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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

21 JUL 1972

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: **JAN 11 2013**

Memo For SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mel,

Attached are the following items pertaining to the NNTAP review:

1. My recommendations for further actions..
2. A memorandum elaborating on these recommendations.
3. Talking points for your breakfast with Kissinger on July 24.
4. Memorandum transmitting the Tentative Guidance to the JCS for comment.
5. Memorandum tasking the Foster Panel and others with further work.

I've given copies of this package to Baroody and Foster.

ODDR&E concurs with the talking points; Baroody has not yet indicated his views to me.

The talking points constitute the most urgent item. We can work with Baroody and ODDR&E to make any necessary changes to the other memoranda after you've reviewed them.

(signed)
Gardiner L. Tucker

Enclosures

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5456552
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
 Date: 11 JAN 2013 Authority: EO 13526
 Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
 Declassify in Part: X
 Reason: 3.3(b)(5)(6)
 MDR: 12-M-2596

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ASD(SA) File



SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JAN 11 2013

21 JUL 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Further Actions Relating to the Review of National
Nuclear Targeting and Attack Policy (NNTAP)(S)

Since you concur with the general thrust of the Tentative Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons prepared by the NNTAP panel, there are further questions to be considered which have to do primarily with the relation among the concepts of the Tentative Guidance, the weapons acquisition policy (i.e., development and procurement of weapon systems), and follow-on SALT.

Ideally, nuclear weapons employment policy, acquisition policy, and arms control policy should be formulated in an integrated way, like solving three simultaneous equations. The revision of the employment policy provides an opportunity to move closer to this ideal.

Figure 1 at Tab A illustrates the relations among these three policies. The relation between employment policy and acquisition policy is clear -- the weapons made available by our acquisition policy determine our nuclear attack capabilities and, therefore, the employment policy we wish to be able to carry out is one of the factors affecting our weapons acquisition policy. The relation between weapons acquisition policy and strategic arms control policy is equally clear. SALT should help preserve, if not enhance, our deterrent and one of the factors determining U.S. SALT positions is the need to continue the acquisition of essential strategic weapons.



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

Although there is a direct relation between strategic arms control and employment policy (the accidents and hot line agreements reflect this relation), it is a weak one. SALT and employment policy primarily affect one another through the weapons acquisition policy. Thus, possible changes in weapons acquisition policy as a result of revising the employment policy become one set of factors to be considered in preparing for SALT 2.

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These considerations lead to four major tasks:

1. Refine the Tentative Guidance and assess the problems of implementation.
2. Ensure that the weapons acquisition policy is consistent with the revised employment policy and that we are able to rationalize this policy and our weapons programs to key Congressional committees in terms of the employment policy and our SALT 2 objectives and tactics.
3. Ensure that the weapons acquisition policy and our SALT 2 objectives and tactics are consistent.
4. Determine the extent to which our declaratory policy to NATO, to the Congress, and to the public should change.

The attached chart lays out the timing for these tasks (Tab A, Figure 2). The most critical timing problem is related to SALT 2.

We do not want SALT 2 decisions to be made within the wrong conceptual framework. Therefore, it is essential that the framework associated with the Tentative Guidance and the weapons acquisition policies be thoroughly understood at the highest level. In addition to briefing Kissinger and Odeen on the Tentative Guidance, this means exposing the concepts of the Tentative Guidance to the President, some of his principal SALT advisors (Kissinger and Rogers), and selected members of their staffs.

If SALT 2 starts in mid-October, we will have to be ready for an NSC meeting by the end of September. Allowing lead time for staff analysis, this means we will want to start working in early August, at the latest, in order to develop the conceptual framework which relates employment policy, weapons acquisition policy, and follow-on SALT.

Of equal importance, but less critical from the standpoint of timing, is the adjustment of our national policy in time for testimony on the FY 74 budget. The strategic sufficiency criteria of NSDM 16 should be modified, although this need not be done before SALT 2. Modification or replacement of the sufficiency criteria in early December would allow time to reflect new policies in the President's Foreign Policy Address, your posture statement, and other DoD testimony on the FY 74 budget. The basis for new sufficiency criteria would be primarily provided by the work for SALT 2 described above.

There is an immediate problem posed by the on-going DPRC study of strategic objectives, which is intended by Kissinger to provide a conceptual framework for SALT 2 decisions and a basis for modifying NSDM 16. Kissinger plans to call a DPRC meeting on July 27 to discuss this study. I believe the best course of action is to take this study "underground"; continue it with a limited group of representatives

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from OSD, the Joint Staff, State, and the NSC staff, chaired by Phil Odeen; and orient the study toward the SALT 2 work I described above. If this is done, a DPRC meeting on July 27 would be unnecessary. Tab B contains talking points to this end for your use when you have breakfast with Kissinger on July 20.

There are a number of DoD actions which should proceed in parallel with the above.

First, as you have already indicated, the current version of the Tentative Guidance should be sent immediately to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, along with the NNTAP panel report for background use. At Tab C is a forwarding memorandum which has been coordinated with the Joint Staff. I think you should, however, talk to Moorer about the Tentative Guidance before sending it formally to the Chiefs for comment.

Second, the following additional analysis should be carried out in order to refine the Tentative Guidance and to support possible changes to weapon acquisition policy and programs.

1. By the NNTAP Panel.

JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)

a. Develop more detailed guidance for theater nuclear weapon employment plans.

c. Develop offline and assess, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approximate employment plans to implement the employment policy.

d. Recommend changes in declaratory policy.

2. By the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

a. Evaluate the enduring survivability and trans-attack stability characteristics of US nuclear forces.

b. Evaluate the capability of the National Military Command Center to implement the employment guidance.

3. By the ASD(SA).

a. Investigate possible changes to the DPPG.

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4. By the WWMCCS Council.

a. Evaluate our C³ capabilities to support the employment guidance. This will mean allowing Eb Rehtin and one of his staff access to the Tentative Guidance.

At Tab D is a memorandum which sets these tasks in motion on a schedule which would permit you to issue final employment guidance in early December. This memorandum also sets forth the policy regarding interaction with the DPRC and the Verification Panel which I described above.

In summary, I recommend that you:

-- transmit the Tentative Guidance to the Chiefs for comment, after talking with Moorer;

-- bring Kissinger and Odeen on board and continue the [REDACTED] with a limited group,

-- initiate further DoD work, keyed to issuing final employment guidance and revising NSDM 16 and the DPPG in early December.

(signed)
Gardiner L. Tucker

Enclosures

JS 3.3(b)(3)(6)

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


Figure 1

Relation Among Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,
Acquisition Policy, and Arms Control Policy

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


Figure 2

Timing for NNTAP, SALT 2, and
Weapon Acquisition Decisions

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NNTAP Talking Points
(Laird/Kissinger Breakfast -- July 24)

I. Status of NNTAP Review

- A. Tentative Guidance (TG) briefed by Foster to SecDef and Chairman, JCS
- B. SecDef reviewing TG in detail and sending TG to JCS for comment.
- C. NNTAP panel being directed to do further analysis.
- D. Although TG is by no means final at this point, SecDef wants Dr. Kissinger's views and advice on TG and on additional analysis. Briefing on TG will be arranged for Kissinger and Odeen.
- E. Current work schedule is keyed to issuing final guidance, after NSC review, in December, 1972.

II. Employment Policy, Weapons Acquisition Policy, and SALT 2

A. Concepts of TG imply a different framework for strategic nuclear program decisions than that provided by the current NSTAP and NSDM 16. Near-term weapon programs probably will not change as a result of implementing revised employment policy, but out-year programs may change and the way we explain and justify our programs may change.

B. Concepts of TG will affect SALT 2 primarily through possible changes in weapons acquisition policy and declaratory policy resulting from the revised employment policy. Therefore, TG should be considered in SALT 2 preparations. On the other hand, TG is still undergoing review and revision. Also, the TG and its concepts should be closely held until we decide what changes, if any, to make in our declaratory policy as a



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

C. We should revise NSDM 16 and the DPPG, based in part on the revised employment guidance. This is not needed before SALT 2, but should be done prior to testimony on FY 74 budget. It is desirable, though, that we have our thinking well along before SALT 2.

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III. Proposed Approach

A. Create a small study group (working under Phil Odeen?) to address implications of the concepts underlying the TG for the strategic sufficiency criteria and for SALT 2. This group should consist of at most two specially cleared representatives from NSC staff, OSD, JCS, and State.

B. Current efforts on the DPRC strategic objectives study by the DPRC Working Group and its Coordinating Group would be suspended. Instead, the study would be carried on by the above study group, oriented to include consideration of the concepts of the TG as related to SALT 2 and weapon acquisition policy, and conducted on a schedule keyed to SALT 2. Papers generated by the study group would have distribution limited to the President and principals in NSC staff, OSD, JCS, and State; ACDA and CIA distribution will be made as necessary, depending on the findings of the study group.

C. Work of the study group will also provide the basis for revising NSDM 16 and the DPPG in December, when final employment guidance is issued.

D. If the above approach is adopted, a DPRC meeting on July 27 to discuss the strategic objectives study would be counterproductive and should not be held. The private briefing of the TG to Kissinger and Odeen should be substituted.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)

SUBJECT: National Nuclear Targeting and Attack Policy (NNTAP)(P)

I have examined the report of the NNTAP Panel and the "Tentative Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons" and am transmitting the Tentative Guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment, together with the Panel's report.

After receiving the comments and suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I intend to ask the Panel to revise the Tentative Guidance and then intend to issue this guidance as the basis for the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and other plans for the employment of nuclear weapons.

To provide a broader analytic basis for revising the Tentative Guidance, the NNTAP Panel should accomplish the following tasks.

1. Develop more detailed guidance for theater nuclear weapon employment plans.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

3. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, investigate in greater detail the operational implications of the Tentative Guidance by developing and assessing, in parallel with the other tasks directed by this memorandum, approximate employment plans which implement the guidance.

4. Make recommendations concerning the declaratory policy the United States should adopt regarding the employment guidance, with special emphasis on the extent to which the United States should inform its NATO allies about the content of the guidance, once it is issued.

~~by [redacted] (S)~~
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5. Brief the WWMCCS Council on the content of the Tentative Guidance, in order that the Council can evaluate command and control capabilities, as set forth below.

To accomplish the above, the Panel should utilize as necessary the full resources of the Department of Defense. Details of the Tentative Guidance should, however, be strictly limited to those with a need-to-know. I recognize that these tasks may require substantial time to complete, but preliminary results should be summarized and reported to me by November 1, 1972, in anticipation of revising the Tentative Guidance during the month of November.

In addition to the above, it is necessary to address the implications of the Tentative Guidance for weapon acquisition policy and strategic arms control. To this end, the following should be accomplished.

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

a. Review and evaluate the enduring survivability and trans-attack stability characteristics of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces (by September 1).

b. Review and evaluate the capabilities of the organization, displays, and procedures of the National Military Command Center to implement the Tentative Guidance (by November 1).

2. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). Investigate possible changes to the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (by September 1).

3. WWMCCS Council. Review and evaluate the capabilities of U.S. command, control, communications, and surveillance programs to support the employment concepts of the tentative guidance (by November 1).

Although the concepts embodied in the Tentative Guidance may have significant implications for weapon acquisition policies and programs and for SALT 2 preparations, it is premature to expose either the concepts or the details of the employment guidance to a wide inter-agency audience. I am arranging with the Assistant to the President

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for National Security Affairs to form a small interagency panel to consider the effects of the concepts of the Tentative Guidance on the strategic sufficiency criteria and on SALT 2 preparations. All interagency discussion of the Tentative Guidance should be carried on within this panel, except as otherwise authorized by me.

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

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