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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Ch. XIV
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2 June 1972

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JAN 02 2013

Subject: National Security Assurances in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the recently concluded Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) ABM Treaty and Interim Offensive Agreement. They believe that specific measures must be taken now if the United States is to guard against a degradation of its national security posture. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following assurances be established:

a. ~~Assurances~~ "A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment."

(1) Provide high confidence monitoring of Soviet compliance with the terms of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement.

(2) Provide information on Soviet strategic activity, capabilities, and achievements as insurance against both technological and strategic surprise and for use in follow-on arms limitations negotiations.

b. ~~Assurances~~ - "Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs."

(1) Maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive

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(a) Accelerate selective improvements already approved for strategic weapon systems.

(b) Accelerate the development and production of selected programs for introduction of new or improved weapon systems.

(c) Initiate new programs necessary to offset Soviet threat growth and to provide leverage in follow-on negotiations.

(2) Plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the treaty and agreement to be made in the event of abrogation, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations.

~~Assurance III~~ - "Vigorous Research and Development Programs."

(1) Maintain weapon systems technological superiority.

(2) Continue testing to insure the effectiveness of new and existing nuclear weapon systems.

It is the conviction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, without the leverage of the actions outlined above, further negotiations on offensive systems cannot be concluded without placing the security of the United States in jeopardy. Further, in the event of abrogation of the treaty and/or agreement or collapse of forthcoming negotiations, rapid augmentation of strategic capability will be essential.

2. ~~(S)~~ Because of the relationship between arms limitations and national security, a formalized national program in support of these assurances is required. This program should be reviewed annually and recommendations concerning the assurances submitted to the President.

3. ~~(S)~~ Appendix A hereto provides a summary of the constraints placed on US and Soviet strategic forces. Appendix B hereto contains an evaluation of the Soviet strategic offensive forces both with and without the agreement in comparison to the US programmed force. The evaluation indicates that, if the Soviets abide by the terms of the agreement, the potential disparity by 1977 between the currently programmed US strategic forces and currently forecast Soviet strategic forces is reduced with the agreement. Although the USSR possesses an advantage in numbers of delivery vehicles and total megatonnage, the agreement should limit the Soviet momentum. While at this time the United States has the advantage in numbers of reentry

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vehicles and total warheads, this advantage could be reversed should the Soviets, with their large payload capability, emphasize MIRV development and deployment.

4. ~~(S)~~ Considerations for verifying Soviet compliance with the treaty and interim agreement are contained in Appendix C hereto. Verification of Soviet noncompliance with the terms of the agreements, including deliberate measures by the Soviets to impede US verification by national means, will require prompt US reaction, to include, if necessary, withdrawal from the treaty and/or agreement. The United States possesses the capability to verify by national technical means the testing of new or significantly modified strategic weapons and can detect, with confidence, violations that could seriously threaten US security. However, assured detection of all violations is not possible. In order to increase US verification capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend research and development efforts to provide new monitoring systems, the provision for reserve monitoring systems that can be employed during contingencies, and improved analytical and processing capabilities to accommodate expanded intelligence efforts and to improve timeliness of processed intelligence data.

5. ~~(S)~~ Measures that would improve the effectiveness of US strategic forces within the limits of the SAL agreements as well as a discussion of the relationship of general purpose forces to SAL are contained in Appendix E hereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that immediate steps be taken to begin the deployment of a ballistic missile defense of the National Command Authorities. They also recommend that immediate steps be taken to insure that adequate nuclear material will be available for new warhead application. They further recommend that the momentum of the ongoing strategic programs contained in the FY 1973-1977 Defense Program be maintained. The B-1 and TRIDENT programs as well as prototype development of Site Defense should be given full support. In addition, concept formulation of the subsonic cruise armed missile capable of being deployed in submarines should be accelerated. Illustrative force improvements discussed in Appendix E are not intended to be all inclusive.

6. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that strategic research and development programs, such as those specified in Appendix D hereto, be aggressively pursued in order that procurement, production, and deployment leadtimes are shortened to the maximum extent in event of abrogation or withdrawal and that weapon systems technological superiority is maintained.

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
7. ~~(S)~~ In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that no further restrictions such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban be imposed in view of the importance of nuclear tests to future US force improvement programs. It should be noted that such testing is not as important to the Soviets due to their extended experience in atmospheric nuclear testing and their marked advantage in throw weight.

8. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you endorse the Assurances Program and attendant criteria and request that you forward their views to the President. The establishment of these formalized assurances may, on the one hand, avoid the development in US society of a sense of euphoria which could reduce US vigilance and willingness to maintain an optimum strategic posture within the established constraints and, on the other hand, allay undue concern for the security of the United States. It should also provide positive evidence to US allies of the intention of the United States to maintain the deterrent power of US strategic forces within a SALT environment. A vigorous Assurances Program may also assist in obtaining congressional support for those force improvement programs which are essential for the maintenance of the strategic balance. Of significant importance is the fact that the force improvement programs will provide essential leverage for subsequent negotiations for an acceptable treaty that limits strategic offensive arms.

9. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit recommendations concerning specific programs at an early date.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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