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John Gordon's 31 October Tactical Systems Paper

Para 4. Strawman measures for Soviet tactical nuclear weapons

- Consolidation

-- Consolidate tactical nuclear weapons being retained at sites providing the maximum security and control, even if those might be operational bases.

-- Consolidate those weapons to be destroyed at locations separate from operational units.

-- Determine the optimum number of storage sites by how best to maximize control and security of the weapons, i.e., minimum number should be secondary consideration to security and control. (For operational unit weapons, this might be operational unit storage sites.)

-- Impose additional control on weapons to be destroyed, i.e., ensure control of storage sites is placed in an agency other than that with operational control of delivery vehicles.

Why?  
How does this help?  
Will they have the experience to control the weapons?

- Weapon Disassembly (All of the following <sup>might</sup> improve Soviet safety and security; they are advanced, however, with the caveat that the U.S. would not accept undertaking parallel steps.)

Same could be so w/ SoUs

-- As an interim measure, separate warheads from delivery vehicles. (For weapons the U.S. will retain in vaults in hardened aircraft shelters, removing weapons from vaults in order to separate the delivery vehicle and weapon could introduce a less secure condition for the warheads; or removing the aircraft from the shelter would mean it would be stored without cover.)

-- For weapons to be retained (operational), remove critical components and store these items at location(s) sufficiently removed and secure that loss of site control, by itself, would not permit complete weapons to be assembled. (For weapons at U.S./NATO operational sites, the security and control afforded by vault storage makes component separation an unnecessary and unacceptable procedure for U.S. weapons.)

-- For weapons to be removed from the stockpile and destroyed, as soon as practicable extract components (as above), but then render the component(s) non-operational by physical or mechanical disablement (this procedure would require ordnance specialists normally found at depot level and the actual operations performed would likely be weapon system unique). (A more invasive interim process, "poisoning" of the warhead's pit could also be suggested to neuter the weapon itself.) Then, as determined by schedule, accomplish the longer term dismantlement process (at a maintenance/storage facility which could be the same site).

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Department of Energy Declassification Review	
1 <sup>st</sup> Review Date: 9/13/13	Determination: [Circle Number(s)]
Authority: <input type="checkbox"/> DC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DD	1. Classification Retained
Derived From:	2. Classification Changed To:
Declassify On:	3. Contains No DOE Classified Info
2 <sup>nd</sup> Review Date: 9/13/13	4. Coordinate With:
Authority: DD	5. Declassified
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- Inventory/Tagging

-- Inventory and ~~tag~~ those weapons to be removed and destroyed. (Neither side should be averse to a tracking mechanism for this class of weapons as long as its intrusiveness was not extended into the actual demilitarization facilities; this level of monitoring would be too intrusive for application to operational weapons, i.e., those retained.)

I *quest*

- Presence at Sites (Bilateral presence at sites, or for that matter Alliance or U.N. presence, is not acceptable for the U.S.)

-- Recommend that a collective authority be established at republic storage sites (i.e., sites containing weapons to be retained or destroyed), as opposed to republic-only sites.

- Technical Assistance

-- Offer U.S. assistance to the Union and/or any inter-republic nuclear agency, specifically in those areas where design information would not be the restraining factor, e.g., safety standards, transportation, and security standards and procedures.

-- Offer U.S. ~~assistance~~ in transporting and disposing of special nuclear material.

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