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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
MR. STEPHEN HADLEY
MR. VICTOR ALESSI
MR. DOUGLAS MACEACHIN
LTG JOHN SHALIKASVILI
AMBASSADOR READ HANMER

FROM: JOHN GORDON *Go*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Initiatives -- Proposed Announcement

Attached is a draft press announcement to follow up on the President's initiative and Gorbachev's response. It is designed to respond to Gorbachev's new ideas in so far as is now possible, to be as positive as possible and at the same time to limit press speculation about what we do next.

We envisage using it as early as tomorrow (October 17). You know best how high in your organization it must go. In any event, I need your comments as soon as possible today. We can try for a meeting late this afternoon if necessary.

Attachment
Proposed Announcement

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 3 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5450552*
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS *and*
Date: *1356A 2013* Authority: EO 13526
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MDR: *13-M-3575*

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October 16, 1991
0900 hrs

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

On September 27, President Bush announced a far-reaching initiative to eliminate all U.S. ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons world-wide, to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. ships and submarines and land-based naval aircraft, to take immediate steps to strengthen strategic stability, to cancel certain modernization programs and to initiate discussions with the Soviet government ^{to take immediate concrete steps to permit the deployment of non-nuclear/unlimited defenses} on the safe and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear warheads, on the safety and security of nuclear weapons and on nuclear command and control.

Shortly after his speech, the President sent a high-level team to Moscow, headed by Under Secretary Reginald Bartholomew, to explain in detail the U.S. initiative and facilitate a positive Soviet response. While this team was in Moscow, President Gorbachev gave the Soviet response in a speech outlining a number of Soviet unilateral steps and suggesting some that would require joint actions.

We have now had the opportunity to study President Gorbachev's response and to consider the discussions held by Ambassador Bartholomew and his team while in Moscow. We are particularly pleased that the Soviets have decided to take steps very much

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nuclear

along the lines we have taken to cut back tactical and strategic forces.

President Gorbachev responded positively and courageously to President Bush's initiative. His decision to take comparable steps to unilaterally eliminate the vast majority of the Soviet Union's ground-launched tactical ^{nuclear} weapons and to remove all tactical ^{nuclear} weapons from naval vessels and land-based naval aircraft is a major step forward. His decision to stand down from alert a number of strategic systems and confine rail-mobile ICBMs to their garrisons is consistent with our own approach. The cancellation of a number of strategic modernization programs is welcome, *and we hope the Soviets limit their new systems to one type of single warhead missile, as has the US.*

As a result of the steps that President Bush has announced and are already being implemented, and the steps that President Gorbachev has announced, thousands of nuclear weapons will be eliminated on both sides. As our plans are finalized, we will be providing to the Soviets information on the status of the withdrawals and eliminations, and look forward to receiving comparable information from them.

We will soon be in contact with the Soviets to arrange the initial meetings to discuss dismantlement of nuclear warheads, safety and security of nuclear warheads and command and control.

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*From meetings in Moscow
we believe new Soviet
leaders will positively ~~react~~ ^{act}
+ these proposals ^{consider} on*

We are pleased with President Gorbachev's agreement to discuss the U.S. proposal to permit limited non-nuclear defenses against limited ballistic missile threats. Those discussions have already begun with exchanges with our team in Moscow and at the Defense and Space Talks in Geneva. President Gorbachev's proposal that the two countries pursue joint early warning systems reflects a common concern about being able to protect against limited [or unauthorized] missile attacks. We will be continuing discussions with the Soviets in these areas.

Some ideas raised in Gorbachev's response, in particular the proposed central ^{storage} basing of air-delivered tactical weapons, will require both more analysis and detailed consultations with our allies. I would point out that the announcement made by NATO today, drastically scaling back the number of air delivered nuclear weapons in Europe [and the number of bases for nuclear-capable aircraft], is in full concert with the President's initiative and is one more very important step recognizing the new international security environment.

We are also encouraged that both sides have now called for further cuts in strategic arms, beyond those in START. President Gorbachev's approach is based primarily on reducing numbers. President Bush ^{proposed reductions} focused on the quality and type of weapons to be reduced. He proposed eliminating the single greatest threat to stability, ICBMs with multiple warheads. We think this is ^{the} more

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*focus on the
most destabilizing
systems*

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most productive way of moving beyond START -

~~important than picking a number~~ -- we will continue to pursue this with the Soviets.

highly-enriched uranium
and plutonium

The President has decided, and I am announcing today, that in response to President Gorbachev's initiative it is U.S. policy that the United States will not produce any new ~~fissionable~~ ^{fissile} ~~[fissionable]~~ ^{fissile} material for nuclear weapons purposes. We do not believe that a formal agreement is necessary to do this or that detailed verification is required. To improve openness and transparency, the United States will share information concerning the status of U.S. facilities with such capabilities.

[It should come as no surprise that despite the broad areas of agreement and the sharing of certain common goals, we are not in agreement on every point. ^{First} At this juncture, we do not see the need to destroy all naval tactical nuclear weapons, even though they will no longer be deployed on ships. We believe the cause of world-wide stability is best served by the retention of a portion of these weapons. We also do not believe that a nuclear test ban is in our national interest. A ban would prevent us from making safety improvements to ~~[remaining]~~ weapons and maintaining the effectiveness of our deterrent. ^{in an environmentally safe manner} We conduct the bare minimum of tests to meet these objectives. In fact the ~~number of U.S. tests has been steadily declining~~: this year we will conduct the smallest number of tests in ^{nearly forty} ~~entire~~ years. And finally, we believe that the policy of the United States and our

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Moreover, as demonstrated by the INF, CFE, and START treaties, as well as President Bush's initiatives and President Gorbachev's response, further testing limits are not required to achieve significant and

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NATO allies that we will use military force only defensively is superior to one focused only on the "no first use" of nuclear weapons.]

OR

[It should come as no surprise despite the broad areas of agreement and the sharing of certain common goals that we are not in agreement with the Soviets on every point. The positions of both countries in these areas are well known [and will require further discussion.]

and should not stand in the way of making progress in other areas

The President is extremely encouraged by President Gorbachev's speech and the report of the discussions held in Moscow. The bold U.S. initiative to seize the opportunity created by the changes in Moscow, particularly since the coup, has now been reciprocated with comparable Soviet steps. The United States is proceeding with the steps the President announced on September 27 and looks forward to continuing discussions with the Soviets on a wide range of issues related to the initiative.

G's response to bold US initiative represents comparable steps in many areas to the initiative taken by the U.S.

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JCS

U.S. continuing
need for nuclear weapons

Subject: Recommended changes to Para 11 on Page 4 of Nuclear
Initiatives Proposed Announcement

It should come as no surprise that despite the broad areas of
agreement and the sharing of certain common goals, we are not in
agreement on every single point. First, ~~at this juncture~~ we do
^{a continuing requirement to maintain a}
~~not see the need to destroy all~~ naval tactical nuclear weapons, ^{capability}
~~even though they~~ ^{tactical nuclear weapons} will no longer be deployed on ships. We

believe the cause of world-wide stability is best served by the
retention of a portion of our naval nuclear weapons. Second, we
~~do not believe that a nuclear test ban is in our national~~ ^{Stet}

~~interest as long as we must maintain a nuclear deterrent.~~ ^{we} ~~A ban~~
~~would prevent us from making safety improvements and maintaining~~
^{must continue to conduct tests to ensure the safety of our weapons.}

the effectiveness of our deterrent. We conduct the bare minimum
of tests to meet these objectives. In fact the number of U.S.
tests has been steadily declining: this year we will conduct
the smallest number of tests in thirty years. And finally, we
believe that the policy of the United States and our NATO allies
that we will use military force only defensively is superior to
one focused only on the "no first use" of nuclear weapons.