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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: JAN 03 2013

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McCoy AFB, Florida 32812  
17 May 1972

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5U.S.C. 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 03 Jan 2013 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part:   
Reason: 3.3(b)(5)  
MDR: 12-M-2602

Dr. John S. Foster  
Defense Director Research and Engineering  
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear John

Inclosed are my comments on the papers which we discussed yesterday. I did not study the Tentative Guidance Paper very thoroughly but believe it reflects by and large the points and arguments made in the basic paper.

Again, if you need me before the end of the month, just call at the number I left with you and with Marie. Will look forward to seeing you again soon.

Sincerely

Bruce Holloway

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 12/11/2012  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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12-M-2602

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Foster, DDR&E

16 May 1972

SUBJECT: Interim Report of Panel to Review U. S. Policies for Employment of Nuclear Weapons and including "Tentative Policy Guidance"

1. The following general comments (as discussed this date) are offered on the Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, with attachment, above subject, dated 6 May 1972:

a. It is an excellent step forward in redefining national policy on employment of nuclear weapons.

b. It can serve as a guideline for nuclear grand strategy from which definitive NSTAP (or NNTAP) can derive. This will fill a void that has existed for some time between national policy as enunciated by the President, NSDMS, JSOP, etc.; and the actual war planning guidance of the NSTAP.

c. It rejects "Assured Destruction" as a cardinal strategic concept (this is a tremendously constructive step).



JS 3.3(b)(5)

e. It restructures strategic policy with flexibility based on positive options (as opposed to options only of exclusion). This is another good step, particularly since the options are classified under types of nuclear force employment which are understandable objectively, and which realistically depart from a doomsday thesis.

f. It identifies a reserve force and refers to specific elements of reserve forces -- but not with convincing arguments to support the alignment, organization or utilization thereof. This needs more thought and analysis, but the idea of a nuclear reserve force which can be flexibly aligned with the objectives and options for employment is as sound as the principle itself.

g. It treats with the relative policies of SIOP and Theater Forces, but not conclusively or convincingly. This, too, needs more analysis, and particularly should address the studies in depth that have been made by USSTRICOM, EUCOM, and SHAPE during the 1960s on 'limited nuclear warfare.' I have given a lot of alleged thought to this recently and am more undecided how it should be sorted out than I am on any other main facet of the employment of nuclear weapons or conduct of nuclear warfare. I am inclined to believe, however, that there is some simple guideline which can make the rules fairly easy to draw up--if we can just find it.

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h. I believe the subject is treated comprehensively in these papers, and have not been able to identify any major points or general issues that have been overlooked. Nuclear force policy must relate to deterrence of coercive negotiation but am undecided whether this should be expounded in this document.

2. Detailed comments:

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

b. Page 9 (2) : One of the most important fundamentals of the paper. The point, however, also relates to the broader aspects of deterrence (which includes our whole way of life and the myriad of ways it can be undermined and degraded. Strong strategic forces which can be flexibly employed figure so very cardinally in this broader concept of what we are defending and how we must defend it.

c. Page 19, middle of page: I agree with the point made regarding the 3rd criterion of NSDM 16. However, I think the 3rd criterion itself is unrealistic, and more of a wish than a goal. It should be removed. Agree generally with the reasoning of the panel in (1) and (2) at bottom of page.

d. Page 22, 2nd paragraph: A most important element of policy. It can work only if we maintain 'sufficiency' - or relative strength from which we can negotiate a satisfactory settlement to us without escalating. If we don't we can control escalation, but only through an unsatisfactory settlement.

e. Page 24, first indented paragraph: Would have to be a very small option for this to be a problem—provided we do the necessary toward rapid retargeting of the ICBM force; [REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

g. Page 24, 4th indented paragraph: Why? They are only with respect to the weaponry itself. Again, rapid retargeting is a must.

h. Page 27: I have never seen a satisfactory explanation of derivation of the term [REDACTED] or just what it is supposed to do and not do. The reserve forces cannot be set aside INFLEXIBLY--we will never be able to afford or program a force structure of such proportions as to provide this kind of luxury.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

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i. Page 28, paragraph f: The Interrelationship of SIOP and theater forces needs more study. I wish I knew the answers. Recommend going through the archives of USSTRICOM in the early 1960s. Many studies, CPXs, and field exercises (to include one with war cabinets) were conducted on limited nuclear warfare at that time. Some were also made by EUCOM, and CENTAG/4ATAF planning and exercising staffs.

j. Page 31, last paragraph: Do not agree. Any contingency action ordered executed will be "ad hoc" to some degree. Two cardinal rules apply.

(1) When a contingency action (large or small) is ordered executed, it never looks exactly like any plan which is 'on the shelf.' Sometimes there is big change; sometimes little-- but always change.

(2) When decision is made, there will be great urgency to do it NOW--in real time--irrespective of force deployments and other factors.

These conditions will always hold, and they emphasize particularly the need for flexible forces and command control systems to match flexible options for employment.

k. Tentative Guidance Paper, page 2, paragraph 3 a, first sentence: This is a vast understatement. It should be so obvious as not to need iteration.

l. Page 19, (4): Agree; but the principles are not yet sorted out.

m. Page 25, paragraph (1) (a): How?

n. Page 25, sentence beginning "Peacetime targeting, etc.": Do not agree. Any reserve elements will have to be figured in the execution of limited attack options. Force flexibility and control will make it possible and still allow minimum levels of suitable reserves in the event of escalation. To think otherwise against ever-tightening military budgets is unrealistic, inefficient, and dangerous.

o. Other specific comments on Tentative Guidance Paper are covered above in commentary on Basic Memo.

3. Summarily, I feel this work is a tremendous step forward; that it strips away some dangerously specious thinking of the past; and that it can form the basis for progressive military planning and force structuring. I look forward to taking part in its further extensions and refinement.

B. K. HOLLOWAY

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