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MCM SUMMARY BRIEFING

- BG Morgan, Assistant Chief of Staff, C-5, CFC will brief the SCM on the results of the 2nd military committee meeting preliminary session.
- Will summarize the joint threat assessment which agrees with the SNIE.
- Will report progress on the wartime resupply requirements study.
- Will outline CFC accomplishments emphasizing progress in command and control. Quick reaction capabilities and intelligence improvements.
- Will highlight the operational status of CFC as exemplified by exercises team spirit 79 and ULCHI forces lens 79.
- Will identify improvements required for further development of the CFC. They include communications requirements, command and control facilities, I & W enhancement, organizational compatibility; reserve mobilization plans, rear area security, capital corps mission alterations, allocation of combat resources, and mobility within and between forward armies.
- Conclude that the military committee signed a memorandum providing guidance and support to the CINC for development of the CFC over the next year.
- Recommend you compliment the CFC staff for its significant progress and endorse an objective approach toward its further development.

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TALKING PAPER
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK

You will meet with President Park at the Blue House on 18 October from 1530 to 1620 p.m. Since you already will have reviewed bilateral issues with Minister Ro, there is no need to do more than touch on these lightly. Your exchange with Park can focus more productively on several broader issues involving the interaction of Great Power relations and developments on the Korean peninsula -- i.e., your visit to China, recent leaks concerning the "swing strategy", Japan's role on the Korean peninsula, and prospects for North-South relations. You should speak privately with Park about human rights -- probably at the end of the meeting with only Bill Gleysteen and the Korean interpreter present.

Park will, of course, expect a reaffirmation of the US defense commitment, and he may seek credit for increasing ROK defense expenditures -- though he probably will not want you to make much of this in public. He will welcome some background on your upcoming trip to China; he may seek some clarification concerning the implications of the "swing strategy" for US support of the ROK; he may warn against any tendency to diminish our vigilance against the threat from the North and from growing Soviet military power in Northeast Asia; and he will be prepared to discuss future prospects for a North-South dialogue. While Park will not relish references to the Korean internal political situation, he certainly will not be surprised if you express some concerns about recent developments.

Bilateral Defense Issues

You might begin your discussions by informing Park that you have had fruitful discussions with Minister Ro on a variety of defense-related issues and that you want to mention several of these to the President before moving on to other topics of mutual interest.

Talking Points

- Note your satisfaction with the overall state of US-ROK security relations, and your belief that President Carter's decision to suspend further US ground combat troop withdrawals pending a review of the situation in 1981 should bolster deterrence, assure Koreans and other Asians of US steadiness and reliability, and strengthen the ROK's hand in its dealings with the North.
- Observe that our plans for modest withdrawals of support units -- some 1500 personnel through 1980 -- have been firmed up and supplied to Minister Ro.

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- Express your appreciation for evidence that the ROK has recently increased the level of its defense efforts, and note that the decision to increase the ROK defense budget to 6% of GNP effectively complements our adjustments in the troop withdrawal plan; both represent appropriate responses to our shared assessment of the North-South military balance.
- Emphasize the importance you attach to correcting ROK ground force deficiencies.
- Inform Park that President Carter has agreed, as an exception to policy, to permit co-assembly of the F-5 in Korea.
- Indicate that you have discussed ROK plans to develop surface-to-surface missiles with Ro, your trip to China and that the US is prepared to consider specific forms of cooperation on the basis of certain understandings set forth in correspondence between General Wickham and Minister Ro.

Your Trip to China

Park is likely to harbor ambivalent feelings about your trip to China. On the one hand, closer Sino-US relations have some appeal to Park. He may see in it an opportunity to develop additional levers with which to induce North Korean restraint and facilitate PRC contacts with the ROK. On the other hand, Park -- like most Koreans -- tends to worry about potential Great Power understandings which may affect the Korean security situation yet elude Korean control. In addition Park fears that Western technology transfers (and certainly arms sales) to China may result in China's provision of more advanced weaponry to Pyongyang. You should explain the scope and purpose of your trip, be receptive to conveying any messages Park may wish you to pass to the Chinese, and be prepared to discuss the potential role we see for the Chinese on North-South issues.

Talking Points

- Explain that your planned trip to China is a natural outgrowth of normalization and is designed basically to broaden the Sino-US bilateral relationship.
- The trip does not foreshadow the establishment of a Sino-American military relationship; nor does it foreshadow a change in our policy toward arms sales to China; nor does the visit represent a change in our policy to seek improved relations with both Moscow and Beijing.
- While the trip was not inspired as a tactical gambit against the USSR, if it serves to remind Moscow of the potential for Sino-American security cooperation in response to Soviet provocations, it may exert a moderating influence on Soviet conduct.

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- Note that US and Chinese representatives have discussed strategic issues since the first Kissinger visit in 1971; this trip will contribute to that dialogue, and broaden US participation in it to include those responsible for formulating US defense policy.
- Agreement has not yet been reached with the Chinese on dates, schedule, or itinerary; but you would expect to discuss with PRC leaders trends in the global military balance, various regional security issues, and some arms control matters.
- Emphasize that if the Korean issue comes up, you will affirm strongly the US commitment to ROK security, urge the Chinese to exert a restraining influence in the North, and emphasize your conviction that discussions between Seoul and Pyongyang "on an equal footing" are indispensable to any resolution of North-South differences and any serious effort to reduce tensions on the peninsula.
- Inform Park that you will see to it that he is kept fully informed concerning the trip and debriefed on its outcome.
- If Park asks you to pass any messages to PRC leaders, you should agree to do so, and you might ask Park whether there are any particular points he wishes you to register with the Chinese concerning Korea.
- You should make clear that we are not sanguine about the PRC willingness to play an active, constructive role on the Korean question. We perceive real limits on China's willingness even to be drawn into substantive discussions of Korean matters for fear of jeopardizing its relationship with Pyongyang and presenting diplomatic opportunities to the USSR. Nonetheless, you should emphasize that we intend to continue urging the PRC to counsel moderation to the DPRK.

Swing Strategy

Recent press treatment of CG-8 may revived some Korean anxieties about the priority the US accords its Asian commitments. There is no need to be particularly defensive on this issue, and no necessity to raise it; but if Park does, the following talking points should put the matter in perspective.

Talking Points

- Regret the lack of discipline reflected in recent leaks of materials such as CG-8, but note that the document is merely a staff study which does not represent official policy and does not have any official standing.
- Acknowledge that for planning purposes the US has recognized the need for redeploying some forces from the Pacific to Europe in the event of a NATO conflict since in such a contingency we assume that the bulk of Soviet strength would be deployed against Europe. But add that on occasion US forces have swung in the other direction (e.g., during the Vietnam War when we deployed 8 or 9 carriers in the Pacific).

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- Stress that flexibility in planning the use of our forces makes good military sense and is necessitated by conflicting requirements for our existing resources.
- Emphasize that the so-called "swing strategy" is merely one of several options to exploit the inherent flexibility of US seapower, and note that we are reviewing the swing option right now.
- Emphasize that reasons for this review include a variety of changes in the international situation -- including the growth of Soviet power in the Far East, the deepening of US-Japan defense cooperation, Sino-US normalization, and the importance of Persian Gulf as a source of energy supplies for all the advanced industrial democracies.

US-Soviet Military Balance

President Park is known to have a keen personal interest in Soviet military activities in Asia. He has been especially attentive to their buildup in the disputed islands north of Japan.

Talking Points

- Reassert our intention to fully support our allies, including Korea, in the Pacific and reiterate once again our determination to retain balanced and flexible military power in the area. (You might wish specifically to knock down suggestions from Mike Mansfield that Korea stands outside the US defense perimeter).
- Remind President Park of US plans to improve its military posture in the Pacific. State that as part of that program we have just recently:
 - Deployed a squadron of F-15s to Okinawa as the first step in modernization of the wing there;
 - Accelerated deployment plans for AWACS in the region -- second and third aircraft will arrive in the fourth quarter of 1980;
 - other improvements (e.g., Spruance class destroyers, Los Angeles class submarines, F-16s and F-14s will follow in time).
- Observe that in your view these steps are prudent given recent Soviet activity in the region. Cite the recent concerns about Hokkaido and note that you intend to visit there on your way home.
- Note that the US worked actively with ASEAN countries recently to discourage them from acceding to Soviet requests for ship visits.
- Solicit the President's views on current Soviet intentions and strategy in the Pacific, and the state-of-play in Moscow's relations with North Korea.

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Relations with Japan

There has been a shift in Japanese thinking about their security stake in South Korea, and ROK attitudes are also changing vis-a-vis Japan. This has resulted in an increase in the number and rank of ROK and GOJ defense officials visiting back and forth, and in more balanced press treatment of this sensitive subject in both countries.

Talking Points

- Note that you have observed a quickening of the tempo of exchanges between Japanese and ROK defense officials.
- Indicate that we regard this as a positive development, but one that we recognize should proceed at a pace that is comfortable politically for both parties.
- Solicit Park's views as on how he expects relations between the ROK and Japan to evolve in the security field.

North-South Talks

North Korea's initial response to President Carter's proposal for tripartite talks was negative, though State has not treated it as a definitive rejection. And there has been some softening of North Korea's stance in international forums. This may be related to North Korea's desire to restore its tarnished image and bolster its troubled economy. If time permits you might invite Park's assessment of future prospects for diplomatic initiatives designed to draw the North into a productive dialogue.

Talking Points

- Invite Park's assessment of current North Korean strategy in its political/diplomatic competition with Seoul.
- With respect to North-South talks, comment that you see little cause for optimism, but feel that no chance should be allowed to slip by which might lead to an easing of tensions.
- Reaffirm that the United States does not intend to enter into bilateral talks with the North Koreans and that we will continue to consult fully with the ROK on this problem.

Human Rights

You should take this matter up privately following the formal session. The nature of your pitch can be fine-tuned with Bill Gleysteen. Nothing you say is likely to have much immediate effect on the situation, but you need to underline our displeasure with the ROKG ouster of Kim Yong Sam, remind Park that we pay a price for such actions, in terms of Congressional support for Korean programs, and position yourself in such a way as to be able to acknowledge when you meet the press that the subject had come up.

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