HISTORY

OF THE

UNITED STATES SUPPORT ACTIVITIES GROUP/SEVENTH AIR FORCE

AND JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH 1975 (U)

30 JUNE 1975

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PACIFIC COMMAND

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#272

PREFACE

(U) The first three months of 1975 found USSAG/7AF personnel putting in extremely long days as the tempo of Southeast Asia activities increased dramatically. The three areas which demanded the most attention were the Mekong River convoys, the airlift operations, and the revision of non-combatant emergency and evacuation plans.

(U) An aerial resupply of historic proportions to a besieged Cambodia became necessary on 5 February when the Khmer Communists (KC) activity closed the Mekong River, lifeline to the survival of Phnom Penh.

(U) Chapter II, RESUPPLY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC, contains information about USSAG/7AF actions to assist Cambodia during the January-March time frame. In addition to documenting Mekong River convoy lessons, a review of airlift activities from the beginning to the end of operations on 17 April is provided in Chapter II. Specific convoy lessons learned are included at Attachment 2.

(U) The remainder of this preface is devoted to Southeast Asia intelligence estimates for January-March 1975. These estimates were provided by USSAG J-2 (Intelligence). A review of the organization's quarterly activities will be more meaningful when the environment is understood.

Vietnam. The first two months of the year saw enemy activity concentrated in Military Region (MR) III, where Communist forces overran all of Phuoc Long (P) during early January. Further north, only light pressure was reported in MR-I and MR-II, as the enemy continued massive preparations for major assaults during the dry season. In the delta, Viet Cong (VC) units continued their slow, but steady, erosion of government security. A significant development occurred in January when the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) called in airstrikes on a large convoy in the western Highlands above Kontum, reportedly catching a division on the move. Subsequent reporting revealed that a new division, the 968th, had moved into northern MR-II from Laos. This was viewed as a prelude to strong attacks at Kontum and Pleiku.

The dry season offensive in MR-II, began 28 February, with attacks and attacks by fire (ABF) in Kontum, Pleiku, and Binh Dinh Provinces. The Communists focused their attention against the major lines of communication (LOC). By 9 March, all overland access to the western Highlands had been interdicted. Further to the south, in Darlac (P), the provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot came under

heavy enemy attack on 10 March. This was the pivotal battle, because the enemy's success here precipitated the South Vietnamese decision to cede the western Highlands. Although the Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) reinforced Ban Me Thuot, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had moved in the 316th Division from North Vietnam and had moved the 320th and elements of the 10th Division south from Pleiku and Kontum. As a result, the enemy had overwhelming superiority, and the city was lost. South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the withdrawal from Kontum and Pleiku, and an unorganized withdrawal began from both cities. Both the ARVN and the civilians panicked, and as the convoy passed through Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces, it came under heavy attack. The enemy continued his drive toward the coast; by the end of March, all of MR-II with the exception of two southern coastal provinces (Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan), was in enemy hands.

On 4 March, shortly after the attacks began in MR-II, enemy forces launched their dry season offensive in MR-I. Soon heavy fighting was taking place on the Quang Tri/Thua Thien border; Hue was receiving ABFs and Highway 1 was interdicted just north of the Hai Van Pass. Local force units and civilians in Quang Tri panicked, as word spread of ARVN unit redeployments to Da Nang and Saigon. A mass exodus began toward Hue, and by 19 March, the Citadel at Quang Tri was in enemy hands. A defensive line was formed to the north (at the My Chanh River), but it failed to hold as friendly forces retreated.

The civilian populace then began leaving Hue for Da Nang. By 25 March, ARVN had evacuated Hue, with most of the friendly forces evacuating by sea to Da Nang. More than one million refugees poured into Da Nang, creating tremendous internal problems. In the meantime, the enemy was able to wrest control over all of southern MR-I, leaving Da Nang as the only major government enclave. At Da Nang, air and sealift began to move some of the refugees to safety, but on 29 March, ABFs resulted in a totally chaotic situation. Late the next day, the city had fallen into enemy hands, and all organized ARVN resistance had ended.

In MR-III, the North Vietnamese widely propagandized their intentions to isolate and then capture Tay Ninh City. To the east of Tay Ninh City, enemy forces overran Tri Tam in March, and then attacked toward Go Da Hau along Highway 1. Fighting in this area continued and spread further to the east toward Saigon. In eastern MR-III, the enemy launched coordinated attacks on 17 March, in Binh Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces. Highways 20 and 1 were cut and three district towns were overrun. Xuan Loc, the provincial capital of Long Khanh Province started receiving ABFs. The withdrawal was carried out with only light enemy pressure, but subsequently attacks against Chon Thanh, Binh Long (P), increased. The North Vietnamese achieved control over the northern tier of provinces in MR-III, with the exception of the bottom half of Tay Ninh Province, and a major battle was apparently shaping up around Tay Ninh City. With the situation in both western and eastern MR-III seriously deteriorating,

the enemy had the option to attack directly toward Saigon.

In the Delta on 10 March, enemy local force units started their monthly high point, with activity subsiding after about a week. The communists increased their efforts to seize and hold territory and it was expected that enemy main force units would be committed to strong attacks in April and May.

Vietnam Summary: The first quarter of 1975 saw the loss of all of MR-I, and most of MR-II to the North Vietnamese; not by military conquest, but due to panic and resulting chaos. Over two million new refugees seriously burdened the Saigon government, which was also trying to reorganize the remnants of its forces rescued from the northern provinces. During the period, the North Vietnamese stepped up the flow of men and material into the south and reporting indicated that some of their reserve divisions started deploying into South Vietnam. March ended with Saigon facing the strongest communist military capability in the history of the war. A major turning point had been reached and the political and military viability of Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was being seriously threatened.

Cambodia. The first quarter of 1975 also marked a major turning point in the Khmer. On the first of January, the KC launched a country-wide dry season offensive. Major initiatives around Phnom Penh resulted in very significant enemy inroads. Along the lower Mekong River, the communists steadily increased pressure, interdicting the river and culminating in the fall of Banam Neak Luong. The KC carried out strong attacks in the provincial areas and created a

serious threat to Kampot and Battambang. Also on the first of January, the KC attacked Phnom Penh from every direction except the south. These attacks were successful in interdicting all the major roads leading into the city's defensive perimeter. Both Phnom Penh and Pochentong airfield started to receive ABFs which steadily intensified as the year progressed. By the end of March, enemy forces were within 10 kilometers of Pochentong airfield, which was receiving 105mm howitzer and 107mm rocket ABFs as the KC attempted to strangle the capital city.

In the outlying areas, coordinated attacks increased with ground attacks and ABFs at all the major provincial capitals. As the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic (FANK) attempted to withdraw troops to help defend Phnom Penh the enemy increased his pressure in an attempt to prevent these withdrawals. As fighting progressed, both sides were forced to deploy men to Phnom Penh, where heavy casualties had been sustained, especially in the area northwest of Phnom Penh and along the lower Mekong. At the end of the quarter, the situation in the outlying regions was most serious at Battambang with the enemy attempting to isolate the city. Ground attacks and ABFs were reported both north and south of the city and enemy forces were at one time within 1 1/2 kilometers of the airfield. Additionally, internal pressures by students and the Buddhists complicated the situation. Kampot was also the scene of heavy fighting with the enemy tightening the defense perimeter. Government forces held out, however, as the KC were forced to dedicate much of

their ammo to the Phnom Penh and Neak Luong battlefields. Oudong fell early in the quarter as the KC moved toward Phnom Penh from the northwest.

This success gave greater access to resupply from the north and enabled them to sustain the high level of fighting along Route 51 to the northwest of the capital. During February and March, FANK and the KC took heavy losses in this area, but persistent KC pressure allowed them to press beyond Route 51 toward the North Dike Road. They also captured Toul Leap to the west and established positions for highly accurate 105mm and 107mm rocket fire on Pochentong airfield. These caused heavy losses to the Cambodian Air Force (KAF) and sporadically interrupted the airlift of supplies into the beleaguered capital. FANK made several concerted efforts to push the KC back to the west and northwest and did manage to retake Toul Leap only to lose it again within a few days.

To the east of Phnom Penh the KC introduced additional units and began to force FANK off the east bank. Toward the end of the quarter, as Prek Luong fell, FANK defensive lines on the east bank were penetrated as the KC attempted to establish positions for attacks on Chrouy Chang War Naval Base and Phnom Penh. Pressure was also maintained from the north and the FANK defensive perimeter began to move in closer to Phnom Penh as more and more FANK units were evacuated or forced to redeploy to the northwest of the city where attacks were most severe.

Perhaps the most significant goal the KC achieved during

the quarter was the interdiction and capture of the lower Mekong. One-by-one they captured strategic positions at the major choke points along the river and set up positions for effective attacks by recoilless rifles, rockets, and mortars. These, in conjunction with mines and barriers in the river, stopped all convoy activity in the first week in February. Several 105mm howitzer artillery tubes were captured as government positions were overrun, and, finally, only the large enclave of Banam/Neak Luong remained. The KC then used the captured 105mm artillery, as well as organic mortars, and rockets to launch heavy ABFs on the enclaves, softening it up for attacks by two KC divisions and sector forces. The enclave was finally overwhelmed in an aggressive coordinated assault as March ended. This development will allow at least one KC division to deploy to the area south of Phnom Penh where FANK forces were reported to be weak.

Cambodian Summary. Inside the capital, the KC were instructed to create chaos and dissatisfaction with the government, but because of effective Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) countermeasures, the enemy was not successful. The KC completed several major objectives on a time scale which reflected their intentions to gain control of Phnom Penh this dry season. Whether this would be attained through political collapse or military assault was still unanswered at the end of March.

( ) Laos. This quarter was characterized by relative calm in Laos. The coalition government operated satisfactorily with cooperation between the Vientiane side and the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) in carrying out various government projects. Prince Souvanna Phouma, recovering from his late July 1974 heart attack, was living in the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The government was principally run by acting Premier Phoumi Vongvichit (a leftist) in Vientiane who purportedly received instructions from the communist headquarters at Sam Neua. The military situation was quiet during the period. During this time frame, however, leftist dominated "student movement" in Laos was taking shape. The movement's influence was felt in demonstrations at Ban Houei Sai and Thakhek. These demonstrations enlisted the support of some Royalist (FAR) Army personnel and -- for the first time -- cooperation between FAR and Pathet Lao (PL) troops. These demonstrations and the movement of PL forces into strategic positions near FAR outposts enhanced the bargaining position of the LPF in the coalition government. In other developments, numerous road sections in northern Laos were completed by Chinese forces. As road segments were completed, the Chinese force was reduced from 23,000 to 14,000 personnel.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Security Statement Letter	i
Distribution	ii
Title Page	iii
Preface	iv
Table of Contents	xiii
List of Figures and Attachments	xix
CHAPTER I--USSAG/7AF MISSION AND RESOURCES	1
MISSION	1
PERSONNEL RESOURCES	4
Key Staff Change	4
FISCAL RESOURCES	4
Budget	4
INSPECTOR GENERAL	4
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE	5
Press Conference	5
Release Coordination	5
PROTOCOL	6
Distinguished Visitors	6
FOOTNOTES/Chapter I	7
CHAPTER II-RESUPPLY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC	8
MEKONG CONVOYS	8
January-March 1975	8
Convoy TP-111	8
Convoy PT-111	11
Convoy TP-112	11
Convoy PT-112	13
Convoy TP-113	14
Convoy PT-113	16
Convoy TP-114	17
JANUARY-MARCH 1975 KHMER AIRLIFT ACTIVITY	18
Contract Operation	19
DC-8/C-130 Trade Off	21
DC-8 Operations	23
Command and Control	25
Contracts Terminated	26
KHMER AIRLIFT SUMMARY	26
Airdrop	27
Airland	29
Environment	29
Termination	30
FOOTNOTES/CHAPTER II	31

CHAPTER III--PERSONNEL..... 32

MILITARY PERSONNEL..... 32
Pipeline Reinstituted..... 32
Strength..... 32
PLANS AND PROGRAMS..... 32
Individual Awards and Decorations..... 32
Air Force Assistance Fund Drive..... 34
HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION..... 34
Dormitories..... 34
Discipline..... 34
Training..... 35
Administration..... 35
FOOTNOTES/Chapter III..... 36

CHAPTER IV--INTELLIGENCE..... 37

PLANS AND SUPPORT..... 37
EAGLE PULL..... 37
TALON VISE..... 37
TALON BLADE..... 38
TALON EAGLE..... 39
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE..... 39
Analysts Activities..... 39
Assessments..... 40
JCRC Assessment..... 40
Cambodian Analysts Activities..... 41
DAO Phnom Penh Support..... 41
EAGLE PULL Support..... 41
Cambodian Analits..... 42
Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) Evaluation.... 42
Special Study..... 42
Reconnaissance Evaluation..... 42
Other Special Studies..... 42
Air Capabilities..... 43
Air Order of Battle..... 43
Surface-to-Air Missile Order of Battle..... 44
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Order of Battle..... 45
Air Activity over Thailand..... 46
PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE..... 46
Underwater Detection Film..... 47
Camouflage Detection Film..... 48
Photographic Processing and Exploitation Requirements in SEA..... 48
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE..... 49
Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR..... 49
Prisoner of War (PW) Data..... 50
Miscellaneous..... 51

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE..... 51
ARDF..... 51
TARGETING..... 53
Special Reports..... 53
OPlan Maintenance..... 54
Staff Assistance..... 55
War Gaming Simulations..... 56
Weapons Orientation Course..... 56
Weaponeering..... 56
Special Study..... 57
INDICATIONS..... 58
FOOTNOTES/Chapter IV..... 59

CHAPTER V--OPERATIONS..... 64

COMMAND AND CONTROL..... 64
Daily Operations..... 64
Special Interest Items/Reports..... 65
Air Defense Summary..... 65
Air Traffic Control..... 67
Target Management..... 68
AOA and ROE..... 69
NEMVAC Rules of Engagement..... 72
TACAIR Protection for SEA Reconnaissance..... 77
Operational Guidance..... 81
CURRENT OPERATIONS..... 83
Daily Air Operations..... 83
Thailand Flood..... 84
KAF Self-Sufficiency (KASS) Program..... 85
Frag Orders..... 85
Daily Air Operations..... 85
COMMANDO SCRIMMAGE (CS)..... 86
Combat Training Event (CTE)..... 86
Air-to-Air Exercise..... 86
TALON SWIVEL..... 87
Wing Composite Strike (WCS)..... 87
KAF Weapons Component..... 88
Tactics..... 88
Recce Operations..... 88
PARPRO..... 90
SURFACE OPERATIONS AND PLANS..... 91
NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060V (TALON VISE)..... 91
NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060L (TALON BLADE)..... 91
NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C (EAGLE PULL)..... 91
SEA Summary..... 96
MEKONG CONVOYS..... 96
TACTICAL ANALYSIS..... 97
VNAF Flying Program..... 98

KAF Sortie Trends..... 98
Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO)..... 101
Cambodia Airlift-Aircraft Ground Times at Pochentong..... 101
Data Retrieval..... 101
VNAF Operations/Management Plan (V-OPS)..... 102
VNAF Quarterly Assessment..... 102
OPERATIONS PLANS..... 102
SA-7 Defense..... 103
Thailand Air Assets..... 103
Ubon Meteorological Equipment..... 104
Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand..... 105
Beddown Posture..... 105
KAF Night Strike Capability..... 106
MACTHAI Reorganization Plan..... 107
(S) Headquarters Disestablishment Planning..... 108
B-52 OPERATIONS..... 108
WEATHER..... 109
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)..... 109
BUFFALO HUNTER..... 110
Miscellaneous Weather Support..... 110
Tactical Reconnaissance Forecasting..... 110
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS..... 111
Computer Operations..... 111
Programming Analysis..... 112
Systems Programming..... 112
JCRC File and Retrieval System..... 113
Fragmentary Order Preparation..... 113
Documentation Retirement..... 113
Combat Air Operations Support Systems..... 114
FOOTNOTES/Chapter V..... 116

CHAPTER VI—LOGISTICS..... 124

OVERVIEW..... 124
KHMER REPUBLIC LOGISTICS..... 124
Movement of Munitions and General Cargo from Vung Tau to Vayama..... 124
All-Barge Concept for Mekong Movements..... 125
Mekong Convoy Requirements Conference..... 126
NEA/VAC PLANS..... 134
Airlift of TCNs, U.S. Press and Civilian Personnel..... 134
Contract Operations..... 137
Implementation of Rice/POL Airlift..... 140
DC-8 Off-Loading Operations at Pochentong..... 140
C-130 Airlift of USAID POL..... 143
Cargo Operations at Tan Son Nhut AB..... 144
Expansion of DC-8 USAID Rice/POL Airlift..... 144

Airlift Interruptions/Volume..... 147
MAP-CB Transportation Charges (TAC A454)..... 149
AMMUNITION-CAMBODIA..... 156
Phnom Penh Ammunition Stockage..... 156
Ammunition Airland into Cambodia..... 157
(S) Deployment of CBU-55..... 157
AMMUNITION-VIETNAM..... 157
Visibility of ARVN Assets..... 157
VNAF Assets..... 168
LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT..... 168
KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency..... 168
EC-47 Aircraft for VNAF/RTAF/ROKAF..... 170
PLANS AND PROGRAMS..... 171
MEDTC Automated Ammunition Data System (MAADS)..... 171
POL..... 174
Rice..... 175
FOOTNOTES/Chapter VI..... 177

CHAPTER VII--COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS..... 183

GENERAL..... 183
COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING-THAILAND..... 183
Reconfiguration of SIMS..... 183
COMBAT LIGHTNING COMMUNICATIONS..... 185
RECONFIGURATION OF USSAG COMMUNICATIONS..... 185
Blue Chip Communications..... 185
SUBMARINE CABLE OUTAGE AFFECTING USSAG..... 185
COMMUNICATIONS CONTINGENCY PLANNING..... 185
Saigon Satellite Ground Terminal..... 185
SITE 75A (LONG BINH-PHNOM PENH)..... 186
FOOTNOTES/Chapter VII..... 187

ATTACHMENTS..... 188

ANNEX I--JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC)..... 199

GENERAL..... 200
JCRC Relocation..... 200
Operations..... 200
PERSONNEL..... 200
Strength..... 200
Awards..... 200
CASUALTY DATA..... 204
Casualty Data Division (CDD) Reorganization..... 204
Project 400..... 204
Project 40..... 204
All Loss Printout..... 205
Report 55..... 205

Master Record Project..... 205
SEA ADP Facility..... 206
Documentary Record Effort..... 206
Casualty Records..... 206
Deserters..... 207
Administration/Security..... 208
Songbird Review Program..... 208
OPERATIONS..... 209
LOGISTICS..... 214
AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING..... 214
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (SJA)..... 215
COMPTROLLER..... 215
PUBLIC AFFAIRS..... 216
SAIGON LIAISON OFFICER..... 218
FOOTNOTES/Annex I..... 220

ATTACHMENT/ANNEX I..... 221

GLOSSARY..... 222

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure No.		Page No.
1.	Headquarters USSAG/7AF Organization Chart	2
2.	Roster of USSAG/7AF Key Personnel	3
3.	Assigned Military Strength	33
4.	KAF Strike Sorties	99
5.	KAF Support Sorties	100
6.	Airlift-7H/RVN to Cambodia	150
7.	C-130 Airland Statistics MAP-CS Commodities	151
8.	C-130 Airdrop Statistics MAP-CS Commodities	152
9.	Surface Delivery Statistics MAP-CS Commodities	153
10.	Ammunition Stockage Phnom Penh	158
11.	Monthly Ammo Shipments Phnom Penh	159
12.	RVNAF Ammunition Support	161
13.	Consumption History	165
14.	RVNAF Ammo Expenditures	166
15.	ARVN Ammo Expenditures	167

Attachments

1.	List of USSAG Visitors	188
2.	Mekong Convoy Lessons Learned Message	189

ANNEX I

Figure No.		
1.	Statistical Summary	201
2.	Workload Data	203

Attachment

1.	List of JCRC Visitors	221

CHAPTER I

MISSION AND RESOURCES

MISSION (U)

From 1 January through 31 March 1975, there was no change in the four-fold mission of the United States Support Activities Group/Seventh Air Force (USSAG/7AF) located at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (NKP), Thailand. The mission remained.[1]

-- To plan for resumption of an effective air campaign in Laos, Cambodia, the Republic of Vietnam and North Vietnam as directed by Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).

-- To maintain a command and control structure for the management of air elements which may be committed to it and a capability for interface with the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) Air Control System.

-- To maintain liaison with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Joint General Staff (JGS), Carrier Task Force (CTF) 77, and committed Strategic Air Command (SAC) systems.

-- To exercise command over the Defense Resources Support and Termination Office (DRSTO), and operational control of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).

HEADQUARTERS USSAG/7AF
ORGANIZATION CHART
(As of 31 March 1975)



Figure 1

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ROSTER OF USSAG/7AF KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 31 MARCH 1975

Commander	Lt Gen John J. Burns, USAF
Deputy Commander	Maj Gen Ira A. Hunt Jr., USA
Chief of Staff	Maj Gen Earl J. Archer Jr., USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/Personnel	Col Robert W. Nelson, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence	Col Robert A. Stefanik, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/Operations	Maj Gen Earl J. Archer Jr., USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/Logistics	Col Delbert E. Smith, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/Communications-Electronics	Lt Col Donald L. Whalen, USAF
Inspector General	Col Melvin J. Steinberg, USMC
Secretary of the Joint Staff	Lt Col Larry L. King, USAF
Public Affairs Officer	Lt Col Ronald C. David, USA
Chief, Defense Resources Support and Termination Office	Maj Gen H. D. Smith, USA
Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center	Col John P. Vollmer, USA
Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group	Captain Delbert W. Nordberg, USN
Chief, SAC ADVON	Lt Col Frank G. Schlier, USAF

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Figure 2

(U) Positive results of liaison with CTF 77 and the command and control management structure for air elements became particularly visible toward the end of the quarter. On 1 March, CINCPAC ordered a 24-hour alert posture to be assumed for possible implementation of EAGLE PULL.[2] Although the response time varied, an increased alert posture continued through the end of March.

PERSONNEL RESOURCES (U)

(U) Key Staff Change. Lt Col Frank G. Schlier, USAF, became the Chief, SAC ADVON on 18 Feb 75.

FISCAL RESOURCES (U)

(U) Budget. A limitation of $75,000 was imposed on travel/TDY on 16 January.[3] The FY 75 resource authorization was reduced on 12 March to $750,000 (new obligation authority).[4] Quarterly allocations were:

1st Quarter	$273,500
2nd Quarter	225,900
3rd Quarter	225,800
4th Quarter	24,800
	$750,000

INSPECTOR GENERAL (U)

(U) Efforts of the USSAG/7AF Inspector General (IG) were directed toward monitoring and advising in the areas of joint operational readiness, operational security, and command and control. Two field visits were made to inspect Thailand-based flying operations.

(U) The IG visited the Thailand Airlift Control Center at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base on 4-5 February, where he monitored briefings of the Bird Air Company flight crews.[5]

He reported a significant improvement in the quality of the briefings.[6] He also recorded that crews were reaching the maximum allowable flying hours, unless additional waivers were granted.

(U) During a visit to the 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 19-20 March, the IG attended a combat briefing prior to a photo reconnaissance mission to Phnom Penh. No discrepancies were observed. All crews were being thoroughly briefed on the rules of engagement.[7]

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (U)

(U) Press Conference. Approximately 55 news media representatives from Thailand, Germany, Japan and the U.S. attended a 15 March press conference at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base. Most of the questions by newsmen regarded the airlifting of supplies to Cambodia by Bird Air, a U.S. civilian contractor. The first USSAG Fact Sheet on the Cambodian Airlift operation was distributed to those attending.

(U) Release Coordination. During the quarter, several requests for information were received from the CINCPAC Public Affairs Liaison Office (PA LNO). Information was obtained from appropriate USSAG staff offices, coordinated, and provided to PA LNO. Topics included the shipment of supplies to South Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as the Bird Air operations. Near the end of the quarter, COMUSSAG requested a feature story about the airlift operations to Cambodia with emphasis on the airdrop portion.

(U) Production of the USSAG Daily News Summary continued, with special news coverage as appropriate.

PROTOCOL (U)

(U) Distinguished Visitors. A list of distinguished visitors to USSAG/7AF during the quarter is included at Attachment 1.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. CINCPAC Instruction (S) S3020.2G, Change 3, 28 Apr 1973, Inclosure 5.

2. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 010035Z Mar 75, Subj: Unknown.

3. Resource Authorization (U), CINCPAC to Commander USSAG, 12 Mar 1975.

4. Msg (U), CINCPAC to Commander JCRC (and others), 160052Z Jan 75, Subj: FY 75 Travel Funding Reduction.

5. Staff Summary Sheet (U), USSAG/IG to USSAG/CC, 13 Feb 1975, Subj: Visit to the Thailand Airlift Control Center, U-Tapao RTAFB.

6. USSAG/7AF History, 1 October-31 December 1974 (TS/NFD), Pgs 5-6.

7. Staff Summary Sheet (U), USSAG/IG to USSAG/CC, 26 Mar 1975, Subj: Trip Report/Visit to 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.

CHAPTER II

RESUPPLY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC

MEKONG CONVOYS (U)*

(U) The distance from Tan Chau, South Vietnam, to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, is about 60 miles. Convoys were able to traverse the course of the Mekong River in about 18 hours under good conditions. And the Mekong convoys looked good until mid-December 1974. Until that time, there had been some highway resupply to Battambang and Sisophon, but 90 percent of the Khmer resupply had been by river convoy.

(U) However, during this quarter, the KC was successful in denying use of the Mekong. The marked change in U.S. efforts to resupply beleaguered Cambodia became evident. In March, 97 percent of the resupply was by air (89 percent airland and 8 percent airdrop) and three percent was by road to the Battambang area.

(U) January-March 1975. Four resupply convoys to Phnom Penh (TP) were attempted in January and February. Three down-river convoys from Phnom Penh (PT) were also made. The following is a summary of the activities significant to the understanding of the perils experienced due to the Khmer Rouge dry season offensive and, ultimately, the closure of the Mekong to resupply convoys.

Convoy TP-111. Initial planning for convoy TP-111 called for four ammunition barges, four petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) vessels and two rice vessels scheduled to cross the Cambodian border

*This narrative includes only discussion about convoy experiences this quarter. Previous convoys have been reported in prior histories. However, a message containing general lessons learned is provided at Attachment 2. Charts of surface and airlift amounts delivered and a discussion of the 5 Feb 75 Mekong Convoy Requirements Conference are included in Chapter VI.

on 3 Jan 75. However, due to deteriorating security conditions on the Mekong, the convoy was rescheduled several times at the request of the Etat Militaire Generale (EMG), Cambodia. As news of increased Khmer Rouge activities became public knowledge and the worsening situation along the Mekong became apparent, concern about the willingness of tug and coastal freighter and tanker crews to transit the Mekong started to increase. A decision to sail the convoy 21 January was finally agreed to by the EMG.

When the tug/barge, rice and POL vessel movements from Vung Tau to the An Long staging area commenced, the unwillingness of crews to transit the Mekong started to become obvious. Vessels that had been waiting in the Vung Tau area for several days suddenly started to report problems with steering, generators and, in one case, the lack of sufficient lubricating oil. Vessel substitutions were made to maintain the desired mix of commodities, and the vessels were moved to the convoy staging area at An Long. After the vessels arrived at An Long, more apprehension among the rice and POL vessel crews manifested itself, and they refused to go.

When the convoy finally got under way from An Long, it consisted of only two ammunition barges and four tugs. After the convoy had passed Tan Chau, on its way to the Cambodian border, the crews of the SEAPAC, Inc., tugs started to have second thoughts about making the trip. As a result, the convoy turned around and returned to Tan Chau where crew members willing to make the trip were grouped on three tugs, and the convoy then got under way again with two ammunition barges and three tugs. This turmoil resulted in

the convoy crossing the Cambodian border at 2100 hours. An added problem was the fact that no Khmer river pilots were available for the tugs.

When the convoy entered the Peam Reang Island Channel, the tug Shibaura ran aground and experienced propeller and engine problems. She managed to free herself, and the convoy continued up-river. After the convoy cleared the Peam Reang Island Channel, it halted because the tug Asiatic Enterprise was having engine problems, and the tug Shinano had a fouled propeller. The convoy remained in place for approximately nine hours before repairs were completed and movement could continue to Neak Luong.

At Neak Luong the master of the Asiatic Enterprise refused to continue to Phnom Penh. Marine Nationale Khmer (MNK) personnel were placed on board the tug, and the crew sailed. After the convoy departed Neak Luong, the Phnom Penh harbor tug Harumi was ordered to move down-river to meet the convoy and assist it to Phnom Penh. The master and crew of the Harumi were paid a $100 bonus each for this trip in order to get them to go. The convoy finally closed at Phnom Penh between 1010-1035 hours, 23 January. Of significant note is the fact that no casualties were sustained by the crews on the tugs even though numerous AAFs were received. The most predominant factor in tug and crew protection was the use of shield barges to protect the tugs, which had not been done previously.

(U) Convoy TP-111. Convoy PT-111 was composed of only MNK escort craft.

Convoy TP-112. Initial planning for this convoy called for two ammunition barges, two rice vessels and three POL vessels. After the success of convoy TP-111, it was hoped that the crews of the rice vessels and POL vessels would be willing to make the transit to Phnom Penh. However, such was not the case. Of the rice and POL vessel crews, only the crew of the POL vessel Vira I agreed to go and stuck with that decision. The crews of the other vessels, excluding SEAPAC tug crews, waivered on the borderline until the morning of the convoy sailing date, 25 January. At that time, the rice vessel crews made their decision to stay at An Long. The crew of the Bayon Trader indicated that they would go, but they were skittish. Their actual departure from An Long was questionable.

When the convoy got underway from the An Long staging area the Bayon Trader started up-river. After it reached Tan Chau the crew started to have second thoughts about the trip, and the vessel stopped. The MNK convoy commander boarded the vessel and talked to the master of the ship, finally persuading him to make the convoy. When the convoy crossed the border at approximately 1400 hours, 25 January, it consisted of four tugs, two ammunition barges, and the POL vessels Vira I and Bayon Trader. Two tugs were used to tow each ammunition barge in order to attain maximum possible speed for the convoy. The tugs and ammunition barges were

deployed in front of the POL vessels, because they were well protected by shield barges and could better withstand ABFs. The plan called for the tugs and barges to transit enemy held choke points before the POL vessels. The POL vessels would hold back at the choke points until the tugs/barges had cleared and then pass through at maximum possible speed.

When the convoy entered the Peam Reang Island Channel, it encountered a barricade across the channel which was cut by the MNK. At approximately Parallel 38, the convoy received an ABF which set the Bayon Trader on fire. The Bayon Trader halted with MNK escorts to fight the fire, while the remainder of the convoy proceeded to Neak Luong. The fire, in the galley and crew living quarters area, was extinguished, and the vessel moved on to Neak Luong. After a halt at Neak Luong, the convoy continued toward Phnom Penh. At approximately Parallel 54, the Bayon Trader reported that a fire had again broken out in the area of the galley and crew living quarters. The vessel turned around and proceded back to Neak Luong, while the rest of the convoy continued toward Phnom Pénh. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 0615 hours, 26 January.

Once again, due to the effectiveness of the shield barges, no casualties were sustained among the tug crew members even though numerous hits were taken on the screens mounted on the barges alongside the tugs. The Bayon Trader was finally brought up to Phnom Penh

at 0545 hours, 27 January.

Convoy PT-112. Convoy PT-112 departed Phnom Penh on 27 January with four empty ammunition barges, five empty cargo vessels, one empty POL vessel, and seven tugs. Approximately 10 kilometers south of Phnom Penh the tug Shibaura went aground and was attacked; the captain was wounded. The tug Shinano, the Phnom Penh harbor tug, was dispatched to assist, and they both returned to Phnom Penh, carrying four shield barges and one empty ammunition barge. Approximately two hours after the convoy left Phnom Penh, the tug Harumi turned around and returned to Phnom Penh for unknown reasons.

When the convoy was passing through the Dei Dos area, the coastal freighters Port Sun I and Tung Pao received ABFs, resulting in two wounded. The Port Sun I later experienced engineering problems and ran aground at Parallel 47.5; she was subsequently freed approximately one hour later and continued to Neak Luong for repairs. The remainder of the convoy proceeded on to An Long after a short halt at Neak Luong, crossing the border between 1010 and 1035 hours, 28 January. Three shield barges were recovered enroute.

On 28 January the tugs Shibaura and Harumi sailed from Phnom Penh under MNK escort for An Long. At Neak Luong, the two tugs were joined by the Port Sun I for the remainder of the trip to the border. Between Parallel 22-23 (Peam Reang Island Channel) the Port Sun I received an ABF which set her on fire, and the crew

abandoned ship. The vessel beached on the west bank at Parallel 22. MNK escort craft picked up the crew, and the convoy continued to the border, crossing at 0645 hours, 29 January.

Convoy TP-113. Planning for this convoy called for two ammunition barges, two rice barges, four rice vessels, four POL vessels and one vessel loaded with salt. The coaster Adriana, loaded with salt, ran aground before reaching An Long on the up-river trip from Vung Tau and could not be freed in time for the convoy. The POL vessel Vira IV sailed from Vung Tau on the afternoon of 28 January and managed to arrive at An Long in time to make the convoy. Two of the four rice vessels scheduled for this convoy, the Wah On and Tung Lee, had been at An Long since convoy TP-111 was staged and had refused to participate in both TP-111 and TP-112. The participation of the Wah On and Tung Lee in TP-113 was questionable.

A representative of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) from Saigon was transported to the An Long staging area to persuade the two rice vessels to participate in the convoy and to head off trouble with any of the other rice and POL vessels. Early on the morning of 29 January the convoy got under way from the An Long staging area, and, with assistance of the USAID representative, all vessels at An Long got under way except the rice vessel Tung Lee. SEAPAC, Inc., in anticipation of trouble with their tug crews, had pre-positioned extra tug crew members at An Long. This proved fruitful, as the crew of the tug Asiatic Stamina refused to sail

at the last moment. Replacements were quickly obtained from An Long City, and the tug got underway.

When the convoy crossed the Cambodian border at 1030 hours, 29 January, it consisted of two ammunition barges, two rice barges, three rice vessels, and four POL vessels. All barges were towed by two tugs with shield barges being used to protect the tugs, including the four USAID tugs, and the ammunition barges. Between Parallels 21 and 25 the convoy sustained an ABF which resulted in the POL vessel Han Seung 7 catching on fire and beaching on the west bank at Parallel 27. The vessel was abandoned by the crew. MNK escorts remained behind to protect the vessel, while the remainder of the convoy proceeded on to Neak Luong.

During this same period of time, the POL vessel Han Seung 2 sustained major damage from an ABF which resulted in her rolling over and sinking. The Han Seung 2 crew managed to abandon ship before she sank. The rice vessel Wah On ran aground approximately four kilometers south of Neak Luong, and MNK elements remained with her for protection. Remaining convoy elements proceeded to Neak Luong.

After arrival there, the rice vessels Port Sun II and Port Sun III reported engineering problems. After halting at Neak Luong, two ammunition barges, two rice barges and two POL vessels continued on to Phnom Penh, arriving at 0530 hours,

30 January; the Port Sun II and Port Sun III remained at Neak Luong. At 0300 hours, 31 January they departed Neak Luong for Phnom Penh, arriving at 0600 hours. Salvage of the Wah On, Han Seung 7 and Port Sun I (lost on PT-112) was scheduled for PT-113.

Convoy PT-113. Convoy PT-113 departed Phnom Penh in two increments; one departed at approximately 1000 hours, 31 January, followed by the second increment at 1800 hours, 2 February. The first increment was composed of two support Cambodia Out of Thailand-Transhipment (SCOOT-T) tugs, four USAID tugs, and three empty USAID barges. The second increment was composed of two SCOOT-T tugs, two POL vessels, and four empty ammunition barges. The first increment proceeded to Neak Luong and then attempted to salvage the vessels Wah On, Han Seung 7 and Port Sun I. All three vessels were found to be severely damaged, and the Wah On and Han Seung 7 were burning. No attempt was made to salvage any of these vessels.

Shortly after the second increment departed Phnom Penh the POL vessel Vira IV reported steering problems and returned to Phnom Penh. The second increment joined the first increment at Neak Luong at 0030 hours, 3 February. At Parallel 22 the convoy sustained an ABF which set the POL vessel Bayon Trader on fire. The vessel was beached, and the crew abandoned ship; MNK escort craft evacuated the crew.

At Parallel 19 the SCOOT-T tug Timberjack was damaged by an underwater explosion, presumed to be some type of underwater mine, and sank. The USAID tugs Hawkeye and Buckeye, which were towing together, experienced an underwater explosion which caused both tugs to sink in the vicinity of Parallel 21. The USAID tug Geronimo sustained serious damage as a result of enemy fire and had to be towed to Tan Chau. The head of the convoy crossed the border at 0630 hours, 3 February, with the tail crossing at 0745 hours. Based on reports from the crew members of the tugs that were sunk, it was concluded that underwater mines had been employed in the Peam Reang choke point.

Convoy TP-114. Based on the losses experienced on the previous convoys with unprotected high silhouette rice and POL vessels, and the mine threat in the Peam Reang Island area, a decision was made to limit this convoy to two ammunition barges and four tugs. The convoy crossed the border at 1200 hours, 5 February. In the vicinity of Parallel 08 (approximately two kilometers west of the border), the convoy received an ABF that resulted in the partial sinking of a river patrol boat (PBR). As a convoy main body approached to within three kilometers of Peam Reang Island, five PBRs preceeding the tugs Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust initiated or were the targets of three underwater explosions. No damages were sustained. Shortly thereafter, there was an underwater explosion to the starboard of the Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust, and both tugs altered

their course, causing them to run aground.

The tug Shinjo Maru, which was towing the tug Shibaura, slipped the lines attaching her to the Shibaura and proceeded toward the position of the Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust to assist them. The Shinjo Maru then struck a mine or was holed by shore fire, causing her to sink. In the meantime, the tugs Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust were maneuvering to free themselves, and they struck a mine which broke them apart with both tugs going aground again. The MNK escort rescued the survivors from the tugs and cut loose the ammunition barge attached to the Asiatic Enterprise. The Shibaura turned around during this time and headed back to Vietnam with her ammunition barge in tow. She safely made it back across the border. The barge from the Asiatic Enterprise was taken under tow by MNK escorts and was returned to Tan Chau.

In summary, during the months of January and February a total of four SCOOT-T tugs, two USAID tugs, fifteen shield barges, two rice vessels, three POL vessels, three miscellaneous barges/junks and a self-propelled barge were lost on the Mekong.

(U) With the intensified ABFs along the river, the KC controlling the choke points, and the mines blocking passage of the Mekong, the convoys ended.

JANUARY-MARCH 1975 KHMER AIRLIFT ACTIVITY (U)

(U) Increased enemy activity in January resulted in the delay of vital Mekong convoy resupply movements to replenish

dwindling critical stocks of materiel in Phnom Penh. Recognizing the need for specific types of munitions items that were rapidly approaching critical stockage levels, action was taken to exercise an option in the Bird Air contract to increase the daily number of resupply sorties from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh to a maximum of 10 per day, pending improvement in the Mekong security situation and the continuation of resupply convoys. (In the past, when Mekong convoys provided the major portion of supplies, the C-130 airlift remined at a low level of activity, averaging about four missions per day.)

(U) Contract Operations. To continue the reduced presence of U.S. military personnel in the Khmer, Bird Air Company had been retained to provide civilian contract crews for the C-130 airlift, effective 8 Oct 74.[1] The company's original strength of five aircrews to fly five daily C-130 sorties, on aircraft provided and maintained by the USAF, was not sufficient to satisfy the rapidly increasing airlift requirements in early 1975.

On 9 January, the airland of munitions began with six airland sorties to Phnom Penh delivering 97.6 S/T. Emphasis on the airlift of munitions continued throughout the remainder of January. An additional requirement for fuel became evident on 16 January. Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery Systems (ABFDS) for C-130 aircraft were obtained from war reserve material stocks stored at Yokota AB, Japan. Delivery of fuel continued until 29 January when a successful Mekong convoy containing two POL tankers arrived

in the Cambodian capital. Between 10-31 January, Bird Air provided from 9 to 12 sorties per day, exceeding the 10 sorties per day surge commitment on three days. The limiting factor on the number of daily sorties was available crew time.

On 5 February, the Khmer Rouge successfully interdicted the Mekong River, thus closing the last surface LOC into Phnom Penh. Just as the Soviets had successfully blocked all rail, water, and highway routes into Berlin in 1948, the Khmer Rouge had now successfully interdicted all surface LOCs into Phnom Penh. Air was the only resupply method available. Two actions were then taken--determination of minimum requirements for MAP-CB materials needed by the Khmer Republic and expansion of the Bird Air contract to lift these materials. It was recognized that expansion of the Bird Air capability to at least 30 airland/airdrop sorties daily would take time. To serve as a stopgap, a commercial contract was issued to two U.S. carriers to provide a capability of lifting 300 tons of ammunition into Phnom Penh daily, using DC-8s. Between 15-26 February, this commercial augmentation was highly successful, lifting 5,229 S/T of ammunition.

(U) It is timely, however, to remember the monumental task faced in attempting to resupply the Khmer Republic by air, even on a limited scale. Fifty C-130s or 25 DC-8s are required to carry the average load of one ammunition barge. Similarly, 80 C-130s or 39 DC-8s are required to equal one POL tanker. Also, 25 C-130s or 13 DC-8s are required to equal one general cargo barge.

Additionally, some commodities, i.e., cranes, large bulldozers, Bailey bridges, could not physically be lifted on the C-130 or DC-8 aircraft. The 5,229 tons of ammunition airlifted into Phnom Penh, requiring 111 sorties, equated to only four and one-half ammunition barges. The best results were on 23 February when 523.5 S/T were delivered on 11 missions.

(U) During this interim, Bird Air continued to hire and train additional crews. By 27 February, Bird Air was adequately manned to sustain 30 C-130 missions daily. Although this was adequate to meet the minimum requirements for military products, the requirements for rice and POL for the civilian sector were equally critical and required greater tonnage.

DC-8/C-130 Trade Off. USAID, the agency responsible for providing all U.S. aid material to Cambodia, then requested the Air Force to contract for airlift to bring in up to 545 metric tons of rice and 120 cubic meters of POL per day. As refugee population increased, the amount of rice required on a daily basis was increased periodically until it reached 700 metric tons per day. To accomplish this, 18 DC-8 aircraft missions daily were required for rice and kerosene. World Airways proposed use of a Boeing 747 as a more economical alternative due to larger capacity. However, engineering estimates of runway and taxiway load bearing capacity mitigated against its use. Analysis of alternatives to implement airlift of USAID commodities to Phnom Penh identified a weak

point, from a cost effectiveness viewpoint, in the delivery of POL. As initially envisioned, USAID POL products would have been transported by contract stretch DC-8s operating between Tan Son Nhut and Pochentong. An analysis of this proposal indicated that it would entail enormous logistical problems in that the POL would have to be moved in containers, such as 55-gallon drums or 500-gallon rubberized containers (seal drums). The DC-8 was not capable of using the ABFDS.

Use of containers necessitated additional time and equipment to fill and empty the containers, the need of a large quantity of containers to permit uninterrupted delivery, movement and storage of pallets and containers within the aerial ports, and the time to load and off load the palletized containers. It was determined that a more cost effective procedure would be the use of C-130 aircraft equipped with the ABFDS. This would expedite aircraft utilization through reduced ground time for loading and unloading, and allow maximum possible flying time, resulting in increased sorties per day. The C-130 alternative required the procurement of bulk POL from the U-Tapao area and, after USAID approval of the concept was obtained, USAID made arrangements to procure bulk POL from the 635th Supply Squadron at U-Tapao. Under this concept, USAID agreed to provide three DC-8 sorties of MAP munitions per day from U-Tapao to Pochentong in return for six C-130 sorties delivering USAID POL.

(U) DC-8 Operations.* The three DC-8s moved from U-Tapao to Tan Son Nhut in Saigon on 27 February. There they initiated the contract airlift of USAID rice and kerosene to Pochentong.

(U) The number of DC-8 missions varied daily depending upon the number of aircraft provided by the carriers (Airlift International, World Airways, Trans International Airways, Flying Tiger Lines, and Seaboard World). Factors affecting these numbers were other commitments, hostile threat at Pochentong, battle damage, and availability and efficiency of the loading crews at Tan Son Nhut. On 18 Mar 75, six DC-8s airlifted 896.8 S/T of rice, 193.2 S/T of ammunition, and 46.9 S/T of kerosene for a record 1,136.9 tons. The most rice delivered to Pochentong in a single day was 1,085.6 S/T airlifted by seven DC-8s on 31 March. The overall performance of the DC-8 contractors was outstanding, particularly in view of the hazards involved.

(U) The performance of the Bird Air crews, operating daily under the most demanding conditions in a hostile environment, was also outstanding. Their best record was on 17 Mar 75 when 34 missions (26 airland and 8 airdrop) were flown. Delivery that day totaled 654.1 S/T of critically needed supplies for Phnom Penh and Neak Luong.

(U) During the quarter, 1,574 rounds of artillery and rocket fire hit Pochentong and the immediate vicinity. The daily average was 15 in January, 8 in February, and 29 in March. In all, there were 710 ABFs between January and March; 433 occurred while U.S.

*Further detailed discussion of contract operations may be found in Chapter VI.

aircraft were on the ground. Fortunately, only minor damage to two DC-8s and five C-130s resulted.

(U) USSAG Tactical Analysis Branch (DOTA) analysts computed probabilities of aircraft damage/loss due to ABFs. These analyses, although dependent upon selective assumptions of enemy intentions, quantified the risks taken during the airlift operations. Rocket patterns and trends were studied by DOTA analysts, both in points of impact and the times of the attacks. Early firings indicated a random haphazard time pattern and gave little evidence that the point of impact could be adjusted to a specific target. By March there was evidence that the ABFs were in response to DC-8 landings. Also, pattern analysis indicated some enemy capability to adjust fire upon a selected point target as captured 105mm howitzers were brought into range of the airport.

(U) When the pressure of rocket attacks exerted by the Khmer insurgents steadily increased at Pochentong, specially coded grid maps were constructed to insure accurate and rapid dissemination of rocket impact points to key staff personnel. Impact patterns were monitored continually and every conceivable step was taken to minimize the probability of losses. These steps included changes in operating patterns, movement of the off-load activities to areas of least impacts, and when prudent, suspension of operations for variable periods of time until favorable changes in the impact pattern could be discerned.[2]

(U) Command and Control. Command and control over the entire airlift operation and key operational decisions were made through the USSAG Tactical Air Control Center (TACC/Blue Chip). Initially the Thai Airlift Control Center (ALCC) at U-Tapao provided sufficient airlift liaison for Blue Chip. As airlift operations expanded, cargo control teams (CCT) were flown into Phnom Penh on the first C-130 each day and out on the last flight of the day to provide additional on-scene command and control. While at Pochentong, the CCT provided aircraft control, communications, threat assessments, and served as a backup for the control tower.

(U) As the volume of traffic increased, a 7AF Supervisor of Airlift (SOA) was deemed necessary and four officers with airlift background were brought in TDY from Clark Air Base. The SOA and CCT members remained overnight in Phnom Penh on a rotational basis. This control was necessary to effect a rapid turnaround of the increasing traffic at Pochentong.

(U) As the total scope of operations increased to include contract DC-8s flying out of Saigon, special airlift teams were established in Blue Chip to insure continued close control and effective working relationships. A 7AF SOA was also established in Saigon in order to effect necessary coordination between the C-130 and DC-8 operational schedules to Pochentong. The Saigon SOA expanded to a five-man operation when it also became responsible for the mammoth task of scheduling the airlift support for

OPERATION BABYLIFT and the Vietnam evacuation flights.

(U) Contracts Terminated. DC-8 airlift operations to Cambodia were terminated 14 April.[3]

In view of SECDEF action terminating all Military Assistance Program-Cambodia (MAP-CB) shipments, JCS requested termination of the Bird Air contract within 48 hours of receipt of their 19 April message.[4] The contract was terminated 20 April.[5]

(U) Approximately 56,300 S/T were delivered this quarter in 2,142 missions. In comparison to last quarter, this represented a 678 percent increase in the number of missions and a 1,692 percent increase in the tonnage delivered.

(U) Airland missions into Pochentong tallied 1,780 delivering approximately 52,370 S/T of supplies. There were 63 airland missions last quarter. Rocket and howitzer attacks on the airfield caused an ammunition dump fire (on 13 March) and 87 C-130 missions and 69 DC-8 missions were cancelled as a result of incoming fire.

KHMER AIRLIFT SUMMARY (U)

(U) The American airlift to the Khmer Republic--airland and airdrop--resulted in another significant chapter in U.S. airpower response. During the two years and six days of operation (11 Apr 73 to 17 Apr 75), 162,514 S/T of critically needed ammunition, rice, POL, and general cargo were delivered to Cambodia.

(U) The sustained airlift support began on 11 Apr 73 with USAF C-130s transporting JP-4 to Pochentong. Until 14 Aug 73, when U.S. combat operations in Cambodia ended, 20,418 S/T of cargo

were airlifted. However, the cessation of combat operations did not stop the airlift support.

(U) From 15 Aug 73 through 17 Apr 75, 7,876 missions were flown delivering 142,096 S/T of supplies. The mix of airland and airdrop missions varied, dependent upon hostile operations affecting the use of the Mekong River by supply convoys. C-130 and DC-8 airland missions during the period totaled 5,413, while 2,463 C-130 airdrop missions were flown (data on the number of missions prior to 15 Aug 73 not available).

(U) Airdrop. The aerial resupply of the Khmer Republic resulted in the largest sustained airdrop effort in USAF history (more than three times the tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh in 1968).

(U) Twenty-five important isolated provincial enclaves, including Kompong Seila and Neak Luong, were sustained by airdrops of 38,693 S/T of ammunition and rice. Approximately 98 percent of the bundles delivered were reported recoverable on small drop zones, some with less than a 500-meter radius of security from hostile forces. Significantly, these airdrops were made from altitudes above 10,000 feet using the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) and Station Keeping Equipped (SKE) C-130s with the 26-foot ring slot high velocity parachute delivering up to 16 one-ton bundles.

(U) In February 1974, the high altitude free fall of rice was successfully tested in the soft soil at Chand[illegible]ge in

Thailand. However, a combat evaluation was flown in the Khmer on 23 Apr 74, with the conclusion that 95 percent of the rice was unusable due to pulverization and ruptured bags.

The major problem in the airdrop operation was a five to seven percent streamer rate. In April 1974, high level interest in the streamer rate resulted in tests to determine causes. High speed film coverage showed the primary cause of streamers was bundle collision after exits from the aircraft. The collisions frequently resulted in tangled shroud lines or collapsed parachutes. Various corrective actions had little effect in improving the streamer rate which remained about six percent. (There were 377 streamers between 1 Jan-17 Apr 75, six percent of the total drops. However, all but 14 of the streamers hit the drop zone.)[6] When considering the adverse environment of the high altitude, high velocity delivery system, being flown under operational conditions, the 94 percent chute reliability was considered extremely successful.

(U) From 1 Jan-17 Apr 75, 6,334 bundles were dropped. Only 20 of the bundles having good chutes missed the drop zone. (Twelve bundles were lost due to AWADS computer malfunctions.) This was a 99.7 percent success rate.[7] This high success rate demonstrated the skill and professional ability of the crews in using the AWADS equipment to compute and attain accurate drop release points. Additionally, the accuracy of determining

release points was improved by computation and refinement of ballistic winds by the USSAG Weather Division.[8]

(U) Airland. Supplies airlanded into the Khmer totaled 123,621 S/T. C-130 airland missions were flown into Pochentong, Ream, Chhnaeng, Cham, and Battambang in the early days of the operations. However, beginning in mid-1974, all C-130 airland missions were into Pochentong as were the DC-8s during January-April 1975. In January 1975, with the interdicting of the Mekong River, Phnom Penh became completely dependent upon U.S. airlift to provide life sustaining supplies of rice, ammunition, and fuel. The last mission into Pochentong was 11 Apr 75, one day prior to the execution of EAGLE PULL, the noncombatant emergency evacuation.*

(U) Environment. The resupply of Phnom Penh was carried out in the daily environment of deadly rocket and howitzer attacks by the Khmer Rouge. Thus, the Cambodian setting was in marked contrast to the Berlin airlift with which many chose to compare the Cambodian resupply operations. Actually, the hostile environs of Dien Bien Phu or Khe Sanh would be more comparable.

(U) More than 2,500 rounds impacted on or near the Pochentong airfield between 1 Jan-17 Apr 75. There were eight instances of minor to moderate shrapnel damage to aircraft. Although no American lives were lost, nine members of the Cambodian military and civilian off-load crews were killed and approximately 40 were wounded. (See also pg x).

*The execution of EAGLE PULL, 12 Apr 75, will be the subject of a separate account in the next USSAG/7AF History.

(U) Termination. The final Khmer airlift support mission, an airdrop, was flown 17 Apr 75, when a Bird Air C-130 completed a rice drop to Kompong Chhnang.[9]

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

1. USSAG/7AF History (TS/NFD) 1 Oct-31 Dec 74, pgs 94-95.

2. Msg (U), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPAC (and others), 230530Z Apr 75, Subj: Khmer Airlift Summary.

3. Msg (C), MAC to JCS, 150630Z Apr 75, Subj: DC-8 Cambodian Operation (U).

4. Msg (C), JCS to CSAF, 190035Z Apr 75, Subj: Termination of Bird Air Contract (U).

5. Msg (C), CINCPACAF to PACAF Procurement Center, Bangkok, 191830Z Apr 75, Subj: Termination of Bird Air Contract (U).

6. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPACAF, 210845Z Apr 75, Subj: None.

7. Ibid

8. USSAG/7AF History, 1 Oct-31 Dec 74 (TS/NFD), pg 74.

9. Same as Footnote #2.

CHAPTER III

PERSONNEL

MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)

Pipeline Reinstituted. On 22 Jan 75, USSAG notified all services that effective immediately the personnel pipeline for USSAG/7AF would be reinstituted.[1] Replacements would be requested from the services to satisfy minimum manning requirements beyond FY75. Requisitions to all services were prepared and forwarded by 11 Feb 75. Earliest replacements are expected in May 1975.

Strength. The military strength for USSAG dropped from the 31 Dec 74 figure of 344 to 334 on 31 Mar 75. 7AF strength for the same reporting period increased by 1 from 74 to 75.[2]

(U) USSAG/7AF strength breakdown by branch of service is reflected in Figure 5.

PLANS AND PROGRAMS (U)

(U) Individual Awards and Decorations. The USSAG Awards and Decorations Board considered 59 recommendations for decorations. The board recommended one Medal of Honor be downgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross; recommended approval of four Legion of Merits; recommended approval of five Meritorious Service Medals; recommended approval of 45 Joint Service Commendation Medals;

USSAG/7AF RESERVE MILITARY STRENGTH
AS OF 31 MAR 73
BY SERVICE BRANCH



Figure 3

recommended disapproval of three Joint Service Commendation Medals and recommended approval of one Air Force Commendation Medal.

(U) Air Force Assistance Fund Drive. The FY75 Air Force Assistance Fund Drive was conducted 1-15 Mar 75. A total of USSAC/7AF contributions totaled $516.05. Contributions from this drive assisted the Air Force Aid Society, Air Force Village and Air Force Enlisted Widows Home Foundation.

HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION (U)

(U) Dormitories. Turn-in of excess equipment and furniture, i.e., beds, dressers, refrigerators, etc., continued. Due to unprojected gains this quarter, the unit obtained one additional dormitory (Bldg 2278) on 6 Mar 75. Through self-help, the dormitory was renovated in 13 days and presently houses 16 personnel.

(U) Self-help upgrade actions in the remaining dormitories continued. Renovation of the rooms in Building 2288 was completed 1 Feb 75. Renovation of Building 2285 will commence about 15 Apr 75, again using self-help, with an estimated completion date of 15 May 75.

(U) Presently 61 rooms in 13 buildings provide a maximum of 294 bed spaces of which 259 are currently in use. It is anticipated that this total will not significantly change during FY75.

(U) Discipline. One individual remained on International Hold as a result of his arrest by Thai authorities in Udorn,

Thani for possession of heroin. He has appeared in Thai civil court three times; however, disposition of his case has not yet been made.

(U) Disciplinary actions increased. Article 15 action was taken against three individuals, and three Letters of Reprimand were issued.

(U) Three personnel are presently being carried in the Weight Control Program. Two were continued in the program from the previous quarter and the third was added in late January. All are progressing satisfactorily.

(U) Training. A decrease of one individual in On-the-Job Training was experienced. The total on OJT is now six. Phase II Race Relations Training and Drug/Alcohol Abuse Control Education continued to be the most active training area. A total of 63 individuals completed training in these areas.

(U) Administration. A new base regulation governing basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) was received.[3] It established, for the first time, a basewide policy for BAS eligibility. The most significant change is that final approval authority now rests with the base commander, whereas previously, unit commanders had final approval authority.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

1. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF DP to AFMPC (and others), 220300Z Jan 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF Personnel Pipeline Reinstitution (U).

2. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF DPM to COMUSMACTHAI, 010915Z Mar 75, Subj: Strength Report/USSAG/CINCPAC RCS 5314-2 (U).

3. Base Regulation 177-3, 28 Feb 1975, Subj: Basic Allowance for subsistence (BAS).

CHAPTER IV

INTELLIGENCE

PLANS AND SUPPORT (U)

During this period, the Plans and Support Division (INP) was engaged in two major areas of endeavor: (1) planning for noncombatant emergency and evacuation (NEMVAC) operations in Cambodia and Vietnam, and (2) participating in developing numerous options which addressed long term U.S. force levels in Thailand, with special emphasis on follow-on command structure (i.e., disposition of USSAG/7AF).

EAGLE PULL. In January, INP disseminated applicable changes to the contingency plan (CONPLAN) which provided photographic and descriptive coverage of helicopter landing zones (HLZs) in Phnom Penh and other key Cambodian locations. INP also coordinated intelligence support requirements for the EAGLE PULL battle staff and briefed tactical units at NKP scheduled to support EAGLE PULL operations.

On 22 March, JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy an additional CVA/CV to the Gulf of Thailand for increased EAGLE PULL requirements.[1] In anticipation of CTF 77 requirements for CONPLAN tabs containing photos and descriptions of the HLZs, INP reproduced 10 copies of the tabs and provided them to a CTF 77 representative on 25 March. (See also pgs 91-96).

TALON VISE. A 214-page document was compiled as tabs to

provide photos and descriptions of 101 landing zones for COMPLAN 5060V. Intensive examination of all source materials was required to insure accuracy and completeness of the document. The hand-held photography and descriptive data on the HLZs/airfields provided by Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon was compared with 1:50,000 charts, city plans, high altitude vertical photography and other source data. This analysis paid off, as the locations of several LZs were found to be incorrectly identified. Appropriate corrections were incorporated into the final document. Several additional HLZs were added. Most of the additions were in MR-IV, since the majority of extraction points for that region were airfields. It was felt that airfields would be likely primary targets for enemy activity and therefore identification of alternate HLZs could be a useful additional planning factor. All changes and additions were communicated to DAO Saigon, both informally via telephone and by formal correspondence.[2]

In support of TALON VISE contingency planning, South Vietnam analysts presented four special briefings in March to the USSAG staff on the current situation in South Vietnam. Briefings also included assessment of probable enemy courses of action.

TALON BLADE. A review of photographic tabs for the RENVAC plan for Laos was also initiated. To improve reproduction capability, INP requested the original negatives from the American Embassy, Vientiane. Duplicate photos and negative were produced for permanent retention by USSAG/7AF and the originals were returned.

TALON EAGLE. Responding to CINCPAC guidance,[3] INP served as the J-2 point of contact for changes to USSAG/7AF OPlan J-0001, TALON EAGLE. Changes this quarter involved the inclusion of North Vietnam (NVN) counter-air threat to U.S. interdiction and close air support operations in RVN, as well as reformatting of the entire input in accordance with the Joint Operational Planning System. This information was compiled as a revised annex to the OPlan and provided to USSAG's Contingency Plans Branch.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

Analyses Activities. On 14 January, a Vietnam analyst responded to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analit concerning the North Vietnam 1975 dry season infiltration effort.[4] On 22 January, an analit was prepared assessing the enemy threat against Hue City. The assessment concluded that a major offensive against the city would probably not occur until March. Probable enemy tactics, routes of approach and chance of success were discussed.[5]

( ) Military trends, a tactical assessment of NVA capabilities and possible courses of action in MR III were discussed in a 17 March analit.[6]

On 24 March, North Vietnam analysts prepared an analit, which discussed the anomalies observed in the current infiltration offensive. Basic knowledge was reviewed and hypotheses presented to explain the possible new developments in the North Vietnam

infiltration efforts.[7]

Assessments. On 8 January, Vietnam analysts prepared an assessment of enemy plans, capabilities and objectives in MR-III. This assessment was published in the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) for that date.

In an effort to validate NVA/VC strength holdings, Vietnam analysts prepared a gains/losses assessment of Communist force since 1967 in South Vietnam. Data was provided to the USSAG deputy com

) In March, the Vietnam section prepared an assessment of the military threat to Laos. This assessment was provided as an input for the revised TALON BLADE Operations Plan.

In response to the deteriorating situation in northern South Vietnam, analysts prepared papers on comparison of forces in Thua Thien Province on 20 March and a comparison of forces in Quang Nam Province on 25 March for COMUSSAG and the principal staff members.

( ) JCRC Assessment. During the quarter, South Vietnam analysts prepared one threat assessment and three update assessments on a proposed JCRC recovery operation in Khanh Hoa Province, South Vietnam.

To clarify enemy Order of Battle (OB) in South Vietnam, the Vietnam desk published its Communist OB holdings on Communists forces in South Vietnam on 12 Feb 75.[9]

Cambodian Analysts Activities. Cambodian analysts prepared reports on the military situation in Cambodia and assessments of enemy plans and capabilities for inclusion in the DISUM and Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). The Southeast Asia INTSUM was instituted 10 February as part of USSAG intelligence support to units responsible for EAGLE PULL execution.[10]

DAO Phnom Penh Support. A Cambodia analyst went TDY to DAO Phnom Penh from 6 Dec 74 - 11 Jan 75 to replace the DAO intelligence analyst, while the latter was on leave. During the TDY, the analyst was responsible for providing intelligence support to DAO, the country team and DIA. In addition, he prepared daily briefings for the ambassador and the country team.[11] Analysts also provided detailed Khmer Communist OB information on three occasions to the DAO analysts.[12]

EAGLE PULL Support. Two complete Khmer Communist OB listings were provided to the U.S. Third Marine Division.[13] Production of the INTSUM was increased from a 24-hour to a 12-hour basis. A briefing on the dry season offensive and projections of probable enemy courses of action for the remainder of the dry season was presented to the EAGLE PULL planning conference at USSAG, 31 Jan-2 Feb 75. Informal briefings were made to intelligence officers from Thailand-based units with EAGLE PULL responsibilities. Specifically, aircrews of the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW), 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), and 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) were briefed.

Cambodian Analysts. Three analysts were assigned during the quarter. They treated the course of the dry season offensive, enemy capabilities in the changing tactical situation and probable enemy courses of action during the remainder of the dry season.[14]

Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) Evaluation. Analysts prepared a detailed survey of the comparability of information gained through ARDF and other sensitive sources for the January-February time frame during the 1974 and 1975 KC dry season offensives.[15]

Special Study. At the request of the Command Section, analysts prepared the intelligence input, and collated inputs from other staff agencies, for a special study designed to compare the 1974 and 1975 dry season offensives from both the friendly and enemy perspectives. The study was provided to Major General John N.D. Cleland, Jr., Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[16]

Reconnaissance Evaluation. In support of a USSAG and national evaluation of the utilization of resources and impact of possible cutbacks, Cambodia analysts prepared a report each month on significant results obtained from tactical reconnaissance flights over Cambodia.[17]

Other Special Studies. Due to the interest in the possible use of Route 5 as an alternate supply corridor into Cambodia, analysts prepared two threat assessments on Route 5 between Battambang and the Thai/Cambodia border.[18] Cambodia analysts also prepared an intelligence input for a requested Pacific Air

Forces (PACAF) study on the feasibility of using CBU-55 ordnance in support of Mekong River convoys.[19] Acting on a request from the Command Section, analysts evaluated a PACAF High Command Intelligence Report which discussed the enemy dry season strategy.[20]

LIMDIS/WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED) Air Capabilities. The first quarter of 1975 was highlighted by the deployment of the Kien An-based MIG-17 regiment to Bai Thuong Airfield and the subsequent deployment of elements of the regiment to Dong Hoi and Vinh Airfields; the deployment of SA-2 battalions below the 19th parallel; the dramatic increase in SA-7 hit and kill ratios against VNAF aircraft; and the continued expansion of AAA/SA-7 operating areas throughout South Vietnam.

Air Order of Battle. The entire regiment of MIG-17s based at Kien An Airfield deployed to Bai Thuong Airfield during the month of January. The move was accomplished in two phases, one in early January and the other during the latter part of the month. Based on last year's deployment activity below the 20th parallel, this deployment had been expected. However, the size of the deployment (the entire regiment) was a complete surprise. Surprises continued into February and March, when the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) moved contingents of Bai Thuong-based MIG-17s into Dong Hoi and Vinh Airfields. Four MIG-17s were deployed to Vinh in the latter part of February and four were deployed to Dong Hoi in two phases, early and mid-March. In the past, the NVAF had not deployed MIGs into these two airfields until the summer months.

The most noteworthy change in the NVAF OB was the delivery in early February of eight MIG-19s from the Peoples Republic of China. This increased the number of MIG-19s in their inventory to 78. The number of MIG 21s in the inventory remained unchanged at 71, but the number of MIG-15/17s decreased from 113 to 112. MIGs continued to operate out of Dong Suong, Kep, Phuc Yen and Yen Bai. Bai Thuong replaced Kien An as an operating base late in January. Dong Hoi and Vinh again became active MIG deployment bases.

Analysis of 6 March GIANT SCALE photography revealed that only 1,320 feet of PSP had been applied to the northeast end of the runway to Dong Hoi. This may have been enough PSP to allow the North Vietnamese to deploy MIGs to the airfield during the rainy season. Shortly after the photography was taken, MIG-17s were deployed to Dong Hoi.

Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle.

Further analysis of 28 Nov 74 and 2 Dec 74 GIANT SCALE photography revealed that NVN completed deployment of all 12 SA-3 sites to defend the area around Hanoi. All key population centers in NVN remained under SA-2 coverage. GIANT SCALE photography on 6 March revealed at least one SA-2 regiment in the process of moving below the 19th parallel. This move was interpreted to be protection of air assets in this area, or in light of recent developments, to establish control over newly acquired territories.

There were 25 SA-7 firing incidents with 26 missiles launched against VNAF aircraft during the quarter. Five firings took place in MR II, eight in MR III, nine in MR IV, and three in Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia. Of the 25, 18 were successful in hitting VNAF aircraft. Of the 18 aircraft hits, 14 aircraft were destroyed. A breakdown of destroyed aircraft follows: nine A-37s, three UH-1s, one F5-A, and one CH-47. The North Vietnamese have improved their hit ratio to 72 percent, and their kill ratio to 58.5 percent. This compares to a ratio of 33.3 percent and 23 percent, respectively, during the last quarter. As a result of the success of NVN against VNAF aircraft during this quarter, three new SA-7 operating areas have been established, two in MR II and one in MR III. Also, four SA-7 operating areas were expanded, two each in MR II and MR III. The increased hit ratio of the SA-7 firings by the NVN may be attributed to a combination of an improved SA-7 missile, better trained SA-7 crews, and an increased aggressiveness on the part of the VNAF.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Order of Battle. There were 113 reported incidents of AAA firings against VNAF aircraft, and 115 VNAF aircraft were hit by these firings. During the quarter, 15 VNAF aircraft were shot down by AAA. Losses included: seven A-37s, four UH-1s, one F5-A, two O-1s and one CH-47. As a result of these incidents, nine new AAA operating areas were established in South Vietnam. One area was in MR I, seven in MR II and one in MR III. Four operating areas in MR III and one in MR I

were also expanded or combined.

Air Activity over Thailand. There was increased unidentified air activity around the NKP area. There were human intelligence (HUMINT) reports of helicopter landings six times in Nam Dong, Thailand, vicinity VE 3837. The wreckage of a small aircraft, black in color with no identification markings, was found in the vicinity of Non-Saard and Ban Pluei, approximately 140 nautical miles southwest of NKP. On 28 February, a small single engine aircraft was observed crossing into Thailand from Laos at 1900L. Between 28 February and 4 March, helicopters were reported to have flown very low and slow between the hours of 1900-2100 local, vicinity VE 5036, 19 nautical miles northwest of NKP. From 11 February to 27 March unidentified air activity was reported in the NKP area on 15 separate nights. This activity was reported by HUMINT sources. In addition to these reports, radar facilities at NKP noted unidentified tracks on several evenings between 11 February and 28 March. The unidentified track activity was seen on INVERT, radar approach control, and weather radar scopes, increasing the validity of the activity reported. Most tracks were in northeast Thailand, with many disappearing after transiting from Thailand into Laos.

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE (U)

On 9 February, CINCPAC verbally directed USSAG to obtain photo coverage of the LZs designated for use in EAGLE PULL. This coverage was obtained on 11 February. Coverage had previously been

obtained of Phnom Penh and the surrounding area. Photos or photo mosaics of these areas were provided to all organizations involved in the anticipated operation.

During this quarter 227 RF-4 missions were flown, 203 in Cambodia and 24 in RVN. The 24 missions in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) represent a significant increase in tactical reconnaissance activity in that country.

Major events which received photo reconnaissance coverage included the defense and eventual abandonment of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot in South Vietnam, and the closing of the Mekong River as a supply route to Phnom Penh. Many missions were flown in an attempt to locate the rocket firing positions used against the Khmer capital and Pochentong Airfield.

Attempts were made to use two noteworthy new products to improve reconnaissance results: underwater detection film and camouflage detection film.

Underwater Detection Film. An inquiry into the use of underwater detection film to locate obstacles, barriers and mines in the Mekong River was initiated.[21] CINCPAC concurred,[22] and Kodak and GAF film were obtained for use in the tests. A test mission was flown on 28 February, using GAF film in a KS-72 camera on an RF-4 at 6000 feet. The film was shipped to the 546 Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) for processing and interpretation. Results proved negative; water penetration was slight. Objects above the water were less visible on the underwater detection film than on

the normal film used in a KA-91 camera.[23]

The second test flight was performed on 18 March using GAF film in one KS-72 camera and Kodak film in the other KS-72 with results essentially the same as those from the first flight.[24] This failure to obtain the desired results was apparently due to high silt content in the Mekong River. USSAG recommended discontinuing the tests.[25] CINCPAC concurred[26] and testing was halted in late March.

Camouflage Detection Film. CINCPAC J-3 suggested that camouflage detection film be used to locate the Khmer Communist's artillery and rocket firing positions around Phnom Penh and Pochentong Airfield. USSAG/IN concurred and a test flight was flown on 27 March. Dual coverage was obtained of areas containing suspected firing positions by using the camouflage detection film in a KA-91 camera and black and white film in KS-72 cameras aboard the same aircraft.[28] A second RF-4 was to provide comparative black and white coverage of the areas using the KA-91 camera, but the camera on the second aircraft malfunctioned.

(U) The camouflage detection film was sent to the 548 Reconnaissance Technical Group at Hickam AFB for processing. It was determined to be out-of-date and the test was declared invalid.[29] Further tests will be scheduled when usable film is received.[30]

Photographic Processing and Exploitation Requirements in SEA. The chief of the Reconnaissance Branch participated in a joint PACAF/AFLC survey chartered to determine future photo

processing and exploitation facility requirements in Southeast Asia. The result of the 11-22 February survey was a recommendation for relocation of one-half Photographic Processing and Interpretation Facility (PPIF) to U-Tapao to process RF-4 film and utilization of the 307th Strategic Wing photo lab to process BUFFALO HUNTER film.[31] Subsequent communications resulted in CINCPACAF recommending that the one-half PPIF be relocated to Korat vice U-Tapao, along with the remaining RF-4 aircraft.[32] IN concurred with the exception of moving the 14th PPIF from Udorn. The Collections Division recommendation was to obtain a rehabilitated one-half PPIF from AFLC and return the 14th PPIF to the U.S. for rehabilitation. This change would eliminate the 4-6 month delay required to move and rehab the 14th, during which no PPIF would be operational in this theater.[33]

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (U).

Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR). Three ICRs were generated. One ICR on enemy threat to airfields in South Vietman was generated in response to USSAG analytical requirements. This was levied on the 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIGp), 7602nd Air Intelligence Group, and DAO Saigon under ICR control number U-UPE-U1954.[34] Another ICR, U-UPE-34537, was levied on DAO Vientiane requesting information from two sources in response to USSAG analytical requirements.[35] ICR U-UPR-U1955, which covered military assistance to North Vietnam was generated by DAO Saigon and given a USSAG control number.[36] This was the first time DAO Saigon had generated an ICR.

Additionally, six ICR supplement messages were sent requesting collectors emphasize the need for locating the NVA 10th and 320th Divisions, enemy use of armored personnel carriers, possible deployment of SA-2s to MR III, possibility of the KC having 37mm guns and possible use of Khmer Kroms as replacements for KC forces in the dry season offensive.[37]

The average number of information reports received per month during the quarter was 307. Between 10-15 percent were evaluated.

Prisoner of War (PW) Data. A detention facility was reported by the 500th MIGp in the U Minh Forest, South Vietnam (VR 97 46).[38] This facility was allegedly there for five years. As JCRC is interested in any PW camp holdings for the purpose of casualty resolution, the 500th MIGp report was forwarded to them. There were aerial photos taken of this camp and copies have been requested from DIA.

The 7602nd reported that there was no PW camp at WU 975 015[39] as originally reported by the 500th MIGp in April 1974.[40] Also, the 500th reported that there was no PW camp at WS 00 74[41] as was originally reported by DAO Saigon in November 1973.[42]

(U) The Collections Branch (INCC) continued to maintain a complete data base on alleged PW camps still containing U.S. personnel in SEA.

INCC began a file on Charles Dean, an American, and Neil Sharman, an Australian, who were captured while traveling

in Laos and are currently being held by the Pathet Lao.

Miscellaneous. INCC wrote an evaluation on Project 0710-14K, a bilateral operation run by the 500th MI Group and Unit 701 of the Vietnamese Navy.[43] The evaluation stated that the information was helpful in monitoring enemy logistics activity, but of little help in monitoring the tactical situation.

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (U)

ARDF. The 60-day test to evaluate the intelligence value of ARDF ended 15 Jan 75. The test data was consolidated and analyzed by J-2 personnel, and a final test report was issued 11 February. The result was a strong endorsement of the ARDF program, and a recommendation to the Pacific Command (PACOM) that U-21 LAFFING EAGLE sorties be retained in support of USSAG intelligence assessments in the Khmer War.[44]

USSAG's evaluation to PACOM stressed that ARDF played a vital role in compiling an intelligence estimate of the KC forces. General locational continuity was maintained on KC entities through ARDF. This information assisted USSAG in assessing the scope, timing and direction of the dry season offensive. In several instances ARDF provided unique and essential information, obtainable through no other source in the time frame required. Continuity on key terminals improved markedly during the test period. KC terminals were located through ARDF an average of every 24 days, while "Command Interest" terminals (those which USSAG regarded as critical to the intelligence assessment) were located on an average of

every 10 days. The fix rate per hour was 1.0, the highest for the U-21 ARDF effort since the beginning of Khmer missions in May 1974. Availability of aircraft also improved significantly. During the test period, the rate of effective hours over target was 92 percent of the total hours tasked -- also the highest figure for U-21 Khmer missions over a comparable period of time.

(U) The task management system, stressing a management by objectives concept, was retained, and was included as a permanent feature of USSAG Operation Order 75-1, dated 12 Mar 75. The system proved ideal for the management of an ARDF program with limited resources, a requirement for high target selectivity, and possessing rapid secure communications among the units involved and the program.

USSAG's evaluation was supported by the National Security Agency (NSA) which stated that ARDF had been a valuable aid to technical continuity.[45] On the basis of the USSAG and NSA assessments, COMUSSAG recommended that the LAFFING EAGLE effort, consisting of four U-21s flying an average of two sorties per day, be retained in support of USSAG's intelligence requirements.[46]

(U) In February, DIA requested that PACOM provide its evaluation of the ARDF effort.[47] Relying largely on the USSAG evaluation, PACOM strongly supported the retention of the LAFFING EAGLE effort, but recommended that LEFT JAB aircraft be returned to U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) for disposition.[48]

In March, DIA queried PACOM concerning the advisability of continuing LAFFING EAGLE sorties in the event that U.S. Embassy personnel were evacuated from Phnom Penh.[49] The USSAG response

indicated that JCS guidance would be appropriate.[50] PACOM concurred with this recommendation to DIA, adding that ARDF resources currently supporting the Khmer War could later be used to cover Thai insurgent activities, or returned to USASA for disposition.[51] On 31 March the JCS directed that LAFFING EAGLE missions be continued in support of the war effort, but be suspended upon implementation of EAGLE PULL. JCS also directed that the LEFT JAB aircraft be returned to USASA.[52]

The LAFFING EAGLE program continued its valuable intelligence support to USSAG. According to an evaluation performed between 16 January-12 March, Khmer entities were fixed on an average of every 13 days, and "Command Interest" terminals on an average of every 4.3 days, the most favorable statistics compiled by U-2ls. The fix rate per hour stood at 1.2, while effective hours over target were 93 percent. Overall, USSAG had a higher confidence level concerning the location of KC entities than at any previous time.

TARGETING (U)

Special Reports. Since October 1974, the Targets Division has been involved in preparing a Weekly Logistics Report utilizing all source intelligence. The report covers North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Personnel from each branch have been assigned reporting responsibilities. Contents of the Logistics Report include such items as NVA/VC ammo expenditures, cargo

shipments destined for South Vietnam, POL activity in North Vietnam and North Vietnamese merchant shipping and rail activity. Articles which have been included in various editions include: NVA logistics unit organization, unit moves and logistics movements, South Vietnam Western Highlands Logistics Corridor (status and activity), NC logistics routes, storage areas, transshipment points, NC ordnance movements and ammunition reserves and expenditures. Several articles have been sent to the national intelligence community in the form of analits. The Tactical Targets Branch (INTT) prepared two reports for the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC). The first was a list of target materials, equipment and support documents which would be transferred to CINCPAC should USSAG be disestablished. The second was a comprehensive study of the use and effectiveness of the CBU-55 in a SEA environment.[53] The Targets Development Branch (INTD) submitted a BUFFALO HUNTER Imagery Interpretation Report to various agencies on 15 February and made several other reports to amplify essential elements of information noted on film.[54]

In response to a request from the USSAG deputy commander, INTD prepared a report on NC ammunition expenditures which was subsequently incorporated into an analit on the NC ordnance logistics system. Another analit was written on the utilization of southern Laos Logistics Corridor.

OPlan Maintenance. The ARC LIGHT Branch (INTS) provided a revised and updated targets list for the PRIME NIT OPlan, which differed considerably from the previous list. The new list

reflected the increased lucrativeness of selected targets and was again prioritized to reflect the actual damage which would be accomplished using the currently available strike force. B-52 target list changes amounted to 15 deleted targets and 23 added. INTT also prepared an updated target list for this plan using current intelligence based on an increased photo recce effort. Priority of targets in the new list was determined by a combined formula of total square feet of storage space, number of buildings, and density of buildings/storage within the target area. A new target list for the TENNIS RACKET OPlan, which considers time sensitivity of targets, was forwarded to CINCPAC.

DAO Saigon was provided a list of all RVN ARC LIGHT targets in the USSAG Target Data Bank. The list and its release were coordinated with CINCPAC and DIA. Contents of the list included target name, military region location and UTM coordinates.[55] INTT also reviewed the TALON SWIVEL, TALON EAGLE and EAGLE PULL plans for target intelligence updates.[56]

Staff Assistance. INTD visited the 432 Reconnaissance Technical Squadron in January and obtained photography of ambush points and barricades along the Mekong River between the RVN border and Doi Doh, Cambodia. This was taken to DAO Phnom Penh.[57] INTT conducted staff assistance visits to the 432 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), 388TFW and 347TFW at Udorn and Korat for the purpose of coordinating target intelligence production matters and providing the wings with needed targeting materials and assistance.

War Gaming Simulations. INT updated simulations of the PRIME KIT and TENNIS RACKET OPlans using current weather information and new targets and targeting data.[59]

Weapons Orientation Course. Staff assistance visits revealed that trained targets officers were not available at the tactical wings, even though two officers were authorized for each wing. Newly arrived personnel filling these slots lacked formal training in target intelligence and weaponeering. To alleviate this problem, INT directed a weapons orientation course (28-30 January) for AFSC 8086 officers of tactical units and 13AF. A total of eight personnel attended the course. Specifically, the course covered:

a. Basic weaponeering terminology, documents and delivery accuracy parameters.

b. Weapons and fusing characteristics/limitations.

c. Target vulnerability and weapon selection.

(1) Damage mechanisms.

(2) Target analysis.

d. Functioning and use of WANG Weaponeering Computer and IBM Printer.

e. Familiarization tour of INVERT Ground Directed Bombing (GDB) Facility (Det 5, 621 TCS) to include GDB delivery techniques and equipment orientation.[60]

Weaponeering. Targets added to the target data banks were weaponeered for optimum weapon selection and fusing. Weaponeering analysis was prepared on:

a. Comparison between the CBU-14, CBU-15, and BLU-32.

b. Comparison of the effectiveness of the CBU-52 and CBU-58 against personnel.

c. Comparison of the CBU-24, MK-82 (with instantaneous fuse) and MK-82 (with proximity fuse) against targets in an aquatic or delta region.[61]

Briefings. Beginning in mid-January, INED prepared and presented weekly briefings on the status and activity in the western Highlands Logistics Corridor and/or the Southern Laos Logistics Corridor (SLLC). During February, the PACAF inspector general and the U.S. Defense Attache, Vientiane, were briefed on the SLLC. The USSAG staff was briefed on 12-13 March on KC ammunition expenditures, basic loads and ammo receipts during the 1974 and 1975 dry season offensives. Briefings were also presented on the status of strategic and tactical targets maintained by INTS and INTT. An NVN POL status update briefing was presented to the chief, Targets Division and selected staff officers.

) Special Study. The chief of INT prepared a study recommending the use of C-130 aircraft with night sensor equipment to detect KC and VC/NVA logistics movements in selected low threat areas of Cambodia and South Vietnam. These unarmed aircraft flights would not violate the cease fire protocols. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn after consideration of political factors, long lead time required for implementation, and the then-pending tactical situation.

INDICATIONS (U)

(U) With the increased tactical activity in SEA during the quarter, the message traffic in the special intelligence (SI) category increased from a daily average of 180 in January to a daily average of 230 by the end of March. Revised distribution methods of SI message distribution led to a savings of approximately $1000 per month in Xerox copying during the quarter.

A system for MIG Threat Warning to the VNAF was implemented in January to notify VNAF when foreknowledge of adverse intentions was obtained concerning aircraft movement and notification of any aircraft reaching 17 degrees north on a southerly heading.[62]

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 221544Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

2. Ltr (C), USSAG/7AF/IN to USDAO SGN, 20 Mar 75, Subj: Tabs A-E, Appendix 4, Annex N, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060V (U)

3. Ltr (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 5 Dec 74, Subj: USSAG/7AF OPLAN J-0001 (U).

4. Msg (S/CW), AFSSO NKP to SSODIA/DI-6, 141100Z Jan 75, Subj: NVN Personnel Infiltration (U)

5. Msg (S/CW/NFD), AFSSO NKP to SSOPACOM/J-2, 220500Z Jan 75, Subj: South Vietnam - Special Threat Assessment - Hue City (U).

6. Msg (S/CW/NFD), AFSSO NKP to SSOPACOM (and others), 171215Z Mar 75, Subj: USSAG Analysts' Tactical Assessment of NVA Capabilities and Possible Courses of Action in and around GVN MR-III (U).

7. Msg (TS/CW), AFSSO NKP to DIRNSA, 241150Z Mar 75, Subj: (Special Access Required).

8. Memo for Record (S/CW) INO to JCRC, 18 Jan 75, Subj: Preliminary Threat Assessment for BP 7641, Khanh Hou (P), MR-II, RVN (C). Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/INO to COMDR JCRC, 050446Z Feb 75, Subj: Threat Assessment Request (U). Msg (S/NFD), USSAG/J-2 to COMDR JCRC, 010720Z Mar 75, Subj: Threat Assessment Request (U). Msg (S), USSAG/J-2 to COMDR JCRC, 101705Z Mar 75, Subj: Update of Threat Analysis (U).

9. Msg (S/CW), AFSSO NKP to SSOPACOM/J2, 120610Z Feb 75, Subj: SEAGOB Exchange - Order of Battle for Communist Forces in South Vietnam (U).

10. Msg (S/NFD), USSAG/J-2 to COMSEVENTHFLT (and others), 100900Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG Daily Intelligence Summary SITA (INTSUM 75-041)(U)

11. Trip Report (C), INOE to IN, 13 Jan 75, Subj: Trip Report to USDAO Phnom Penh, CHR, 6 Dec 74-11 Jan 75 (U).

12. Msg (S/CW), USSAG/J-2 to SSO Phnom Penh, 021055Z Jan 75, Subj: KC Order of Battle Working Exchange (U). Msg (S/CW), USSAG/J-2 to SSO Phnom Penh, 251330Z Jan 75, Subj: KC Order of Battle (U). Msg (S/CW), USSAG/J-2 to SSO Phnom Penh, 251055Z Mar 75, Subj: KC Order of Battle (U).

13. Msg (S/NFD), USSAG/J-2 to CG Third Marine Div, 120730Z Jan 75, Subj: Cambodia Communist Order of Battle (C). Msg (S/NFD), USSAG/J-2 to CG Third Marine Div, 170530Z Feb 75, Subj: Cambodian Communist Order of Battle Information (C).

14. Msg (C/CW), USSAG to SSO IPAC/J-32, 060910Z Jan 75, Subj: Mekong Threat (U). Msg (S/CW), USSAG/J-2 to CINCPAC, 130530Z Jan 75, Subj: Assessment and Projection of KC Dry Season Offensive (U). Msg (S/CW), USSAG/J-2 to CINCPAC, 060505Z Feb 75, Subj: Second Phase of KC Dry Season Offensive (U).

15. Special Study (S/CW), USSAG/INOEC, undated, Subj: INOEC KC Personality Study (C).

16. Cleland Paper (C), March 1975, USSAG/INOEC Files.

17. Working Paper (S), INOE to INCC, 4 Mar 75, Subj: Significant Recon Results (U).

18. Msg (S/NFD), USSAG/J-2 to Cdr MACTHAI Spc Gp, 100530Z Feb 75, Subj: Status of Rte 5 in Western Cambodia (U). Ltr (S/NFD), J-2 to J-4, 16 Mar 75, Subj: Route 5 Battambang to the Thai Border (U).

19. Msg (S/NFD), USSAG/DOX to PACAF, 200520Z Jan 75, Subj: CBU 55s (U).

20. Msg (S/CW), AFSSO NKP to SSO Phnom Penh, 271000Z Jan 75, Subj: EMG Intelligence Assessment (U).

21. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 121134Z Feb 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

22. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 130443Z Feb 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

23. Msg (C), 548RTG to DIA, 070315Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

24. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 080706Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U). Msg (U) USSAG to 548RTG, 190300Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film. Msg (C), 548RTG to DIA, 220100Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

25. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 250115Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

26. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG, 260046Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

27. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 272045Z Mar 75, Subj: Photo Recon Requirements (U).

28. Msg (S), USSAG to CINCPAC, 270850Z Mar 75, Subj: Camouflage Detection Film (U).

29. Msg (C), 548RTG to 432TFW, 290400Z Mar 75, Subj: Sensor Status Report (U).

30. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 310735Z Mar 75, Subj: Camouflage Detection Film (U).

31. Ltr (S/NFD), PACAF, 12 Mar 75, Subj: Photographic Equipment Survey (U).

32. Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CSAF, 220500Z Mar 75, Subj: Program Change Request (U).

33. Msg (S), USSAG to CINCPACAF, 241145Z Mar 75, Subj: Disposition of WS430B Assets (U).

34. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 240420Z Jan 75, Subj: Intelligence Collection Requirement (U).

35. Msg (S), USSAG to DIA, 180300Z Jan 75, Subj: Intelligence Collection Requirement (U).

36. Msg (C), USDAO SGN to USSAG, 120105Z Mar 75, Subj: Intelligence Collection Requirement (U).

37. Msg (S/NFD), USSAG to DAO SGN, 010300Z Mar 75, Subj: ICR Supplement (U). Msg (S), USSAG to DAO SGN, 240430Z Feb 75, Subj: ICR Supplement (U). Msg (C/NFD), USSAG to DAO SGN, 140710Z Jan 75, Subj: ICR Supplement (U). Msg (S/NFD), USSAG to DAO SGN, 140900Z Jan 75, Subj: ICR Supplement (U). Msg (S/NFD), USSAG to DAO SGN, 290800Z Jan 75, Subj: ICR Supplement (U). Msg (S/NFD), USSAG to SGN, Subj: ICR Supplement (U).

38. Msg (C/NFD), Special Acty Gp BKK to USSAG, 040315Z Mar 75, Subj: Communist PW Camp, Kien Giang (P) (U).

39. Msg (C), 7602 AIG to USSAG, 101919Z Feb 75, Subj: Negative PW Camp at WU 975 015 (U).

40. Msg (C/NFD), USDAO SGN to USSAG, 240400Z Apr 74, Subj: U.S. PW Camp Located in Krek Area (U).

41. Hard Copy IIR (C), 500th MIG to USSAG, Subj: Negative Report of PW Camp in area Trasu Mountain, Dien Bien District, Chau Duc Province (U).

42. Msg (C), USDAO SGN to USSAG, 060700Z Nov 73, Subj: U.S. PW Sighting (U).

43. Msg (C/NFD), USSAG to USAINTA, 210930Z Feb 75, Subj: Evaluation of Project 0710-14K (U).

44. Msg (S/CCO), USSAG to CINCPAC, 111030Z Feb 75, Subj: Evaluation of ARDF, COMINT and other Sources to Locate KC Entities (U).

45. Msg (S/CW), DIRNSA to SSO PACOM and AFSSO NKP, 202124Z Jan 75, Subj: Cambodian ARDF/U-21 Evaluation (U).

46. Msg (C/CCO), SSO DIA to SSO PACOM, 271806Z Feb 75, Subj: LAFFING EAGLE Program (U).

47. Ibid.

48. Msg (S/CW), SSO PACOM to SSO DIA, 010600Z Mar 75, Subj: LAFFING EAGLE Program (U).

49. Msg (S/CCO), SSO DIA to SSO PACOM, 110156Z Mar 75, Subj: LAFFING EAGLE (U). Msg (U), SSO PACOM to USSAG, 110155Z Mar 75, Subj: LAFFING EAGLE.

50. Msg (C/CCO), AFSSO NKP to SSO PACOM, 111130Z Mar 75, Subj: LAFFING EAGLE Requirement (U).

51. Msg (S/CW), SSO PACOM to SSO DIA, 122037Z Mar 75, Subj: LAFFING EAGLE (U).

52. Msg (C/CCO), JCS to CINCPAC, 311257Z Mar 75, Subj: SEAGIA Airborne Radio Direction Finding Operation (U).

53. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 182120Z Dec 74, Subj: USSAG Targeting Functions (U). Ltr (S), USSAG/INT to IPAC, 20 Dec 74, Subj: USSAG Targeting Function (U). Msg (S), AFSSO NKP to AFSSO PACF/INA, 290900Z Jan 75, Subj: CBU-55 Use in Cambodia (U).

54. Report (C), INT to 432RTS, 15 Feb 75, Subj: BUFFALO SPIKE (U)

55. Staff Summary Sheet (S), INT to IN, 15 Feb 75, Subj: Target List Request (U).

56. Msg (TS), USSAG/J-2 to CINCPAC, 250300Z Feb 75, Subj: TENNIS RACKET (U).

57. Trip Report (S), INT to IN, 23 Jan 75, Subj: Trip Report/UDorn and DAO Phnom Penh (U).

58. Trip Report (C), INT to IN, 16 Jan 75, Subj: Staff Assistance Visit (U).

59. Staff Summary Sheet (S), INT to IN, 31 Jan 75, Subj: TENNIS RACKET War Gaming Simulation (U).

60. Ltr (U), INT to IN, 21 Jun 74, Subj: Weaponeering Course.

61. Ltr (C), INTT to INT, 27 Jan 75, Subj: Comparative Analysis of CBU-14, CBU-55 and BLU-32 (U); Report (C), INTT, 15 Feb 75, Subj: Comparison of CBU-55 and CBU-58 Against Personnel (U); Ltr (C), INT to IAD, 2 Jan 75, Subj: Proximity Fuses and Fuse Extenders (U).

62. Operating Instruction (C), USSAG/7AF/TACC, 28 Jan 75, Subj: DOCB Operating Instruction 55-25 (U).

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)

Daily Operations. TACC airlift controllers provided coordination for the successful conduct of 192 Intra-Thailand C-130 "Klong" missions, 247 Khmer airdrop missions, 1,709 Khmer airland missions and 13 missions in support of the Four Party Joint Military Team. Airlift controllers provided flight advisory service to U.S. aircraft transiting the Saigon Flight Information Region. The TACC also provided operational control and flight following for 175 T-39/C-118 Seatback missions.

The TACC air defense position coordinated with U.S., Thai, and VNAF air defense personnel in the effort to resolve the identity of 78 unknown tracks. The position provided operational control of 245 tactical reconnaissance sorties in the Khmer and South Vietnam, including refueling support. The tankers for these combat missions also refueled 70 ferry flights to/from Clark AB, PI.

(U) On 24 January, the TACC provided a vital command and control link when it was determined that a 56SOW CH-53 had crashed 24 miles southwest of NKP while on a routine functional flight. The TACC quickly directed Search and Rescue (SAR) and observation resources to the scene where the bodies of the four crew members and crash remains were recovered. The cause of the accident was determined to be a failure in the main rotor head.

(U) Special Interest Items/Remarks. In the latter part of January, because of high level interest concerning U.S. personnel traffic to and from Cambodia, the TACC was tasked with approval/disapproval authority for all U.S. aircraft and personnel entering or departing the Khmer. Procedures were implemented whereby proposed passenger lists were passed to the TACC daily for documented control of U.S. force status.[1]

(U) The TACC participated in all Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) emergency timing exercises, WHITE ROCKET/Pinnacles, commander's availability checks and the commander's daily locator checks without noted discrepancies.[2]

(U) The TACC processed numerous CPREP Pinnacle and Beeline reports. There were 16 incidents concerning confrontations between Thai and U.S. personnel, and 17 operational incidents. There was more than three times the number of incidents last quarter.

Air Defense Summary. CINCPACAF directed USSAG/7AF to develop, implement and be prepared to execute procedures to provide VNAF with tactically perishable MIG warning and flight data. Voice communication circuits were connected between Blue Chip, Da Nang Control and Reporting Center (CRC) and the alternate CRC at Pleiku. Tactical information was passed on all air activity when foreknowledge of adverse intentions were known, as soon as it became available, and/or when the aircraft reached 17 degrees parallel on a southernly heading. Blue Chip would transmit the unclassified notification

message in the clear simultaneously to the TACC at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang and Pleiku CRCs, giving all available information.[3]

Procedures for the use of Mark X IFF/SIF were revised 30 January to reflect the use of the AKAA-283 True Track Mode III code tables which were effective 1 February. The basic IFF operation procedures remained unchanged. The change was in the documentation that directed the procedures of how, when and where to use the codes. AKAA-283 Mode III True Track (peacetime) code tables replaced the PACOM true track code tables.[4]

AKAA-285 is the wartime mode III IFF code tables held in unit communication security accounts and released only upon specified authority from a unified commander as approved by JCS. These codes would be used by strike aircraft to secure safe passage through allied or U.S. ground environment systems as they execute the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) or the Chinese Communist/ North Vietnam OPlans. USSAG holds the AKAA-285 codes for RVN. DAO Saigon agreed to hold the AKAA-285 code tables and distribute to each of the five RVNAF air control and warning sites upon receipt of the implement order.[5]

A message was sent to CINCPAC stating the concept and procedures by which the 7AF Commander would defend the Mainland SEA Air Defense Region (MSEAADR) in a contingency situation. The message explained that the MSEAADR is divided into two nationally oriented air defense sectors--East and West, and then further

divided into four sub-sectors. The 7AF Commander is responsible for the active air defense of SEA West Sector and must be prepared to assume the responsibility for the employment of U.S. forces in the active air defense of the SEA East Sector. Air defense of the region is an integrated effort between the RTAF, VNAF and USAF. Letters of agreement are used between the responsible countries to facilitate and provide for the integrated air defense within the region. The USSAG/7AF Commander, as 7AF Commander, is responsible to CINCPACAF for the air defense of MDEAADR. There is no change during the transition to wartime contingency plans.[6]

(U) Air Traffic Control. Numerous hazards existed for aircrew members who operated aircraft within Laos, Khmer Republic and South Vietnam. USSAG/7AF requested that DAOs in each country construct airfield folders for each airfield in their respective country that is transited by DOD non-based aircraft. The DAOs were also requested to formulate operating procedures that would give the aircrew members the best methods to use during enroute arrival and departure phases of flight within their respective country.[7]

One MAC and Seatback aircraft insisted on using spiral approach procedures at Tan Son Nhut. Such procedures were developed by USSAG/7AF Air Defense Branch (DOCA) for use in SA-7/AAA high threat areas and were published for specific use at Pochentong Airport at Phnom Penh. Saigon Air Route Traffic Control Center and Saigon Approach Control asked DAO Saigon to stop the VFR spiral descents. USSAG/7AF/DO transmitted a message which informed all

U.S. aircraft of the recommended arrival procedures to use at Tan Son Nhut.[8]

(U) COMUSMACTHAI requested comments and recommendations on ways to reduce U.S. military visibility in and around Chiang Mai Airport. The problem was one of scheduling and coordinating arrival and ground times. It was recommended that COMUSMACTHAI control the operation entirely. Since they do 90 percent of the flying into Chiang Mai, they agreed that control can best be maintained at that level, coordinating with their own Political-Military Division to reduce Chiang Mai traffic when required.[9]

Intelligence information indicated that 57mm AAA with a tactical effective range of 19,700 feet was in position and within range of R-68/Track 7 in the vicinity of PE-11 between Tan Son Nhut and Phnom Penh. As the manager of the Saigon Airspace, USSAG/7AF dispatched a message recommending aircraft use a minimum altitude of FL200 along airway R-68/Track 7 to avoid the threat. Aircraft that could not maintain at or above FL200 should use airway W-31. Minimum altitude on R-67 and G-72 was raised to FL240. Airways W-2, W-3, and W-7 were closed.[10]

Target Management. Rapidly deteriorating military and political situations in RVN and GKR caused staff agencies throughout USSAG/7AF headquarters to substantially reassess nearly all on-going and contingency programs, as well as to develop some totally new solutions to traditional problems. The chaotic retreat of ARVN in

the face of an apparent VC/NVA general dry season offensive, as well as the severe military losses suffered by FANK, resulted in a serious deterioration in security of the territories and population centers still under friendly control.

(U) These reversals posed two immediate problems to USMAG staff agencies. First, they stimulated immediate action to insure that all preparations necessary to protect and evacuate U.S. nationals and other designated individuals currently located in threatened areas were complete and able to be implemented. The reversals also created severe problems in efforts to continue to provide vital MAP equipment, material and humanitarian supplies to beleaguered friendly forces.

(U) Targets Management Branch (DOCM) personnel engaged in numerous coordination activities to provide basic information and interpretations on the operational restraints contained in current Air Operating Authorities (AOA), Rules of Engagement (ROE), U.S. laws and existing international agreements. Additionally, DOCM personnel were directly involved in several major staff activities concerning SAR, reconnaissance, airlift, and as members of task groups to revise and refurbish NEIVAC plans.

AOA and ROE. From the point of view of providing logistics support, all activities supporting the Khmer resupply were well within the bounds established by current SEA AOA/ROE and the RVN cease-fire agreement, but another factor was not quite as clear-cut.[1]

The issue of concern involved providing SAR support for downed aircrews and passengers (PAX) aboard contract aircraft, should a shoot-down or mechanical failure occur over hostile territory. Current ACA/NOE authorized the 7AF commander to conduct SAR for U.S. personnel throughout SEA.[12] However, as a result of a USAF/7AF inquiry to CINCPAC when the original airlift contract was being negotiated in July and August 1974[13], the JCS interim and final replies indicated that requests to provide SAR for civilian contract crews would be approved on a case-by-case basis by JCS after FANK assets were exhausted and AMEMB Phnom Penh requested U.S. military assistance.[14]

This seemed fairly clear cut, but an interpretive difficulty developed when USAF C-130 operations into Phnom Penh ceased. Shortly thereafter, 7AF support aircraft flights (T-39) to Phnom Penh were curtailed due to increasingly heavy ARFs against Pochentong Airfield. Considerable passenger hauling capability in and out of Phnom Penh was routinely required, due to the relatively large numbers of U.S. military personnel assigned to the DAO, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) or on TDY from other PACOM locations. The individuals had previously used USAF C-130s and Seatback, but now these individuals had to try to book on the already overtaxed AMEMB C-47, various MEDTC support aircraft or "hitchhike" on contractor flights. With this knowledge in mind, and also with the tremendous increase in the number of contractor

flights during February and early March, on 4 March, CINCPACAF readdressed CINCPAC on the issue of SAR support for contractor operations (making specific reference to those supporting military PAX).[15]

CINCPAC initially approved SAR, IAW current AOA/ROE for military PAX[16], and forwarded a request to JCS for additional guidance. The JCS reply stated that SAR for contractors would continue to be approved on a case-by-case basis after local national efforts were exhausted. They further stated that U.S. military personnel and other U.S. or third country national (TCN) civilian PAX would not be authorized to use contractor flights and suggested that a USAF administrative support flight be reestablished to satisfy personnel travel requirement.[17]

CHMEDTC initially suggested that the military support requirement be fulfilled by U.S. Army U-21 assets belonging to the 70th Aviation Squadron at Don Muang.[18] After additional study, a USAF C-130 flight, five days a week, was authorized to support AMEMB/MEDTC administration and travel requirements.[19] Though not directly stated in the JCS guidance, the assumption was that SAR in support of this mission would be IAW current AOA/ROE.

The AMEMB Phnom Penh attempted under EAGLE PULL Option I (Embassy directed evacuation) to assist those non-essential U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as Khmer and TCNs for whom the State Department had accepted evacuation responsibility, in

leaving before too severe a personnel backlog had developed.[20] The objective of this effort was to reduce to a minimum, the number of people to be evacuated during an EAGLE PULL evacuation Option II (military fixed wing) or III (military helicopter) operation. Accomplishing this goal, however, required the use of commercial Air Cambodge, the AMAB, MEDIC and contractor operated aircraft. The available PAX capacity of the first three carriers was far too limited to provide the needed support alone. Due to this problem, the JCS restriction on passenger use of contractor backhaul flights was appealed as a significant obstacle to attempts to reduce the number of potential evacuees.[21]

NEOVAC Rules of Engagement. With the sudden closure of the Mekong River in February, attention and interest were quickly focused on the viability of current NEOVAC plans for Cambodia. An operations task group was formed on 4 February to revise the OPlans for EAGLE PULL Options II and III. A working group meeting, chaired by the USSAG/7AF/OS, was held 4 February to establish initial directions and goals. On 5 February, the task group members briefed COMUSSAG on their initial findings and proposals, and after brief discussions and additional guidance, the various members began to prepare their final drafts. The initial objective was to prepare the OPlans as quickly as possible, secure verbal approval, and then get them inserted into the 7AF Strike Computer as Special Instructions (SPINS) to the EAGLE PULL frags. Thus, if the operation had to be

executed before the OPlans were formally published, the guidance would be available to all tasked organizations.

DOOM personnel, participating in the effort, were charged with providing an updated ground security force (GSF) and air operations ROE consistent with current higher headquarters guidance and realistic mission objectives. This opportunity was a culmination of efforts by DOOM personnel dating back to September 1973 and January 1974 to provide a specific air ROE for the NEMVAC CONPLANS.[22] The provisions for air ROE, up to this time, had cited current USSAG/7AF ROE/AOA guidance as applicable to NEMVAC. The problem was that current USSAG/7AF guidance on day-to-day activities was far too broad and general to be easily applied at the aircrew level to specific mission objectives (close air support (CAS) to GSF, etc.). It was also unnecessarily restrictive in many areas (notably on provisions for return of hostile fire) considering that relief from current AOA had been provided by JCS on 30 July 73.[23] Under the restrictions of existing AOA, any attempt by hostile forces to contest the evacuation would preclude completing the mission or even defending the lives of the evacuees. The completed ROE developed for EAGLE PULL was read and approved by USSAG/7AF/CS and placed in the computer SPINS on 8 Feb 75. Subsequently, the OPlans were formally published on 23 February (Option II) and 24 February (Option III).[24] The EAGLE PULL ROE was also provided to the OPRs for USSAG NEMVAC CONPLANs 5060L (TALON BLADE) and 5060V (TALON VISE) for inclusion into these plans.

The new EAGLE PULL air ROE, included the following guidance (published CSF ROE remained unchanged):[25]

a. Rules for the general conduct of TACAIR battles, including the specific responsibilities of the Forward Air Control (FAC) and strike crews.

b. Specific rules and requirements for the conduct of CAS, including the scope of authorized operations, the responsibilities of the CSF/evacuees and FAC/strike crews, and additional guidance on identifying and engaging targets.

c. Specific rules and requirements for the return of groundfire, including the authority to suppress (rather than withdraw from) groundfire during specified mission-essential phases of the operation.

d. Guidance and restrictions on the use of ordnance, including guidance on approval requirements.

e. Specific guidance on the channels and procedures for the request, validation and approval of targets for strike, including who must approve various requests and what constitutes a disapproval. COMUSSAG was identified as the final approval authority for all TACAIR ordnance deliveries. A standardized target request form and guidance on its use were also provided in the OPlan.

f. Reaffirms commander's right to self-defense and provides authorities for the emergency support of the CSF and return of groundfire.

c. States that all operations not specifically addressed will be conducted IAW current USSAG/7AF SEAsia ROE.

(U) EAGLE PULL options had barely been published and the coordinations with various tasked units, service components and headquarters completed when the abrupt withdrawal of ARVN and VNAF units from the Central Highlands (notable from Kontum and Pleiku) signaled the start of a near total rout of RVN forces from the northern two-thirds of South Vietnam. As district and province defenses fell into chaos before the advancing NVA and VC forces, refugees and shattered military units pressed into the few remaining coastal areas still in GVN control. Now attention had to be turned to the NEOVAC provisions of USSAG CONPLAN 5050V and its associated OPlans. However, the military situation in northern RVN deteriorated so quickly that Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Quin Nhon, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay all fell or were abandoned to enemy pressure before a coherent evacuation operation could be mounted. As a result, efforts at USSAG focused on developing the OPlans and supporting documentation necessary to execute the final evacuation of the Saigon area if that action should be required.

(U) DOCM personnel entered the task group on 25 March to produce ROE for CSF and air operations. The starting point used for this effort was the recently developed EAGLE PULL ROE, but due to the totally different character of the tactical situation in RVN, including the higher levels of threat to U.S. evacuation aircraft and

forces, and the sheer numbers of evacuees, the final product became considerably more involved than the EAGLE PULL proposal. A preliminary draft was prepared and ready for coordination by 31 Mar 75.

The expanded provisions of the ROE for EAGLE VISE (above those of the EAGLE PULL ROE discussed earlier) include:

a. The substitution of fast mover FAC-qualified or Flight Lead qualified pilots in-place of OV-10 FACs to provide strike control due to the high AAA/SAM threat anticipated throughout most of the intended area of operations. Guidance requires that the FAC/Flight Lead have direct communication with GSF commander when conducting air strikes within 1,000 meters of GSF/evacuee positions to insure proper and timely coordination and to preclude inadvertent injuries to friendly personnel.

b. Provisions for active visual reconnaissance patrolling within a 22 NM radius of the assembly/embarkation areas and critical LOCs to locate long range weapons (artillery and rocket launchers) and concentration of troops and/or armor which were firing on or being maneuvered so as to fire on or engage the GSF/evacuees. This activity is necessary due to the potential threats posed to GSF/evacuees by the large numbers of armed personnel, long range artillery weapons and armored vehicles possessed by the combatants on both sides, as well as in view of the fact that either group might attempt to disrupt a U.S. evacuation.

c. Provisions for air defense/counter air operations including combat air patrol (MICCAP/BARCAP) activities. [illegible] guidance for CAP/Air Defense was provided due to the fact that the [illegible] forces had already established limited SAM and Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) radar capability in newly captured areas and possess several serviceable airfields within operational range of the evacuation area, thus presenting a credible air-to-air capability. In addition, the ultimate VEAF reaction to a U.S. evacuation effort was not known, and they do possess a considerable bombing/interdiction capability that must be monitored.

d. Expanded guidance on the conduct of SAR activities including specific criteria for the return of groundfire and hostile fire.

e. Modification to the strike/target request procedures to reflect the changes in strike control, the new provisions for interdiction activities and guidance on counter-air requests. Also, authority statements have been modified to provide a more definitive role to the airborne mission commander aboard airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) in processing/approving target requests, while still insuring that COMUSSAG retained overall control over ordnance delivery activities (especially, the initial decision to permit ordnance expenditures).

<u>TACAIR Protection for SEA Reconnaissance</u>. On 22 March, CINCPAC, as a result of issues raised during a Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) Conference in Japan, requested

amplified guidance from JCS on the authorities and restrictions in providing armed protection for unarmed FARPRO mission aircraft operating in FARPRO Area Ten (All of JCS defined SEA less the territorial airspace of NVN).[26] This request was based on the assumption that the requirements would be fulfilled by tasking U.S. Thai-based TACAIR assets. At the request of USSAG/TAF/CS, DOCM personnel conducted research on the current authorities and international agreements to determine the types of support authorized in various areas, the engagement criteria for conduct of CAP/escort activities, including the firing of weapons, and the operational feasibility of providing authorized support using Thai-based assets.[27] The findings were briefed to USSAG/CS on 25 March and subsequently included in a fact sheet to be provided for future reference in the General Officer Fact Books.[28] A summary of findings follows:

a. Current SEA ACA/ROE provides for:

(1) Armed escorts and MIGCAP/BARCAP over SEA international waters and, by exclusion, within the territorial airspace of Thailand (AMEMB/BKK will be appraised of an intent to fly missions in Thailand).

(2) Armed overflights of the remainder of SEA are restricted to NEMVAC and SAR escorts or aircraft engaged in defensive response/immediate pursuit.

b. U.S. forces currently maintain air defense alert aircraft at Udorn RTAFB. The current ACA/ROE plus CINCPAC and CINCPACAF guidance directing COMAF, as the director of the MSEAADR, provide

the authorities to conduct operations throughout the region.[2] Also, a mutual agreement between TAF and the RTC on air defense responsibilities is in force for operations in Thailand.[3]

c. The existing Strip Alert aircraft can only provide practical air defense coverage for a small section of PARPRO Area Ten due to limitations imposed by the amount of warning time available versus distance to travel to the engagement area.

d. A more practical solution to the defense of PARPRO would be to establish MIGCAP/BARCAP assets in authorized areas, but even this solution has limitations, unless several further conditions are met as well.

(1) Thai-based TACAIR can provide adequate coverage of western Area Ten from orbits in Thai airspace. USAF Thai-based aircraft, however, cannot provide practical coverage to eastern Area Ten due to current ACA restrictions on the overflight of Laos, GKR and RVN that would be required by armed aircraft on the way to and from the orbits over SEA international waters.

(2) CAP aircraft cannot adequately defend PARPRO aircraft operating more than 50 NM from orbits (due, again, to warning time/distance to travel problems) unless the CAP aircraft are authorized, under the commander's provisions for actions taken in self-defense, to depart orbit when a hostile attack is known to be imminent (all source intelligence considered). Ordnance expenditures would still require a receipt of hostile fire.

e. In conclusion, the most practical defensive arrangement to protect the PARPRO platforms would require CAP orbits in Thailand supported by USAF Thai-based aircraft for western Area Two, and CAP orbits over SEA international waters supported by CVA TACAIR (Navy carrier-based) to cover the easter sector. To provide a timely response, while remaining within AOA/ROE restrictions, CAP aircraft could be directed to depart orbits when a hostile attack on PARPRO assets is known to be imminent, under the AOA provisions of self-defense, as long as ordnance is expended IAW AOA provisions for defensive response (hostile fire received first).

f. A JCS reply received on 27 March, confirmed the authority to react IAW defenseive response, but stated that armed aircraft should not penetrate Laos, GKR, RVN or NVN airspace until hostile fire is received.[31] The JCS message does not, however, address the authorities of the commander to take action in self-defense of his forces (granted in the basic JCS AOA/ROE messages). DOCM recommended that the conclusions of the 25 March task group are defensible IAW the spirit and intent of that basic JCS AOA/ROE guidance.

On 28 March CINCPAC dispatched a message to JCS requesting temporary relief from the JCS SEA AOA restrictions on intra-country movement of military equipment and supplies in RVN.[32] The actual purpose of the request was to seek authority to provide C-141 airlift support (two aircraft) to the VNAF 6th Division by airlifting vitally needed military equipment and materiel from Tan Son Nhut AB to Phan Rang AB. The basis of the request was that the cease-fire agreement

upon which the existing airlift restrictions were based seemed to have been overtaken by events. The JCS reply, received on 29 March, states that though they understood the concern, the current climate in Washington precluded taking action on such a request and that perhaps the ANVN JGS should consider civilian contractor support, if VNAF airlift capability is not sufficient.[33]

(U) Operational Guidance. In response to an informal conversation between USSAG/7AF/CS and DOOM personnel on 4 March concerning the quality of operational guidance available to tasked units, DOOM personnel prepared a detailed analysis of the perceived deficiencies and problem areas in existing guidance, along with proposals for corrective actions. The analysis and accompanying proposal were presented to and approved by USSAG/7AF/DO on 7 March. A summary of the findings and DOOM follow-on actions follows:

a. Current USSAG/7AF ROE/ACA for SEA operations are provided to subordinate units in three messages.[34] USSAG OpOrd 74-01, Rules of Engagement Southeast Asia, provides ROE for contingency planning and training purposes only and becomes effective as combat ROE when directed by COMUSSAG. It is not valid for current operations, but often is mistakenly referred to as the current USSAG/7AF ROE for SEA because of its OpOrd title.

b. USSAG/7AF subordinate units are handicapped by the lack

of comprehensive, definitive ROE guidance of the conduct of daily operations over which USSAG/7AF has operational control, i.e., SAR, TAC reconnaissance, airlift, air defense. A need exists for a single document which contains all of the rules of engagement and operating authorities governing current USSAG/7AF operations in SEA. In addition, there is also a need to develop an OPlan to replace USSAG OpOrd 74-01 which would contain anticipated rules of engagement for operations not presently authorized (i.e., armed reconnaissance, all-weather interdiction, etc.). This plan would have limited distribution, would not be a required item of knowledge for subordinate units for ORI purposes, but would serve as a basis upon which to plan for a resumption of hostilities. To satisfy these needs, DOCM began development of a comprehensive ROE OpOrd and a contingency ROE in OPlan format.

c. The new OpOrd should be specific in nature, written in clear, concise terms, and provide the detailed guidance deemed necessary by COMUSSAG/7AF to insure mission accomplishment within the present political and military constraints. The organization should reflect the division of SEA for ROE purposes into North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic on the one hand, and Thailand on the other. A discussion of the general rules applicable to each of the two major areas should be followed by sections dealing with specific rules based upon missions and tasks. The proposed organization by mission-type would provide easily understood, comprehensive guidance to all categories of users, while avoiding

the requirement verbiage required in a ROE organized primarily along country lines. A target date of 30 Jun 75 was tentatively established for final approval of the new OpOrd. A parallel development of the OPlan is anticipated, but no completion time has been forecasted yet.

CURRENT OPERATIONS (U)

(U) Daily Air Operations. The C-130 support of U.S. personnel at Thailand bases continued under operational control of USSAG/7AF. The C-130s flown by USAF aircrews out of U-Tapao, continued to support all intra-Thailand requirements, including the frequent MITRAPAB (Thai word for "friendship") rural school fund-raising parachutist demonstrations and the weekly Saigon-Hanoi liaison flights. Administrative support C-130 flights between U-Tapao, Bangkok and Pochentong, flown by USAF crews, returned to the schedule 17 March.

(U) The 56SOW Seatback aircraft remained under operational control of USSAG/7AF. On 17 January, one C-118 departed NKP for retirement at Davis-Monthan AFB, reducing the Seatback fleet to two T-39s and one C-118. Seatback flew 176 missions this quarter in support of USSAG/7AF. Additional missions were flown as required to provide AFM 60-1 aircrew proficiency flying.

(U) DOCO continued to be the single point of contact for USSAG for CH-53 operations of the 21st Special Operations Squadron. Two helicopters were used to assist in transport of JCRC personnel and equipment during the organization's move to Camae San in January.

Nightly reconnaissance missions for NKP perimeter defense continued during the quarter. Training exercise support for JORC was discontinued due to the fluid tactical situation in SEA which required the helicopters to be on an increased alert status for possible EAGLE PULL operations. Training sorties for CH-53s were curtailed to a maximum of 20 per week in order to maintain a higher aircraft op -tionally ready rate for potential EAGLE PULL use.

DOOS personnel were involved with providing the airlift expertise for various contingency plans developed this quarter. The USSAG support plan for CINCPAC OPlan 5135 was written. The plan developed requirements to accomplish total Khmer resupply via airlift using available contract and USAF C-130 assets to provide up to 90 sorties per day. This plan was followed by the USSAG support plan for CINCPAC OPlan 5136, to implement DC-8/C-130 airlift operations out of Saigon and U-Tapao into Pochentong. The airlift portions of EAGLE PULL and TALON VISE were also written.

(U) Thailand Flood. Heavy flooding in the southern part of Thailand in early January was described as the country's worst national disaster in 100 years. The floods caused an estimated $45 million damage, killed 239 persons, left 15,384 people homeless and another 59 missing. The U.S. was requested by His Majesty, the King of Thailand, to provide USAF airlift in support of flood relief operations. A C-130 from the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) resources at U-Tapao, two CH-53s from the 56SOW at NKP, and two UH-1s from the NAKHAI Support Group provided the support, under

operational control of USSAG/7AF. In a 14-day period from 13-27 January, 430.7 S/T of cargo and 79 passengers were airlifted at a cost of $124,724. The overall U.S. assistance was accepted by the Thailand Government as an indication of friendship and concern.

KAF Self-Sufficiency (KASS) Program. The KASS Program progressed on schedule to include student training. The first C-123K flying training class began at Udorn on 27 January and graduated six pilots, four co-pilots, five navigators, five flight mechanics, and five loadmasters on 25 March. These crewmembers became valuable assets to the KAF capability to provide in-country airlift of critically needed supplies. The increased requirements of the KAF C-123 fleet were reflected on 19 March when 11 airdrops and 10 airland missions were flown.

Frag Orders. During this period, ARDF (U-21) and photo reconnaissance (RF4C) made up the majority of the operational sorties fragged. The location of SAR alert for two HH-53s was moved from Ubon to Korat, and one HH-53 was added to the daily frag for SAR at NKP. SAR Alert was maintained at Korat RTAFB with four A-7s, two HH-53s and two HC-130s. Air defense alert was continued with two F-4Es at Udorn RTAFB. A typical frag day included two U-21s, two F-4Es, four A-7s, two HH-53s, 1 CH-53, two HC-130s, and two RF-4Cs.

Daily Air Operations. There was no change in ARDF operations this period. U-21s were fragged for an average of 14 sorties per week in Cambodia.

RF-4 activity remained at an average of 2 1/2 sorties per day. All activity was day photo. A total of 20 sorties were flagged into NVN with all the remaining being flagged in Cambodia.

COMMANDO SCRIMMAGE (CS). CS scenarios remain the mainstay of the exercises developed by the Weapons and Tactics Branch (DOTW). These scenarios continue to reflect LINEBACKER-type missions. CS X, Alpha scenario (High Threat), was scheduled and exercised on 6 Jan 75. CS XI, Bravo scenario (High/Low Threat), was scheduled and exercised on 24-25 Feb 75. Frags were workable and both exercises were conducted in a satisfactory manner. To exercise the full spectrum of command and control during a LINEBACKER-type operation, the TA3C was utilized in the conduct of CS X and CS XI. Weather coordination among all 10th Weather Squadron units resulted in outstanding weather support and successful forecasting.

Combat Training Event (CTE). Each tactical fighter wing and the 56SOW were tasked to perform two CTEs during this period. All CTEs were satisfactorily completed with the exception of the CTE scheduled for the 388/347 TFW on 10 March and the CTE scheduled for the 56SOW on 31 March. The 388/347 TFW CTE was cancelled due to a PACAF ORI. The 56SOW CTE was cancelled due to EAGLE PULL preparation.

Air-to-Air Exercise. The 432TFW was tasked for three air-to-air exercises during the quarter. These exercises were designed to realistically evaluate the MIGCAP and escort role of the 432TFW. The scenarios contained realism incorporating dissimilar fakers (A-7 and F-111). The use of A-7 fakers was discontinued in January

1975 due to an imposed airspeed limitation. Emphasis continued to increase on the function of TEABALL. Overall, the air-to-air exercises continued to improve the MIG suppression tactics for TACAIR crews and supporting agencies in SEA.

(U) TALON SWIVEL. TALON SWIVEL, scheduled for 20 Feb 75, was cancelled due to operational commitments.

Wing Composite Strike (WCS). Each tactical fighter wing and the 56SOW were tasked to perform a WCS during this period. All WCSs were fragged and conducted in a satisfactory manner.

The Fighter Branch (DOOF) made a major departure from its normal duties during this quarter when it was tasked as the OPR for the development of OPlans to support USSAG/7AF COMPLAN 50600, EAGLE PULL. A maximum effort by all elements of the Current Operations Division developed USSAG/7AF OPlans 50600-1-75 and 50600-2-75 which described in detail the various courses of action, unit taskings, TACAIR employment, communications and ROE to meet EAGLE PULL objectives. These plans were prepared utilizing the Strike Computer to facilitate rapid dissemination and to permit timely update.

An EAGLE PULL deployment exercise for the 56SOW and 40ARRS was developed to determine the capability of these units to deploy aircraft, equipment, and personnel to Ubon airfield as a forward operating location. The exercise was conducted on 2 Mar 75. All helicopter assets were flown on a simulated EAGLE PULL route, and other elements were taken through the mobility and equipment marshalling phase for deployment to Ubon. No significant problems were noted

and observers passed on their recommendations to improve future deployment procedures.[35]

KAF Weapons Component. The CBU-55 weapon system was introduced in Cambodia to destroy Khmer Rouge fortifications along the Mekong River. The CBU-55 was used solely in support of convoy resupply operations for Phnom Penh and proved effective. (See also pg 157).

Tactics. Chaff employment configurations and new tactics recommendations for B-52 support were submitted to PACAF during March. This was accomplished in compliance with CSAF request for updating chaff employment concepts.

Recce Operations. The BUFFALO HUNTER Program included 28 sorties scheduled for January, 21 successful, 30 sorties for February, 21 successful, and 40 sorties for March, 26 successful.

The Reconnaissance Operations Branch (DOOR) conducted an in-depth study of scheduling, coordination and monitoring procedures for BUFFALO HUNTER operations. This was done to research the potential for mid-air collision with traffic in the operating locations and along recovery routes. It was learned that scheduling through PARPRO and coordination and monitoring procedures for the drone missions together with careful route selection away from airways, minimize the mid-air collision potential. There have been no reported incidents in more than 3,400 drone sorties.

DOOR also monitored the OLYMPIC MEET/TORCH programs which are U-2 ELINT/SIGINT missions flown over selected routes in the theater. During January, there were 62 TORCH and 2 MEET sorties.

During February, there were 56 TORCH and 4 MEET sorties and during March there were 56 TORCH and 9 MEET missions. The RC-135 ELINT/ SIGINT program COMBAT APPLE, flew 24 sorties.

DOOR was responsible for coordinating the suppression of radar/interceptor reaction to the SR-71 GIANT SCALE sorties flown throughout SEA. Six sorties were scheduled and five were flown.

A congressional inquiry requested, through CINCPAC, the number of USAF reconnaissance flights by type and date which occurred over North and South Vietnam since 27 Jan 73. Information as to number of flights specifically by and date was not available; however, monthly totals for the requested period by type were prepared and forwarded by DOOR.

CINCPACAF requested replacement aircraft from CONUS resources to maintain the 14TRS surge capability upon departure of five LORAN-C equipped aircraft from Udorn. DOOR conducted a study as to impact of the loss of the LORAN aircraft on the 14TRS mission capability and the requirement of maintaining the LORAN-C Ground Chain after the aircraft departed. It was established that loss of the LORAN aircraft would have minimal impact on the 14TRS mission capability. The LORAN-C Ground Chain was still required in the theater due to its use by other systems including F-4s, B-52s and the BUFFALO HUNTER drones.

DOOR coordinated the Aerial Photography Project at Clark AB, PI which was initiated on 25 January. Photo requests had not been acquired on the original attempt, 12-23 October, due to low cloud cover associated with a typhoon.

DOR personnel conducted a study as to what impact returning the AQM-34M(L) drones to the ZI would have on the BUFFALO HUNTER mission capability. Since there were only two AQM-34M(L) drones in the theater and these were flown only over specific tracks, return of these to the ZI would not impact significantly on the BUFFALO HUNTER program.

The American Ambassador to Laos requested after the fact information on reconnaissance flights conducted in Laotian airspace in order to answer political questions arising from the overflights. Procedures were established for Blue Chip to provide this information to the embassy on a daily basis.

(U) PARPRO. DOOR prepared the computer program and transmitted the USSAG PARPRO monthly schedules.

DOOR personnel attended the January and March PARPRO conferences in Yokota, Japan. They presented the USSAG RF-4C and U-2R missions requests at both meetings. At the March conference limitations of USSAG fighter support was briefed and the question concerning rules of overflight in relation to the Paris Peace Accords or fighters aiding a PARPRO platform was discussed. A letter of agreement outlining fighter and tanker support for PARPRO in the PACOM area was drafted. Coordination is now in process with CINCPAC and [illegible].

DOOR conducted an analysis of the cost of reconnaissance support for Cambodia and South Vietnam. This was prepared pending

possible inquiry from the General Accounting Office. Actual figures have not been authorized for release by JCS at this time.

SURFACE OPERATIONS AND PLANS (U)

NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060V (TALON VISE). The basic CONPLAN was revised in accordance with instructions received from CINCPAC.[36] Copies of the 28 February revision were distributed to all concerned on 26 March. Plans were prepared for the NEMVAC of Da Nang, however, they were not implemented as civilian assets were utilized to accomplish that mission during the last week of March 1975. Detailed planning for evacuation of the remainder of RVN continued. (See also pgs 37-38, 75-77).

NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060L (TALON BLADE). A detailed OPlan for NEMVAC operations in Laos is under development. American Embassy, Vientiane furnished an update on the number of potential evacuees in Laos. The new figures of 1,711 reflected a decrease of 263 persons for the previous reporting period.[37]

NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C (EAGLE PULL). On 3 February, USSAG/7AF informed all EAGLE PULL addressees that Change 2 to USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C and Changes 1 and 2 to Appendix 3, Annex N of the CONPLAN had been approved by CINCPAC.[38] Modifications to supporting plans, caused by approval of these changes, were due at USSAG within 30 days.

As a result of the advent of the enemy's dry season offensive, which began in Cambodia on 31 December, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT on 6 Jan 75 to reconstitute the CH-53 helicopter mix aboard Amphibious

Ready Group (ARG) ALFA and reduce the ARG response posture from its present 168 hours to helicopter launch position off Kompong Som to 96 hours.[39] CINCPAC reported to JCS on 11 Jan 75 that these actions had been achieved.[40]

AMEMB Phnom Penh reported on 7 January that the number of potential EAGLE PULL evacuees in Cambodia was 788.[41] CINCPAC requested COMUSSAG evaluation and comments on the impact of the latest evacuee figures.[42] COMUSSAG replied that increased evacuation time and aircraft utilization rate during helicopter evacuation would be the chief factors resulting from the latest evacuee totals.[43]

A USSAG representative attended the NEOVAC coordination conference at U-Tapao, 23-24 January, and provided briefings to representatives of MACTHAI and Thailand-based CSAF units tasked with support requirements for EAGLE PULL, CAMON BLADE, and CAMON VIBE. Subsequent requests necessitated separate briefings for the MACTHAI Support Group commander and the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.

CTF 79/III MAF on 30 January provided country clearance information to MACTHAI on representatives of Marine units tasked with EAGLE PULL support for purposes of travel to NKP for a coordination conference with USSAG/7AF representatives during period 31 Jan-2 Feb 75.[44] The representatives were from III MAF, 3d Marine Division and ARG ALFA/31st MAU. The visit included coordination conferences, a visit to Phnom Penh with a tour of the LZs for all conferees before their departure on 4 February.

On 3 February, a war game of EAGLE PULL Option III (helicopter evacuation) was conducted at USSAG/7AF.[45] Participants included key members of those USSAG staff sections who would supply TACC Battle Staff representation if EAGLE PULL were executed. Key personnel from 56SOW, 3ARRS, 40ARRS, and 56ARRS and visiting Marines from CTF 79/III MAF. This exercise indicated the planning factors employed were current.

Following a CTF 79 recommendation having COMUSSAG concurrence,[46] COMSEVENTHFLT approved deployment of the senior ground security force (GSF) commander and three staff officers to NKP for briefings and preparation for their possible insertion into Phnom Penh if execution of EAGLE PULL appeared imminent.[47] CTF 79 requested country clearance from MACTHAI for the incoming marines.[48] Following arrival of senior GSF commander and staff on 7 February, CTF 79 requested country clearance for the remainder of the command group which arrived on 8 February.[49]

AMEMB Phnom Penh reported on 6 February that their estimated total of potential EAGLE PULL evacuees was 606.[50]

CINCPACAF addressed AN/TRN-17 expeditionary TACAN support at the emergency helicopter divert point for EAGLE PULL operations at Chantaburi on 9 February. Thirteenth Air Force was tasked for providing such support with 1961 Comm Group assets.[51] On 11 February, 1974 Comm Group responded to CINCPACAF with airlift, maintenance and operational support requirements.[52] On 12 February, CINCPACAF requested 13AF take the lead on accomplishing support and coordination

requirements for the AN/TRN-17 TACAN. In view of a 24-36 hour lead time between implementation and initiation of equipment operation, advance staging of the TACAN at Chanteburi was recommended.[53] On 14 February, USSAG requested 13AF provide consolidated information on time, personnel and material support on activating Chanteburi including financial impact.[54]

Thirteenth Air Force provided the requested information and recommended that in view of the heavy support requirements and cost of deploying and utilizing the AN/TRN-17 TACAN that the jeep-mounted M-108 combat control team vehicle with UHF homing beacon be used instead.[55]

On 9 February, the chief of the Fleet Coordinating Group expressed concern to CTF 79 that political constraint may inhibit timely introduction of the senior CSF commander into Phnom Penh prior to EAGLE PULL execution and outlined USSAG/7AF fallback position.[56] CTF 79 requested COMSEVENTHFLT to insure early insertion and COMSEVENTHFLT requested CINCPACFLT early resolution of political contraints.[57]

(U) USSAG/7AF, on 10 February, published modifications to Annex K of USSAG/7AF OPlan 5060C-1-74 to all holders of the OPlan.[58]

JCS reviewed responsibilities of CINCPAC for evacuation of additional TCNs in Phnom Penh not currently addressed in EAGLE PULL as the responsibility of the American ambassador. Their priority was

to [illegible] after American citizens.[59]

CINCPAC granted CHMEDTC blanket authority to transport potential EAGLE PULL evacuees from Phnom Penh on Contract C-130 aircraft.[60]

CINCPAC tasked the CINCPAC PA LNO for coordination of information coverage of EAGLE PULL operations for release to news media.[61] USSAG/7AF advised all concerned that due to the limited helicopter lift capability, insertion of a two-man photo team into Phnom Penh was not practical and stated that CHMEDTC had agreed to document the operation from Phnom Penh within existing photographic capability. As a result, CINCPAC LNO cancelled tasking to 601 Photo Squadron to provide coverage.[63]

On 16 February, AMEMB Phnom Penh reported to DEPSTATE that there were 200 Americans in country who were assigned as official embassy personnel and approximately 202 private American citizens in country.[64] The Ambassador stated an embassy advisory letter was directed to 35 dependents and 50 transient Americans in the latter category who had no essential reason for remaining.

AMEMB Phnom Penh advised SECSTATE regarding his discussion on 20 February with United Kingdom Charge-d' Affaires on potential evacuation.[66] The charge had informed the American Ambassador that he had recommended to London that his embassy staff remain and that he thought public opinion would not accept the British Embassy staff making use of American evacuation means.

(S) AMEMB Phnom Penh reported to SECSTATE that they had informally advised news correspondents that they would be unable to assume responsibility for TCNs working for networks in Khmer Republic, due to their then already high figure of 757 potential evacuees.[67] By the last of March, the number of evacuees in the Khmer had gone to 1, 257.[76] Throughout the month the AMEMB reported the closing of friendly embassies.[77]

Based upon the increased number of evacuees, JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy on short notice a CVA TACAIR in support of EAGLE PULL on 22 March.[78]

The CVA Hancock was directed to off load personnel and material to accommodate 17 USMC CH-53D helicopters, 41 officers and 234 enlisted marines and to leave for Subic Bay.[79] Furthermore, on 28 March, CINCPAC directed ARG ALPHA to reduce to a 6-hour response time to Kompong Som.[80] This was accomplished the same day.

(U) SEA Summary. To accomplish the mission of keeping abreast of all activities in SEA, including cease-fire violations in RVN, the Surface Operations Branch (DOSO), maintained situation maps, combat statistics and other data on a daily basis. A daily summary of significant activity in SEA was forwarded to the JCS. The USSAG Daily Status Report of Selected Southeast Asia Activities provided recipients an executive summary of significant ground actions that occurred in the Khmer Republic and South Vietnam.

MEKONG CONVOYS (U)*

(U) Significant developments during the quarter were:

*Further discussions of the Mekong Convoys are provided in Chapters II and VI.

a. The procurement of 10 additional, unfield barges.[81]

b. The establishment of continuous situation room manning by an officer during convoy transits and the initiation of a periodic situation reporting system. This system was event, rather than time, related.[82]

c. Internal staff responsibility for Mekong operations was transferred from Surface Operations and Plans to DCSO.

d. Agreement with AMEMB Phnom Penh and all concerned to establish the minimum monthly Mekong resupply requirements by tonnage and commodity.[83]

e. Convoys consisting of only tugs and barges were conducted and USAID and Military Sealift Command (MSC) assets were merged.[84]

f. Interested agencies in the Western Pacific, Washington, and Hawaii convened for a wide-ranging conference to discuss and clarify measures to improve convoy security and operation. Agency responsibilities for the resulting recommendations were also specified.[85]

g. The decision to indefinitely postpone scheduling of future convoys in view of the lack of adequate bank security.[86]

h. The Mekong Air, Ground and Riverine Operations Study Group of the Tri-Partite Deputies met in Saigon on 27 January and 26 February.

MILITARY ASSISTS (U)

VNAF Flying Programs. The FY 75 VNAF Flying Hour Program, totaling 332,290 hours, continued approximately as programmed throughout the quarter. Intensified hostilities during March were reflected in increased hours flown by the VNAF. The average number of daily hours flown were 865 during January, 886 during February and 1070 during March. The average daily flying costs for the mixes flown were $150,000 in January, $135,000 in February and $190,000 in March. The number of hours programmed for UH-1 helicopters were being overflown considerably, but other systems were either as programmed or behind the programmed hours. DOTA analysts monitored the VNAF flying hour program, costed the actual hours against the budget and provided this information to command elements. The VNAF force structure remained relatively stable until late March when the enemy offensive forced RVN evacuation from Pleiku and Da Nang. Losses of aircraft, munitions, POL, spares and other VNAF equipment were not yet confirmed although it is known that they were very high.

KAF Sortie Trends. In the third quarter FY 75, KAF TACAIR sorties were flown to blunt the NC dry season offensive. T-28, AC-24, AC-47 and UH-1 sorties were concentrated around Tuol Leap in support of rocket and 105mm howitzer clearing operations and in defense of the Kompong Luong perimeter (Figure 4). C-123s were flown in support of diverse enclaves using both airland and airdrop sorties to move personnel, equipment and food (Figure 5). C-123s were used to expend MK-82 bombs in support of Tuol Leap operations and in defense

CONFIDENTIAL

KAF STRIKE SORTIES



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AU-24	407	351	315	275	368	398	491	360	476			
AC-47	167	139	148	156	194	175	274	236	207			
T-28	2702	2435	2000	1587	1419	1403	2291	1764	1647			
UH-1G	628	508	695	651	753	1026	1389	1217	1402			
TOTAL	3904	3433	3359	2829	2731	2996	4245	3579	3932			

Figure 4

KAF SUPPORT SORTIES



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
C-123	640	665	788	687	721	656	687	601	687			
C-47	74	69	74	47	39	33	35	45	35			
O-1	561	573	601	536	566	539	573	469	591			
UH-1H	786	1066	1310	924	1025	945	1720	1758	1537			
TOTAL	2191	2373	2765	2194	2451	2172	2595	2873	2850			

Figure 5

of the Neak Luong perimeter. Maintenance problems continued to plague KAF operations, but effective use of operationally ready assets provided high sorties rates during critical periods of the KC offensive.

(U) Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO). One CHECO report, USAF Close Air Support in SVN, 1 Jan 72-31 Jan 73, completed USSAG/7AF coordination, received command approval and was forwarded to CHECO on 27 January. One CHECO team completed two weeks of microfilming on 28 January. A second team will return in the 4th quarter FY 75 to microfilm pertinent data on the Khmer Republic airlift.

Cambodia Airlift - Aircraft Ground Times at Pochentong. The enemy shelling of Pochentong Airport placed added emphasis on the turnaround times of airlift aircraft. Bird Air C-130 traffic was monitored from 16 January and DC-8 traffic from 15 February. The average time elapsed from touchdown to takeoff through 31 Mar 75 for C-130s was 23.3 minutes and for DC-8s was 28.9 minutes. These averages were computed on 1,197 C-130 sorties and 593 DC-8 sorties.

(U) Data Retrieval. DOT continued to provide many interested agencies with information from the Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB). DOTA analysts obtained information on the numbers of hours and sorties flown by both South Vietnamese and Khmer Air Force. DOTB briefers used this information as background and for periodic presentations during their air operation briefings to the headquarters staff.

(U) VNAF Operations/Management Plan (V-OPS). At the direction of CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, the Tactical Analysis Division (DOT) developed a comprehensive contingency plan to assist the VNAF in optimizing their resources. Previous studies, analyses and trip reports conducted by DOT provided the basis for this task. Coordination was completed within the headquarters in February, a draft was forwarded to DAO Saigon for their comments. This plan had high level interest and will be forwarded to Headquarters PACAF early in the next quarter.

(U) VNAF Quarterly Assessment. The second quarter FY 75 RVNAF Quarterly Assessment was received and distributed for review.

OPERATIONS PLANS (U)

(U) USSAG/7AF was released from exercise play in PRIME RATE 75 by CINCPAC. However, CINCPACAF requested two representatives be present at Clark Air Base to fulfill USSAG/7AF responsibilities.

Four plans continued different options for the EAGLE PULL operation. It was felt that a single plan was needed to prevent duplication and delete excess detail, so OPlan 5060C-3-75 was completed in March.

CINCPAC-directed changes to the TALON EAGLE contingency plan were completed. However, the renewed fighting in South Vietnam precluded final coordination. The change was in a hold status at the end of the quarter awaiting the outcome of the military and political situation.

CINCPACAF was provided the numbers and locations of all F-5E aircraft in South Vietnam.[87] The final summary, as of 17 Jan 75, showed 33 F-5Es at Phan Rang and the remaining 20 at Bien Hoa. The 33 F-5E aircraft at Phan Rang were moved from Bien Hoa to avoid rocket attacks.

SA-7 Defense. Recent VNAF A-37 losses to SA-7 missiles highlighted the inadequacy of existing infrared countermeasures. A study was conducted and it concluded that at the present A-37 loss rate, infrared jammers would be cost effective and would enhance the survivability of the A-37 against the SA-7 threat. However, they are very expensive and limited in number. A missile launch detector (MLD) associated with the ALE-20 flare dispenser would be ideal, but none are available. The ALE-20 for USAF aircraft was not designed as a continuous deployment system. MLDs are still in the development stage. It is doubtful that the DAV program would have sufficient funds to speed the MLD program out of the development stage. In the interim, strike aircraft tactics should be developed which position the aircraft not delivering ordnance to look for SA-7 launches when the other aircraft are unable to detect missile launches.

Thailand Air Assets. CINCPAC tasked USSAG/7AF to assess the feasibility of consolidating Thailand U-21 assets at Don Muang Airport.[88] An in-depth study was undertaken and the recommendation was that consolidation be delayed at this time. Facilities and secure communications circuiting are not available at Don Muang to support

highly classified operation of the 7th Radio Research Field Site Aviation Detachment. It also appears that the added mission flexibility and appropriate responsiveness of retaining the JCRC U-21 assets at U-Tapao is desirable. It was determined some logistical economies could be gained through consolidation, but the savings might possibly be offset in mission degradation.

USSAG/7AF comments regarding reduction of the current HH-43 inventory in Thailand was requested.[89] MAC has restricted the HH-43 to a life or death mission only, pending the complete evaluation of its airworthiness and supportability. CINCPACAF proposed the inactivation of HH-43 at NKP and Korat, and the SAR efforts for these bases would be provided by in-country HH-53s. USSAG/7AF concurred.[90]

USSAG/7AF requested the 388TFW develop AC-130 SAR tactics to support HH-53 rescue operations.[91] The missions flown to date have proved that the concept is valid and affords a far greater degree of operational flexibility than was originally conceived. The 16 SOS is concurrently developing the operational procedures, training scenarios, and a briefing to review the added combat potentialities realized.

Ubon Meteorological Equipment. USSAG/7AF recommended the transfer of all meteorological equipment at Ubon RTAFB, to the RTG when U.S. operational control of that base ends.[92] This recommendation was predicated on the fact that if the RTG does not receive this equipment, as verbally agreed upon, then they would probably

withdraw weather observing support, primarily in the personnel field. This would necessitate an increase of approximately 20 USAF weather personnel billets in Thailand. The cost of this action would be considerably more than the cost of the meteorological equipment, approximately $30,000. In addition, it would require the addition of U.S. personnel in Thailand at a time when withdrawal is being emphasized.

Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand. CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations for the force level mix, and basing requirements for the manpower levels from present to 21,300 by the end of FY75, reduction to 12,000 beyond FY76, and a third reduction to 10,000 by 31 Dec 76.[93] Also included were withdrawal plans, any change to logistical support, changes in plans for reduction in joint headquarters and in plans for telecommunications and the resulting base closure schedule. USSAG/7AF recommendations were provided.[94]

Beddown Posture. Thirteenth Air Force requested comments on the following beddown changes:[95]

a. Maintain two unspecialized F-4D squadrons at Korat instead of one F-4D and one F-4E squadron.

b. Transfer the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) detachment (six RF-4C) with tailored PPIF support from Udorn to Korat vice U-Tapao. The RF-4Cs would remain at Korat until post-SEA when an appropriate tactical organization would be activated at U-Tapao.

USSAG made these comments:[96]

a. Inactivate the 34TFS at Korat and transfer the aircraft out of Thailand. Move one F-4D squadron (special equipped) and two F-4E squadrons (TISEO/MAVERICK/COMBAT TREE equipped) to Korat. This would give a balanced fighter force to insure an adequate in-place capability.

b. In order to consolidate photo processing and to minimize moves, USSAG/7AF recommended that the 15TRS detachment with tailored PPIF support move to U-Tapao as programmed. A permanent PPIF can then be established for support of both drone and RF-4 operations at one location for FY76 and the follow-on years.

CINCPACAF requested comments on proposed transfer schedule and programmed beddown posture.[97] USSAG concurred with the proposed basing, force level and aircraft mix for Thailand F-4D and F-4E assets in the post FY75 SEA withdrawal phase. In view of higher force levels and the JCS decision to consider U-Tapao and Korat closure at a later date,[97a] USSAG/7AF recommended that 12 RF-4C aircraft be moved to Korat with the remaining six RF-4C aircraft returning to the CONUS. This would consolidate all Thailand TACAIR assets at one location, facilitating logistics support, management, and command and control. Additional RF-4C aircraft (12 vice 6) are required to accomplish USSAG/7AF day/night reconnaissance requirements.

KAF Night Strike Capability. CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF's analysis in coordination with USSAG/7AF, TAC, CSAF to determine if T-28 all weather/night strike capability should be considered urgent-cost/mission-effective requirement and be included in KAF FY76 training program.[98] USSAG concurred with CINCPACAF.[99] In

essence, the existing night capability in AC-47, AU-24, and UH1G, coupled with artillery, provides significant fire power against enemy ground troops, the primary night target. With the limited air resources and MAP funds, the added capability represented by expanding T-28 strike operations does not justify the urgent funding classification. CHMEDTC requested reconsideration be given to KAF T-28 night training.[100] CINCPACAF recommended that in view of the additional rationale T-28 night CCT in the FY76 KAF training program should be instituted.[101] USSAG/7AF concurred in support of the desirability of a night T-28 strike capability.[102] The rationale and justification submitted by MEDTC was considered sound and the requested training should be high on the priority list for funding after essential levels of ammunition and other basic commodities.

MACTHAI Reorganization Plan. USSAG/7AF reviewed and concurred with the proposed MACTHAI Organization Plan for FY76 with the following comments:[103]

a. The plan should delineate the commander's interface with the Thai police and intelligence organization. Also, the functional description should designate the new directorate or staff elements that will provide this interface.

b. If continued operation of the Training and Logistics Detachment, based on KAF requirements, is needed beyond FY75, USSAG/7AF recommended the responsibility for this detachment be transferred to CINCPACAF/13AF.

c. In the event present planning is modified for the

drawdown of Thailand based forces, that is surge commitments are continued or forces are not withdrawn on schedule, MACTHAI/JUSMAG should be sufficiently adaptable to accommodate the situation.

Headquarters Disestablishment Planning. CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations on the following options should the political/military situation require retention of USSAG beyond FY75:[104]

a. Move essential functions to Clark Air Base and dual-hat the USSAG commander with the 13AF commander (inactivate 7AF).

b. Retain reduced USSAG at NKP.

The USSAG/7AF response centered around these vital considerations:[105]

a. Minimum manpower requirements to continue contingency planning, command and control, logistics monitoring, and intelligence functions at NKP.

b. Minimum additional manpower requirements at Clark Air Base to form a USSAG/7AF headquarters.

c. Time required to achieve a move to Clark, if directed.

d. Base support considerations for both options.

B-52 OPERATIONS (U)

The B-52 Operations Division continued operational staff support for the USSAG mission. The primary activity within the division was continued training in order to maintain proficiency among the assigned personnel. Operating procedures were reviewed and updated for use in the event of renewed hostilities in SEA.

Weekly scheduled exercises were conducted to maintain the capability of processing and validating ARC LIGHT targets and to exercise coordination efforts with SAC ADVON in order to effect strikes on selected targets. In addition to submitting simulated targets in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam for strike planning proficiency, the division provided SAC ADVON with actual radar bomb scoring targets for training missions flown in Thailand. These training sorties were flown from Anderson AFB, Guam and U-Tapao, and employ the various bombing methods used by the B-52 fleet.

WEATHER (U)

(U) During the first half of the reporting period, efforts were confined to improving environmental support to USSAG and providing COMUSSAG with weather forecasts for specialized missions. The second half of the reporting period saw a significant increase in air operations as a massive resupply effort for Cambodia was initiated. Airlift weather support coordination became the primary task of the USSAG TACC weather officers.

(U) Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP): The DMSP facility, Site 23, continued to produce high resolution visual and infrared photographs in support of USSAG mission requirements. Power budget problems with satellite number 8531 occurred on 3 February. In order to solve the problem, tests were conducted on 8, 22, and 27 February, as well as 3 and 6 March. The test resulted in a loss of some data over SEA. During the past quarter, Site 23 supported the USAF Selective Reconnaissance Program by

telephoning 15 tropical storm analysis and position reports to the Joint Typhoon Warning Center at Guam.

(U) BUFFALO HUNTER. DOW briefed COMUSSAG on all scheduled BUFFALO HUNTER missions by track and probability of cloud free sky. Missions were not launched solely on the basis of intelligence needs and adequate weather in the areas of concern. Recovery area weather played an extremely important role in go/no go decision making due to the atypical weather conditions which prevailed over the SEA interior during March. Visibility seriously hampered BUFFALO HUNTER missions. Regarding March weather at NKP, the temperature averaged 6 degrees above the climatological norm of 84.5°F. More importantly, visibility was less than five miles 40 percent of the month at NKP, as opposed to the climatological norm of 12 percent.

(U) Miscellaneous Weather Support. Weather inputs for OLYMPIC MEET and GIANT SCALE missions were routinely briefed. USSAG J-2 was provided a weather study regarding Thailand precipitation. Support to the 6908th Security Squadron also continued.

(U) Tactical Reconnaissance Forecasting. DOW contined to provide forecasts which were geared to facilitating USSAG RF-4 tactical reconnaissance decision making. Surface observations were routinely secured from Phnom Penh, and sporadically received from Battambang, Kompong Chhnang, Kampot, and Lovek. They were extremely valuable when used in combination with Defense Meteological Satellite photographs. In additon to providing the above weather forecasts, a procedure was

established in January whereby the TACC weather officer would provide an optimum weather time-frame for RF-4 reconnaissance by geographical area. This "weather window" was given to the USSAG/J-2 Reconnaissance Branch for both the current day's operations and as a planning forecast for missions being contemplated during the next 24 hours.

(U) The idea of a "weather window" generated flexibility in reconnaissance scheduling whereby "weather" versus "intelligence to be derived from a mission" became a planning factor, rather than too much emphasis being placed on the former. Thus, if the cloud free probability of seeing a target were 95 percent between 1030 and 1200 hours, but was 70 percent from 0800 to 1000 hours; the latter time might be selected to preclude the enemy from restricting his movements during the most cloud free periods. The "weather window" concept is most applicable during the October- May period. From June through September, the southwest monsoon and associated deteriorating weather conditions result in a very narrow "weather window." This minimizes the value of the window concept and causes the optimum weather time to become the dominant planning factor.

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS (U)

(U) Computer Operations. The following figures represent the percentage of total computer processing time dedicated to each major functional area for the months indicated:

	JAN	FEB
Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB)/OPREP-5	32.07	32.53
Republic of Vietnam Analysis	25.42	15.99
Joint Casualty Resolution Center	8.67	12.76
Systems Maintenance	5.06	5.33
Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia	2.51	1.36
Frag Order Preparation	2.96	7.02
Southeast Asia Reconnaissance Inquiry File (SIRFA)	2.60	2.56
Other	20.70	22.45

The March figures are unavailable due to a hardware failure. However, there were no significant changes from February.

(U) Programming Analysis. Nine data automation requests for development work were completed. Most were for enhancement or modification of existing capabilities.

(U) Due to the critical nature of the logistic support of the Khmer, much work was accomplished on the MEDTC ammo system. To supplement the logistics accounting system, an airlift load optimizer program was assigned which provided Phnom Penh with a means of matching ammo needs with available airlift. Output from this analyzer was transmitted automatically to Phnom Penh.

(U) The RVN Cease-Fire Analysis System was turned over completely to the primary user, the special assistant to the DEPCOMUSSAG.

(U) Systems Programming.[106] An on-line copy processor was completed that permits the disk-to-disk transfer of any type of data set. It permits the movement of data with the use of several parameters to establish the attributes of the resultant set. This is a useful adjunct to the existing capabilities of the Interactive Console System.

(U) JCRC File and Retrieval System.[107] A modification was made to the on-line processor for JCRC that permits entry of literal statements into a series of records with only one command. The capability has substantially reduced the time needed to alter biographic records when a statement is applicable to many records at the same time.

(U) Fragmentary Order Preparation. A significant system "clean up" was conducted and an extraordinary use of frag prep was made in an extensive plans generation task. As the result of a comprehensive analysis, 50 percent of the frag prep data base, and 60 percent of the programs in the main subsystems were deleted. These components were found to be obsolete and dysfunctional. Thus, a significant reduction in frag order preparation processing time and training time for new personnel was achieved. Also, surge capability was tested and affirmed.

(U) The IBM 1130 frag prep software was modified to reduce by 45 percent the time required to punch cards for dissemination. This alteration is significant when the normal dissemination capability through the IBM 360 is inoperative and the 1130 card punch must be used.

(U) Documentation Retirement. Twenty-two boxes of combat operational reports were prepared for permanent retirement to the National Records Center, Washington, D.C.

(U) CINCPAC returned the SEADAB History Tape for January-November 1974. A note on the transmittal sheet stated that this project has

been cancelled at CINCPAC. A message confirmed that CINCPAC will not require the monthly history tape and the daily transactions for SEADAB, because they no longer have capability to process SEADAB data.[108]

(U) Combat Air Operations Support Systems. From 7-17 January, Lt Col McCleary Douglas, CINCPACAF/ACDP, visited the USSAG Automated Systems Division (DOY) to discuss and review current USSAG Combat Air Operations Support Systems. The primary purpose of his trip was to transport to PACAF all existing documentation and source programs used for frag preparation and SEADAB capabilities. These concepts will eventually be used in the creation of similar capabilities on the WWMCCS hardware and software. CINCPACAF requested additional program listings.[109] DOY transmitted a magnetic tape containing most of the requested programs.[110] Some programs could not be furnished because they were obsolete and the listings had been destroyed. CINCPACAF later requested the SEADAB Edit Tables and an explanation of several programs' functions.[111]

(U) In February, the 374TAW began reporting contractor DC-8 (non-military) flights in OPREP-4s. DOY requested PACAF guidance regarding how this data should be entered in SEADAB and OPREP-5.[112] CINCPACAF directed entry of the DC-8 activity in SEADAB with a Service Code of "O" for others, and requested the time required to modify the OPREP-5 for automatic inclusion of this activity.[113] DOY estimated two weeks for the changes and recommended that manual tabulation of this activity should be used.[114] On 5 March, DOY began coding

and inputting the DC-8 activity into SEADAB. Since adequate personnel were not available in Saigon to produce OPREP-4s, the 7AF TACC Airlift Flight Following Log and the Cambodian Airlift Summary, Saigon Reports are used to make SEADAB records. Data from 27 February through 4 March was coded and input on 5 March.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF, 310245Z Jan 75, Subj: Approval/ Disapproval Authority (U).

2. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF, 250035Z Jan 75, Subj: Commanders Locator Check (U).

3. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPACAF, 210830Z Jan 75, Subj: Threat Warning for the VNAF (U).

4. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8707, 250940Z Jan 75, Subj: Procedures for the Use of IFF MarkX (IFF) Mark XII in the PACOM (U).

5. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPAC, 061115Z Feb 75, Subj: AKAA-285 Distribution (U).

6. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPAC (and others) 170430Z Mar 75, Subj: Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Region (MSEAADR) (U).

7. Ltr (U), USSAG/7AF/DO to USDAO Khmer, Laos and RVN, 5 Jan 75, Subj: Airfield Folders and Aircrew Guidance.

8. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8707, CINCPAC, PACAF (and others) 060950Z Mar 75, Subj: Approach Procedures at Tan Son Nhut, RVN (U).

9. Msg (U), USSAG/7AF/DO to COMUSMACTHAI, 170440Z Mar 75, Subj: Military Air Traffic at Chiang Mai Airport.

10 Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/DO to CSAF (and others), 271320Z Mar 75, Subj: AAA/SAM Threat (U).

11. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 142336Z Aug 73, Subj: SEASIA Operating Authorities (U). Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 142338Z Aug 73, Subj: SEASIA Basic Rules of Engagement (ROE) (U).

12. CINCPAC Instruction 3130.2C (U), 6 Jan 75, Subj: War Time Search and Rescue (SAR) Procedures for U.S. Military Forces in the CINCPAC Area of Responsibility.

13. Msg (TS), USSAG/7AF/CS to CINCPAC, 090830Z Jul 74, Subj: Contract Airlift Support to Khmer Republic (U).

14. Msg (TS), JCS/8297 to CINCPAC, 292043Z Aug 74, Subj: Contract Airlift Support for Cambodia (U). Msg (TS), JCS 2479 to CINCPAC, 152211Z Oct 74, Subj: Contract Airlift Support to the Khmer Republic (U).

15. Msg (TS), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 040415Z Mar 75, Subj: Contract Airlift Support for Cambodia (U).

16. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 040722Z Mar 75, Subj: Contract Airlift Support to Cambodia (U).

17. Msg (TS), JCS/2451 to CINCPAC, 051519Z Mar 75, Subj: Contractor Airlift Support to Cambodia (U). (Interim Response). Msg (TS), JCS 3800 to CINCPAC, 181538Z Mar 75, Subj: Contract Airlift SAR Support (U). (Final Guidance).

18. Msg (S), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 150410Z Mar 75, Subj: Bird Air Cambodia Operation (U). Msg (S), CHMEDTC to COMUSMACTHAI, 141012Z Mar 74, Subj: Unknown (Requests U-21 Support to Phnom Penh) (U).

19. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 152342Z Mar 75, Subj: Unknown (Directs USAF C-130s to provide support to DAO/MEDTC)(U) Implemented by: Msg (S), USSAG to CHMEDTC (and others), 160835Z Mar 75, Subj: USAF C-130 Administrative Support Flight to Pochentong, CB (U).

20. Msg (S), AMEMB Phnom Penh/5179 to CINCPAC (and others), 211010Z Mar 75, Subj: Unknown.

21. Ibid.

22. Ltr (S), DOC to DOSP, 20 Sep 73, Subj: Air Elements Rules of Engagement (U). Memo for Record (S), DOCM Internal, 8 Jan 74, Subj: ROE for Evacuation Assistance Operations (U).

23. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 310220Z Jul 73, Subj: COMUSSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C-EAGLE PULL (U). (Retransmittal of JCS 30 Jul Guidance.)

24. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8713, 231439Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-1-75 (EAGLE PULL) (U). Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8713, 241342Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-2-75 (EAGLE PULL) (U).

25. Ibid.

26. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 220443Z Mar 75, Subj: Strip Alert/Fighter Support-PARPRO SEASIA (U).

27. Flag Note (U), USSAG/7AF/CS to USSAG/7AF/DO, 24 Mar 75, Subj: Strip Alert/Fighter Support - PARPRO SEASIA.

28. Fact Sheet (TS), USSAG/DOC to CC, CS, DO, DOCB, 2 Apr 75, Subj: Fact Sheet on Strip Alert/Fighter Support - PARPRO SEASIA (U).

29. CINCPAC Instruction 3020.2G (S), 9 Jan 71, Subj: Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (U).

30. Letter of Agreement (C), Between 7/13AF and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), 1 Apr 67, Subj: USAF/RTAF Joint Use and Integrated Air Defense Operations Agreement (U).

31. Msg (TS), JCS 3250 to CINCPAC, 271722Z Mar 75, Subj: Reconnaissance Operations in SEASIA (U).

32. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 280902Z Mar 75, Subj: Resupply of 6th VNAF Air Division (U).

33. Msg (S), JCS 1149 to CINCPAC, 292009Z Mar 75, Subj: Resupply of 6th VNAF Air Division (U).

34. Msg (TS), USSAG/7AF to AIG 789 and JCRC, 151030Z Aug 73, Subj: SEASIA Operating Authorities (U). Msg (TS), USSAG/7AF to AIG 789, 151200Z Aug 73, Subj: SEASIA Basic Rules of Engagement (ROE), Cease-Fire in NVN, RVN, The DMZ, Laos, and Cessation of Combat Activities by U.S. Forces in GKR (U). Msg (S), USSAG/7AF to 13AF (and others), 090240Z Feb 74, Subj: Operating Authorities and Rules of Engagement, Thailand (U).

35. Exercise Report on file in USSAG/DOXW files.

36. Ltr (S) CINCPAC to COMUSSAG, 16 Dec 74, Subj: USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060V (S).

37. Msg (S) AMEMB Vientiane to COMUSSAG, 190637Z Mar 75, Subj: E & E Personnel Figures (U).

38. Msg (U) USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8713, 030740Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C EAGLE PULL with Appendix 3. Ltr (U), CINCPAC to COMUSSAG, 22 Jan 75, Subj: Review of Change 2 to USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C, EAGLE PULL.

39. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J31/J3 to CINCPACFLT, 062101Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

40. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J3/DOO to JCS, 111909Z Jan 75, Subj: None.

41. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 070450Z Jan 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

42. Msg (C) CINCPAC/J31/J3 to COMUSSAG, 100257Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

43. Msg (S) COMUSSAG/7AF/CS to CINCPAC, 170545Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

44. Msg (S) CTF 79/III MAF to AMEMB/DAO Bangkok, 300419Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

45. Ltr (S), USSAG/7AF/DOS to Staff Sections, Info: 56SOW, 1 Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL War Game (S).

46. Msg (S) CTF 79 to COMSEVENTHFLT, 050640Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

47. Msg (S) COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF 79, 051128Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

48. Msg (S) CTF 79 to COMUSMACTHAI, 060045Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

49. Msg (S), CTF 79 to COMUSSAG, 080030Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Command Group (U).

50. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 060440Z Feb 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

51. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to 13AF, 090210Z Feb 75, Subj: Deployment Directive, TACAN Support (U).

52. Msg (S), 1974 Comm Group to CINCPACAF, 111050Z Feb 75, Subj: Deployment Directive, TACAN Support (U).

53. Msg (S) 13AF/DOCE to 1961 Comm Group and 1974 Comm Group, 120400Z Feb 75, Subj: Deployment Directive, TACAN Support (U).

54. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF/LG to 13AF and COMUSMACTHAI, 140805Z Feb 75, Subj: Chantaburi Support Requirements (U).

55. Msg (S) 13AF/CS to USSAG (and others), 220055Z Feb 75, Subj: 13AF EAGLE PULL Support Tasking (U).

56. Msg (S) CHFLTCOORDGRU to CTF 79, 090213Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Command Group (U).

57. Msg (S) CTF 79 to COMSEVENTHFLT, 100435Z Feb 75, EAGLE PULL Command Group (U). Msg (S) COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT, 100750Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Planning (U).

58. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF/DC to AIG 8713, 100700Z Feb 75, Subj: Change 1 to Annex K, USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-1-74 (EAGLE PULL)(U).

59. Msg (S) JCS to CINCPAC, 102220Z Feb 75, Subj: NEMVAC Plans for Cambodia (U).

60. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J4716/J01 to COMUSSAG, 112021Z Feb 75, Subj: Transport of Civilians on Military Aircraft (U).

61. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J74 to CINCPAC LNO, 150310Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Public Affairs (U).

62. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 220130Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Photographic Support (U).

63. Msg (U) CINCPAC LNO to 601 Photo Squadron, 240546Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Public Affairs.

64. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 160630Z Feb 75, Subj: Evacuation of American Citizens (C).

65. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 181045Z Feb 75, Subj: Coordination of Evacuation Plans with Thai Embassy (C).

66. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 210600Z Feb 75, Subj: Discussion with UK Charge on Potential Evacuation (U).

67. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 220520Z Feb 75, Subj: E & E: TCNs Working for U.S. Networks (U).

68. Msg (C) CINCPAC/J311/J3 to USDAO Phnom Penh, 202152Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (C) USDAO Phnom Penh to CINCPAC, 220330Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

69. Msg (S) CINCPAC to JCS, 010324Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

70. Msg (S) COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT, 022130Z Mar 75, EAGLE PULL (U).

71. Msg (S) CINCPAC to MAC, 020135Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (S) CINCPAC to JCS, 022035Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

72. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to DAO Phnom Penh, 030505Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

73. Msg (S) CHMEDTC to USSAG/7AF, 080445Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

74. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to USSAG/7AF, 111225Z Mar 75, Subj: Addition Potential Evacuees for NEMVAC Plan (C).

75. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 150602Z Mar 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

76. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 310515Z Mar 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

77. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 140555Z Mar 75, Subj: French Evacuation Aircraft (U). Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 151125Z Mar 75, Subj: French Evacuating Nearly All Personnel (C). Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 200430Z Mar 75, Subj: Philippines Embassy Evacuates Phnom Penh (U).

78. Msg (S) JCS to CINCPAC, 221544Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (S) COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF 76, 221410Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

79. Msg (S) CINCPAC to JCS, 222146Z Mar 75, Subj: Concept Plan for EAGLE PULL (U).

80. Msg (S) CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 280533Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (S) CTG 76.4 to CTF 76, 281333Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

81. Msg (C) CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 260001Z Jan 75, Subj: Additional Shield Barges (U).

82. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 211254Z Jan 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Sitrep Number 1 (U).

83. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 240711Z Jan 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Requirements (U).

84. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to AMEMB Phnom Penh (and others), 300525Z Jan 75, Subj: All Barge Mekong Convoy Concept (U).

85. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 040338Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Requirements (U).

86. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 261330Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Update (U).

87. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPACAF, 180705Z Jan 75, Subj: VNAF F-5E Aircraft (U).

88. Msg (U) CINCPAC to COMUSSAG, 010152Z Feb 75, Subj: Consolidation of U-21 Assets at Don Muang.

89. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to USSAG/7AF, 270304Z Dec 74, Subj: HH-43 Reduction in SEA (U).

90. Msg (U) USSAG/7AF to CINCPACAF, 070515Z Jan 75, Subj: HH-43 Reductions in SEA.

91. Msg (C) 13AF ADVON to 13AF, 130750Z Feb 75, Subj: AC-130-CH/HH-53 SAR Integration (U).

92. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CSAF, 030230Z Mar 75, Subj: Turnover of USAF Meterological Equipment (U).

93. Msg (S) CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF (and others), 061903Z Mar 75, Subj: Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels Thailand (U).

94. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 120820Z Mar 75, Subj: Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (U).

95. Msg (S) 13AF to USSAG/7AF, 150320Z Feb 75, Subj: Thailand Force Review (U).

96. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to 13AF, 260755Z Feb 75, Subj: Thailand Force Review (U).

97. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to USSAG/7AF (and others), 150513Z Mar 75, Subj: Thailand Programming on F-4 Specialized System Beddown (U).

97a. Msg (S) JCS to CINCPAC, 142244Z Feb 75, Subj: U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand FY76 and Beyond (U).

98. Msg (S) CINCPAC to CINCPACAF (and others), 070330Z Jan 75, Subj: Reductions in Headquarters and Support Elements in Thailand (U).

99. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPACAF, 160200Z Jan 75, Subj: Khmer AF Night Strike Capability (U).

100. Msg (S) CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 290931Z Jan 75, Subj: Reductions in Headquarters and Support Elements in Thailand (U).

101. Msg (C) CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 040100Z Feb 75, Subj: KAF Night Strike Capability (U).

102. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 011055Z Feb 75, Subj: KAF Night Strike Capability (U).

103. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to USSAG/7AF, 0103312 Jan 75, Subj: Proposed MACTHAI Organization Plan for FY76 (U). Msg (S) CINCPAC to USSAG, 2421152 Dec 74, Subj: Proposed MACTHAI Organization Plan for FY76 (U).

104. Msg (S) CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF, 030235Z Jan 75, Subj: USSAG Options (U).

105. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 211045Z Jan 75, Subj: USSAG Options (U).

106. USSAG History, 1 October - 31 December 1974.

107. USSAG History, 1 July - 30 September 1974.

108. Msg (U) CINCPAC/J63 to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 170157Z Jan 75, Subj: SEADAB Data.

109. Msg (U) CINCPACAF/ACDP to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 230230Z Jan 75, Subj: SEADAB Programs.

110. Ltr (U) USSAG/7AF/DOY to CINCPACAF/ACDP, 4 Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB Programs.

111. Msg (U) CINCPACAF/ACDPC to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 270115Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB Programs.

112. Msg (C) USSAG/7AF/DOY to CINCPACAF/XOOCR, 180904Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB/OPREP-5 (U).

113. Msg (C) CINCPACAF/XOOC to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 210115Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB/OPREP-5 (U).

114. Msg (C) USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPACAF, 241305Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB/OPREP-5 (U).

CHAPTER VI

LOGISTICS

OVERVIEW (U)

(U) Logistics continued to concentrate primarily on monitoring munitions, POL, rice and equipment required by the Khmer Republic. Funding constraints and interdiction of the Mekong River necessitated virtual hour-by-hour analysis of the MAP-CB management. In addition, funding constraints continued to require detailed analysis and management for Military Assistance Service Funded and Defense Assistance, Vietnam (DAV). These efforts, including the necessity to advise the national command authorities daily on the status and effectiveness of the supply effort, received major emphasis during the quarter.

KHMER REPUBLIC LOGISTICS (U)

Movement of Munitions and General Cargo from Vung Tau to Vayama. As a result of a steadily increasing drain on limited MAP-CB funds, CHMEDTC took action to gain some relief through the deobligation of munitions loaded aboard nine barges at Vung Tau. These barges had been frustrated at Vung Tau due to the inability of the EMG to regain control of the Mekong River. DAO Saigon was extremely concerned about the possibility of sapper attacks against these barges if they remained at Vung Tau for an indefinite period of time. Consequently,

after Secretary of Defense approval, USSAG took action to move six barge loads of munitions approved for deobligation to Vayama for off-loading and storage in the Vayama Ammunition Depot. The commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI), obtained the necessary customs clearance for importation through Vayama and on 14 March the six barges arrived at Vayama. On 22 March, after SECDEF approval, USSAG initiated action to move the three remaining loaded barges from Vung Tau. Again, COMUSMACTHAI obtained the necessary customs clearance for the move, and on 30 March the three barges departed Vung Tau enroute to Vayama, scheduled to arrive on 3 April. As of that date, all SCOOT-T barges loaded with munitions and general cargo will have been returned to Vayama for off-loading.

All-Barge Concept for Mekong Movements. On 23 January, U.S. Ambassador John Gunther Dean called a meeting at Phnom Penh to discuss all aspects of the scheduling and operation of Mekong convoys with the USSAG deputy commander, CHMEDTC, USAID Cambodia, and CINCPAC/J4. At that meeting it was decided that convoys should go to an all-barge concept for munitions, rice and POL, and requirements for additional shield barges and USAID tugs and barges were identified. CINCPAC was requested to approve use of SCOOT-T tug/barge assets in support of USAID for movement of rice and POL on a reimbursable basis and incentive pay for SCOOT-T crew members. The American Embassy Phnom Penh was requested to reaffirm agreement to reimburse the SCOOT-T assets. As a result of these proposals, it was necessary to call a joint meeting of all interested activities and agencies.

Mekong Convoy Requirements Conference. On 5 February, a conference was held at DAO Saigon to discuss Mekong convoy requirements and to reach agreements on actions to be taken by all interested parties. Activities and agencies participating were: CINCPAC/J4, HQ USSAG, USAID Washington, USAID Vietnam, USAID Phnom Penh, commander Military Sealift Command (COMSC), COMSC Far East, MACTHAI Support Group, DAO Saigon, Military Sealift Command Office Vietnam, and U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity. A myriad of closely interrelated topics, having a direct bearing on the movement of supplies by the Mekong under the all-barge and tug concept, were discussed during the conference. Actions were directed and recommendations made for the accomplishment of necessary tasks required to implement the concept. The following is a summary of tasks and the status.

a. Acquisition of Additional Shield Barges. Approval for ten additional SCOOT-T shield barges and 12 USAID shield barges was obtained. Funding in the amount of $1.8 million was provided jointly by CHMEDTC and USAID. Construction of 21 shield barges had been completed.

b. Use of Target Cloth Covering on Outer Screen of Shield Barges to Obscure Enemy Gunners' View of Shielded Vessels. Test of this concept under actual conditions, using one set of shield barges on a tug, was agreed upon. Since no convoys were attempted after the meeting, a test did not take place.

c. Shield Barge Repairs at An Long and Vung Tau. COMSC Far East had taken action prior to the meeting to amend the contract to include repairs at An Long in addition to the original requirement for repairs at Vung Tau.

d. Requirement for Repair of USAID Acquired Shield Barges. USAID agreed to hand receipt their shield barges to COMSC who would then provide the necessary repair services as part of the existing shield barge repair/maintenance contract. This would permit pooling of assets and interchangeable use by both COMSC and USAID.

e. Requirement for Additional Mooring Buoys. Additional buoys at An Long are not required. Two additional buoys at Phnom Penh are required, bringing the total number of buoys up to four. Four buoys at An Long and four at Phnom Penh will handle the requirements.

f. Use of Rice-Stuffed CONEX containers to Provide Shielding on Munitions Barges in Lieu of Chain Link Fence and Sandbag Protection. Agreement was made to test the concept utilizing one barge. The lack of adequate MAP-CB funds and the Khmer Rouge interdiction of the Mekong River precluded this project.

g. Use of Rice for Protective Tops, Covering On-Loaded Ammunition Barges in Lieu of Sandbags. USAID Saigon was unable to obtain the necessary RVN customs clearance for rice to be used for the project.

h. Change of Mekong Operations to an All-Barge and Tug Operation. All participants agreed to this proposal. Four additional tugs and barges were identified as needed for the SCOOT-T tug/barge contract. USAID identified a total requirement of eight tugs and 13 barges. Action was initiated by COMSC and USAID to procure the

additional assets. COMSC and CINCPAC took action to locate tugs owned by the services that could be obtained for use as government furnished equipment for the SCOOT-T tug/barge contract. As a result, four small Navy-owned tugs (820-1081 BHP) were offered from CINCPACFLT assets, and two Army tugs in wet storage at Okinawa were located. The SCOOT-T tug/barge contractor, SEAPAC, Inc., located and hired one tug from Japan and two barges-- one cargo barge from Vung Tau and one POL barge from Singapore. USAID hired one additional tug from its tug/barge contractor and then issued a request for proposal (RFP) to obtain six additional tugs and POL barges.

On 27 February, CINCPAC requested that all ongoing negotiations for new or expanded SCOOT-T requirements be limited to phases short of contract award due to exhaustion of MAP-CB packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) funds.[1] Expenditure of funds was authorized at the existing level for current contracts, and CHMEDTC was requested to submit compensating decreases for new or additional SCOOT-T requirements. On 28 February CHMEDTC recommended to CINCPAC that the additional cargo barge brought on-hire be released in order to reduce expenditures.[2] CHMEDTC also recommended that further action by COMSC to acquire additional tugs should be terminated and that the government option for a three-month extension of the fire fighting tugs Shinano and Asiatic Stamina be exercised for the period April-30 June 1975. This extension, providing a total of eight contractor tugs without increased costs, was approved on

28 February.[3]

On 3 March, CINCPAC concurred in the CHMTDTC request to off-hire the recently acquired cargo barge and in the termination of action to obtain additional tugs from commercial sources.[4] CINCPAC later proposed that the four small tugs from CINCPACFLT assets being offered to COMSC might be crewed by Khmer personnel, that the tugs be provided to SEAPAC, Inc., as government furnished equipment, or that other arrangements be made.[5] The object was to reduce costs, as SEAPAC, Inc., had indicated a daily per diem rate of $1,100 to crew each tug. On 8 March, COMSC advised that use of Khmer personnel to crew the tugs was not considered appropriate for a civilian contractor operation.[6] Such manning was considered to be a loan of U.S. Government assets to a foreign government, requiring approval of higher headquarters. In further attempts to reduce MAP-CB PCH&T costs for the SCOOT-T operations, COMSC Far East proposed a series of recommendations pertaining to the SCOOT-T tug/barge contract.[7] Requested comments on the recommendations were provided to CINCPAC along with a statement of tug and barge requirements for optimum resupply of Phnom Penh, using four convoys per month and short term requirements based on MAP-CB PCH&T funding limitations for FY 75.[8] On 20 March, Ambassador Dean directed that all USAID barge and tug assets under contract on behalf of USAID Cambodia be put off-hire and that bids and offers from shipping companies for additional assets were to be cancelled.[9] This action left a total of eight tugs and 13 barges under contract

to COMSC for SCOOT-T.

i. Status of Actions to Procure Fire Fighting Tugs and Equipment for Use by MNK. The GKR presented a formal request in early January to the AMEMB Phnom Penh for the loan of two 65-foot fire fighting tugs for use as harbor tugs and escort for Mekong convoys. These tugs were available from U.S. Army assets in Japan and Korea. The request was forwarded to SECSTATE for further coordination with the Department of the Army.[10] Action progressed to provide fire protection on Mekong convoys and the pier in Phnom Penh in February; four P-250 water pumps and two fire fighting kits were shipped to MSCO Vietnam.

j. Requirement for Pre-Convoy Briefing of Tug Crews Participating in Convoys. All concerned agreed that briefings on the tactical situation and air and artillery support to be provided were essential for successful convoy passage. DAO Phnom Penh was requested to insure that MNK convoy commanders fully brief tug crews.

k. Communications Requirements for Convoy Control and Protection. Existing communications gear on convoy tugs was non-standard and the primary frequency (HF 8232 KHZ) unreliable due to propagation and interference. It was considered to be too expensive to replace existing gear, and all concerned were requested to explore other, more economical, means of communication.

l. Incentive Pay for Crews Operating on the Mekong. USAID and COMSC were requested to explore all possible avenues relative to providing incentive pay to tug crews to insure payment could be made

if the need arose.

m. Consolidation of SCOOT-T Support Contracts under COMSC Far East. All concerned agreed to consolidation of all SCOOT-T surface support contracts under COMSC Far East. COMSC Far East agreed to accept responsibility for initiating new procurement actions from 1 Apr 75 onward. On 21 February, COMSC Far East issued a RFP for a new contract covering SCOOT-T stevedoring and cargo documentation services at Vung Tau and the security/maintenance/repair of SCOOT-T shield barges that would become effective 1 April. On 4 March, SECDEF requested CINCPAC extend the existing contract for a 30-day period (1-30 April) and insure coverage for SCOOT-T documentation services. SECDEF also directed that the outstanding RFP be cancelled.[11] COMSC Far East gathered the cost estimates for the various contract extensions and requested authority from CINCPAC for expenditure of $333,363 to cover the extension period.[12] The expenditure of this amount was approved and COMSC Far East provided the necessary notification.[13]

n. Use of COMSC Personnel to Perform Contract Management of All SCOOT-T Functions. During the conference, COMSC Far East identified a requirement for 10 additional personnel for this function, nine to be added to the MSCO Vietnam staff. DAO Saigon indicated that these additional U.S. national spaces could be accommodated through 30 Jun 75 within the existing ceiling; spaces would require JCS approval after that date. COMSC has taken action

to obtain necessary spaces and funds for FY 76.[14]

o. Liabilities to be Encountered by USAID if COMSC Assets are used for Movement of USAID Commodities/Barges. USAID was tasked with: obtaining from GKR liability releases for rice moved on SCOOT-T munitions barges or USAID barges towed by SCOOT-T tugs; establishing through State Department channels procedures for reimbursement through the Department of the Army to MAP-CB for COMSC movement of USAID cargo; and establishing procedures for settlement of any marine casualty/loss claims. On 12 February, AMEMB Phnom Penh advised CINCPAC that funds had been reserved to cover costs of USAID financed commodities transported by COMSC assets and any claims against USAID for COMSC asset losses.[15] On 13 February, AMEMB Phnom Penh advised CINCPAC that GKR had agreed to waiver all claim rights against U.S. Government and COMSC contractors for any losses sustained in connection with Saigon/ Phnom Penh transshipment.[16]

p. Movement of MAP-CB General Cargo from Sattahip to Phnom Penh. At the time for the conference, Sattahip had a backlog of approximately 5,000 measurement tons of general cargo awaiting transshipment to Phnom Penh. The last surface shipment of general cargo to Phnom Penh was in mid-December 1974. Since that time, tug and barge assets had been devoted strictly to the movement of munitions to sustain required stockage levels in Phnom Penh. Sufficient airlift was not available to handle the volume of critically needed medical supplies and spare parts. It was agreed that every effort should be

made to move this cargo by surface mode. On 8 February, USSAG took action to move the barge load equivalent of general cargo to Vung Tau via deep draft vessel for subsequent discharge into a SCOOT-T barge for movement to Phnom Penh.[17] On 22 March, due to the interdiction of the Mekong, action was taken by USSAG to return the general cargo (delivered to Vung Tau on 13 February) to Sattahip for off-loading.[18]

q. Color Coding Sensitive Items of Munitions Requiring Maximum Protection or Special Handling for Ease of Identification. In order to facilitate identification of items to be stowed in the center of barges, for maximum protection, representatives of USAMSAA recommended items such as fuzes, mines and propellant charges be distinctly color coded at time of shipment from origin. After reviewing the proposal, at the request of CINCPAC, U.S. Army Munitions Command recommended that subject items be block stowed and segregated at time of loading each SCOOT-T vessel in CONUS for ease of access and identification.[19] CINCPAC concurred and requested implementation of future shipments from CONUS, directing USSAG to monitor effectiveness and insure proper loading of barges at Vung Tau.[20]

r. Modification of 105mm Artillery Ammo Packaging Techniques. Representatives from USAMAA also discussed a new concept for packaging 105mm artillery ammunition that could result in a 30 percent reduction of pallet weight while allowing 42 rounds to be transported in place

of the present 30 rounds per pallet. Subsequent information indicated that new packaging techniques were also being developed for 81mm mortar ammunition.[21] CINCPAC requested evaluation of the proposed new concept. USSAG/7AF recommended that: the proposed packaging method be discussed at the March Ammo Conference - Pacific Area (scheduled for 18-21 March); an economic analysis, from production to firing, should be conducted for the items to assist in determination of true cost avoidance; testing should be conducted to include sealift, airdrop delivery, and outside storage.[22] It was also strongly recommended that a test quantity (approximately 2,000 S/T) be packaged in proposed wirebound packs and shipped on the first available SCOOT-T vessel in order to gain actual experience on the viability of the concept. Discussion of the proposal at the conference revealed that apparent monetary advantages were currently outweighed by disadvantages and not to be further pursued for SCOOT-T at this time. The concept was recognized as having possible merit if using containerized shipments. Future consideration was recommended following normal development channels for economic operation without the special requirements associated with SCOOT-T.

NEMVAC PLANS (U)

Airlift of TCNs, U.S. Press and Civilian Personnel. The air movement of passengers from Phnom Penh to adjoining countries became a matter of great concern to the American Embassy as artillery and rocket attacks on Pochentong Airfield caused virtual cessation of commercial passenger flights. Air Cambodge was the sole commerical

airline which continued to fly; it flew on an infrequent basis. The AMEMB received an increasing number or requests for airlift of U.S. and other nationals out of Phnom Penh, using the C-130 and DC-8 aircraft employed in the airlift of rice, POL and military supplies to the beleaguered city. In mid-February CHMEDTC requested blanket authority for the movement of selected U.S. and foreign nationals covered by the Embassy evacuation plan, utilizing Bird Air C-130 aircraft for space available transportation from Phnom Penh to U-Tapao.[23] AMEMB Phnom Penh would determine eligibility and control passenger movements.

The request was approved under the provisions of paragraphs 14-6 and 14-8, DOD Regulation 4515.13R, with movements to commence not earlier than 0600 hours, 12 February.[24] USSAG advised AMEMB Phnom Penh and CHMEDTC that a maximum of 22 seats were routinely available on cargo configured C-130 aircraft for backhaul of evacuees to U-Tapao and that in an ememgency, 100 persons could be hauled if floor pallets were used.[25] In early March, the U.S. press services approached the State Department with requests for assistance in the evacuation of their TCNs using the Bird Air C-130s and contract DC-8s. Both SECSTATE and SECDEF concurred in these requests, and authority was granted for evacuation to U-Tapao by DC-8s.[26] This was later modified to include flights to Saigon. However, AMEMB Bangkok objected to the movement through U-Tapao, as the TCNs could not be properly processed through Thai customs.[27] There was a potential for adverse reaction by the RTG with a risk of exposing reconnaissance

operations to the news media. The Embassy counterproposed that flights be routed to Saigon as a first choice, followed by Don Muang Airport, Bangkok, with U-Tapao being the last choice. It was also proposed that for those press service personnel having valid reasons for wanting to come to Thailand, it would be more prudent to use the regularly scheduled USAID aircraft scheduled into Don Muang Airport; proper customs processing could be handled there. The AMEMB Phnom Penh agreed and assured that it was planning to use the USAID charter flights to Bangkok or Saigon. The American Embassy Saigon agreed, recommending Don Muang to AMEMB Phnom Penh.[28]

During this same period of time, it was discovered that a waiver of FAA regulations requiring passenger briefings on the contract DC-8s on the use of oxygen equipment and evacuation procedures was needed before passengers could be backhauled.[29] There was also a question of carrier liability in case of an accident. Headquarters MAC advised that the use of DD Form 1381 (Waiver of Liability) was unenforceable.[30] No waiver was required of personnel being transported, as the government had already indemnified the carriers for passenger liability in the airlift support for Cambodia. Waiver of the FAA regulations required certification by SECSTATE that an emergency condition existed. On 27 March the waiver was granted.[31] Other foreign national passenger movement complications were centered around requests to assist in the evacuation of foreign nationals assigned to allied embassies in Phnom Penh. A policy was requested that would permit the use of

DC-8s to carry limited numbers of these personnel to Saigon.[32] On 31 March, the embassies of Thailand and Vietnam both requested assistance in moving some of their personnel. A request for guidance was telephonically passed to CINCPAC.

Contract Operations (See also pgs 19-21). Comments and recommendations were provided to CINCPAC questions and proposals, as follows:

a. Two DC-8s on the ground simultaneously at Pochentong was preferable to night operations.[33]

b. Use of 747 aircraft was feasible, based on limited available information, and should be considered as an alternative. However, since charter cost was unknown, cost effectiveness should be considered.[34]

c. Proposed concept of operations could be handled by expanding/modifying the current command and control, flight scheduling, fragging, flight following and coordination functions.

d. USAID Phnom Penh be responsible for off-loading at Pochentong with assistance/coordination of CHMEDTC as required.

e. Consideration should be given to use of Bird Air C-130 bladder airlift as overall solution to the delivery of the required POL products; use of 55-gallon drums, 500-gallon rubberized containers (seal drums) and the Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System (ABFDS) had been considered. POL products could be contracted for in the U-Tapao area by USAID. Under this concept, a USAID chartered

DC-8 would fly three missions per day from U-Tapao to Pochentong with MAP-CB cargo to offset six MAP-CB funded C-130 sorties delivering USAID POL.

f. If available, two additional 25K loaders and two 10K forklifts should be moved to Pochentong. Loaders in Thailand were committed. Additional material handling equipment (MHE) assets would have to come from sources outside of Thailand.

g. Based on past experience with DC-8 cargo operations, 18 pallets (5,000 to 5,500 pounds each) vice 14 pallets (6,500 pounds each) would facilitate ease of handling, expedite off-loading and still maximize allowable cabin load (ACL).

h. Requirement for airlift mission commander at Tan Son Nhut to act as single point of contact for coordination and supervision of contract DC-8/747 operations was valid.

Other involved agencies added information and assistance. CINCPACAF advised of many operational and support problems involved with use of 747s. CHMEDTC advised that two 25K loaders and six 10K Hyster forklifts would be needed to off-load two DC-8s at one time, but with assets already on-hand from the DC-8 munitions airlift only one additional 25K loader and two additional 10K forklifts would be required; that daylight operations with two DC-8s on the ground at the same time was preferable to partial nightime operation; that the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC), Bangkok had advised against use of 747s as Pochentong ramp did not have sufficient concrete thickness. AMEMB Saigon advised that necessary arrangements at Tan Son Nhut were being taken care of and that there was a need for 463L pallets, nets, and tie down equipment, one 25K loader and

one 10K forklift. MAC agreed to provide, as availability permitted, pallets, nets, tie downs and MHE; 500 pallets/nets were available from McGuire AFB, two 25K loaders were available at Clark AB and one 10K rough terrain forklift was available at Travis AFB.

ased on these inputs, a modified operations plan was forwarded to JCS on 20 February.[35] On 22 February, the proposed plan was approved with the following exceptions and limitations:

a. If CSAF was unable to generate commercial assets to meet the 25 February start date, then one of the three DC-8s at U-Tapao airlifting munitions was to be pulled and a rice airlift started on 25 February, if date remained as a firm requirement. Additional commercial aircraft were to be input as soon as possible.

b. Approval/authorization was granted to commit up to $5.5 million in support of operations.

c. No additional personnel were authorized at Saigon or Phnom Penh to support this operation except for a mission commander at Tan Son Nhut, provided the ambassador concurred.[36] With embassy concurrence, two individuals were authorized at Tan Son Nhut, arriving in place on 23 February. The chief, Logistics Management Division, USSAG/7AF, was selected to serve as the Seventh Air Force Supervisor of Airlift, Saigon, providing the required continuity, supervision and coordination with all concerned. An assistant from USSAG/7AF/DO was also authorized in support of CINCPAC OPlan 5136. Subsequently, a contract administrator from 604MASS, Clark AB, was assigned to insure contract compliance, and a fourth

officer from USSAG/7AF/DO was assigned to assist in the overall operation at Tan Son Nhut as a result of the expanded requirements.

Implementation of Rice/POL Airlift. MAC was directed to implement the airlift starting 27 February.[37] A requirement for five stretch DC-8s was identified with two of the required aircraft to be provided by WOA and one by AII at the termination of the MAP-CB munition airlift from U-Tapao on 26 February. Of the two additional aircraft required, one was to be in place at Tan Son Nhut on 1 March with the remaining aircraft in position at U-Tapao on 4 March to assume airlift of MAP-CB cargo to offset two C-130 aircraft scheduled to commence airlift of USAID POL on that date. On 27 February, with three DC-8s in position, a total of nine sorties were flown, delivering 425 S/T of rice to Phnom Penh. MAC provided additional 463L pallets from McGuire AFB; one 10K forklift from Travis AFB, one 25K loader from Clark AB and two 10K forklifts from Travis AFB were provided for the Pochentong off-load operation. On 28 February, Bird Air achieved the desired 30 sorties level per day with the attendant capability of delivering 600 S/T per day. On 1 March a Flying Tiger (FTL) stretch DC-8 was added to the operation at Tan Son Nhut and on 4 March the final aircraft, a Trans International (TIA) stretch DC-8 was positioned at U-Tapao.

DC-8 Off-Loading Operations at Pochentong. Off-loading of DC-8 aircraft at Pochentong was set up at the east end of the commercial ramp, the area formerly used by C-130 aircraft for off-loading munitions. Due to the increased frequency of rocket attacks

on Pochentong, impacting heavily on the commercial side of the airport, a decision was made to move operations across the airport to the military side, or "Charlie" ramp. The ramp, constructed of soil cement, was surveyed by engineers to determine its ability to withstand heavy DC-8 traffic, with several engineering opinions emerging as to the rate at which these surfaces would fail under sustained usage. An engineering analysis conducted by the 635th Civil Engineering Squadron, U-Tapao, indicated that:[38] the soil cement ramp would sustain up to 90 DC-8 sorties without failing; shear cracks could be expected from use by the heavily loaded DC-8s, but the base material would provide sufficient strength to prevent the soil cement from total failure in the form of depressions. Therefore, the opinion continued, aircraft should avoid cracks to prevent failure after only a few sorties, because the ramp was designed to accommodate C-119/C-47 aircraft. Further, since C-130s had been operating, some fatigue may have already been experienced. He recommended that if the ramp and taxiway was to be used, aircraft movement should be monitored by engineering personnel. While this would not preclude possibility of sudden failure, general trends and rate of deterioration could be evaluated.[39]

On 27 February, CINCPAC and CINCPACAF concluded that regardless of which assessment was used, it appeared that the soil cement surfaces would fail under the anticipated usage, particularly in channelized traffic areas.[40] The taxiway and the transition/loading

areas on Charlie ramp were the most suspect areas. AM-2 matting was recommended for installation on these areas, initially proposed to cover a 54-foot wide segment or two 10-12 foot wide tracks for the DC-8s plus an 80-foot area on Charlie ramp. Action was taken to move 200 bundles of AM-2 matting, located at Sattahip and marked for KASS, to Pochentong by airlift.

Actions taken to accomplish this effort included:[41] CHMEDTC would call forward the material and make the necessary KASS funds reprogramming actions; Bird Air C-130s would airlift the matting from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh, fitting this material into the scheme of other MAP commodities; USAID Phnom Penh agreed to share cost of the airlift (by flying three DC-8s of MAP cargo for the six C-130s of matting) since the matting was needed primarily for the DC-8 airlift operation; FANK engineers would install the matting after training at U-Tapao; and work would be done at night to prevent disruption of the airlift operation. On 3 March, release was requested for an additional 152 bundles of matting, required to surface a 36-foot (vice 54) wide segment lengthwise on taxiway One and a transition/DC-8 off-load/turn around area on Charlie ramp, so that the project could continue without interruption.[42]

(U) The matting work started on taxiway One the night of 4 March and was completed on 8 March. The transition area on Charlie ramp was completed on 11 March. At project completion, approximately 238 bundles of AM-2 matting had been used; ten were

reserved for repair work, and 102 remained at U-Tapao. The complete DC-8 off-load/turn around area was not completed (accounting for the extra 102 bundles), because engineering and operational evaluation indicated that this portion of the Charlie ramp area was satisfactory without the matting. The completed project allowed for ingress and egress of Charlie ramp by DC-8s, using the primary taxiway, with C-130s entering via the main taxiway and exiting by the laterite taxiway.

C-130 Airlift of USAID POL. On 21 February, AMEMB Saigon was queried as to the acceptability of the proposal for exchanging equivalent DC-8 sorties for C-130 POL sorties using the ABFDS to transport USAID bulk POL.[43] The State Department concurred and approval was given for implementation provided that the C-130s carried POL at least equal to the amount that a DC-8 would be capable of delivering in one day; 120 cubic meters (CM) a day was noted as the minimum.[44] Three ABFDSs had been obtained previously for the support of CHMEDTC requirements and two additional systems had to be obtained to support the USAID requirements; these items were secured from war reserve material stocks (HARVEST EAGLE) located at Yokota AB, Japan. (See also pgs 21-22).

This allowed for the use of two equipped C-130 aircraft to fly three sorties per day each for a total of six sorties, delivering 126 to 132 CM of POL. The requirement for kerosene could not be handled within the U-Tapao area, and USAID resorted to procurement of packaged kerosene in Saigon, dedicating a DC-8 sortie

every other day to the movement of this product into Pochentong. Requirements for MOGAS, ADO, and AVGAS were handled by C-130s flying out of U-Tapao. Starting 17 March, after a delay in obtaining permission for a fuel specialist to enter Cambodia, the operation to defuel JP4 from the C-130s was begun.[45] This procedure was to increase the average ACL on each POL sortie by 1.73 S/T.

Cargo Operations at Tan Son Nhut AB. USAID Saigon was responsible for coordinating and arranging the transportation of rice and packaged kerosene in the local area, providing covered storage and palletization of items, loading of aircraft to include provision of some MHE, and control of pallets and nets. To accomplish these tasks, it was necessary to execute contracts covering various aspects of the operation. Stevedoring at the Saigon port and dryage to Tan Son Nhut cost $4 per metric ton (MT); off-loading at Tan Son Nhut at $3 per MT; pallet buildup at $10 per pallet; pallet buildup supervision and coordination of aircraft loading, movement of pallets, use of MHE, maintenance and security of government furnished MHE at $10 per pallet; loading and unloading of aircraft at $434 per flight; covered storage/pallet buildup at $3642 per month; and miscellaneous cost of $20,000.

Expansion of DC-8 USAID Rice/POL Airlift. On 8 March, AMEMB Phnom Penh increased the daily requirement for rice to 700 MT, estimating that two additional DC-8s would be required.[46] These two aircraft would raise the number of contract support aircraft to six.

The embassy estimated that 16.25 sorties at 40 MT per sortie would be required to support these increased requirements. USAID Washington was requested to make the assets available as soon as possible. AMEMB Saigon suggested, based on their experience, that five aircraft could lift 801 net MT of rice a day with four sorties daily per aircraft; four aircraft could lift 641 net MT per day.[47] This would be reduced by 40 MT every other day when one sortie of kerosene was hauled.

SECSTATE requested that SECDEF increase the daily rice airlift average and confirm the capability of five aircraft to provide the new requirement, while staying within the $5.5 million project ceiling.[48]

The expanded airlift was executed on 12 March by JCS, directing necessary arrangements for DC-8s and MHE to move the required rice and POL.[49] JCS further advised that no additional U.S. personnel would be authorized in Saigon or Phnom Penh, funding limitations of $5.5 million would apply, and a "no comment" reply would be given to all news media queries. CINCPAC directed implementation as soon as the fifth DC-8 aircraft was in place, suggesting that USAID Saigon increase the labor force and lease or rent additional MHE to support the revised requirements.[50] CINCPACAF recommended that Pan Am provide the additional MHE, being more cost effective than airlifting the equipment from the CONUS.[51] PACAF would provide 200 additional pallets and 400 side nets to Saigon on 14 or 15 March. MAC was requested to provide, as soon as

possible, still another 150 pallets, 250 top nets and 100 side nets to meet the expanded needs.

On 15 March, AMEMB Phnom Penh reiterated the 700 MT per day requirement and cited as unacceptable the 440 MT per day (11 sorties) average since the airlift began.[52] It was pointed out that the discrepancy between delivery and distribution requirements would exhaust rice stores about 16 April.

USSAG/7AF advised that a minimum of 18 sorties per day were necessary to meet the required tonnage.[53] Further, using the MAC contract scheduling effectiveness rate of 80 percent, 22.6 sorties must be scheduled to attain the required level of 18. Although a scheduling effectiveness rate of 85 percent had been experienced in the operation, the sustained sortie rate could not be produced with four aircraft. Five DC-8s could surge to the required level provided maintenance problems or battle damage did not disable any aircraft. Six DC-8s would be required to produce and sustain the required 18 sorties per day capability and augmentation was requested as soon as possible.

On 18 March, MAC indicated that six DC-8s were contracted for use in the airlift (5-6 operating during the period 19-26 March).[54] However, on 26 Mar 75, the $5.5 million would be exhausted causing cessation without any additional funds. On 19 March, SECSTATE increased the USAID rice/POL lift dollars by $8 million to extend the DC-8 operation for another 30 days.[55]

Battle damage, with resultant down time, and contractual

fluctuations caused the following schedule of aircraft available for airlift, during the closing days of the quarter:

TOTAL A/C Available	Date	Comments
4	26 March	Contract terminated for WOA 805 at COB.
3	27 March	Three DC-8s operating (one each, WOA, AII, FTL).
4	28 March	WOA 805 available after MAC renegotiated to use the in-place aircraft for an additional seven days (28 March-3 April).
5	29 March	Added Seaboard World (SBW) DC-8 commenced flying.
6	30 March	A second FTL DC-8 added.
7	31 March	A second SBW DC-8 additionally contracted by MAC to help meet requirements.

Airlift Interruptions/Volume. Between 27 February and 31 March, 1427 total sorties were flown into Cambodia despite the ever increasing accuracy and frequency of ABFs in and around Pochentong Airport. Temporary interruptions occurred on three occasions:

a. On 11 March TIA representatives notified the Seventh Air Force Supervisor of Airlift, U-Tapao, that they had terminated their operation into Cambodia after two of four scheduled sorties due to the risk from artillery and rocket attacks. They agreed, however, to reassess the security situation the next day.[56] Two hours later, without knowledge of the TIA decision, the other three carriers operating out of Tan Son Nhut advised of their intent to suspend operations after the third sortie of each aircraft. They did, however, indicate their willingness to fly five sorties with each of their three aircraft in conjunction with a significant

improvement in the security of the airfield. On 12 March all DC-8s flew their scheduled sorties.

b. On 21 and 22 March aircraft were damaged three times at Pochentong. On 21 March TIA aircraft sustained shrapnel damage to the nose section on the first sortie of the day. On 22 March a TIA aircraft and a Bird Air C-130 were damaged severely enough to be left on the ground and operations were suspended. The following day, only one airland sortie was flown into Pochentong carrying equipment and personnel to prepare the grounded aircraft for flight to U-Tapao. The TIA craft was flown to U-Tapao where sufficient maintenance was performed to enable the plane to be flown to Hong Kong for complete repair. The C-130 was returned to U-Tapao for repair there. On 24 March, with the exception of TIA, all carriers flew as scheduled.

c. On 28 March, airland operations were suspended at 0040Z hours due to ABFs. No DC-8s landed and only three C-130 sorties were able to off-load. On 29 March operations returned to normal.

Between 27 February and 31 March, 414 rice sorties and 13 POL sorties were flown by the DC-8s with 19,512 S/T of rice and 596 S/T of kerosene being delivered to Phnom Penh. In addition, 149 C-130 POL sorties were flown by Bird Air in support of USAID with 2,853 S/T of other POL products (including 377 S/T of JP4 defuel) being moved from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh during the period 4-31 March. MAP-CB received 57 DC-8 sorties from USAID, delivering 2,725 S/T

of MAP supplies to Phnom Penh from U-Tapao, in return for USAID use of the MAP funded Bird Air C-130s delivering POL. The cumulative figures for the airlift through 31 March are shown at Figure 6.

(U) Resulting C-130 airland and airdrop statistics are shown at Figures 7 and 8. Commodities transported by surface modes are reflected at Figure 9.

MAP-CB Transportation Charges (TAC A454). Congress imposed a $200 million limitation on FY 75-MAP-CB. However, they further authorized an additional $75 million of special authority funds under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act.[57] By the end of December 1974, all but $6.5 million of the initial $200 million MAP funds had been expended. A Presidential Determination, processed by the State Department, was required before any of the up to $75 million could be provided to Cambodia under the Section 506 special authority. Presidential Determination 75-9 authorized the additional expenditures.[58] The Foreign Assistance Act also changed accounting procedures, directly impacting on the transportation picture. Previously, transportation costs for the movement of MAP-CB supplies had been charged against world-wide PCH&T funds. Under the 1974 Act, all transportation costs for MAP-CB would be reimbursed from the total MAP-CB authorization. Costs chargeable against the PCH&T funds included: operation of the Bird Air C-130 contract airlift; all contracts in support of the Mekong tug and barge operation; port handling costs and highway

AIRLIFT - TSN/RVN TO CAMBODIA

As of 31 March 1975

Report of tonnage delivered (short tons) to date (inclusive) from 27 February 1975:

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
	CARRIER	SORTIES	AMMO	POL	RICE	GENNOS	TOTAL
1.	WOA	179	0	596.1	7835.2	0	8431.3
2.	AII	105	0	0	4956.0	0	4956.0
3.	FTL	127	0	0	5994.4	0	5994.4
4.	TIA	60*	2714.8	0	141.6*	10.0	2866.4
5.	SBW	13	0	0	585.1	22.0	607.1
6.	BIRD	943	8218.2	7390.8	613.9	1659.6	17882.8
7.	" MAP	794	8218.2	4538.3	613.9	1659.6	15030.3
8.	" AID	149	0	2852.5	0	0	2852.5
9.	TOTAL MAP	851	10933.0	4538.3	613.9	1669.6	17755.1
10.	TOTAL AID	576	0	3448.6	19512.3	22.0	22982.9
11.	TOTAL	1427	10933.0	7986.9	20126.2	1691.6	40738.0

NOTES:

(1) WOA, AII, FTL and SBW fly from Tan Son Nhut carrying AID products, primarily rice.

(2) TIA and Bird Air fly from U-Tapao, TIA carrying MAP cargo and Bird Air carrying MAP cargo and AID POL.

(3) Exceptions to notes (1) and (2) are identified below:

* Three USAID rice sorties flown either from Tan Son Nhut or with rice loaded at Tan Son Nhut. The sortie count and tonnage for these three sorties are computed into the "Total AID" figures.

Figure 6

C-130 AIRLAND STATISTICS

MAP-Cambodia Commodities

COMMODITY	AVERAGE SORTIES/DAY	AVERAGE SHORT TONS/SORTIE
Munitions:		
January		
1-8	--	
9-31 (Note 1)	5.96	15.7
February	10.96	
1-12 (Note 2)		16.2
13-28 (Note 2)		21.6
March		
1-10 (Note 3)	10.6	22.8
11-31 (Note 3)	5.2	
POL:		
January		
1-15 (Note 1)	--	
16-31	1.69	16.7
February		
1-14 (Note 4)	--	
15-28	3.36	18.4
March	7.06	19.7
General Cargo:		
January	1.06	10.7
February	1.71	12.8
March	3.00	17.16

NOTES:

1. Decision made to airland critical items to Phnom Penh due to delay in Mekong Convoy sailing.
2. Gross aircraft cargo load increased to maximum of 24 S/T by stripping aircraft of unnecessary items.
3. Due to funding limitations for munitions, daily deliveries had to be reduced to conserve funds causing a reduction in airlands after 10 April.
4. Arrival of Mekong convoys TP-112 and TP-113 at Phnom Penh in late January eliminated POL airland requirements during this period.

Figure 7

C-130 AIRDROP STATISTICS

MAP-Cambodia Commodities

COMMODITY	AVERAGE SORTIES/DAY	AVERAGE SHORT TONS/SORTIE
Rice:		
January	.35	12.9
February	0	0
March	1.29	15.4
Munitions:		
January	.94	13.2
February	.89	15.3
March	5.39	14.5

Figure 8

SURFACE DELIVERY STATISTICS

MAP-Cambodia Commodities

COMMODITY	Short Tons Delivered: JAN	FEB	MAR
Munitions:			
Mekong River	6,493	0	0
Road	1,275	584	1,096
Rice:			
Mekong River	7,444	0	0
Road	0	0	0
POL:			
Mekong River	5,322	0	0
Road	0	0	0
General Cargo:			
Mekong River	0	0	0
Road	0	0	0
TOTAL by Commodity:			
Munitions	7,768	584	1,096
Rice	7,444	0	0
POL	5,322	0	0
General Cargo	0	0	144
TOTAL by Mode:			
Mekong River	19,259	0	0
Road	1,275	584	1,240

Figure 9

transportation costs incurred by MACTHAI Support Group for MAP-CB supplies; ocean transportation costs for general cargo and munitions delivered directly from CONUS to Vung Tau; costs delivered by deep draft vessel from Vaymia to Kompong Som and Vung Tau; CONUS port handling costs; CONUS inland transportation costs; and air shipments to include special assignment airlift mission. As a result, $55.045 million of the total $75 million special authority funds was set aside for MAP-CB POH&T expenditures. Subsequent to the Presidential Determination, SECDEF initiated action to closely control all future expenditures of MAP-CB POH&T funds, advising that, effectively immediately, all transportation costs citing TAC A454 would be referred to SECDEF/DSAA (Comptroller) for approval prior to implementation.[59] CINCPAC's implementation of the SECDEF procedures required submission on a case-by-case basis to CINCPAC for review prior to forwarding to SECDEF/DSAA.[60] On 18 February, SECDEF advised that the monies set aside for TAC A454 had been fully committed and that any additional requirements could be funded only with the identification of compensating decreases in FY 75 MAP-CB requirements.[61] A breakdown of the TAC A454 commitments was requested from CINCPAC, as data on actual expenditures incurred previous to the SECDEF directive had not been provided to CHMEDTC. The request was subsequently forwarded to JCS.[62] SECDEF subsequently directed COMSC to provide information relative to SCOOT costs so that the necessary cost data would be available to accurately control

the legislative ceiling on assistance to Cambodia.[63] Specifically requested were the costs accrued for the period 1 Jul 74 to 28 Feb 75 by certain major categories and an estimate of additional weekly accrued costs by category to be incurred during March 1975, reporting actual expenditures at the end of each week during March. The submitted data reflected a total cost of $14.5 million as being accrued for the period in question and an estimated additional cost of $588,000 to be incurred each week during March. Further, an estimate of $2.6 million was made for contract cancellations/terminations if effected on 28 February. SECDEF then provided a breakdown of the PCH&T funds status reflecting that as of 28 February $49.4 million had been committed.[64]

Surface Transportation	$17.4 million
Bird Air Contract	4.1 million
12-day DC-8 Augmentation	1.3 million
All Other Modes	26.6 million

In the meantime, SECDEF had directed that all ongoing contractual negotiations for new or expanded SCOOT requirements, excepting airland and airdrop operations, were to be suspended short of contract award and fund commitment. For those suspended requirements considered essential requests with offsetting decreases to funded FY 75 MAP requirements were to be submitted for approval.[65] COMSC Far East obtained the cost data for the extension of the existing Vung Tau stevedore contract, shield barge security/maintenance/

repair contract and cargo documentation services and requested approval for the expenditure of the funds.[66] The expenditure was approved on 20 March. However, on 29 March, CINCPAC directed termination of all SCOOT surface support contracts funded by MAP-CB as soon as possible.[67] SECDEF subsequently approved this action and provided guidance on actions to be taken.[68] However, due to the worsening situation in South Vietnam, the available tugs and barges on contract to MAP-CB had been loaned to DAO Saigon on 24 March for use in evacuating refugees from coastal towns and cities in the northern part of South Vietnam and would be required for an extended period of time.[69] Arrangements were then made for DAO Saigon to pick up the daily per diem for the tugs and barges being used, relieving MAP-CB funds.[70] Action to terminate the other contracts was subsequently initiated by COMSC Far East on 30 March.[71]

AMMUNITION - CAMBODIA (U)

Management of ammunition stockage in Cambodia was complicated by two factors: the ammunition budget, critically low on January 1, was virtually depleted by the dry season offensive which started on 3 Jan 75; and the closing of the Mekong necessitated heavy reliance on ammunition airlift (both airdrop and airland).

Phnom Penh Ammunition Stockage. Because of the factors mentioned above, stocks in Phnom Penh declined from 18,150 S/T (15,400 S/T ground and 2,750 S/T air munitions)[72] on 3 Jan 75 to

8,473 S/T (7,772 S/T ground and 701 S/T munitions)[73] on 28 Mar 75. The average monthly stockage for the quarter and country-wide month expenditures are shown in Figure 10. January [illegible] are particularly high due to reported operations by FANK, MNK and KAF in efforts to keep the Mekong open.

Ammunition Airland into Cambodia. The Mekong closure caused complete reversal in the earlier trend of reduced ammo airlands as depicted in Figure 11.

Deployment of CBU-55. Introduction of the mid-air explosive weapons system (CBU-55) into Cambodia was accomplished in late January. The CBU-55 gave the KAF an additional capability for clearing operations along the Mekong River banks in support of convoys.[74] Subsequently, employment was expanded to other targets including attempts to detonate river mines by means of hydrostatic shock waves induced by the CBU-55.[75] Its use for this purpose was determined not to be cost effective.[76] (See also pg 88).

AMMUNITION - VIETNAM (U)

Visibility of ARVN Assets. Subsequent to the receipt of 54,000 S/T of excess Laotian and Thai reserve stocks in January, the ground ammunition posture began to deteriorate. As of 24 March, a total of 75,886 S/T were on-hand in the 13 operational ARVN depots. Five depots were lost during the period due to NVA/VC activity (Ban Me Thuct, Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bai, Chu Lai). Distribution by Area Logistical Command (ALC) and Military Region of the remaining

AMMUNITION STORAGE
PHNOM PENH



MONTHLY AMOUNTS SHIPMENTS

PHNOM PENH

AIRLAND AND MEKONG



stocks was as follows (also see Figure 12):

ALC	MR	Short Tons (Thousands)	Dollars (Millions)	Percent
I	I	14.3	37.1	1.9
II	II	5.2	17.8	7
V	II	6.4	16.2	8
III	III	41.5	107.2	55
IV	IV	8.5	24.1	11
	Total	75.9	202.4	100

As of 28 March, a total of 12,622 S/T was effectively lost at Da Nang, further reducing the total stockage.

As of 24 March, ground ammunition on-hand; by category was:

Category	S/T	Percent	$	Percent
Small Arms	6,751	9	21.7	10
Mortar	10,611	14	40.2	20
Artillery	52,373	69	108.8	54
Rocket	529	1	6.5	3
Grenade & Signal	2,646	3	15.9	8
Mines	2,394	3	5.2	3
Explosive Comp/Misc	582	1	4.1	2
Total	75,886	100	202.4	100

The March Vietnam Ammunition Monthly Program requisition for $23 million (1,901 S/T) completed requisitioning activity for FY 75, considering the normal pipeline time of 90 days. The


QUANG TRI – Prov. Hqtrs.
DEPOT 615
PHU BAI
DEPOT 612
51st AMMO GP
DEPOT 511
DA NANG
CHU LAI
1ST ALC
AMMO
DEPOT 613
52ND AMMO GP
DEPOT 621
QUI NHON
KON TUM
DEPOT 526
PLEIKU
DEPOT 525
TUY HOA
DEPOT 522
2ND ALC
AMMO
DEPOT 562
SAN HE THUOT
DEPOT 555
DA LAT
5TH ALC
AMMO
23TH AMMO GP
NHA TRANG
DEPOT 561
CAM RANH DET
DONG BA THIN
3TH ALC
AMMO
DEPOT 534
PHAN THIET
534th AMMO DEPOT
536 AMMO DET
TAY NINH
BIEN HOA
THANH TUY HA
SAIGON
DEPOT 553
55TH AMMO GP
DEPOT 551
MY THO
DEPOT 545
SA DEC
4TH ALC
AMMO
DEPOT 615
54th AMMO GP
DEPOT 542
CAN THO
BIEN THUY

program for FY 75 totaled $239.2 million.

During the period, a total of 59,243 S/T were received; 73,563 S/T were issued. Issues cost an average of $2,011 per S/T.

Based on a daily expenditure rate (DER) of 817 S/T; which represents the daily average for the previous 90 days, and in consideration of 32,630 S/T due-in, a balance of 28,450 S/T was forecast for 1 July. However, with the fall of Da Nang, the forecasted quantity was reduced to 15,828 S/T. With an anticipated increase in combat intensity, as evidenced by a peak of daily issues averaged 1,351 S/T, the end of the year position was forecasted at the following rates and expressed in days of supply (DOS) at the intensive combat rate (ICR) and DER:

DER	On-Hand Due-in	98 Day Consumption	1 July On-Hand	ICR DOS	DER DOS
700	95,894	68,600	27,294	15	39
817	95,894	80,066	15,828	9	19
900	95,894	88,200	7,694	4	9
1,000	95,894	98,000	0 on 28 June	0	0
1,100	95,894	107,800	0 on 19 June	0	0
1,200	95,894	117,600	0 on 12 June	0	0

On-hand stocks, plus quantities due-in, equates to 53 DOS at the ICR, or 71 DOS at the daily average of 1,351 S/T for the past two weeks.

During March, DAO Saigon computed and implemented a revised Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR) which, together with an average 13

percent cost increase (effective 24 March), resulted in the cost per day increasing from $1,191,503 to $1,529,622 for the 38 Department of Defense Identification Codes (DODICs) actively monitored by USSAG/7AF. These actions resulted in the cost per S/T for the TSR increasing from $2,075 to $2,284.

As a further result of the revised TSR and an updating of on-hand density figures, the Stockage Objective was increased from 126,150 S/T to the following: (a 6.5 percent increase)

60 DOS at Vietnam supply rate	112,430 S/T (1,874 S/T per day)
30 DOS at TSR	21,123 S/T (704 S/T per day)
30 Days Training	1,277 S/T (104 S/T per day)

Stockage Objective: 134,830 S/T ($340,715,957)

USSAG/7AF proposed a common SEA ICR to representatives of ARVN, DAO Saigon and CHMEDTC during a "mini-ammo conference" held in Saigon on 6 March. The proposed rate would alter utilization by type weapon category as follows:

	Current Percent	Proposed Percent
Individual Weapons	25	24
Mortars	15	21
Artillery	56	50
Miscellaneous	4	5

Savings are to be realized by altering the expenditure rates of

artillery versus mortars. For example, an increase in 81mm mortars and a corresponding decrease in 105mm artillery alone would equate to an annual savings of approximately $12 million.

Comparative ammunition consumption data for the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) and USAF with the ARVN and the VNAF is provided, as available, at Figure 13 for the period 1963 through 1974. A breakout of VNAF ammo expenditures for the period July 1972 through March 1975 is attached at Figure 14. ARVN expenditures for the period 1968 through 1974 are shown at Figure 15. During CY 69, RVNAF forces fired only 17.6 percent of the total ammunition consumed in the country. In 1970, this percentage increased to 23.8, in 1973 to 34.6, and in 1972 it was 47.2 percent. Since the Cease-Fire was signed in January 1973, consumption has all been by RVNAF forces.

Ground ammunition expenditures averaged 73,356 S/T per month during the six-month period preceding the cease-fire. During CY 73, residual combat activity declined, with 236,540 S/T being expended during the first six months and 96,562 S/T expended during the last half of the year. Expenditures remained relatively stable from July 1973 through July 1974, averaging approximately 15,707 S/T. In-country ammunition stock was reduced from 177,800 S/T, the level at cease-fire, to 118,100 S/T by the end of July 1974. Since then ARVN has operated under stringent expenditure controls, averaging 19,984 S/T per month.

CONSUMPTION HISTORY

(In Thousands of Short Tons)

	Ground	Air	TOTAL
CY 1963	USARV - 15.0 ARVN - 39.2	US - 0 VNAF - 0	0 0
CY 1964	USARV - 128.0 ARVN - 54.0	US - 0 VNAF - 0	0 0
CY 1965	USARV - 360.0 ARVN - 119.5	US - 0 VNAF - 0	0 0
CY 1966	USARV - 648.0 ARVN - 139.3	US - 0 VNAF - 0	0 0
CY 1967	USARV - 915.0 ARVN - 126.0	US - 0 VNAF - 37.9	0 163.9
CY 1968	USARV - 1,038.0 ARVN - 222.7	US - 0 VNAF - 39.6	0 262.3
CY 1969	USARV - 907.0 ARVN - 293.2	US - 669.3 VNAF - 43.5	1,576.3 336.6 1,912.9
CY 1970	USARV - 690.0 ARVN - 377.1	US - 695.3 VNAF - 55.5	1,385.3 432.6 1,817.9
CY 1971	USARV - 320.0 ARVN - 445.2	US - 656.2 VNAF - 73.0	976.2 518.2 1,494.4
CY 1972	USARV - 40.0 ARVN - 798.0	US - 958.8 VNAF - 95.9	998.8 893.9 1,892.7
CY 1973	USARV - 0 ARVN - 333.1	US - 401.0* VNAF - 58.5	* 391.6
CY 1974	ARVN - 205.2	VNAF - 46.4	251.6

* U.S. bombing ceased in August; 401.0 was mainly in support of FANK.

Figure 13

RVNAF AMMO EXPENDITURES

(Short Tons)

		Air		Ground		Total	
1972 -	Jul	7,387		96,187		103,574	
	Aug	7,600		102,577		110,177	
	Sep	7,495		72,293		79,788	
	Oct	8,955		62,275		71,320	
	Nov	8,439	8,165	64,648	73,356	73,087	81,521
	Dec	8,595	Avg	52,885	Avg	61,480	Avg
1973 -	Jan	7,907		85,460		93,367	
	Feb	9,574		79,447		89,021	
	Mar	4,242		32,434		36,676	
	Apr	4,262		12,272		16,534	
	May	3,835		11,767		15,602	
	Jun	5,894		15,160		21,054	
	Jul	2,095		10,387		12,482	
	Aug	4,370		15,887		20,257	
	Sep	3,397		14,774		18,171	
	Oct	3,758		18,981		22,739	
	Nov	3,719		18,371		22,036	
	Dec	5,470	3,984	18,216	15,707	23,686	19,691
			Avg		Avg		Avg
1974 -	Jan	5,196		18,472		23,668	
	Feb	4,411		15,277		19,688	
	Mar	3,134		13,798		16,932	
	Apr	4,425		13,280		17,705	
	May	4,047		13,797		17,844	
	Jun	3,791		17,300		21,091	
	Jul	3,340		16,464		19,804	
	Aug	5,469		23,242		28,711	
	Sep	3,432		22,687		26,119	
	Oct	2,403	3,625	17,083	19,984	19,486	23,609
	Nov	2,018	Avg	15,221	Avg	17,239	Avg
	Dec	4,795		18,647		23,442	
1975 -	Jan	3,035		23,025		26,660	
	Feb	4,454		22,091		26,545	
	Mar	6,158		28,447		34,605	

Figure 14

ARVN AMMO EXPENDITURES

	Short Tons	Short Tons/Month	Short Tons/Day
1968	222,200	18,517	609
1969	292,606	24,384	802
1970	376,299	31,358	1,031
1971	444,228	37,009	1,217
1972	796,264	66,355	2,182
1973	333,067	27,756	913
1974	205,450	17,121	563

Figure 15

(U) VNAF Assets. Depot losses in the closing days of March placed the VNAF ammunition inventory in a critical position:

Da Nang	10,000 S/T
Pleiku	6,000 S/T
Phu Cat	5,500 S/T
Nha Trang	1,150 S/T
Phan Rang	4,850 S/T
Total	27,500 S/T

Remaining stocks as of 25 March consisted of 20,000 S/T located at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Thuy.

Based upon a DER of 158 S/T, the daily average for the previous 90 days, a balance of 4,516 S/T (29 DOS) was forecast for 1 July. However, daily issues during the period 10-24 March averaged 270 S/T. If this increased expenditure rate continued, the supply would be exhausted by 6 June.

LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT (U)

KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency. The approved plan to attain KASS made substantial progress during this quarter.[77] Five C-123K aircraft were delivered to the GKR, and a sixth was enroute as the quarter ended. To recap: (1) Seven aircraft were originally scheduled for delivery - five from CONUS and two from Clark AB, representing a change directed by CINCPACAF in which two NC-123s were transferred as an expedient;[78] (2) One was delivered in December 1974,

five during the quarter and one is enroute. This brings the KAF C-123K assets to an end position of 16.

The C-123 Mobile Training Team (MTT) at Udorn RTAFB normally uses four or five of these assets while the remaining aircraft are used daily by the KAF, with seven or eight normally in operationally ready condition. The average number of sorties per day stayed in line with the six month average of 22. Airdrop missions, with an average ACL of six S/T, however, increased from two or three to approximately ten per day. Further, the KAF started employing the C-123K as a bomb platform.

(U) The MTT training schedule for C-123 maintenance personnel progressed smoothly.

Date	Total Graduated	Specialty
27 Feb 75	17	5 reciprocating engine, 3 propeller and 4 hydraulic mechanics
7 Mar 75	15	8 airplane general, 3 electric and 4 jet engine
19 Mar 75	4	corrosion control
25 Mar 75	2	maintenance control

The first flying training class began training on 27 Jan 75.

Date	Total Graduated	Specialty
25 Mar 75	25	6 pilots, 4 co-pilots, 5 flight mechanics, 5 loadmasters and 5 navigators

The second element of maintenance/aircrew personnel began training on 26 Mar 75.

Hostilities at Pochentong airfield frustrated the construction effort associated with the KASS. Little or no progress was made with aerial port construction, although repairs were made to the laterite taxiway, making it usable for C-123s and other traffic. In early March, KASS AM-2 matting was diverted for use on taxiway One and Charlie ramp to support the DC-8 USAID rice/POL airlift operation (see also pgs 140-143). The following is the status of KASS construction funds at the end of the quarter.

	Current Work Estimate	Obligated	Committed
AM-2 Matting	$162,272	$114,328	$47,944
Aerial Port Construction	73,493	71,493	2,000
Airfield Repair	19,792	15,792	4,000
Transportation/Handling	5,000		5,000
Reserved for Additional Repair Work	15,843		15,843
Sub-Total	$276,400	$201,613	$74,787
Contingency	50,000		
Funded Total	$326,400		

EC-47 Aircraft for VNAF/RTAF/ROKAF. The project to transfer EC-47/ALR-35 equipped aircraft to the VNAF, EC-47/ALR-34 equipped aircraft to the RTAF and EC-47/UHF only equipped aircraft to the ROKAF came to a stand-still due to the political/military situation in Vietnam, transfer costs and funding constraints. It now appears that the

RTAF is no longer interested because of cost consideration, the VNAF still has reservations and aircraft update is still required before the transfer to the ROKAF.[79]

The dwindling maintenance and aircrew support for EC-47 aircraft in the 56th SOW, coupled with the uncertain final beddown and deteriorating aircraft condition, caused CSAF to direct temporary storage of these assets at Udorn RTAFB.[80] The 15 EC-47 aircraft were relocated to Udorn RTAFB on 10 Mar 75, awaiting further disposition instructions.

PLANS AND PROGRAMS (U)

MEDTC Automated Ammunition Data System (MAADS). The two primary areas of the MAADS, inventory and funds management, were significantly impacted during this quarter. The surge in the level of military activity that closed the Mekong River for ammunition resupply and the scarcity of MAP-CB funds resulted in CHMEDTC requesting funds credit for the ammunition located on barges at Vung Tau awaiting shipment to Phnom Penh.[81] In obtaining the credit, the MAADS transactions required identification and reverse-posting by call forward. Due to the scope of the airland and airdrop effort, CHMEDTC required several personnel at Pochentong to monitor aircraft off-loading and verify ammunition loads, causing deferment and/or termination of some MEDTC administrative tasks due to the loss of these personnel from their duty sections.

Valid DODIC expenditure rates were maintained throughout this quarter. Per CHMEDTC request, USSAG/7AF updated the MAADS by

registering CHMEDTC call forwards and documenting all information (call forward, receipt and issue) concerning airdrops. The issue status for other than airdropped ammunition was input into the MAADS by CHMEDTC. CHMEDTC ceased updating the receipt portion of their inventory system in early January 1975.

Also during this quarter, a FY 74 ammunition funds reconciliation was completed. Initially, a figure of $22.1 million was identified as available within 26 different FY 74 report control numbers (RCNs) for 13 different DODICs.[82] The funds availability was then reduced to $21.5 million with the revised computations indicating only $20.9 million.[83]

CHMEDTC had already called forward $10,581,120 worth of ammunition using the FY 74 reconciled RCNs when SECDEF placed a hold on use of the reconciled funds.[84] CHMEDTC and USSAC then examined the call forwards that used FY 74 funds to determine if they could be covered with FY 75 funds.

Since the FY 74 ammunition funds were managed by RCN and DODIC, it was impossible to place call forwards in the file citing FY 74 funds without having the respective RCN in file. Therefore, receipts of call forwards using FY 74 funds could not be documented in the MAADS. Thus, CHMEDTC had the requirement to simultaneously maintain FY 75 funds status (ground, air and navy munitions) and FY 74 funds information under DODIC/RCN funding procedures, while being faced with a decreased manning due to airland operation requirements.

Subsequently SECDEF released a lump sum of $40 million of the FY 74 funds.[85] CHMEDTC had already requested and received SECDEF approval to change the RCNs cited on some recent call forwards and cite FY 74 vice FY 75 RCNs.[86] This effort provided funds flexibility for future call forwards rather than having only FY 74 funds available which were locked into specific DODICs. This RCN reverse-posting action was accomplished by CHMEDTC immediately after the remainder, or $11.5 million, was released.[87]

Subsequent to that release, Headquarters, Department of the Army discovered the $4.6 million of the $11.5 million that was to be available had been transferred to the USAF on 20 May 74.[88] Another reverse-posting action of ammunition RCNs was required by CHMEDTC.

While the upheavals in the ammunition funds status were occurring, the MAP-CB total funds availability was decreasing to a point where it was practically nonexistent. In order to balance the overall program, some funds had to be withdrawn from ammunition to cover expenses in other critical areas. The almost constant switching of funds status as well as the decreased administrative manning at CHMEDTC had a negative effect on the MAADS operation.

(U) The primary advantages of MAADS, providing useful information with minimal expense of manhours, timely information from a vast array of data, and a document register for MAP-CB ammunition transactions, were subsequently severely curtailed.

(U) One MAADS report, The Ground/Air Munitions Status (GAMS) Report, continued to be a key management tool provided to and used by CHMEDTC. Prior to this quarter, the GAMS report computed DODIC expenditure rates automatically at the end of the month. A program change was implemented in March 1975 through which CHMEDTC and this headquarters could obtain expenditure rates, via the GAMS report, for any specific period of interest, e.g., 10 Feb - 4 Mar 75.

(U) Various "spin-off" computer programs were developed, using the MAADS data base and computer support facilities though not an integral part of the MAADS. The two most useful programs assist CHMEDTC in daily coordination with the airlift source. Each program identifies by DODIC the quantity of items that MEDTC should call forward in order to maintain a balanced supply position in the depot for a given projection period and a given constraint. One program was developed using an airlift capacity constraint; the other program operates with a funds constraint. The results from both programs may be transmitted by Autodin to CHMEDTC from the USSAG Strike Computer.

POL. The POL stock balance in Cambodia declined throughout the quarter with only 5,634 CM reaching Phnom Penh by the Mekong prior to its closure. The stocks ranged from a high of 30,389 CM at the start of the quarter to a low of 6,822 CM at the end. The airlift operation was very successful in supplying both the military and civil fuel requirements for Phnom Penh.

A summary of gallons delivered by the airlift between 16 January and 31 March follows:

	MAP/Military	Civil/USAID
JP-4	289,599 gallons	0
AVGAS	362,215 gallons	0
MOGAS	609,089 gallons	134,105 gallons
ADO	542,231 gallons	685,883 gallons

During the first week in February, the storage capability in Phnom Penh was reduced by 7,500 CM to 31,460 CM with the FANK transfer of the fuel stored in their depot at Prek Phnou to more secure storage in Phnom Penh.

The civil fuel conservation measures continued to be effective with consumption levels declining to approximately 25 percent of the usage last year. The military consumption levels increased slightly due to the increased level of activity.

Rice. The rice situation in Cambodia continued to worsen during the quarter with stocks in Phnom Penh declining from 36,000 (47 DOS) on 1 Jan 75 to 7,650 MT (13 DOS) on 31 Mar 75. Only 6,755 MT of rice reached the city by the Mekong prior to its closure. The USAID airlift stabilized the rice stocks in Phnom Penh at approximately 13 DOS. During the month of February, the daily distribution rate was cut from 770 MT to 545 MT as a conservation method. However, during the month of March the rate increased to 700 MT a day due to the Title II program of providing free rice to displaced persons and needy families.

Airdrop of rice to Cambodia by Bird Air C-130 continued to operate from U-Tapao dropping a total of 755 S/T during the quarter. The rice supply for this effort continued to be a problem due to clearance of only small quantities into Thailand by the RTG. One shipment of 660 S/T was cleared during the period with only 517 S/T on-hand for delivery at the end of the quarter.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI

1. Msg (C), CINCPAC to SECDEF (and others), 270340Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Tugs and Barges (U).

2. Msg (C), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 280925Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Tugs and Barges (U).

3. Msg (C), SECDEF to COMSCFE, 282115Z Feb 75, Subj: SCOOT Fire Fighting Tugs (U).

4. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 032307Z Mar 75, Subj: SCOOT Tugs and Barges/Protection of Ammo with Rice (U).

5. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMSCFE, 070442Z Mar 75, Subj: Additional Tugs for TC-106 (U).

6. Msg (C), COMSC to COMSCFE, 081642Z Mar 75, Subj: Additional Tugs for TC-106 (U).

7. Msg (C), COMSCFE to CINCPAC and COMSC, 050732Z Mar 75, Subj: Contract TC-106 (U).

8. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/LG to CINCPAC, 100820Z Mar 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Requirements (U).

9. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE and AMEMB Saigon, 200125Z Mar 75, Subj: Barge and Tug Assets (U).

10. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 130900Z Mar 75, Subj: Request for Loan of Fire Fighting Tugs (U).

11. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 042354Z Mar 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Contract Support (U).

12. Msg (U), COMSCFE to CINCPAC, 190208Z Mar 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Contract Support.

13. Msg (U), COMSCFE to USDAO Saigon and Chief Procurement Activity, Bangkok, 210300Z Mar 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Contract Support.

14. Msg (C), COMSC to COMSCFE, 212257Z Feb 75, Subj: None.

15. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to CINCPAC, 120910Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoys - Use and Indemnification MSC Assets (U).

16. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to CINCPAC, 131200Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoys - Use and Indemnification MSC Assets (U)

17. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/LG to MACTHAI Support Group and MSCOV, 080400Z Feb 75, Subj: Movement of MAP-CB General Cargo (U).

18. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/LG to USACAMO-P (and others), 221035Z Mar 75, Subj: Movement of Munitions and General Cargo (U).

19. Msg (U), USARMCOM to CINCPAC, 252040Z Feb 75, Subj: Color Coding Ammunition Shipments.

20. Msg (U), CINCPAC to USARMCOM and USSAG, 010032Z Mar 75, Subj: Segregation of SCOOT-T Ammo.

21. Msg (U), CDRAMC to CINCPAC, 201608Z Feb 75, Subj: Consolidated Packaging of Ammo.

22. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/LG to CINCPAC, 181110Z Mar 75, Subj: Ammunition Packaging (U).

23. Msg (S), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 110435Z Feb 75, Subj: Transport of Civilians on Military Aircraft (U).

24. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CHMEDTC, 112021Z Feb 75, Subj: Transport of Civilians on Military Aircraft (U).

25. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AMEMB Phnom Penh and CHMEDTC, 130950Z Feb 75, Subj: Transport of Civilians on Military Aircraft (U).

26. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMBs Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Saigon, 071712Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs Employed by US Press Services (U).

27. Msg (C), AMEMB Bangkok to SECSTATE, 080632Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs Employed by US Press Services (U).

28. Msg (C), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 090450Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs Employed by US Press Services (U).

29. Msg (C), SEAAC/7AF SOA U-Tapao to USSAG, 090315Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs (U).

30. Msg (C), MAC to SECDEF, 242045Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs Employed by US Press Services (U).

31. Msg (U), MAC to 7AF SOA Saigon, 271440Z Mar 75, Subj: None.

32. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 111155Z Mar 75, Subj: Use of AID Chartered DC-8 Rice Airlift Flights for Passengers from Phnom Penh to Saigon (U).

33. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG and CHMEDTC, 150520Z Feb 75, Subj: Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

34. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/LG to CINCPAC, 201815Z Feb 75, Subj: Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

35. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 210415Z Feb 75, Subj: Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

36. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 221556Z Feb 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

37. Msg (S), CSAF to MAC, 221800Z Feb 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

38. Msg (C), SEAAC/7AF SOA U-Tapao to CINCPACAF, 250250Z Feb 75, Subj: Engineering Analysis of Charlie Ramp, Pochentong Airport, Cambodia (U).

39. Msg (U), OICC Thailand to USSAG, 260420Z Feb 75, Subj: Analysis of Soil Cement Apron.

40. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CHMEDTC, 270716Z Feb 75, Subj: Operation on Charlie Ramp Pochentong Airport (U). Msg (C), CINCPACAF to USSAG, 270315Z Feb 75, Subj: Charlie Ramp Taxiway - Pochentong Airport (U).

41. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/LG to CINCPACAF, 020235Z Mar 75, Subj: Charlie Ramp Taxiway - Pochentong Airport (U).

42. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/LG to CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 031235Z Mar 75, Subj: Charlie Ramp Taxiway - Pochentong Airport (U).

43. Msg (S), CINCPAC to AMEMB Saigon, 220415Z Feb 75, Subj: Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

44. Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Phnom Penh, 282240Z Feb 75, Subj: None.

45. Msg (C), SEAAC/7AF SOA U-Tapao to CINCPACAF, 171145Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodian Airlift Summary Report No 33, as of 171000Z Mar 75 (U).

46. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 0811[illegible]9Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia Rice Airlift (U).

47. Msg (C), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 101020Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia Rice Airlift (U).

48. Msg (C), SECSTATE to SECDEF, 102159Z Mar 75, Subj: Rice and POL Airlift to Phnom Penh (U).

49. Msg (S), JCS to CSAF and CINCPAC, 121938Z Mar 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

50. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 130819Z Mar 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

51. Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, MAC and 6APS, 140355Z Mar 75, Subj: Rice and POL Airlift - Phnom Penh (U).

52. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 150650Z Mar 75, Subj: Rice/Commercial POL Airlift (U).

53. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/LG to CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 181115Z Mar 75, Subj: DC-8 Availability at Saigon in Support of USAID Airlift to Phnom Penh (U).

54. Msg (C), MAC to SECSTATE and SECDEF, 182215Z Mar 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift to Cambodia (U).

55. Msg (C), SECSTATE to SECDEF, 192209Z Mar 75, Subj: Extension of Commercial Rice/POL Airlift to Cambodia (U).

56. Msg (S), USSAC/7AF/CS to CJCS, CSAF, CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 110705Z Mar 75, Subj: JOPREP JIFFY/Pinnacle/OPREP-3 (U).

57. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC,CSA, CNO and CSAF, 232230Z Dec 74, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP (U).

58. Msg (U), SECDEF to CINCPAC, CSA, CNO and CSAF, 102235Z Jan 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP Ammo Fund Requests.

59. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 111912Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOP Transportation Costs (U).

60. Msg (U), CINCPAC to USSAG and CHMEDTC, 122330Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOP Transportation Costs.

61. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC (and others), 181852Z Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP PCH&T (U).

62. Msg (U), CINCPAC to JCS, 200320Z Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP POM.

63. Msg (U), SECDEF to COMSC, 212022Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Transportation Costs.

64. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 282222Z Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 MAP POM (U).

65. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 212132Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Transportation Costs (U).

66. Msg (U), COMSCFE to CINCPAC, 190208Z Mar 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Contract Report.

67. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMSCFE, 290447Z Mar 75, Subj: Termination of SCOOT Surface Contracts (U).

68. Msg (S), SECDEF to COMSC and CINCPAC, 291756Z Mar 75, Subj: Termination of SCOOT-F Contracts and Support (U).

69. Msg (U), MSCOV to COMSCFE, 240816Z Mar 75, Subj: Refugee Evacuation.

70. Msg (U), USDAO Saigon to COMSCFE, 270930Z Mar 75, Subj: Fund Cite for Use of Contract TC-106 Assets.

71. Msg (C), COMSCFE to USDAO Saigon, 310750Z Mar 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Support (U). Msg (C), COMSCFE to USDAO Saigon, 310751Z Mar 75, Subj: Termination of SCOOT Stevedoring Contract (U). Msg (U), COMSCFE to USDAO Saigon, 310752Z Mar 75, Subj: SCOOT Contract TC-106 Termination.

72. Msg (C), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 060959Z Jan 75, Subj: Weekly Groun/Air Munitions Status and Materiel Delivery Report (U).

73. Msg (C), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 311010Z Mar 75, Subj: Weekly Ground/Air Munitions Status and Materiel Delivery Report (U).

74. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 200210Z Jan 75, Subj: CBU-55 in Cambodia (S).

75. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 021510Z Feb 75, Subj: CBU-55 in Cambodia (S).

76. Msg (S), CHMEDTC to USSAG, 151111Z Feb 75, Subj: CBU-55 Employment (S).

77. USSAG/7AF History 1 Oct-31 Dec 74, (TS/NFD), pg 92.

78. Msg (C), CINCPACAF to 13AF and 3TFW, 242030Z Jan 75, Subj: Delivery of NC-123 Aircraft (U).

79. Msg (S), MACTHAI to CSAF (and others), 030722Z Mar 75, Subj: EC-47 Aircraft Transfer (U). Msg (S), USDAO Saigon to CSAF and AFLC, 190630Z Mar 75, Subj: EC-47 Aircraft (U).

80. Msg (S), CSAF to CINCPACAF, CINCPAC, USDAO Saigon, 261500Z Feb 75, Subj: EC-47 Aircraft Transfer (U).

81. Msg (C), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 271205Z Feb 75, Subj: MAP-CB Ammo Funding (U).

82. Msg (U), CINCPAC to CHMEDTC, 020146Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Ammo Reconciliation.

83. Msg (U) CDRAMC to CINCPAC, 061920Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Reconciliation.

84. Msg (C), SECDEF to DA, 070055Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Army Ammo Reconciliation (U).

85. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 142352Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia MAP Ammunition (U).

86. Msg (U), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 182158Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Reconciliation.

87. Msg (S), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 212307Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia MAP Ammunition (U).

88. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CHMEDTC, 260931Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Ammo Reconciliation (U).

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

GENERAL (U)

Throughout the quarter, the primary emphasis of the J-6 staff was centered upon the preparation of detailed Communications-Electronics Annexes to operations plans in support of USSAG/7AF NEWVAC plans. The installation of communications required by the airlift control element to control the Cambodian Airlift was coordinated.

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING - THAILAND (U)

The status of the Integrated Communications System realignment proposal submitted to CINCPAC/J6 by USMACTHAI/J6 on 20 Nov 74 remained unchanged.[1] The proposal was based on projected communications requirements of residual subscribers commensurate with base closures and personnel reduction subsequent to 1 Jul 75. Two tropospheric scatter cross-border radio systems which had been included in the realignment proposal were deactivated as a result of enemy interdiction of the Pleiku and Monkey Mountain Single Integrated Military Telecommunications Systems (SIMS) sites on 16 and 29 March, respectively.

Reconfiguration of SIMS. NVA offensives in MRs I and II and RVN's decision to evacuate the northern provinces resulted in the interdiction of seven SIMS Sites, including two cross-border

radio systems between Thailand and RVN. The impact of losing the SIMS Sites upon USSAG/7AF communications was primarily one of flexibility. The cross-border and intra-RVN systems provided an alternate route to the Nha Trang terminal of the Philippine submarine cable (Wetwash Alfa) in the event the 439L undersea cable system between Thailand and RVN was interrupted.

A chronological listing of sites lost to the enemy and radio systems affected is presented below: (Channel capacity for each affected link included to illustrate magnitude of the loss.)

DATE	SITE/SYSTEM	CHANNELS
10 Mar 75	Ban Me Thuot[2] - Nha Trang	60
16 Mar 75	Pleiku[3] - Warin (Thailand)	60
16 Mar 75	Pleiku - Monkey Mountain	60
16 Mar 75	Pleiku - Pr Line	180
16 Mar 75	Pleiku - Nha Trang	72
23 Mar 75	Hue/Phu Bai[4] - Da Nang	240
24 Mar 75	Chu Lai[5] - Da Nang	120
29 Mar 75	Monkey Mtn[6] - Warin (Thailand)	60
29 Mar 75	Monkey Mtn - Vung Chua Mtn	180
29 Mar 75	Monkey Mtn - Da Nang	240
29 Mar 75	Da Nang[7] - Da Nang Cablehead	120
31 Mar 75	Qui Nhon[8] - Vung Chua Mtn	180
31 Mar 75	Qui Nhon - Qui Nhon Cablehead	120

COMBAT LIGHTNING COMMUNICATIONS (U)

CINCSAC/DCO analysis of operational tests of the COMBAT LIGHTNING Weapons Control Center Radio Relay Aircraft/Fighter aircraft communications link, conducted in accordance with 8AF Communications Test Plan, was received.[9] The COMBAT LIGHTNING Communications Test Analysis document was forwarded to USSAG/7AF Operations Division for review.[10]

RECONFIGURATION OF USSAG COMMUNICATIONS (U)

(U) Blue Chip Communications. Four point-to-point non-secure voice circuits between Blue Chip and the VNAF Direct Air Support Centers and CRCs at Da Nang and Pleiku were deactivated following VNAF evacuation of the facilities on 18 and 29 March.

SUBMARINE CABLE OUTAGE AFFECTING USSAG (U)

(U) The 439L submarine cable between Camp Vayama, Thailand and Vung Tau, RVN was out of service from 11-15 February. USSAG/7AF circuits were restored over the two cross-border radio systems between Warin and Monkey Mountain/Pleiku.

COMMUNICATIONS CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

Saigon Satellite Ground Terminal. Contingency plans were developed to insure continuity of communications between COMUSSAG and the U.S. diplomatic missions in Cambodia and the RVN. Enemy gains in the northern provinces and an increasing threat against the Nha Trang cable terminal of the Wetwash Alfa submarine cable to the Philippines prompted DAO Saigon to request that CINCPAC arrange for the deployment of a satellite ground terminal.[11] CINCPAC obtained

JCS approval to deploy a AN/TSC-54 Satellite Terminal to Saigon to establish a twelve-channel link to Hawaii.[12]

SITE 75A (LONG BINH - PHNOM PENH) (U)

A developing threat against Long Binh, the location of the sole entry point for communications serving the U.S. diplomatic mission in Cambodia, prompted USSAG/J6 to direct DAO Saigon to locate an alternate location. DAO Saigon located a site at Tan Son Nhut. An in-service cutover to the new site dictated a requirement for two additional TRC-129 radio terminals and associated antenna packages. It was determined that U.S. Army Communications Command-Thailand could provide one AN/TRC-129 Radio Terminal complete with the required antennas. A second radio terminal was located by DAO Saigon in the Tan Son Nhut area and was airlifted to the Area Maintenance Supply Facility located at U-Tapao on 28 Feb 75 for extensive rehabilitation. USSAG/7AF/DC submitted a request for $35,000 to defray the cost of rehabilitating the radio terminal, completing site preparation, caretaker manning and security.[13] A proposal to deploy two AN/TSC-80 SHF Satellite Terminals to provide Phnom Penh entry into the Defense Communications System via Clark AB was submitted to JCS by CINCPAC.[14] The terminal for Phnom Penh was to be prepositioned at U-Tapao.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII

1. Ltr (S), Proposal by USMACTHAI/J6 to CINCPAC/J6, 20 Nov 74, Subj: Future Communications Planning - Thailand (U).

2. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 170910Z Mar 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

3. Ibid.

4. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 260638Z Mar 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

5. Ibid.

6. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 290513Z Mar 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

7. Ibid.

8. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 011000Z Apr 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

9. Ltr (S), 8AF to USSAG/7AF (and others), 24 Oct 74, Subj: Communications Test Plan (U).

10. Ltr (C), CINCSAC/DOKO to USSAG/7AF (and others), 20 Mar 75, Subj: COMBAT LIGHTNING Communications Test Analysis (U).

11. FONECON (SECVOX), Colonel Graham, DAO Saigon, to Colonel Lally, CINCPAC, 21 Mar 75, Subj: Contingency Communications Planning for RVN Satellite Ground Terminal (U).

12. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC (and others), 260004Z Mar 75, Subj: Saigon-Hawaii Communications (U).

13. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/DC to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 200200Z Mar 75, Subj: Proposed Contingency Site for 75A (U).

14. Msg (C), CINCPAC/J6 to JCS (and others), 290209Z Mar 75, Subj: Request for TSC-80 Deployment (U).

VISITORS TO USSAG/7AF

January-March 1975

3 Jan	Staff Delegate Robert Q. Old, professional staff member, Senate Armed Services Committee
7 Jan	Brig Gen Fred A. Treyz, deputy director of operations, CINCPAC
10 Jan	Gen David C. Jones, chief of staff, USAF
25 Jan	General Officers' Vietnamization Review: Maj Gen Eugene L. Hudson, USAF/LGX Maj Gen George Rhodes, AFLC/CS Rear Adm Hugh A. Benson, CINCPAC/J4 Brig Gen Jack W. Waters, CINCPACAF/LG
11 Feb	Col Kenneth H. Kennedy, Thai Regional Exchange commander
12 Feb	Adm Noel A.M. Gayler, CINCPAC
18 Feb	Brig Gen Roswell E. Round, Jr., defense attache to Laos
19 Feb	Capt Prapat Krisanachan, RTN, Mekong River Operations Unit Commander
24 Feb	Mr. Franklin P. Shaw, GS-18, deputy assistant secretary of defense (regional programs) Mr. Frank A. Tapparo, GS-16, director of Asia Division, OASD (PA&E)
10 Mar	Maj Gen John R.D. Cleland, Jr., USA, vice director for operations, JCS
11 Mar	Lt Gen Winton W. Marshall, VCINCPACAF
19 Mar	Maj Gen Walter H. Baxter, 13AF ADVON commander
22 Mar	Brig Gen Robert C. Taylor, assistant DCS/P&O for plans, PACAF
29 Mar	Adm Noel A.M. Gayler, CINCPAC
31 Mar	Honorable David P. Taylor, assistant secretary of the Air Force (manpower & reserve affairs)

Attachment 1

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: USSAG NKP APRT THAI/CD

TO: CINCPAC CAMP SMITH HI

INFO: CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

AMEMB SAIGON VS

USDAO SAIGON VS

MSCOV SAIGON VS

AMEMB PHNOM PENH CB

USDAO PHNOM PENH CB

CHMEDTC PHNOM PENH CB

COMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK TH

[redacted]

CINCPAC FOR J3/J4. USDAO SGN PASS TO JGS, RVNAF ATTN:

BG THO, PACAF FOR IN

SUBJ: LESSONS LEARNED, MEKONG CONVOY (U)

DISTR:

CJS-3; IN-2; DO-1; LG-2; DOS-3

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE

IRA A. HUNT, JR., MG USA CD 3717

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

IRA A. HUNT, JR., MG USA CD

ATTACHMENT 2

SIGNATURE

SECURITY [redacted]

DD FORM 173 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

UNCLASSIFIED

02

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. THERE HAVE BEEN THREE NORTHBOUND/SOUTHBOUND CONVOYS SINCE THE INITIATION OF THE KC DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE. THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE CONVOY OPERATIONS ARE CLEAR CUT AND MUST BE INCORPORATED INTO FUTURE ENDEAVORS.

2. CURRENT SITUATION:

A. THE MEKONG SPECIAL ZONE PLAN HAD ALMOST BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN DECEMBER 1974. THE PLAN CALLED FOR BFM OUTPOSTS AT STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS ALONG THE RIVER; AN INTEGRATED ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT PLAN THAT FURNISHED 100 PER CENT COVERAGE; AND RAF SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. AS IMPLEMENTED THE PLAN INSURED THE SUCCESS OF CONVOYS. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION CHANGED DRAMATICALLY WITH THE INITIATION OF THE KC DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE. THE ENEMY OVER-RAN ALMOST ALL OF THE BFM OUTPOSTS SOUTH OF NEAK LUONG. AS A RESULT, THE ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT PLAN WAS TOTALLY DISRUPTED AND THE ENEMY GAINED CONTROL OF THE KEY SOUTHERN CHOKE POINTS. NORTH OF NEAK LUONG, FANK RETAINED CONTROL OF DEI DOH AND REESTABLISHED A BN POSITION AT

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PREK YUON. ARTILLERY COVERAGE FOR MOST OF THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF THE LOWER MEKONG WAS MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, DURING THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BFM WAS MARGINAL. IN SEVERAL CASES OUTPOSTS WERE ABANDONED WITHOUT MUCH OF A FIGHT AND IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE THE LEADERS ABANDONED A MAJOR OUTPOST PRIOR TO AN ENEMY ATTACK. BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE OUTPOSTS, FANK HAS HAD TO INSERT THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF BRIGADES IN THE LOWER MEKONG. THIS HAS PROVIDED BETTER PROTECTION BUT HAS NOT ENABLED THEM TO REESTABLISH ALL THE KEY OUTPOSTS OR TO EXPAND ARTILLERY COVERAGE. CURRENTLY THE ENEMY CONTROLS KEY CHOKE POINTS NEAR PEAM REANG ISLAND AND MOST OF THE RIVER BANKS IN THE VICINITY OF DEI DOH AND JUST SOUTH OF NEAK LUONG.

B. THE MAJORITY OF THE ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST CONVOYS HAVE OCCURED BETWEEN PARALLELS 21 AND 30 (THE PEAM REANG/PEAM CHOR AREA) AND BETWEEN PARALLELS 56 AND 69 (THE DEI DOH/PREK YUON AREA). IN THE 20 PLUS ABFS BETWEEN PARALLELS 21 AND 30 THE ENEMY HAS USED RECOILLESS RIFLES, RPG'S AND MORTARS WITH ACCURACY, WITH THE PREDOMINANCE OF FIRE BEING BY

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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RECOILLESS RIFLES. IN THE 50 PLUS ABFS IN THE DEI DOH AREA THEY HAVE USED RECOILLESS RIFLES AND RPG'S WITH THE PREDOMINANCE OF FIRE BEING RPG'S. ENEMY FIRE HAS BEEN PROLONGED AND INTENSIVE, SEVERAL ABFS HAVE LASTED IN EXCESS OF 30 MINUTES. THE KC HAVE FIRED MORE RECOILLESS RIFLES AND RPG ROUNDS AGAINST ONE CONVOY LATELY THAN THEY FIRED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THOSE THAT HAVE NOT VIEWED THE CURRENT ABFS TO VISUALIZE THE INTENSITY OF THE FIRE.

C. ENEMY ATTACKS WERE PROBABLY MORE EFFECTIVE AT NIGHT THAN DURING THE DAY BECAUSE KAF'S CAPABILITIES AT NIGHT ARE MUCH REDUCED. BY USING FLARES, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO SILHOUETTE THE SHIPS AND PROVIDE ACCURATE FIRE. NEW ENEMY TACTICS ARE THE USE OF BARRACADES AND MINES. MNK HAS BEEN ABLE TO CUT THE BARRACADES EASILY ENOUGH AND THEY HAVE NOT PROVEN EFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY'S FIRST USE OF MINES WAS MOST SUCCESSFUL, MAINLY, IT IS BELIEVED, BECAUSE MNK WAS NOT ACTIVELY SWEEPING FOR THEM. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE MINES ARE THE FLOATING TYPE WHICH SHOULD BE ABLE TO BE EASILY

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DETECTED. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY MIGHT HAVE A SUBMERSIVE MINE CAPABILITY THAT COULD REQUIRE A MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED RESPONSE BY MNK (THEY PROBABLY DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT FOR THE JOB).

D. LOSSES ON THE LOWER MEKONG HAVE NOT BEEN GREAT ON NORTHBOUND VOYAGES NOR HAD THEY BEEN PARTICULARLY ACUTE SOUTHBOUND UNTIL PT-113, WHEN THREE TUGS AND ONE POL TANKER WERE SUNK. THE FOLLOWING TABLE INDICATES THE TRACK RECORD FOR THE 1975 CONVOYS.

MEKONG CONVOYS (1975)

(ARRIVED/SAILED)

	BARGES				SHIPS	
	AMMO	RICE	TUGS	SHIELDS	RICE	POL
NORTHBOUND	6/6	2/2	16/16	35/40	2/3	4/6
SOUTHBOUND	6/6	-	9/12	23/30	0/1	1/2
LOSSES	0	0	3	10	2	3

3. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED:

A. FIREPOWER: THE GREATEST DETERRENT TO ENEMY EFFECTIVENESS IS FANK FIRE POWER. TO DATE, KAF WHEN

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UTILIZED HAS BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL. BOMBS ON TARGET HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUPPRESS THE ENEMY. MNK HAS BEEN GUTSY, BUT DUE TO THE LACK OF FIRE POWER (EXCEPT MONITORS) MNK HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPRESS FIRE. THE USE OF ARTILLERY, PARTICULARLY THAT STATIONED AT NEAR LUONG, HAS BEEN POOR. TO BE SUCCESSFUL, CONVOYS MUST BE OPERATED WHEN KAF HAS MAXIMUM AVAILABILITY SUPPORTED BY GREATEST POSSIBLE ARTILLERY SUPPORT. WITHOUT THESE TWO KEY ELEMENTS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ENEMY FIRE CAN BE SUPPRESSED. UNTIL THE ENEMY IS ATTRITED (KILLED), THE SITUATION WILL NOT GET BETTER.

B. NIGHT VERSUS DAY OPERATIONS: NIGHT OPERATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TOO SUCCESSFUL AND IN THE FUTURE THEY WILL BE EVEN LESS SO. THE ENEMY IS NOW USING MINES WHICH MIGHT BE VISUALLY DETECTED IN DAYTIME. KAF AT NIGHT IS NOT EFFECTIVE. THEREFORE, CONVOYS SHOULD BE RUN IN DAYTIME WHEN ENEMY FIRES CAN BE SUPPRESSED AND MINES HOPEFULLY DETECTED.

C. USE OF SMOKE: ALL OF THE ENEMY WEAPONS, INCLUDING COMMAND DETONATED MINES, ARE LINE OF SIGHT. MNK HAS

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BEEN PROVIDED SMOKE AND HAS TESTED IT. IT IS HOPED THAT THE USE OF SMOKE ON THE NEXT CONVOY WILL BE USEFUL IN REDUCING ENEMY VISIBILITY.

D. BARGES VERSUS SHIPS: TO DATE NONE OF THE LOW SILHOUETTE BARGES HAVE BEEN LOST TO ENEMY FIRE. ON THE OTHER HAND, FIVE RICE AND POL VESSELS HAVE BEEN LOST. THIS IS A COMBINATION OF TWO FACTORS, FIRST THE BARGES ARE PROTECTED BY SHIELD BARGES WHICH HAVE PROVEN TO BE OF INESTIMABLE VALUE. SECOND, THE LOW PROFILE MAKES THEM LESS VULNERABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE RICE BARGE HAD NO SHIELDS ATTACHED AND MADE THE TRANSIT. IN THE FUTURE, AN ALL-BARGE-CONCEPT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. THE KEY TO THIS CONCEPT IS THE AVAILABILITY OF SHIELD BARGES.

E. SHIELD BARGES: SHIELD BARGES HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE. OF THE SEVEN BARGES IN TP-111 IT WAS FOUND THAT EACH SUSTAINED AN AVERAGE OF 20 HITS WITH RECOILLESS RIFLES OR RPG'S. SHIELD BARGES ARE EXPENSIVE, NOW COSTING ABOUT $40,000 EACH. ALREADY 10 HAVE BEEN LOST AND IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ONLY THREE OR FOUR WILL BE RECOVERED. THE ALL BARGE

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CONCEPT REQUIRES 36 SHIELD BARGES. FOURTEEN ARE NOW AVAILABLE, 10 ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND 12 MORE HAVE BEEN ORDERED. CONSIDERING CURRENT LOSSES THIS WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT AN ALL BARGE CONCEPT.

F. ASSET AVAILABILITY: THE PERFORMANCE OF CIVILIAN CREWS HAS BEEN HEROIC. WHILE MANY CREWS HAVE FAILED TO GO, SOME CREW MEMBERS ARE MAKING THE JOURNEY FOR THE THIRD TIME. PT-113 RESULTED IN FOUR CREW MEMBERS MISSING AND SEVERAL DEAD AND MANY WOUNDED. CREWS ARE PROBABLY UNDERPAID CONSIDERING THE RISKS THEY ARE TAKING. THEY/PROBABLY NEED SOME TYPE OF INCENTIVE PAY. BELIEVE CONTRACTS MIGHT HAVE TO BE RE-NEGOTIATED TO PROVIDE CREW MEMBERS MORE MONEY. THE NUMBER ONE PROBLEM IS THE AVAILABILITY OF BARGE/SHIP ASSETS. SEADAC DESERVES A GREAT CREDIT FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE TO DATE. RIGHT NOW THEY ARE THE ONLY CONTRACTOR STILL WILLING TO MAKE THE TRIP. FOR ALL INTENTS THE RICE/POL SHIPPERS HAVE DEFINITELY RENEGED. WE NEED A SINGLE CONTRACTOR TO OPERATE THE ALL BARGE CONCEPT.

G. MINE THREAT: THE ONLY NEW WEAPON TO DATE HAS BEEN MINES. BY GOING TO DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS AND PROVIDING

DD FORM 173

SHELLS AGGRESSIVELY PLANTING MINES SHOULD BE HANDLED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE ENEMY IS USING SUBMERSIBLE COMMAND DETONATED MINES AND UNLESS MORE SOPHISTICATED MINE DETECTING EQUIPMENT IS MADE AVAILABLE TO MNK, THIS COULD SUCCESSFULLY CLOSE THE MEKONG. MORE WILL BE KNOWN ON THE MINE THREAT AFTER TP-115. UNLESS MNK PROVIDES MAXIMUM PROTECTION EVEN THE CURRENT THREAT IS FORMIDABLE.

H. ATTRITION: ASSETS ARE BEING ATTRITED WITH EVERY CONVOY. MNK IS LOSING VESSELS AND THEY ARE GETTING TIRED. IT IS HARD TO QUANTIFY FATIGUE. WE LOSE ADDITIONAL SUNKEN BARGES AND COMMERCIAL ASSETS ARE ALSO BEING LOST WITH EACH CONVOY. CONTINUED ATTRITION COULD HAVE SERIOUS RESULTS. WE CANNOT CONTINUE TO SCHEDULE CONVOYS EVERY FOUR DAYS BUT WE MUST GET BACK TO A FOUR A MONTH SCHEDULE. PLANS NOW CALL FOR FOUR 4-CAR CONVOYS PER MONTH CONSISTING OF 8 BARGES; 3 PAMC, 3 RICE AND 2 POL. THIS WILL PROVIDE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO PHNOM PENH.

4. TP-115 IS A WATER SHED. FIRST SEAPAC MUST SAIL.

WE THINK THEY WILL. HAVING INITIATED THE CONVOY, IT MUST GET THROUGH. THIS REQUIRES MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT BY ARTILLERY AND KAF AND MAXIMUM COUNTER-MINE MEASURES BY MNK. FAILURE OF TP-115 COULD PERMANENTLY END CIVILIAN SUPPORT OF FUTURE OPERATIONS.

5. IN SUMMARY, CONVOYS SHOULD BE OPERATED IN DAYLIGHT WITH MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT AND AGGRESSIVE MINE SWEEPING. THE ALL BARGE CONCEPT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. SUCCESS OF THE CONVOY REQUIRES MAXIMUM KAF PARTICIPATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE IDENTIFIED AREAS OF MOST INTENSIVE ENEMY FIRE. IT ALSO REQUIRES VASTLY IMPROVED ARTILLERY SUPPORT. THE KEY, OF COURSE, IS TO PUT MORE FANK TROOPS ON THE GROUND AT THE CHOKE POINTS. MNK MUST PERFECT THEIR MINE SWEEPING CAPABILITIES. COMMERCIAL VESSELS SHOULD BE PROVIDED ANLE COMPENSATION TO MAKE IT WORTH THEIR WHILE TO MAKE THIS INTENSIVE COMBAT RUN.

IT WILL TAKE TOTAL DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE MEKONG OPEN.

GDS 31 DEC 81

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ANNEX I

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

ANNEX I

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

GENERAL (U)

(U) The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) compiled and analyzed data on unresolved cases and initiated casualty resolution (CR) activities, in consonance with its mission of assisting in resolving the status of U.S. missing (MIS) and body not recovered (BNR) personnel.

(U) JCRC Relocation. JCRC relocated during January from NKP to Camp Samae San. The advanced echelon departed on 6 January and the main unit deployed 13-24 January. Full operations at Samae San resumed 27 Jan 75. The only residual JCRC personnel remaining at NKP are about five data automation personnel. They provide interface with the JCRC programs on the USSAG/7AF computers, particularly the BRIGHT LIGHT System.

(U) Operations. The workload continued to fluctuate. Operations figures associated with remains recovery continued to expand. (See Figures 1 and 2).

PERSONNEL (U)

(U) Colonel Terance E. Cawley, USAF, arrived 27 March for duty as the deputy commander.

Strength. Assigned personnel strength dropped from 143 on 1 January to 97 as of 31 March.

(U) Awards. Thirteen recommendations for the Joint Service

STATISTICAL SUMMARY/JCRC/JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH 1975

Total sites to be located/inspected by country.

Inland Sites:

	CRASH			GROUND			TOTAL		
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Jan	Feb	Mar	Jan	Feb	Mar
North Vietnam	375	375	376	0	0	0	375	375	376
South Vietnam	295	296	295	232	231	231	527	527	526
Laos	265	265	264	32	32	32	297	297	296
Cambodia	28	28	28	23	23	23	51	51	51
Thailand	3	3	3	0	0	0	3	3	3
Total	966	967	966	287	286	286	1253	1253	1252

Over Water Sites: Jan - 78 Feb - 78 Mar - 76

Total Crash-Ground Sites with MIS/ENR Associated: Jan - 1331 Feb - 1331 Mar - 1328

Total Grave Sites:

	NVN	SVN	LAO	CAM	TOTAL
Jan	15	73	10	9	107
Feb	15	73	10	9	107
Mar	12	72	8	9	101

Total Sites of JCRC Interest: Jan - 1331 Feb - 1331 Mar - 1328

	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
Total U.S. Military Missing	929	923	906
Total U.S. Military ENR	1163	#1484	#1498
Total U.S. Civilian Missing	24	24	24
Total U.S. Civilian ENR	13	13	12
Number of Field Operations/ Other CR Activities Conducted to Date	50	55	59

- (includes 319 ENR (Nonrecoverable))

FIGURE 1

	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
Crash/Grave Site Search/ Investigation Operations	18	18	18
Remains Recovery Operations	6	6	6
Other CR Activities	26	31	35
Sites Inspected During Month	1	5	3
Number of Remains ID to Date	77	81	156
Identified as U.S. and Accepted by USAMAA	40	41	42
Identified as U.S. and Pending Acceptance by USAMAA	1	1	2
Identified as SEAsian Mongoloid and Accepted by USAMAA	22	25	32
Identified as SEAsian Mongoloid and Pending Acceptance by USAMAA	0	7	1
Number of Cases Recommended for Resolution			
Cases Resolved:	410	412	414
Cases Pending:	11	12	12

MIA/BNR

As of: 10 April 1975

	SVN	NVA	LAOS	CMB	AW SEA	TOTAL
ARMY	194 / 268	1 / 7	51 / 80	18 / 22	0 / 26	264 / 423
NAVY	4 / 19	72 / 100	11 / 33	0 / 0	10 / 0	97 / 152
AIR FORCE	53 / 115	202 / 139	194 / 171	6 / 13	14 / 58	*469 / #496
USMC	48 / 83	9 / 13	9 / 11	0 / 0	5 / 0	71 / 107
US CIV	13 / 7	0 / 0	6 / 3	5 / 1	0 / 1	24 / 12
TCN	21 / 9	0 / 0	5 / 1	23 / 5	0 / 1	49 / 16
TOTAL	333 / 521	284 / 259	276 / 299	52 / 41	29 / 86	979 / 1207

* +5 in Thailand
\# +1 in Thailand

TOTAL 2186

Figure 2

Commendation Medal were forwarded for approval. One nomination each for the Meritorious Service Medal and the Legion of Merit were also submitted.

CASUALTY DATA (U)

(U) Casualty Data Division (CDD) Reorganization. The CDD was restructured to include Automated Data Processing Division as a branch. This action was necessitated by increased emphasis on casualty records reconciliation, prioritizing of all JCRC case crash sites, documenting the JCRC record of effort in casualty resolution, and the master records development program. Additional work space was provided to facilitate augmentation by nine members of the Field Team Element for 90 days. These personnel helped bring RVN records up-to-date and allowed time to draft new Joint Manpower Program to add more analysts to complete the task.

(U) Project 400. Reconciliation of JCRC case files by the Casualty Records Branch with service casualty branch files was designated as "Project 400." The Navy identified 101 cases and Air Force identified 62 cases for primary reconciliation. Of the Navy cases, 32 were prepared for forwarding to Navy Casualty Branch. Thirty-two of the Air Force cases were prepared for forwarding. Upon computerization, these cases will be dispatched to the services.

(U) Project 40. The Crash Site Investigation Branch (CSI) was tasked with developing an empirically based program to rank crash sites in priority, according to probability of successful recovery.

Factors taken into consideration were type of aircraft, terrain, number of personnel on board the aircraft, and age of the crash site. Threat will be assigned numerically. A numerical value will be assigned each crash site, the highest numbered sites will be those having the greatest probability of success. This program, still under development, was identified as Project 4C.

(U) All Loss Printout. CSI received the up-dated All Loss Printout which included losses of USAF, USN, USA, USMC, RLAF, VNAF, Air America, Continental Air Services, CIA, and civilian aircraft. This document now contains 14,566 entried, each of which must be verified. This action is in progress. CSI began compiling information of all aircraft lost in Laos to answer a request from the Vientiane Liaison Office.

(U) Report 55. Automated Data Processing (ADP) and Analysis and Studies (A&S) branches developed a new BRIGHT LIGHT data base reporting format. Called Report 55, it combines the previously separate Biographical/Site Report 51 and 52. The single report format provides all fixed field biograhic and site information, as well as the Narrative Incident Summary. The first Report 55 was published during the quarter for utilization by the Vientiane Liaison Office.

(U) Master Record Project. Presently in the embryonic stage, the master record concept will define the complete set of records for each case by identifying all activities retaining essential case-related documentation. A cross reference will be placed in

each record.

(U) SEA ADP Facility. Delivery of the hardware for the SEA ADP Facility was delayed. Operational date for the WWMCCS conversation is presently scheduled for late September 1975. Programming support for JCRC will be completed as scheduled, 30 Jun 75.

(U) Documentary Record Effort. The ADP Branch was tasked with developing a computerized format which would provide a summary of the JCRC record of effort. A&S Branch has been assigned as the accounting agency for all record of effort information, a review of previous documentation is underway.

(U) Casualty Records. Changes in status based on identification of remains, service determination, or administrative correction posted in January:

	January	February	March
U.S. Army	1 Cpt/RVN to Cpt/CB 1 MIA/LA to BNR/LA	1 MIA/RVN to BNR/RVN 1 MIA/LA to BNR/LA	1 BNR/VS to BNR/VN 1 MIS/VS to MIS/CB 1 MIS/VS to MIS/VN 1 MIS/LA to BNR/LA 1 BNR/VS to BNR/LA 1 MIS/VS to KIA/VS 6 BNR/VS to BNR/VN
U.S. Air Force	3 MIA to BNR	2 MIA to BNR	5 MIA/VN to BNR/VN 2 MIA/LA to BNR/LA
USMC	None	3 MIA/RVN to BNR/RVN 1 BNR/RVN to Recovered	1 MIA/VS to MIA/VN 1 MIA/VN to BNR/VN 1 Cpt/VS to Delete
U.S. Navy	None	1 MIA/NVN to BNR/NVN	3 MIA/VN to BNR/VN 2 BNR/OW to BNR/VN 3 MIA/OW to MIA/VN

	January	February	March
U.S. Civilians	None	None	BNR/VS to Remains Recovered
TCN	None	None	None

Analysis of Over Water/Nonrecoverable records continued. As a result of JCRC's recommendation, four BNR/over water cases were accepted and declared nonrecoverable (inactive).

(U) The Air Force declassification program continued with 100 documents, secret and confidential, downgraded or declassified.

(U) Case papers and cranio-facial photographs supporting the proposed identification of James A. Ravencraft, USA, remains recovered 21-23 Jun 73, were forwarded to U.S. Army Memorial Affairs Association 26 February.

(U) Deserters. All information available on personnel carried as deserters by the services (approximately 53) from units formerly in South Vietnam was forwarded to ADP for inclusion in the data base. Case files on deserter personnel were established.

(U) In support of the South Vietnam Site Priority Program, nine sites were recommended for possible casualty resolution efforts and forwarded to JCRC Saigon Liaison Office, 4 Feb 75.

(U) CDD assistance to South Vietnam's ADOs in conjunction with Project 40 and the record of effort program, involved the analysis, filing, and/or responses to approximately 60 memorandums. Increased communication and effort is being placed on sites with the highest probability of finding remains. One set of remains

(probable reference number 337) was recovered as a direct result of this program.

(U) Eighty case files were reviewed and forwarded to ADO for inclusion in the BRIGHT LIGHT System.

(U) Reconciliation was made of JCRC/DIA last known position coordinate discrepancies involving 15 specific sites. Seven held by both JCRC and DIA were clarified, with DIA accepting the JCRC last known position recommendations.

(U) The Master Records Development Program continued with 514 records completed as of 31 March. Review of all Navy case files in support of Project 400 was completed during this quarter.

(U) The grave site correlation from intelligence reports continued with 101 grave sites posted to date, 20 from DIA grave site data base.

(U) A total review of all MR II sites was conducted for additional submission of site proposals. Although 10 sites were selected for proposal, forwarding of these recommendations was precluded by increased hostile activity in MR II. A similar project was initiated for Laos.

(U) Administration/Security. Security received and placed under secret document control approximately 1,500 microfiche USAF PW debriefs.

(U) Songbird Review Program. Approximately 4,000 Songbird reports containing potential casualty information have been made

available to JCRC from USDAO files. Approximately 500 documents have been reviewed for additional data which would require correlation.

OPERATIONS (U)

A message from JCRC to CINCPAC provided a CR activity report of a remains turnover at Tam Ky City, Quang Tin Province, MR I, RVN.[1] The remains reportedly were those of a black American who was killed during Tet 1968. Participants in the turnover included the deputy province chief, deputy chief Two Part Joint Military Commission (TPJMC), Tam Ky Office, and JCRC Area Desk Officer (ADO)-1. Remains which consisted of 32 teeth, a fractured mandible and maxillae, shattered skull, shattered portions of the upper torso and extremities were subsequently forwarded to the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL).

(U) On 13 January, six JCRC Field Element Command noncommissioned officers successfully completed the 2nd class diver course 10-75 at the Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippines. Individuals completing the course were SFC James L. Knight, SFC Serafin Telles, SSg Charles D. Ball, SSg Michael D. Hughes, Sgt John M. Kelsey, and Sgt Peter A. Galpin. Sergeant Kelsey was an honor graduate of his class, and the school.

A CR activity proposed for 20 Jan 75, in Can Ranh Special Zone[2] and postponed due to nonavailability of guide, was carried out on 4 Feb 75. With JCRC indigenous operations specialist acting

as a guide, a thorough investigation of the site was conducted with negative results and without incident. No further actions involving this site are anticipated.

A turnover of commingled remains was made by the Hau Nghia province representative to the ADO-3 on 3 Feb 75.[3] There was no previous announcement and no ceremony. The remains were delivered to the ADO-3 office in a bag. Investigation to this point has yielded contradictory information as to probable racial type and origin of remains. There is no correlation with existing reference numbers. Remains were forwarded to CIL for further identification.

Remains were turned over to ADO-1 by the deputy province chief of Quang Tin, MR-I, Mr. Tran Ngoc Thiey and LTC Nhuyen Duc Chung, TPJMC deputy chief of the Tam Ky Office at 1500 hours on 27 Feb 75.[4] The turnover ceremony was brief, simple and dignified. Approximately 75 percent of the remains were recovered including some teeth and the shattered skull. Remains were forwarded to CIL.

On 27 Feb 75 at 1545 hours, remains were turned over to U.S. Delegate Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) representative by TPJMC Region II representative.[5] Turnover was conducted at Region Five TPJMC at Long Binh. Ceremony was brief and dignified with U.S. Delegate tendering thanks to RVN/TPJMC representatives for their continuing support on behalf of the U.S. CR mission. The wooden casket was not, repeat not, flag draped nor did it have any

distinctive markings or names. No media representatives were present, however, RVN delegate TPJMC representatives took numerous photos. Remains were accompanied from Long Binh back to Saigon by a JCRC representative. Remains were sent to CIL. Remains were reported as recovered from wreckage of a C-130 at UTM XT746866 by a platoon of 3/2?6 RF company of Long Binh sector forces. Recovery was effected at 0900 hours on 27 Feb 75.

On 15 February, JCRC-LNO, ADO-1, accompanied by Commanding General (CONGEN), Da Nang, on a visit to Hue, at 1500 hours met with Thua Thien Province chief to discuss alleged American remains buried in the Thanh Luong Hamlet, Huong Xuan Village, Huong Tra District Thua Thien Province at YD 68?275.[6] CONGEN accompanied province chief to gravesite. Province chief wanted to exhume remains at that time, but CONGEN persuaded him to wait and get the TPJMC involved with their JCRC-trained personnel. Province chief agreed and ordered TPJMC officials to exhume remains on 16 February. At 0800 hours, 16 February, ADO-1 went to TPJMC headquarters and met with two RVN TPJMC representatives who had received JCRC CR training in Saigon. The three of them drove to Huong Tra District headquarters located at YD 70?254 and met with district chief who gave TPJMC permission to exhume subject remains. At 0915 hours, TPJMC representatives proceeded to the gravesite and exhumed remains. The ADO-1 stayed at district headquarters. Remains were turned over to ADO-1 at 1100 hours without ceremony at the district headquarters.

Activity concluded without incident.

Without prior notification, a unilateral TPJMC-initiated remains turnover occurred on 4 March, 1530 hours at Phuc Hau Hamlet where seven sets of remains were received by the assistant ADO-4.[7] Present were representatives of TPJMC Region 7 and the district chief, Hau Thanh District. No news media were present. The ceremony was solemn and dignified. The remains were recovered from a common grave at Phouc Hau Hamlet UTM WS 070369. According to local villagers, these remains were casualties suffered as a result of action in 1968. American casualties at that time were reported as six KIA (according to locals) of which five were recovered immediately after the action. The sixth KIA is alleged to be that of a helicopter pilot whose remains were burned. One of the seven remains recovered is reportedly that of the pilot. The other six are ARVN soldiers. Remains were transferred to CIL.

A unilateral TPJMC-initiated remains turnover occurred on 5 March without prior notification.[8] Alleged U.S. remains were turned over to chief U.S. Delegation FPJMT by TPJMC Region V chief. Turnover was conducted at Region V TPJMC compound at Long Binh. Ceremony was brief and dignified, with chief, U.S. Delegation FPJMT expressing thanks to RVN/TPJMC representatives and to chief RVN Delegate FPJMT who was also in attendance. U.S. delegation contrasted RVN cooperation with the continued intransigence of DRV and PRG. The wooden casket was not, repeat not, flag draped nor did it have

any distinctive markings or names. No media representatives were present; however, RVN Delegate FPMC representatives took numerous photos. Remains were reported as recovered from wreckage of a C-130 at UTM XT 775889 by elements of the 38th Ranger Battalion of Binh Long Province. Recovery was effected at 1240 hours, 28 February. In addition to the remains, one set of metal I.D. tags was also recovered. Remains along with I.D. tags were transferred to CIL. Two I.D. tags recovered belonged to Lester Bracey, FR107-40-5331. The remains of Bracey (TSN 0439-78) and five other crew members of a C-130 aircraft were identified 19 Jun 74.

On 6 March, without prior notification, commanding general, Bien Hoa turned over a partial set of remains, portion of a flak jacket, and aircraft parts to ADO-3.[9] Items reportedly turned in by a hunter/woodcutter. Source claimed they came from vicinity XT 990462. However, source had previously turned in other data plates and identifying numbers of a resolved helicopter crash site vicinity XT 946520 and source states these remains came from the same site. Remains, portion of flak jacket, and aircraft parts were shipped to CIL.

On 15 March, remains were exhumed by Vietnamese laborers in the Hue area at the Ba Don cemetery, and turned over to the operations specialist ADO-1.[10] The remains were initially discovered by local people at YD 747219, in the Citadel, on 1 Mar 75, and reburied at Ba Don cemetery the same day. There

are no known events or statements available to indicate that they are U.S. remains. Remains are only suspected to be U.S. because of their large size. No formal turnover ceremony was held.

LOGISTICS (U)

(U) In additon to the normal supply function, the Logistics Division was heavily involved in renovation and equipping the new headquarters buildings and logistical support of the organization's relocation.

(U) The physical location of the division appears to create some problems. The only available building for logistics operations was at U-Tapao, inside a B-52 access area. Problems arise from limited accessability based on flight line pass requirements, plus physical distance between JCRC headquarters, logistics depots, and the JCRC warehouse.

AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING (U)

(U) In February, ADP became a branch under the Casualty Data Division.

(U) In January, ADP printouts were provided to ADOs designed to assist in making assessments and correlations based upon the sites and people believed to be located in their respective areas of interest. Initial reaction was favorable.

(U) The conversion of the BRIGHT LIGHT System was proceeding on schedule. Minor problems that arose were worked out with the Naval Communications Systems Support Activity. One conceptual

problem with an assembler program caused some consternation but, to date, has not reached inordinate proportions.

(U) Delivery of hardware for the SEA ADP facility was delayed. Operational date for the WWMCCS conversion is now scheduled for late September 1975.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (SJA) (U)

(U) The SJA served as the NKP Base Defense Counsel until 10 January. Five individuals were advised concerning military justice matters.

(U) In coordination with CINCPAC, research was conducted relating to amendments to the Freedom of Information Act on JCRC. A directive was published establishing procedures within JCRC for processing requests.

COMPTROLLER (U)

(U) The Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA) between JCRC Liaison Office Saigon and DAO Saigon was received and concurred upon 2 Jan 75. Revised ISSA provides for reimbursement by JCRC assistance when required, utilities and rents for administrative office spaces, special transportation requirements, vehicle maintenance, POL and quarters when provided.

(U) During March, the Section 205 of Public Law 93-594, Article 3679 of the revised statutes, as applied to funds available for travel, was rescinded. The limitation on funds expendable for travel is currently an administrative ceiling in nature, subject to CINCPAC control. The previously established

ceiling of $135,000 for JCRC was increased to $154,000. The balance available to support travel and transportation of JCRC personnel as of 31 March was $32,755.74.

(U) Month-end financial documents were submitted to USMACTHAI for preparation of monthly reports. Year-to-date obligations under the operation and maintenance (Navy) appropriation through 31 March amounted to $598,490.02. Official funding for the 4th quarter FY 75 was received in the amount of $96,700 bringing new obligational authority to a FY 75 total of $950,000.

(U) The annual planning figure provided by CINCPAC for FY 76 is $1,000,000.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

(U) Face-to-face communications continued to be used as the primary means of conveying the JCRC story to the public. More than nine briefings were given to approximately 245 national/international opinion leaders. These included key military leaders and MIS/BNR next of kin. (See Attachment 1)

(U) On 16 Feb 75, Colonel Eugene L. Hollis, Jr., deputy commander, and Major Donald L. Gilleland, public affairs officer accompanied Major Robert Phelps, Major Robert Wellatz, and Professor Charles P. Warren (Physical Anthropologist with the Central Identification Laboratory), to Pattaya for an interview with Mr. Arnold Abrams, managing editor of Asia Magazine. After receiving an extensive JCRC briefing from CINCPAC PAO LNO, Mr. Abrams

wanted to talk with JCRC personnel about their respective jobs. The interview lasted two hours and was generally restricted to what kind of work the three JCRC men do in a particular day. They restricted their comments to their own area of expertise. Mr. Abrams seemed pleased with the interview.

(U) While visiting U-Tapao, Mr. John Brady and Mr. John Sullivan, Senior Consultants to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, requested a meeting with the JCRC commander. The commander and the public affairs officer met with the staff delegates at U-Tapao at 1400 hours on 25 Feb 75. The staff delegates requested an update briefing on CR efforts from April 1973 to present. The JCRC commander and the public affairs officer provided general background highlighting reduced U.S. accessibility and increased ARVN and TPJMC cooperation and assistance.

(U) At the request of the AMEMB Saigon, on 2 March, the JCRC commander provided a modified command briefing on casualty resolution efforts to the following Congressmen who were visiting Saigon: Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla), Representatives William Chapell, Jr. (D-Fla), Bella Abzug (D-NY), Donald Fraser (D-Minn), Paul McCloskey, Jr., (R-Cal), John Murtha (D-Pa), and Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ).

(U) On 31 March, Mr. David P. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) visited U-Tapao RTNB, Thailand. The briefing provided Mr. Taylor with JCRC problem areas, future prospects and accomplishments.

SAIGON LIAISON OFFICE (U)*

(U) Distribution of all public communication school notebooks to all provinces in Region 2 was completed.

On 5 Nov 74, ADO-3 presented a briefing to CONGEN-3 about the 46 MIA cases in MR-3.

(U) Colonel Bruce Walker, USAF (retired) next of kin to reference number 1820 visited Da Nang for the period of 16-18 Nov 74.

On 20 Nov 74, Mr. James Tully, ADO-4 briefed all the provincial representatives and CONGEN staff members. During this briefing, ADO-4 emphasized the weakening of the CR program and the need for more support and thorough investigations by the local hire province staff.

On 24 Nov 74, a CR activity was conducted in Thua Thien Province without specific reference number correlation. The remains recovered were transferred to CIL for identification.

The long-term mass exhumation at the Citadel in Hue continued at an average rate of eight remains per day. A total of 215 remains have been exhumed.

(U) ADO-4 and his operation specialist completed visits to eight provinces in the Delta for site investigations and public communications. Two Cambodian refugee camps were also visited. At these camps, the JCRC program was explained to Cambodian religious leaders and specially prepared public communications materials were distributed along with school notebooks.

*Second quarter FY 75 information not available for last history.

(U) Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem issued a policy document on 14 Nov 74, entitled, "Fundamental Operational Instructions for Procedures and Regulations for Search, Exhumation and Transfer of American Remains in the Territory of the Republic of Vietnam." This document, the first all encompassing statement of policy of its kind, had as its basic thrust that the primary responsibility for recovering remains believed to be those of Americans belongs to the Government of Vietnam. U.S. organizations and agencies assume a support and coordinating role.

(U) The JCRC Liaison Office took action to implement a more positive and active program for casualty resolution efforts. This "Affirmative Action Program" will allow more selective dedication of resources and effort toward those casualty cases which have the highest likelihood of resolution. A "Status of Sites" report will be initiated beginning in January 1975 to give constant updates to JCRC headquarters on pending cases.

FOOTNOTES

ANNEX I

1. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 310232Z Jan 75, Subj: Remains Turnover; Quang Tin Province; Region 1, SVN (U).

2. Msg (U), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 070825Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Cam Ranh Special Zone.

3. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 180900Z Feb 75, Subj: Remains Turnover Hau Nghia Province, Region 3, SVN (U).

4. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 060402Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Quang Tin Province, MR-1, SVN (U).

5. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 060401Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Long Binh Province, MR-3, SVN (U).

6. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 240802Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Thua Thien Province, MR-1, SVN (U).

7. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 080303Z Mar 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Kien Giang Province, MR-4, SVN (U).

8. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 080302Z Mar 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Binh Long Province, MR-3, SVN (U).

9. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 140840Z Mar 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Binh Duong Province, MR-3, SVN (U).

10. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 240330Z Mar 75, Subj: Remains Recovery at YD 747219, In the Citadel, Hue City (U).

PERSONNEL WHO RECEIVED THE COMMAND BRIEFING

DATE	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	GROUP
9 Jan	2	Senator Strom Thurman in Bangkok
27 Jan	35	Base Personnel at Rama San USO
28 Jan	40	Base Personnel at Udorn USO
29 Jan	18	Intelligence Personnel of 432TFW (Udorn)
13 Feb	24	SAC Command Post at U-Tapao
21 Feb	65	Mixed audience at U-Tapao USO
25 Feb	8	Mr. John Brady, and Mr. John Sullivan, Senior Consultants to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
2 Mar	20	Congressional Delegates; Senator Dewey Bartlett, (R-Okla); Representatives William Chapell, Jr., (D-Fla); Bella Abzug, (D-NY); Donald Fraser, (D-Minn); Paul McCloskey, Jr., (R-Cal); and Millicent Fenwick, (R-NJ); John Murtha (D-Pa)
31 Mar	35	Mr. David P. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Command Staff of U-Tapao.

Attachment 1

HISTORY OF USSAG/7AF AND JCRC 1 JAN - 31 MAR 75

UNCLASSIF

US[illegible] AIR FORCE

A[illegible] SOLUTION CENTER

[illegible] (U)

[illegible]-4

[illegible] AIR FORCE

ENCLOSURE (3)

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