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ENCLOSURE "J"

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES  
IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

WSEG REPORT NO. 50

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ENCLOSURE "J"

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES  
IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

PROBLEM

1. To explore possible changes in the nature of the threat and the implications thereof for the U.S. strategic offensive posture.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

2. In any country, military strength in a period five years or so hence will consist of strength now in being, of accretions of strength now programmed, and of other accretions decided upon between now and the period of interest. Force in being in the future period will therefore depend in significant measure upon decisions and actions in the intervening period. This is a matter of intention which, in turn, is to some extent a product of internal forces and to some extent a response to external conditions. It is therefore appropriate that inquiry into weapons requirements should include concern for those factors that may alter the future dimensions of the threat that must be confronted.

3. The same logic that induces us to look at the nature and dimensions of the potential enemy threat as a primary consideration in determining the requirements of our own military forces, compels the enemy, in turn, to gauge his military requirements upon what we do. Consideration of our own future weapons requirements cannot therefore ignore the factor of the variable response, in form of enemy military policy, that different U.S. military policies may elicit.

4. The threat to the U.S. should not be measured solely by the strength available to actual or potential enemies. The seriousness of this threat is also affected by the intention and resolution of enemy nations to employ their strength against us. It is therefore appropriate to take into account the factor of the willingness of the enemy to accept the risks of modern war.

5. This paper will not presume to judge the effectiveness of specific strategies or weapons systems. It will be confined to:

a. Possible changes in the nature and dimensions of the threat and what these possible changes imply, in general, concerning U.S. military requirements;

b. The probable range of Communist strategic intentions as they concern U.S. military requirements, and the problem of possible influence upon these intentions of variable U.S. military postures and strategies;

c. Inter-relationships between different forms of U.S. military strength, especially as a function of probable Communist reponse to our total posture.

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. The probable growth of both Communist strength and the areas of potential East-West conflict will require greater and more flexible military strength than we have needed in the past, with a capability of more widely dispersed application of force.

7. United States strategic offensive systems may play an indirect role in limiting the scope of local conflicts, but the military deterrence or resistance to local aggression will rest principally upon other forces and weapons.

8. Because of the strategic stalemate, limited war forces are likely to become the primary military means employed in combat to attain political objectives.

9. A limited war posture, unduly weak in conventional capabilities in both manpower and weapons, can materially increase the probability of general war by accident or miscalculation and thus erode the deterrent effect of the strategic posture.

10. Because a favorable outcome of a general nuclear war does not appear attainable in the 1964-67 time period, prudence requires that we reduce the number of issues to be resolved primarily by threat of or recourse to strategic nuclear forces. It is, therefore, highly important that, in order to avoid weakening the military support of national policies, we be assured of adequate alternative means which afford confidence of a favorable outcome if actually employed.

11. For as long as there is a hostile confrontation in which we must depend upon the restraint of our enemies as well as ourselves to avoid general nuclear war, we must choose a difficult course between two extremes. We must convey, on the one hand, that we will be restrained so long as our enemies are, but on the other hand that under extreme provocation we would not necessarily wait until they have struck first. The safest way to give evidence of our own restraint will be to limit the number of issues on which strategic sanctions are threatened. An unmistakable second strike capability -- which is bound to include a fearful first strike capability -- is the most convincing means of showing the enemy that it is in his interest to be restrained with respect to general nuclear war, and also with respect to extreme forms of provocation short of that.

DISCUSSION

GENERAL PROSPECTS OF GROWTH AND CHANGE IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD<sup>1/</sup>

12. The economic and military strength of the Communist Bloc is expected to increase markedly over the next decade. Khrushchev's position appears firm, and struggles for power among his rivals or successors are unlikely to menace the stability of the regime, although the possibility is real that a contest for succession may introduce increased instabilities of policy into the Soviet scene, and ultimately into the Communist scene as a whole. Much may depend upon who dies first, Khrushchev or Mao.

13. Soviet domination of Eastern European satellites is expected to continue. The satellite regimes have been consolidated and prospects of real political change appear extremely remote. However, popular hostility toward Communism and toward the USSR is a serious problem in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, but recurrence of attempted revolt or national revolt is judged highly unlikely. For this reason the USSR may be obliged to continue to allow the satellite regimes some leeway in internal policy, to count upon no major satellite contributions in case of war, and to be prepared to move its own forces into satellite areas not now occupied.

14. Sino-Soviet relationships are so important, also at present so fluid and complex, that they cannot be dealt with satisfactorily in the brief notations of this section. There is a summary of the current status and outlook in Appendix "A", and the potentialities for significant change and developments on the China side are the subject of major considerations later in this Enclosure

<sup>1/</sup> This section is principally based upon the pertinent NIE's and SNIE's relating to political and economic conditions and trends in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Communist activities in the non-Communist world, and political and economic conditions and trends in underdeveloped countries.

15. The Soviet economy is expected to continue to grow at a rapid rate. Assuming that the U.S. maintains an average annual rate of growth in GNP of 3.5 to 4 percent, Soviet annual growth of 6 percent will lead to an increase from about 45 percent of U.S. GNP at present to about 50 percent by 1965. The predicted economic growth will enable the USSR to carry the burden of competitive armaments more easily, enlarge its foreign aid programs, raise living standards, and compete in world markets in an important way. Thus, economic growth will probably increase Soviet political leverage in world affairs.

16. The prospect of both economic growth and maintenance of large forces under arms in the USSR is seriously handicapped by a severe manpower shortage that will get worse during the next decade. The impact of the low birth rate of a generation ago is now beginning to be severely felt and will get worse. The U.S. population of military age is now only about  $\frac{3}{5}$  that of USSR, but in 1970 will be nearly equal.<sup>1/</sup> The current 7-year plan commits generous resources to training personnel and providing research facilities. This will offset, to some uncalculated extent, the shortage in total numbers of workers. By 1964 it is expected that Soviet manpower with scientific and

<sup>1/</sup> Because of the considerable differences in age group distribution of the total population as between the U.S. and the USSR, comparisons of the military age population of the two countries will differ when "military age" is defined differently. For instance, if we base the comparison on males ages 20-29 we get:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>U.S. as Fraction of USSR</u>
1960	11.2x10 <sup>6</sup>	19.2x10 <sup>6</sup>	.58
1970	15.6x10 <sup>6</sup>	16.1x10 <sup>6</sup>	.97

If, on the other hand, we count all males ages 20-49, we get:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>U.S. as Fraction of USSR</u>
1960	34.1	42.1	.81
1970	38.7	49.0	.79

The source of these figures is, for the USSR, unpublished estimates of the Foreign Manpower Research Office of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and for the U.S., M. Zitter and J.S. Siegel, Illustrative Projections of the Population of the U.S., by Age and Sex, 1960-1980, U.S. Bureau of the Census, (10 Nov 1958), p. 18.

**[REDACTED]**

technical training will be about one-third larger than that of the U.S. and roughly comparable in quality. A great many of these trained persons will be required, however, for industries supplying consumer demands if standards of living are to continue to rise.

17. The capacity of the Bloc to project its power externally is expected to gain in strength and flexibility. Extension of territory under acknowledged Communist control is a distinct possibility. This will serve as expanded base for political operations. In addition, opportunities for Communist meddling are already great, and are reaching into areas not previously considered under serious threat. In the Far East and Southeast Asia, bellicose Communist Chinese policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities. Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Singapore remain unstable and particularly vulnerable to Communist influence. There is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in one or another country in the area within the next five years, unless U.S. action can forestall such developments. In South Asia, Afghanistan has become deeply involved with the USSR in trade and economic and military aid programs. Even granted continued Western support, there is a possibility that it will come under effective Soviet domination within five years or so. The Pakistan-Afghan tribal areas could also be a source of conflict.

18. The Middle East will continue unstable, and there are serious dangers of further Communist in-roads. The situations in Iran and Iraq are precarious and could quickly become chaotic. In Africa the situation has been deteriorating rapidly in recent months. The Moroccan government is turning to the left. The Algerian nationalists are reorganized and supported by the Chinese Communists, Guinea is already Communist dominated, and

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Communist penetration is evident in almost all of Africa south of the Sahara. There is a strong prospect of considerable influence, by one or another brand of Communism, in one or another guise, in most of the areas of former French and Belgian domination.

19. In Latin America, Communist prospects of penetration are improving as a result of infiltration of nationalists and revolutionary movements, as in Cuba; and, to a lesser extent as a result of Bloc trade and aid programs. Some expansion of Communist influence is predicted by intelligence estimates, but current estimates do not expect it to be widespread because of what are considered to be possibilities for U.S. countering actions.

20. The striking impression created by a general review of prospects is that the present trend of change in the uncommitted areas is on balance in the direction of Communist growth. What has been heretofore regarded as a contest very largely confined to the Eurasian land mass, has now extended into the Southern and Western Hemispheres. There are trouble spots in Germany, China, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East as before. But it is evident that we must also face the same issues, and be prepared to act in the same way, in Africa and perhaps even in Latin America. Therefore, the threat we face is an expanding one, and if military requirements exist in proportion to the dimensions of the threat, they too are undoubtedly expanding.

#### POSSIBILITY OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CHANGES

21. The degree of menace presented to the U.S. and the Free World generally is a product not only of the total strength of the Communist world, and of the total number of situations ripe for Communist exploitation. It is also a product of the way in which they pursue their goals, and of the degree of unity within

their own ranks in respect to the pursuit of these goals. The way in which they pursue their goals concerns, for the purposes of this paper, their policies with respect to

- a. Risk taking,
- b. Inevitability of general war, and
- c. Feasibility of general nuclear war as a political instrument.

Their degree of unity, as considered here, is simply the prospect of unity of action in military affairs in a crisis involving U.S. military operations against a Communist state.

22. A central consideration is that there is a doctrinal division of the Communist world today.<sup>1/</sup> This doctrinal division is involved in most of the major issues of Communist policies, both domestic and foreign, and it is an important element in our consideration of the best manner of confronting the Communist threat not only politically, but militarily. One element, headed by Khrushchev and the presently dominant Soviet hierarchy (or, at the furthest extreme, by Tito and Yugoslav Party), is comparatively more responsive to internal pressures for better living, greater personal freedom, and, hence, wishes to reduce the proportion of total expenditures for armaments and for capital growth, favors less international risk-taking, is more inclined to accept the delays of gradualism in the evolution to Socialism, and is willing to make progress by expedient cooperation with other left-wing groups. In order to favor these processes, it readily tolerates, even may encourage, some relaxation of tensions.

23. The opposed group, led by the Chinese, puts great emphasis upon the most rapid capital growth possible, and favors extremely

1/ Appendix "A" to this Enclosure, "Recent Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations," discusses the present state of this dispute in more detail than is possible here.

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austere living standards and stern coercion as necessary to accomplish these ends. It advocates comparatively high sacrifices to maintain military strength, opposes disarmament, favors more rapid and aggressive exploitation of colonial and nationalistic unrest, insists upon direct and rapid change to Communist social forms, and shows greater readiness to accept risks of both local and general war.

24. The Chinese view favors greater readiness to assume risks, including the risks of both limited and general war. The Russians are apparently more convinced than the Chinese of the political appeal of peace-loving pretensions; they are in general a little more imbued with the caution that comes from a sense of having something to lose, and being aware of that as much as of what is to be gained. The Chinese view accepts the older Communist doctrine concerning the inevitability of a climactic general war which would bring final victory to Communism over Capitalism. Their view on the ultimate inevitability of general war is probably related to their greater optimism concerning the possible usefulness of general nuclear war as a political instrument. They seem to believe that the rural nature of Chinese culture would guarantee China's survival and even her victory in a general nuclear war.

25. In contrast to these Chinese attitudes, there is apparent consensus among the Soviet leadership that strongly favors policies that stop short of general war, and that discourage lesser wars also, partly at least, from fear that they might get out of hand. Russian leadership appears to have nearly come full circle, and almost to have resumed the previously condemned views of Malenkov concerning the disastrous probable consequences of thermonuclear warfare. There is also a doctrinal legacy which deplores adventurism. The effect of this is reinforced, so far

as attitudes toward possible nuclear war are concerned, by the pride that the present Soviet leadership feels in the industrial structure they have developed. There is apparent agreement within the Soviet leadership that things are going very well as they are, and that war might simply place at risk the progress that it already made, and the optimistic prospects now in view. Finally, they have found the peace issue politically useful, both at home and in uncommitted areas, and they have tried to project abroad the image of Communism as the advocate of peace -- an image to which they attach considerable value -- with considerable success in many places.

26. We do not know, of course, what views and plans Soviet officials may have for the use of their strategic offensive weapons. There may be secret plans or understandings of which we have no knowledge. What may be inferred from their actions, and from repeatedly expressed views on the destructiveness of nuclear warfare suggests a rather amorphous view that the most profitable role of Soviet strategic power is to serve as a counter-deterrent. However, there is no evidence that the Soviets have adopted deterrence as an articulated, rationalized policy in the sense that deterrence has been consecrated as an American policy. Soviet strategic writings dwell upon the conduct of wars rather than in deterrence of them.<sup>1/</sup>

1/ Soviet attitudes on war and military strategy have been studied, and discussed in well-known open publications by Raymond Garthoff (now with CIA) and Herbert S. Dinerstein (RAND), and have been dealt with in classified studies by these two individuals, and many others. CIA has published compilations of "Soviet Elite Statements on Nuclear Warfare." The Bureau of Intelligence Estimates of the Department of State follows the subject closely, and in August 1959 published "Some Aspects of the Soviet Attitude on War," SECRET. The judgments on Soviet strategy expressed here are based on these written sources plus oral consultation with some of the authorities cited concerning the special application to problems in this paper of their more general observations.

27. On the other hand, they have shown practical proficiency in nuclear blackmail, and are old hands at the immemorial practice of using the threat of military action to extort political concessions. They see the growth of their military strength as enhancing their ability to attain their ends by these means.

28. It can be argued that a basic U.S. objective should be to strengthen and confirm the apparent Soviet belief that general nuclear war is not a profitable instrument of national policy. Inasmuch as Communist China may seek to embroil the Soviet Union in war with the United States, it may also be desirable to convince the Chinese of the same proposition. While present evidence suggests that Soviet views on the matter are conservative, these views are, of course, subject to change. Certain pressures, such as the Soviet need to maintain leadership of the Communist movement abroad, may swing Soviet views toward the more radical positions now upheld by the Communist Chinese.

29. Appraisal of future prospects for Communist strategy, and consideration of U.S. policies that may affect it, must give prominence to the unusually fluid situation that now exists. The older doctrines adhered to quite predictably for many years are now subject to change. Russia has very recently attained a position of power close to equality with the West. This is new. Much of the former caution was probably in part a product of the regularly inferior strategic position of the Communist world. Reappraisal of the more cautious policies may be considered by Communist theorists to be in order. (This may well be a principal point in the argument of the Chinese Communists, namely that the new balance in the strategic equation justifies such reappraisal, hence greater readiness to accept risks to hasten their ultimate victory.)



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for example, permit the U.S. to take stronger measures against Chinese peripheral aggression than would otherwise be possible. It appears, however, that U.S. action so strong as to constitute a threat to the existence of the Chinese Communist regime would be likely to elicit a Soviet response aimed at neutralizing such a threat, or at least lessening its impact.

PROBABLE RANGE OF DIFFERENT COMMUNIST POLICIES TOWARD WAR

33. The range of likely policy variation in the sixties appears to fall between two extremes, one of which might involve genuine moves by the Russians toward detente with the West, especially the U.S., possibly carrying the Chinese with them, but perhaps even at the expense of a de facto if not a de jure break with the Chinese Communists. At the other extreme, Russian views on risk-taking, the inevitability of general war, and the comparative advantage of general war, might come into agreement with those now held by the Chinese. In between, there is probably an area where Sino-Soviet views might be made to coincide on an approach to risk-taking that involved considerably more caution than the Chinese seem at present to favor. A major problem of this paper is to identify variable U.S. military moves which might conceivably influence these Communist Bloc policies one way or another.

34. Major objectives of American policy in the next decade probably will be not only to foster conservative attitudes on the part of both China and Russia toward a general nuclear war with the United States, but also to foster the divisive factors in the Sino-Russian alliance. With respect to the particular prospect of Communist Bloc divisiveness, while it is not clear precisely how U.S. actions might foster it, it is conceivable that events might take a turn that would bring about presently unexpected combinations. For instance, there may be a prospect, if further developments confirm the impressions created by

current intelligence, that Russia may in time become convinced that the excessive zeal of the Chinese leadership is highly dangerous to Russia, and to the world Communist movement as viewed from Moscow. If this becomes true, it could produce a situation in which a war between the U.S. and China, with the USSR remaining initially neutral, is imaginable, in a way that at present it is not.

35. In such an eventuality, it is to be assumed Russia would be standing by ready to pounce, and intent on dominating the peace. It is conceivable that, just as the Chinese Communists might upon occasion feel it desirable to involve the U.S. and the USSR in a war, sane Russian leadership might come to feel that a war between the U.S. and Communist China, if not desirable, might be turned into an opportunity to get rid of the unwelcome elements of Chinese Communism and weaken the U.S. as well.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF U.S. MILITARY POLICY UPON COMMUNIST STRATEGIES

36. As U.S. military power is the principal obstacle to Communist achievement of world hegemony, the posture, composition and strategy of U.S. forces can be expected to have a significant impact on the military actions of the Communist Bloc. (This influence is, of course, not one-sided. As the Bloc is generally conceded the advantage of initiating wars, both limited and general, the military capabilities of the Bloc may be said to be of greater importance to our military posture than is ours to them.)

37. Both these examples are theoretical extremes. In practice, by the time period of interest, the long-awaited strategic stalemate should have arrived. Unless there is a dramatically unforeseen turn in the course of events, both the U.S. and the USSR will then have strategic forces capable of inflicting

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unacceptable damage upon the other in a strike-second role.<sup>1/</sup> Strike-first capabilities will then have little significance in a general war of the kind commonly visualized between the U.S. and the USSR because neither will be able to deny to the other second-strike capability to deliver unprecedented disastrous retaliatory damage. In this situation, U.S. strategic offensive weapons can be expected to contribute to the deterrence of lesser aggression principally by deterring their escalation to all-out war, while the aggression itself is met directly by limited war forces. Discouraging the Sino-Soviet Bloc from such lesser aggression would rest more heavily than in the past or at present on limited war forces that can be employed with conspicuous avoidance of threat of general nuclear war.

38. Conceivable U.S. strategic postures would have widely variant effects on the courses of action rationally open to the Bloc leadership. At one extreme, an acknowledged U.S. first strike counterforce capability would be likely to have a valuable deterrent effect against Communist aggression overseas. At the other extreme, a U.S. strategic force limited in capability and intention to the infliction of punitive damage on the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike would not only be ineffective in deterring overseas aggression, but might cause Soviet leaders to doubt that such a force would in fact be used in reply to their initial strike against our strategic forces. (The effect of both postures in deterring a general war would, of course, be influenced by the security of our forces and a number of other factors.)

39. As the anticipated strategic stalemate will not prevent war by accident or miscalculation, and as the Sino-Soviets are expected to retain the military advantages of initiative and

<sup>1/</sup> See the analysis of this problem in Enclosure "A", WSEG Report No. 50, TOP SECRET.

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superior military intelligence, it will remain important that these other means be usable without incurring undue risks of precipitating general war. This in turn requires impressing the enemy with the proposition that he will avoid serious dangers by observing the restraints that our own moves may suggest. Such an impression may depend on Soviet knowledge that the U.S. possesses sufficient graduated forms of military power to significantly widen the scope of "local" conflicts should it choose to do so, without going all the way to an unrestricted, uncontrolled thermonuclear exchange.

40. There can be no fixed specification of nuclear deterrence requirements or supplemental supports without reference to enemy response to our preparations, or to the issues or circumstances these means apply to, and the general political context of their use. It is to be expected there will be cases where tactical nuclear weapons will not be needed, or where the immediate presence of nuclear capability is a detrimental embarrassment (for instance, Lebanon), or where their use would involve political costs greater than their military value. There may be other cases where the threat of localized use of nuclear weapons may deter conventional aggression, or prevent its spread (this may have been the case in the Quemoy Matsu crisis of 1958). Wherever there are nuclear weapons on both sides, however, the stalemate of strategic nuclears will very likely extend to so-called tactical nuclear weapons as well. The presence of some backup nuclear weaponry should be sufficient to prevent breaking this stalemate for limited purposes. It should likewise prevent unrestrained use of other means to attain the decisive ends that tactical nuclear weapons would be supposed to gain, for unlimited objectives are in the end as serious a challenge as unlimited means.

41. Limited war, however it is defined otherwise, involves mutual restraints upon the use of available means. Restraint by one side involves understanding, or hope, of the same or comparable restraint on the other side. Limitation of war depends, therefore, upon this understanding of enemy intent. There are probably circumstances of use of nuclear weapons, intended to be limited in violence and in objectives, which could be clearly and promptly perceived by an enemy to be deliberately limited. There are certainly also many possible uses of nuclear weapons in limited applications which we could not count upon the enemy, with confidence, to perceive immediately as limited in intent. Wherever this dividing line is, it may be argued that, below that level of evidently limited intent, there is hope that nuclear war may be kept limited. But the same logic suggests there is no reason for confidence that, once that level is exceeded, there can be much confidence that limitations will be observed. The dominant element of the problem is understanding. The decisive question, then, is what kinds of limited uses of nuclear weapons will be dependably and promptly understood by the enemy to be limited. What we know about the dependable correctness of rapid appraisals of great violence and battle situations, and of the value inevitably attached to rapid response, once full-scale nuclear response has been decided upon, does not encourage the view that there are likely to be many cases, except at sea or in other geographically distinguishable areas, where use could be made of nuclears below the level that would invite escalation. We may reasonably expect that a clear-cut difference in kind will be understood fairly well and fairly promptly. The available evidence offers little support for confidence that differences of degree will be thus clearly and promptly understood.

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42. The growing number and geographical spread of actual or potential enemies, increasing the global dispersal of their strategic nuclear striking forces make the problem of an initial disarming strike both more difficult operationally, and more hazardous in the prospect of being discovered and surprised while in preparation. These difficulties operate both ways, of course. Spread of nuclear weaponry in the Free World complicates the problems of a possible Communist counterforce strike.

POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO CHINA

43. This is a special problem that needs prominent mention because it involves a possibility of ultimate major revision of the strategic balance in the Asian borders of the Pacific. There is increasing evidence of Chinese activity in the development of nuclear weapons. The current NIE (NIE 100-4-60, 20 September 1960) estimates that China may be able to detonate a nuclear device in the period 1962-1964 with a crude weapon deliverable by BULL bombers six months or so thereafter. Soviet assistance is considered critical, and the situation is presently not clear. The acquisition of a first-class nuclear capability is still a long way off, unless it were supplied by the USSR, but a nuclear nuisance capability is a distinct possibility for the 1964-1967 period.

44. It may not require a great or highly sophisticated Communist Chinese capability, however, to alter considerably the strategic balance in the Formosa Straits area, and perhaps also in Eastern and Southeastern Asia as a whole. The Chinese Communists have demonstrated an interest in testing U.S. resolution in the matter of Taiwan, even when they had no nuclear weapons and we had many. They may conclude, when they possess some small capability, that we would not be as ready to assume risks over Taiwan, but that, if in fact we did assume the risks of nuclear war with

China, Russia would be involuntarily but surely involved in a general war that would end the resistance of the capitalist world. The dilemma in the Formosan Straits area may be generally analogous to the situation in Europe, with the added complication that in the Asian area both local parties to the dispute have displayed an interest in getting their principals to fight it out, a factor certainly not present in the European situation.

45. Quite apart from actual use, proof of the mere existence of incipient nuclear capabilities for the Chinese Communists might have very disturbing effects on the ultimate stability of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, and likewise influence adversely the attitude of the governments of both Japan and Korea toward alliance with the U.S. There can be little doubt, either, that the propaganda value of such an accomplishment would be great in many other areas, especially in Southeast Asia. China's voice within the Communist world would be greatly strengthened, also.

#### INTERACTION OF U.S. AND COMMUNIST STRATEGY

46. Weapons systems, which are variable, are employed in strategies, which are variable, to attain objectives, which are variable, against an enemy whose means and strategies and objectives are also variable, and are in part determined by what we do. Military strength adequate for some objectives may be inadequate for others; and strategies appropriate to some issues may be inappropriate to others. Military strength should be designed to support national objectives and objectives should be fixed which are within the power of attainable military strength to support.

47. There are limits to what may be achieved by policies of deterrence, and when these limits are exceeded, deterrence is likely to fail. It is likely to fail because it becomes

incredible, or because it appears to the enemy intolerably oppressive or threatening. It may be incredible because it does not appear that the potential gains to ourselves are equivalent to the risks involved in invoking the deterrent force. This could lead to disregarding their enjoining intent, presumably at first by ambiguous and diversionary tactics. It may appear threatening or oppressive by being applied to issues as important to the enemy as the risks of nuclear war, or because the technical or strategic characteristics of our deterrent suggest that general nuclear war is inevitable or highly probable. This could serve to justify assumption of the risks of preventive or pre-emptive attack upon us as the lesser of two evils.

48. Theoretically, if the policy of deterrence is overextended in the issues to which the threat is applied, the deficiency might be repaired by strengthening the total defensive posture to a point where the risks were reduced to a level that appeared to be commensurate with the value of the objectives which were sought. This would give deterrence credibility by one means. Enclosure "A" suggests that improvements in strategic offensive posture cannot forcibly prevent the Soviets from destroying from half to nine-tenths of our people and wealth in a general war. This suggests that the problem cannot be solved solely by improvement of the military posture. The alternative is to reduce the area of issues to which deterrent policy is applied to a point where it is credible that we would invoke the deterrent in response to enemy violations.

49. Determination of the issues and objectives to which a nuclear deterrence policy should be applied is a political question, not a military question. The minimum conceivable application of the nuclear deterrence policy will probably be to deter

direct, unambiguous nuclear attacks upon the U.S. itself. But presumably the application of the deterrent threat will always extend somewhat further. This is because defense can seldom be counted upon to be effective if it sets out, from the first, to defend only the most vital areas. In other words, because preservation of the independence and integrity of the U.S. itself may be judged impossible unless other areas are also defended, it may remain credible that we would use the deterrent force in retaliation if closely allied areas were subjected to nuclear attack by the Soviet. But defense of more remote or less vital areas will have to be entrusted principally to means whose use does not involve such dangers to the U.S. In proportion as the areas defended by the strategic deterrent are reduced, they must be defended by other means.

50. The most important effect of the nuclear stalemate upon our total posture is that it will curtail drastically, and perhaps eliminate, our ability to project U.S. strategic power, as now defined, into foreign areas in support of American diplomatic policies which are not immediately and directly crucial to our continued national existence. It is important that political decisions concerning the use of military means in support of national policies be made in awareness of both the alternatives available to us in military postures applicable to the issues confronting us, and of the risks and possible consequences of these alternatives. The indicated adjustments to reduce the overextension of strategic deterrence will probably consist much less in changes of plans for the strategic force than in adjustments in strategy (addition of supplemental military forces), and adjustment of objectives to be sought by particular strategies and military means.

51. To suggest Soviet reactions to alternate U.S. strategic postures it is first necessary to assume that the Soviets will attribute roughly the same general characteristics to U.S. weapons and deployment patterns as we do. The Soviets could attribute certain value judgments and strategic choices to a particular U.S. weapons mix. The composition of the "mix" and a considerable amount of data on both weapons systems and U.S. judgments of them will, of course, be available to the Soviets in Congressional hearings, technical journals and other forms.

52. In addition, the Soviets have exhibited some specific reactions to certain types of strategic force deployment. They have expressed alarm over armed bomber flights over northern territories, calling such flights dangerous and therefore provocative. They have expressed some recent concern over the danger of war by accident, particularly the initiation of war on erroneous or misinterpreted warning signals. They have, on the other hand, described the concealment of their own strategic weaponry as ensuring retaliation, and therefore making war an unprofitable venture for the initiating nation. These may or may not be "genuine" expressions of Soviet opinion; they would, at least, not be irrational opinions for them to hold.

53. At one theoretical extreme, it may be judged that a U.S. strategic force posture capable only of punitive attacks upon cities, would have undesirable effects on Soviet strategic policies. This would emphasize that the U.S. could not rationally initiate a strategic strike in retaliation for major aggression against our allies, and might induce strong doubts that such a force would in fact be used in retaliation for a strike against U.S. military targets. At the other theoretical extreme, a U.S. force posture clearly limited in capability to

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an initiative first strike would probably encourage Soviet efforts to counter it and, quite possibly, would encourage a Soviet first strike in the period when this force was under construction.