NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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11 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Comments on Departmental Headquarters and National Command Structure Studies-ACTION MEMORANDUM

As requested by your memorandum of 13 July 1978, I have reviewed the studies conducted under the auspices of Mr. Ignatius and Mr. Steadman. Neither I nor any member of my Agency were interviewed by either study group, thus none of our views are reflected in the studies.

The only recommendation in either Study which is directly relevant to NSA is that found on page 48 of the Steadman Report where it is proposed that "the DOD intelligence elements should report to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Policy". There is no indication that the study members recognized any difference between the National Security Agency, which is structured to perform services for the entire government under the Executive Agent direction of the Secretary of Defense, and other DOD intelligence elements which are integral to the Department. When the Fubini Panel of the Defense Science Board presented its findings to the Secretary in 1977, such a proposal was among the options offered to Secretary Brown. He selected a different option, noting that NSA differed from other DOD intelligence elements, and directed that its Director continue to report to the Secretary of Defense. I believe that decision was sound and should be reconfirmed.

Putting aside my responsibilities as Director of a Defense Agency, I am concerned that broad recommendations of the two study groups will result in additional layering without any appreciable prospect of improved performance. I have in mind the requirement in the Steadman Report to add responsibilities in resource allocation to the JCS/Joint Staff and to add a planning office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to undertake politico-military long range planning and contingency planning. I believe there is another option, not addressed in either study, which if properly executed could offer improved performance in these vital areas with less rather than more layering. That would involve creation of a civilian and military manned Defense Concepts and Doctrine Agency, using billets taken from the OSD and Joint Staffs. This proposal is further developed in the Attachment.

Finally, while I generally concurred in the recommendations of the Steadman Report on the Unified and Specified Command structure, I was surprised at their recommendation not to reestablish an Army Component Command in Hawaii. The original decision to disestablish CINCUSARPAC was undertaken, in my judgment, in haste in the face of uninformed Congressional criticism and without a full understanding of the role played by such a commander in supporting the operational and readiness needs of the Unified Commander and the support needs of the services and Defense Agencies. I recommend an early decision to proceed with reinstatement of an Army Component Commander for CINCPAC.

B. R. INMAN
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl: Proposed Defense Concepts and Doctrine Agency

PROPOSED DEFENSE CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE AGENCY

There is currently no Defense forum in which strategic and general purpose doctrine can be studied and established without undue distortion due to parochial interests or resource allocation preferences. Comparably, concepts for unified operations and support are reduced to the lowest common denominator by the current planning structure.

An alternative approach which should receive serious consideration would create a jointly manned Defense Concepts and Doctrine Agency to undertake politico-military long range planning and contingency planning oriented to the formulation of Defense policy guidance and in mutual support with overall national security policies. It should also develop concepts for optimum support for Defense operations in the field of communications, intelligence, use of Space and perhaps other areas. Manning should be obtained by moving billets which now undertake such planning/concepts and doctrine development in less than a full Defense environment in OSD(ISA), JCS (parts of J-5 and J-3) and in the Defense Agencies and Service Headquarters staffs.

Optimally such an agency should be headed by a Director at Executive Level Four/General and a Deputy Director at Executive Level Five/Lieutenant General. The two billets should alternate between civilians and military officers with tours not longer than four years. Ideally the civilian Director or Deputy Director would be drawn from outside the Government, from the spectrum of individuals who pursue interests in National Security Affairs. Civil Service and Military assignees above clerical levels should be nominated for assignment with approval resting with the Director/Deputy Director.

The Agency could be tasked by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with its product available to both. Day to day supervision of its activity could be assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Such an organizational move has the drawback of creating another Defense Agency, but the counterpart benefits include reduction in the present size of the OSD and Joint Staffs, reduction in layering, and the prospect that such critical areas as the proper mix of strategic and general purpose forces and contingency planning for their use could be undertaken in a structure providing substantial buffers against parochial pressures, yet driven by politico-military considerations rather than financial/resource allocation

preferences. Such an agency could readily provide the Secretary of Defense and the JCS unbiased judgments about whether Service programs conformed to Defense approved Concepts and Doctrine and whether proposed levels of resource allocation funded the critical politico-military requirements of the country.