

17 March 1972

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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Reason: 3.3(b)(5) and (6)
MDR: 12-M-2604

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

NSTAP Issues

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JAN 04 2013

Based upon a review of the current and the proposed NSTAP, discussions of the NSTAP review panel, and discussion among the panel staff, the outstanding issues appear to fall into three classes: (1) issues concerning targeting and attack policies as related to national objectives, (2) issues concerning the President's call for greater flexibility in employing strategic nuclear weapons, and () issues concerning control of escalation.

Targeting and Attack Policy Issues

The objectives of the current NSTAP are general -- to be able to limit damage to the United States and its allies, destroy a comprehensive system of military targets, conduct selective attacks, and to terminate hostilities under conditions of relative advantage to the United States. Many different (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) targeting and attack policies are consistent with these objectives. Some, for example, would emphasize options



a paper is needed which discusses the following specific targeting and attack issues, with a view toward formulating language for SecDef guidance on these issues:

JS 3.3(b)(5)

1. What scenarios of war initiation should be assumed in targeting and in planning attack options? What do these imply about alternative U.S. objectives? What differences in targeting should there be between U.S. pre-emption and U.S. retaliation? How do we wish to adjust targeting on the basis of data obtained during hostilities?

2. In what ways should U.S. allies be supported through SIOP targeting? Specifically, what policy guidance should be given about targeting strategic nuclear weapons on (a) nuclear threats and (b) general purpose military threats to our European allies? What priorities are to be accorded to these targets relative to nuclear threats to CONUS? What should be the relation between the SIOP and SACEUR's General Strike Plan?



JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

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EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended
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5. How to account for uncertainties in the combat performance of U.S. and enemy forces.

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JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

Flexibility Issues

In three annual foreign policy reports, the President has stated a requirement for "the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction,"* but without being more specific.

Int.

The major issue for the NSTAP review committee is how to provide greater flexibility in ~~the SIOP~~. For example, should there be attack options against specific subsets of targets such as defenses or nuclear threats to Western Europe? What problems of strike coordination and SIOP erosion arise in connection with limited strategic operations and how are they to be dealt with? What should be the nature of the interface among the NCA, the targeting staff, and the CINCs in planning and selecting limited strategic nuclear strike options?

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Issues Concerning Control of Escalation

If a nuclear war starts with less than all-out nuclear strikes by one or both sides, then an important set of issues concerns provisions in U.S. nuclear weapon employment plans for control of escalation. This topic is not explicitly addressed in the current or proposed NSTAP. At least three issues should be addressed:


1. What data are needed from the C³, attack assessment, warning surveillance and intelligence systems to support control of escalation?

Int.

ISA

* "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s", February 25, 1971, p. 133.

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)



S.A.

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5. Under what circumstances do you attack enemy C³, surveillance, and warning.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

** What signals could we get to lead to preemption decision?*

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