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~~SECRET~~SUMMARY REPORT FOR SCM LOGISTICS COMMITTEE

SCOPE: This is an initial unilateral US report of known ROK discussion issues and "US desired outcomes" for the SCM Logistics Committee (LOG CMTE). It has yet to be coordinated with the ROK.

BACKGROUND: US/ROK LOG CMTE delegates will discuss the following issues/topics.

- ROK Topics:
 - Wartime resupply study:
 - Expansion of ROK force structure.
 - Wartime resupply of aircraft and warships.
 - Wartime ammunition reserve level increases.
 - Facilities for wartime resupply - Kimhae Air Base.
 - Aviation gasoline (AVGAS).
- US Topics:
 - Combined defense improvement projects (Host Nation Support).
 - ROK contribution to strategic lift.
 - War reserve material for Korea (principally ammo).

POINTS OF EXPECTED AGREEMENT:

- That logistical support for the ROK Force Structure should be gradually expanded from the 26 to 33 DFE and, in the long term, could be expanded even further (perhaps to 42 DFE).
- That a high priority must continue to be assigned the outfitting/modernization of existing units.

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Current state of preparedness dictates that ROK must continue to rely on USAF and USN/MC early on to reinforce Korea with air and Naval power.

- That ammunition target levels should be studied with a view towards an upward revision. That a new priority CAA study is being undertaken and the CFC is to have in-country propensity. Study should begin at the first of next year.
- That Kimhae is a strategic/tactical aerial port. That additional work is required to identify alternate aerial ports to be developed. That an airdrop rigging facility at Kimhae appears valid.
- That ROK requires AVGAS to operate their aircraft fleet.
- ROK is making great contributions in the area of Host Nation Support. That individual support arrangements need to be verified. That there should be a combined (ROK/US) effort to establish a means to determine and evaluate the combined defense improvement projects required to enhance the combat capability of ROK/US forces.
- That the strategic sealift MOA was in the best interest of both countries and should be signed ASAP. Agreed that a strategic airlift MOA, analogous to the sealift MOA, would greatly enhance the security of the ROK and should be developed.
- That improvements must be made in all types of war reserve stockpiles.

POINTS OF CONTENTION:

- ROK are expected to push for FMS sale of AVGAS'. US position is that ROK should go to oil companies in the Far East (Australia, Japan).
- US position is that ROK must begin to procure and produce ammunition to help fill the stockpiles, not at the expense of their modernization program, but as an addition to improvements being made in their equipment modernization program. ROK are expected to point out that all their money is going into their FIP modernization program.

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EXPECTED COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION TO 2D PLENARY SESSION:

- Log planning should be expanded to include a ROKA force of 33 DFE.
- New ammunition rate expenditure study is required.
- Kimhae Air Base should be used as primary aerial port, alternative sites should be considered.

A STRATEGIC AIRLIFT MOA SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO ENHANCE THE ROK DEFENSE POSTURE.

- A combined (ROK/US) effort to establish a program of combined defense improvement projects.

CONCLUSIONS: Discussion outcome on AVGAS and ROK contribution to ammunition stockpile are undetermined.

RECOMMEND YOU:

- Stress that you are aware of the significant amount of Host Nation Support currently being provided by the ROKG. Truly, they are now providing the lion's share of their defense burden.
- Mention that this year's revised format for the SCM (i.e., committee sessions) seems to be much more desirable from the aspect of getting our people together and allowing them a forum for the discussion of issues of mutual concern.
- Recommendations would appear to have merit and deserve careful consideration.
- Our new appreciation of the threat underscores the importance of assigning a high priority to filling valid war reserve requirements.
- When completed, the on-going CFC study should assist in establishing definite goals for the war reserve program.

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United States/Republic of Korea
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)
Seoul, Korea - October 18-19, 1979

Logistics Committee - List of Participants

Mr. Donald S. Cuffe
Director for International Logistics
OASD(MRA&L), OSD
Co-Chairman

LTG Yoo Nak Seung
Asst. Minister for Logistics
MND
Co-Chairman

RADM E. E. Tissot, USN
Asst. Chief of Staff, J-5
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M/G Han Sang Kwon
Director, Logistics Bureau
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M/G Lee Kyoung Yoo
Director, Operations Bureau
Joint Chief of Staff

B/G Sarber, USA
Asst. Chief of Staff J-4
U. S. Forces Korea

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Logistics Committee - Main Talking Points

I. Host Nation Support (HNS)(U)

~~(S)~~ Several good initiatives have been taken in the area of HNS. These are: personnel augmentation, port/rail operations, air operations, transportation, POL support, military construction, munitions, financial support for JUSMAG-K, and communications.

Issues to be discussed include:

a. Additional initiatives in munition storage and allocation of transportation and port facilities in wartime to assist in logistic support.

b. Plan for addressing HNS with ROK in the future. This will include general approach, assignment of responsibilities and areas for priority emphasis.

II. ROK Contribution to Strategic Lift (U)

~~(S)~~ The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Flag Shipping is currently being staffed in the ROKG. We will discuss any areas which may cause further delay and assist them in this area. An action has been started to consider the use of Korean Air Lines (KAL) aircraft for airlift in support of Korean contingencies. The action plan calls for completion of a MOA in July 1980. We will discuss the schedule, reaffirm the milestones and try to reach agreement on the development of this proposal.

III. Compensatory Equipment Transfer (CET) and Withdrawal

~~(S)~~ The withdrawal program and associated CET have slacked off considerably. The topics will presumably be briefly touched on during the opening Plenary Session. The ROK have dropped these topics from their background papers. We do not expect much discussion on these topics in committee meetings but will be prepared to respond to any ROK references. Our basic anchor on this is the President's decision.

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IV. War Reserve for Allies (Korea)(U)

(S) In July 1977, COMUSK requested special contingency legislation to ensure timely logistic support of the ROK. Since it was thought Congress might not be receptive to such legislation, an alternate plan for rapid transfer was developed.

In January 1978, ASD(MRA&L) recommended accelerated FMS procedures necessary to provide for the rapid transfer of WRSA under existing legislation. (These procedures speed up the process but fall short of the speed and flexibility considered essential by the military commanders. Once the procedures are fully approved, the implementing plan can include some logistic arrangements that will expedite the transfer.)

The State Department has approved the repositioning of Letters of Offer and requested NSC concurrence. State has also indicated that Congress may now be receptive to special legislation. OASD(MRA&L) is staffing proposed contingency legislation. DSAA plans to incorporate this in the next Security Assistance legislative package.

We need to find ways and means of encouraging the ROK to dedicate more of their own resources to War Reserve Stockage. This will be a topic for our continuing work with them on logistics.

V. Wartime Resupply Study (U)

(S) The Combined Forces Command (CFC) has just completed Phase I of the Wartime Resupply Study. This phase covers only the requirements. The study has not yet covered identification of responsibility for resources. It is anticipated that there will be considerable discussion on this subject.

VI. Joint US/ROK Logistic Planning

There is increasing concern within ROK forces regarding continued logistic assistance and support from the U.S. in both peacetime and war or other contingencies. On the U.S. side we see distinct advantages of expanding ROK logistic assistance to the U.S. particularly in the area of Host Nation Support (HNS). The Logistics Committee at this SCM is a good start but there is a need for a structural arrangement whereby mutual logistic support planning will be given priority and emphasis at all levels within Korea and the United States. At the MOD/DOD level there is a need for more complete guidance and additional work on political, financial and

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logistic policy constraints. Most of the work on specific proposals and identification of needs should be done in Korea through the Combined Forces Command (CFC). U.S. Forces Korea and ROK Armed Forces should also play an active and continuing role.

If it appears appropriate, the U.S. will open up this proposal in the Logistics Committee at the SCM. If agreement in principle is reached, Secretary Brown and Minister Ro could agree to the overall approach with details to be worked out after the SCM.

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HOST NATION SUPPORT PROGRAM

Discussion:

- The ROK has undertaken several Host Nation Support (HNS) Programs.
- A large number of the initiatives will be in the logistic support area.
- Memoranda of Agreement are being negotiated concerning the ROKG furnishing flag cargo, shipping and aircraft in wartime. If agreements are reached, these ROK resources will be used to move U.S. and ROK logistic support intra-theater to Korea. Under present schedule, the agreements will not be completed until after the 12th SCM.

Recommend you:

- Express your appreciation for the ROK efforts to date.
- Urge Minister Ro to consult with General Wickham on a continuing basis to develop a plan for addressing HNS with the ROK in the future.
- Note the importance you place on forward movement in this area.

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