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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Handwritten initials

Handwritten initials

28 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY QUARLES

A copy of my memorandum which enclosed a suggested plan for initial organization of Freedom, Inc. is enclosed herewith for your information.

E. C. [unclear]
Memo and attachment

G. B. ERSKINE
General, USMC (Ret)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USDC-552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: x
Reason: 3-3(b)(1-9)
MDR: 13-M-1344


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OSD 3.3(b)(1)-(9)

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CIA 3.3(b)(1-9)

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Reason: 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)
MDR: 13 - 1344

50 USC - 552

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MEMORANDUM FOR: AL COX

CIA


SUBJECT : Lt. Colonel Clarke T. Baldwin

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) > 25 Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

1. I have looked through Baldwin's file and find that his record with us is uniformly superior. The following points may be of interest to Col. Lansdale.

2. Baldwin came to the attention of CIA through our representatives who have known Baldwin at the Russian language school at Regensburg. Because of his outstanding qualities, our people were anxious to have him serve a tour with CIA. An internal memorandum of 1953 refers to Baldwin as follows:

"Col. deSilva knows Subject to be an outstanding officer in every regard and to be a man of high competence in the field of USSR affairs. He is a graduate of the Army Language and Area School, Detachment R, at Regensburg, Germany, has served a short tour in Moscow, and has performed in a superior fashion as liaison officer with various Soviet missions in Germany and Austria. Major Baldwin is a person who will bring the highest type of competence and integrity to his assignment."



CIA 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

5. Baldwin was born on 27 February 1923, He is married and has one child. He is a graduate of West Point where he was later an instructor

OSD 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

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in Russian and German. He also did Russian area study at Columbia for one year and a half in 1946 and 1947. In addition to fluent Russian and German, he is fluent in French. I do not know about his Arabic. One of his hobbies is short-wave radio operating.

6. It might be worth mentioning that he is undoubtedly known to be RIB. However, this Branch does not consider this to be serious draw back in the contemplated mission to Iran.

7.  and I believe that Baldwin has the qualifications for which Col. Lansdale is looking.



CIA 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1) +
3.5(c)

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CIA

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.5(c)

20 January 1960

Lt. Col. Louis A. WAPLE;

Present assignment: PMS&T Colorado State University

Career Service: Artillery



OSD 3.3(b)(1) H
3.5(c)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

General: A highly qualified and highly regarded military officer.

Did an outstanding job during his assignment to Project

Waple is well oriented

works well without close supervision, gets along well

with other people and was very popular with his

associates during his time in

Lt. Col. Robert FRANCIS;

Present assignment: D/C, 1st Bg. 8th Inf. 4th Div
Fort Lewis, Washington.

Career Service: Infantry



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General: A highly qualified and highly regarded military officer. (Rated in the top ten Lt. Col.s of the army at time of his assignment [redacted] Did an outstanding job [redacted] particularly in connection with [redacted] Was very well oriented [redacted] extremely adept at making friends with [redacted] he came in contact with, works well without close supervision, highly esteemed by all who worked with him during his tour.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

COMPARATIVE:

Beth Lou and Bob are extraordinarily capable officers. They both managed to keep [redacted] interests foremost during their assignment [redacted] even though their careers are based in their parent service. I handled both these men [redacted] and consider them two of the most astute officers [redacted] received on detail from the military services. I think either of them could do a highly competent and professional job of the task at hand. In a choice between the two, Bob may be slightly more aggressive in tackling a job of the type in question.

[redacted]

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CIA
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1) > 25Yrs

*Engineer School (2420)
V.P. Bekasov*

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Major Norman L. Williams, OE, 026173, assigned in spring of 1957 to the Office of District Engineer, Persian Gulf Area, Tehran, Iran:

[REDACTED]

Fluent in Persian and French - previously stationed in Iran under Army WAF Program.

1st Col Harry K. Thomson, 024907, prior to 1957:

[REDACTED]

1st Col Robert Francis [REDACTED] - late 1957:

Replacement for 1st Col Thomson.

Col Henri E. La Tourette, USAF:

Assigned to MAAG 1955 as special advisor to Gen Gullauch, Chief of Shah's Military Bureau.

[REDACTED]

Major William Kayser, 6902A, USAF:

Was to have been assigned in 1955 to AF Foreign Area Training Program with duty station Iran (to attend University of Tehran).

[REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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MDR: 13-M-1344

SUSC:
552+

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CIA
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Major Norman L. Williams, CE, 026173, assigned in spring of 1957 to the Office of District Engineer, Persian Gulf Area, Tehran, Iran:

[REDACTED]

Fluent in Persian and French - previously stationed in Iran under Army FAST Program.

Lt Col Harry K. Thomson, 024307, prior to 1957:

[REDACTED]

Lt Col Robert Francis [REDACTED] - late 1957:

Replacement for Lt Col Thomson.

Col Henri E. La Tendresse, USAF:

Assigned to MAAG 1955 as special advisor to Gen Gullansbah, Chief of Shah's Military Bureau. [REDACTED]

Major William Keyser, 6982A, USAF:

Was to have been assigned in 1955 to AF Foreign Area Training Program with duty station Iran (to attend University of Tehran).

[REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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MDR: 13-NE-1349

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Date: NOV 11 2013

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS
DOCUMENT. DATE:
08-Jul-2013

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Date: NOV 11 2013

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10 September 1958

OSJ Working Paper

The Problem: To provide the United States with the means of having foreign manpower readily available for military use, with the following characteristics:

- a. Legally deniable by the United States, if desired;
- b. Trained for ground, naval, and air combat;
- c. Operating under U. S. control;
- d. At an acceptable cost.

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SUSC 552
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Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. There is nothing new in using "volunteers" to satisfy national objectives in foreign areas. It has long been an established practice.

There are numerous examples in modern times, such as the U. S. Army's Macabebe Scouts and its Philippine Scouts (including the 12th and 14th Divisions after World War II), as well as the AVG who flew for the Chinese. Several nations had volunteer forces in the Spanish Civil War, as part of the Spanish forces.

b. The Communists are adept at the practice; witness the Communist "volunteers" in Korea and Khrushchev's recent threat to send "volunteers" into the Middle East.

c. ~~The Freedom Company of the Philippines permitted some~~
telling action in saving Vietnam from Communist take-over.

d. Recent examples of employment of "volunteers" is illustrated by the infiltration of Egyptian and Syrian "volunteers" into Lebanon

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and Jordan before and during the recent crisis in the Middle East.

e. In the past few years, the U. S. has considered several plans for developing a foreign manpower capability to combat Communist-guided forces in foreign areas. Most of this planning has envisioned a "Foreign Legion" type of organization, with considerable political and budgetary problems, and has not been implemented.

f. At present, the U. S. has some limited capability of this type through clandestine projects, mostly fixed to a local area and local contingency.

g. U. S. defense programs have created a potential pool of foreign manpower for U. S. military use, which only awaits proper exploitation.

h. Through the Lodge Act (PL 597) and through language and area training, there are military personnel equipped to deal with the peoples and problems of a number of Communist target areas.

i. Through our 38 JUSMAGs, MAAGs, and Military Missions in foreign countries, there are now foreign armed forces equipped and trained with U. S. materiel, schooled in U. S. tactics, and with personnel who generally meet security standards acceptable to the U. S. ; most of these foreign armed forces include ground, naval, and air forces.

j. Sizable numbers of these foreign military officers and men have shown a willingness to volunteer when man's freedom has been threatened in a neighboring country. This fact will be attested to by American officials in foreign countries during the Hungarian Revolt, the Indonesian Rebellion, the Indochinese War, and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines. Today's

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trouble in the Middle East is no exception.

k. Methods could have been developed in several nations of the Free World, including the United States, for processing military personnel so they can be used in foreign areas and be diplomatically deniable by the government involved. Although the processes for doing this in free countries are more complex (to protect the individual) than those in Communist countries, the Free World does have this capability.

It is contemplated that the foreign manpower being discussed in this paper would be employed only in accordance with national policy on approval by the President.

During the past few years several situations have existed wherein it appeared that foreign manpower could have been used to advantage in carrying out our national policies. Some assets were available and were clandestinely employed on a small scale without achieving the initial objectives. It therefore appears that a method can be devised by which trained foreign manpower on a larger scale can be made available in a manner that would not require the United States to have any official connection with such use of foreign manpower.

A potential reservoir of trained foreign manpower exists within the units being supported by the various military assistance agreements and within units receiving the assistance of United States military and naval missions. The feasibility and practicability of utilizing manpower from

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these sources will depend upon the nature of agreements that can be made with the respective governments in each instance. It is doubtful that any pattern of agreement can be obtained because of various problems which may be created in certain areas of the world. It is preferable that agreements be made on a country basis. Planning should be done on a regional basis in order that manpower employed in a given locality would resemble as closely as possible the indigenous population in the areas in which it is to be employed.

Other factors which would influence employment of foreign manpower would be certain religious bitterness and racial animosity which may exist in the areas concerned.

The implementation of any basic plan for employment of foreign manpower must take into consideration the factors enumerated in the above paragraph, stability of the government being dealt with, the possibility of an internal coup d'etat and other security hazards that may exist. Implementation of such a plan would also need to take account of the political and foreign policy problems in regard to the relations of the United States with the country willing to provide volunteers.

It is required that the foreign volunteers be employed by the entity which we are supporting or by some mechanism which has no visible ~~relationship with the U. S. Government.~~ The Central Intelligence Agency is specifically charged with the conduct of clandestine operations in support

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of our national policies. The extent of participation by the Defense Department initially would be in a support role. Should the covertly supported operation develop beyond the capability of CIA, the direction of the operation should pass to the Defense Department, with CIA continuing in support. The exact point at which this change of direction and control would be made from CIA to the Department of Defense is difficult to determine, but for planning purposes it is regarded that when the size of the foreign volunteer units is that of a battalion or greater, such change should be made. Thus, the type of organization dealt with in this paper in each instance must have the capability of processing and handling units of battalion size or larger.

Discussion

Considering the aforementioned factors, it appears that the following courses of action are open for consideration as a means for the development of a plan as follows:

Course I (Ad Hoc) - When the situation requires, arrange for the entities that the United States is supporting to set up one or more purchasing agencies, the purchasing agencies to assume the responsibility of processing the volunteers in accordance with the agreement of the country providing the volunteers, and arrange for them to join the entity to be supported. The purchasing agency should also engage in the purchase of certain war supplies.

Course II (Covert Permanent) - To organize permanent covert units which would organize covert affiliates in countries willing to provide volunteers, for the purpose of processing the volunteers and arrange means

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for them to join the entities to be supported, conduct advance planning for organizing, equipping the troops, and logistics support of the volunteer project, as well as demobilization upon completion of the operation.

Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) - To establish a new, or utilize an existing, organization within each country under secret U.S. sponsorship and with no visible affiliation between each other or with the United States. These organizations would conduct appropriate local programs in addition to carrying out the activities listed in Course II.

Course IV (Overt Permanent) - To organize a permanent, non-profit corporation which would establish affiliates in countries willing to provide volunteers. This corporation would conduct a suitable overt program through the affiliates as well as secretly carry out the activities listed in Course II above.

Discussion of Courses of Action

Course I (Ad Hoc) would appear to have the following advantages:

- a. Provide a means for employment of foreign manpower in support of the selected entity designated.
- b. The plan is simple and would provide a high degree of deniability of United States involvement.

The disadvantages of Course I (Ad Hoc) are:

-
- a. This course of action would function initially at least on a crash it basis and/is doubtful that it would have the capability of an operation of any magnitude.

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b. It has a disadvantage of not having predetermined plans or personnel for supporting the designated entity.

Course II (Covert Permanent) would appear to have the following advantages:

a. A small permanent organization would be in being and in contact with the officials who would be involved in assisting and providing volunteers.

b. Better control of procurement of equipment, organization, logistic support could be provided.

c. Predetermined plans could be made and adequate personnel could be earmarked and positioned.

The disadvantages of Course II (Covert Permanent) appear to be that it would be difficult to operate on a covert basis for an extended period of time and be deniable because of the possible magnitude of the operation.

Course III (Covert -Overt Permanent) appears to have the following advantages:

a. There would be no visible evidence of U. S. sponsorship and support.

b. The public program could be conducted so as to provide excellent justification for the activities in connection with the foreign volunteer project.

c. Predetermined plans could be made and adequate personnel could be earmarked and positioned.

d. It appears possible, especially in the case of existing organizations, that part of the program could be financed from public contributions.

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The disadvantages of Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) are:

- a. Because of the requirement for covert U. S. participation, control would not be as effective as direct participation makes possible.
- b. In some instances it would be more costly, at least initially, than either Courses I or II because the public programs would have to be covertly financed by the U. S. Government.

Course IV (Overt Permanent) appears to have the following advantages:

- a. The affiliates would receive guidance and supervision on a permanent basis from the unit organized in the United States.
- b. The public program could be conducted so as to provide excellent justification of activities connected with the foreign volunteer project.
- c. The affiliates could conduct their programs in such a manner and under such titles as to indicate a relationship or affiliation with the organization in the United States.
- d. Once the programs are underway, it appears possible that part of the program could be financed from public contributions.

The disadvantages of Course IV (Overt Permanent) are:

- a. It would be more costly, at least initially, than either Course I or II because the public programs would initially have to be financed by the government.

b. The visible relationship between the affiliate and the U. S. organization could be a weakness. (Note: Covert funding would be the sole clandestine aspect of Course IV.)

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Courses I, II and III if adopted would be the exclusive responsibility of CIA as regards control and direction. Pre-planning and logistic support with the Defense Department to the extent possible will be necessary in each instance. (Course III would involve closer coordination and would make possible more extensive planning than Courses I and II.)

Course IV is overt in nature, with the sole covert aspect the funding of the organizations involved. Major responsibility therefore should lie with the Department of Defense, with CIA supporting on the covert aspects. Because of its overt nature, Course IV permits the greatest amount of pre-planning and pre-arrangements vis-a-vis the other courses of action.

Any of the four courses of action listed above would appear to have the following advantages for the utilization of foreign manpower versus the "foreign legion" concept as follows:

a. They would be more likely to secure the enthusiasm and support of other free world nations than a solely U. S.- sponsored foreign legion volunteer effort. It could conceivably contribute to uniting the free world to some extent against communist-inspired subversion.

b. The United States would be much less susceptible to Soviet propaganda charges of "war mongering" than if it were to establish a "foreign legion" type force and attempt to hold it in readiness.

c. The cost factor would be much more acceptable since training costs would be largely absorbed within existing military aid programs.

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d. A much greater flexibility could be achieved with regard to the type of forces to be employed and the nature of their employment. Forces to be committed could be readily tailored to meet the demands of the existing situation.

e. This concept would permit commitment of a volunteer force largely indigenous to the geographic area in which the emergency exists, thus relieving it of the stigma of being a force for Western imperialism in contravention of nationalistic aspirations.

f. U. S. Government sponsorship under this concept can be maintained on a secret basis and could be legally deniable.

g. No substantial detracting from regular U. S. military programs would result from this approach.

h. Regular U. S. foreign military assistance programs would not be duplicated but rather they would be rendered more immediately productive in terms of their being more responsive to the immediate threat.

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