure the government by disabling energy-distribution systems. Inoperable pipelines reduce government revenues and discourage foreign investment. Insurgents bomb electric power pylons, denying power to manufacturing plants, halting production, and costing workers their jobs. Electric power disruptions also highlight the government's inability to protect its citizens.

~~(S)~~ To justify energy-infrastructure attacks, insurgents characterize foreign investment in Colombia's natural resources as "exploitation." The ELN extorts money from industry and local government officials in return for not

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disrupting energy transmission. The group also requires those officials to contract with ELN-controlled construction companies for repairing damaged pipelines and pylons. As the FARC has moved into oil-producing areas, it has taken a different approach: unceasingly bombing the pipelines, purportedly to divert government attention from other regions.

Oil and the Economy

~~(S//NF)~~ National oil export revenues usually reach or exceed \$4 billion annually, but the money lost from deferred oil production illustrates the true cost of the insurgent bombing campaign. In 2001, the worst year thus far, over 23 million barrels slated for transport by the Cano Limon-Covenas Pipeline were deferred, primarily because of the insurgent threat. Moreover, the pipeline was shut down for 240 days, exacerbating the unemployment problem as well as increasing security and decontamination costs.

~~(S//NF)~~ Guerrilla bombings of the Cano Limon-Covenas Pipeline have spilled an estimated 1.7 million barrels over the past several years, compared with the 260,000 barrels spilled by the oil tanker Exxon Valdez. This waste has caused extensive environmental damage on both sides of the Colombia-Venezuela border. Hundreds of thousands of barrels a day flow through the 3,000 kilometers of the three major crude oil export pipelines. The second-most-bombed pipeline last year was the 275-kilometer Transandino Pipeline, carrying 75,000 barrels a day but with considerably less impact on national revenues.

The Path Ahead: Energy and Road Battalions

(U) Seeking a long-term answer, the Army announced plans to create 10 Energy and Road Battalions to protect Colombia's energy infrastructure. These specially trained battalions would free counterinsurgent battalions from infrastructure-security duties. Each Energy and Road Battalion will have 4 145-soldier companies, not counting officers and NCOs. These units will have more manpower available, compared with the counterinsurgent battalions, for guarding pipelines and electrical pylons.

Intelligence Provides the Key

~~(C)~~ Bogota recognizes that reliable intelligence is crucial to the success of this security mission.

(S)

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Colombia's Electric Power System Under Siege
~~(S//NF)~~ The Colombian electricity system, with an estimated 1,500 kilometers of electric power transmission lines, faces extreme challenges. The practically unhindered destruction of key transmission pylons has substantially reduced power delivery. Repairs to key pylons now occur rarely, because insurgents threaten the crews. Grid interconnections have been blown up, leaving the country divided into several smaller, nearly autonomous grids. Distortions in local markets have resulted, as regions that normally export electricity are cut off from high-consumption markets. The hardest hit areas include the departments of ~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~ The increase in attacks on the system has delayed sector privatization, owing to hundreds of millions of dollars in lost sales.


Implications for Future Operations

~~(S)~~ The government's decision to treat the energy-infrastructure crisis as a multifaceted problem may lead to a more effective response. To improve the security forces, Bogota examined not only methods to secure facilities and reduce attacks but also the existing security structure. **Creating the Energy and Road Battalions allows counterinsurgent battalions, which are designed for offensive operations, to do what they do best — hunt insurgents.** Once all the Energy and Road Battalions are created and trained, the newly available counterinsurgent battalions will have greater flexibility in responding to emergent threats.

~~(S)~~ Despite these steps, serious challenges remain. ~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S)~~ ~~(S//NF)~~ If Bogota were to implement a program similar to the National Roads Security Program, with its satellite-based highway monitoring system, the move might improve reaction time and maximize the effectiveness of the scarce forces available. Still, the absence of regional energy infrastructure security boards limits the ability of departmental governments and the ~~(S//NF)~~

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2. Principals' Decision Memorandum/Principals' Committee Meeting Developments (NSC)

NSC will discuss its efforts to obtain DOD and JCS concurrence to the Decision Memo and the status of the DOD/JCS request for a Principals' Meeting.

3. Director Walters Visit (ONDCP)

ONDCP will review the visit, which apparently went well.

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FOUO

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Putumayo and Caqueta.

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04 Jan 02

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Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics
Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 28 February 2002

Colombia




1. (U) Situation Review

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
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(S)	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4	Category 5
—	109	148	144	203	275
—	17	81	84	91	106
—	204	247	258	320	397

(S)

(U) Colombia Situation Update



U.S. CITIZENS IN COLOMBIA


- Approximately 2,000 Americans in country
- Approximately 45,000 potential evacuees including foreign nationals
- Bogota, Cali, Medellin named as principal staging areas for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

32 (b)(1)

296 (b)(1)

20
07

Former FARC safe haven.



ASSESSMENT

- Increased FARC violence likely
 - Increased collateral threat to U.S. personnel
 - Direct threat is likely once U.S. involvement is perceived
- Paramilitaries likely to move into former safe haven
 - Increased likelihood of human rights violations

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Presidential Candidates' Views on Counterdrug Issues

~~(S//NF)~~ Polling data indicate independent candidate Alvaro Uribe-Velez is ahead in the race for president, having distanced himself from his opponents by taking a stronger stance on security issues. Uribe's get-tough policy with insurgents is a means to attack the drug trade.

~~(S//NF)~~ Bolstered by an electorate tired of stalled peace negotiations between the government and the rebels, Uribe has assumed the lead with a 53-percent approval rating. Earlier, he had trailed Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa and independent Noemi Sanin, but Uribe apparently is benefiting from the intransigence of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas at the peace table. Moreover, recent FARC attacks on police stations, power pylons, and cities evidently have swayed more voters in favor of Uribe, who supports the latest military operation against the FARC, in the former DMZ. Uribe was a strong critic of the Switzerland-sized haven, which he said was a base for kidnapping, staging attacks, and cocaine trafficking. His aggressive rhetoric condemning the peace negotiations and his promises to confront the FARC militarily undoubtedly prompted the three assassination attempts against him, allegedly carried out by FARC operatives.

~~(S//NF)~~ Although Uribe has been critical of President Pastrana's handling of peace negotiations with the insurgents, he supports Plan Colombia's overall concept to attack the drug trade. However, he prefers expanding existing programs to include more assistance for upgrading the country's security forces. Uribe has said he would back aerial spraying of coca leaf and opium poppies, but he appears to favor a military solution aimed at reducing the FARC's ability to profit from the drug trade in areas under the group's control. Believing Bogota must address both problems simultaneously, he has hinted at inviting foreign troops to help defeat the insurgents. Uribe's political base has been the upper class and wealthy ranchers, and he is gaining support from the lower classes, who are being hurt by the actions of the guerrillas, and paramilitary forces.

~~(S//NF)~~ Serpa and Sanin support cooperation with the United States on eradication spraying and counterdrug programs to varying degrees. Both have expressed reservations about expanding aerial fumigation, citing a greater need for alternative development to provide employment opportunities in coca-growing regions. Publicly, Serpa and Sanin support Plan Colombia, most likely out of fear of repercussions from the international community, which provides much of the financial assistance for Bogota's counterdrug programs.

~~(S//NF)~~ Serpa, a career politician, has pledged to work closely with the United States to improve cooperation on antiterrorism, counterdrug, and extradition issues. Perhaps as a gesture to areas affected by spraying, he also said he would like to reduce aerial eradication, but he gave no specifics. Serpa may see an opportunity for international funding for a broader platform; he reportedly wants to shift Bogota's counterdrug policy focus away from eradication and toward a program that emphasizes combating terrorism and insurgency. Serpa believes fighting terrorism can be more effective in addressing counterdrug issues and will bring Bogota's defense policy more in line with that of the United States.

Plan Colombia: The Pastrana Legacy

~~(S//NF)~~ The incoming president will inherit Plan Colombia, which still faces formidable obstacles, including bureaucratic inefficiency and scarce resources. Plan Colombia is President Pastrana's domestic and foreign policy initiative, started in December 2000, to strengthen the country and promote peace and prosperity. Its key elements include negotiating with insurgents, revitalizing the economy, increasing investment in social programs, and acquiring needed equipment for the military. In addition, the new president will take on an insurgency that so far has resisted peace efforts.

~~(S//NF)~~ Sanin has not presented a strong antidrug message and, according to most polls, has a slim chance of winning. She is best known for her positions on fighting corruption, reducing kidnapping, and strengthening the economy. She had hoped to capitalize on these themes, which Colombians generally see as their most urgent problems; however, lagging peace negotiations and the insurgent attacks have focused public attention on security issues.

Assessment

~~(S//NF)~~ As the election nears, eradication spraying may slow as the government focuses on securing the DMZ. The incoming president will inherit a counterdrug program that needs reenergizing if it is to attain yearend goals. Whichever candidate assumes office after the May election most likely will seek additional international funds for drug eradication and interdiction, as well as for combating insurgents and paramilitaries, both heavily involved in the drug trade. The candidates' proposals for reduced spraying of coca leaf and opium poppies may be intended for the press and for potential voters in affected areas. Nonetheless, international pressure, in addition to training and technical support, will be essential to maintain an aggressive eradication spraying program.

Colombia: A Post- Despeje FARC

~~(S)~~ The end of the DMZ, locally known as the despeje, profoundly complicates Colombia's security situation. A recent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) airplane hijacking in southern Colombia prompted President Pastrana to end peace negotiations and begin bombing the despeje. The FARC's loss of this haven will considerably change insurgent operating patterns. With the FARC weakened, paramilitaries and drug traffickers will be quick to fill the void.

A Glimpse Into a Post- Despeje Colombia

~~(C)~~ Since January, when the FARC and Bogota agreed to seriously discuss cease-fire timelines, the insurgents have launched a campaign of violence and destruction against Colombia's cities and infrastructure to pressure the government during peace negotiations. After the government


agreed on 20 January to prolong of the despeje, the FARC ambushed many police and Army patrols, attacked the power infrastructure more than 30 times, and stepped up bombings in major cities — inflicting minor damage on an aqueduct that supplies much of the water to Bogota. The attack against a water delivery system — a blatant violation of humanitarian law — has brought the conflict to a more radical level. This January urban bombing campaign could portend what the FARC will do now that it has lost the despeje.

Colombia: Counterdrug Brigade

~~(S)~~ Last year, the Army's Counterdrug Brigade carried out a series of aggressive raids in coca-rich Caqueta and Putumayo Departments. These successful operations severely hurt the cocaine industry in southern Colombia, forcing traffickers to abandon processing laboratories and curtailing their income.

~~(S)~~ The Counterdrug Brigade operated almost continuously throughout 2001, providing ground protection to US-supported Colombian National Police coca-eradication operations and sweeping the area for narcotrafficker and insurgent targets. By patrolling areas of heavy insurgent influence, the brigade lent crucial support to coca eradication, minimizing ground fire against aircraft spraying 38,000 hectares of coca in Putumayo. In addition, brigade forces destroyed 15 cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) laboratories and more than 600 cocaine base laboratories, along with tens of thousands of coca seedlings and nearly 1,000 metric tons of processing chemicals.

Counterdrug Brigade: Operational Profile



~~(S)~~ These successes came despite resistance from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Southern Bloc and from the United Self-Defense Group of Colombia (AUC). The brigade lost 11 soldiers in skirmishes with illegal armed groups, but it claimed the highest percentage among Joint Task Force-South (JTF-S) units of confirmed kills (168) and captured more than 600 FARC and AUC personnel, mainly at laboratories.

~~(S)~~ The brigade has had a major impact on Colombia's cocaine industry. Traffickers apparently are abandoning cocaine HCl laboratories in Putumayo and establishing them in Narino or other

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locations outside the brigade's area of operations. The FARC's 48th Front has relinquished control of certain areas of Putumayo, and intelligence suggests the group's finances have suffered owing to the dwindling cocaine-base market. Local AUC forces are feeling the pressure as well. Four of the first 10 cocaine HCI laboratories the brigade destroyed were associated with the AUC. More traditional trafficking organizations are targets as well; brigade forces recently helped arrest four important Putumayo money launderers connected to the Cali Cartel.

Assessment

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

Secrets to the Brigade's Success


~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ US-provided helicopters are also central to the brigade's success. Of 33 UH-1Ns in the country, 14 to 18 are available for operations at any time. UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, also part of Plan Colombia, will expand airlift and fire support while extending the brigade's operational range.

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

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←(C) The imperative of a common enemy has forced cooperation during spraying operations among the military, the National Police, and the Prosecutor General's Office. It also has made those elements more receptive to working with the United States. To build on this success, Colombian military leaders see the Counterdrug Brigade as a prototype that the country needs to replicate in its fight against the combined threats of narcotics and insurgency.



(U) Major Counterdrug Brigade Operations in 2001

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Brigade Accomplishments in 2001

Cocaine HCl labs destroyed	15
Cocaine-base labs destroyed	More than 600
Cocaine HCl seized	164 kg
Cocaine base seized	2,561 kg
Coca leaves destroyed	269,000 kg
Precursor chemicals destroyed	971,000 kg
Area secured for coca eradication	38,000 hectares

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Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 7 March 2002

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1. (U) Situation Review

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
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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(U) Colombia Situation Update



COLOMBIA – OPERATION TANATOS

As of 050900Z Mar 02



- Surface area of illegal crops grow in former Despeje
 - Poppy crops increased by a factor of 7
 - Coca growth doubled
 - GOC may use figures as argument to combine CD and COIN wars
- Electricity returns to San Vicente del Caguan
 - Electricity Sector attacks have cost approximately \$10.9 million (USD)

(S//NF)



Spraying of Poppy Fields

- Elections may stretch security force manning
 - GOC plans to deploy 100,000 CNP
- AUC declare Venezuelan consulates targets
- J2 ASSESSMENT:
 - Collateral threat to US personnel
 - Direct threat to US personnel and interest possible if FARC perceive a greater involvement by US military



GEN Tapias confident of safe election

• (U) During the three years that the ex-Despeje existed, the surface area of poppy crops purportedly grew from 50 to 350 hectares. In similar fashion, coca growth doubled, surpassing 15,000 hectares. GOC may attempt to use the new figures to strengthen the argument to combine the CD and COIN efforts.

- (C) Analyst Comment: One kilogram of heroin sells for three times as much as a kilogram of cocaine in Florida. (DEA – Sep 2001 figures)

• (U) Power has been restored to the 22,000 residents of SVC after one week without electricity. Insurgent attacks against the electrical infrastructure have cost \$10.9 million (USD) this year with 130 power pylons and four transformer and distribution stations destroyed since 1 Jan 02

(S//NF)

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~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

-- Note: The pieces of the puzzle [REDACTED] tend to implicate the [REDACTED]

• ~~(S)~~ The COLMIL must soon begin dispersing its forces throughout the countryside to support security at polling places for the 10 March elections, which will inhibit offensive operations in the second week of March and further stretch already taxed military financial resources.

-(U) On February 26, 2002, the AUC contacted the VEN ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and informed the MFA that all VEN consulates in COL would be considered military targets by the AUC, beginning immediately.

- Note: While VEN has requested CNP protection no attack has been launched against any VEN consulate.

FARC Guerrillas Receive Contingency Orders to Kill North American Missionaries

~~(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL)~~ [REDACTED]

• Comment:

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(S//NF)

Since mid-February, the Colombian government has blamed the FARC for hijacking a commercial airliner, kidnapping a senator and a presidential candidate, killing a senator, and firing on the presidential helicopter. Although the FARC was likely behind all of these events, the possibility exists that, in some cases, another group may be involved and attempting to shift the blame to the FARC. As the FARC continues its terrorist attacks throughout Colombia, US interests may become targets.

2. (U) Regional Topics

a. Peru ARI Assessment - Talking Points

- The assessments can be extremely useful for the Country Teams as they implement their CD strategies through a systematic look at resources and capabilities.
- DOS has been asked by the AMEMBASSY Panama to do an ARI assessment for them. The timeframe is unclear, but it will likely take place before the summer.
- These assessments are being done on an as requested basis, and entail considerable Country Team support as well as sizeable SOUTHCOM/LEA/other commitment of resources. A Panama assessment would be smaller in scope and shorter than Peru due to limited size of programs, lack of a military.

3. (U) Colombia - Pending Issues

a. Budget Developments, FY 2002 and FY 2003 - Talking Points

- At the Deputies Committee meeting of February 20, Undersecretary Feith committed to working with Joint Staff and OMB to identify FY03 funding to implement the policy decision on training a 2nd CN Brigade.
- We're still working what that will involve. I am sending my staff down to AMB Patterson's meeting on the 2nd Brigade in mid-March. I'll have more details after that.
- Beyond the 2nd Brigade, the Department's FY 02 & FY 03 CN budget represents a steady state but I am in the process of conducting a policy review of all the CN programs.

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d. Expediting FMS Cases - Talking Points

- The increase in Force Activity Designator (FAD) from III to II in Colombia makes them the only Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer with an overall FAD II.
- ~~(S)~~ Four other countries and NATO have FAD II, but only for certain units or weapon systems.
- The FAD upgrade applies to priority requisitions supporting readiness of Colombian forces.
- ~~(S)~~ The FAD upgrade was granted to support Government of Colombia (GOC) military actions against the FARC.
- A DoD team, led by DSCA, will be in-country next week from 10-16 March to review all open FMS cases. By reviewing every case, the USG and GOC will be able to reprogram some financial resources to priority cases.

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
Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 14 March 2002

Colombia



1. (U) Situation Review

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


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
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(U) Colombia Situation Update



COLOMBIA – OPERATION TANATOS



. FARC developing Amazonas as a fall-back position and drug trafficking area


. FARC insurgents paint helicopter to resemble military aircraft

. Peruvian Special Forces training two battalions to repel FARC incursions into Loreto Department

. J2 ASSESSMENT:


- Collateral threat to US personnel

-- Direct threat to US personnel and interest possible if FARC perceive a greater involvement by US military



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COLAR near San Vicente



Former Despeje

COLOMBIA

Loreto Department, Peru

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

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
Colombia: Guerrillas and Drugs

~~(S//NF)~~ Senior leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) control key segments of the country's cocaine trade. Even though the government has pushed the FARC out of the group's former haven, drug trafficking continues unabated. Several FARC fronts are promoting coca cultivation, managing cocaine processing, selling drugs for cash, and cutting arms deals with international trafficking organizations. The FARC will keep expanding its drug-trade role.


~~(S//NF)~~ ^(S//NF)



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FARC Anticipating Eradication Operations?



Assessment

~~(S//NF)~~ Since 1998, the FARC's involvement in the drug trade has advanced well beyond extorting money from traffickers and coca farmers. For example, the FARC is expanding into selling cocaine and heroin to Colombian and international traffickers, with the approval of the group's senior leaders.

~~(S//NF)~~ Despite overwhelming evidence of their involvement in trafficking, FARC leaders still do not publicly condone the use of drugs. They see drug trafficking as a lucrative way to support their goal of toppling the central government. The FARC's growing diversification into processing and direct negotiations with traffickers provides the funds for a broad weapons-procurement program.

Cocaine-for-Weapons Trafficking Persists

~~(S//NF)~~ FARC-associated traffickers and logisticians kept coordinating cocaine deals after security forces reoccupied the despeje (haven) on 22 February. Shortly afterward, a FARC

FARC's International Drug Connections

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~~(S//NF)~~ Jorge Briceño-Suarez, FARC Secretariat member and Eastern Bloc commander, oversees front commanders' drug trafficking.

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


~~(S//NF)~~ Tomás Molina-Caracas coordinates all drug-trafficking operations for Briceño-Suarez.

~~(S//NF)~~

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Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 21 March 2002

Colombia




1. (U) Situation Review

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) Colombia Situation Update

(U) Coca Cultivation Estimates

(SBU) Overview

- The CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) estimates indicate that coca cultivation increased from 136,200 ha in 2000 to 169,800 ha in 2001.

- CNC's estimates are incompatible with those from the US Embassy, the Department of State (DOS) Air Wing, and the Colombian National Police (CNP).

- US Embassy believes that United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) imagery and USSOUTHCOM DRUID imagery suggest the CNP estimate of a 13 percent decrease, is more accurate.

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The CNC, DOS, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy have commissioned an independent academic group to review the discrepancies; findings expected at the end of Mar 02.

(SBU) CNC Estimates

- CNC estimates a 25 percent increase in Colombian coca cultivation in 2001.
- CNC did not estimate any coca cultivation in Nariño in 2000, but found 12,100 ha in 2001. The probability of this much new growth in just one year is small. Slightly more than one-third of CNC's total cultivation increase in 2001 is attributed to this additional growing area.
- A large increase in cultivation was also noted in the traditional growing areas of the Guaviare region. CNC cultivation estimate rose from 36,100 ha in 2000 to 51,600 ha in 2001.
- Cultivation within the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Despeje increased on par with the national level; however, it only represents roughly six percent of Colombia's total cultivation.
- CNC estimates only a slight decline from 44,900 ha to 39,400 ha in Putumayo despite an aggressive eradication campaign focused there.

(SBU) CNC Methodology

- CNC bases its cultivation estimates on satellite and aircraft imagery sampling of suspected growing areas. Areas that remain in persistent cloud cover cannot be accurately sampled.
- CNC analysts conduct random sampling primarily within the suspected growing areas, to produce their estimates. Suspected growing areas are determined from past surveys, field observations, commercial imagery and soil/climate/geographic analysis. Coca cultivation outside identified suspected growing areas often remains undetected.
- CNC collects imagery from August through February, with most photos taken in December and January, to capitalize on superior weather conditions. Because of this imagery collection schedule, CNC estimates sometimes do not include results of spray eradication operations which occurred after the photos were taken.

(C) Other Agency Concerns

· The CNP's coca estimates, prepared in cooperation with UNDCP and based on a combination of satellite data and overflight observations, indicated a 13 percent decrease in total coca cultivation in 2001 from 163,289 ha in 2000.

o CNP figures, because of high original estimates, showed a temperate increase in cultivation in the last several years followed by last year's slight decline.

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- o CNC estimates indicate a dramatic rise in cultivation in the last several years.

The DOS Air Wing states that CNC estimates of total cultivation do not adequately depict the successful and record high amount of coca eradicated last year.

- o Although DOS does not have a cumulative means of estimating cultivation, ground verification, multi-spectral digital imaging system (MDIS) data, and DRUID studies of Putumayo correspond to the DOS Air Wing's estimate of 77,165 ha eradicated

- o The discovery and inclusion of the cultivation in Nariño in last year's (2001) estimates erroneously depicts a greater increase in total cultivation.

Subtracting the DOS Air Wing's eradication estimate from CNC's 2000 cultivation estimate leaves the assumption that 110,765 ha of coca were planted in Colombia in 2001, a highly unlikely estimation. Since young coca plants cannot be detected ^{(b)(1)} most of the alleged planting must have been completed by early 2001.

The US Embassy emphatically believes that CNC has underestimated Colombian coca cultivation for years as a result of earlier interagency assumptions.

(SBU) Assessment

Determining the actual amount of coca cultivation is a highly complex and contentious process.

- o CNC and CNP start with different cultivation estimates in CY 2000, and have in fact never agreed on the cultivation totals for most of the 1990's.

- o For example the CNC estimate reflects 12,000 ha of "newly discovered" coca in Nariño Department, which the CNP had included in their previous estimates.

Neither CNC, nor the CNP have total knowledge of ground truth.

- o CNP primarily uses LANDSAT imagery, augmented by overflights and ground intelligence, to arrive at their estimates. LANDSAT imagery covers the entire growing area, but provides poor resolution.

- o CNC uses high-resolution imagery, but cannot image the entire growing area--relying instead on statistical sampling of suspect growing areas. Because CNC relies on sampling, errors can distort their final results. Additionally, if CNC does not sample a growing area, such as Narino, it will not be counted.

CNC is further hampered by the timeframe in which their imagery is taken. If imagery is taken in September, and eradication takes place in November, such as it did in Putumayo, this will not be reflected in the CNC estimate or reporting trends.

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CNC's ability to collect timely, accurate information would be enhanced with increased technological support from tools such as DRUID imagery. Increased interagency cooperation would also make cultivation estimates a less contentious issue.

US Embassy has confidence in UNDCP's LANDSAT imagery and photo interpretation methodology, which forms the basis of the CNP estimate. American Embassy, the DOS Air Wing, the CNP, the UNDCP, and believe there is a small, albeit significant, decrease in coca cultivation.

- o Evidence suggests that aerial eradication efforts have effectively killed a large percentage of crops sprayed.

- o Eradication efforts in Colombia have forced drug traffickers and growers to relocate and replant their crops.

Despite intermittent delays, 2001 was a record year for coca spray operations. A continuous spray campaign, coupled with a fully implemented alternative development program, will continue to force replanting and relocation of coca crops nationwide.


Panama: Drug Trafficking in Darien and San Blas Provinces

~~(C)~~ Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups use Panamanian border towns for drug and arms smuggling and for rest during lulls in fighting. Panama City has responded weakly to these incursions for more than 20 years, creating a security vacuum that permits nearly unlimited smuggling in the border region.

~~(C/NF)~~ Over the past few years, Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups have increased illicit-drug and weapons smuggling in Darien and San Blas Provinces. Panamanian authorities have directly linked the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to cocaine and heroin shipments transiting Darien. In 2000, about 820 kilograms of FARC-controlled cocaine were seized near Puerto Obaldia (San Blas) and Guayabo (Darien). Last year, Colombian paramilitary units repeatedly stole FARC cocaine, reportedly exchanging the drugs for black market weapons. The drugs-for-arms trade is of increasing concern to Panama's [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may lead to a rise in smuggling along the border.

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


Drug-Trafficking Dynamics

~~(S/NF)~~ Panama is a major node for smuggling cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the United States and Europe. Over the past 3 years, about 40 metric tons of cocaine have been detected en route to Panama from Colombia, primarily in go-fast boats. Although the amount of drugs shipped through Darien Province is small, control of smuggling routes is a major point of contention between the FARC and the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia.

Panamanian Public Forces.

About 1,000 members of the Special Police Force (border police) — an entity of the Panamanian National Police, supported by the National Air Service — provide most security in Darien. Assisting are 800 to 1,000 jungle-trained city police personnel,



~~(S/NF)~~ The Moscoso administration publicly denies a major guerrilla or paramilitary problem in the region, unwilling to acknowledge that Panamanian sovereignty has been compromised. Nonetheless, since 1994, the government has incrementally, albeit unsubstantially, expanded the border presence of the Panamanian National Police (PNP) — a paramilitary, jungle-trained force — to respond to the threats.

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Assessment

~~(S//NF)~~ Confrontations between the PNP, FARC, and AUC probably will intensify this year as each force tries to assert greater control in the border region. Although clearly a national security concern,

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
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics
Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 4 April 2002

Colombia




1. (U) Situation Review



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GOC Request for Military Assistance *Security Assistance*



ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
1. Prioritization/Categorization of repair parts requests		● MIL OP
2. Request DSCA support expedited delivery of Operationally Urgent parts (Category 1)	Message sent 21:25:52Z MAR 02	● J5 SADI
3. Request DSCA expedite establishing new cases for Operationally Urgent parts (Category 2)	Message in final coordination staffing	● J5 SADI
4. Request Joint Staff authorize diversion of existing stocks for Cat 1 & 2 requirements	Draft Working	● J5 SADI
5. C-130 Fleet Readiness	Readiness improvement continues	● J5 SADI

29 Mar 02

GOC Request for Military Assistance *Operations*



ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
Intratheater Airlift		
1. Hirdana Movement	CCJAF transported 2 of 3 boats to Tinsu Kupa, Ind	● J5 SADI
Personnel Recovery (PR)/(CSAR)		
1. Assess CCI MIL PR needs/requirements	Completed 20/22/02	● J5 SADI
2. Identify Resource PR-related equipment requirements		● J5 SADI
3. Enhance CCI MIL PR capabilities	BT SO/SMITT with CCJAF in IND	● J5 SADI
4. Establish theater PR requirements	In progress	● J5 SADI

29 Mar 02

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(b)(1)

ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
USG Policy Guidelines (CD v CI)	Final Review	2002-03-28
FOL Renegotiation	Final Review	2002-03-28
1. Foreign Assets for CD v CI	Final Review	2002-03-28
2. Modified Foreign Assets	Final Review	2002-03-28
1. Foreign Assets	Final Review	2002-03-28
2. Foreign Assets	Final Review	2002-03-28
3. Civilian Duty Drop	Final Review	2002-03-28
4. Endless LNO	Final Review	2002-03-28
5. Air Request	Final Review	2002-03-28

29 Mar 02

(b)(1)

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ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
1	Final Review	2002-03-28
2. Endless LNO	Final Review	2002-03-28
3	Final Review	2002-03-28
4. High Altitude Radar Missions	Final Review	2002-03-28
5	Final Review	2002-03-28
Timely Threat Assessments to Deployed Crews		
1. BOD Review	Final Review	2002-03-28
2	Final Review	2002-03-28
3. Distribution of	Final Review	2002-03-28

29 Mar 02

(b)(1)



ISSUE

STATUS

LEAD

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

1 Provide additional Major Entry and CT/C Southak J1/J1

2 Convert J1/J13

3 Valid Incident CT Data Base to EFC J2/J10

(b)(1)

4 J2/J12

(b)(1)

1 Validate Adequacy of Airspace Coordination Assessed SOUTHAF (b)(1)

2 Restructure for Joint Manning J1/MLOGP

3 Complete Manpower Study (Mission Expansion) J1/MLOGP

(b)(1)


4 Fully man J1/SOUTHAF USARSO

29 Mar 02

(U) Effects of Operation TANATOS on FARC Drug Activity

(S) The ongoing Colombian military (COLMIL) campaign, Operation TANATOS, has forced the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to abandon drug production facilities in the former DMZ. The COLMIL forces in the former DMZ attacked FARC drug labs, clandestine airstrips and drug storage facilities. COLMIL and Colombian National Police (CNP) forces successfully destroyed 7 metric tons (mt) of cocaine and 347 mt of precursor ingredients found in the former DMZ. Colombian forces have also attacked drug cultivation in the former DMZ. This is the largest successful counterdrug operation since March 2001. Colombia's counterdrug police began aerial eradication on 2 and 3 March by spraying 15 hectares (ha) of poppy. By 7 March, 75 ha of coca had also been sprayed. Spray assets were moved to the former DMZ from heavily cultivated areas such as Putumayo.

(C) COMMENTS: The drug infrastructure in and around the former DMZ will be disrupted as the FARC suffers the loss of cultivation sites, clandestine airfields, and drug labs. However, the drug cultivation and infrastructure found within the DMZ is only a portion of the FARC drug industry. The FARC participation in the drug industry will continue to supply the insurgents with arms and munitions despite the government retaking of the former DMZ. Operation TANATOS will also inhibit continued drug cultivation in the region. However, prolonged deployment of COLMIL assets in the former DMZ will increase both drug activity in other departments and insurgent presence in the coca growing regions.



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3. (U) Pending Colombia Issues

Update on DoD Funding of JTF-South JIC:

- ~~(S)~~ DASD(CN) sent out a cable on 26 March agreeing to fund the JIC after the LOA between the AMEMBASSY and the Colombian Minister of Defense is modified.
- ~~(S)~~ Modification would legally allow DoD to fund the JIC and would relieve the Colombian MOD from funding responsibility for the remainder of the FY.
- ~~(S)~~ The Colombian MOD would provide the [REDACTED] that comprises security of the base and personnel.
- ~~(S)~~ The MILGP Commander asked that we accept extending the period from end of FY to end of CY.
- (U) No news on the MOA modification.

2nd CD Brigade

- Productive first concept development conference.
- Training dates and infrastructure requirements can not be further defined until locations are determined. Consideration may be given to procuring long lead time equipment in advance of training or basing.
- Responsibility for sustainment of equipment and infrastructure for the brigade needs to be defined.
- Overall Assessment: This was a preliminary conference. It is too early to define hard requirements or the necessary funding for infrastructure or equipping. Required training funds will be similar to the 1st brigade; SOF estimates \$8-9M
- Country Team and SOUTHCOM will publish an after action and way ahead soon. Expect this week.

Update on "Caribbean Navy Patrols" (ISA/WHA)

SOUTHCOM is to conduct an assessment of the operational considerations (including concept refinement, mission analysis, funding and resource requirements, course of action development

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for an array of options). There was no date provided when SOUTHCOM would complete the assessment and provide this information.

Additionally, the terms used [redacted] and "having Caribbean countries deploy" are premature considering this initiative has not been assessed.

Background:

Initiative:

Initiative advanced by [redacted] after realizing the [redacted] had created real and perceived security deficits in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. Proposal was a way for the nations of the Western Hemisphere to participate in *Enduring Freedom*, by contributing naval assets to close these security deficits in an operation provisionally called "*Enduring Friendship*." He had informally advanced this idea with Congressional staffers in Nov/Dec 2001.

Benefits

1. Plugs real gaps in the security perimeter of the US and its hemispheric allies.
2. Makes Western Hemisphere nations substantive, not merely symbolic, stakeholders in *Enduring Freedom*.
3. Low-cost, high value-added platform to build a strong, new, pro-US security identity among Western Hemisphere nations.
4. Advances interoperability and readiness of Western Hemisphere navies and command structures.
5. Showcases the "New Relationship with Latin America" that is a key goal of President Bush.

Concept of Operations

1. *Structure.* *Enduring Friendship* would be a multinational naval patrolling operation, melding operational lessons of the UNITAS exercise with structural concepts drawn from STANAVFORLANT and JIATF-East.

2. *Mission.* The mission of *Enduring Friendship* would be preventive: "to ensure freedom of navigation, standby for humanitarian and disaster relief, and safeguard basic security on the high seas" of the areas of operation.

Suggested operations might include:

- Routine presence and surveillance.
- Cross-decking naval personnel
- Underway replenishments and vertical replenishments
- Surface Action Group tactics
- Search and rescue/Combat search and rescue training
- Cross-platform helicopter operations.
- Meteorological warning/advisory support, especially in Caribbean

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Funding Issues

Requirements. This operation draws on existing assets, structures, and systems and is intended to provide relief for US assets. The chief funding issues will concern operations (especially fuel costs) and personnel. Another issue concerns the legal/constitutional requirement of some Latin American nations to pay a *per diem* (known as *viaticos*) to military personnel deployed outside their borders beyond a given length of time.

4. (U) Interdiction/Eradication/Development

<p>COL SPRAY OPS 27 Feb - 26 Mar 02</p> 	<p>SPRAYING OPS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Narino Dept: 1,985.72 ha ★ Caqueta Dept : 954.19 ha ★ Huila Dept: 1,288.5 ha (Poppy) <p>DEPARTMENTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Antioquia ★ Bolivar ★ Cauca ★ Caqueta ★ Cesar ★ Huila Narino ★ Putumayo ★ Santander ★ Vichada ★ Guaviare 		
<p>Results to Date 19 Dec 00 - 26 Mar 02 126,049 ha</p>	<table border="0"> <tr> <td data-bbox="779 1386 885 1585"> <p>COCA GOAL 180,000 HA</p>  <p>■ YTD 18%</p> </td> <td data-bbox="1055 1386 1161 1585"> <p>POPPY GOAL 8,000 HA</p>  <p>■ YTD 23%</p> </td> </tr> </table>	<p>COCA GOAL 180,000 HA</p>  <p>■ YTD 18%</p>	<p>POPPY GOAL 8,000 HA</p>  <p>■ YTD 23%</p>
<p>COCA GOAL 180,000 HA</p>  <p>■ YTD 18%</p>	<p>POPPY GOAL 8,000 HA</p>  <p>■ YTD 23%</p>		

**JTF-S INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS**

28 Feb - 27 Mar 02



**OPERATIONS INTERDICTION,
MARISCAL, MERCURIO AND
MIRADOR**

- BACNA 1 - NSR
- BACNA 2 - Putumayo
 - 13 base labs
 - 7,220 lbs coca leaf
 - Two 48th FARC insurgents captured
 - One 48th FARC insurgent killed
- BACNA 3 - Putumayo & Caqueta
 - 21 base labs
 - 20,425 lbs coca leaf
 - Four 48th FARC insurgents killed
 - Two 15th FARC insurgents captured
 - 18.6 kilos coca base seized

FOUO

29 Mar 02

**JTF-S INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS**

19 Dec 00 - 27 Mar 02



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DETAILED RESULTS

- 923 labs destroyed:
 - 21 HCL labs & 902 base labs
- 123 people detained
- 177 kilos cocaine
- 3,023 + kilos coca base
- 172,556 + lbs coca leaf
- \$168,350 (USD Equivalent)
- 100,676+ gal gasoline / diesel
- Essential chemicals
(various amounts / types)
- ~60,071 hectares coca sprayed
in Putumayo and Caqueta

FOUO

29 Mar 02

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DATA COMPARISON

JTF-S	JAN		FEB	
	2001	2002	2001	2002
COCA LEAF	3,100	4,981	6,309	15,414
BASE LAB	18	32	40	13
HCL LAB	0	1	3	0

SPRAY OPERATIONS	JAN		FEB	
	2001	2002	2001	2002
COCAINE (Ha)	11,079	9,006	1,195	13,781
POPPY (Ha)	0	0	0	548

TC:0

29 Mar 02

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Policy and Support


Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 18 April 2002

Colombia



1. (U) Situation Review


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(This chart classified ~~SECRET~~)



(U) Top Presidential Candidate Unharmed in Explosion

(U) On 14 April, Colombian presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe escaped injury, after a bomb exploded during an apparent attempt on his life. Reportedly, the explosives were packed into a bus parked in a central marketplace of the northern city of Barranquilla and detonated as Uribe and an entourage traveled by. The explosion killed three people and injured 13 others, including five of Uribe's escorts. The candidate's armored vehicle managed to pass in front of the bus seconds before it exploded, but still received severe damage. The blast was triggered by remote control. There was no immediate claim of responsibility from any armed groups, but security sources say their leading suspect is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The attack came three days after suspected FARC guerrillas kidnapped 12 state legislators from an assembly meeting in the city of Cali by posing as bomb squad officers helping to evacuate them. Government troops are still looking for the politicians, believed to be held in the mountains outside the city.

~~(C)~~ COMMENTS: The FARC is likely involved and have been blamed for past assassination attempts against the presidential candidate. The blast is believed to be the third assassination

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attempt on Uribe, who is the front runner in Colombia's leadership elections next month. Last January police arrested two snipers in the northern city of Medellin, who said they were planning to assassinate Uribe. In September, four alleged FARC members were arrested in a plot to put a suitcase containing Bibles stuffed with explosives at a meeting place in Bogota. Uribe has consistently topped polls in Colombia, with more than 55% of voters preferring him to other candidates running in the 26 May election. Though a member of Colombia's Liberal Party, the FARC considers him right wing, because of his perceived support for paramilitary groups.



COLOMBIA – OPERATION TANATOS



- Insurgents aware of CD eradication operations but continue to conduct their coca cultivation operations
- Seven bombings in Bogotá in last two days
- Urban targeting continues
- Ecuador Ministry of Government to abandon immigration protocols with Colombia
- [REDACTED]
- Dublin: Irish Times reports that IRA has given arms training to the FARC
- **J2 ASSESSMENT:**
 - Collateral threat to US personnel
 - Direct threat to US personnel and interest possible if FARC perceive a greater involvement by US military



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FARC Bombings Intensify (U)

(SBU) On 6 April, ongoing wave of FARC bombings began

(SBU) Numerous innocent civilians killed; obvious bid by FARC to spread terror and make GOC appear impotent in run up to May presidential elections

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(SBU) In the last 12 months, FARC has assassinated at least 12 of GOC's bomb technicians, making innocent Colombians more defenseless against FARC bombs


(SBU) FARC bombing techniques notably "improved" following Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) Professionals arrival into ex-Despeje in 1998

(SBU) In Reftels, 1.75 million USD is requested to provide equipment and training through Embassy ATF


(SBU) Comment: FARC is using new tactical sophisticated bombing techniques to murder as many police and innocent bystanders as possible, techniques likely learned from PIRA trainers entering the ex-Despeje over the past three years. FARC is now attempting to decimate the GOC's small corps of professional bomb technicians. GOC lacks the bomb robots, anti-bomb suits, explosives information clearinghouse, and modern training necessary to respond to the current wave of bombings.

~~(S//NF)~~ Colombia: Operation CARIBE

~~(S//NF)~~ ^{(b)(1)}



~~(S//NF)~~ COMMENTS:



Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics
Policy and Support

Operations and Intelligence Weekly - 25 April 2002


Colombia



1. (U) Situation Review


(S)

(b)(1)



(S) [Redacted]

(This chart classified ~~SECRET~~)



[Redacted]

(U) Leading Presidential Candidate Criticizes Military

(U) The leading presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe recently criticized the Colombian military for being continuously slow to respond to insurgent attacks. His comments followed a 2-day siege of a police outpost, during which the Colombian military provided air support to the beleaguered policemen, but could not reinforce the garrison with ground forces before the attackers retreated. General Enrique Mora responded to Uribe's criticism with a statistical report lauding recent military actions against the insurgents. Mora also stated that even though the Army is performing almost impossible feats in defense of Colombia.

(S) COMMENTS:

[Redacted]

(S//NF)

(S//NF) ARC Urban Attack Plans May Include US Embassy

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

• Comment:

(S//NF)

GOC Request for Military Assistance *Security Assistance*



ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
C-130 Fleet Readiness	1 x currently, 4110, 1 x MTT Request and 1 x RDM in early May and 1 x EDA set in July 02	US S&D

19 Apr 02

GOC Request for Military Assistance *Operations*



ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
Intratheater Airlift	10 x Prandus in Cartagena require movement to multiple destinations. 1 seek DASSON funding	● MLOP-SCU33
Personnel Recovery (PR)/(CSAR)		
1 Assess COLML PR needs/capabilities	28 May 02 Jun 02 07/08 - SOS P1033	● SCU33
2 Enhance COLML PR capabilities Training	ETI SOS MTT with both CDR AF 8 SCJAK 7 Aug - 13 Sep 02	● MLOP-SCU33
3 Enhance COLML PR capabilities Equipment	4 sets CH-60 PR equipment included in DASSON request	● MLOP-SCU33/33
4 Establish theater PR requirements	JOCAs being developed with SC Joint Search and Rescue Center and JPRC	● SCU33

19 Apr 02

ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
1	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
2	[Redacted] One in place. Second row of [Redacted] [Redacted] identifies COAs for conversion of digital files to CD-R	[Redacted]
4	Host Nation Rider in Mission Suite	SCUTRAF NORNSA
SP Operator Cross-Training	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
Timely Threat Assessments to Deployed Crews		
[Redacted]	Posted daily [Redacted] weekends when [Redacted] processes & responsibilities	[Redacted]
19 Apr 02		

ISSUE	STATUS	LEAD
1 Provide additional LNO support to DAD E/FC	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
2 Victim Incident/OT Data Base to E/FC	Working	[Redacted]
3 Dove Sky Intelligence Sharing Expansion	Procedures in development	[Redacted]
CDOCC Operations		
Complete Manpower Study (Mission Extensions)	[Redacted] findings due out mid July 02	[Redacted]
2 Restructure for Joint Manning	Awaiting Manpower Study Results	[Redacted]
Edu [Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
19 Apr 02		

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(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]	April			May			June		
	[Redacted]								
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	

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[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]	July			August			September		
	[Redacted]								
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	

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