

ACTION NEA-00

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	INL-00	USNW-00	PERC-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-00	E-00	IO-00	L-00	NSCE-00	OMB-00	PA-00
	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00	D-00	FMPC-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	R-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	G-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/000W					

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 FM CPA BAGHDAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1552
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
 WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY


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STATE FOR NEA/NGA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL 06/25/14
 TAGS: PINS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, IZ
 SUBJECT: CPA 1421: IRAQI MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL
 SECURITY MEETING ON JUNE 24

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (A) (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: Topics included: the dayQs operations-intelligence briefs; development of an Iraq national operations center capability; an update on current force disposition and associated problem areas; ^{(b)(1)}



and a brief status report on the Iraqi review of the implications of imposing limited martial law to help control the violence surrounding the countdown to the 30 June Transition of Authority. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(S)~~ On June 24, 2004, the Iraqi Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS), chaired by ^{(b)(1)} met to discuss the current situation in Iraq. Key Iraqi attendees included ^{(b)(1)}



Coalition members attending included Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander Lt. General Sanchez, Deputy MNF-I Lt. General McColl (UK), Director J2 MNF-I Maj. General Fast, U.S. Mission

Pol-Mil Counselor Ambassador Neumann, UK Advisor Ambassador Richmond, Ministry of Interior (MOI) Senior Advisor Steve Casteel [REDACTED] Catherine Dale (MNF-I Political Advisor), CPA Consultant to the MOI Matt Sherman, and CPA Consultant to the Office of National Security Affairs Phil Jamison. The following paragraphs give a readout of the topic addressed.

OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFS

3. ~~(S)~~ LTG Sanchez provided an extensive overview of what he called QcoordinatedQ attacks across the country, primarily aimed at police forces in various locations. He indicated that soon Baghdad would also be included in this coordinated effort by enemy forces. (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

FORMATION OF IRAQI NATIONAL OPERATIONS CENTERS

4. ~~(S)~~ LTG McColl provided a status report on the formation of a Prime MinisterQs Situation Room and a National Joint Operations Center (JOC) (location to be determined). While the standup of the JOC is possibly months away, McColl briefed the PM that the Situation Room should be available for use by June 30 with limited capability (non-secure phones, etc.) and could be considered as the Interim Joint Operations Center, operating with secure phones, by July 30. It would include MNF-I watch standers and have good connectivity to MNF-I. Daily briefings by Brigadier General Kimmit would take place in the Situation Room and begin shortly.

IRAQI MOD UPDATE

5. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) briefed the disposition of Iraqi military forces leading up to the 30 June transition. (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

FALLUJAH

6. ~~(C)~~ The Prime Minister asked for an assessment of the Fallujah Brigade. LTG Sanchez said that, to date, he would assess the Brigade as Qineffective.Q When asked by NSA Rubaie what would come next, Sanchez said his forces would continue to work with the Brigade and better equip it; but if there was no improvement, the plan was to disband the troops and integrate them as individuals (not as a unit) with other Iraqi forces. Shehwani noted that there were still many foreign fighters in Fallujah stirring up the violence. The PM asked for a final

MOFA DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

7. ~~(C)~~ MOFA (b)(1) discussed his recent attendance at an Islamic conference, at which he consulted with Turkish, Iranian, Kuwaiti, Syrian, and Pakistani representatives, among others. Focusing on Iraq's relationship with Syria, (b)(1) indicated that Syria was very defensive and unhelpful about the issue of control of the Iraq-Syrian border and Iraq's problem with the infiltration of terrorists across that border. Speaking more broadly of Iraq's emerging international relations among countries in the region, (b)(1) recognized the need to reassure them all that Iraq should no longer be considered a threat, even as it rose from the ashes and reasserted itself in foreign affairs. (b)(1) asked hypothetically about the value of Iraq helping to establish a committee of countries in the region which could address specific problems, such as (b)(1)

8. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1)

9. ~~(C)~~ Ambassador Neumann indicated that such pressure had been, and continued to be, applied, but to no avail. Though

[REDACTED]

10. (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11. (S) The Defense Minister added that support for terrorists was coming from many states.

[REDACTED]

IRAQI PUBLIC SAFETY LAW

12. Q (S) The PM closed the MCNS meeting noting that there would soon be an emergency meeting to discuss the Public Safety Law Q MOFA and MOD took the opportunity to offer their strong support.

BREMER

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