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S4.S.C.552

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
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October 1, 1991

Dear Alfred (if I may):--

I am ashamed and chagrined to realize that I have had your transcripts for over a year without taking final action on them. I did read them with care and made the red corrections enclosed, but held up to do the add-ons and then never got to these till just now. Excuse: I have been working hard on an MS that would cover Nixon's Vietnam policy and much else in his whole foreign policy, and that is taking most of my dwindling creative energies. I will come back to that in a moment.

I think the changes and add-ons are self-explanatory. Just let me know if any questions. One cannot cover everything, but we did go over a lot of ground and it says at least approximately what I want to say on all the significant things.

Among the categories you use, I select Category 2 for now, with the proviso that if I am no longer around they should be moved to Category 1.

Now, for my own book, is it possible to have access to any transcripts from officials of the Nixon era? Who is there: e.g., Laird, Pursley, the ISA people, Admiral Moorer? Are there especially useful ones? Can one at least see and note for corrective purposes -- or more substantively and fully? With permission, I would assume, or is that now required? In short, which are available, and what categories are they in?

Lots of episodes I could single out, notably the Cambodian incursion and aftermath, but also Vietnamization, the state of the army from 1969 on, etc etc etc. Have, or will have, read most of the secondary sources, but the inner insights are occasionally priceless.

Please advise at your leisure.

Warm regards,

Yours ever,
Bill

R-1

P.S. Are the DOD *Per summaries* available for the 1969-74 period? If so, how to get access?
13-M-1081

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 05 2014

October 1, 1991

Added Text for Oral History Interview, OSD
William P. Bundy

1. On page B24, add the following brief amplification on the Indian aid story.

What went on in 1962-63 may have been important in the long story of US-Indian relations. After an initial and dramatic phase of emergency aid (mines and other defensive stuff) we provided a very generous initial program of \$120 million, with the British contributing half as a result of negotiations with them prior to the Nassau Meeting of December 1962 between JFK and Macmillan. That was an amusing London negotiation in a personal sense: my opposite number turned out to be none other than my wartime chief at Bletchley (in the ENIGMA operation), Stuart Milner-Barry (later Sir Stuart) of the Treasury, and we wrapped up the deal in principle in about 15 minutes, to the astonishment of our staffs, and then left them to work out the details. Then at Nassau, aid to India was on the agenda but got very short shrift indeed, with the intense discussion reserved for the SKYBOLT business and the coming out with our POLARIS offer. By the time the two top men got to India, both were tired and visibly bored by the whole subject. So they just signed off on the deal without any real discussion.

Then during 1963 the Indians sent a couple of high-level delegations, and I recall dealing directly with their Army chief of staff and also with the prominent industrialist J.R.D. Tata (then head of Air India as well as his great steel company), who was a Parsi from Bombay, direct, charming and extremely able, brought in by his government as a special troubleshooter and emissary.

We worked especially on aid to their air force, where at some point the Indians wanted to get help to set up their own aircraft production program. At the same time, they were still scared enough of the Chinese to want assurances of our help in case of another attack, and we drew up some contingency plans, and gave some assurances, that went pretty far -- in an effort, essentially, to head off their building up their own air force to the maximum and using scarce resources in what we thought would be a wasteful way.

In all this, Ambassador Galbraith was far more gung-ho and ready to make commitments than Washington was -- either in the Pentagon or in State, where Phillips Talbot, the Assistant Secretary, was very wary of the implications in the area of our taking on a commitment to India of any sweeping sort. At the same time, the Soviets were in the play, already giving some help to the Indian military, including the Air Force, and it was argued that they might get a much stronger position if we did not join in heartily.

I forget the details, but the outcome was that we did not

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date MAR 05 2014

give them the large-scale help they wanted, or give them the categorical assurances they wanted of US action in case of a crunch, and they did not accept our advice against a production program of their own. And in due course the Soviets did move in and establish themselves as the prime suppliers of military aid, including production advice, designs, etc. for fighter aircraft production.

All quite possibly of importance in declining a gambit and refusing to change the basic shape of US-India relations. Whether it left scars I never followed up to find out as I dropped out of the picture by early 1964. We judged that despite Soviet aid the Indians would go on being ornery and independent, ergo basically neutral and not a true Soviet client, and I would think that judgment borne out by time.

2. On C12, add the following to cover a neglected point about MAP training programs in general.

Here I want to digress to discuss an important point about the training of foreign military officers in the US (and to a lesser extent the programs for training them in place).

In my time the basic guideline was that we would not explicitly seek to indoctrinate such officers in a "pro-American" direction. Rather, the idea was to let them see our system and learn for themselves, not to urge them to change theirs at least in basic ways, or to take the American view of civilian supremacy. On this point, at least, I strongly suspect we were right: they almost always did get the point, although if you combed the list of graduates of US military training programs you would probably find the odd case where an officer did get into politics in an UnAmerican way, or even perhaps engage in a coup or a military government. Such governments and coups were of course endemic in Latin America especially, and I suspect that there were cases where American officers (and Ambassadors and Washington too at times) accepted them as inevitable and perhaps best in a particular situation. But the guideline always was to describe our doctrine of civilian supremacy as sound and the best possible, without trying to cram it down their throats, which I doubt would have worked in the badly inclined cases anyway.

This problem, of course, went on both before and after my time with MAP, right down to the Noriegas and others very recent. I am only describing what the guideline was in my time. And with it, as I recall, went a ban on CIA recruitment of officers, at least during their training periods. The purpose was to focus the training exclusively on professional military matters.

A tough and complicated subject. I doubt we had the final answers even in principle. Later, after I left office, I had occasion to review a draft study of MAP training programs, done for Brookings by Ernest Lefever, a strong hard liner. He either reported or urged that MAP have an explicit ideological purpose and I doubted his attempt to prove that this had been the case in

the past. Don't know how this effort ended up.

3. On page C14, at the margin circle, add:

At the time we took over, I think there was far too little genuine policy direction of the MAP program in relation to other programs and to our basic policy toward a given country. Basically such direction had to come from State and ultimately from the President or the NSC, and in working it out and applying it ISA had a key role. We also had our own ideas, of course, and were often troubled by tendencies, for example, to get into "mirror-imaging" of US forces and following the JCS force goals slavishly without regard to what experience had revealed about the severity and nature of the threat and especially the capacities of the local forces and society.

To put it another way, MAP when we took over seemed to be running on automatic pilot and to need a good bit of navigational checking and the constant re-checking. In this process we worked with State a lot, but also tried to keep the military viewpoint in mind, with what success I will let others judge.

4. On page C23, at the left margin circle, add (a point often skirted by biographers):

Moreover, I think it is high time to be candid about the exhaustion factor, not only for Rusk but for others of us as the grind went on from 1964 to early 1969. Rusk as I first knew him at close quarters in 1964 was a much more vigorous man than he was by late 1968, and a lot less grooved than he became as the ordeal went on. He himself writes that he went through the last year in office, 1968, with a lot of "help" from heavy smoking. He also drank a lot of whiskey, never so that he was visibly under the influence (slurring words, or incapable of putting his views clearly) but so that, as at least I came to feel, he was not open to new ideas or new approaches as he might have been in top physical form.

Setting this down, I realize that my own staff would very likely say the same things about me (minus the whiskey part). We were all damn tired by 1968 and I am afraid it showed at times.

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 05 2014