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
THE HISTORY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND NATIONAL POLICY

VOLUME IX: 1965-1968

PART I

BY
WALTER S. POOLE



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Ch. 6 ①

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CHAPTER VI

NATO UNDER STRAIN

Introduction

(U) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹ joined Western Europe with North America in a collective security arrangement. Among US foreign policy objectives, none ranked higher than preserving an "Atlantic Alliance." This chapter describes NATO problems that had important military consequences, but were basically political in their origins. France, by withdrawing from the integrated command, challenged US leadership and the very idea of a trans-Atlantic partnership. West Germany worried about a US disengagement from Western Europe. Greece and Turkey seemed to distrust each other more than their supposed adversary, the Warsaw Pact.

The Eviction from France

(U) During 1965-1966, NATO passed through one of its severest tests. Charles de Gaulle deeply resented US domination of NATO. Historically, he believed, France had been preeminent in Western Europe; she should not now accept a subordinate role. When he became President of France in 1958, de Gaulle

1. For the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, see Dept of State Bulletin, 20 Mar 49, pp. 339-342. Signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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approached the US and UK Governments about forming a triumvirate to deal with global problems. After Washington and London rejected that proposal, de Gaulle began going his own way. In 1959, he withdrew some French naval units from NATO assignments. More importantly, he awarded high priority to developing an independent "force de frappe," composed of Mirage bombers carrying nuclear weapons. The French exploded their first fission device during 1960.

~~(S)~~ Nuclear cooperation became a bone of contention, not only between Washington and Paris but also within the US Government. President Johnson, in April 1964, decided not to help any national nuclear forces save those that would be assigned to NATO and targeted in accordance with NATO plans. The British met these conditions; the French, of course, did not. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had misgivings about denying help to France. Just before President Johnson made his decision, they warned about possible French retaliation. For example, restrictions could be placed upon US use of ports, airfields, depots, and headquarters in France. American efforts, they felt, should be directed more toward influencing French nuclear efforts in a way that would benefit the Atlantic Alliance.² But the President did not change his policy.

2. NSAM 294 to SecDef et al., 20 Apr 64, JCS 2278/76, ~~S~~ JMF 9164 (11 May 64). JCSM-280-64 to SecDef, 2 Apr 64, JCS 2278/74, ~~S~~ JMF 9164/9105 (27 Mar 64).

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~~(S)~~ In September 1964, General LeMay reopened the question of Franco-American cooperation. During 1965, he warned, the French might develop a thermonuclear weapon and an intermediate range ballistic missile. Then, he feared, President de Gaulle could offer the European allies more advanced weapons than the US Government, limited by the Atomic Energy Act, could make available. The British, in exchange for admission to the Common Market, might join the French in establishing a European nuclear force. Alternatively, President de Gaulle might energize the Franco-German relationship or build a "third force" among Common Market countries. At all events, argued General LeMay, the time had come to formulate proposals aimed at preventing France from taking control of NATO's strategy and future.³

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted this position. On 8 October 1964, they asked Secretary McNamara, as "a matter of priority," to press for an interdepartmental investigation of how to integrate French nuclear forces into the NATO framework. Such a study should recognize that US concessions might be necessary, and that the French might try to exploit their nuclear potential "to the detriment of US interests." Subsequently, Assistant Secretary of Defense

~~3.~~ CSAFM-789-64 to SecDef, 21 Sep 64, JCS 2278/78, S. JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec 1.

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John T. McNaughton presented their proposal to a State-Defense Ad Hoc Group on NATO Strategy.⁴

~~(TS)~~ On 4 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again pressed Mr. McNamara about what they saw as the urgent need for a policy review "at the highest level." The Administration should consider ways of giving its allies a greater nuclear role. Unless President de Gaulle could be persuaded to integrate his force de frappe into NATO, he probably would block US efforts to change NATO's strategic concept from "massive nuclear retaliation" to "flexible response." In that case, the alternatives would be either continuing without French participation or moving toward coordination of national nuclear forces.⁵

~~(S)~~ Shortly afterward, President Johnson did make some conciliatory moves. On 17 December, he instructed US negotiators

to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which

4. JCSM-853-64 to SecDef, 8 Oct 64, JCS 2278/78-1, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Nov 64, JCS 2278/78-2, U; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 21 Nov 64, JCS 2278/78-3, U; JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec 1.

5. JCSM-1014-64 to SecDef, 4 Dec 64, JCS 2278/78-4, ~~TS-GP 1~~, same file. Ch. VII describes the debate over whether NATO should move toward "flexible response."

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is in fact directed against France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and responsibly explored. . . .⁶

~~(TS)~~ In April 1965, General McConnell proposed three steps toward nuclear sharing: first, minimize Franco-American policy conflicts; second, make a Presidential determination that France was eligible for US assistance in nuclear weapons development; and third, give the allies more control over and responsibility for nuclear weapons. As an example, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) might assume responsibility for targeting 30 B-58 bombers, even though the aircraft themselves would stay under the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command's (CINCSAC's) control. That arrangement, perhaps, would set a precedent for France to follow. But these proposals were too bold, apparently, for General McConnell's colleagues to endorse outright. The Joint Chiefs of Staff simply forwarded his paper to Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, who was serving with the State-Defense Ad Hoc Group.⁷

6. NSAM 322 to SecState and SecDef, 17 Dec 64, JCS 2421/906-3, ~~S~~, JMF 9050 (14 Nov 64).

7. CSAFM-R-32-65 to JCS, 7 Apr 65, JCS 2278/72-5, ~~TS-RD~~; Briefing Sheets for CJCS, "2278/78-5," 16 and 20 Apr 65, ~~TS-GP-1~~; SM-379-65 to LTG Goodpaster, 23 Apr 65, JCS 2278/78-5, ~~TS-RD~~, same file, sec 2.

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~~(TS)~~ What nuclear weapons might the allies share? The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe wanted to have, by 1970, (b) Polaris SLBMs and either (b)(1) mobile, land-based medium-range ballistic missiles or (b)(1) extended-range Pershings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported him. On 27 September 1965, they warned Secretary McNamara that NATO's viability might well hinge upon resolution of the nuclear-sharing problem. An MRBM force at SACEUR's disposal would add an option for countering the threat from Soviet intermediate- and medium-range missiles; satisfy allied aspirations for a greater role in controlling and using nuclear strike forces; and allay fears that Western Europe might face a situation for which there was no suitable nuclear response. In November, the Army submitted a plan describing the technical steps involved in building an MRBM, but the Administration took no action upon it.⁸

~~(TS)~~ Meantime, a much more troubling question was coming to the fore: would France leave NATO? Early in 1964, President de Gaulle had called for a new system of coordinated planning wherein each ally would be responsible for the defense of its own national territory. Secretary McNamara reacted by asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume:

1. That France either withdrew from NATO or took actions tantamount to withdrawal; and

⁸. Ltr, SACEUR to JCS, 18 Aug 65, JCS 2450/68, ~~TS-GP 1~~; JCS 2450/68-1, 17 Sep 65, ~~S~~ JCSM-722-65 to SecDef, 27 Sep 65, JCS 2450/68-1, ~~S~~; Memo, LTG Mock to DJS, 30 Nov 65, JCS 2450/68-2, U; JMF 9050 (18 Aug 65).

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2. That French forces would support the alliance, and that ports, airfields, and other facilities would become available in wartime.

How, he asked them, could damage to NATO be minimized and an effective defense maintained? Their reply, dated 27 June 1964, stated that without the lines of communication that ran across central France, a forward defense seemed to be infeasible. Furthermore, unless extensive peacetime stockpiling took place, French facilities would possess "marginal" value if they became available only in wartime. Nothing save "strong and effective" bilateral arrangements could minimize the damage to NATO and maintain an effective defense posture.⁹

~~(TS)~~ In May 1965, as President de Gaulle grew ever more outspoken in his criticisms of US policies worldwide, Secretary McNamara began to fear a French secession from NATO. Accordingly, Mr. McNamara asked for:

1. An emergency plan for withdrawing US forces from France; and

2. An examination of how US forces would operate if they were forced completely out of France.

On 22 May, in a hasty, preliminary answer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff described three alternative logistical arrangements:

⁹ Jules P. Davids, The United States in World Affairs: 1964 (1965), pp. 22-23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 May 64, JCS 2421/792, ~~S~~, JCSM-563-64 to SecDef, 27 Jun 64, JCS 2421/792-1, ~~TS~~; JMF 9050 (2 May 64).

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1. Base section in the British Isles, advanced section in the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg).

2. Base section in Portugal, advanced section in Benelux and the British Isles.

3. Base section in the United States, advanced sections in Benelux and the British Isles.

The cost of relocation would reach about \$1 billion; the time required might total 18 to 36 months. A major withdrawal from France might lead to major readjustments of plans and force structures. A complete evacuation, however, "would have extensive repercussions affecting NATO and all of Europe." That being the case, Washington should not react to French pressure by unilaterally initiating any large-scale withdrawals. If the French did request a withdrawal, the US reply should place wholly upon them the onus for fragmenting NATO. Then France would face counter-pressure from all the allies, and not the United States alone.¹⁰

~~(TS)~~ Soon afterward, General Wheeler's Special Studies Group looked at places where US forces and facilities might move. On 13 August, after reviewing the Group's findings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that

¹⁰. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 May 65, JCS 2278/83, S. JMF 9164 (13 May 65). Note to Control, "Effect of Withdrawal of US Military Forces from France," 17 May 65, ~~TS~~ JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec 1. JCSCM-402-65 to SecDef, 22 May 65, JCS 2278/83-1, ~~TS-GP-1~~, JMF 9164 (13 May 65).

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in none of the solutions is the strategic posture of the Alliance improved. Nothing in the study indicates that the relative importance of France to the defense of Western Europe has declined. Further, without France there is no feasible alternative to supporting US force commitments to NATO except through the Low Countries. The execution of [Allied Command Europe's] war plans, as well as relocation of the LOC, is militarily possible but it would certainly involve greater risks and higher costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that, with the loss of France, the current problems confronting NATO regarding the coordination of nuclear forces and the pressure from European Allies for reliance on nuclear weapons will continue and could increase.

Then too, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, protecting a Benelux supply line would require a strengthening of defenses in the North German plain. Because the financial and political problems involved in shifting US forces northward seemed sizable, the Europeans--preferably the Germans--should fill the need. So, obviously, US interests would be best served by either avoiding or delaying a withdrawal from France. Emphasis should be placed upon "how to stay" rather than "how to leave."¹¹

¹¹. JCSM-627-65 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 2278/84-5, ~~TS GP I~~, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec 2. For OSD acknowledgement, see Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 25 Aug 65, JCS 2278/84-6, ~~TS GP I~~, same file.

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(U) Soon afterward, President de Gaulle intensified his campaign against NATO. During a press conference on 9 September, he declared that

At the expiration of our present commitments--that is to say, in 1969 at the latest--we shall end the subordination which is described as integration and which puts our destiny into the hands of foreigners.¹²

Five weeks later, the French Government proposed that the present alliance structure be replaced by two separate systems. The first, covering the North Atlantic area, would be a "simple treaty of alliance" in which each member would enjoy "genuine freedom of action." The second, limited to Europe, would contain a "considerable degree" of integration in the nonnuclear field.¹³

~~(TS)~~ President de Gaulle's proposals, which posed a direct challenge to NATO, seemed to kill any hope of nuclear sharing. In October 1965, the State-Defense Ad Hoc Group recommended against asking the French to coordinate targets assigned to Mirage bombers with targets assigned to NATO-committed nuclear forces. For the next few years, its reasoning ran, military advantages from such cooperation would go almost exclusively to France. Also, a bilateral arrangement would appear to reward President de Gaulle's drive for nuclear independence. Should the French make an

¹². NY Times, 10 Sep 65, p. 1.

¹³. NY Times, 17 Oct 65, p. 1.

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overture, the Group suggested telling them that coordination could be accomplished most effectively within the SACEUR framework.¹⁴

~~(TS)~~ Next, in December, Defense Minister Pierre Messmer told Mr. McNamara that France would be willing "very soon now" to talk about target coordination. Assistant Secretary McNaughton asked for JCS advice. This time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a cautious and relatively inflexible approach. They urged close consultation with allies, particularly London and Bonn, before responding substantively to French proposals. The best solution, they believed, would be one that committed the force de frappe to NATO, with SACEUR accomplishing coordination. Admittedly, President de Gaulle's agreement was extremely unlikely. A fallback position could provide for coordination through the SACEUR Liaison Office at Omaha, Nebraska, headquarters of the Strategic Air Command. But the United States should not countenance any proposal that contemplated coordination outside NATO.¹⁵

14. Memo, LTG Goodpaster to CJCS, 7 Oct 65, JCS 2450/101, ~~TS-GP-1~~, JMF 9050 (7 Oct 65).

15. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 8 Jan 66, JCS 2278/91-1, ~~TS-GP-1~~; JCSM-68-66 to SecDef, 1 Feb 66, JCS 2278/91-3, ~~TS-GP-1~~; JMF 9164 (30 Dec 65). The Johnson Administration continued to study NATO nuclear-sharing possibilities. See, for example, JCSM-154-66 to SecDef, 11 Mar 66, JCS 2437/50-1, ~~C~~, JMF 4610 (6 Dec 65) and JCSM-298-66 to SecDef, 6 May 66, JCS 2450/209-2, ~~S~~, JMF 9050 (22 Apr 66) sec 1. Finally, in December 1966, the North Atlantic Council created two bodies: a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all the allies; and a seven-member Nuclear Planning Group to "handle the detailed work." Dept of State Bulletin, 9 Jan 67, pp. 50-51.

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~~(TS)~~ During his September press conference, President de Gaulle had intimated that foreign forces could not remain on French soil unless they came under French command. At Deputy Secretary Vance's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the problem. On 15 December, they reported that "some foreign control . . . has worked satisfactorily in other countries." Concessions would vary for each unit and facility. But, apparently, there had never been any bilateral arrangements giving the host country permanent peacetime control over US forces. That being the case, a major departure from current practice would be "detrimental" to US security interests.¹⁶

(U) On 21 February 1966, President de Gaulle delivered his decisive stroke. He declared, first, that the last French forces committed to NATO--two divisions and supporting aircraft in West Germany--would withdraw from the integrated command and, second, that "every foreign element stationed in France must be under the sole control of French authorities." Through a subsequent aide-memoire, he made clear that "every foreign element" meant NATO headquarters as well as US bases. A second note set 1 July 1966 as the date for ending French participation in integrated commands, and

¹⁶. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 12 Nov 65, JCS 2278/84-8, U, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec 2. JCSCM-884-65 to SecDef, 15 Dec 65, JCS 2278/84-11, ~~TS-GP 1~~, same file, sec 3.

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1 April 1967 as the deadline for evacuating "foreign" elements from France.¹⁷

~~(S)~~ On 6 March, Secretaries Rusk, George W. Ball, McNamara, and Vance tentatively agreed upon several courses of action. First, treat President de Gaulle's action as a France-NATO rather than a Paris-Washington problem, and undertake closest consultation with the allies. Second, oppose a bilateral agreement between France and NATO. Third, move everything out of France and seek no arrangement for wartime reentry rights.¹⁸

~~(S)~~ President de Gaulle asserted that his country was leaving the organization, not the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO's other members condemned France's secession. All the allies save France subscribed to a declaration, made public on 18 March 1966, that "the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization established under it are both alike essential to the security of our countries." President Johnson, writing to President de Gaulle four days later, stressed how long and how well NATO had preserved peace and security. "For our part," he said,

we continue to believe that if the Alliance is to have force and reality, members of the Alliance should prepare the command structures, the strategic and tactical

¹⁷. NY Times, 22 Feb 66, p. 1; 10 Mar 66, p. 2. Dept of State Bulletin, 2 May 66, pp. 702-703. For the US response, see ibid, pp. 699-701.

¹⁸. Memo of Conv, "France-NATO," 6 Mar 66, ~~S~~ CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

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plans, the forces in being, and their designation to NATO in advance of any crisis and for use in time of crisis. . . . Readiness to fight instantly under agreed plans and procedures, worked out and practiced in peacetime, adds immeasurably to our common strength. . . .

Reliance in crises on independent action by separate forces in accordance with national plans, only loosely coordinated with joint forces and plans, seems to me dangerous for all concerned. It has proved disastrous in the past.¹⁹

(U) Six weeks later, however, President Johnson told Secretaries Rusk and McNamara:

I wish the articulation of our position with respect to NATO to be in constructive terms.

I see no benefit to ourselves or to our allies in debating the position of the French government. . . .

Our task is to rebuild NATO outside of France as promptly, economically, and effectively as possible.

In so doing, we shall develop . . . proposals which would bind the Atlantic Nations closer together; support, as best we can, the long-term movement towards unity in Europe; and exploit the possibilities for easing East-West tension.

¹⁹. Dept of State Bulletin, 4 Apr 66, p. 536. Ltr, Pres Johnson to Pres de Gaulle, 22 Mar 66, ~~S~~ CJCS 092.2 (Relocation).

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Our discussion of the NATO problem should focus on the positive lines of action on which we are engaged.

In the President's judgment, "To have attacked de Gaulle would only have further inflamed French nationalism and offended French pride. It would also have created strains among the nations of the European Common Market and complicated their domestic politics."²⁰

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, on 18 March, General Wheeler had made SACEUR (General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA) privy to his private thoughts about the state of NATO. Whatever reorganizing was done, he reasoned, "must be austere in the extreme" because Congress would fund nothing more. Indeed, "I personally worry a good deal as to whether the U.S. will continue to support NATO with US funds and forces in whatever form [the alliance] takes" In his judgment, keeping West Germany tightly tied to the Atlantic Alliance had now become "probably our highest security interest vis-a-vis NATO." General Wheeler thought that the job of rebuilding NATO should proceed along the following lines:

1. "Factor" the French out of NATO organs and agencies.

²⁰. Memo, Pres to SecState and SecDef, 4 May 66, JCS 2450/217, U, JMF 9050.3 (4 May 66). Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 305. For the "positive" US proposals to bind the Atlantic community, see Memo, SecState and SecDef to Pres, 3 Jun 66, JCS 2450/209-6, ~~S-CP-1~~, JMF 9050 (22 Apr 66) sec 2.

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2. Reorganize NATO and US military structures. Wheeler was looking with "a good deal of interest" at the possibility of elevating SACEUR to the status of Supreme Allied Commander, NATO (SACNATO), who would control not only the European but also the Atlantic and Channel Commands.

3. Reconstitute the US lines of communications in Europe.²¹

~~(S)~~ Simultaneously, Deputy Secretary Vance ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate alternatives for relocating US and NATO activities and to appraise possible adjustments in NATO's military structure.²² On 13 April, after extensive interservice discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara their views. They wanted Washington to take the lead in reorganization and relocation proposals. Concerning reorganization, they outlined two possibilities:

First, establish a SACNATO, supported by an International Military Staff. His principal subordinates would be Commanders-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, and Atlantic. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander in Chief, Channel Command (CINCHAN) would be abolished. Appointing a SACNATO would centralize responsibility and allow the North

²¹. Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 18 Mar 66, ~~S~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

²². Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 18 Mar 66, JCS 2278/84, ~~S~~, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec 1.

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Atlantic Command (NAC) to draw advice from a single primary source. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred this solution, but only if SACNATO was an American.

Second, continue SACEUR and SACLANT--but not CINCHAN. Establish an International Military Staff, under the Military Committee. This would entail minimum disruption, but could prove cumbersome and might result in conflicting advice being tendered to the North Atlantic Command (NAC).

~~(S)~~ As for relocation, selecting a new site for SHAPE stood forth as "the key element" in planning NATO's readjustment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred "the vicinity of Brussels." The sequence of relocations should be: send SHAPE to the Brussels area, with an advance element becoming operational about ten months after the decision; move Headquarters, US European Command (USEUCOM) to the same vicinity, as soon thereafter as possible; shift Headquarters, Allied Forces, Central Europe to Trier or Luxemburg.

~~(S)~~ American forces and facilities in France amounted to 28,000 US military personnel, about 40,000 dependents, and 730,000 tons of removable stores.²³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff found that President de Gaulle's deadlines did not leave enough time to do everything they wanted in the way they wanted. They therefore

23. JCSM-886-65 to SecDef, 15 Dec 65, JCS 2278/84-12, U, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec 3.

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proposed a two-phase relocation plan. Phase I would establish "a new LOC . . . through the Benelux countries with primary effort placed on development of a through-put capacity, as distinguished from maintenance of reserve stocks." Nonetheless,

the constraints noted limit what can and must be relocated to those supplies and stocks vital to the first 60 days of operations for the forces planned to be in place by D+30. . . . Therefore, additional vital stocks, primarily ammunition and heavy equipment, which cannot be accommodated in the Federal Republic of Germany, will, in Phase I, be moved to available storage in the United Kingdom, either afloat or ashore.

The cost of Phase I would be about \$200 million. Phase II, the building of a permanent infrastructure over the next five years, would require perhaps \$600 million.

~~(C)~~ Finally, there were in France nine USAF bases and six tactical reconnaissance squadrons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended (1) redeploying these aircraft to Germany and Great Britain, and (2) acquiring nine replacement airfields in Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany. They opposed any dual-basing in the United States, "particularly at this time," on grounds that it would be regarded as a US withdrawal and thus lend credence to President de Gaulle's allegations about American unreliability. Additionally, the assumption that there would be sufficient warning time for aircraft to return from CONUS to Europe amounted to

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"gambling on a correct assessment of enemy intentions rather than enemy capabilities."²⁴

~~(TS)~~ On 21 April, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum in which he enumerated alternatives that were "far less costly than their JCS counterparts." First, move SHAPE to London or Brussels, but send USEUCOM headquarters to Germany and house it in existing facilities; the American element at SHAPE should be large enough to retain US influence and also maintain liaison with USEUCOM. Second, transfer war reserve stocks from France to Germany but build no new depots. That would involve stockpiling 60 days' worth of ammunition and 50 days' worth of other items. The Secretary saw no need to do more at present, in view of Allied Commander Europe's (ACE's) conventional weakness and the fact that allied stocks did not exceed 15-30 days. Third, dual-base the reconnaissance squadrons, which meant returning them to the United States but bringing them back to Europe twice a year for two-week periods. Fourth, study whether replacing French air bases with an equal number elsewhere was really necessary. Would not a smaller number of well-protected facilities, for example, be preferable to a larger number of poorly protected ones?²⁵

24. JCSM-234-66 to SecDef, 13 Apr 66, JCS 2278/94-3, ~~S~~ JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec 1B.

25. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, "Disposition of US Forces and Facilities in France," 21 Apr 66, ~~TS~~ JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec 2.

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~~(S)~~ In a rebuttal dated 3 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no ground. Mr. McNamara's alternatives would, they asserted incur "military risks disproportionate to the savings described"; appear to the allies as a "fundamental change" in US policy; and "endanger the survival of US forces on the Continent and significantly lower the capability of SACEUR/USCINCEUR to conduct a successful, sustained forward defense." Then they addressed the four specific areas of contention. First, they said, SHAPE should be in Brussels: "The stigma of the special Anglo-American relationship and the retreat from the Continent would appear to eliminate London from further consideration. . . ." Moreover, USEUCOM ought to be colocated in Brussels because the SACEUR/USCINCEUR bore responsibilities that required immediate and continuous access to US intelligence data and operational advice. He also had to be able to act unilaterally, if necessary. Second, they wanted to stockpile a 60-day ammunition supply in Germany and a 30-day supply elsewhere in the theater, for a total of 90 days in all. Allied deficiencies, they insisted, did not justify US reductions. Actually, in most cases, the allies' stocks of combat-essential items approached the 90-day level. And, in any event, "the measurement of how much reserve is needed must be based on sustaining the capability of US forces to fight until resupply [from CONUS] can be established." Supplies from CONUS should start arriving in 71 days, but a safety cushion had to be added beyond

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that minimum time. Additionally, they rejected the argument against building any more depots in Germany, largely on grounds that overcrowding would impede resupply. Again, they charged, "the risk is extremely high for the contemplated savings." On the third issue, dual-basing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that militarily, squadrons should be in place, familiar with the terrain, and ready to undertake immediate operations; economically, redeployment to CONUS would yield no over-all saving; politically, dual-basing combined with deployments to Vietnam could fan allied fears that US withdrawals from NATO were imminent. Fourth, and finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked that they wished to expand existing air bases rather than construct new ones.²⁶

(U) Mr. McNamara, in turn, offered only minor concessions. He agreed that SACEUR needed a much larger US liaison staff, but remained convinced that moving USEUCOM to Germany was efficient and would save \$40 million. On the subject of reserve stocks, he offered a detailed rationale for storing only 67 combat-days of ammunition and 50-70 of other materiel--a solution that would be \$200 million cheaper than the JCS plan. NATO strategy, he claimed, did not envision a large-scale

²⁶. JCSM-291-66 to SecDef, 3 May 66, JCS 2278/94-9, S. JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec 2. The 71-day figure comes from JCSM-255-66 to SecDef, 23 Apr 66, JCS 2278/94-7, ~~C~~, same file, sec 1B.

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conventional conflict lasting more than 30 to 45 days under any circumstances. British and German Defense Ministers, in fact, talked of escalating to nuclear weapons within a matter of hours! Also, according to Mr. McNamara, most allied forces could not sustain themselves logistically for more than 30 to 45 days. Thus even reduced US stockpiles would well exceed those of the allies. And, even if there should be a long conventional battle, he believed that resupply from CONUS would be fully underway within 75 days. In sum, the Secretary denied that he was seeking "fundamental" policy changes; he simply wanted to insure that resources were not used in a manner that was "wastefully inconsistent" with NATO strategy and allied capabilities.

(U) Turning to the dual-basing dispute, Mr. McNamara considered it "clear" that there would be a saving of perhaps \$50 million in gold outflow. Moreover, he doubted whether increased risk would be involved. Might not the danger of loss to a surprise attack be greater than the hazard of having aircraft unavailable for several days? Politically, he was confident, periodic rotations to Europe would calm allied unease. Lastly, on the matter of replacement air bases, the Secretary still deemed JCS requirements excessive.²⁷

27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 May 66, JCS 2278/98-11, U, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec 3.

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~~(S)~~ On the afternoon of 20 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed their differences with Secretaries McNamara and Vance. The military men again advocated collocating USEUCOM with SHAPE and creating 90-day stockpiles. They also advanced additional arguments against dual-basing. Aerial reconnaissance was important in time of mounting tension and stood "at a premium" during the opening days of hostilities. Trans-Atlantic flights would require refuelling, but SAC had first call on tanker aircraft. Four reconnaissance squadrons were scheduled to go to CONUS and Southeast Asia; the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to see the remaining two stationed in Germany. As for the issue of additional air bases, they decided to carry out a detailed review.

~~(S)~~ Mr. McNamara agreed to discard the controversial DPM. This was one instance where Robert McNamara, a man often accused of arrogantly overriding military advice, concluded that JCS objections had merit. On 25 May, the Secretary sent President Johnson a short memorandum stating that "we are prepared . . . to move out of France as promptly as possible." The cost, he said, would be relatively modest--"somewhere in the tens of millions of dollars." General Wheeler took charge of studies into relocating personnel, materiel, and also the headquarters, US European Command. General McConnell and Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown began preparing recommendations

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about (1) the repositioning of reconnaissance squadrons and (2) air base requirements in Europe.²⁸

~~(S)~~ The question of where to redeploy the reconnaissance squadrons was rapidly settled. Late in June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended returning two to CONUS and retaining four in Europe. The Secretary, however, decided to send three squadrons to CONUS and three to the United Kingdom.²⁹

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, on 26 May, Mr. McNamara authorized the movement from French to German facilities of whatever stocks were needed to support, for 60 combat days, the US forces programmed to be in Europe by D+30. General Wheeler wanted two new depot sites built; the Secretary disapproved.³⁰

~~(TS)~~ President de Gaulle now insisted that "not a man, not a kilo" could remain in France. Accordingly, on 1 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara a plan for transferring 417,000 tons of

28. JCS 2278/94-12, 19 May 66, and Dec On, 20 May 66, ~~S~~; Note to Control, "JCS 2278/94-12," 20 May 66, ~~S~~; JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec 3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 20 May 66, JCS 2278/104, ~~S~~; JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec 1. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 25 May 66, JCS 2278/104-9, ~~S~~, same file, sec 2.

29. JCSM-432-66 to SecDef, 28 Jun 66, JCS 2278/104-15, ~~S~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Jul 66, JCS 2278/104-20, ~~S~~; same file, sec 3.

30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Relocation of US Forces and Facilities in France," 26 May 66, ~~S~~; CM-1532-66 to SecDef, 10 Jun 66, ~~S~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Jun 66, ~~S~~; Msg, JCS 4858 to USCINCEUR, 21 Jun 66, C; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

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supplies to Germany. But, they elaborated, German depots would be filled to overflowing, and practically all the combat support stocks would come within profitable range of both air and missile attack. At least two new and safer storage sites were needed. Subsequently, they warned against reducing stocks from 90 to 60 combat days. First, they contended, the duration of a conventional conflict was unpredictable. Second, residual forces must be able to continue fighting after a nuclear exchange. Third, stocks must last until resupply from CONUS began. Therefore,

UNLESS there is sufficient strategic warning, UNLESS timely decisions are made to mobilize and deploy forces to Europe and commence automatic resupply, and UNLESS losses in combat are insignificant, . . . anything less than 90 combat days of war reserve stockage constitutes significant risk. . . .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that (1) US planning exclude wartime use of French facilities, (2) efforts begin to develop a British base for 30 combat days' stockage, and (3) an attempt be made to obtain sites in the Saar that would be suitable for new storage facilities.³¹

³¹. JCSM-497-66 to SecDef, 1 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-25, ~~S~~; JCSM-522-66 to SecDef, 19 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-28, ~~TS-CP-1~~, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec 5. For a detailed justification of 90-day levels, see Msg, CINCUSAREUR to CJCS, HBG 1583, 071442Z Jul 66, ~~S~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

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(U) The Secretary remained skeptical of JCS claims. He required "a better appraisal" of how additional depots in Germany would reduce vulnerability and increase efficiency. Mr. McNamara also questioned the advisability of creating a British logistical base, thereby raising theater stocks from 60- to 90-day levels. Seventy-five days, he said, were needed to bring supplies from CONUS. Could that time be cut by assembling convoys while supplies were being amassed in US ports?

(U) On another plane, Mr. McNamara cited recent studies suggesting that the Benelux complex might be lost within a week or two, in which case supplies stored in the British Isles could not reach Germany. Thus a 30-day reserve in British depots would be needed, he thought, only during a large-scale conflict that began with little warning--but under such conditions Allied Command Europe would have great difficulty conducting a prolonged conventional defense.³²

~~(TS)~~ On 7 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara a study of relocation sites for the 156,000 tons of combat-essential stocks remaining in France. The four alternatives were: to Germany; to CONUS; afloat; and to the United Kingdom. The last alternative impressed them as the best, on grounds of economy, safety, availability, and flexibility. They answered Mr. McNamara's misgivings about a British base

³². Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Sep 66, JCS 2278/104-33, U, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec 6.

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by noting that, even if defenses in Central Europe did collapse, US plans still envisioned the holding of strong points on the Continent, in Norway, and in the British Isles. In such circumstances, UK stocks would be most useful. They therefore urged an immediate decision to relocate 156,000 tons to the United Kingdom. Subsequently, an additional 94,000 tons should be stored at British sites.³³

~~(TS)~~ Mr. McNamara still felt that the figure of 75 days for bringing supplies from CONUS could be reduced. A shorter interval, of course, would support his argument for a 60-day stockpile. But a study by OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services apparently persuaded the Secretary that he was wrong. On 12 December 1966, Mr. McNamara approved stocking 156,000 tons of war reserves in the United Kingdom. Thus, with 30 days of supplies in the United Kingdom and 60 days in Germany, the JCS objective of 90 days had been approved.³⁴

33. JCSM-643-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-44, ~~TS-GP 1~~, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec 8.

34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-57, ~~TS-GP 1~~, JCSM-703-66 to SecDef, 3 Nov 66, derived from CM-1882-66, ~~TS-GP 1~~, Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Nov 66, JCS 2278/104-60, U; same file, sec 10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Dec 66, JCS 2278/104-85, U, same file, sec 14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also asked that alternatives to French POL facilities be developed. Mr. McNamara authorized some actions, but decided to continue peacetime leasing of the French pipeline. JCSM-657-66 to SecDef, 12 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-47, U, same file, sec 9. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Nov 66, JCS 2278/104-58, ~~S~~, same file, sec 10.

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~~(S)~~ Relocating USAF forces and facilities proved equally complex. Early in August 1966, US Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen approached Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, who said that France would only permit reentry during a war in which she herself was participating. Mr. McNamara reacted promptly by ordering plans to withdraw all Air Force property and personnel. The Air Force developed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed, a plan for relocating equipment from France to Greenham Common, Scunthorpe, and Chelveston in the United Kingdom. In December, the Secretary agreed to reopen Greenham Common for temporary storage only, and to negotiate base rights at the other two sites.³⁵

~~(TS)~~ On 29 December, at General Lemnitzer's suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that there be negotiations with France, to permit wartime use of airfields; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) facilities; hospitals; and depots. Although an agreement was unlikely, discussions could serve useful purposes by informing Paris of US needs and apprising Washington of the availability and condition of

³⁵. Memo, SecDef to SecAF, 5 Aug 66, JCS 2278/109, ~~S~~; JCS 2278/190-1, 22 Aug 66, and Dec On, 30 Aug 66, ~~S~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 7 Sep 66, JCS 2278/109-2, U; JCSM-666-66 to SecDef, 14 Oct 66, JCS 2278/109-5, U; JMF 9050.3 (15 Jul 66) sec 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 24 Dec 66, JCS 2278/109-9, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 20 Dec 66, JCS 2278/109-8, U; same file, sec 2.

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facilities. In accordance with their wish, Mr. McNamara solicited State Department views--and received a polite rebuff. Back in March 1966, Secretary Rusk reminded him, the French had offered wartime facilities. The Americans had replied by insisting upon peacetime access plus "an ironclad guarantee" of wartime availability. No new approach should be contemplated, therefore, until relocations from France were completed.³⁶

~~(S)~~ There remained the problem of replacing nine French air bases--facilities that, in time of crisis, were supposed to receive aircraft arriving from the United States. Purely from the standpoint of military effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported in December 1966, the best solution was to build three new bases in Germany, two in Belgium, and five in the British Isles. But, when economic and political considerations were added, a combination of one base in Germany, one in Belgium, and seven in Great Britain seemed preferable. Longer distances from the battlefield would lead to some loss of operational capability, but cost and vulnerability would both be cut.³⁷

36. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 220950Z Nov 66, ~~TS-CP 1~~, JCSM-800-66 to SecDef, 29 Dec 66, JCS 2278/118, ~~S~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Feb 67, JCS 2278/118-1, ~~S~~; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Mar 67, JCS 2278/118-2, ~~S~~; JMF 9164 (27 Sep 66).

37. JCSM-768-66 to SecDef, 14 Dec 66, JCS 2278/114-3, ~~S~~; JCSM-33-67 to SecDef, 23 Jan 67, JCS 2278/114-5, ~~S~~; JMF 9050.3 (15 Nov 66) sec 1.

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~~(S)~~ Mr. McNamara decided against fully adopting either alternative. In the United Kingdom, he authorized reopening Sculthorpe and Chelveston and expanding Mildenhall. Other augmentation aircraft would be accommodated at seven existing bases, one German and six British. Since such a concentration in the British Isles would reduce aircraft payload and loiter time, while increasing response time, he authorized an approach to the allies about establishing colocated bases in northern Germany and the Netherlands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a colocation survey in September 1967, and supported an Air Force proposal permanently to reopen Greenham Common. Mr. McNamara disapproved that proposal but, after he left the Pentagon, the Air Force won a reversal in March 1968.³⁸

~~(TS)~~ Finally, there was the task of headquarters relocation and reorganization. The most radical solution, that of creating a Supreme Allied Commander NATO, was stillborn. Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and SACEUR himself all supported this concept as providing the simplest, most economical, and most effective means of

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 16 Feb 67, JCS 2278/114-6, U; Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 18 Jul 67, JCS 2278/114-10, U; JCSM-508-67 to SecDef, 13 Sep 67, JCS 2278/114-11, ~~S~~ Memo, SecDef to SecAF, "European Air Bases," 7 Dec 67, U; JMF 9050.3 (15 Nov 66) sec 2. A handwritten note appears on this paper: "See SecAF memo to SecDef, 13 Feb 68 for reconsideration . . . and DepSecDef approval 16 Mar 68."

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military direction.³⁹ But the allies balked, feeling that resentment would arise against absolute US control. The British, for example, argued that the power already enjoyed by SACEUR was one reason for President de Gaulle's defection. By mid-May 1966, the Administration had to admit that SACNATO was "dead."⁴⁰

~~(S)~~ On 3 May 1966, General Lemnitzer recommended relocating SHAPE in the vicinity of Brussels. The Belgians offered Chievres-Casteau, about 30 miles southwest of Brussels. General Lemnitzer deemed the site unacceptable, on grounds of remoteness and inaccessibility; he felt that separating SHAPE from the NAC, at Brussels, would seriously harm working relationships. But the State Department, fearing the Belgians might withdraw their offer, opposed any "confrontation." Finally, Casteau did become SHAPE's new home.⁴¹

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained convinced that military considerations mandated colocating SHAPE

39. Msg, CJCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 2365-66, 30 Apr 66, ~~TS~~; Msg, GEN Lemnitzer to CJCS, PRS 1075, 241756Z Apr 66, ~~S~~; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation). Ltr, Dean Acheson to SecDef, 25 Mar 66, JCS 2450/189, U, JMF 9050 (25 Mar 66).

40. USN-85-66 to DJS, 13 Apr 66, U; Msg, CJCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 2727-66, 17 May 66, ~~TS~~; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

41. Msg, GEN Lemnitzer to GEN Wheeler, PRS 1927, 051040Z Aug 66, ~~S~~; Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 4812-66, 13 Aug 66, ~~S~~; Msg, GEN Lemnitzer to GEN Wheeler, PRS 1975, 151730Z Aug 66, ~~S~~; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation) (Jun 66-Oct 66).

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with USEUCOM. They recognized, however, that political factors took precedence. USEUCOM headquarters had to be operating outside France by 1 April 1967; relocation to the Brussels area would involve delays and Belgium might be reluctant to accept a US as well as a NATO headquarters. Accordingly, on 30 June 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Mr. McNamara that they agreed to put USEUCOM at Stuttgart, 250 miles from SHAPE.⁴²

(U) On 14 March 1967, American flags were lowered at USEUCOM's old headquarters near St.-Germain-en-Laye. On 31 March, SHAPE opened its new facilities at Casteau, Belgium. As fighter-bombers flew past and a British Army band played a regimental march, flags of fourteen allies crackled as they ran up their poles. But NATO's blue and silver flag remained earth-bound; at the critical moment, the pulley had come off the flagstaff.⁴³

42. JCSM-440-66 to SecDef, 30 Jun 66, JCS 2278/104-16, ~~S~~ JMF 9050.3 (20 Mar 66) sec 3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-30, U, same file, sec 5. For similar nonmilitary reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed to merge HQ, Seventh Army with HQ, USAREUR.

43. NY Times, 15 Mar 67, p. 1; 1 Apr 67, p. 1. During this reorganization, the US-UK-French Standing Group was abolished and its International Planning Staff expanded into an International Military Staff under the NATO Military Committee, which moved from Washington to Brussels.

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(U) Dire predictions about the consequences of French withdrawal proved exaggerated. The integrated command kept functioning; there were no radical changes to defense plans. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff won an important victory by persuading Secretary McNamara to approve 90-day stockpiling objectives (60 days in Germany, 30 in the United Kingdom). Thus US forces could retain their capacity for flexible response.

Re-cementing the German Connection

~~(S)~~ One of the two major continental powers had left the integrated command. Thus General Wheeler, in March 1966, told SACEUR that keeping West Germany tightly tied to the Atlantic Alliance was "probably our highest security interest vis-a-vis NATO."⁴⁴ But, during 1966, that tie began fraying badly. Growing balance-of-payments deficits, aggravated by Vietnam requirements, produced increasing pressure for US withdrawals from Europe. Inevitably, West Germans began wondering about the durability of the American commitment.

(U) On 7 April 1966, the Johnson Administration revealed plans to withdraw 15,000 men with special skills from West Germany, thereby reducing Seventh Army's strength from 225,000 to 210,000. Rebuilding to

⁴⁴. Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 18 Mar 66, ~~S~~ CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

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the original level, officials insisted, would be completed by the year's close.⁴⁵ In May, however, Mr. McNamara warned West German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe Von Hassel that Washington was reserving the right to reduce US forces "proportionally" if Bonn's purchases of American arms failed to offset US troop costs. Some Germans, doubting that the United States would place its vital interests at hazard merely over balance-of-payment problems, suspected that the Secretary was using the financial issue as a "pretext" to justify transferring several divisions to Vietnam. But, in July, the British also began insisting that they would withdraw some forces from West Germany unless Bonn began bearing the costs of keeping them there.⁴⁶

(U) There were repercussions on Capitol Hill as well as in Western Europe. On 27 July, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield called for the return of all American personnel in France and for a 10 percent troop cut elsewhere in Europe. He cited, as justification, "great" financial pressures of the Vietnam War,

45. NY Times, 8 Apr 66, p. 1. By June, a reporter found that "hardly a unit" in Seventh Army had not experienced "significant" personnel losses. Ibid., 26 Jun 66, p. 2. This was the beginning of a decline in combat readiness that would continue for the next two years.

46. NY Times, 6 Jun 66, p. 40; 22 Jul 66, p. 2; 26 Jul 66, p. 1. For an elaboration of British views, see JCS 2265/33, 29 Aug 66, U, JMF 9163 (1966).

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changing conditions in Europe, and the need for American troops elsewhere. In August, the Senate Democratic Policy Committee proposed a substantial reduction of the 330,000 US servicemen in Western Europe. Senator Mansfield introduced an implementing resolution that attracted 31 co-sponsors; the Administration promptly announced its opposition. Although this measure never came close to passage, it was a harbinger of growing Congressional discontent over US involvement abroad.⁴⁷

~~(TS)~~ Secretary Rusk, anticipating that Moscow might propose mutual withdrawals of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and of American units from Western Europe, asked for a military assessment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 27 June, urged a very cautious approach. They started with a somber overview of the military situation. Improvements to Soviet strategic forces could weaken the US nuclear deterrent. France was withdrawing from the integrated command; the other allies were not doing as much as Washington wanted; the United States was making what its NATO partners saw as a major shift from Europe to Asia. Moreover, a "resurgent and increasingly independent" West Germany threatened the existing Soviet-American relationship in Europe. In these circumstances, mutual withdrawals could increase instability and the chances of conflict,

47. NY Times, 28 Jul 66, p. 1; 16 Sep 66, p. 1.

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unless there should be either a unilateral Warsaw Pact reduction or movement toward a general European settlement.

~~(TS)~~ Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, NATO's active divisions fell five short of the number thought necessary; the reserve forces suffered from extensive shortfalls. A unilateral Soviet withdrawal of 5-10 divisions from East Germany, while not completely eliminating the Warsaw Pact's conventional advantage, could constitute "a basis for subsequent mutual withdrawals." The Soviets, after all, could reintroduce forces into Central Europe more rapidly than the NATO powers. US airlift and sealift, they remarked, could not carry all the reinforcements now slated to come from CONUS during the first 30 days; having also to bring withdrawn forces back to Europe would aggravate that problem. As for tactical air power, a Soviet pull-back could be reversed so quickly that, for all practical purposes, the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance would not change appreciably. And, because of their theater-missile array, the Soviets' rapid nuclear delivery capability would not suffer. Additionally, allied views must be taken into account, since a Soviet pull-back could be aimed at evoking similar actions by NATO members, thus compounding the disruptive forces already working within the alliance. A US withdrawal might produce substantial reduction in allied efforts; a mutual pull-back, leaving Soviet closer than US

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forces to the scene of operations, could greatly reduce NATO's conventional options. So, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no withdrawals should occur until a "suitable political basis" for doing so had been established. Washington should be willing to consider withdrawal discussions with the Soviets, provided that "a supporting NATO consensus" existed, but should neither initiate them unilaterally nor appear anxious to carry them forward.⁴⁸

~~(TS)~~ Subsequently, Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the implications of: first, withdrawing two US divisions and 184 tactical fighters; second, removing four divisions and 368 aircraft; or third, thinning out US units, as well as redeploying 108 aircraft. Their reply, dated 27 September, ran as follows:

1. Withdrawing two divisions would "jeopardize the integrity of the entire defense," probably require earlier use of nuclear weapons, force a rapid retreat to the Rhine, and endanger reinforcing capability by quickly losing German bases. These two divisions could be brought back to Europe in 47 days.

2. Withdrawing four divisions would "negate the concept of a forward defense and would probably neces-

48. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 13 Jun 66, JCS 1731/936, ~~TS~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Jun 66, JCS 1731/931-1, ~~TS~~; JCSM-452-66 to SecDef, 8 Jul 66, JCS 1731/936-2, ~~TS-GR 1~~; JMF 3050 (13 Jun 66) sec 1.

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sitate the immediate use of nuclear weapons." Returning all these divisions would require 74 days.

3. Thinning out Army units to 70 or 80 percent strength would seriously degrade their combat capability and endurance.

4. Redeploying tactical fighters would severely degrade NATO's ability to fight the initial air battle, and to provide interdiction and ground support. If ground units had to be withdrawn, in-place reconnaissance and air-defense squadrons became much more important. For a trans-Atlantic return, 50 tankers would be needed to refuel 108 planes, 90 to refuel 184 planes, and 110 to refuel 316 planes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff ended this report by saying that they opposed any withdrawals.⁴⁹

~~(TS)~~ General Wheeler held little hope that JCS arguments would carry much weight. On 7 September, he warned General Lemnitzer that

there is already a definite acceptance (and perhaps even a tentative but closely held decision) in OSD and the White House that substantial reductions should be made . . . ; I think it is most significant that the Mansfield amendment was not refuted by the administration except from

⁴⁹. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Aug 66, JCS 1731/936-3, ~~TS-CP-1~~, JCSM-605-66 to SecDef, 27 Sep 66, JCS 1731/936-5, ~~TS-CP-1~~, JMF 3050 (13 Jun 66) sec 1.

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the standpoint of its timeliness, the need for consultation, and the need to distinguish between combat and support troops. It is likely, I think, that the reduction would initially be along the lines [of] . . . preserving the facade of the magic 5 divisions . . . until the political ground has been thoroughly plowed for further reductions.⁵⁰

~~(S)~~ His forecast proved astonishingly accurate. In Washington, on 27 September 1966, President Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard agreed to undertake a "searching reappraisal" of NATO strategy and force levels, and to "address the question" of equitable burden-sharing. The British, and eventually all other allies, would be asked to participate in this review. One week later, Secretary McNamara requested JCS judgments on the best way of slashing USAREUR's strength by 50,000 men. He told them to apply several assumptions, the most important being that withdrawals would be completed by the close of 1967; redeployed units would remain committed to NATO; dehumidified storage and prestockage would be authorized; and the United States would continue supporting a forward-defense strategy.⁵¹

50. Msg, JCS 5279-66 to USCINCEUR, 071423Z Sep 66, ~~TS~~ CJCS 323.3 SACEUR.

51. Public Papers, Johnson, 1966, pp. 1078-1079. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 66, JCS 2450/294, ~~S~~ JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec 1.

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~~(S)~~ General Wheeler, anticipating such a directive, already had ordered the Joint Staff to investigate the "least bad" way of accomplishing reductions. On 27 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara a lengthy report on the subject. They asserted, at the outset, that there was "no military justification for reducing forces . . . in light of current Warsaw Pact capabilities and [Soviet] ability to augment rapidly its forces in central Europe." For ground forces, the "least undesirable" solution would be returning to the United States the entire 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), plus one brigade and assorted support units. The 24th was USAREUR's reserve division, located in southern Bavaria outside Seventh Army's defense sector. And, since an entire complex of installations could be closed, substantial savings would occur. Alternatively, political advantage might accrue from keeping all five division flags in Europe. In that case, the 24th Division's command and control elements could stay--but a brigade from another division would have to depart.

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff then questioned Secretary McNamara's assumption about the availability of dehumidified storage. Vietnam demands meant that pre-positioned stocks might not be available before FY 1971. That being so, equipment would have to be returned to CONUS along with personnel. Continued credibility of the US commitment would revolve, in large part, around the feasibility of rapidly returning forces to Europe. According to JCS calculations,

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reentry times would vary between 43 and 69 days, depending upon how much equipment was pre-positioned. But even under the "least undesirable" redeployment scheme, US capability for a forward defense would be called into question, since the means for supporting it would be "visibly weakened." Under any other alternative, they contended, forward defense would become "virtually impossible."⁵²

~~(S)~~ Mr. McNamara also asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider "dual-basing" perhaps 12 to 15 tactical squadrons. That meant withdrawing the squadrons to CONUS, but periodically bringing them back to Europe. The JCS reply, dated 27 October, described the "least unsatisfactory" solution as being:

	<u>Retained in Europe</u>		<u>Withdrawn</u>	
	<u>Current</u>	<u>Proposed</u>	<u>to CONUS</u>	<u>Rotated</u>
Strike Sqdns	18	18	-	-
Recon Sqdns	6	4	3	1
Air Defense Sqdns	4	3	1	-
Total	28	25	4	1

That would mean a manpower reduction of 4,245 and \$16.4 million balance-of-payments saving. The next most palatable possibility would be:

	<u>Retained in Europe</u>		<u>Withdrawn</u>	
	<u>Current</u>	<u>Proposed</u>	<u>to CONUS</u>	<u>Rotated</u>
Strike Sqdns	18	16	3	1
Recon Sqdns	6	2	6	2
Air Defense Sqdns	4	3	1	-
Total	28	21	10	3

⁵². JCSM-693-66 to SecDef, 27 Oct 66, JCS 2450/294-1, ~~S~~, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec 2.

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Then the personnel cut would be 8,043, the saving \$31.2 million.⁵³

~~(C)~~ General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara considered applying a "rotational brigade" approach to the 8th and 24th Divisions. When a division withdrew, one brigade plus command and control elements and all heavy equipment would remain in Europe; the division's three brigades then would rotate periodically. All the other JCS members opposed this solution. Late in December, they advised Mr. McNamara that brigade rotation "represents a difficult and expensive way to do business" Admittedly, the rotational approach would not only better demonstrate US will and ability to reinforce Europe but also make reintroduction less sensitive politically. On the other hand, past experience indicated that training would be disrupted and morale impaired. Rotation also would require maintaining units at 102 percent strength; pre-positioning equipment for 1 1/3 divisions; making available more transport aircraft; and providing additional support personnel (3,000) and funds (\$46 million). Implementation, if ordered, ought to be postponed until all these additional assets became available. In sum, then they preferred the alternatives outlined on 27 October.⁵⁴

53. JCSM-693-66 to SecDef, 27 Oct 66, JCS 2450/294-1, S, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec 2.

54. CM-1897-66 to DJS, 5 Nov 66, JCS 2450/294-5, S, JCSM-789-66 to SecDef, 28 Dec 66, JCS 2450/294-6, U; same file, sec 3.

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~~(S)~~ General Wheeler remained partial to rotating brigades, largely because that would retain elements of all five divisions in Europe and keep "visible strings" on the withdrawn forces. Moreover, lift and reinforcement capabilities could be constantly tested. Rotation required more personnel, but promised a greater balance-of-payments saving. The Chairman told Mr. McNamara that he considered it "both feasible and desirable" to withdraw the 8th and 24th Divisions completely, then bring back one brigade from each division on a rotational basis. And rotation could be effected immediately by making use, if necessary, of the pre-positioned stocks already in Germany.⁵⁵

(U) Meanwhile, in Bonn, trilateral talks about security issues were beginning among Americans, British, and Germans. President Johnson appointed John J. McCloy, who had been US High Commissioner for Germany during 1949-1952, to be the US representative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied him with a support element headed by Lieutenant General Berton E. Spivy, Jr., USA, who was Director, J-5.⁵⁶

~~(S)~~ The President asked Mr. McCloy to review NATO policy and strategy and to base his negotiating position upon its results. In November, after consulta-

~~S.~~ 55. CM-2025-66 to SecDef, 28 Dec 66, JCS 2450/294-6, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec 3.

56. Public Papers, Johnson, 1966, p. 1139. Memo, CJCS to McCloy, 8 Oct 66, U, JMF 9050 (11 Oct 66) sec 1.

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tions with State, Defense, Treasury, and CIA officials, Mr. McCloy gave the Chief Executive his conclusions. He believed flexible response "essential" for balanced defense and effective deterrence; forces in Central Europe were sufficient to support it. Any substantial US reductions, he reasoned, probably would trigger allied cuts, lower the nuclear threshold, and encourage Soviet pressure tactics. Even with forthcoming airlift and sealift improvements, reinforcements from CONUS still could not reach Europe for "at least three weeks." Politically, sizeable withdrawals would lessen US influence in Europe and "seriously" increase the danger of NATO's disintegration. Consequently, Mr. McCloy recommended against "significant" redeployments from Central Europe under current conditions. In the financial realm, he proposed exploring with Bonn measures to stanch the dollar drain. After reviewing McCloy's report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that it generally reflected their views.⁵⁷

~~(S)~~ On 19 January 1967, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum (DPM) in which he outlined ways of cutting foreign exchange costs by \$200 million annually without "significantly reducing our military effectiveness." That result was

⁵⁷. Ltr, Pres to McCloy, n.d., JCS 2450/303-1, 1 Nov 66, U; Rpt, McCloy to Pres, n.d., JCS 2450/326, 22 Nov 66, ~~S-GP 1~~, Dec on JCS 2450/326, 22 Nov 66, ~~S-GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (11 Oct 66).

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due, he claimed, to the availability of (1) several weeks' political warning time prior to an attack and (2) faster means of trans-Atlantic movement. Thus there would be more time, and better means, for bringing troops back from CONUS to Europe.

~~(S)~~ In Central Europe, Mr. McNamara continued, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had reached a state of rough equilibrium. The Soviets, in fact, seemed to be adopting an increasingly defensive posture, in reaction to the split with China and the loosening of their control over Eastern Europe. The NATO allies no longer feared a Soviet attack, as proved by the slackening of their military effort since 1963. Consequently, they would not look with alarm upon a "moderate" American reduction, provided that the United States reaffirmed its "solemn commitment" and maintained a credible military posture.

~~(S)~~ Mr. McNamara then reviewed the balance-of-payments problem. American military expenditures abroad, apart from Vietnam, had averaged \$2.8 billion during 1961-1965; that figure probably would rise to \$4.1 billion in 1967. Costs in Germany, which had averaged \$650-700 million annually in 1960-1966, probably would grow to \$850-900 million during 1967-1969. Furthermore, the agreement to "offset" the cost of keeping US forces in Germany was not being fulfilled. Bonn's commitment was to order \$1.35 billion in US military equipment during 1965-1966; Bonn's performance fell \$600 million short of that standard.

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Since the Germans would meet their FY 1966-1967 "offset" by advance payments against future orders, none of the \$850-900 million costs incurred by the United States between 30 June 1967 and 31 December 1968 would be offset by new German payments. In these circumstances, Congressional opinion was coming to look upon a force reduction as "reasonable and consistent with basic US security."

~~(S)~~ Finally, the Secretary set forth his withdrawal recommendations. First, dual-base the 8th and 24th Infantry Divisions, always keeping at least one brigade from each division in Germany. That would bring back 59,000 men and cut the annual goldflow by \$123 million. The two divisions could return to Europe "substantially" in fifteen days, completely in thirty. Most equipment would be pre-positioned in Germany; war reserves should provide enough stocks for training in CONUS. Second, dual-base 432 tactical aircraft, always keeping at least 108 of them at British and German bases. Thus the number of US tactical aircraft in Western Europe would fall by 50 percent, from 662 to 338. There should be a \$40-50 million balance-of-payments saving; 11-14,500 personnel would withdraw. Mr. McNamara concluded by cautioning that, while a serious foreign-exchange drain would still remain, any further cuts in combat power would be "traumatic, and dangerous, at this time."⁵⁸

⁵⁸. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jan 67, JCS 2450/294-8, ~~S GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec 4.

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~~(S)~~ On 2 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara a strongly worded critique. Broadly, they argued, his proposed withdrawals would result in further allied force reductions; greater Soviet political leverage; greater dependence upon a nuclear strategy; increased allied skepticism about American interest in Europe; and reduced US influence over European affairs.

~~(S)~~ Then the Joint Chiefs of Staff set about challenging many of Mr. McNamara's conclusions. First, they expected that emergencies would develop too swiftly to allow return of forces from the United States. Strategic warning for a major attack would be 11 to 15 days; for a lesser assault, only a matter of hours. Reliance on a long period of political warning, therefore, ran "a great risk." Second, they questioned Mr. McNamara's claim that dual-based divisions could return to Europe in 15 to 30 days, mainly because they would be competing for transportation with units already scheduled to arrive there by M+30. Additionally, if dual-based fighters did not fly back to Europe before hostilities began, Allied Command Europe probably could not sustain air superiority long enough to allow their safe arrival later. Third, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disbelieved the Secretary's argument that there was a NATO-Warsaw Pact equilibrium. They cited intelligence estimates that, within 21 to 28 days, the Soviets could deploy 80 divisions in Central Europe, not 50 to 70 as the Secretary supposed.

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Fourth, they disputed McNamara's conclusion that withdrawals would neither weaken NATO significantly nor destabilize Europe. Since there would be no compensating Soviet cuts and the NATO allies might well make reductions in their own forces, Moscow could be tempted toward a more adventurous course. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated that they saw no military justification for force reductions. If there had to be withdrawals, the DPM should be revised to say that overriding economic and political considerations compelled this choice. The DPM also should propose prior consultations with the allies; limit FY 1968 withdrawals to one division and 216 aircraft; and recommend extra funding to make possible Army brigade rotation and Air Force dual-basing.⁵⁹

~~(S)~~ When this issue reached the White House, it was treated as a political problem: what was the smallest withdrawal that would disarm Congressional critics without alarming the allies? From Bonn, Mr. McCloy cabled that he would support dual-basing one division and 9 squadrons, provided that (1) the allies agreed, (2) US reinforcement capability was effectively demonstrated, and (3) no more removals would occur without reciprocal Soviet reductions or major improvements in the international climate. Secretary Rusk recommended dual-basing two brigades from one division and most of three wings--that is, 162 of their

⁵⁹. JCSM-60-67 to SecDef, 2 Feb 67, JCS 2450/294-10, ~~S~~, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec 5.

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216 aircraft. A large US withdrawal, he feared, might make the allies more willing to accommodate with Moscow. Mr. McNamara, however, tended to agree with a Special National Intelligence Estimate that the Soviets probably would respond by making some withdrawals from East Germany.⁶⁰

~~(S)~~ Soon, though, the two Secretaries reached agreement. On 25 February, Rusk and McNamara informed the President that their "preferred outcome" involved rotating not more than one division and three air wings; one of the division's three brigades and 54 of the 216 aircraft always would remain in Europe. President Johnson said he was "greatly reluctant" to make any cuts, but implied that Congressional pressure probably would compel some reductions. Two days later, the President talked with Congressional leaders. Senate Democrats favored reductions, while Senate Republicans did not; House members of both parties opposed any withdrawals.⁶¹

60. Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 309-310. Memo, Francis M. Bator to Pres, "U.S. Position in the Trilateral Negotiations," 23 Feb 67; Trilateral Negotiations and NATO: 1966-67, ~~S~~ Book 2, Doc 48c, NSC History; NSF, Johnson Library. Memo, SecDef, SecState, and SecTreasury to Pres, "Force Levels in Europe," n.d. [23 Feb 67], ~~S~~ same file, Doc 48e.

61. "Trilateral Negotiations: Skeleton Instructions for U.S. Negotiator," n.d. [25 Feb 67], ~~S~~ same file, Doc 50b. "Results of the Meeting with the President on February 25, 1967," ~~S~~ same file, Doc 51c. "Record of the President's February 27 Meeting with the Congressional Leadership," ~~S~~ same file, Doc 52g.

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~~(C)~~ Finally, on 17 March 1967, Secretary McNamara told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that two brigades plus supporting units from the 24th Division (about 30,000 men, all told) would return to CONUS. The entire 24th Division would exercise annually in Germany, using pre-positioned equipment. Additionally, 216 tactical aircraft would be dual-based, 54 of which would always be at German bases. The other planes and 6,500 personnel would redeploy to CONUS, but remain ready to return within seven days. Again, all dual-based aircraft would assemble annually in Germany. Mr. McNamara wanted withdrawals to begin on 1 October 1967.⁶²

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested several modifications. They preferred to keep a division based in Germany and rotate the three brigades on a six-month cycle.⁶³ They also wanted the withdrawal limited to 28,000 personnel, in order to retain more support personnel. Assuming equipment was pre-positioned and air transportation available, combat-ready forces would reach Europe in 28 days. Yet, unless additional funds became available, pre-positioned stocks could not be

62. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381-1, ~~S~~, JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec 1.

63. ~~(S)~~ J-5 suggested stationing one brigade perman-ently in Germany, to save money and ease the strain on personnel. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that frequent rotation would demonstrate US ability and intent to reinforce Seventh Army in time of crisis. JCS 2450/381-3, 28 Mar 67, ~~S~~, same file, sec 1A. Note to Control, "JCS 2450/381-3," 29 Mar 67, ~~TS~~, same file, sec 1.

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provided before mid-1970. As to tactical aircraft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended returning 144 planes and retaining 72. One squadron from each of the three wings affected should remain at German airfields; squadrons would rotate every 2-3 years.⁶⁴ But, because of crew shortages caused by Vietnam requirements, only 75 percent of each squadron could return to Europe within a week. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that, in order to achieve reintroduction within the time limits specified by Secretary McNamara (30 days for ground units, seven for air forces), the following additional money and manpower were required:

Army - \$121-148 million and 3,900-7,500 personnel to provide pre-positioned equipment and storage.

Air Force - \$107 million and 1,700 personnel for basing facilities, air crews, and equipment.

Finally, they once more reminded Mr. McNamara that they could find no military justification for any force reductions at all.⁶⁵

~~(S)~~ Secretary Rusk pronounced Mr. McNamara's 17 March scheme "good," and approved its use in the tripartite talks.⁶⁶ These talks concluded on 28 March

⁶⁴. J-5 favored wing rotation as being cheaper and more efficient. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose squadron rotation and then, in JCSM-180, claimed the same advantages for their solution.

⁶⁵. JCSM-180-67 to SecDef, 30 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381-3, ~~S~~ JMF 806-374 (17 Mar 67) sec 1.

⁶⁶. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Apr 67, JCS 2124/386, ~~S-CP-1~~, same file, sec 2.

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1967, when Mr. McCloy, George Thomson (UK), and Georg Duckwitz (Germany) signed a series of agreements. The United States would withdraw two brigades from the 24th Division, together with their support (approximately 28,000 men). One brigade would stay in Germany on a six-month rotational cycle; the other two would join it for annual exercises. Redeployed units would maintain a state of readiness permitting their return to Europe in 30 days; the US Government would "strive to shorten" this interval. Dual-basing of aircraft would involve 216 planes, of which 120 would remain in Germany and 96 return to CONUS.⁶⁷ As many as 6,500 Air Force personnel would withdraw. The redeployed aircraft would remain ready to return within ten days (five, if possible); all 216 planes would perform annual exercises in Germany. For both ground and air forces, "first movements . . . will not take place before January 1, 1968 . . . , but in no event before the US is ready to meet the criteria described above." Any more major reductions should either be balanced by Soviet withdrawals or result from major shifts in the security situation.

⁶⁷. This was apparently the thorniest area of German-American controversy. According to President Johnson, Mr. McCloy recommended the compromise figures that were finally agreed upon. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, p. 310. (TS)

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~~(S)~~ As for "offset" arrangements, the Bundesbank agreed to buy \$500 million in US securities during FY 1968 and to stop converting dollars into gold. The Germans promised to purchase significant amounts of US military equipment, and to deal with the remaining dollar deficit by other monetary measures. Bonn also agreed to make major purchases in the United Kingdom. The British intended to bring home one brigade and two tactical air squadrons early in 1968, and had threatened to make "massive" withdrawals unless the Germans acted to offset their foreign-exchange costs.⁶⁸

~~(S)~~ The Johnson Administration had re-cemented the tie between Washington and Bonn. As Mr. McCloy assured President Johnson, "we have come a considerable distance from the unpromising situation we faced last autumn." The Germans had been "particularly pleased" by US willingness to change position and remove only 96 rather than 154 aircraft. "As a result," he related, "I noted a distinct improvement in the political atmosphere at the conclusion of the talks."⁶⁹

~~(S)~~ In May 1967, at Secretary McNamara's request, the Services submitted redeployment plans. The Army's REFORGER (an acronym for "Redeployment of Forces from Germany") outlined a 28,000-man withdrawal; the Air Force's HEAVY DRAW described a 3,500-man redeployment.

68. See NY Times, 28 Feb 67, p. 1.

69. Ltr, McCloy to Pres, 17 May 67, JCS 2450/413, ~~S~~ JMF 806/541 (CY 67).

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Mr. McNamara ordered the preparation of 31,000- and 6,500-man packages; both Services complied under protest. The Joint Chiefs of Staff added their dissent, telling the Secretary on 22 June that withdrawals above 35,000 would "give the allies the impression that a policy of continuing redeployments was underway" and thereby "contribute to the further unravelling of the NATO defense structure." And they asked again that the beginning of dual-basing await the availability of pre-positioned equipment.⁷⁰

(U) Ultimately, in August, Mr. McNamara ruled that 28,000 Army and 5,300 Air Force personnel would redeploy during January-June 1968. He later delayed their return until April-September 1968, so that costs could be deferred until FY 1969 and more pre-positioned equipment would become available.⁷¹ All in all, a tolerable solution had been found for a potentially explosive situation.

70. CSAFM-61-67 to JCS, 18 Apr 67, JCS 2450/381-4, U; "HEAVY DRAW," 15 May 67, JCS 2450/381-8, U; JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec 2. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 19 May 67, JCS 2450/381-11, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 31 May 67, JCS 2450/381-14, U; Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 6 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-15, U, same file, sec 3. Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 15 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-20, U; JCSM-358-67 to SecDef, 22 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-21, ~~C~~ same file, sec 4.

71. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Aug 67, JCS 2450/381-22, U, same file. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 11 Oct 67, JCS 2450/381-24, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Oct 67, JCS 2450/381-25, U; same file, sec 5.

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A Shaky Southern Flank

(U) Greece and Turkey presented special problems for NATO. Geographically, the two countries lay exposed and vulnerable to Soviet or satellite attack. Militarily, both nations suffered from numerous weaknesses; neither could afford thoroughgoing modernization. Politically, Athens and Ankara intensely distrusted one another. During August 1964, clashes between the Greek and Turkish populations on Cyprus brought the two countries close to war.⁷²

(U) The Greeks sought more US aid, and tried to justify their request by citing a threat from Bulgaria. In December 1964, the Greek Defense Minister told Secretary McNamara that his country had little hope of meeting its NATO force goals, and voiced particular concern about a Bulgarian attack against narrow, exposed Thrace in northeastern Greece. Mr. McNamara was not much worried about a Bulgarian attack. The two men did agree, however, that there should be a "completely fresh" evaluation of Greek defense problems--meaning, primarily, a statement about priorities among the missions assigned to Greek forces.⁷³

~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by creating an Hellenic Defense Study Team. General Wheeler chose Lieutenant General Charles H. Bonesteel,

72. See Jules P. Davids, The United States in World Affairs: 1964 (1965), pp. 53-67.

73. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Dec 64, JCS 2445, U, JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec 1.

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USA, to be its Director.⁷⁴ Secretary McNamara told the Team to assume that US aid would average \$65 million annually, plus \$5 million from other allies. The Bonesteel Team visited Greece during March 1965. It concluded that, although a Bulgarian surprise attack seemed highly unlikely, Greeks stood "less than a fifty percent chance" of conducting a successful forward defense unless NATO's alerting procedures and regional defense plans were improved. Prompt Turkish cooperation would be required, as would rapid support from the US Sixth Fleet.

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~~(S)~~ After reviewing this report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a modified forward-defense strategy

⁷⁴. GEN Bonesteel was Director of Special Studies in GEN Johnson's Office.

⁷⁵. Note to Control, "Greek-Turkish Exercise," 19 Jan 65, ~~S~~; CM 398-65 to CSA et al., 27 Jan 65, S; CM-402-65 to LTG Bonesteel et al., 27 Jan 65, JCS 2445-1, U; JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec 1. Rpt by JCS Hellenic Defense Study Team, "Reappraisal of the Defense Posture of Greece for the Period FY 1966-FY 1971," secs I and XIV, 25 Mar 65, ~~TS-CP-1~~, same file, sec 2A.

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for Greece. But they opposed establishing priorities between limited and general war, mainly because giving first priority to limited war would spark serious opposition within NATO. They could not find any mission tradeoffs between Greek and NATO forces that would enhance overall effectiveness "significantly". Although external reinforcements could offset Greek shortcomings, no adjustments in mission priorities could greatly improve the "austere" combat capability of Greek forces.

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Finally, while acknowledging that there might be genuine worry about a Bulgarian "land grab," they noted that the Greeks were not themselves taking reasonable corrective actions. Perhaps, they speculated, the Greeks were really preparing themselves for trouble with Turkey over Cyprus. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the Team's recommendation about annual US aid was too small. Secretary McNamara had assumed that it would average \$65 million; the Bonesteel Team proposed a figure of \$80 million; the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended \$131.3 million.⁷⁶

⁷⁶. JCSM-317-65 to SecDef, 30 Apr 65, JCS 2445-5, ~~S-CP-3~~, JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec 2. A resume of the Bonesteel Report was forwarded to the Greeks via Ltr, SecDef to Greek Min of Def, 7 Dec 65, JCS 2445-8, ~~S-CP-3~~, same file.

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~~(TS)~~ General Wheeler, apprehensive about hurt feelings in Ankara, recommended a similar study of Turkish forces. Mr. McNamara agreed.⁷⁷ So, during April, another Team headed by General Bonesteel visited Turkey. It reported, late in May, that Turkey's strategic importance actually had increased, because of Soviet success in penetrating the Arab Middle East and extending Soviet influence across the North African littoral. But the Team believed that the Cyprus issue, where Turks saw US behavior as favoring the Greeks, was creating an emotional wave of anti-Americanism. American efforts to shift NATO strategy toward a flexible response, and talk about sizeable reductions in military assistance, were reinforcing Turkish doubts about US dependability. The Bonesteel Team believed that, unless these trends were halted or reversed, Washington might lose a staunch ally within the next few years.

~~(TS)~~ Turning to military matters, the Team concluded that "locally applicable" Warsaw Pact forces could seize and open the Turkish Straits, as well as achieve major successes in eastern Turkey. The Team favored a "modified forward defense strategy," which would put less emphasis on Turkish capabilities for general war, and place more reliance on bringing external reinforcements to meet lesser aggressions.

77. CM-401-65 to SecDef, 27 Jan 65, 1st N/H of JCS 2445, 28 Jan 65, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Feb 65, JCS 2445-2, U; JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec 1.

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Turkish forces were already so austere that no mission tradeoffs with allied forces seemed possible. Rather, the Team said, there should be improved rapid reinforcement capabilities, along with more NATO planning and exercises. Current general war plans called for making three USAF squadrons available by D+30; one Marine Division/Wing Team could arrive by D+30, with another perhaps following by D+60. Finally, the Bonesteel Team stressed the importance of Turkish cooperation and allied assistance. Turks must reorganize their forces, spend more, and improve production facilities. Depending on the degree of success, US aid needed to carry out the Team's proposals would average \$118-130 million annually. In July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they generally concurred with this report. But US military aid to Turkey, they thought, should average \$219.6 million annually.⁷⁸

~~(TS)~~ Early in October 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that current Military Assistance Program (MAP) levels would leave major Greek and Turkish weaknesses uncorrected.⁷⁹ Yet, they con-

78. "Reappraisal of the Defense Posture of Turkey for the Period FY 1966-FY 1971," sec IIA, 28 May 65, JCS 1704/142-7, ~~TS-GP-1~~, JCSM-511-65 to SecDef, 1 Jul 65, JCS 1704/142-8, ~~TS-GP-1~~, JMF 9187 (10 Feb 65). A resume was forwarded to the Turks via Ltr, SecDef to Turkish Min of Defense, 7 Dec 65, JCS 1704/144-1, ~~S~~, JMF 9187 (28 May 65).

79. The deficiencies that US aid, at current levels, could and could not set right are detailed in Encl B to JCS 2315/346-2, ~~S~~, JMF 4060 (5 Dec 64).

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tinued, the greatest risks were political and psychological. If the Turks became disenchanted with NATO, "we risk the loss of the Turkish Straits and the loss of a substantial complex of communications, intelligence, and transportation capabilities of direct concern to U.S. national security."⁸⁰

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, in September, the ISA tentatively had suggested maximum annual outlays of \$60-70 million for Greece and about \$120 million for Turkey. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on 9 October, repeated their recommendation that annual programs average \$131.1 million for Greece (\$182.7 in FY 1967, \$119.3 by FY 1971) and \$219.6 million for Turkey (\$243.6 in FY 1967, \$185.2 by FY 1971). In view of the recognized weakness on NATO's flanks and the "continually deteriorating US strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean," caused partly by Greek-Turkish friction over Cyprus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this "a particularly inopportune time" either to reduce assistance for the two countries or to readjust the proportionate share between them. Conversely, increased aid of the size they suggested would do much to reverse declining American influence in both nations.⁸¹

⁸⁰. JCSM-755-65 to SecDef, 14 Oct 65, JCS 2315/358-4, ~~TS CP 1~~, JMF 4060 (16 Jun 65).

⁸¹. Rpt by OASD(ISA), "Military Assistance Reappraisal, FY 1967-1971; Draft Report on Greece and Turkey," pp. II-32, II-35, Sep 65, ~~S~~, JMF 4060 (26 Sep 65) sec 1A. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Sep 65, JCS 2315/372, ~~S~~, JCSM-742-65 to SecDef, 9 Oct 65, JCS 2315/372-1, ~~TS CP 1~~; same file, sec 1.

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(U) Unfortunately, Congressional appropriations fell far short of JCS proposals. In FY 1966, Greece received \$77.4 million, Turkey \$124.4 million. For FY 1967, Greece received \$65 million and Turkey \$134 million.⁸² These, of course, were approximately the figures that ISA had suggested.

(U) During 1967, US relations with Greece worsened considerably. In Athens, on 20 April, conservative Army officers overthrew the constitutional government and established military rule. The soldiers claimed that they had acted in order to prevent a leftist takeover. The United States responded by suspending major MAP deliveries: aircraft; ships; tanks and tank recovery vehicles; missiles; APCs; and munitions. Late in June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended resuming, as soon as possible, normal military relations and delivery of MAP equipment. They noted that the junta had agreed to accommodate Americans evacuated during the Arab-Israeli war, a gesture that might ease Congressional concern about the new regime's nature and intentions. Additionally, small steps toward liberalization had taken place. Continuing the suspension would seriously delay military modernization and could alienate the Greek government. "The United States," they argued, "can ill afford these consequences in view of the delicacy of the US presence in other parts of the eastern and central Mediterranean."⁸³

82. See Chapter VIII, p. 429.

83. JCS 2445/10, 19 Jun 67, U; JCSM-359-67 to SecDef, 22 Jun 67, JCS 2445/10, U, JMF 954/495 (12 Jun 67).

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~~(S)~~ When he sent these comments to State, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Townsend W. Hoopes added his own appreciation that "our policy was meant to be flexible," alleviating suspensions if liberalization occurred and tightening them if authoritarianism increased. The junta had ended martial law and released most political prisoners--yet Washington had made no reciprocal gestures, thereby deepening misunderstanding and distrust. Mr. Hoopes worried, also, that King Constantine's apparent intention to stage a showdown with the junta probably would lead either to his expulsion or to civil war. Why not, then, try to create a climate in which a showdown might be averted? Specifically, Mr. Hoopes suggested transferring a minesweeper to the Greeks; selling ten helicopters;

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~~(S)~~ In mid-July, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) endorsed releasing the equipment that Hoopes had suggested. Writing to Secretary McNamara on 7 August, General Wheeler strongly recommended a release. In fact, if any delay developed, he urged that the minesweeper alone be transferred as soon as possible. But, after discussions with the State Department, Mr. McNamara decided to defer all action until Congress finished its work on the MAP. Since the Greek junta

84. Memo, PDASD(ISA) to AsstSecState L. D. Battle, 28 Jun 67, ~~S-CP-1~~, JCS 2445/10-1, JMF 954/495 (12 Jun 67).

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was unpopular on Capitol Hill, equipment transfers could jeopardize the worldwide program.⁸⁵

(U) Unfortunately, the passage of time only created more political problems. In November 1967, on Cyprus, Greeks attacked several Turkish villages; Turkey responded by preparing to invade the island. A mediation mission led by Cyrus Vance secured, temporarily, a peaceful solution. Next, in December, King Constantine tried to oust the Greek junta. He failed, and fled into exile.⁸⁶

~~(S)~~ In April 1968, the SIG again debated whether to ease the Greek aid embargo. Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach said that, by all evidence, the military junta would stay in power for some time to come. Linking MAP to political liberalization seemed sound in theory, Mr. Katzenbach continued, but Washington then became accountable for meaningful liberalization, regardless of whether the junta was willing to move in that direction. During the ensuing discussion, SIG members agreed that preserving the US position in Greece was "essential" to preserving the US position in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Finally, the SIG recommended releasing \$5 million at once,

85. CM-2557-67 to SecDef, 7 Aug 67, JCS 2445/12, ~~S-GP 37~~, Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Aug 67, JCS 2445/12-1, ~~S-GP 37~~, JMF 954/495 (7 Aug 67).

86. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1967 (1968), pp. 214-223.

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and obligating another \$20 million before 1 July. But, since the US Government could not exert more than marginal influence upon Greek political developments, MAP gradually should be dissociated from Greek politics, and be justified solely from the standpoint of US and NATO interests. Again, though, the Administration continued the MAP ban from fear that easing it might anger Congress and thereby endanger the worldwide program.⁸⁷

(S) With Turkey, there were problems of a different sort. Congress cut military assistance to the point where, for FY 1969, Turkey received only \$100 million. Moreover, the Administration began to doubt whether Turkey would make bases available for non-NATO purposes. In December 1967, Secretary McNamara decided that US visibility within Turkey must be reduced, both to preserve the long-term health of bilateral relations and to reduce American dependence upon Turkish facilities. Accordingly, he ordered plans for reducing the number of US personnel (military, civilian, and dependents) from 25,000 to 10,000 over five years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a plan in March 1968, but stated their opinion that such a large reduction would not serve US interests. At this point, they

87. "Record of Discussions and Decisions at the 34th SIG Meeting on April 16, 1968," 23 Apr 68, JCS 2464/87, ~~S-CP-1~~, JMF 537 (CY 68). Draft Admin History of the Dept of Defense: 1963-1969, Vol. I, ~~S~~ p. 92.

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argued, nothing more than a modest FY 1969 cut should be approved.⁸⁸

~~(TS)~~ In May 1968, the ISA circulated a different phasedown plan. Among other things, it called for removing 3,139 people during FY 1969. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that ISA aimed at removing too much, too soon. They voiced particular concern about reducing US personnel in two NATO headquarters: Commander, Land Forces, South East; and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. The Turks, they warned Secretary Clifford, might see such drastic unilateral reductions as a significant weakening of US assurances--particularly in light of REFORGER, the decrease in military aid, and Congressional demands for more US withdrawals from Europe. The psychological impact, they continued, would serve to increase uncertainty and unrest throughout this increasingly important area, thus inviting new and aggressive Soviet initiatives. So, instead of acting unilaterally, they favored awaiting East-West discussions about mutual force reductions.

~~(TS)~~ The State Department, however, endorsed ISA's plan. On 29 June, Mr. Nitze approved withdrawing 3,098 personnel in FY 1969, followed by 3,034 more in FY 1970. He also endorsed, in principle, reductions during FYs 1971-1973 that would lower the total to 10,000.

⁸⁸. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Dec 67, JCS 1704/173, ~~S GP 3~~, JCSM-164-68 to SecDef, 16 Mar 68, JCS 1704/173-3, ~~S GP 3~~. JMF 970/101 (11 Dec 67).

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But the Joint Chiefs of Staff did win one point. Withdrawals from the NATO headquarters, scheduled for FY 1969, were made smaller.⁸⁹

(U) NATO's southern flank seemed to be sagging under the weight of political discord. There was a chill between Washington and Athens, a cooling between Washington and Ankara--and, thanks to Cyprus, enmity between Athens and Ankara. None of these difficulties was about to disappear.

⁸⁹. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 16 May 68, JCS 1704/173-5, ~~TS GP 3~~; JCSM-356-68 to SecDef, 5 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-6, ~~TS GP 3~~; Ltr, DepUSecState to DepSecDef, 3 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-7, ~~TS GP 1~~; Memo, PDASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 27 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-9, ~~TS GP 3~~; JMF 970/101 (11 Dec 67).