

FY73

Budget

November 7, 1970

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JAN 24 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategy for Peace - A National Security
Strategy of Realistic Deterrence

I am transmitting this document for your EYES

ONLY.

William R. Fair

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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Strategy for Peace

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6 November 1970

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JAN 24 2012

6 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached document follows up my memorandum of July 8, 1970, concerning the need for resolution of key strategy issues with regard to defense planning.

I thought it would be both useful and timely to give you my view of the basic approach we should follow in seeking to implement your Foreign Policy and Strategy for Peace in the 1970's.

As I see it, our basic goal is this:

To make the transition from war to lasting peace and freedom with a restructured U.S. military force that would require 7% or less of GNP, made up of 2.5 million volunteers or less. Such a force, combined with adequate strength, true partnership and progress in negotiations, would be designed to deter war, and contrasts with the force requiring more than 9% of GNP, made up of a draft-heavy strength of 3.5 million men engaged in war, which you inherited.

I thought it particularly timely to bring this matter up now not only to assist in our overall defense planning but also to present my views on how members of your foreign policy and national security team can more easily and consistently address that major element of your foreign policy for which each has primary responsibility. It seems to me that a logical and appropriate division of effort within

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the Administration in presenting your foreign policy and strategy for peace would approximate the following:

- 1) The President -- comprehensive, conceptual presentation of
 - a. Foreign policy objectives.
 - b. Essentials of foreign policy strategy.
 - c. Essentials of national security strategy.

Vehicle: Second Annual Foreign Policy Report to Congress, following State of the Union and Budget Messages.

- 2) The Secretary of State -- Comprehensive exposition of foreign policy strategy with emphasis on diplomacy, negotiations and international politics.

Vehicle: Posture Statement.

- 3) The Secretary of Defense -- Comprehensive exposition of National Security Strategy including essentials of military strategy and defense planning factors.

Vehicle: Defense Report.

The above represent formal elements that would be used to present your program. At the same time, I believe it would be important to complement these with a comprehensive program to convince Congress of the validity of our approach and the need for support. I have in mind a series of informal meetings with key members, where we could discuss the issues without the constraints associated with formal hearings.

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Turning to strategy issues, as you know, the time has come to make those hard decisions about the defense budget and plans for the future. The fundamental question of what is this Administration's basic policy, around which military forces should be designed and procured has been answered quite simply and forcefully by you: A policy of peace. It is not a policy of warfighting; it is not a policy of status quo; it is a policy to move this country and the world towards a generation of peace based on three principles -- partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate.

What is needed to make your strategy for peace work is both internal and external flexibility on programs. We also need a coherent and credible public position on strategy for the 1970's. So the strategy must be:

- a. Positive.
- b. Consistent with individual and collective U.S. domestic and foreign obligations.
- c. Consistent with free world nations sharing the burden as well as the fruits of security.
- d. Reflected in U.S. force mix, composition, and deployments.
- e. Understandable to the U.S., our friends and allies, and to our enemies -- both actual and potential.
- f. Realistic and attainable.

Last year we planned this year of transition to implement new foreign policy and to revise, as necessary, national security strategy. We

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have made visible progress in reducing defense spending and making the transition to a peacetime economy but we don't have full public acceptance of the cost of attaining and ensuring peace.

The material in the attachment is a conceptual approach to accomplish your several objectives. It approaches the problem as was done with Vietnamization: objectives first, resource availability, new strategy, revised force composition and mix, and flexible implementation. The proposed approach takes basic foreign policy objectives as given and describes strategy in these terms rather than in terms of specific capabilities. It injects some flexibility and new initiatives into our approach for defense planning, but at the same time it does not represent a radical diversion from current programs.

Within this framework, the strategy would be based on the following planning goals:

- 1) A larger share of free world security burden to be taken by those free world nations which have enjoyed major U.S. support since World War II, rapid economic growth, and a relatively low defense contribution.
- 2) A strong emphasis on regional defense arrangements.
- 3) A U.S. military force which in a stable peacetime environment would require 7% or less of our annual Gross National Product.
- 4) Volunteerism for U.S. manpower.

This approach lends itself to keying our presentation to the Congress and to the public in a way that preserves maximum flexibility.

It provides for:

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- 1) A set of minimum baseline forces.
- 2) Program options (development, long lead time, or new initiatives) which we may or may not need but which are prudent to provide as a hedge against SALT failure or other adverse situations
- 3) A possible set of contingency force or budget options, where we want approval for funding to preserve short-term flexibility, but would hold in abeyance pending world developments (e.g., SALT).

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This last set, for example, could reflect initiatives taken by the Administration to bring pressure to bear in our pursuit of successful negotiations. We are tentatively planning to request funds for a new strategic submarine system (ULMS) which would give us an initial operational capability in 1980 through orderly development. Increased funds for FY 1972 could accelerate initial operational capability to 1978. We might wish to ask for the increased level to provide a signal to the Soviets in SALT and to maximize our capability in FY 1972 to actually accelerate the program if SALT developments and continued Soviet deployments indicate this to be a prudent course. The increased amount, however, would be placed in a contingency account.

Such accounts could also provide greater internal flexibility on some major programs where we have been pursuing the status quo but may no longer want to do so for various reasons. The SAFEGUARD program obviously lends itself to this approach.

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In sum, the proposed national security strategy provides both internal and external flexibility and credibility. It is consistent with your policy for peace, consistent with preserving capabilities but providing for increased initiatives, consistent with maintaining strength while phasing down to a peacetime force with flexible options, and, to the degree possible, consistent with the unsettled world environment.

There is one point that is essential to an understanding of the need for the conceptual approach I am recommending in this document. My two years of experience in this office and more particularly my attempts to approach our planning for the decade of the 1970's have strongly reinforced the conclusions I reached in my 16 years of experience on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in Congress: defense planning, programming, procurement, force design (including R&D and equipment) and force deployment, employment and operations are inseparable. For an effective implementation of national security policy, none of these elements can be treated as a separable entity. I am sure that President Eisenhower and you, as his Vice President, were motivated by the same conclusion in fashioning the national security policy and strategy for the Eisenhower years and in proposing amendments to the National Security Act of 1958 to broaden and strengthen the role and responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to encompass all of these areas.

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The following chart provides a schematic overview of a national security strategy of realistic deterrence. The document that follows explains the strategy and many of the major elements required in the defense planning portion of the strategy.

Attachment

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