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COPY No. 252

JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SM-535-83

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SM-535-83
12 August 1983

Subject: JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION (Annex Z)

[redacted]

2. (U) This plan fulfills a requirement established in paragraph 3, Section V, Volume I of JSCP FY 83.

3. (U) This plan is effective for planning purposes upon receipt and for execution upon order.

4. (U) Elements of this plan were coordinated during the preparation with representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, unified and specified commands, DIA, NSA, OJCS, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), and DNA. Because of the broad nature of this plan, the concepts identified herein have been informally staffed for accuracy and applicability with the Departments of Justice, Energy, and State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

5. (U) The supporting plans listed in subparagraph 3d, Plan Summary, will be prepared and forwarded for review within 60 days.

6. (U) When separated from the Enclosure, this letter is SECRET.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David O. Swennes

DAVID O. SWENNES
Colonel, USAF
Secretary

Attachment

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JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U)

1. The long title of this plan is JCS Plan For The Recovery of US Nuclear Weapons (U). The short title is JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U).

2. The JCS RECOVERY PLAN is classified SECRET Formerly Restricted Data. Information contained herein is considered to be of the highest sensitivity, having direct implications for US foreign policy and national security interests particularly as they relate to US and allied nuclear deterrence. Therefore, this information will be disseminated only to agencies, Services, and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those required to develop supporting plans.

3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is prohibited, except as required for the preparation of supporting plans.

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JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)

JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
PLAN SUMMARY (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE



b. (U) Because of operational variation and international complexity, this plan is subdivided into CONUS (50 States and territories) and OCONUS (outside CONUS) operations. Certain required national and international agreements

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between the United States and host nation governments have not yet been finalized; therefore, major assumptions essential to complete planning and successful operations are provided. Plans will be revised, if necessary, when such agreements are completed. This plan has been developed in consideration of multilateral agreements already approved and identifies interagency coordination and cooperation required.

2. (U) CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

a. (U) Recovery operations may be initiated by the CINCs, Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or NCA. Normally, plan execution will be initiated upon (1) receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/BROKEN ARROW report that indicates a nuclear weapon or nuclear component has been lost, seized, or stolen from DOD custody, facility, or transport; (2) notification by the DOE Emergency Operations Center that nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon components, or special nuclear material (SNM) has been lost or stolen from DOE custody; or (3) notification by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a nuclear threat.

b. (U) Subelements of this plan, such as search capabilities or technical assistance teams, may be activated and/or deployed prior to and separate from this

plan by those agencies having command authority to activate such elements. Plans for activation/deployment of such search and technical assistance teams will be developed in sufficient detail to permit separate activation/deployment.

c. (U) For OCONUS operations, this plan and supporting plans may be executed by the appropriate CINC upon receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/BROKEN ARROW report, AVOID report, or any authenticated communication through any channel that indicates a nuclear weapon or nuclear component has been lost, seized, or stolen from US custody, or is in danger of such loss. Subelements, such as search capabilities or technical assistance teams, may be activated and/or deployed separately and prior to the execution of this plan by those headquarters having such authority.

d. (U) Recovery of a lost or stolen nuclear weapon during peacetime is of the highest national priority, taking precedence over all other operations.

e. (U) Recovery of nuclear weapons is considered a peacetime mission and should not conflict with wartime missions. This does not preclude the possibility of recovery operations during time of tension or conflict. Should there be a conflict between recovery operations and wartime missions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will assign the mission priorities.

[redacted]

[redacted]

g. (U) Secure communications are required for all military and US civilian elements of search and recovery operations. Allies should be encouraged to provide secure communications for all OCONUS recovery operations. However, recovery operations will not be delayed due to lack of secure communications.

h. (U) Military security or recovery forces may continue "hot pursuit" (as defined in Annex C).

i. (U) CONUS Operations

(1) (U) The Operations Team within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) will be the initial command and control element for all military search and recovery operations conducted in CONUS. In accordance with public law, control of such operations will be transferred, as soon as possible, to the Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI, which has recovery responsibility in CONUS.

(2) (U) Upon request from DOJ and in accordance with public law, military recovery forces (MRF) and technical assistance teams will be deployed by the appropriate CINC or Service to support DOJ operations as a matter of the highest priority.

(3) (U) CINCs and Services will implement NAIC procedures as required, and report the loss or theft of a nuclear weapon, nuclear components, or SNM to the NMCC in accordance with JCS Pub 6.

[redacted]

j. (U) OCONUS Operations

(1) (U) The Department of State (DOS) has primary responsibility for the coordination of recovery operations outside the United States. The US Ambassador to the host nation has overall responsibility for the conduct of US operations. The appropriate CINC has primary responsibility for command and control of US military operations and coordination with host-nation military agencies.

[redacted]

(3) (U) The US military will support the host-nation forces (either civilian or military) in search and recovery operations as directed by the CINC.

[redacted]



(10) (U) CINCs will implement plans as required and report the loss or theft of a nuclear weapon to the NMCC in accordance with JCS Pub 6.





(13) (U) This summary provides military decisionmakers a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency. The information contained herein should be reviewed and, if necessary, updated prior to use in adopting courses of action in a particular situation.

3. (U) OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED

a. (U) Force Requirements. Recovery operations will be initially conducted with in-place forces (primarily surviving site security or escorting security forces and security response forces) within their capabilities. Augmentation of the forces initially attempting the recovery will be as directed by the CINC or other responsible commander. Augmentation forces from outside the theater will be as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on the situation.

[redacted]

b. (U) Employment

c. (U) Deployment. Because of the immediate response required by recovery forces to consummate recovery of a nuclear weapon, intertheater and intratheater major force deployment is not considered feasible. Prolonged siege by the perpetrators or request for support by host-nation authorities may require deployment of specialized forces or major combat forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the appropriate CINC, will direct such deployment as required by the situation.

d. (U) Supporting Plans. USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, USCINCCENT CINCSAC, CINCMAC, CINCLANT, USCINCRED, USCINCSO, CINCAD, Chief of Staff, US Army, and Chief of Staff, US Air Force, will review, revise, or prepare supporting plans for implementation of options covered in this plan. New supporting plans or changes to existing plans or directives

will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 60 days after receipt of the JCS RECOVERY PLAN for review and approval.

4. (U) ASSUMPTIONS. The following assumptions provide rationale for the concept of this plan and will be considered in the development of supporting plans.

a. (U) Agreements with host nations will be completed and consummated by DOS wherever politically feasible.

b. (U) Interagency agreements, national and State laws, and policy will allow military assistance and support to the DOJ or host-nation forces in recovery operations.

c. (U) Terrorist groups motivated to steal a nuclear weapon are well equipped, well trained, adequately manned, and capable of establishing sophisticated communications systems and have transportation capabilities and adequate operational control and coordination.



b. (U) The welfare and safety of hostages shall be considered in determining the actions to be taken. However, the presence of hostages shall not deter taking decisive, prompt, and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to recover a nuclear weapon.

6. (U) TIME TO COMMENCE EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS

a. (U) Search and recovery operations will be initiated at the earliest indication that a nuclear weapon is known or suspected of being stolen or lost.

b. (U) Initial notification and assembly of first response teams as well as crisis management teams will commence at the earliest indications of the loss. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be notified as soon as possible of the deployment of a recovery team.

[redacted]

[redacted]

8. (U) COMSEC. Secure communications are required for all phases of the search and recovery operations. Shortfall of sufficient equipment to meet this requirement will be reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible.

9. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Existing military command relationships will continue in effect for search and recovery operations. However, interagency and international relationships not normally required are clarified in the recovery plan as follows:

a. (U) CONUS Operations

(1) (U) The Operations Team within the NMCC has initial responsibility for command and control of all military operations conducted in CONUS. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) will be the principal representative of the Secretary of Defense regarding safety and security of nuclear weapons. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) will be the principal representative of the Secretary of Defense regarding matters of counterterrorism.

(2) (U) Command and control responsibilities for search and recovery will be transferred from the Department of Defense to the FBI as soon as possible. The Department of Defense will continue to support search and recovery operations as required on a priority basis.

[redacted]

(4) (U) If the weapon is taken from the United States or its territories, the operation is then treated as OCONUS and responsibility will be transferred to DOS as soon as possible.

b. (U) OCONUS Operations

[redacted]



10. (U) LOGISTIC APPRAISAL. Logistic support will be provided recovery forces by their parent headquarters. Special logistic requirements will be presented to the responsible commander for resolution.

11. (U) IMPLEMENTATION. This plan or supporting plans may be activated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, or Services upon receipt of indications that a nuclear weapon has been lost, seized, or stolen or is in danger of such loss. The checklist found in Annex X represents a broad guide to the scope of necessary actions to place the plan into operation. CINCs and Services will expand and/or augment this checklist with specific details to activate their supporting plans.

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JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
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JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
RECOVERY OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 6.

b. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) USEUCOM/FAAEUR, in implementation of Executive Order and DOD/FAA MOU.

c. JSCP, Annex C.

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Situation dependent.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) General

(1) (U) This plan may be executed, sequentially or concurrently, with traditional Nuclear Accident and Incident Control (NAIC) operations when directed by the appropriate CINC or Chief of Service.

(2) (U) The plan is subdivided into two areas of operations: the contiguous United States, Hawaii, Alaska and US territories (considered CONUS), and all other areas outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Search and recovery operations are more likely to occur OCONUS than CONUS because of the number of weapons stored OCONUS; greater accessibility of OCONUS storage sites by terrorist groups; and the many international borders near the OCONUS storage sites that afford the terrorist an opportunity to confuse, disrupt, or impede recovery operations.

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b. (U) Enemy. Situation dependent.

c. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) CONUS Operations

(a) (U) Operations involving the search and recovery of nuclear weapons will involve federal, state, and/or local law enforcement personnel, accident response groups from the Department of Energy (DOE), and supporting units and equipment from all US military services. DOD agencies, Service organizations, commands, or units having primary responsibilities in search and recovery operations are specifically identified in this plan.

(b) (U) In accordance with public law, the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for all search and recovery operations conducted in the United States.

(c) (U) Secure communications are required for all military and US civilian elements of search and recovery operations.

(d) (U) The Operations Team within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) will be the initial command and control element for all military support for search and recovery operations conducted in CONUS. Control of such operations will be passed to DOJ as soon as possible. The NMCC will continue to coordinate DOD assistance throughout the period of operations.

(e) (U) CINCs and Services will implement NAIC procedures as required and will report the loss or

theft of a nuclear weapon or nuclear components in accordance with JCS Pub 6.

(f) (U) Military security or recovery forces will continue "hot pursuit" within the limits of current policy.

[redacted]

(i) (U) CINCMAC, as a matter of the highest priority, will provide transport to the MRF, FBI, DOE, and/or other agencies, organizations, or units, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in support of search and recovery operations.

(j) (U) Once the weapon has been recovered, nuclear qualified explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel will ascertain that the weapon is safe. If required,

the weapon will be rendered safe by EOD personnel and prepared for transportation. The weapon will be evacuated from the recovery scene to a safe location, preferably a military or DOE nuclear storage facility, as soon as possible. If damage to the weapon is evident or suspected, the weapon will then be transported to a DOE facility.

(2) (U) OCONUS Operations

(a) (U) Operations involving the search and recovery of nuclear weapons in foreign countries may involve host-nation law enforcement agencies, military, and political communities, as well as the US military and diplomatic communities.

(b) (U) The Department of State (DOS) has primary responsibility for the coordination of recovery operations outside United States territory (OCONUS). US Ambassadors in the country or countries of operations will be the senior DOS representative in theater and as such will have primary responsibility for coordinating US recovery operations.

[redacted]



(h) (U) The Operations Team within the NMCC will provide all interagency interface and will facilitate inter-Service support required for such operations.



(j) (U) MRF for OCONUS recovery operations may be deployed from within the theater of operations or from CONUS. The commander of the unified command, in coordination with the US Ambassador, Department of Defense, DOS, and the host nations, will determine the details of MRF deployments.

(k) (U) Once the weapon has been recovered, nuclear-qualified EOD personnel will insure that the weapon

is safe. If required, the weapon will be rendered safe by the EOD team and prepared for transportation. The weapon will be evacuated from the recovery scene to a safe location, preferably a military facility or transported to CONUS for DOE disposition, as soon as possible. If damage to the weapon is evident or suspected, the weapon will be transported to CONUS and transferred to DOE for further disposition.

d. (U) Assumptions

(1) (U) A nuclear weapon stolen in one country may be moved to and subsequently recovered in another nation state.

(2) (U) The primary purposes for a terrorist to remove a nuclear weapon from US custody are to gain spectacular recognition, to further ideological interests, to cause political embarrassment to the United States or other governments, and/or to gain an instrument of blackmail. Motivation could also come from an interest in gaining nuclear design information or causing a nuclear incident.

[redacted]

(4) (U) The Department of Defense will render maximum assistance to other agencies and host nations in the conduct of search and recovery operations.

(5) (U) DOS will negotiate and coordinate, as soon as possible, diplomatic clearances for the crossing of international borders by DOD or civil aircraft required to support search and recovery operations. Where politically feasible, such agreements will be concluded by DOS in advance.

(6) (U) FAA will provide priority for CONUS airspace for aircraft in support of search and recovery operations.

(7) (U) The Department of Treasury will be prepared to close appropriate sections of the borders between the United States and contiguous countries. If requested, the Department of Defense will assist in such operations.

e. (U) Legal Considerations

(1) (U) "Posse Comitatus" does not apply to the recovery of nuclear weapons.

(2) (U) The Federal police powers of the Department of Defense and DOD Directive 5200.8 do apply to search and recovery operations in CONUS.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept of Operations. The concept of operations for CONUS operations is predicated on existing nuclear accident and incident response procedures and organizations. When a loss occurs, an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/BROKEN ARROW report will be forwarded to the NMCC by the most expeditious means.

(1) (U) General. Initial notification of the incident will be made to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of Defense; White House; Services; DOE; DOJ; and DOS in accordance with crisis action procedures. Notification to other agencies will also be made in accordance with current NMCC operating instructions. Additionally, staff members of the Services involved may be requested to provide staff assistance and to expedite response for Service support.

(a) (U) At the time of loss or theft, the command having responsibility for the storage site involved will alert, activate, and deploy all resources capable of recovering or locating and maintaining surveillance of the stolen weapon. Additionally, local site support plans will be activated at the discretion of the site commander.

[redacted]

(b) (U) Recovery operations OCONUS will be initiated by the CINC responsible for providing custody or protection for the weapon and may be delegated to his designated representative in the operational chain of command, to include the custodian, on-scene commander, or site commander.

(c) (U) Integration of Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NESTs), intelligence agents, and other appropriate agencies will be accomplished by the supporting plans of subordinate elements.

(2) (U) Employment. Surviving security and escort forces, along with any response forces, in accordance with DOD Directive 5210.41 and DOD 5210.41M, will pursue and maintain contact with forces and individuals who have possession of a stolen nuclear weapon. Forces in hot pursuit are authorized to use the amount of force required to regain US custody of the weapon. Use of nuclear weapons and lethal chemical agents are not envisioned for this plan. No nuclear appendix is prepared for Annex C. Commanders will use all supporting operations deemed appropriate, commensurate with time available for implementation, such as PSYOP, EW, and deception.

(3) (U) Deployment

(a) (U) Intratheater and intertheater deployment of major combat forces is not expected for recovery operations because of the requirement to take

immediate military action to recover stolen nuclear weapons. Depending on the situation, specialized forces or equipment may be required to support the commander effecting recovery. Intratheater assets will be used as available, with intertheater assets made available through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Deployment of forces in support of supporting deception plans will be specified in the separately published deception plans.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) Chief of Staff, US Army

(a) (U) Is responsible for the security and recovery of nuclear weapons from CONUS Army nuclear weapon storage facilities.

(b) (U) When directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepare US Army forces and equipment for support of other commands conducting recovery operations.

(2) (U) Chief of Naval Operations

(a) (U) Provide hot pursuit within existing capabilities.

(b) (U) Provide notification of loss or theft of nuclear weapons.

(c) (U) Provide support to DOS and DOJ upon direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(d) (U) When directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepare US naval forces and equipment for support of other commands conducting recovery operations.

[redacted]

(3) (U) Chief of Staff, US Air Force

(a) (U) Is responsible for the security and recovery of nuclear weapons from US Air Force nuclear weapon storage facilities in CONUS not otherwise assigned to a unified or specified commander.

(b) (U) When directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepare US Air Force forces and equipment for support of other commands conducting recovery operations.

(4) (U) USCINCEUR

(a) (U) Is responsible for the security and recovery of US nuclear weapons from nuclear weapon storage sites within NATO Europe.

[redacted]

(c) (U) Is responsible for the coordination of US recovery plans with other European NATO military forces and non-NATO forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[redacted]

(5) (U) CINCLANT. Is responsible for the security and recovery of US nuclear weapons deployed in the LANTCOM AOR in support of assigned US and NATO naval forces (excluding NATO sites that are in the CINCEUR AOR).

(6) (U) CINCPAC. Is responsible for the security and recovery of US nuclear weapons from nuclear weapon storage sites within the Pacific area.

[redacted]

(9) (U) CINCAD

[redacted]

(b) (U) Provide flight following and air intercept within assigned area of operations of airborne elements that have stolen US nuclear weapons.

(10) (U) CINCSAC

(a) (U) Is responsible for the security and recovery of US nuclear weapons in the custody of CINCSAC as well as those weapons in the custody of another organization but stored on a SAC base.

(b) (U) Provide aerial refueling to other commanders as directed.

(c) (U) Be prepared to support recovery operations worldwide with assigned strategic reconnaissance assets.

(11) (U) USCINCRED

(a) (U) Be prepared to provide to recovering commanders such forces and equipment as required.

(b) (U) Be prepared to provide a JTF for the recovery of nuclear weapons in geographic areas not otherwise assigned by this plan.

(12) (U) CINCMAC

(a) (U) Is responsible for the security and recovery of US nuclear weapons that are in the custody of CINCMAC while airborne or that are stored on one of his installations where custody is maintained by another organization.

(b) (U) Is responsible for the security and recovery of US nuclear weapons that are in the custody of CINCMAC during ground operations in conjunction with logistic movement and that are the responsibility of the CINC or Service owning the installation.

(c) (U) Be prepared to provide airlift for intratheater and intertheater deployment of forces and equipment reinforcing recovery forces.

(13) (U) Commander, CTJTF. Be prepared to provide a JTF for the recovery of nuclear weapons in any geographic region of the world as tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(14) (U) Director, DNA. Be prepared to provide nuclear weapon technical support and specialized equipment to recovering commanders.

(15) (U) Director, NSA. Be prepared to provide technical support and specialized equipment to recovering commanders.

(16) (U) Director, DIA. Provide intelligence support to recovering commanders with emphasis on identification of potential nuclear weapon terrorists.

(17) (U) Director, DCA. Provide communications support as indicated in Annex K.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and for implementation on order.

(2) (U) Commanders tasked for recovery of nuclear weapons will designate, equip, train, and insure readiness of units or personnel.

(3) (U) If a JTF is formed, OPCON of forces will pass to Commander, JTF, upon arrival of forces in the objective area.

(4) (U) Lateral coordination between commanders and directors for planning is authorized.

d. (U) Operational Constraints

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) (U) The welfare and safety of hostages will be considered in determining the actions to be taken. However, the presence of hostages will not deter taking decisive, prompt, and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to recover a nuclear weapon.

[redacted]

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. (U) Concept of Support. Logistic support of recovery forces will be provided by the parent headquarters in accordance with peacetime procedures. Specialized logistic

support is situation dependent and will be requested from higher headquarters as required.

b. (U) Logistics. Not applicable.

c. (U) Personnel. In accordance with peacetime operating procedures. See Annex E for policy on captured and detained personnel.

d. (U) Public Affairs. Annex F.

e. (U) Civil Affairs. Not applicable.

f. (U) Environmental Services. Not applicable.

g. (U) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. Not applicable.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. (U) Command Relationships

(1) (U) CINC or Military Service operations. Operational command of committed forces will be exercised by the applicable CINC or Chief of Military Service.

(2) (U) JTF Operations. Operational control of committed forces will be exercised by:

(a) (U) The providing commander during deployment operations to the objective area.

(b) (U) The Commander, JTF, during employment in the objective area. Specific transfer of authority time and place will be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operation order directing formation of the JTF.

b. (U) Command Posts (CPs). Initial locations will be the peacetime CP locations. Operational CP locations will be specified in OPORDS.

c. (U) Succession to Command. See applicable COOP Plans.

d. (U) Communications and Electronics. See Annex K.

Annexes:

B INTELLIGENCE
C OPERATIONS
F PUBLIC AFFAIRS
K COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
L OPERATIONS SECURITY
X EXECUTION CHECKLIST
Z DISTRIBUTION

[redacted]

ANNEX B TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) See current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).

Appendices:

1 - Essential Elements of Information
3 - Counterintelligence

[redacted]

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. Continuing Intelligence Requirement, D-DC4-42557, 29 January 1982, Critical Unusual Situation-Terrorism. (U)

b. Continuing Intelligence Requirement, K-OSI-00046.

1. (U) GENERAL. The purpose of this appendix is to identify requirements for essential elements of information (EEI) for execution of the planned operation. These EEI are considered supplemental to those listed in references a and b.

2. (U) BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN. The following is a partial listing of EEI requiring fulfillment prior to execution. EEI indicated have been stated in terms of potential requirement to assist intelligence collecting agencies in formulating their procedures to satisfy the EEI. It should be noted that the list of EEI is not inclusive and may be expanded. Prompt action to satisfy these EEI is essential to successful recovery of nuclear weapons.

[redacted]

[redacted]



3. (U) UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

a. (U) Who were the perpetrators? How many were involved?

b. (U) What weapons, tactics, etc., were used?

c. (U) When do they plan to move it?

d. (U) Where is it? Where will it be used?

e. (U) How is it secured? By how many? With what weapons?

f. (U) How is it stored?

g. (U) What are the access, terrain, and physical security factors of location where weapon is hidden?

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, United States Intelligence Activities.

b. DOD Directive 5240.1, 3 December 1982, Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect US Persons.

c. DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, December 1982, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons.

d. DOD Directive 5240.2, 18 December 1979, Department of Defense Counterintelligence.

e. SM-496-81, 22 July 1981, Counter-intelligence Responsibilities.

f. DIA Manual 58-10-2, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Security and Subversive Organizations and Operation.

g. Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation 54-5, 13 August 1980, Counterintelligence, DIA Counterintelligence.

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) The purpose of this appendix is to establish procedures concerning the conduct of counterintelligence (CI) and security activities in support of the military operations outlined in this plan.

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[redacted]

c. (U) Coordination of CI activities will be effected between DOD activities and Department of Justice (DOJ) for CONUS operations and between the Department of Defense and Department of State (DOS) and commander of the appropriate unified command for OCONUS (outside CONUS) operations. CINCs, Services, or DOJ (CONUS operations) and DOS/host nation (OCONUS operations) will designate, initiate, and coordinate all actions required to insure that CI collection capabilities within the area of operations are used to the maximum extent.

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. (U) HOSTILE THREAT. The threat to a specific recovery operation cannot be determined in advance. Likely individuals, groups, or organizations will be identified in the current National Intelligence Estimate.

3. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITS

[redacted]

c. (U) NMCC will coordinate DOJ/DOS requests for CI personnel augmentation teams in CONUS and OCONUS.

4. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS, ACTIVITIES, AND FUNCTIONS

a. (U) CONUS operations. Assigned and supporting CI elements will contribute to the recovery of a lost or stolen nuclear weapon or weapons through:

(1) (U) Aggressive CI collection operations and defensive CI activities against the multidiscipline CI and terrorist collection threat.

(2) (U) Assessments of the terrorist threat and potential for use of a stolen nuclear weapon or weapons.

(3) (U) Collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information concerning threats and incidents related to the security of special nuclear materials.

[redacted]

b. (U) OCONUS Operations. Director, DIA, will provide:

[redacted]

5. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TARGETS AND REQUIREMENTS

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) COORDINATION

[redacted]

b. (U) Friendly Nations. CI elements will assist civil and military organizations of the host country in which the search is being conducted. CI personnel must observe local laws and diplomatic agreements between the United States and the host nation, and must be alert to the presence of anti-nuclear groups that could act as an impediment to operations forces.

c. (U) Neutral Nations. CI elements and personnel must comply with laws of the nation concerned and any US/host-nation agreements.

[redacted]

7. (U) MISCELLANEOUS

a. (U) Special Reports. Will be submitted in accordance with directives set forth by command and control elements.

b. (U) Intelligence Funds. When required, requests will be submitted through parent-Service CI channels, with information copies to the CAT.

[redacted]

ANNEX C TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
OPERATIONS (U)

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the conduct of military operations involved with the search for, and recovery of, US nuclear weapons that have been lost, seized, or stolen from DOD or Department of Energy (DOE) custody. This annex will not be issued separately from the basic JCS RECOVERY PLAN.

b. (U) Mission. See Basic Plan.

c. (U) Alliance Plans. Not applicable.

[redacted]

2. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Search and recovery operations are logical extensions of the CINCs' and Services' safeguarding responsibilities. Such operations are characterized by four distinct phases--nuclear accident and incident control (NAIC) reporting, search operations, assault/recovery operations and

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Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in foreign dissemination. Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

postrecovery operations. This plan will not cover the assault phase in that such operations are governed by other operations or concept plans. Only postrecovery operations need be conducted sequentially to the other phases. It is envisioned that more than one search and recovery operation may occur simultaneously and in different locations. Therefore, commanders must consider the need to conduct multiple operations simultaneously in their area of responsibility.

a. (U) Phase I - Reporting

(1) (U) Theft, seizure, or loss of nuclear weapons is categorized as a nuclear weapon accident. Immediate reaction to such accidents is the primary responsibility of:

(a) (U) The CINC or Service having custody of the installation where the weapons are stored or providing protection for the weapons while on their installations during logistic movement.

(b) (U) The host nation assigned responsibility, through a US bilateral stockpile agreement, for external security of US nuclear weapons.

(2) (U) Seizure, theft, or loss of US nuclear weapons will be reported as an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/BROKEN ARROW in accordance with JCS Pub 6.

(3) (U) The NCA will be notified immediately through the National Military Command Center (NMCC) whenever a recovery action is initiated. Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOE, Department of State (DOS), and possibly local authorities will be notified

if recovery actions are required in the United States. If loss occurs in a foreign country, the US Ambassador in the host country or countries involved will be notified expeditiously by US military authorities.

[redacted]

(1) (U) Supporting plans will be developed to integrate all search capabilities available to the CINCs and Services. Plans will include elements such as the DOE Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NESTs), and the DOD Overseas Nuclear Emergency Search Teams located in Europe (USCINCEUR) and Guam (CINCPAC), counterintelligence (CI) units, and other capabilities as appropriate.

(2) (U) Technical description, details of capabilites, and other sensitive information may be contained in separate annexes with limited distribution.

c. (U) Phase III - Assault and Recovery Operations. Assault and recovery operations will not be addressed by this plan. Other plans containing the specific details of such operations have been approved and should be considered in conjunction with this plan by those units designated as the military recovery force (MRF). General requirements for assault and recovery plans should include:

(1) (U) Recovery forces are required to establish and maintain secure two-way contact with a facility having

continuous secure communications with the NMCC. However, inability to communicate will not inhibit commencement of recovery operations.





d. (U) Phase IV - Postrecovery Operations. These plans are initiated once the weapon has been recovered.

(1) (U) Under most circumstances, the recovery force will have nuclear qualified explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel. In the other situations, nuclear qualified EOD personnel are readily available to the recovery force commander for technical assistance.

(2) (U) At the conclusion of the assault operation and upon notification of the recovery force commander that assault operations are completed, nuclear qualified EOD personnel will examine the nuclear weapon to determine its condition and to ascertain if the weapon is safe to transport.

(3) (U) If required, the EOD personnel may render the weapon safe so that it may be transported by the most expeditious mean to a location designated by the controlling headquarters. Such locations will be, when possible, an approved military or DOE nuclear weapons storage site.

(4) (U) If questions of safety are raised by EOD personnel, DOE may be requested to provide technical assistance. If overseas, the recovered weapon will be transported to CONUS where custody will be transferred from the Department of Defense to DOE for further disposition.

3. (U) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

a. (U) Readiness, Alert, and Marshaling. Situation dependent.

b. (U) Air Operations



c. (U) Aerospace/Air Defense Operations

(1) (U) CINCAD will prepare plans to track civilian or military aircraft identified as suspected of carrying stolen nuclear weapons. Such aircraft should be intercepted to prevent departure from the United States. Lethal force may be directed.

[redacted]A

(2) (U) CINCs in assigned area of operations will plan, in conjunction with host nations, for the identification, tracking, and if directed, the interception of such aircraft to prevent entry into countries preventing recovery operations. If time allows, such decisions should be made in coordination with the US Ambassador and host nation in the area of operation.

d. (U) Amphibious Operations. Not used.

e. (U) Antisubmarine Warfare Operations. Not used.

f. (U) Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures. Situation dependent. Plans will be based on threats in applicable area of operations.

g. (U) Counterinsurgency. Not used.

h. (U) Nuclear Operations. Nuclear options are not contemplated for this plan.

i. (U) Chemical Warfare. Not used.

j. (U) Electronic Warfare. Not used.

k. (U) Psychological Operations. Not used.

l. (U) Unconventional Warfare. Not used.

m. (U) Search and Recovery Operations. Not used.

n. (U) Deception. Published separately.

o. (U) Rules of Engagement. Appendix 8.

p. (U) Reconnaissance. Not used.

q. (U) Counterterrorist Operations. Published separately.

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

7 - Deception (published separately)
8 - Rules of Engagement
10 - Counterterrorist Operations (published separately)

[redacted]

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (U)

1. (U) SITUATION

[redacted]

b. (U) Enemy. Annex B.

c. (U) Friendly. TBD.

d. (U) Assumption. When all or portions of this plan are executed, additional and specific rules of engagement (ROE) will be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. (U) MISSION. ROE herein, and additional ROE published to support any options executed, are intended to avoid provocation, to limit force to that necessary to accomplish the mission, and to provide protection for US lives and property. Nothing in these ROE is intended to deprive a commander, at any level, of his inherent right to self-defense nor alter his responsibility for the security of his command and the accomplishment of his mission.

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3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept of Operations

(1) (U) General

(a) (U) Recovery operations are divided into four phases - (1) nuclear accident and incident control (NAIC) reporting and notification, (2) search operations, (3) assault and recovery operations, and (4) postrecovery operations. This plan does not address assault operations, which are covered by separate plans.

(b) (U) Specific ROE will be promulgated with the execute order by the department having primary responsibility for each specific incident or accident.

(c) (U) All possible actions shall be taken, including the use of deadly force, to preclude unauthorized access to or seizure or theft of a nuclear weapon.

(2) (U) General ROE Policy



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b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) Commanders at all levels will disseminate ROE to forces operating under their control.

(2) (U) ROE and/or request for ROE approval generated by subordinate units will be forwarded to appropriate CINCs or Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) The ROE announced herein are based on standing JCS guidance.

(2) (U) The Commander, Military Recovery Force (MRF) (when activated), will provide approved ROE to assigned forces.

[redacted]

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION. Violations of ROE will be reported to the Commander, MRF, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. (U) Command. Annex J.

b. (U) Signal. Annex K.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND OTHER DETAINED PERSONS (U)

1. GENERAL

a. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to promulgate policy for the handling of persons detained during recovery operations.

b. Scope. This appendix prescribes responsibilities for the execution, processing, internment, and treatment of persons captured or detained as a result of recovery operations.

c. Policy. The treatment of captured and detained persons is as prescribed by the laws of the nation within which the capture or detainment occurs. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for the proper treatment and protection of captured and detained persons in the custody of members of the commands.

2. SITUATION

a. Enemy. See Annex B, Intelligence. The requirement to handle captured and detained persons may occur at any time during a recovery operation.

b. Friendly. The CINC or Commander, Military Recovery Force (MRF), responsible for the recovery operation will establish a detention center for captured or detained persons. The detention center will establish and maintain contact with the appropriate US or host-nation agencies.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. The CINC or Commander, MRF, will accept custody of persons captured or detained during

recovery operations. These persons remain the responsibility of the commander until such time as they are delivered against receipt to the appropriate US or host-nation authorities.

b. Tasks. Supported commanders will:

(1) Establish holding areas as appropriate, as dictated by the situation, until the captured or detained persons can be delivered to the detention center.

(2) Be prepared to evacuate captured or detained persons who are sick or non-walking wounded. These persons are to be evacuated through medical channels, to include inpatient care, but are to be segregated from US forces personnel.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) No transfer of custody of captured or detained persons will be made to host nation or US civil authorities except in accordance with approved, formal procedures established by the CINC or Commander, MRF, responsible for the recovery operation.

(2) The evacuation of captured or detained persons from the scene of the operation to the detention center will be by the most expeditions means possible under the circumstances.

4. SPECIAL GUIDANCE

a. Legal Status. Persons who steal a nuclear weapon during peacetime are to be treated as civil criminals rather than prisoners of war. The civil laws of the country or countries involved apply. During the recovery of a nuclear weapon, the persons who perpetrated the theft may be

captured by US military forces. Continuance of the apprehension is the responsibility of appropriate US or host-nation authorities and transfer of custody will be effected expeditiously.

b. Interrogation. Interrogation by capturing commanders to gain information of immediate tactical value may be done. Further interrogation will be the responsibility of appropiate US or host-nation authorities.

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administration and logistics support for captured or detained persons will be provided by the CINC or Commander, MRF, as required during the time the captured or detained persons are in their custody.

[redacted]

ANNEX F TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. DODI 5230.16.

b. DODI 5230.7.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) General. The conduct of public affairs (PA) during all phases of the effort to locate and recover a lost, seized, or stolen nuclear weapon will be critical to the success of the operation. During the initial stages, it may be necessary to react to the queries from the news media in a positive manner while observing the requirement to maintain the "neither confirm nor deny" policy until senior authorities decide to invoke an exception in the interest of public safety or to preclude wide-spread public alarm. Additionally, the PA operation will require careful coordination between all participating Federal agencies at the field, national, and international levels where appropriate.

b. (U) Enemy. Enemy forces cannot be totally predetermined and will depend upon the exact nature and location of the incident. However, in general terms, they may be generally identified as the group in possession of the nuclear weapon, other affiliated terrorist

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organizations, dissident groups throughout the world, and those international organizations that have indicated a desire to possess a nuclear weapon for whatever reason.

c. (U) Friendly. Situation dependent.

d. (U) Assumptions

(1) (U) Adequate communications will be available to provide real-time, accurate exchange of information between the operation area and the national level.

(2) (U) State, local, and host-nation authorities will be represented by properly accredited personnel at the operation area.

(3) (U) Secure communications will be available between coordinating agencies.

2. (U) MISSION. The mission of the PA elements in a situation of this nature is to insure that US Government representatives speak with one voice; they provide accurate, timely information to national and international news media personnel; and are consistent with national security considerations.

3. (U) EXECUTION

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. (U) Tasks. Commanders and Chiefs of Services will:

(1) (U) Following coordination with the ASD(PA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide policy guidance on PA matters as is pertinent to nuclear weapon recovery to all appropriate subordinate commanders.

(2) (U) Coordinate and control all PA activities of subordinate commands concerned with this plan.

[redacted]

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. PA policy and plans will be coordinated with the ASD(PA), Joint Chiefs of Staff, applicable host nations, and other US agencies by the CINCs and Chiefs of the Services as appropriate in each assigned area of operation.

4. (U) ACCREDITATION. The ASD(PA), Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and Chiefs of the Services will coordinate media accreditation as required for unilateral operations. The host nation will be consulted as required for other recovery operations.

5. (U) FIELD PRESS WARTIME INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM (WISP). WISP will be invoked and will be the responsibility of the recovery commander.

6. (U) ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. To be provided by the recovery commander.

7. (U) SECURITY. There will be no release of detailed information on operations, location of search areas, or status of terrorist actions or hostage situations that might provide the enemy key information upon which to make subsequent plans and actions.

[redacted]ENTIAL

8. (U) AUDIOVISUAL. Film coverage of ongoing search or recovery operations will be conducted by official DOD or US Government agencies, as required. Approval of news media coverage of search and recovery operations must remain with ASD(PA). On-scene filming and video/audio recording by the news media will not be authorized. Audiovisual material providing scenes of ongoing operations will not be released.

[redacted]RET

ANNEX K TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. JCS MOP 112 (6th Revision), 13 February 1978, Military Telecommunications Agreements Between the United States and Regional Defense Organizations of Friendly Foreign Nations.

b. JCS MOP 167 (5th Revision), 14 September 1982, Mobile/Transportable Communications Assets Controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. JCS Pub 6, Joint Reporting Structure, Volume II, Part 2, Chapter 1, 1 April 1980, Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP).

d. DCA, Review of Area Communications Electronics Capabilities. Four volumes.

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for preparing C-E plans to support communications between the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the supported CINCs or commands.

b. (U) Situation

(1) (U) General

(a) (U) See Basic Plan.

(b) (U) The range of scenarios, possible geographic locations, and varying response times require detailed preplanning of C-E options.

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(3) (U) Friendly. All communications systems and facilities available to the United States will be considered.

(a) (U) Director, DCA

1. (U) Designate and coordinate DCS entry points and provide DCS entry points and DCS channelization for deployed forces.

2. (U) Establish DCS/tactical interface criteria to support this plan.

(b) (U) Director, NSA

1. (U) Provide COMSEC guidance and technical assistance.

[redacted]

(c) (U) The following C-E capabilities are considered available for planning and appropriate tasking in supporting plans:

1. (U) C-E forces and capabilities of the Services and the unified and specified commands.

2. (U) DCS, including AUTODIN, AUTOVON, and AUTOSEVOCOM networks and transmission systems, including the Defense Satellite Communications System.

3. (U) Mobile/transportable communications assets controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as listed in reference b.

4. (U) Commercial telecommunications capabilities.

[redacted]

6. (U) Specialized DOD facilities and networks, such as IEMATS and SPINTCOM.

7. (U) Facilities and networks of the National Communications System (NCS).

(d) (U) Summaries of worldwide C-E capabilities that may be considered in supporting plans are contained in reference d.

2. (U) MISSION. To provide secure, responsive, and reliable command and control communications between the NMCC, the supported CINC, and the assigned tactical commanders.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Guiding Principles

(1) (U) Communications supporting plans will be in accordance with this annex.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) (U) The design of communications systems must be adaptable to the range of scenarios and possible locations.

(a) (U) All forms of transmission means should be considered.

(b) (U) Communications systems will provide all levels of command with access to a fully secured system and, when possible, interconnective to any available communications system.

(c) (U) Pre-production C-E equipment, including COMSEC, will be considered for use on a case-by-case basis.

(d) (U) At least one high-quality, secure-voice circuit and one 100-WPM (75 baud) secure-teletype circuit will be provided among the NMCC, the supported commander, and intermediate command centers.

(e) (U) Tactical communications between the supported commander and assigned forces will incorporate existing communications packages in airborne/ground/afloat platforms as required.

(4) (U) Communications discipline at all levels of command is required for mission success. C-E personnel and C-E system users will be thoroughly trained and indoctrinated on the COMSEC aspects of this plan. See Appendix 1.

(5) (U) The Director for Operations (J-3), Organization of the Joint Chiefs Staff, will have the authority to direct deployment and employment, including pre-positioning of JCS-controlled C-E assets governed by reference b, in time-sensitive situations.

b. (U) Operational Concept

(1) (U) Upon receipt of initial JCS planning guidance, secure voice and record communications nets will be activated. Upon deployment, secure communications will be maintained. Necessary circuitry will be established for secure voice and record communications.

(a) (U) Existing capabilities will be used to the maximum extent possible to meet these requirements.

(b) (U) Commercial circuitry secured with appropriate transportable COMSEC equipment will be used when existing Government-owned facilities are not sufficient or available.

(c) (U) C-E assets will be deployed as necessary to support communications with areas of operations.

(2) (U) Airborne command and control platforms, such as JACC/CP, AWACS, ABCCC, or ABNCP, may be used.

(a) (U) The airborne platform must provide minimum secure communications as described in subparagraph 3a(3)(e) above.

(b) (U) When suitable existing ground entry points are not available for the airborne platform(s), mobile/transportable assets and/or naval vessels will be used.

c. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) (U) Chief of Staff, US Army

(a) (U) Provide mobile/transportable assets to support this plan.

(b) (U) Provide Army-controlled fixed facilities.

(2) (U) Chief of Naval Operations

(a) (U) Provide naval communications station entry/satellite access.

(b) (U) Provide interface/relay of airborne communications.

(c) (U) Provide communications afloat, as required.

(3) (U) Chief of Staff, US Air Force

(a) (U) Provide USAF global aeronautical station and satellite access.

(b) (U) Provide mobile/transportable C-E assets.

(c) (U) Provide USAF-controlled fixed facilities upon request.

(4) (U) Commanders of unified and specified commands

(a) (U) Provide airborne command and control platforms, as required.

(b) (U) When directed, determine C-E requirements for operations by commander.

(c) (U) Prepare C-E plans to support assigned forces during all phases of operations.

(d) (U) Coordinate the C-E interface between supporting commands/agencies and the forces of a supported commander as required in the implementation plan.

(e) (U) Provide long haul communications support as required.

(5) (U) Supported commander

(a) (U) Determine C-E requirements for operations.

(b) (U) Prepare C-E plans and Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions to support assigned forces during all phases of operations.

(c) (U) Plan for employment of the JCS-controlled C-E resources, including the JACC/CP and SHF satellite terminals, when required capability exceeds supported CINCs' capability.

NOTE: (U) Tasking will be effected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon request of the supported commander.

(d) (U) Coordinate the C-E support interface between supporting commands/agencies and assigned forces as required for the implementation of this plan.

(e) (U) Coordinate necessary tactical C-E and COMSEC interfaces with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DCA, NSA, and other governmental agencies as appropriate to support required circuitry.

(f) (U) Develop a COMSEC support package that includes appropriate operations codes, authentications, and key lists to support this plan in coordination with NSA.

4. (U) SPECIAL MEASURES. The Services, DIA, DCA, and NSA will each appoint a C-E officer to coordinate with the Command, Control and Communications Systems (C3S) Directorate.

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Services on the C-E aspects of this plan.

5. (U) LOGISTICS

a. (U) See Basic Plan.

b. (U) The Services tasked to provide C-E support for this plan will provide or arrange associated logistic support.

c. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish priority airlift for C-E deployments directed in support of this plan.

6. (U) ADMINISTRATION

a. (U) Communications logs will be maintained for all C-E activities associated with this plan.

b. (U) Appropriate C-E reports will be submitted in accordance with reference c.

Appendix:

1 - Communications Security

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (U)

(U) REFERENCE: JCS MOP 131 (4th Revision), 2 May 1975, Joint Communications Security Policy (U).

1. (U) PURPOSE. To provide COMSEC guidance necessary to enhance the operational security of forces tasked. The C-E operational environment and the required COMSEC support will depend upon the nature of the situation. Detailed COMSEC measures for C-E plans will be developed as an actual situation becomes known.

2. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) An opposing force can degrade communications effectiveness by:

[redacted]

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[redacted]

b. (U) All available COMSEC must be used to protect communications from exploitation and maintain operational security.

[redacted]

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept for COMSEC Support Operations

(1) (U) Commanders will insure that only secure equipment/materials (OPCODEs) are used for the transmission of classified/sensitive communications.

(2) (U) Communications will be encrypted to the maximum extent possible. On-line systems will be used when possible, and if such systems are not available, appropriate off-line systems and operations codes will be used.

[redacted]

(4) (U) Predeployment coordination of times, routes, frequencies, and call signs will be accomplished by secure communications.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(5) (U) Circuit activations; C-E asset deployments; and communications difficulties, including equipment/system malfunctions/limitations/or procedure problems, will not be discussed in the clear.

(6) (U) As required, deceptive C-E emission patterns will be established to cover actual emissions during training, deployments, and employment.

[redacted]

(8) (U) COMSEC Surveillance Reporting. In order to insure that the Commander, MFR, is continually appraised of the SIGSEC status of the operations, the COMSEC monitor team will produce the following reports:

(a) (U) Spot Reports. When information of possible intelligence significance is revealed, a spot report should be immediately sent to the Task Force Commander so that he can take appropriate action to counter the possible damage done. This report will be short and concise and usually will be transmitted to the consumer via secure means.

(b) (U) Daily Summaries (DASUMs). DASUMs of possible intelligence significance, which do not meet spot report criteria, will be reported in letter format to the Commander, MRF, through the senior intelligence

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representative. The report will contain the following three sections: A summary of spot reports issued; a summary of information monitored, including analyst comments, keyed to an Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) list; and a summary of information monitored, including analyst comments, which, although it does not specify EEFI list criteria, is still of possible intelligence value.

(c) (U) After-Action Report. Within 10 days after the termination of monitoring, the support SIGSEC agency(ies) will forward, in letter format to the participating entities, a comprehensive report detailing the force's SIGSEC posture during the operation. This report will not be limited to a particular format but will provide a detailed discussion of each finding presented and contained recommendations for improving the SIGSEC posture of future operations.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, USCINCCENT, USCINCSO, CINCSAC, CINCMAC, USCINCRED, CINCAD, the Director, DNA, the Chief of Staff, US Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, will:

(a) (U) Prepare COMSEC support plans in coordination with the Director, NSA.

(b) (U) Determine joint COMSEC material requirements.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) (U) Director, DCA/NCS. Provide support as required.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. To be developed in supporting plans.

4. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. (U) Maximum use will be made of existing COMSEC systems.

b. (U) COMSEC violations and instances of interference or jamming will be reported by secure means only.

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. In accordance with the Basic Plan.

[redacted]

ANNEX L TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

(U) REFERENCE: JCS Pub 18, Operations Security, current edition.

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) Definitions

(1) (U) Operations Security. The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning, conducting military operations and other activities.

(2) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. Key questions about friendly intentions and military capabilities likely to be asked by opposing planners and decisionmakers.

(3) (U) Appreciations. Assumptions, estimates, and facts about an opponent's intentions and military capabilities used in planning and decisionmaking.

(4) (U) OPSEC Indicators. Actions or information, classified or unclassified, obtainable by an adversary that would result in adversary appreciations and actions harmful to achieving friendly intentions and preserving friendly military capabilities.

b. (U) Mission. When directed by the appropriate CINC and/or Service, units will alert, activate, and deploy forces necessary to successfully locate and assist in the

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recovery of a lost, seized, or stolen nuclear weapon and return it to secure storage in DOD or Department of Energy facilties.

[redacted]

2. (U) TASKS

a. (U) Each CINC and Service preparing and exercising plans will conduct a thorough OPSEC evaluation of the operations to be conducted and will:

(1) (U) Identify and implement OPSEC/cover measures in anticipation of a possible incident to insure secrecy of operations should an incident actually occur.

(2) (U) Prepare OPSEC/cover plans for execution should an actual incident occur.

(3) (U) Prepare OPSEC plans to insure secrecy during exercises, and exercise OPSEC/cover measures that would be used in an actual incident.

(4) (U) Execute OPSEC/cover measures to preserve secrecy during an actual incident.

b. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will advise the President of OPSEC/cover measures requiring national

level execution or support and will coordinate planning with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and agencies outside the Department of Defense.



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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX L TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
OPSEC ESTIMATE (U)

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2. (U) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

a. (U) What US sensor capabilities exist to detect nuclear materials? How are they deployed? Who controls their capabilities?

b. (U) What is US knowledge of terrorist groups? What level of cooperation exists among US agencies that track terrorist groups? How quickly is information exchanged/provided the United States?

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[redacted]

c. (U) What are US and allied capabilities to track trucks, aircraft, and ships/boats and determine quickly the legitimacy of cargo?

d. (U) What US and friendly foreign military commands/civil agencies are likely to conduct searches for nuclear weapons? How will they communicate information? What movements of US and friendly personnel, changes in communications, focusing of search efforts, indicate perceived success?

e. (U) What US and friendly forces are likely to be tasked to train and prepare for nuclear weapons recovery missions? How will they be commanded and what communications nets will be used to control them? What commanders will be involved? What indicators are provided by patterns/volumes of communications (including telephone calls) that nuclear weapons have been located and that forces are deploying?

f. (U) Where can explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel come from? How skilled are they at handling nuclear weapons? What indicators show EOD personnel are readying for movement? Have they deployed?

[redacted]

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX L TO JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
PROTECTIVE MEASURES (U)

1. (U) Actions that are logically to be expected in a crisis should be carried out in a normal manner.

[redacted]

3. (U) Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel in multiple locations should be prepared overtly for movement. The actual EOD personnel to be used should make covert preparations. Consideration should be given to making multiple preparatory movements with overt announcements and a tie into the peaceful recovery.

4. (U) Intelligence collection efforts should focus on multiple areas. No announcements about the success of search efforts should be made. If success is realized, then intelligence collection should continue and no detectable activities executed that might reveal US knowledge.

5. (U) Measures to prepare, deploy, and use forces must be covered. This includes combat forces, nuclear emergency search teams, EOD, medical, and transportation capabilities as well as other assets that might be used.

6. (U) Operations into countries where national forces may oppose US recovery actions or where the theft was carried out by that nation should use OPSEC and deception measures suitable for combat operations.

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ANNEX X to JCS RECOVERY PLAN (U)
EXECUTION CHECKLIST (U)



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



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