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Attachment 1

Presentation of GPALS to Soviets

- Current GPALS concept designed to accommodate political/military fluctuations in USSR/post-coup Russia and republics
 - Concept envisions base level of defensive capability to perform stated mission (high effectiveness against attacks of limited scope)
 - Should democratization occur, sides should agree that "protection" against accident, unauthorized launch via one another is consistent with their political relationship; protection against Third World a mutual objective
 - Should democratization fail, concept provides U.S. alternative to offensive force deployments and/or arms control; for stabilizing relations at the strategic level of armaments; protection vis-a-vis Third World remains valid; provides U.S. additional capability to offer East European and/or breakaway republics security vis-a-vis a rump Soviet state/hostile Russia, etc
- Consequently, little should be done to revise GPALS concept in light of current events
 - Soviet massive strikes were not driving factor of GPALS concept
 - While careful to note no "official concern about inadvertent use of nuclear weapons," U.S. past position on issue has been validated -- has said that C2 process is sound; stability of command structure concerns us
 - As SecDef noted, U.S. cannot predict long term consequences of what has occurred
 - Third World threat unlikely to recede and potential for creation of additional countries in Europe may exacerbate international instability and tension, both near- and far-term, leading to continued U.S. involvement on Eurasian continent in proximity to the successor to Soviet Union
- Best option, therefore, is maintain course on GPALS
 - Structure and fund GPALS for late 1990s IOC

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- Push advanced theater missile defense; urgency may have been increased by coup and aftershocks, detail below
- Perhaps reduce follow-on technology funding or transfer to DARPA
- If directed, pursue single site deployment, but use for OT&E site
- Press hard at home and with Soviets for ABM Treaty relief
- Opportunity on ABM Treaty relief may be created
 - For theater missile defense, by pointing to potential need of exposed states in East Europe and on periphery of Russia for protection
 - For sensors, more than half of Soviet LPARs on soil of potential breakaway republics; sensor data could support USSR and/or republics; true even if republics agree to permit Soviets to operate/lease/draw data from LPARs
 - For weapons, exploit democratic tendency and willingness to pursue normalized relations to get defense deployed as insurance against returning to offensively-based strategic doctrines; allow offensive reductions to run course -- no need to insist numbers come down to make defense deployments possible; on the contrary, should argue that with defenses in place, reductions now easier and return to offense made more difficult
- Means for exploiting opportunity
 - Assumption: Democratization moves forward
 - Method for securing defense deployment which may prove legally possible but politically unacceptable is lapse of ABM Treaty with dissolution of USSR; domestic argument would be either defense was not needed or U.S. would not want to take advantage of rump state, thereby causing a military reaction to democratic movement
 - Desire for mutual acceptance of defenses by Soviet Union argues at very least for seeking political agreements to deploy, potentially in a staged manner, with not more than "X" deployed by years "A," "B," and "C," with some termination date of restrictions

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-- "X" in foregoing could refer to segments -- theater missile defense by 1996; nation-wide missile defense with space sensors by 2000; global missile defense by 2005; or functional capabilities -- number of interceptors for any purpose not to exceed _____ before 199X; any space-based sensor deployed after 199Y must provide data to signatory countries; following 199X, additional interceptors allowed, accept obligation to apply space-based interceptors to defense of signatory countries

-- More politically oriented approach would exchange aid -- economic, industrial, financial, etc., for package of changes at strategic level, to include offensive arms; with respect to defense component, the less allowed the lower the level or the more restrictive the aid; offense could be pegged to set rate -- SS-18 is worth \$____, etc

-- Either of foregoing could be coupled to technical assistance, if U.S. believes regime is in fact headed in correct direction, in return for concession on defense; e.g., reconfiguring warning net would require ABM Treaty testing relief; nuclear weapons safety and surety testing (given loss of Semi-) could require deployment concessions, etc

Assumption: Democratization is Slow or Fails:

-- ABM Treaty as null and void approach might be more successful under conditions where Soviet Union is dissolved and remainder is hostile to U.S. or to neighbors

-- Pressure might also be brought to bear through republics on center, encouraging in republics sentiments against offensive nuclear forces and demands for new structures to deal with problem

-- Direct negotiations might prove difficult; at very least, likely to see a "putting off" of serious negotiations on defense by Soviets

-- While pursuing direct negotiations, U.S. would also attempt to convince U.S. and allied domestic opinion that, given the lack of commitment to reform reinforces appropriate character of GPALS concept, need to hedge, etc.; then push hard for theater missile defense and single site deployments and agreement internally on compliant or legally correct testing and deployment; at same time, hold out to Soviets prospects of further offensive reductions; purpose would be to impress Soviet government that it could not

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possibly compete defensively and to expose its intentions to U.S. and allied public opinion if it did not accept reductions as part of package deal on strategic arms control

- Short term initiatives

-- At 30 September 1991 DST meeting seek agreement to place negotiations on a new footing: U.S. agrees to limits on defense consistent with GPALS in return for Soviet commitment to negotiate deployments; target for IOC of GPALS (all three segments operating simultaneously) is turn of decade; U.S. to make clear that it is prepared, short of direct technology transfer, to assist Soviets in areas of warning, C2, and cooperate on intelligence, etc

-- Use stability talks to propose confidence building measures on both offense and defense

-- If republics are independent and recognized, approach them separately on GPALS

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