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
THE HISTORY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND NATIONAL POLICY

VOLUME IX: 1965-1968

PART I

BY
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CHAPTER VII

"FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" FOR NATO: REALITY OR MIRAGE?

Evolution of a New Strategic Concept

~~(S)~~ This chapter deals with strategy and force planning--matters that, unlike those treated in the last chapter, were fundamentally military in nature. The US Government wanted to change NATO's policy of meeting a major conventional attack against Western Europe with prompt nuclear retaliation. According to MC 14/2, the strategic concept approved by NATO in 1957, the North Atlantic powers would not fight a limited war with the Soviet Union. NATO would employ tactical and strategic nuclear weapons--regardless of whether the Soviets did so--in all situations save temporary infiltrations, incursions, and local actions. Beginning in 1961, however, the US Government pressed for a strategy of defending Western Europe against nonnuclear attack, at least initially, by conventional means alone. Among the allies, Washington's effort at redirecting NATO strategy toward "flexible response" sparked considerable resistance. To the Europeans, a threat of swift nuclear retaliation constituted the essence of deterrence. Emphasizing conventional capabilities, they feared, would encourage Moscow to think that it could launch an attack without risking nuclear devastation. Secretary McNamara kept telling the Europeans that changes in the strategic nuclear balance required changes in NATO's strategic concept. But his arguments left them largely unmoved.

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~~(S)~~ Late in 1963, the NATO Military Committee, comprising Chiefs of Staff from member nations, addressed this problem. The Military Committee had before it MC 100/1, a draft document that very broadly prescribed direct defenses at the conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear levels. Discussion bogged down, however, mainly because the French would accept no strategy except prompt and massive nuclear retaliation.¹

~~(S)~~ The French withdrawal from the Military Committee, in 1966, removed one apparently insuperable obstacle to revising MC 14/2. But the Germans still had serious doubts about "flexible response." General Wheeler tried to remove them through correspondence with his West German counterpart, Inspector General Heinz Trettner. In February 1966, General Wheeler opened the exchange by defining the "fundamental" German-American divergence as a question of whether defending Central Europe without early recourse to nuclear weapons was feasible and desirable. The concept was obviously feasible. Even now, Wheeler claimed, Allied Command Europe could repel a sizeable attack without resorting to nuclear weapons. What about desirability? There might be a temporary loss of territory, Wheeler admitted, but that would be

1. See The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1961-1964, Part III, ~~TS RD~~, Chapters XII and XIII.

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preferable to the devastation caused by firing battlefield nuclear weapons. Americans and Germans, Wheeler continued, "must set the military standards for the other NATO nations." The capabilities of US forces furnished commanders with a wide range of options; those of German units, in his judgment, did not.²

~~(TS)~~ General Trettner replied by calling nuclear weapons "the most significant political instrument for the defense of NATO Europe." The less either side dreaded escalation, the more likely such escalation would become. Since he saw no "convincing proof" that the conventional option could deter an attack, "nuclear weapons--particularly those in the lower [yield] category--must be made part of operational plans . . ." Extended and extensive use of battlefield nuclear weapons, on West German territory, struck him as "untenable" because of the resulting devastation. Consequently, threatening the enemy with early use of nuclear weapons constituted "the very nature of the strategy of deterrence."³

~~(TS)~~ On 31 May, General Wheeler told General Trettner that "we now have arrived at the point of essential agreement." General Wheeler wanted NATO forces to be able to: identify, at an early stage, the scale and intent of aggression; defeat limited

2. Ltr, CJCS to GEN Trettner, 2 Feb 66, ~~S~~, CJCS 091 Germany.

3. Ltr, GEN Trettner to CJCS, 13 May 66, JCS 2124/370, ~~TS~~, JMF 9165 (13 May 66).

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aggression by conventional means; conduct a forward defense against major aggression, using nuclear weapons as necessary; and employ strategic forces when needed. The most credible deterrent, he claimed, was one that spanned the full spectrum of warfare. Nuclear weapons would be employed when necessary, but the strategic deterrent's unity must not be fragmented by premature, indecisive, demonstrative use. In fact, Wheeler doubted that a demonstrative use of a few nuclear weapons had "military merit." That would suggest to the enemy a lack of determination to use them in strength, and force him to choose between complete withdrawal and massive nuclear retaliation.⁴

~~(TS)~~ General Trettner agreed that "our two concepts coincide to 90 percent." He still worried, however, that NATO's conventional forces would be "very inferior" at the outbreak of war. And it was an "open question," he thought, whether the Soviets or the Americans would win the reinforcement race. Thus, if the Soviets thought that NATO would not employ nuclear weapons, they could "in all cases" count on success. Would it not be wise to show them, by early demonstrative use of tactical nuclear weapons, that their basic assumption was wrong?⁵

4. Ltr, CJCS to GEN Trettner, 31 May 66, ~~TS~~, CJCS 091 Germany.

5. Ltr, GEN Trettner to CJCS, 29 Jul 66, ~~TS~~, same file.

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~~(TS)~~ The International Military Staff (IMS), which acted as executive agent for the NATO Military Committee, took the next step. In February 1967, the IMS circulated drafts of a new strategic concept and an appreciation of the military situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged them generally acceptable, although they thought (1) that adequate warning before an attack was less likely than the IMS believed, and (2) that the risks incurred because of reduced allied efforts should be clearly set forth. Deputy Secretary Vance, however, criticized both IMS drafts for being much too pessimistic. The appreciation, he asserted: wrongly forecast a narrowing gap in US versus Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities; over-estimated enemy combat readiness; and did not allow for NATO mobilization and reinforcement capabilities. Moreover, Mr. Vance rejected the JCS reservations about warning time, claiming that "any attack on NATO is likely to be preceded by political warning measures in weeks." And, he continued, the IMS appreciation contradicted Administration views by (1) indicating that conventional resistance for more than 2-6 days was impossible and (2) assuming that the initiation of tactical nuclear warfare would improve NATO's position. The strategy paper, similarly, was marred by an excessive emphasis on nuclear response.⁶

6. USM-52-67 to CJCS, 17 Feb 67, JCS 2450/367, U; USM-50-67 to CJCS, 17 Feb 67, JCS 2450/368, U; JCSM-128-67 to SecDef, 10 Mar 67, JCS 2450/368-1, ~~TS-GR-1~~; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Mar 67, JCS 2450/368-2, ~~S~~; JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

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~~(S)~~ General Wheeler differed with Mr. Vance over several points. Writing in mid-April, the Chairman expected that the strategic nuclear gap would narrow, and endorsed the IMS estimate that three-fourths of Soviet line divisions could undertake offensive operations immediately or after short preparation. Also, he rejected Secretary Vance's claim that increasing political tension was a meaningful indicator of "warning," on which military actions could be based.⁷

~~(NATO-S)~~ Soon afterward, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) met at Brussels.⁸ Here, on 9 May 1967, the Defense Ministers approved the following guidance to military authorities:

So long as the forces committed to NATO and the external forces supporting the Alliance are able to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will deliberately initiate either a general war or, provided that the risk of general war continues to be made clear to it, a limited war in the NATO area.

7. CM-2208-67 to DepSecDef, 12 Apr 67, JCS 2450/368-3, ~~S~~, JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

8. The DPC, to which the Military Committee was subordinate, stood in permanent session and normally comprised representatives of the Chiefs of Staff. Several times a year--and this was one such time--it met at either the Chiefs of Staff or the Ministerial level.

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Nevertheless, . . . military planning must take account of the risk of deliberate attack . . . ; the military weaknesses of the flanks make them particularly vulnerable. . . .

Although there can be no certainty that the Soviet Union or one of its Allies would not undertake a sudden onslaught, it is probable in the present political climate that a period of increasing political tension (possibly of weeks, if not months) would precede aggression. . . .

The basis of NATO's military planning must be to insure security through credible deterrence; secondly, should aggression occur, to preserve or restore the integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty area by employing such forces as may be necessary within the concept of forward defense.

In order to deter, and if necessary counter, aggression, the Alliance needs a full spectrum of military capabilities including:

a) The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance. These are adequate to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack and constitute the backbone of NATO's military capabilities.

b) The tactical nuclear forces available to the major NATO Commanders. These constitute an essential component of the deter-

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rent. Their primary purposes are to . . . counter [conventional] attacks if necessary, by confronting the enemy with the prospect of consequent escalation of the conflict; and to deter, and if necessary respond to the use of tactical nuclear weapons by posing the threat of escalation to all-out nuclear war.

c) The conventional forces of the Alliance . . . are a further essential component of the deterrent. They should be designed to deter and successfully counter to the greatest extent possible a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by confronting the aggressor with the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities on a scale that could involve a grave risk of escalation to nuclear war.
. . .

The tactical nuclear weapons available . . . are sufficient in quantity to meet the likely requirements

The present level of NATO conventional forces for the Central region . . . would appear in present circumstances to be acceptable within the strategic concept of flexibility now being discussed. . . . Certain imbalances, deficiencies, vulnerabilities, and maldeployments need to be corrected. . . .

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The overall strategic concept for NATO should be revised to allow NATO a greater flexibility and to provide for . . . direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to any type of aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack.⁹

~~(NATO-S)~~ In response to this guidance, the International Military Staff wrote and circulated a draft, MC 14/3, that defined NATO's "defense concept" as follows:

1. Maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent with a secure retaliatory capacity;
2. Sustain a forward defense capability, so that a potential aggressor would feel that he must contend with an effective and immediate response;
3. Identify the scale of any aggression as quickly as possible;
4. Prevent an aggressor from seizing and holding NATO territory, and counter limited aggression without necessarily resorting to nuclear warfare; if the aggressor persisted, confront him with such resistance that he must either withdraw or risk further escalation;
5. Meet major aggression with whatever conventional and nuclear power proved necessary.

9. DPC/D(67)23, 11 May 67, ~~NATO-S.~~

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Therefore, "The main deterrence to aggression short of full nuclear attack is the threat of escalation which would lead the Warsaw Pact to conclude that the risks involved are not commensurate with their objectives." NATO needed "a full spectrum of capabilities"--specifically, the strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional forces described in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of the Ministerial guidance. Thus the alliance must maintain a credible capability: first, "for direct defense to deter the lesser aggressions such as covert actions, incursions, infiltrations, local hostile actions, and limited aggression"; second, "for deliberate escalation to deter more ambitious aggression"; and third, "to conduct a general war response as the ultimate deterrent."¹⁰

(U) Among the allies, MC 14/3 found ready acceptance. In June 1967, the US representative on the Military Committee, Admiral Alfred G. Ward, gave his US superiors the glad news that a general consensus had been reached within the Alliance on a new strategic concept." Any attempts at radical revision, he warned, would preclude approval during 1967. On 1 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Mr. McNamara that MC 14/3 generally reflected US positions taken at the May DPC meeting. In their opinion, it accommodated allied views yet preserved "the primary US position of

¹⁰. MC 14/3 (Final), 16 Jan 68, ~~NATO-S~~.

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flexible response to meet any aggression, while keeping the level of conflict as low as possible." They also agreed with Admiral Ward about the inadvisability of seeking major changes. As General Wheeler stressed in a separate paper, "a raft of national comments" could prevent its adoption and thereby "slow the momentum NATO has been gathering since the low point of the French defection."¹¹

(U) On 18 August, Secretary McNamara authorized Admiral Ward to help finalize MC 14/3. Mr. McNamara believed, however, "that the IMS draft substantially changes the tone and intent of the Ministerial guidance and I want to make it clear that, to the extent this influences the force recommendations of the NATO Military Authorities, I shall take exception to them." Therefore, whenever there were variations between the Ministerial guidance and MC 14/3, he wanted the wording and interpretation of the guidance to be governing. (Evidently, Mr. McNamara felt that MC 14/3 placed undue emphasis upon nuclear escalation.) Admiral Ward was instructed accordingly.¹²

~~(S)~~ When the NATO Chiefs of Staff met on 16 September 1967, they not only approved MC 14/3 but also adopted McNamara's proviso that wording of the

¹¹. JCSM-377-67 to SecDef, 1 Jul 67, JCS 2450/420-1, U; CM-2486-67 to SecDef, 1 Jul 67, JCS 2450/420-1, U; JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

¹². Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Aug 67, U; SM-571-67 to US Rep to MC, 19 Aug 67, JCS 2450/420-1, U; same file.

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Ministerial guidance would be controlling. On 12 December, the DPC accepted MC 14/3 under the same conditions.¹³ Its wording was sufficiently ambiguous to allow diverging interpretations--otherwise, the Europeans would not have accepted it. Nonetheless, the seven-year American campaign to reshape NATO strategy had achieved some measure of success.

The Capacity for "Flexible Response" Dwindles . . .

~~(S)~~ A concept was abstract; force levels were concrete. Could Allied Command Europe acquire the forces needed to carry out "flexible response," as Secretary McNamara defined it? Ever since 1961, the US Government had been pressing its European allies to expand their conventional capabilities. The North Atlantic Council, in December 1961, had approved a 1966 objective of 107 2/3 active and reserve divisions, including 29 2/3 active divisions on the Central Front.¹⁴ But, by 1963, it was apparent that these goals would not be met. Accordingly, the DPC initiated a new force planning exercise. The Major NATO Commanders (MNCs)--SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCHAN--started preparing 1970 force goals. Since the French would appraise requirements only in the context of a general nuclear

13. Msg, USDEL, MC to JCS, 170757Z Sep 67, C, CJCS 092.2 NATO. MC 14/3 (Final), 16 Jan 68, ~~NATO S.~~

14. These figures are taken from Ann to JCSM-349-67 to SecDef, 19 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419-1, ~~S.~~ JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67).

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war, the MNCs proceeded within the parameters of MC 14/2.¹⁵

~~(TS)~~ In August 1964, the MNCs submitted two sets of 1970 goals: ALPHA, which they recommended; and BRAVO, which simply continued 1964 expenditure rates and which, they felt, constituted an "unacceptable" risk. For ALPHA, there would be 66 2/3 active and 23 1/2 reserve divisions; for BRAVO, 63 and 17 1/2.¹⁶

~~(TS)~~ When the Military Committee met, in December 1964, it did not choose between ALPHA and BRAVO. Instead, it ordered the MNCs to appraise their conventional capabilities and recommend priorities for improvement. This became known as the "Mountbatten Exercise," after Admiral of the Fleet Louis Mountbatten, Chief of the U.K. Defense Staff. The results were rather pessimistic. For example, SACEUR postulated that, after 72 hours' warning, 40 NATO divisions and 1,248 aircraft would be attacked by 83-88 Warsaw Pact divisions with about 3,800 tactical aircraft. The SACEUR thought that he could "handle" an air attack for 1-2 days and hold his main forward defense zones for 1-3 days.¹⁷

15. See The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1961-1964, Part III, Ch. XIII, ~~TS RD~~, pp. 128, 135, 140-141, 148-150.

16. "1966 NATO Defense Planning Survey and Country Defense Summaries," Jan 67, p. 9, ~~TS~~, JMF 806 (2 May 67) sec 1A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, p. 28, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec 1.

17. SACEUR's assumptions about warning times and opposing forces are given in Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec 1.

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~~(S)~~ But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 June 1965, advised Mr. McNamara that these conclusions overrated Warsaw Pact and underestimated NATO capabilities. SACEUR ignored, for example, the qualitative superiority of NATO aircraft and the availability of reinforcements from the United States. All in all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued, these appraisals "should not be used as a basis for revising NATO strategic concepts or for restructuring the major commanders' forces." But the MNCs' recommendations for quantitative and qualitative improvements did impress them as valid and worthy of US support.¹⁸

~~(S)~~ When the Defense Ministers met in Paris, on 31 May-1 June, they noted the progress made in studying force requirements, and directed the Council to continue these studies. Secretary McNamara warned them, though, that neither ALPHA nor BRAVO goals appeared attainable. So he advocated a "rolling" five-year force structure and financial plan, updated annually, that would "enable us to move up and down the scale of military power according to changes in the threat we face."¹⁹ Obviously, he was trying to pattern NATO planning after the system that he had imposed upon the Pentagon. Ultimately, as will be seen, the Secretary succeeded.

¹⁸. JCSM-454-65 to SecDef, 11 Jun 65, JCS 2450/32-1, ~~S~~, JMF 3050 (2 Jun 65).

¹⁹. Dept of State Bulletin, 21 Jun 65, p. 993. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Jun 65, JCS 2421/982-1, ~~S~~ ~~GP~~ 1, JMF 9050 (22 Mar 65) sec 1.

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~~(TS)~~ Within the Defense Department, on 11 September, Mr. McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum dealing with NATO's strategy and force posture. Mr. McNamara wanted, in Central Europe, a force approximately equalling the Warsaw Pact in combat potential. SACEUR had, in Central Europe, 26 active divisions.²⁰ US intelligence estimated that NATO would have 11-15 days' warning time before being struck by a 55-division attack. These 55 Warsaw Pact divisions, plus 15 more in reserve, had the fighting power of 35 US divisions. So, to stop them, 11 American and 24 allied divisions would be needed. There already were five US divisions in Europe. With 11 to 15 days' warning, four to five more could be moved from the United States. By 1971, faster means of trans-Atlantic reinforcement could change the requirements to 16 US and 19 allied divisions. Moreover, according to McNamara, NATO air forces probably could achieve "commanding" superiority over the battlefield and furnish considerable air support and interdiction. In sum, the Secretary saw no reason why NATO could not match the Warsaw Pact conventionally within current expenditures.

20. This figure is taken from Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Jan 65, JCS 2421/897-6, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (26 Oct 64) sec 4.

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~~(TS)~~ But how could the allies be persuaded that nonnuclear defense was feasible? Mr. McNamara was sure of one thing:

If our allies believe the conclusions of the Mountbatten Exercise, they will probably be more convinced than at present that a non-nuclear defense is totally infeasible. For this reason the U.S. should make known in appropriate NATO forums its rejection of the Exercise.

~~(TS)~~ What about nuclear weapons? SACEUR's arsenal included (b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 } 132 British V-bombers, (a)(1)(C) and about 1,000 tactical aircraft; (b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168

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b(3)

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a)(1)(C) The Soviets had 760 medium and intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers targeted against Western Europe, along with about 800 light and medium bombers. Additionally, they could use approximately 3,700 tactical nuclear weapons. 21

~~(TS)~~ In this DPM, Secretary McNamara stated that he opposed developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) for NATO, as the military wished, on grounds that strategic targets should be covered by "external" US and UK forces. As for the tactical nuclear stockpile, he favored

(b)(1)

21. Figures are taken from Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Jan 65, JCS 2421/897-6, ~~TS-GP-1~~, JMF 9050 (26 Oct 64) sec 4.

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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

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b(3)

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 September, disputed Mr. McNamara on many points. They were not sure whether "external" US and UK strategic forces would remain strong enough to render MRBMs redundant. More importantly, they challenged the Secretary's claim that "an equal ground combat capability with the Warsaw Pact will achieve the desired non-nuclear option." In their judgment, "force-matching" gave insufficient attention to air and naval requirements, and could not adequately assess critical factors that eluded quantification. Furthermore, to make force-matching fully reliable, NATO would need "an absolute knowledge of enemy objectives, intentions, tactics, and force capabilities." Much would also depend on US ability to

22. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec 1. NSAM 334 to SecDef et al., 1 Jun 65, JCS 2430/92-3, ~~TS RD~~, JMF 4614 (30 Mar 65). McNamara's reservations about tactical nuclear weapons are fully explained in The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1961-1964, Part III, ~~TS RD~~, Ch. XIII, pp. 145-147.

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move divisions to Europe. Additionally, Mr. McNamara appeared to ignore requirements beyond M+30.

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff also thought it unwise to reject the Mountbatten Exercise. In June, they recalled, allied military leaders had seemed willing to accept the results. Perhaps, then, US interests would be better served simply by "playing down" attention to the exercise. Late in October, McNamara circulated a revised DPM that showed no substantive changes but did cite, in a footnote, the JCS complaint against force-matching.²³

(U) Allied reactions to the Mountbatten Exercise gave no grounds for expecting much conventional improvement. The French insisted upon strict adherence to MC 14/2 strategy, in which context BRAVO forces "might be acceptable." The Germans believed that BRAVO forces, reinforced, could cope with middle and upper levels of aggression. But, as in past years, they strongly urged increasing SACEUR's nuclear capabilities. The British felt that forces should be programmed to deal with either local incidents or general war--"nothing in between."²⁴

23. JCSM-713-65 to SecDef, 24 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77-1, ~~S~~ JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Oct 65, JCS 2450/77-6, ~~S-CP-1~~, same file, sec 2.

24. USM-246-65 to CJCS, 17 Sep 65, JCS 2450/80, U, JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65).

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~~(S)~~ The British, facing massive balance-of-payments deficits, said that they had to reduce military expenditures. But General Wheeler had no patience with their argument that increased defense spending would hurt economic growth. As he wrote to a US official at NATO headquarters,

The British government thesis reminds me of the fox who lost his tail . . . [and] thereupon tried to persuade all other foxes that lack of a tail was not only more chic but actually gave an operational advantage to foxes who lacked that appendage. . . . Unfortunately, I am afraid that . . . the British line will prove attractive to the political leaders of other nations. There are comparisons that could be drawn between foxes and humans, but they would be odious!

The Chairman repeatedly had told allied leaders that he "considered the core of the matter to be that the European nations were not scared enough. In other words, what is lacking is not money but political will."²⁵

~~(S)~~ Early in September, Assistant Secretary McNaughton asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose NATO force goals for 1970. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Johnson excepted, recommended accepting BRAVO goals (except for the northern and southern flanks,

²⁵. Ltr, CJCS to DEFREPNAME, 7 Jun 65, CJCS, C, 092.2 NATO.

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where qualitative improvements and quantitative increases were needed). Risks would be greater than with ALPHA, but goals would be more realistic. General Johnson dissented, saying that it seemed illogical "to establish new force levels within the context of a strategic concept (MC 14/2) that all member nations, except [France], have agreed to revise" Why not simply extend existing goals for a year, by which time President de Gaulle's intentions would be clearer? By a separate memorandum, General Wheeler sent the Secretary some additional advice. Attaining BRAVO goals, he reasoned, would be a significant gain. The alliance would not look upon BRAVO as a reaffirmation of MC 14/2 but as encouraging evidence of US willingness "to work constructively within the alliance rather than to isolate itself in inflexible positions" NATO was already apprehensive about the French secession. Therefore, "the imperative . . . today is to get underway with measures to restore life and vitality to the Alliance; to do otherwise may well destroy it."²⁶

~~(S)~~ On 13 October, Secretary McNamara did endorse BRAVO goals, but added several provisos. First, the Administration saw no military requirement for land-based MRBMs. Second, US approval of NATO force goals

²⁶. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Sep 65, JCS 2450/75, U; JCSM-752-65 to SecDef, 15 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-1, ~~S~~; CM-911-65 to SecDef, 15 Oct 65, ~~S~~; JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65).

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should not be construed as a commitment to supply the allies with additional nuclear support. Third, US acceptance of BRAVO goals in December 1965 was conditional (1) upon allied presentation, in May 1966, of detailed plans for attaining BRAVO objectives and (2) upon NATO's agreeing to an annual appraisal of five-year goals. Fourth, forces on the flanks need not be "significantly" above BRAVO levels.²⁷

(U) The North Atlantic Council met Mr. McNamara's wishes. In December 1965, it:

1) accepted 1970 BRAVO goals as a basis for further planning and study, subject to examination of nations' ability to implement them;

2) requested submission of country programs through 1970;

3) agreed that, in mid-1966, nations would address differences between BRAVO forces and national programs;

4) instituted an annual review of five-year plans.²⁸

~~(C)~~ Troops, of course, could fight only as long as their stockpiles lasted. SACEUR proposed that NATO's objective of stocking enough supplies for 90 days be superseded by one requiring enough supplies to fight (1) until resupply was reestablished and (2) for at

27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-3, U; SM-1002-65 to US Rep to MC/SGN, 21 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-3, S: JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65).

28. JCS 2450/143-8, 4 May 66, U, JMF 9050 (7 Jun 66) sec 2.

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least 30 days in any case. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred; the Secretary of Defense did not. The allies, he countered, would consider stockage until resupply began an impossible objective and would look upon "30 days in any case" as an upper rather than a lower limit. He favored a goal of 45 days, to be achieved over five years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to 45 days as an "intermediate" objective, "reasonable for the near term." But, after that goal had been achieved, each nation should acquire enough additional stocks to fight until resupply began. Mr. McNamara, however, dismissed this definition too as unrealistic. The final US position, presented to the Military Committee in January 1967, was that

each nation should achieve, as a matter of first priority, an intermediate objective of providing a capability to support, as a minimum, 45 days of combat operations. When this interim objective has been essentially achieved, a long-term objective should be established to achieve higher stock levels as they are clearly desirable.²⁹

29. JCSM-860-65 to SecDef, 7 Dec 65, JCS 2450/95-2, C; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Jul 66, JCS 2450/95-3, C; JCSM-521-66 to SecDef, 18 Aug 66, JCS 2450/95-4, C; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 66, JCS 2450/95-5, C; JCSM-712-66 to SecDef, 14 Nov 66, JCS 2450/95-6, C; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Dec 66, JCS 2450/95-7, U; (U) SM-63-67 to US Rep to MC, 23 Jan 67, JCS 2450/95-8, U; JMF 9050 (1 Oct 65).

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~~(TS)~~ Meanwhile, at Mr. McNamara's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated 1971 NATO goals that would be attainable and consistent with country plans. In May 1966, they sent the Secretary two alternatives. The first called for 85 divisions, active and reserve, and for 6,338 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized such a force as militarily desirable, but probably unattainable. With it, they foresaw "a good probability" of holding east of the Weser-Lach, along a line running from Bremen and Hannover through Augsburg. Italy could be defended, too, but Greece, Turkey, and northern Norway would be lost.

~~(TS)~~ The second alternative included 76 divisions and 5,691 aircraft. This force, which they termed "NAMILPO-71," stayed within expected manpower and budget levels, and fell somewhat below BRAVO objectives. In northern Europe, NAMILPO-71 forces could neither deter an attack nor defend territory. In the Center, with 15 days' warning for reinforcement, there was "a reasonable chance of stabilizing the situation behind the Weser-Lach." In the South, Italy could be defended for a considerable time; Greece and Turkey, however, would require "rapid external reinforcement."

~~(TS)~~ Although achieving NAMILPO-71 goals would reduce NATO's weakness in the North German plain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered additional improvements necessary and feasible. These included: increasing the number of active divisions and tactical

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aircraft; raising divisional manning and readiness levels, and improving their support echelons; augmenting air defenses; and strengthening tactical nuclear capabilities in northern Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to use NAMILPO-71 levels as a basis for commenting on the adequacy of 1970 country programs, and urged Secretary McNamara to do the same.³⁰

~~(S)~~ Concurrently, the allies were reviewing the validity of current estimates measuring NATO's air strength against that of the Warsaw Pact. Secretary McNamara agreed to give the Germans a comparison that had DIA and JCS support.³¹

~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June 1966, sent Mr. McNamara a comparison of tactical air inventories. NATO, they said, would be at a disadvantage during the early days of a conflict:

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
M+12 hours	4,662	4,750
M+6 days	4,983	5,727
M+30 days	6,317	5,905

^{30.} Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec 1. JCSM-297-66 to SecDef, 5 May 66, JCS 2450/204-1, ~~S~~, JMF 9050/3001 (19 Apr 66) sec 1. Figures are taken from "NATO Military Posture Study: Part I, Basic Report," Apr 66, ~~S~~, same file, sec 1A, and Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Oct 65, JCS 2450/77-3, ~~S~~, same file, sec 2.

^{31.} CM-1432-66 to DJS, 14 May 66, JCS 2450/220, ~~S~~, JMF 2200 (14 May 66) sec 1.

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Systems Analysis, however, contended that NATO's resources "greatly" exceeded those of the Warsaw Pact, in both quantity and quality. Its estimate of aircraft totals in Central Europe, after the arrival of reinforcements, read as follows:

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
1966	4,008	4,050
1971	3,637	3,550

Admittedly, for a few days at the outset, Allied Command Europe might be outnumbered by as much as 1,000 aircraft. But, Systems Analysis contended, that was not as bad as it seemed. Most Pact aircraft were designed as air defense interceptors, and so could not attack NATO ground forces. Moreover, because of their generally superior quality, US reinforcing aircraft were "worth about double" their Soviet counterparts. They had greater range, and carried two to three times more payload; a higher proportion were either supersonic or highly supersonic.³²

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff spotted many apparent errors in Systems Analysis' position. Their main points may be briefly summarized. First, contrary to what Systems Analysis said, many Pact aircraft could fly ground support as well as air defense missions.

32. JCSM-376-66 to SecDef, 4 Jun 66, JCS 2450/220-1, ~~TS CP 1~~, "Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Power," Att to Memo, Col. Moody to CJCS, 11 Jun 66, JCS 2450/220-2, ~~S CP 1~~; JMF 2200 (14 May 66) sec 1.

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Second, adding Soviet medium bombers to the equation would further reduce NATO's payload-carrying advantage. Third, the assumption by Systems Analysis that NATO's higher operating cost resulted in greater capability seemed questionable. NATO aircraft, for instance, needed extra range and payload capability to reach enemy targets; the Soviets used theater missiles and medium bombers for this task. Hence equally capable Pact planes, requiring less range and payload capacity, could be produced more cheaply. Fourth, the qualitative advantages that Systems Analysis so stressed were difficult to measure. NATO's standard of 23 flying hours per month did exceed that of the Warsaw Pact--yet many allied pilots averaged only 13 hours.³³

~~(S)~~ Systems Analysis and Joint Staff officers devoted three weeks to bridging their differences. Ultimately, on 14 July 1966, Assistant Secretary Enthoven and the Director, J-5, signed an agreed estimate about what tactical air strengths in 1968 should be:

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
European Deployments through M+30	5,847	5,475
Reserves and Training Aircraft	2,773	1,287
Other US Aircraft	1,739	
Worldwide Total	10,359	7,762

³³. JCSM-414-66 to SecDef, 21 Jun 66, JCS 2450/220-3, U, JMF 2200 (14 May 66) sec 1.

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Thus, worldwide, NATO would outnumber the Warsaw Pact by about 50 percent. But, if there was no time for mobilization and deployment, NATO would be outnumbered by perhaps 20 percent, and many multi-purpose aircraft would have to be committed to a counter-air battle. Qualitatively, the higher cost of NATO aircraft "appears to result" in equivalent advantages in effectiveness. Similarly, greater training of NATO pilots produced a superiority equal to or larger than its cost. Mr. McNamara forwarded these findings to Defense Minister Kai-Uwe Von Hassel. In doing so, however, he noted that "NATO's potential advantage is in danger of being wasted because of deficiencies in logistics, air base defense, and training These can be remedied for a relatively small cost."³⁴

34. Memo of Understanding, "Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Power," 14 Jul 66, JCS 2450/220-4, ~~S~~: Ltr, SecDef to Def Min Von Hassel, 19 Jul 66, JCS 2450/220-5, U; JMF 2200 (14 May 66) sec 2. In How Much is Enough?, pp. 142-147, Enthoven and Smith claim a complete victory for OSD over JCS. For a somewhat similar 1962 JCS-OSD debate, see Vol. VIII, Ch. V, pp. 264-267. In 1967, after Israel's spectacular victory in the Six-Day War, Air Force officers could not resist the temptation of applying Systems Analysis methodology and caustically concluding that "the Israeli Air Force, because of its extremely limited damage-causing capability, could not influence the outcome of the land battle with the Arab States." Their point, of course, was that "surprise, well-defined objectives, air-ground cooperation, strategy and tactics, precise plans, and imaginative leadership greatly affect the effectiveness of tactical air." Memo, VCSAF to SAF-OS, 12 Jun 67, U, CJCS 091 Israel.

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~~(TS)~~ Early in 1966, countries submitted their force plans. In 1966, there would be 64 2/3 active divisions and 2,831 strike, reconnaissance and air defense aircraft; in 1970, 68 2/3 divisions and about 2,570 planes.³⁵ SACLANT and CINCHAN compared these plans to their own BRAVO goals, and found few significant differences. SACEUR, however, said that the countries' force plans would not correct what he saw as critical shortcomings in his command. On 9 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that the United States should encourage allies to correct deficiencies highlighted by the MNCs, and asked him to approve appropriate guidance for Admiral Ward, the US Representative on the Military Committee. Mr. McNamara amended the guidance given Admiral Ward so as to rebut SACEUR's statement that ACE could "handle" enemy forces for only 2-6 days. Since 30 percent of the attackers would be freshly mobilized and hence not completely combat-ready, McNamara believed that a longer defense was possible.³⁶

~~(S)~~ In June 1966, General Wheeler apprised the NATO Chiefs of Staff about his concern over allied

³⁵. "1966 NATO Defense Planning Survey and Country Defense Summaries," Jan 67, ~~TS~~, JMF 806 (2 May 67) sec 1A.

³⁶. USM-155-66 to CJCS, 3 Jun 66, JCS 2450/232, U; Encl B to JCS 2450/232-1, 7 Jun 66, ~~S~~; JCSM-384-66 to SecDef, 9 Jun 66, JCS 2450/232-1, ~~S~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Jun 66, JCS 2450/232-2, ~~S~~; Msg, JCS 4183 to USRO Paris, 11 Jun 66, ~~S~~; JMF 9050 (3 Jun 66).

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reluctance "to maintain defense spending at levels which are even barely adequate."³⁷ When the Defense Ministers met in July, Secretary McNamara said bluntly that, given the level of country programs, BRAVO goals appeared "quite unrealistic" and unattainable. Mr. McNamara then condemned the long-standing separation of military and political planning. Because there was no integrated threat evaluation, he contended, BRAVO goals were based upon exaggerated estimates of enemy strength and focused upon the extreme rather than the most likely danger. Moreover, the country programs themselves required substantial changes to eliminate weaknesses and correct inequities in contributions. On the ground, for example, "either we are too ready, or our allies . . . are not ready enough." The German and Italian Defense Ministers agreed that increased efforts were in order, but the British Minister argued that current plans were adequate for deterrence, as distinct from "battles and campaigns." Finally, the Ministers adopted 1970 country programs (except for Greece and Turkey, which depended on allied aid) as a minimum

37. General Wheeler thought that a force of 15-18 active divisions in Central Europe would be adequate, provided it could expand to about 25 divisions in around two weeks' time. "Memo of Conv between GEN Wheeler and Dr. Tim Stanley of USRO, 26 Jan 67," ~~S~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

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plan. These would be subject to review under the new "rolling" five-year procedures.³⁸

~~(TS)~~ By this time, though, the US Government was in no position to lecture allies about their inadequate efforts. Vietnam requirements began depleting the Army's CONUS reserve. In 1965, the US response to NATO's annual Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) had listed two armored divisions, one infantry division, and one brigade as an M-Day strategic reserve, earmarked for NATO. In March 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made an important revision to the DPQ. Since the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions had been drained of personnel to support Vietnam deployments, they changed the M-Day reserve to a weaker mix of one mechanized, one infantry, and one airborne division.³⁹

38. JCS 2450/232-3, 20 Jun 66, ~~S-CP 1~~, JMF 9050 (3 Jun 66). "Remarks by Secretary McNamara, Defense Ministerial Meeting, Paris, France, 25 Jul 1966," JCS 2450/274, ~~TS-CP 1~~, JMF 9050 (21 Jun 66). JCS 2450/262, 1 Aug 66, U, JMF 9050 (12 Jul 66) IR 6501. Encl B to JCS 2450/419-1, 14 Jun 67, ~~S~~, JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67). Subsequently, the Joint Staff reviewed allied defense efforts and found that sweeping generalizations were impossible. Improvements ranged from marginal (Greece and Turkey) to very substantial (Germany, Italy, and Norway). DJSM-340-67 to CJCS, 17 Mar 67, ~~C~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO (misfiled under Mar-Jul 68 section).

39. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Apr 65, JCS 2450/3, U; JCSM-420-65 to SecDef, 29 May 65, JCS 2450/3-1, ~~TS-CP 1~~, JMF 9150 (15 Apr 65) sec 1. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Feb 66, JCS 2450/170, U; JCSM-159-66 to SecDef, 12 Mar 66, JCS 2450/170-4, ~~TS-CP 1~~, JMF 9050 (23 Feb 66) sec 1.

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~~(TS)~~ On 1 August 1966, Secretary McNamara circulated his DPM treating NATO's strategy and force posture. He concentrated upon four conventional contingencies: an accidental small-scale conflict; a surprise assault by the Warsaw Pact with limited objectives; political-military aggression preceded by tension and mobilization; and a full-scale surprise attack. Purely in terms of manpower available, NATO had more than enough men under arms to cope with any of these contingencies except the last, which struck him as the least likely. Assuming simultaneous mobilizations, the Pact would lead at M+30, but NATO would catch up by M+90. In the air, Mr. McNamara noted that the System Analysis-Joint Staff study of 14 July had awarded NATO an "inherently large advantage."⁴⁰ The Pact might be able to acquire a 1,000-plane edge at the outset, but NATO would pull slightly ahead by M+30 and have a 50 percent lead by M+90. Qualitatively, NATO's advantage was wide. Allied naval forces actually seemed excessive and could profitably be pruned. But, he continued, most of the allies' active ground units lacked adequate equipment and support; reserves, also, were poorly trained and equipped. Consequently, the allies should improve the quality of their active forces (by cutting back on quantity, if necessary) as well as their mobilization capabilities. Force planning thus would be

⁴⁰. See pp. 376-377.

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refocused toward "less extreme and much more probable contingencies."

~~(TS)~~ Secretary McNamara contemplated reorganizing US ground forces along more austere lines. Since allied armies could not sustain large-scale combat for even 45 days, he spoke of withdrawing some support forces and limiting combat stocks in Europe to 60-day levels. And, because Mr. McNamara saw little need for large-scale reinforcements after M+60, he confined CONUS reinforcements to three rather than six divisions. Committing even these, he asserted, would "make sense" only if the allies substantially improved their own capabilities. (Since Vietnam deployments were depleting the CONUS strategic reserve, the Secretary may also have been making a virtue of necessity). Finally, McNamara suggested dual-basing about 10-15 of the 35 USAF tactical squadrons currently in Europe. Already, he argued, there were enough aircraft in Europe to maintain air superiority and accomplish a substantial amount of interdiction.⁴¹

~~(TS)~~ In their 1 September critique, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that, while the 1965 DPM had hypothesized that NATO could resist a major conventional assault by nonnuclear means, the 1966 DPM argued that US conventional strength should be cut unless the allies acted to create a credible capa-

⁴¹. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Aug 66, JCS 2453/118, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec 1.

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bility. That implied an earlier resort to nuclear weapons, yet the DPM did not discuss how tactical nuclear warfare would affect conventional requirements. But this was only the first of their objections. Of "paramount importance," for instance, was the DPM's failure to provide for concluding a conflict successfully. They also contended that Mr. McNamara had understated the enemy threat by: concentrating on Soviet intentions rather than capabilities; assuming that adequate warning time would precede an attack; slighting the weaknesses on NATO's flanks; and treating inadequately the implications of US withdrawals. Since US strength in Europe was the essence of NATO's military viability, continued reductions could transform it into a mere facade. Neither the superiority of NATO equipment nor improved strategic airlift could offset the great risks incurred by major withdrawals from Germany. They also thought that the US stockpiling objective should stay at 90 days, partly as an incentive for the allies to reach 45. In sum, then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected Secretary McNamara's main arguments. How large a military investment was the United States prepared to make in Europe? That struck them as the "fundamental issue." All the allies should join in reexamining NATO's objectives and the resources that each member could contribute toward their accomplishment.⁴²

⁴². JCSM-560-66 to SecDef, 1 Sep 66, JCS 2458/118-2, ~~TS-GP I~~, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec 1.

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~~(S)~~ Mr. McNamara modified his final memorandum in a number of ways. He spoke of possible US withdrawals only in general terms, and noted that effective warning time would be reduced if NATO failed to react promptly. Additionally, his assessment of NATO's conventional capability became somewhat less sanguine:

Except in Northern Norway, present forces are more than adequate to deal with "small unexpected conflicts," even those which might involve as many as 20-25 Pact divisions in the Central Region If the Pact decided to expand the scale of conflict beyond this point, however, NATO's prospects would not be so favorable. As for the "crisis/mobilization" type of contingency, if NATO had 60 days or more to mobilize and if all members use this time effectively, the resulting force would, I believe, at least deny any overwhelming Pact superiority and might reasonably be expected to mount a successful forward non-nuclear defense.

In the case of the "surprise non-nuclear attack" (i.e., 20-36 Pact divisions attacking in the Central Region without warning), NATO would have at worst something approaching rough equality in manpower, even without France, but qualitative weaknesses in Allied forces and maldeployments would lessen our prospects for successful forward defense. One cannot say with any confidence how such a conflict would develop, given today's NATO

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forces. It should be noted, however, that under reasonable (but by no means provable) assumptions present forces might permit stabilization of the battle line at some point East of the Rhine without NATO's initiating the use of nuclear weapons.⁴³

~~(TS SP)~~ The Secretary also circulated a DPM dealing with theater nuclear forces, in which he stated that the Soviets were "approaching essential parity with the U.S." Neither side, he believed, could acquire an advantage great enough to upset this equilibrium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had wanted ~~(b)(1)~~ weapons over the next several years; the Secretary disapproved any increase.⁴⁴

~~(TS SP)~~ In their reclama, dated 4 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked that they were "not reassured" by his assertion that neither side could upset the existing parity. A controlled, selective response required more than merely an exchange of equivalent megatonnage; there had to be a balanced stockpile with a wide variety of warheads and delivery systems. Moreover, they disputed Mr. McNamara's linkage of "parity" with "equality." Since the US stockpile of ~~(b)(1)~~ NATO would enjoy great discrimination and flexibility. The Joint

43. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Sep 66, JCS 2458/118-5, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec 3.

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Jul 66, JCS 2458/104, ~~TS-RD GP 1~~, JMF 7130 (2 Jul 66) sec 1.

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Chiefs of Staff insisted, therefore, that increases were essential. The major difference involved tactical bomb requirements (b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC (Mr. McNamara justified his lower position by citing the advent of Pershing missiles, the strength of external strategic forces, and the vulnerability of forward-based attack aircraft. So his final recommendation, in January 1967, made no concessions and simply footnoted JCS criticisms.⁴⁵

(S) During the next budget cycle, on 20 May 1967, Secretary McNamara circulated a DPM that appraised conventional capabilities in the same way as had the previous year's DPM.⁴⁶ And the JCS critique, dated 2 June, was just about as harsh. Fundamentally, they denied that a state of mutual deterrence existed at the conventional level. Recent Soviet restraint, they reasoned, flowed from a realization that the atmosphere of detente was "contributing much toward the dissolution of NATO." As the Soviets neared parity in strategic weapons, they might become increasingly confident about their ability to launch nonnuclear actions. Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that NATO's capabilities had been exaggerated and the Warsaw Pact's minimized. They challenged Mr. McNamara's

45. JCSM-505-66 to SecDef, 4 Aug 66, JCS 2458/104-1, ~~TS RD GP 1~~, JMF 7130 (2 Jul 66) sec 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 31 Aug 66, JCS 2458/104-5, ~~TS RD GP 1~~; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Jan 67, JCS 2458/104-6, ~~TS RD GP 1~~, same file, sec 3.

46. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 May 67, JCS 2458/237, JMF 560 (10 May 67) sec 1.

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assumptions that extended political warning would precede an attack, that both sides would begin mobilizing simultaneously, that US movement factors were applicable to Soviet reinforcements, that what they called "simplified and static" comparisons of capabilities could be considered valid, and that NATO possessed a major advantage in tactical air power. They cited the US intelligence community's feeling that the Soviets could commence a surprise attack with 35 divisions, not "some part" of 20 as the Secretary claimed. Also, they voiced doubt about NATO's alleged training advantage, since Soviet conscripts served longer than their western counterparts. In the air, they claimed, McNamara had underestimated the enemy's numbers and greatly underrated his capabilities. "To superimpose US criteria on Pact forces will produce differences," they cautioned, "but not necessarily deficiencies." Finally, as they saw it, the DPM set forth a combination of concepts but failed to unite them in a coherent strategy. If deterrence failed, for example, how was a war to be fought and won? For all these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the DPM. The Secretary, however, found no more merit in their arguments than they had in his. The final paper, issued in November 1967, contained only trivial changes; JCS dissents were summarily footnoted.⁴⁷

⁴⁷. JCSM-313-67 to SecDef, 2 Jun 67, JCS 2458/237-1, ~~S-GP-1~~, JMF 560 (10 May 67) sec 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Nov 67, JCS 2458/237-8, ~~S-GP-1~~, same file, sec 3.


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~~(TS RD)~~ In his DPM on theater nuclear forces, dated 29 June, Mr. McNamara characterized the current stockpile as "more than adequate":

The size and design of our theater nuclear forces should fit their limited role. We should not try to provide forces for a long tactical nuclear war nor should we set aside special theater nuclear forces for a general war. Their contribution in general war is too small compared to that of our strategic forces to be considered anything more than a bonus.⁴⁸

~~(TS RD)~~ Of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. Being able to conduct a sustained operation, they claimed, was just as important as being able to meet an initial attack. Quick termination of the conflict might hinge upon an ability to threaten further losses, rather than upon the losses already suffered. Moreover, the "damping down" phase could well be characterized by either protracted exchanges at a lower delivery rate or sporadic bursts of intense delivery. Therefore,

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)



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48. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Jun 67, JCS 2458/257,
~~TS RD GP 1, JMF 560 (29 Jun 67) sec 1.~~

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(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

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Accordingly, the programmed tactical nuclear capability must provide selective options of discriminate and flexible response . . . and not be limited by a philosophy that theater nuclear wars will be short. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with the DPM view that our theater nuclear stockpile is "more than adequate"

As usual, the Secretary stood unswayed by JCS arguments.⁴⁹

(U) Meantime, on 9 May 1967, the NATO Defense Planning Committee asked for 1968-1972 force proposals. The MNCs' proposals, which essentially extended 1970 country plans through 1972, fell below BRAVO goals:

	1970 <u>BRAVO Goals</u>	1970 <u>Country Plans</u>	1972 <u>MNCs' Proposals</u>
Active Divisions	63	60	60 1/3
Strike, Reconnaissance, and Air Defense Aircraft	3,232	2,606	2,676

49. ~~(TS-RD)~~ JCSM-421-67 to SecDef, pp. 2-3 of Appendix, 26 Jul 67, JCS 2458/257-2, ~~TS-RD-GP 1~~, JMF 560 (29 Jun 67) sec 1. "Record of Decision" Memo, SecDef to Pres, 11 Jan 68. JCS 2458/257-7. ~~TS-RD-GP 1~~ same file, sec 2.

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

For a subsequent JCS protest, see JCSM-245-68 to SecDef, 19 Apr 68, JCS 2458/376-1, ~~S~~, JMF 374 (22 Mar 68).

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SACEUR said that his own proposals, although inadequate, would effect as much improvement as possible within the limits set by the May Ministerial guidance (See pages 356-359).⁵⁰

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July, advised Secretary McNamara that the MNCs' 1968-1972 proposals carried varying degrees of risk. In a surprise attack without prior mobilization, enemy forces would total 35-45 divisions and NATO "could not provide high confidence of a successful forward defense without improvements in quality and readiness . . . or the early use of tactical nuclear weapons." If the Warsaw Pact mobilized beforehand, the 80 enemy divisions that would then be at hand "could penetrate NATO forces before sufficient NATO reinforcements were available, unless NATO initiated the use of nuclear weapons."

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended merely "noting" the MNCs' risk assessments. Secretary McNamara refused. He instructed Admiral Ward, instead, to press the view that MNCs' appraisals were "overly pessimistic" in light of (1) the likelihood of political warning prior to major aggression, and (2) a proper comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities. He also wanted the Military Committee to acknowledge a need for dual-capable aircraft, improved mobilization

⁵⁰. USM-175-67 to CJCS, 8 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419, U, JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67).

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and reserve systems, and "realistic" flank requirements.⁵¹

~~(C)~~ In December 1967, NATO Defense Ministers "reluctantly" adopted the MNCs' 1968-1972 proposals, on the understanding that they would be revised to conform to the May guidance and the forthcoming 1969-1973 force plans. At this meeting, also, Mr. McNamara spoke to his NATO colleagues for the last time. Concentrating upon the well-worn theme that a good nonnuclear option was "clearly" within reach, he recommended a return to "the tested European tradition" of maintaining (1) an active force adequate to deal with surprise attack and (2) a mobilization base capable of keeping pace with the enemy's build-up. In Central Europe, he claimed, the 11-14 reserve divisions required by M+90 would cost the equivalent of only 2-3 active divisions. The Secretary also stressed that US strategic mobility was steadily improving. In 1972, even if seven American divisions were still in Southeast Asia, the United States would be able to send 16 divisions to Europe by M+120.⁵²

51. JCSM-349-67 to SecDef, 19 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419-1, ~~S~~ Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 30 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419-2, U; SM-468-67 to US Rep to MC, 1 Jul 67, JCS 2450/419-5, U; JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67).

52. Encl 3 to Bfg Book, "NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 10 May 1968," ~~S~~ JMF 806 (15 May 68) sec 1A. "Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to Defense Planning Committee of NATO, Brussels, December 12, 1967," JCS 2450/507, U, JMF 806/372 (19 Dec 67) sec 1.

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~~(C)~~ Pursuant to the Defense Ministers' instructions, attention now focused upon force planning for 1969-1973. The MNCs' proposals, which constituted the first step, are summarized below:

	<u>1968 Forces</u>	<u>1973 Proposals</u>
Active Divisions	58	61 1/3
Strike, Reconnaissance, and Air Defense Aircraft	2,566	2,641 ⁵³

SACEUR intended to give "flexible response" greater substance by shifting

(b)(1)

Nonetheless, in January 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that the MNCs' proposals would fail to provide "the full range of options" envisaged in the May 1967 Ministerial guidance and in MC 14/3. NATO could furnish more forces, but "financial and political constraints . . . in Europe as well as in North America" precluded greater effort. Accordingly, they recommended giving Admiral Ward the following guidance:

1) 1969-1973 proposals were more responsive to the Ministerial guidance than those for 1968-1972.

2) More emphasis should be placed upon improving mobilization capability and aircraft survivability.

⁵³ Encl 5 of Bfg Book, "NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 10 May 1968," U, JMF 806 (15 May 68) sec 1A.

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3) Since "stringent cost constraints" would continue, recommendations should be readied for achieving force improvements (e.g., dual capability of tactical aircraft) through "trade-offs."⁵⁴

~~(S)~~ Deputy Secretary Nitze made two major changes. First, Admiral Ward should say that MNCs had exaggerated Pact capabilities by neglecting the qualitative superiority of NATO aircraft, the larger size of NATO divisions, and growing US strategic mobility. Second, the endorsement of dual-capable aircraft should not be blunted by mention of high cost and possible "trade-offs." This amended guidance was forwarded to Admiral Ward on 14 February 1968.⁵⁵

~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the allies could be prodded into greater efforts by being told that the enemy's conventional capabilities were less than previously estimated. Complacency, rather than determination, might result. As General Wheeler had written three years before, he "considered the core of the matter to be that the European nations were not scared enough."⁵⁶ So, at Wheeler's suggestion, Admiral Ward advised the Military Committee "that there

54. USM-355-67 to DJS, 16 Nov 67, JCS 2450/490, ~~S~~; JCSM-18-68 to SecDef, 13 Jan 68, JCS 2450/490-1, ~~S~~; JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839.

55. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 9 Feb 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2450/490-1, 14 Feb 68, U; SM-98-68 to US Rep to MC, 14 Feb 68, JCS 2450/490-1, ~~S~~; JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839.

56. See p. 369.

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is a high degree of skepticism both in the civilian elements of DOD and the JCS that the detente is anything more than a facade." Consequently, "even though the Soviet military strengths may not be as strong as once thought," NATO still needed powerful forces.⁵⁷

~~(S)~~ When the DPC met in May 1968, Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford took up many of Mr. McNamara's cudgels. He expressed disappointment that, since December, little had been done to improve mobilization capabilities. (The 1973 proposals, for instance, listed only 3 1/3 reserve divisions for the Central Front). Mr. Clifford also stressed that pressure from American public opinion made more equitable burden-sharing essential. He doubted, in fact, whether the United States would maintain "indefinitely" the forces currently committed to Europe. Subsequently, several Ministers disputed the US claim that Soviet divisions stationed in the USSR might possess "substantially less equipment" than previously estimated; further study was agreed upon. Tentatively, the Ministers adopted the MNCs' 1969-1973 force goals (61 1/3 active divisions and 2,641 aircraft for FY 1973). The British earmarked for NATO a 30,000-

⁵⁷. USM-93-68 to CJCS, 27 Feb 68, JCS 2450/540, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839. Memo, CJCS to ASD(SA), 12 Mar 68, ~~S~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

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man task force, organized out of units that were being brought home from the Middle and Far East.⁵⁸

~~(S)~~ One last, rather ironic, point must be made. Just as MC 14/3 finally won adoption, US ability to implement "flexible response" grew increasingly doubtful. During the summer of 1967, a US response to NATO's Defense Planning Review Questionnaire was being prepared. Secretary McNamara told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to list one mechanized and two armored divisions as being in the NATO-committed reserve. If these units could not be made available by M+30--and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that they could not--1 1/3 airborne divisions would be substituted for them. Then, in January 1968, came the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the seizure of the Pueblo. As Chapter IV has shown, the CONUS reserve virtually disappeared. In July 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that the NATO-committed reserve consisted of only two airborne brigades available by M+30 and one airborne, one mechanized, and two infantry brigades by M+60.⁵⁹ Back

58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 May 68, JCS 2450/581, U; "Talking Points, SHAPEX-NATO Meetings, 5-10 May 68," 13 May 68, ~~S~~: JMF 806 (15 May 68). Encl 30 to Bfg Book, "NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 10 May 1968," ~~C~~, same file, sec 1A. NY Times, 11 May 68, p. 12.

59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 67, JCS 2450/459, U; JCSM-522-67 to SecDef, 23 Sep 67, JCS 2450/459-1, ~~S~~: JMF 806 (31 Aug 67) sec 1. JCSM-443-68 to SecDef, 12 Jul 68, JCS 2450/483-1, ~~S~~: JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec 1.

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in 1961, before the drive toward "flexible response" even began, that reserve had been much stronger--one infantry and two airborne divisions available on M-Day.

~~(TS)~~ Inevitably, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to do some rethinking about regional strategy. JSCP-68, approved in December 1966 and applicable from 1 July 1967 until 30 June 1968, retained the concept of a forward defense, despite reduced US reinforcement capability and forthcoming American withdrawals from West Germany. Nonetheless, JSCP-68 stated that "these realities, combined with the ambiguous position of France within NATO, increase the possibility that early employment of nuclear weapons would be necessary to maintain a successful forward defense." JSCP-69, approved in December 1967 and applicable between 1 July 1968 and 30 June 1969, took the same position.⁶⁰ That, of course, ran directly contrary to what the Administration, through MC 14/3, was hoping to achieve.

(U) American public opinion hobbled efforts to improve US conventional capabilities. Opposition to the Vietnam War broadened into what seemed like a revulsion against all overseas commitments. In Congress, demands for sizable US withdrawals from Europe grew ever louder. And the persistent balance-of-payments deficit provided Administration critics with a powerful argument.

⁶⁰. JSCP-68, circulated via SM-998-66 to CINCAL, et al., 22 Dec 66, JCS 1844/469, S, JMF 3120 (17 Dec 66). JSCP-69, circulated via SM-863-67 to CINCAL et al., 23 Dec 67, JCS 1844/488, ~~TS~~, JMF 510 (4 Dec 67).

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~~(C)~~ Late in 1967, NATO had started studying the possibility of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Secretary Rusk had decided that the United States should proceed with "high caution," leaving initiatives to others. But, by the spring of 1968, "high caution" no longer seemed possible. In Congress, Democratic Senator Stuart Symington prepared an amendment that would provide funding for no more than 50,000 US military personnel in Western Europe. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, reacting swiftly, drafted a NATO Ministerial resolution endorsing MBFR and inviting early talks with the Soviets.

~~(C)~~ Writing to Secretary Clifford on 27 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that MBFR was acquiring a life of its own, one that could prematurely propel the United States into a major withdrawal. They were willing to accept "carefully calculated, truly mutual, and fully verifiable" reductions, in which "assured political gains outweighed increased military risks." Quick diplomatic progress, admittedly, might ease the pressure for unilateral US withdrawals. But, General Wheeler cautioned in a separate memorandum, "I really believe that we are getting ahead of ourselves in our effort to placate Congress." The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed any approach to the Soviets until NATO could fully examine all of MBFR's ramifications. They feared that current trends toward detente, disarmament, and disengagement could "dismantle the Alliance before its members have reasoned out another way to defend

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themselves with reduced forces." Moreover, according to Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, this was the wrong time to approach Soviet leaders, who might see MBFR as a device for reducing Soviet garrisons in restive satellites. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore proposed a cautious policy until the Soviets seemed more receptive. NATO should use the intervening time to study the political and strategic consequences of withdrawals, and to develop a new security concept.⁶¹

(U) NATO did decide against precipitate action. At Reykjavik, on 25 June, the North Atlantic Council

agreed that it was desirable that a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated. To that end, they decided to make all necessary preparations for discussions with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe as they call on them to join in this search for progress towards peace.

They affirmed, however, that "the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing."⁶²

61. DJSM-415-68 to CJCS, 11 Apr 68, U; DJSM-610-68 to CJCS, 18 May 68, ~~C~~, Msg, State 167504 to all NATO capitals, 21 May 68, ~~C~~, Msg, Moscow 3870 to SecState, 16 May 68, ~~S~~; JCSM-341-68 to SecDef, 27 May 68, JCS 2450/580, ~~C~~, Memo, CJCS to SecDef, 27 May 68, JCS 2450/580, ~~C~~, Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 20 Jun 68, JCS 2450/580-1, ~~C~~, JMF 806/372 (22 May 68).

62. Dept of State Bulletin, 15 Jul 68, p. 77.

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(U) Congressional critics were not appeased. Senator Symington, who had withdrawn his 50,000-man amendment under White House pressure, reintroduced it on 25 June. He dismissed MBFR hopes as unfounded, and offered some caustic observations:

It is difficult to understand . . . why American families should be disrupted by the call-up of some 40,000 reserves this year so that we may keep the present number of United States troops in Europe, troops which are not there to meet an immediate military threat, at least in European eyes, but rather for psychological assurance purposes, and the financial benefit of the countries in question.

Senator Mansfield voiced a hope that, if the Administration failed to act, "Congress itself will face up to this responsibility, and do it before too long." Senator Richard B. Russell, influential Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, reportedly favored the Symington amendment.⁶³

~~(TS)~~ Even before Senator Symington's speech of 25 June, the OSD had begun drafting a "save the teeth" program intended to cut spending by \$200 million without sacrificing major combat units.⁶⁴ This plan

63. NY Times, 26 Jun 68, p. 17.

64. The FY 1968 military balance-of-payments deficit in Europe exceeded \$600 million; in FY 1969, it probably would total \$300-500 million. The US-German "offset" agreement, described in the previous chapter, apparently was proving inadequate.

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involved: merging and reducing higher headquarters; redeploying to CONUS one reconnaissance squadron from Germany (b)(1)

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consolidating air and naval bases, particularly around the Mediterranean littoral; reducing support to allies; streamlining the Army's supply system; and combining strategic communications and intelligence. Deputy Secretary Nitze now suggested more measures that might induce Senator Russell to oppose Senator Symington: in FY 1969, end rotation for the 24th Division, withdraw its third brigade and air support, and negotiate a "real" offset agreement with the allies; in FY 1970, if no satisfactory offset arrangement had been achieved, withdraw an additional division and its air support.⁶⁵

(S) When the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred on 26 June, they began thinking about what had hitherto been unthinkable--a total withdrawal from Western Europe. General Wheeler said that, if Seventh Army was cut to three divisions, "we had better get out of Europe." Without a large force, General Johnson agreed, Europe would become a big "Bataan." Admiral Moorer, General Chapman, and General McConnell expressed similar opinions.⁶⁶

65. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 68, JCS 2458/410, ~~TS GP 1~~, CM-3440-68 to JCS, 26 Jun 68, S; JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec 1.

66. Note to Control, "CM-3440-68," 26 Jun 68, S, same file.

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~~(TS)~~ Nevertheless, the JCS advice that reached Secretary Clifford on 12 July was much less drastic. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Mr. Clifford that his "save the teeth" program (apart from Mr. Nitze's additions) would produce "an unbalanced force with inadequate command and support arrangements." The result would be: "severe atrophy" of the Mediterranean base posture and impairment of normal operations in that area; additional degradation of air defenses in Central Europe; a loss of rapport with the allies; further reductions in maintenance and construction capacity; tardy analysis of enemy electronic activities; and "significant degradation and/or elimination" of command and control facilities.

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To compensate, could be inactivated, with their equipment transferred to the Germans, and the 24th Division's 3d brigade retained permanently in Germany. Costs would be cut by \$124.77 million. As a "last resort," which the Joint Chiefs of Staff "strongly" opposed, another \$15.46 million could be saved by returning one tactical reconnaissance wing from the United Kingdom and

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67. JCSM-449-69 to SecDef, 12 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-4, ~~TS CP 1~~, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec 3.

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~~(S)~~ The State Department reviewed "save the teeth" proposals, and also had misgivings about some of them. On 22 July, Under Secretary Katzenbach told Mr. Nitze that he thought \$200 million could be saved without incurring "serious" foreign policy problems.

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Also, removing a tactical air squadron from Germany could jeopardize the offset agreement; Mr. Katzenbach preferred, as having less political impact, dual-basing reconnaissance squadrons in the British Isles. Lastly, he anticipated that withdrawing

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other allies would be alarmed.⁶⁸

~~(TS)~~ On 23 July, General Wheeler turned his attention to the long-term task of maintaining a substantial US contribution at bearable cost. He asked the Joint Staff to examine ways of providing "a well-balanced three-division force," buttressed by "reception facilities to provide for a rapid build-up

⁶⁸. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 22 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-7, 8, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec 5.

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in times of tension." Naturally, he continued, "this will involve a fresh look at our force posture" Thus the Chairman wanted the Joint Staff to start studying a solution that, in June, had struck him as obliging the United States to "get out of Europe."⁶⁹

. . . Until Czechoslovakia Sparks a Turnabout

~~(S)~~ At this point, Europe's political climate changed completely. In Czechoslovakia, during the spring, Stalinists had lost power to the reform-minded regime of Alexander Dubcek. Now, Soviet leaders evidently decided that the Czech push toward liberalization was becoming dangerous. So, on 20-21 August, 17 Soviet and 4 Polish divisions (supported by Bulgarian, Hungarian, and East German contingents) occupied Czechoslovakia.⁷⁰ The invaders met virtually no resistance. Mr. Dubcek was quickly deposed; Gustav Husak, a reputed hard-liner, replaced him.

~~(S)~~ The occupation of Czechoslovakia left Western Europeans deeply shocked; Congress stopped talking about massive US withdrawals. On 27 August, General Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with assessing how the events in Czechoslovakia would affect NATO. He believed

⁶⁹. CM-3485-68 to DJS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-8, TS-GP 1, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec 5.

⁷⁰. Msg, DIA to US mission, Brussels, 13 Sep 68, ~~NATO S GP 1~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO. See Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 487-488.

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detente to be "at least for the moment, dead" and MBFR negotiations impossible "for some time to come." Furthermore, General Wheeler found "real fear" among the allies about future Soviet actions; several had suggested steps for improving NATO's capabilities. For the moment, Washington was taking care to do nothing that would lend credence to Moscow's charges that Western machinations had compelled Soviet intervention. Perhaps, Wheeler wondered, the time had come to pursue a more active policy.⁷¹

(U) The Joint Staff completed its work quickly. On 7 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to advise Secretary Clifford that "the basic US objective of a secure, peaceful, self-reliant and cooperative Europe is now more remote than at any time during the past several years." NATO's posture had been shaped by a number of beliefs: that Europe was achieving stability; that the USSR posed a diminishing threat to peace; that the Soviets "think and act like us," and would seek to avoid a direct resort to force; that a surprise attack was unlikely; that ample warning time and increased mobility permitted troop withdrawals; and

⁷¹. CM-3608-68 to DJS, 27 Aug 68, JCS 2450/609, ~~S~~, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec 1. In mid-September, General Wheeler suspended the three-division study that he had requested in July. CM-3647-68 to DJS, 12 Sep 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2458/410-8, 24 Sep 68, ~~S~~, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec 5.

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that arms control and MBFR agreements would permit further economies without undue risk. The Soviets' speed and ruthlessness in Czechoslovakia called each of those judgments into question.

(U) By all accounts, the allies were looking to the United States for leadership. The Joint Chiefs of Staff posed three possible responses. The first, involving no additional American actions, would accept "optimistic estimates of Soviet intentions rather than realistic recognition of existing capabilities, with attendant high risks." The second, requiring major improvements and a return to Europe of dual-based forces, would not only create severe budgetary and balance-of-payments pressures but also appear "over-reactive as well as provocative." The third, which they supported, would lower risks and improve NATO's cohesion and capability "in a situation which should be neither ignored nor intensified." It would involve the following actions:

1. Hold an early Ministerial meeting to demonstrate unity and reassess policy.
2. Delay Soviet-American talks on arms control.
3. Take advantage of any French interest in reestablishing military links.⁷²

72. Subsequently, the French did increase army liaison, participate unofficially in naval maneuvers, and cooperate in Mediterranean air surveillance. NY Times, 20 Nov 68, p. 1.

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4. Suspend US redeployments and reductions, and urge the allies to do likewise.

5. Raise all NATO-committed US forces to high readiness, and press the allies to take equivalent steps.⁷³

6. Return dual-based units to Germany early in 1969 for annual exercises, thereby reversing a recent decision to cancel the return of Army units.

7. Continue efforts to solve the balance-of-payments problem through long-term US-FRG agreements. Replying on 20 September, the Secretary assured them that most of these steps were either under study or actually being implemented.⁷⁴

(U) One week earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent Mr. Clifford a list of "immediate and visible military actions" to bolster NATO. First, they recommended cancelling most "save the teeth" proposals and strongly supporting the Military Committee's

~~73. (TS)~~ As of 31 March, USCINCEUR rated all five of his divisions in the lowest readiness category. GEN Westmoreland cited the Czech crisis to propose--unsuccessfully--the activation of an additional US-based infantry division. EUCOM Annual Historical Report: 1968, TS, pp. 2-4. CSAM-335-68 to JCS, 27 Aug 68, JCS 2450/609-1, ~~TS-SP-1~~, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec 1.

74. JCSM-538-68 to SecDef, 7 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-2, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-4, U; JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec 1.

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proposal that members promise to make no force reductions. Second, they pressed for immediate improvement of the US posture in Europe. Promptly dispatching to Germany an armored battalion from the 24th Division, for example, would symbolize US resolve to return dual-based units regularly. Then, at the very least, Washington would gain leverage in dealing with the allies. "In particular, the United States should insist that all of its NATO Allies improve their mobilization capabilities and build up adequate war reserve stocks." Additionally, the Administration should begin expensive long-term measures to remedy the debilitating effects of Vietnam drawdowns.⁷⁵

~~(S)~~ Late in September, General Wheeler toured Western Europe and came away convinced that more economizing would not simply trim away fat but cut into

75. ~~(TS)~~ JCSM-547-68 to SecDef, 14 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-3, U, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec 1. Concurrently, the Soviets made threats against independent-minded Rumania, and alleged that Austria had not acted neutrally. At Mr. Nitze's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed possible countermoves against further Soviet aggression. They concluded that, apart from unconventional warfare units, available US forces were "inadequate to support major contingency operations" in Yugoslavia, Austria, or Rumania. Consequently, the United States should act with "extreme caution" in these areas. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 21 Sep 68, Att to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Sep 68, JCS 2066/74, ~~S-CP-1~~, JMF 948/532 (21 Sep 68) sec 1. JCSM-667-68 to SecDef, 7 Nov 68, JCS 2066/74, ~~TS-CP-1~~, same file, sec 3.

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muscle. All the allied Chiefs of Staff, he found, appreciated the necessity for effecting improvements. SACEUR said--and Wheeler agreed--that Czechoslovakia represented a turning-point for NATO; positive action could revitalize the alliance, while hesitation would simply continue the downward spiral.⁷⁶

~~(TS)~~ Meanwhile, on 18 September, Secretary Clifford circulated a new "save the teeth" solution. "Largely due to your efforts," he assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "this plan is substantially superior to our first one." He now proposed: withdrawing or transferring to the

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reorganizing Army communications and logistical support systems; consolidating Air Force activities in the London area; and closing port facilities at Bremerhaven. Taken together, these actions would reduce personnel by 55,000 and save \$425 million annually. No withdrawals would occur, however, until occupation forces began leaving Czechoslovakia.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs

⁷⁶. CM-3702-68 to SecDef, 4 Oct 68, ~~C~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

⁷⁷. ~~(S)~~ Because of the Czech invasion, the number of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe had risen from 22 to 36. Msg, DIA to US Mission, Brussels, 13 Sep 68, ~~NATO S GP 1~~, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

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of Staff protested that even these proposals "would place USCINCEUR in an unsound military posture from which it would be impossible to respond immediately and effectively to a crisis situation."⁷⁸

~~(S)~~ State, Defense, and Treasury officials considered sending a high-level team to European capitals in order to "take soundings" on what extra steps the allies might take to strengthen NATO. As a corollary, on 2 October, Deputy Secretary Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to say what would constitute appropriate contributions. For an inducement, he added, the United States might increase its own effort by \$50 million in budgetary and \$50 million in balance-of-payments expenditures.⁷⁹

~~78. (TS) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Sep 68, JCS 2458/410-10, ~~TS GP 1~~, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec 5. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 Sep 68, JCS 2458/410-11, ~~TS GP 1~~, JCSM-580-68 to SecDef, 2 Oct 68, JCS 2458/410-13, ~~S~~, same file, sec 6. According to the final plan, approved in December,~~

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All told, 33,897 military and 2,205 civilian spaces would be eliminated. Total budgetary savings would be \$428.8 million; total balance-of-payments savings, \$158.4 million. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Dec 68, JCS 2458/410-28, ~~TS~~; same file, sec 8.

~~79. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620, ~~C~~, JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).~~

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(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered by characterizing the \$50 million budgetary program as an inadequate one that would permit only superficial, short-term improvements. Sudden injection of a small sum could not eliminate the major weaknesses that had accumulated over the past several years; indeed, "our deteriorating readiness will not even be slowed." What, then, was to be done? An "indispensable first step," they argued, should be a moratorium on force reductions. Measures within the \$50 million package ought to include returning dual-based Army and Air Force units to Europe during January or February 1969 and keeping them there until mid-year. As for allied actions, they suggested that West Germany, the most important ally, activate two additional brigades. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized, as self-defeating, the American position that the allies had to act first:

The timing and magnitude of the response in this situation may be critical to the future of the North Atlantic Alliance, and budget savings in the short term could represent political and security losses in the long term. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that implementation of this proposed [\$50 million] package be undertaken as a first step in a longer term program to strengthen NATO80

80. JCSM-594-68 to SecDef, 8 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-1, U, JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

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~~(S)~~ Tentatively, Secretary Clifford decided to increase budgetary spending by \$49 million and to raise the balance-of-payments deficit by \$18 million. These steps would allow the return of dual-based units and the construction of additional aircraft shelters in Germany and the Netherlands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, instead, that the Administration assume the \$18 million in aircraft shelter spending was NATO-reimbursable and apply the money thus saved to: retaining dual-based Air Force units in Europe for 90 days (Army units could not stay so long because their former billets had been released to the Germans); returning an EB-66 squadron to Europe earlier than planned; improving aerial port facilities; and maintaining a maritime patrol squadron in the Mediterranean. But they insisted again that "this effort does not go far enough, especially if [it] is to signify US leadership in improving NATO's posture in the post-Czech situation."⁸¹

~~(S)~~ Despite JCS admonitions, Secretary Clifford decided to defer near-term US responses until allied intentions became clear. He noted, also, that JCS plans for long-term improvement would cost \$5.1 billion during FYs 1969-1971. The Secretary asked them

⁸¹. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-2, ~~S~~; JCSM-651-68 to SecDef, 31 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-3, ~~S~~; JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

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carefully to reconsider their proposals, and then submit detailed justifications for those that they still thought necessary. In mid-December, J-5 drafted a memorandum that described more precisely the \$5 billion program. General Westmoreland, however, warned his JCS colleagues that the paper was "untimely" and would not make them "look good" in Mr. Clifford's eyes. He now understood, also, that specifics were to be avoided when they talked with their civilian superiors. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided simply to "note" J-5's submission.⁸² They thought, presumably, that the outgoing Administration was not willing to make such a major decision.

(U) Early in November, the NATO Chiefs of Staff concluded that, despite some withdrawals from Czechoslovakia, the Soviets' capability for launching a surprise attack had been enhanced and their options increased. They therefore assessed risks as "markedly higher" than those used in conjunction with 1969-1973 force plans, and urged members to act with "utmost vigor" in meeting goals and raising active forces to the required readiness standard.⁸³

~~82. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 68, JCS 2450/609-5, S, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec 1. JCS 2450/609-6, 13 Dec 68, U; Note to Control, "JCS 2450/609-6," 20 Dec 68, C, same file, sec 2.~~

~~83. Msg, USDEL, MC to JCS, 051142Z Nov 68, U, same file. For US approval, see JCSM-672-68 to SecDef, 8 Nov 68, JCS 2450/636, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2450/636, 12 Nov 68, U; Msg, JCS 5336 to USDEL, MC, 10 Nov 68, S; same file.~~

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~~(S)~~ To show NATO's concern, the Defense Planning Committee advanced its semi-annual meeting from December to November. When Secretary Clifford spoke to this gathering, he called for "significant" improvements and insisted upon allied cooperation in closing the balance-of-payments gap. He then outlined US responses, which were conditional upon similar allied actions:

1. Raise USAREUR to full peacetime strength, and make NATO-committed divisions in CONUS available for employment by M+30. The 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) should reach that status by 31 December 1968, the 2d Armored 31 March 1969, and the 1st Armored several months thereafter.

2. Earmark for SACEUR the USAF Rapid Reaction Force in CONUS. It consisted of 14 squadrons (10 fighter, 3 reconnaissance, 1 airlift) totaling about 300 aircraft.

3. Eliminate rotation of the 24th Infantry Division's brigades, keeping one brigade permanently in Germany.

4. Move the return of dual-based units forward to January-February, and temporarily retain four fighter squadrons in Europe.

5. Pre-finance, with US funds, construction of aircraft shelters in Germany and the Netherlands.

6. Accelerate return of an EB-66 squadron, and increase greatly the number of electronic jamming pods for fighters.

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7. Augment aerial port facilities.

8. Suspend inactivation of a Mediterranean maritime patrol squadron.⁸⁴

When the DPC meeting ended, no one could be sure whether NATO had started on an upward spiral.

~~(S-PP)~~ Interestingly, the Czech crisis had little effect upon the 1968 DPM debate. Here, familiar JCS-OSD differences persisted.

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He then proposed three new concepts of employment:

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⁸⁴. "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Clifford in NATO Defense Planning Committee," 14 Nov 68, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 7 Dec 68, JCS 2450/653, ~~S~~, JMF 806 (16 Oct 68).

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~~(TS RD)~~ The JCS critique, dated 7 September, dismissed the discussion portion of Mr. Nitze's paper as being "obfuscated and inconsistent to the point that it is not possible, in most instances, to determine . . . the basis upon which force level recommendations . . . have been derived." The DPM, they continued, "implies that theater nuclear forces can somehow deter without, at the same time, being needed to wage war successfully should deterrence fail." Moreover, by placing heavy emphasis upon CONUS-based strategic forces, it moved "in a direction distinctly away from controlled, deliberate, and flexible response." They rebutted Nitze's new proposals with the following arguments:

(b)(1)

85. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Aug 68, JCS 2458/436, ~~S-RD~~, JMF 560 (10 Aug 68) sec 1.

~~FRD~~

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(b)(1)

DOE
b(3)

he stated simply that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services were exploring a rear defense concept. Meanwhile, no cutbacks would occur.⁸⁶

(S) Meantime, on 1 May, Mr. Nitze had circulated a DPM claiming that active conventional forces in Central Europe were roughly balanced. Although the Warsaw Pact possessed 45 M-Day divisions versus 28 2/3 for NATO, manpower totals were more nearly equal (677,000 against 610,000). The Pact led in tanks, was about equal in artillery, and fell behind in vehicles and logistic support. The enemy's impressive armored capability could be countered by the greater accuracy and reliability of NATO tanks, the defenders' advantages of better terrain and firing first, and an array of anti-tank weapons. NATO's weaknesses, moreover, were far from insuperable. Without great expense, aircraft

⁸⁶. JCSM-534-68 to SecDef, 7 Sep 68, JCS 2458/436-1, ~~TS RD GP 1~~, JMF 560 (10 Aug 68) sec 1. "Tentative Record of Decision" Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 15 Jan 69, JCS 2458/436-8, ~~TS RD GP 1~~, same file, sec 3.

~~SECRET~~

"Flexible Response" for NATO: Reality or Mirage?

shelters could be built, ammunition stocks increased, maldeployments corrected, reserve readiness improved, and Greek-Turkish equipment shortages eased.⁸⁷

~~(S)~~ Commenting on 29 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made many criticisms--most old, a few new. They rejected Mr. Nitze's assumption that there would be a period of political warning, and speculated that NATO's slow decisionmaking process most likely would give the Warsaw Pact an initial advantage in mobilizing and deploying forces. They argued, also, that Mr. Nitze did not deal with the "most dangerous" kind of attack--one in which the Soviets (through limited, concealed reinforcement) could achieve an optimum balance between surprise and weight of assault. Likewise, he had failed to touch upon requirements for undertaking deliberate escalation, recapturing territory, and ending a conflict on favorable terms. And, as before, they challenged his comparisons and calculations. In their judgment, Nitze's tally of Soviet M-Day forces underestimated personnel in Central Europe and wrongly excluded divisions stationed in the Western USSR. The latest National Intelligence Estimate listed 35 divisions available for a surprise attack, not "some part" of 20 as Mr. Nitze still claimed. Such a force, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could seize "considerable portions of NATO territory." In comparing

⁸⁷. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 May 68, JCS 2458/394, ~~S-CP 1~~, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec 1.

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armor capabilities, they noted, Nitze had matched NATO's newest models not against comparable T-62s but against older T-54s and T-55s. Additionally, Nitze had ignored important advantages enjoyed by the attacker: surprise; choice of whether to engage; and ability to mass and maneuver. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also disputed his claims that NATO's tactical air strength was superior and that most enemy aircraft were merely interceptors. According to recent analyses, they remonstrated, MiG-19s and MiG-21s were actually multipurpose planes, able to support ground troops. This accumulation of alleged errors led them, once again, to dismiss the DPM as unsatisfactory.⁸⁸

~~(S)~~ Mr. Nitze's final memorandum, appearing on 7 January 1969, offered no substantive concessions but did add several rebuttals of JCS criticisms. The appearance of Shillelagh-equipped US tanks, he said, should "more than offset" the Soviets' introduction of T-62s. As to political warning time, Nitze cited statements by SHAPE and the NATO Military Committee that the Czech invasion had been preceded by a three-month political warning period. He recast the section on rival reinforcement capabilities, but did not change his conclusions. The Soviets, according to US intelligence, could assemble 84 divisions (1,260,000 men) within 10-20 days. Yet, unlike their NATO counterparts, Soviet reservists would move to the front

88. JCSM-334-68 to SecDef, 29 May 68, JCS 2458/394-1, ~~S-CP 1~~, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec 1.

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"Flexible Response" for NATO: Reality or Mirage?


immediately, without undergoing unit refresher training. Thus the Warsaw Pact would have more men with less training available around M+30. Mr. Nitze was not impressed: "If we thought the Pact would gain a major advantage with its temporarily larger forces, we could change our predeployment training times."⁸⁹ Obviously, then, there was no consensus about NATO's capabilities. Secretaries McNamara and Nitze considered "flexible response" to be almost a reality; the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it was still a mirage.

Conclusion

(U) During the late 1960s, NATO faced potentially fatal challenges. First, General de Gaulle did his best to destroy the integrated command. Then, the Vietnam War and growing financial pressures brought about American withdrawals that frayed the tie between Washington and Bonn. NATO weathered both crises, but at some cost. Without France, Allied Command Europe apparently held a much shallower front. Dual-basing calmed German fears, but gave the allies ample excuse for easing their own efforts. Resources that might have strengthened NATO were either withheld by Europeans or spent in Southeast Asia by Americans; Czechoslovakia stopped the erosion but failed to spark a great renewal. Still, NATO had survived--and that, in itself, was no mean feat.

⁸⁹. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Jan 69, JCS 2458/394-5, ~~S-GP 1~~, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec 2.

NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE




MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS

*** DPC**
The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) is composed of representatives of the 14 countries which take part in NATO's integrated defence.

**** COMMITTEES**
The main committees of the Council-DPC deal with the following subjects: Political Affairs; Nuclear Defence Affairs; Economic Affairs; Defence Review; Armaments; Science; Infrastructure; Senior Civil Emergency Planning; Information and Cultural Relations; Challenges of Modern Society; Civilian Budget; Military Budget; European Airspace Co-ordination; NATO Pipelines; etc.

***** STANAVFORLANT**
Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

****** STANAVFORCHAN**
Standing Naval Force Channel (Mine Counter Measures).



Source: NATO Handbook, February 1976, pp. 36 & 37.