



8 February 1963

DA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)-25Yrs

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEXIS JOHNSON

From: Brig. Gen. Landale

Dep Sec Jac Iscan

Subject: Philippines

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass. Div. WHS

Date: NOV 1 1 2013

Mr. Chipstead intended to show you the attached memorandum of my conversation with Alberto Kozalla, but apparently was unable to do so prior to his departure for Europe. He asked that I send it to you, for your information.

The Philippines help in Vietnam, there is a most constructive idea suggested by Senator Murray Mansbach of the Philippines who visited Vietnam recently. (Says that you consider it and, if it makes sense to you, that you use your influence to get the idea implemented.)

Senator Mansbach, when he visited the High Plateau of Vietnam, was struck by the racial similarities of the Montagnards to the Igorots of Mountain Province in the Philippines. (There are many similarities of physical appearance, customs - including the same tribal dances, and clothing.) He suggested that a group of Igorots be recruited, trained, and sent to Vietnam to work with the Montagnards. The Igorots know how mountain people can get along with lowland people, as they have done in the Philippines, and should prove of unusual value in helping get the Vietnamese and the Montagnards together as a team.

Whether or not you would like to be aware of the current problems of U.S. influence with the Montagnards, how Montagnard loyalties have grown toward Americans at the expense of the Vietnamese, when we phase out U.S. help, this will leave a vacuum which the Communists are almost certain to fill. This can be prevented, if we can get the Vietnamese and Montagnards to respect each other and work together as equal citizens of the country. Properly placed into position in the High Plateau of Vietnam, Igrot advisors from the Philippines could help resolve this problem while assisting the U.S. effort.

*Do not do per instructions below
5 May 61 J. J. [unclear]*

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GROUP G

Suggest that this be brought to the attention of Governor Harriman. Ambassador Nolting might be asked to evaluate the idea with [redacted] and Phillips of USOM; Ambassador Stevenson might be asked to explore the idea with Senator Manahan in Manila. It strikes me as a far more dynamic idea than the current Saigon proposal to put a group of Filipinos on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Both Nolting and Stevenson also would benefit by talking with Johnny San Juan, whose Eastern Construction Filipinos have been working for years in the High Plateau and know both the Filipino-Vietnamese and the Montagnard-Vietnamese relationships. San Juan was Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner for Magsaysay (vice Manahan who was Magsaysay's first Commissioner) and the guiding spark of the Freedom Company of the Philippines, the public corporation which was the predecessor of Eastern Construction and which did such splendid work for the Vietnamese government in 1954-56. San Juan would have a lot of practical suggestions on how best to implement the idea noted above.


Attachment

Office of the Secretary of Defense 508492
Chief, RDP, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1349

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

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
Office of the Secretary of Defense 54150.552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA 3.3(b)(1-9)

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OSD 3.3(b)(1)-(9)

Memo



CIA 3.3(b)(1)

723

Subject: Briefing for Godel - Layton Party

1. The content of the briefing will depend to some extent upon who is present and whether it is a joint briefing with Lawton, a ^{separate} briefing coordinated with him, or a completely separate, uncoordinated briefing. I assume that it will be a coordinated but separate briefing.

2. Specific suggestions:

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

a) Emphasis on point that we are now engaged in a cold war; we are not at peace.

b) The next problem. Statement of the problem, what you have done, what you are doing now.


c) The implications of the French withdrawal. American - French relationships. Attitude of the Vietnamese vis-a-vis the French

d) Reorganization of Vietnamese

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


Intelligence Service

Many other subjects may come up,
even though they may be licensed
in other brigades, as the cable
indicates that Godel specifically
wants to see you:
a) Civil Action
b) Rural Militia
c) Military and political action
in the west.
d) Civil guard and its relationship
with the military.

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WM. H. GODEL, Deputy Asst to Secy Def

Admiral Edwin T. Dayton, Dep Dir for Int of Joint Staff

Kenneth Landon, OCB

Wm A Smith, OSD

Capt J S Holtwick, Jr. USN-NSA

Lt-Col James A Riley, G-2

Capt W. H. Packard, USN-ONI

Col James J Macias, Jr, USAF-AFOIN

Lt-Col R A Martin, USA-JCS

Lt-Col B J Smith, USA-OSD

Saigon ETA 22/1200 ETD 25/1100

Particularly desire discuss intelligence problems
re Spl Ops problems.

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) > 25Yrs

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

730

24 February 1960

MEMORANDUM

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Dys Colonel Landale, OSO/OSD SIGNED :

Subject: Presidential Candidates, Philippines OSD 3.3(b)(1)

It is time to start planning on how we can best attain U.S. objectives in the Philippines Presidential Election of 1961. Failures in the Philippines elections of 1957 and 1959, and U.S. difficulties with the political entities brought to power in those elections, show the weakness both of doing too little and of dividing our support. Let us take these lessons to heart, quit pattering around as though we are not affected by the results of our actions, and either use our resources and efforts to bring about a Philippine political result beneficial to the U.S. or firmly decide to keep our hands off entirely. And, I don't believe we can afford the latter.

It is believed that a good starting place, at this early date, would be to take a really hard look at those most likely to be Presidential candidates in 1961. Four Filipino politicians seem to stand ahead of others: Garcia, Osmena, Magsaysay, and Lacson. They offer a Hobson's choice to us that perhaps we shouldn't take.

Garcia is the only "known quantity" to us, in that we have seen him in power. He has courted our enemies in the Philippines, probably has aided some of them, and has been stubbornly blind and deaf to the corruption in his administration. Even so, he is predictable. Essentially, the others are not.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Osmena has been openly pro-American, energetic, sharply intelligent, has rounded his personal life sufficiently to give the appearance of morality, and has shown real political skill. He boasts to his associates that he has American backing. As proof, he points to U.S. interest and assistance in the Mactan airport, with its link by tunnel or bridge to Cebu. While Osmena gives a good performance on the surface, a close scrutiny of him would show a real wolf in sheep's clothing. He has a long record as a ruthless, amoral person - in matters of money, sex, politics, and family obligations. This tremendously ambitious person would be a most dangerous, unstable President.

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Macapagal has sounded as a friend to the U.S., and undoubtedly is sincerely so. However, he has demonstrated a rare lack of understanding the political instruments of power. It would be well to examine his personal activities--such as those on his visit to the U.S.--to evaluate his stability and his comprehension of problems which would beset a Chief of State. His province mates who know him well have bestowed the nick-name "Mac Mac" ("fool") on him, after observing his behavior as Vice-President.

Lacson has political sagacity and personal magnetism, a Visayan who has a demonstrated ability to sway the Tagalog mob. However, if he became President, he would probably vie with Osmeña in instability and crookedness, helped by drunkenness.

This dreary picture is presented not simply to call attention to the type of problem we might face if we overlook taking any corrective action, or if we fail to consider the serious consequences of encouraging one of these politicians thoughtlessly.

Corrective action would require a survey of all other potential candidates, to see if there is one whom we could help gain a meaningful nomination, and then assist in a realistic manner. This would have to be done early enough to bring such a person into the zone of serious consideration by political organizations by about November 1960, so that they would start noticing him along with other potential candidates. To do this, such a person would have to embark upon a series of constructive actions--not political speeches--from his present position, during the intervening period until 1960. If the U.S. can find such a person, we should help him undertake these constructive actions in the intervening period, on a non-partisan, public-good basis--perhaps even help place him in position to undertake such actions.

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