

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED ADNAN AHJM

8. Al Wafa is on the Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Exclusion List. An organization can be placed on this list if the Secretary of State finds the organization participates in various terrorist activities.

9. The detainee stated he stayed in a Syrian guest house in Afghanistan for approximately one year.

10. The detainee stated he was captured crossing into Pakistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan where he received physical fitness training, topography training, and weapons training on the Kalashnikov, M-16, PEKA, rocket propelled grenade launcher, and hand grenades. The detainee then joined a training course on mortars taught by an explosives trainer at another camp in Afghanistan.

2. A source stated the al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and all students received weapons training, attended a commando course, and received instruction on topography and explosives.

3. The detainee identified his alias on a list of personnel scheduled to attend a tactics training course in Afghanistan, that was found at an al Qaida house in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated he studied with a Sheikh in Afghanistan.

5. An individual with access to a senior al Qaida official stated the Sheikh was a scholar for the Arabs and part of the al Qaida network. The Sheikh's students would come from al Qaida training camps, attend approximately two weeks of the Sheikh's training, and then go and fight. The training topics included taking weapons from enemy dead, killing non-believers such as Americans, and dealing with Muslims fighting in a non-believer's army.

6. Another individual with access to a senior al Qaida leader stated the Sheikh provided final approval for students to begin an al Qaida suicide mission training program. The one year program was conducted at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan and included training in explosives, poisons, document forgery, currency counterfeiting, disguises, and how to blend in with western populations. Student progress reports were sent to the Sheikh and Usama bin Laden. Upon completion of the training, each student spent two weeks with the Sheikh, gave bayat to Usama bin Laden, and was deployed on his mission.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on a document recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida members.

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2. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was the permanent aide to a general for two years in Syria.

2. The detainee stated every person at the guest house in Afghanistan received their own envelope of money, but he did not know the source of the money.

3. The detainee stated he fled with a group to the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan when the fighting approached Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was detained without identification documents.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution.

b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on United States interests.

c. The detainee stated he had no desire to go fight jihad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 May 2007

TO: ALI HUSAIN SHAABAAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI HUSAIN SHAABAAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee learned about the route to Afghanistan from a television broadcast featuring a Sheikh who gave directions for travel to Afghanistan.

2. A source identified the Sheikh mentioned above as a Saudi mufti who condoned the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, helped raise money for Usama bin Laden, and issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan because he wanted to immigrate there, and thought Afghanistan would be a place where Islam was observed the way it was supposed to be.

4. In July 2000, the detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria to Kandahar, Afghanistan, via Turkey, Tehran and Zahedan, Iran.

5. It cost 1,500 Syrian Lira to get smuggled into Afghanistan from the Iranian border. The detainee claims the smuggling was not prearranged.

6. The detainee stayed at an Arab house on Haji Habash street in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for three months.

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7. The Daftare Taliban office, which provided Arabs the means to cross the border into Afghanistan and lodging while traveling, recommended travelers stay in the Haji Habash House in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee then went to Kabul, Afghanistan, and lived in a Syrian guest house for about one year.

9. The Syrian group guest house was where money and documents were forged.

10. Every two or three months the detainee received an envelope with his name on it containing money. He was not really sure where the money came from.

11. A source stated the detainee fought on the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan.

12. The detainee identified an individual as someone he saw in the trenches at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

13. A source stated he and the detainee served under the same commander in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee was part of a fire team, composed of at least 4 fighters. The detainee always carried a heavy machine gun, bipod, and 100 round magazine. Others on the fire team assisted with the machine gun, carried a Kalashnikov rifle, or carried a rocket propelled grenade launcher.

14. The detainee stated he left Kabul, Afghanistan, as the city fell and traveled to a cave in the mountains where an individual gave him a Kalashnikov rifle and he hid for ten days during the American bombing. The detainee was arrested in a small border village inside Pakistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee has had training on the Kalashnikov rifle in Syria.

2. The detainee received a week of Kalashnikov training in the Syrian house in Wazir Akbar Khan District. The detainee claims it cost nothing and no other training took place.

3. The detainee attended military training at the al Farouq Training Camp.

4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. All students received two week blocks of instruction in weapons, basic commando skills, topography, and explosives.

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5. The detainee claimed he mainly studied Islam on his own and read the Koran, the Hadith, and other religious books at the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee and others in the house would refer questions to a Sheikh.

6. The Sheikh at the guest house in Kabul provided a two week training session for Arabs who trained at Usama bin Laden sponsored camps, including lectures on the right to kill infidels, including Americans, and how to deal with captured Muslim opponents. Following training, students either returned home or went to fight against the Northern Alliance.

7. The detainee joined an al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee claims he is not affiliated with al Qaida or any terrorist network.

c. The detainee claims he would like to live a normal life and raise a family.

d. The detainee stated the people involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks should be punished.

e. The detainee claims he would not take action against the United States if he were asked to fight.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 April 2007

TO: AHMAD MUHAMMAN YAQUB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD MUHAMMAN YAQUB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While in Kyrgyzstan the detainee told a neighbor he wanted to get in shape and receive military training. The neighbor told the detainee about a camp at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated the neighbor took his passport and later provided him with visas for Iran and Pakistan and a plane ticket from Kyrgyzstan to Iran.

3. In November 2000 the detainee traveled to Iran and then to Pakistan before crossing into Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he went to a Uighur training camp. The detainee spent a total of approximately 10 months at the camp near Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated since he already knew how to pray and had studied the Koran, he chose to learn about the AK-47, hand guns, and an unidentified bolt-operated rifle. The detainee also provided weapons training at the camp for one month.

c. Connections/Associations

A source that worked for a senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an al Qaida member.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD MUHAMMAN YAQUB

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he believed the Taliban may have helped finance the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed the Uighurs did not participate in any way with the Taliban or al Qaida.

b. The detainee stated that until his experience in camp, he held the United States in the highest regard, viewing the United States as the only saviors of the suppressed Uighur people. Uighurs ages seven to 70 know that America is the sole advocate for human rights and democracy in the world.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 June 2007

TO: ABD AL HADI OMAR MAHMOUD FARAJ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL HADI FARAJ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was able to escape from a dismantled terror cell and is believed to have fled to Afghanistan where he joined al Qaida's military training camps.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan where he stayed in a Syrian guest house for approximately 12 to 18 months.

3. The Syrian house was located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he stayed at the Syrian house and received lessons from a Sheikh.

2. An individual with access to a senior al Qaida official stated the Sheikh was a scholar for the Arabs, was part of the al Qaida network, and that he would provide approximately two weeks of training to students from the al Qaida training camps before they went to fight. Topics included taking weapons from enemy dead, killing non-believers such as Americans, and dealing with Muslims fighting in a non-believer's army.

3. The Sheikh provided final approval for students to begin the year long al Qaida suicide mission training program which included training in explosives, poisons, document forgery,

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL HADI FARAJ

currency counterfeiting, disguises, and western lifestyle topics. Student progress reports were sent to the Sheikh and Usama bin Laden. Upon completion of the training, each student spent two weeks with the Sheikh, gave bayat to Usama bin Laden, and then was deployed on his mission.

4. The detainee was identified as a Syrian who was trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was believed to be fighting with or on behalf of Usama bin Laden as of early December 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name or alias appears on a document recovered from safe house raids on suspected al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured on 03 January 2002 in a Pakistan border town.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of al Qaida, Usama bin Laden, or the Taliban outside of information he heard on radio broadcasts.

c. The detainee stated he was not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 May 2007

TO: SHARGO SHIRZ JUWAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARGO SHIRZ JUWAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled from Damascus, Syria, to Kabul, Afghanistan, via Turkey and Iran, and paid an Iranian guide to help him cross into Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was a fighter in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he left Kabul, Afghanistan, as the city was about to fall, and traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated they left in such a hurry they could not retrieve their weapons. The detainee traveled from Jalalabad to the Tora Bora Mountains where an individual led him to a bunker complex and issued him a new Kalashnikov.

b. Training

1. In 1993 the detainee attended the Harrasta police training facility in Damascus, Syria, where he trained for two years. The detainee's training at the facility included physical fitness and the use of the Kalashnikov rifle and a hand gun.

2. The detainee was a Syrian who trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was believed to be fighting with, or on behalf of, Usama bin Laden as of early December 2001.

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3. The detainee's name appeared on a list of personnel scheduled to attend a sniper training course. The list was found with documents bearing official Qaida Ansar Allah letterhead.

4. A source stated the detainee had received advanced explosives training at an al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he attended religious training conducted by a Sheikh while residing at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2001.

2. The Sheikh was an Amir in the Egyptian jihad organization and chief Mufti of al Qaida.

3. Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001 and has been identified as a foreign terrorist organization by the Department of Homeland Security.

4. A source stated the Sheikh was an al Qaida operative who trained students on the rules of jihad in his home for two weeks before sending them to fight.

5. The Sheikh approved students' entry into a year long al Qaida suicide mission training program conducted at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. The program included training in explosives, poisons, document forgery, currency counterfeiting, disguises, and western lifestyle topics that taught students how to blend in with western populations. Student progress reports were provided to the Sheikh and Usama bin Laden. Upon completion of the training, each student spent two weeks with the Sheikh, gave bayat to Usama bin Laden, and was deployed on his mission.

6. The detainee's name, alias, nationality, and items in his possession appeared on a list of 324 Arabic names recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

7. A senior al Qaida leader identified the detainee as someone he met in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARGO SHIRZ JUWAN

b. The detainee advised he never attended any training camps and he never stayed at a safe house throughout his travels. The detainee denies ever meeting any al Qaida or Taliban members, and states no one sponsored him to migrate to Afghanistan.

c. The detainee denied attending a sniper training course.

d. The detainee stated he had never heard of jihad and could not explain what it meant.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 September 2007

To: AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he traveled to United Arab Emirates and was hired on or about 12 December 1996 by the Union Beverage Company, which is based in Qatar and has several plants throughout the Middle East. The detainee stated he was hired as an executive secretary to an individual.
 2. The Union Beverage Company has been associated with Bosnian and Chechen Mujahed.
 3. The detainee stated one of his responsibilities was to assist al Haramayn in delivering humanitarian goods to Baku, Azerbaijan. The detainee stated he assisted with three shipments of humanitarian goods from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Baku between mid-1997 to the end of 1998 or the beginning of 1999.
 4. A source stated the al Haramain Saudi Arabian Foundation's main mission is to implement and teach true Wahhabism religious doctrine worldwide. Al Haramain has connections with al Qaida. A former head of the al Haramain has been accused of controlling the financial, material and logistic support to al Qaida and other terrorist organizations. Al Haramain is suspected of involvement in weapons smuggling to Algeria and the transfer of radical fundamentalists to Bosnia during the war in the former Yugoslavia.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

5. The detainee stated that during multiple trips that he made to Azerbaijan between 1996 and 1999, he delivered a total of 133,000 United States Dollars to al Haramayn. The detainee was denied entry into Azerbaijan in January 2000.
6. The detainee stated that in March or April 2000, he left the Union Beverage Company and went to work for al Jazeera Media in Doha, Qatar.
7. The detainee stated that on 11 October 2001, he traveled from Qatar to Afghanistan via Pakistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that as an al Jazeera reporter, he received three months worth of training and was later trained on using the camera and other equipment.
2. The detainee stated that after he went to work for al Jazeera, he spent the first several months learning to operate the video camera and satellite operations.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he stayed in Kandahar, Afghanistan for 29 days. While there, he and a co-worker interviewed the Treasury Minister of the Taliban, the Taliban Minister of Electricity, and the Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. The detainee stated he interviewed a man who identified himself as a member of the al Qaida.
3. A source stated the individual in the previous statement was discovered and recruited by al Qaida intelligence to be the personal religious advisor to Usama bin Laden and is responsible for the Mauritanian al Qaida cell.
4. A senior al Qaida operational planner met the detainee at the al Jazirah office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was a senior al Qaida operative and logistics expert.
2. The detainee stated his boss' business was so powerful that all charities working with Chechen Mujahedin used his boss' Union Beverage Company to smuggle money and goods between the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan and Chechnya.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he was never involved with or a member of any organization, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council of Shura. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of al Qaida's involvement with the war in Chechnya and with his former boss.
- b. The detainee stated he wants to return to his family and resume his position as a father and provider. The detainee noted that he would exercise caution in future assignments with al-Jazeera. The detainee hopes to return to Doha, Qatar, with his family. He stated that he harbors no ill feelings against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 June 2007

TO: SAID ALI SHARI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID ALI SHARI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review, the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is on a watch list, and is accused of facilitating travel for people willing to go to Afghanistan on fake passports.

2. The detainee met with a group of extremists in Mashad, Iran, following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and briefed them on entry procedures into Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida facilitator in Mashad, Iran, for youth traveling to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee wanted two individuals to assassinate a writer based on a fatwa by Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained in urban warfare at the Libyan Camp north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's alias was among 100 names taken from Afghanistan based military training camp documents located in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he met an individual in Lahore, Pakistan, who advised the detainee to go to the Red Crescent hospital in Quetta, Pakistan, to offer his services. The individual was the director of the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan.

2. Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia is an Islamic extremist nongovernmental organization that claims to serve humanitarian purposes. However, Wafa has provided logistical support to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization, and many of the documents found at the Herat, Afghanistan, al Wafa house pertained to military and terrorist training.

3. The detainee's alias and phone number was found in the pocket litter of the manager of Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's alias was on a list of Arabs apprehended at a Pakistan border crossing in December 2001. The detainee claimed to be Yemeni and was taken to a civil hospital in Quetta, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he heard about al Qaida often in Afghanistan. The detainee watched Usama bin Laden on television and liked his message. The detainee believed that Israel committed the attacks of 11 September 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any involvement or knowledge of assistance provided to jihadists traveling from Iran to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he did not provide any assistance to any person traveling to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

h. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee stated that he was just a Muslim and not a terrorist. The detainee denied knowledge of being with known or unknown terrorists.

d. The detainee has no knowledge of weapons sales to the Taliban, or any non-governmental organization.

e. The detainee denied knowledge of al Wafa or its objectives.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID ALI SHARI**

f. The detainee stated that if released, he would like to return to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he would reunite with his family. The detainee stated he would attempt to work at his family's furniture store, if it is still in business.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 August 2007

To: AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QAWI ABDUL
AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought in the 1994 Yemen revolution. He served for two months at Hadramut, Yemen in the Eighth Saiqa Brigade.
2. The detainee participated in the Bosnian jihad.
3. The detainee was listed as a member of al Qaida.
4. A source identified the detainee as being at a house that was an al Qaida group meeting place and used for planning the USS Cole bombing, in Sanaa, Yemen.
5. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan during Ramadan, January 2001, following the fatwa of a Sheikh.
6. According to a source the Sheikh in the previous statement condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. The Sheikh also raised money for Usama bin Laden until his death.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

7. The detainee flew alone from Yemen to Pakistan after buying a plane ticket with his own money and money from another individual. The detainee traveled by car from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
 8. The detainee was a frequent visitor of a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 9. A source stated the guest house in Kabul, in the previous statement, was used by al Qaida for meetings and as a staging area.
 10. The detainee served on the lines of the Omar Saif Center. The detainee remained at this position for six months. Shortly before leaving this position, the detainee attended a talk by Usama bin Laden.
 11. A source stated the OMARSAIF was a reserve camp east of Kabul, Afghanistan. Activities at this camp included small arms training, medical care, and guard duty.
 12. After six months at the Omar Saif Center, the detainee, along with the rest of his unit, moved up to Konduz, Afghanistan. After spending six months fighting in Konduz, the unit retreated to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- b. Training
1. The detainee received ten days of basic military training at Abyan Volunteer Camp in order to fight in the regional civil war in Yemen. The detainee's training consisted of learning to shoot small arms including the AK-47, PK, rocket propelled grenades and DSHK-38 model 38/46.
 2. The detainee claimed that because of his military training in Yemen he did not have to go through any training in Afghanistan, and that he could go directly to the lines.
 3. The detainee stated he was supposed to attend al Farouq Training Camp but was not mandated because of his previous training, which was vouched for by his facilitator from Yemen.
 4. The detainee received specialized training in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 5. A source stated that the detainee and three other students took a class on electronics to learn how to make a circuit to be used as a remote control for remote controlled explosives.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source identified the detainee as a Yemeni who knows members of al Qaida and commanded people at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
2. Detainee's name was found on a listing of killed and wounded al Qaida martyrs.
3. Detainee's alias was on a listing of al Qaida held trust accounts.
4. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.
5. The detainee's alias was found in a notebook, which was in the possession of a Mujahedin entering Croatia.
6. Detainee's name is in several letters to and from possible al Qaida and Taliban personnel.

d. Intent

The detainee stated that the Koran strictly prohibits violence and acts of terrorism. However, the detainee believes that killing in the name of jihad is acceptable.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. Indications are that the detainee was a commander of troops at Tora Bora.
2. The detainee stated he was captured on approximately 26 November 2001 in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan by General Dostum's forces.
3. A source stated the detainee was a trainer at al Farouq.
4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
5. A source identified the detainee as a trainer at al Farouq.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

6. An additional source identified the detainee as a trainer at al Farouq.
 7. A source stated he saw the detainee at al Farouq.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.
 - b. The detainee stated that if he were to be released from United States custody, he would return home and get married. The detainee claimed that he has not heard of any plans to harm the guards or any plans to escape from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He stated that he would report any such information to United States personnel.
 - c. The detainee claimed that when the uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif occurred, he was outside the main compound in an interrogation facility, and was not part of the attack.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 April 2007

TO: FAHED NAIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAHED NAIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In late 2000, the detainee read a fatwa that instructed young Muslim males to join the jihad in Chechnya. The detainee stated he felt inspired by the fatwa.

2. In early 2001, the detainee purchased a video that supported the fatwa and incited him to find out how he could join the jihad.

3. The detainee stated, in February 2001 he met an individual at a mosque in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The detainee and the individual discussed the jihad in Chechnya. The detainee expressed his desire to go to Chechnya, and the individual told the detainee he could provide additional information at a follow on meeting.

4. The following day, the detainee met a second time with the individual. The individual provided the detainee with specific instructions on obtaining a Pakistani visa and a travel route to a Taliban madafa in Quetta, Pakistan.

5. In early March 2001, the detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and then from Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan, where he stayed at a hotel for three days.

6. The detainee stated he then left Karachi, Pakistan, and traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he arrived at the Taliban madafa and spent the night.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAHED NAIF

7. The following morning, the detainee stated he was taken across the border into Afghanistan and proceeded to an unnamed Arab madafa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

8. While at Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee inquired about military training at a small mosque. After meeting and explaining his intentions to two individuals at the mosque they spoke to the detainee for an hour and a half about the Taliban. The detainee stated he was inspired to join the Taliban.

9. The detainee stated he traveled from Kandahar to Kabul, Afghanistan and received military training for approximately one month. The detainee traveled with a group of Taliban fighters to Khowst, Afghanistan after spending three to four days at Khowst the detainee left with the same group of fighters and traveled to Konduz, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated he stayed in a Taliban house in Konduz, Afghanistan for about two weeks and then went to the front line located near Kwahajhar, Afghanistan for approximately two weeks. The detainee continued a two week rotating cycle to and from the font line for approximately six and a half months.

11. The detainee stated in early November 2001, he awoke to chaos in the streets of Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee learned the Northern Alliance was rapidly approaching the city, and was advised to find transportation and escape towards the city of Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he stayed with an individual on a farm near Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately one month and received military training. The detainee trained with the Kalashnikov rifle, ran, and exercised.

2. The detainee also stated he received training in a small area near the front line at Khawajaghar, Afghanistan. The detainee trained with the Kalashnikov, Beka, rocket propelled grenade, and bolt-action rifle.

3. A source identified the detainee as someone that trained at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. An individual stated the detainee was in Afghanistan for a long time and knew all the Arabs fighting on the north line.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAHED NAIF

2. The detainee's alias with a description of what the detainee had in his possession appeared on a list of 324 names recovered during the raid of a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated if he returned to Saudi Arabia and saw a fatwa for war against the United States he would fulfill his religious duties and comply with the fatwa if all of the clergy agreed with the fatwa.

2. The detainee stated he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle but never saw any fighting because he was stationed at the rear of the front line.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not receive training at a camp nor did he receive any explosives training.

b. The detainee stated he was never approached to join al Qaida nor did he know anyone who was with al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 July 2007

TO: MOHAMMED ALI FOWZA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED ALI FOWZA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee heard about Afghanistan from an individual. The two discussed Chechnya, but the individual told the detainee he could not take the detainee to Chechnya because the detainee smoked and did not pray enough.

2. The individual suggested the detainee go to Afghanistan to receive religious instruction. The individual told the detainee he could provide the detainee with a passport and all the necessary travel documents.

3. The individual provided the detainee with a letter of introduction to the Khalden Training Camp in Afghanistan.

4. Khalden's program was a six-month program that consisted of light and heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.

5. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house in Quetta, Pakistan on the way to Afghanistan.

6. The detainee, his travel partner, and four unidentified Afghan Taliban members departed in a vehicle for Kandahar, Afghanistan. They stayed at an Arab house in Kandahar across the street from the Hajji Habash Mosque.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED ALI FOWZA

7. The detainee was told the Khalden Camp was closed and his only option was to attend the al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee's travel partner convinced him to stay until his training was complete, and then return to Yemen.

8. The detainee left for al Farouq after staying in Kandahar for two days.

9. The detainee left the basic course after 15 days because he did not agree with the early morning schedule and the substandard food.

10. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan with three Yemenis. The detainee arrived in Kabul and went to a Taliban and Arab guesthouse for one night. They arrived after a major battle, and many people were wounded at the house.

11. The detainee stated he was serving in an Arab unit in the vicinity of Khwajeh Ghar, Afghanistan, when the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred in the United States. The detainee stayed in Afghanistan thinking that the fighting would continue.

b. Training

While at al Farouq, the detainee stated he trained on rocket propelled grenades and the Kalashnikov, M-16, G-3, Beka and Garanov machine guns.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being an al Qaida soldier seen at the Ashara guest house.

2. The Ashara guest house was located in the Karta Par Wan area of Kabul, Afghanistan. A senior al Qaida member personally ran this guest house. This house acted as a transition point for Arabs going to and coming from training camps or frontline areas. The house could hold between 20 to 50 personnel. A guard was required to keep a log of all visitors to the house.

3. The detainee stayed at the Said Center near Kabul, Afghanistan where his recruiter provided him with three fatwas. These fatwas convinced the detainee to assist the Taliban and to join the fighting against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated that after 20 days at the Said Center he left for the front lines to fight.

5. The detainee traveled to the Bilal Center where he was issued a Kalashnikov and was subsequently wounded. After the detainee recovered, he was stationed at Khwaja Ghar for about seven months.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED ALI FOWZA

6. The detainee stated he heard about skirmishes between the Taliban and Northern Alliance in the vicinity of Taloqan, Afghanistan. The detainee was interested in joining the fight and traveled there, where he joined an Afghan Taliban unit engaged in fighting the Northern Alliance.

7. The detainee was with his Afghan unit in the vicinity of Taloqan, Afghanistan when the United States bombing campaign in Afghanistan started on 7 October 2001.

8. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden on three separate occasions in Afghanistan; once at a wedding, once at al Farouq, and once at the front, north of Kabul.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he and his unit departed in November 2001 for Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan to surrender to the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated the Northern Alliance was broadcasting radio messages that any foreign fighter could turn in their weapons and would be sent back to their homeland.

2. The detainee stated that when he reached Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, he was sent to the Al-Istikh Barat prison.

3. The detainee said that he did not surrender himself at Mazar-e-Sharif, but the Northern Alliance came and got him from his house when Taloqan fell.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11 2001.

b. The detainee stated that he did not fight Americans before so he doesn't plan to fight the Americans if released.

c. The detainee stated he never saw Usama bin Laden and never attended the al Farouq Camp.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 June 2007

TO: MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN
SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he wanted to go to Afghanistan for military training to prepare himself to fight. The detainee stated Jews were killing innocent Palestinians and the same thing was happening in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he talked to an individual about the training camps in Afghanistan and how they should travel to Palestine to fight the Jews.

3. The detainee stated an individual provided him with a travel visa for Pakistan, airline tickets, and approximately 5,000 Yemeni Riyals to purchase the detainee's passport. The detainee then traveled with this individual to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated he went to the rear lines for four months and then to the front lines to guard against the Northern Forces.

5. The detainee stated he went to the front lines to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance after training at the al Farouq Training Camp.

6. The detainee stated he went to Tora Bora, Afghanistan, where the detainee sat in a bunker in a cave for 15 days. When the detainee left the cave, he was injured by a bomb blast. The detainee was then captured by Northern forces and turned over to the Americans.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN SAID

7. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida soldier from Yemen seen at the Ashara Guest House.

8. A source stated the Ashara Guest House was run by a senior al Qaida member, received funding from the Taliban Defense Ministry and al Qaida headquarters in Afghanistan, and acted as a transition point for Arabs going to and coming from either the training camps or front line areas.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he trained at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan for four months. The detainee trained on mountain fighting, the Kalashnikov rifle, the Russian PK rifle, and rocket propelled grenades.

2. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and all students received training in weapons, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

3. The detainee stated an individual trained him at al Farouq on the AK-47 and PK machine gun, and trained him on M-43 mortars and the SBG-9 at the back lines.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name appeared on a document listing the names of captured Mujahedin associated with a senior al Qaida leader.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied receiving any type of explosives training while at the al Farouq Training Camp.

b. The detainee stated he was sent to the front lines after receiving training, where the detainee did not fight but guarded a position.

c. The detainee stated he did not agree with the philosophies of Usama bin Laden and felt Usama bin Laden was not correct in his jihad. The detainee stated Islam did not believe in the killing of women, children, or the elderly.

d. The detainee insisted he was not affiliated with al Qaida.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED MOHAMMED
AHMEN SAID**

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 August 2007

To: OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN ABESS

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN ABESS

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in 1989 he relocated to Italy from Tunisia. In 1997, the detainee met an individual in Milan, Italy. The detainee lived in this individual's home for three months and spent most of his time in bed, withdrawing from heroin.
2. The individual in the previous statement is the leader of an unidentified Tunisian Islamic Terrorist Group.
3. The individual asked the detainee if he would be interested in attending a training camp for jihad in Afghanistan, and the detainee said he was interested. The detainee said the overall plan was to go to Afghanistan for training, go to Sudan for more religious study, and then go to Tunisia to fight against the government.
4. The detainee flew from Milan, Italy to Islamabad, Pakistan in September or October 1997. The individual took care of all arrangements to include tickets and a visa, provided 800 United States Dollars, and told the detainee that a person would meet him at the airport.
5. The person in the previous statement facilitated the movement of personnel to the al Qaida terrorist organization training camp, Durenta, outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN ABESS

6. The Derunta Training Camp is considered to be the primary installation of Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The camp was considered crucial because of the training that was carried out there in the fields of explosives, manufacture of poisons, clandestine techniques, as well as the basic training it provided in the use of individual weapons such as the rocket-propelled grenades.
7. The detainee was taken to a house in Peshawar, Pakistan by a man who was assigned to facilitate the detainee's travel to Afghanistan. There were several former Hezb-e-Islami fighters also living in this house. After about one month, the facilitator took the detainee to Afghanistan. The facilitator took care of all the documentation they entered Afghanistan. The facilitator and the detainee then traveled to a house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where the detainee stayed for ten to fifteen days before the facilitator returned to take the detainee to the training camp.
8. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG, as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977. HIG has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.
9. During grenade training the detainee had an accident and was taken to a hospital in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
10. The detainee stated that after he was released from the hospital, the facilitator gave the detainee his plane ticket back to Pakistan. When he arrived in Peshawar, the detainee lived with two Libyans who had been part of a Libyan Fighting Group operating in Afghanistan. In 2000, the detainee moved back to Afghanistan because he did not have enough money to return to Italy and his residency documents had expired.
11. The detainee stated that on 11 September 2001 he heard about the attacks in the United States on the radio while in his home in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
12. The detainee stated he left Jalalabad, Afghanistan once Kabul, Afghanistan fell to the Northern Alliance. The detainee went to a nearby village where most of the local Arabs and Afghans were going.
13. The detainee stated an Afghan instructed the Arab men to flee to the Tora Bora region. There, the Arab men were divided into smaller groups. The leader of the detainee's group issued each man a Kalashnikov. The detainee stated he threw away his Kalashnikov prior to his capture.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN ABESS

14. The person who gave the detainee the Kalashnikov was an al Qaida commander who fought against United States Forces in Afghanistan in late 2001.

b. Training

1. The detainee went to the al Qaida terrorist organization's Derunta Training Camp, outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the only people that can get into the camp are members of al Qaida.
2. The detainee spent 28 days at the Derunta Training Camp, where he participated in Kalashnikov rifle, pistol, grenade and rocket propelled grenade training.
3. A source stated the detainee had knowledge in chemical explosives and trained at a camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
4. Indication are that the detainee was an explosives trainer and one of the most important trainers who dealt with and trained many high-level al Qaida individuals.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee may have traveled with the Emir of the Tunisian Group to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was responsible for the finances of the Tunisian Combatant Group.
3. The Tunisian Combat Group reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets the United States and Western interests. The group is associated with al Qaida and other Northern African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots.
4. The detainee described an al Qaida terrorist organization housing compound owned by Usama bin Laden, located 15 km west of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Al Qaida members and their families occupy the housing compound.
5. The detainee is reported to have visited on more than one occasion with the spokesman for al Qaida. The spokesman reportedly stayed with the detainee in both Karachi, Pakistan, and in Kabul, Afghanistan.
6. A source stated that the detainee had advance knowledge that an attack would occur against the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. The detainee reportedly trained with one of the men who ultimately carried out the operation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN ABESS

7. A source stated that the detainee knew about an al Qaida plan to carry out a chemical weapons attack.
8. A source stated that the detainee knew several Usama bin Laden bodyguards.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that in 1985 he attempted to go to Algeria illegally to avoid military service. The detainee was arrested by the Algerians and held for a week before being sent back to Tunisia.
2. The detainee stated he spent three years in a prison in Rome, Italy from 1992 to 1995 for possession and use of heroin.
3. The detainee stated he sold drugs to finance his drug habit.
4. A source stated the detainee had been living in Afghanistan for approximately five years and reportedly left Tunisia due to the fact he was a Muslim extremist with the intention of returning back to Tunisia to help his Muslim brothers in the effort to fight against the Tunisian government.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he had no involvement in the assassination of Commander Massoud of the Northern Alliance.
- b. The detainee stated he had never taken part in a meeting between Usama Bin Laden and the Tunisian Combat Group and had never heard of the Tunisian Combat Group.
- c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- d. The detainee denied assisting his roommate in Milan, Italy, or his acquaintances, in any of their extremist activities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 February 2007

TO: DHUBY, MOHAMMED KHALID SALIH AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED
SALIH AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he wanted to go to Afghanistan to receive training and prepare for his duty as a Muslim. The detainee met a man named Ali al Yafi at a mosque near the detainee's home in Saudi Arabia, who told the detainee of a camp in Afghanistan where the detainee could receive training. Al Yafi, who fought in Chechnya, showed the detainee pictures and films of the fighting between the Muslims and Russians.

2. Abu Ali al Yafai was reportedly killed in a raid in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated Ali al Yafi made all of the arrangements for their travel to Afghanistan. Ali al Yafi informed the detainee he would take care of everything and money would always be there if the detainee needed it. The detainee and al Yafi left for Afghanistan after the Hajj in 2001 and traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and on to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee and al Yafi proceeded to Lahore, Pakistan, through Quetta, Pakistan and on to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated he left for Afghanistan circa June 2001. Once in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed in a guest house for three months studying the Koran while waiting for training. The detainee stated the guest house was a way station for individuals preparing to attend the al Farouq Training Camp and the majority of these people were training for combat.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH

5. The detainee stated he stayed at a guest house on Haj al Habash Street in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. Al Qaida maintained a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, near the Haji Habash Mosque. Arabs who came for military training at the al Farouq Training Camp used this house.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was at the al Farouq training camp for about one and one half months. The detainee trained on how to dig trenches, protect oneself from bombing, cover terrain, read maps and use of a Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun and rocket propelled grenades.

2. The detainee stated he wore camouflage uniforms similar to the United States military while at the al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee noticed two other training camps and was told by a trainer that the other camps were off limits.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that about two to three weeks into training at al Farouq, the camp expected the arrival of Usama bin Laden. The detainee heard that Usama bin Laden had been to the camp before, but Usama bin Laden never showed up that day.

2. The detainee stated that when his group arrived at a large farm in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the men were separated into different groups. The detainee was placed in Abu Thabit's group.

3. The Abu Thabit group was one of several al Qaida groups fighting in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan. Abu Thabit was the commander of the group, but was killed along with another member.

4. The detainee stated he was in Tora Bora, Afghanistan during Ramadan 2001. The detainee stated he was given a Kalashnikov rifle with one thirty-round magazine of ammunition and was told to defend himself from opposition forces. The detainee heard and saw the bombings going on. The detainee stayed in one of several caves in the mountains above Tora Bora large enough to fit three or four people. Abu Thabit was the Emir of the high mountain area called Toran.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance unit Hajir al Qadir during the allied offensive in the area. The detainee was then taken to prisons in Kabul, Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan, before being transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

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2. The detainee stated he saw his brother at the guest house on Haj al Habash Street in Kandahar, Afghanistan and was very surprised. The detainee did not know what happened to his brother in Afghanistan.

3. DNA tests performed on the detainee and another detainee indicate that they are likely to be full siblings.

4. The detainee stated when he went to the al Farouq Training Camp, he was never told that he would have to be a fighter after he received training. The detainee never had to present any letter or give an oath to anyone.

5. A source stated the group the detainee was captured with after the fall of the Taliban in Tora Bora, Afghanistan was captured with quite a bit of foreign money, to include approximately 10,000 in Spanish bills, 50 to 100 United States Dollars and unknown amounts of Pakistani money and other currencies.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he never heard of al Qaida before he went to prison in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee claimed that no one told him that the al Farouq Training Camp belonged to Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee stated he heard Usama bin Laden was kicked out of Saudi Arabia, but did not know Usama bin Laden was a terrorist. The detainee never thought about Usama bin Laden and hardly ever watched the news.

c. The detainee stated he was not a fighter or a killer. The detainee just wanted to train to fight. The detainee wanted to train to protect himself and his family, as well as defend his country. After training, the detainee wanted to return to Saudi Arabia.

d. The detainee did not see any United States troops fighting in Afghanistan.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

f. The detainee stated that, if possible, he would go back to Saudi Arabia if he were set free. However, the detainee would most likely have to find his sister in Yemen and live with her.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID
MOHAMMED SALIH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 March 2007

To: MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA KAZAZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA KAZAZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan for jihad.
2. The detainee was injured during the bombing in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained for approximately 20 days on small arms at the al Farouq Training Camp.
2. The detainee shot the Siminoff rifle, a single shot rifle and a Kalashnikov rifle twelve times.
3. The detainee was given additional instruction on map and land navigation.
4. A source claims that the detainee received training at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from suspected al Qaida safe houses.
2. The detainee's name was found on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA KAZAZ

3. A source identified the detainee as Abu Abdul Rahman al Ta'izi, a light weapons trainer at the al Farouq Training Camp. The source also claimed the detainee fought in Tora Bora.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he tried to refuse training and leave but the leadership would not give him back his passport.

b. The detainee claims he never fired a weapon during training, nor was he issued a weapon.

c. The detainee stated he was never issued a weapon following training and never fired any rounds outside of training.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 July 2007

TO: RIYAD NASIR MOHAMMED ATAHAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RIYAD NASIR MOHAMMED ATAHAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. According to a foreign government, the detainee is considered one of the most dangerous Tunisian operatives.

2. The detainee was condemned in Italy for making and passing counterfeit money, had a warrant order issued for terrorism related crimes and subversion and has an international arrest order on record.

3. The detainee was arrested in 1998 for involvement in fabricating false documents and trafficking arms and ammunition. In 1999, the detainee was sentenced in Tunisia to ten years in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.

4. A foreign government agency identified the detainee as a member of the Armed Islamic Group.

5. The Armed Islamic Group has been designated by the United States Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.

6. Large amounts of documentation and propaganda related to the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) was found in the detainee's apartment. The detainee was identified as specializing in negotiating and distributing false banknotes.

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7. A source identified the detainee as being involved in establishing the Tunisian Combat Group. The source stated the detainee was originally in charge of information and preaching, but later became the Emir of the Tunisian Combat Group.

8. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as the Emir of the Tunisian Group in Afghanistan.

9. The Tunisian Combat Group has been identified by the United States Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Group. The Tunisian Combat Group reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and also targets United States and Western interests. The group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots.

10. A foreign government has identified the detainee as a known member of the Tunisian Islamic Front.

11. According to a foreign government agency, it is suspected that the Tunisian Islamic Front is the armed wing of En Nahda. Members of the Tunisian Islamic Front have a range of contacts within the Islamic movement and would be in close contact with other Islamic extremists.

b. Training

1. According to a foreign government, the detainee left Italy in the mid-1990s for Bosnia where he received military training and participated in the war along side Bosnian Mujahedin.

2. A foreign government stated the detainee was dispatched to a paramilitary training camp for armed struggle in Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated that he received military training at the Derunta Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he learned to use automatic weapons.

4. Derunta was one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan. The camp provided training on the use of explosives. Derunta also contained several secondary bases belonging to Usama bin Laden.

5. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as having trained at Khalden Camp.

6. Khalden Camp training consisted primarily of tactics for escaping from rockets, the use of rocket launchers, the manufacture of explosives and training in destructive techniques. The

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camp was well known for bringing in volunteers recruited from North Africa, many of whom had been living in Europe and transferred to Afghanistan via Karachi, Pakistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's recruiter directed the detainee to meet a contact in Peshawar, Pakistan. The contact was a Mujahideen Warrior and a member of Hezb al Islami led by Hikmatyar.

2. Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin, founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, has been identified by the United States Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Group. Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin is a faction of the Hezb e Islami party that has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its' attempt to force United States Forces to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he has hated America since he was a baby because it always takes the side of Israel. The detainee stated that America will eventually receive justice for its crimes against Islam.

2. The detainee stated the purpose of Islamic extremist groups was to counter act the west's exploitation of Muslim countries' natural resources. The detainee stated the day is coming when all Muslim countries will no longer tolerate the United States depleting the Muslims' oil resources, the forcing of western culture on Muslims, and keeping Israel in power. The detainee stated all Muslim countries will rise up and defeat the west.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he fled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan to the Tora Bora region after the area fell to the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee was injured in the Tora Bora region during the United States bombing.

3. The detainee stated he was told that Tora Bora, Afghanistan would be a safe place in Afghanistan for fleeing Arabs. The detainee stayed in an individual's cave for 18 days.

4. The individual in the previous statement has ties to al Qaida by providing forged passports.

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4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied taking part in any explosive training. The detainee also denied knowing of any explosive type training being taught at Duranta Camp.
- b. The detainee stated he did not receive any training at or near Khowst, Afghanistan and had not heard of a terrorist training camp prior to an interview.
- c. The detainee claimed not to have belonged to any anti-Tunisian Government group.
- d. The detainee claimed he was never the leader of any group.
- e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- f. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' interests or the Guantanamo Detention Facility.
- g. The detainee denied being associated with the Armed Islamic Group and stated he was against the Armed Islamic Group because they killed Muslims in Algeria.
- h. The detainee denied any prior personal knowledge of the Tunisian Combatant Group.
- i. The detainee denied any association with false documents. The detainee stated that any documents found in his apartment after he departed did not belong to the detainee.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 October 2007

To: AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD SULEMAN BIN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD SULEMAN BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that in approximately June 2001 he traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to visit the holy places.
 2. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan after he heard a fatwa issued by a Sheikh that stated it was the duty of all Muslims to receive basic military training.
 3. A source stated the Sheikh in the previous statement was a Saudi mufti who issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. The Sheikh condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden.
 4. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to prepare for Palestine.
 5. The detainee stated he was taken to a guest house in Karachi, Pakistan owned by an individual.
 6. The individual in the previous statement was a Bosnia jihad veteran and facilitator for al Qaida. He worked with senior al Qaida leaders to bribe officials, forge documents, and provide visas, money, and airline tickets for people traveling to

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD SULEMAN BIN

Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated he traveled in early 2001 to Quetta, Pakistan then Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at a safe house for about a week. The detainee stated that while at the safe house he watched a film about jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya. The safe house was owned by an individual.
8. The individual in the previous statement owned the Anabras guest house. The detainee stated travelers stayed at the Anabras guest house before going to al Farouq.
9. A source stated the Nabras guest house was used by fighters headed to the al Farouq Training Camp. The source stated Usama bin Laden would greet the fighters before they went to training.
10. The detainee stated he arrived at Camp Farouq sometime before Ramadan 2001.
11. A source stated that the al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at the al Farouq consisted of two week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
12. About halfway through the two months of training at al Farouq, the trainees were told the training would be completed at another location. The detainee stated they were taken from Kandahar to Kabul to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He stated they were then taken to the Tora Bora Mountains. The detainee stated each detainee had a Kalashnikov rifle.
13. The detainee stated that while in Tora Bora he took turns with others standing guard in front of a cave until he was captured by Afghani forces.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he trained for approximately one month with the Yemeni military. The detainee stated he received physical training and instruction on the Kalashnikov.
2. The detainee stated his training at al Farouq consisted of small arms training with the Kalashnikov and pistols.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD SULEMAN BIN

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was in the mosque at al Farouq Usama bin Laden gave a lecture about the jihad in Israel and Palestine and encouraged the trainees to join their brothers in Palestine.
2. The detainee stated that while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he saw Usama bin Laden a second time. Usama bin Laden talked about the jihad for approximately one hour.
3. The detainee's name was found on a hard drive that was associated with a senior al Qaida operative.
4. The detainee's name was found on a document in a safe house associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.
5. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin in an al Qaida associated safe house in Pakistan.
6. The detainee stated an individual was in charge of his group in Tora Bora.
7. The individual in the previous statement was the camp commander at one of a series of camps established to support and defend retreating Taliban and al Qaida terrorist forces. The detainee stated he was one of the personnel stationed at this camp.
8. A source stated the detainee was part of the individual's group in the mountains and carried a Kalashnikov rifle.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated the detainee trained at al Farouq and fought at Tora Bora.
2. Another source stated he was with the detainee at both al Farouq and Tora Bora.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he was never asked to take an oath to al Qaida, nor did he see anybody else take a oath. He stated he had heard about men taking an oath to al Qaida, but stated even if he was asked, he would not have taken the oath. The detainee stated it is every Muslim's duty to receive military training, but he was not in

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD SULEMAN BIN

Afghanistan to fight and never discharged his weapon.

- b. The detainee stated he did not know he was in a camp operated by al Qaida. He said the only thing he knew about al Qaida was from what he read in a newspaper article. The detainee stated if he knew that the Afghani war was Muslim against Muslim and if he knew al Qaida operated al Farouq, he would have never left Yemen. The detainee stated he felt sorry for the plight of the Palestinians and wanted to train if he was ever needed to help.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - d. The detainee stated he is not mad at the United States.
 - e. The detainee stated he knew al Farouq was run by al Qaida, but not everyone at the camp was necessarily a member of al Qaida.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 April 2007

TO: ABDUL RAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL RAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he met two Tajiks in his mosque and they recommended the detainee go to Afghanistan because it would be easier to live there.

2. The detainee stated, he and his family departed Kazakhstan for Afghanistan in September 2000. The detainee claimed, he and his family flew from Kazakhstan to Pakistan and from Pakistan traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee also admitted he and two Tajiks traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 by way of Tajikistan.

4. The detainee stated he and his family lived in Kabul, Afghanistan in a house assigned to them by Taliban officials. The Taliban financially supported the detainee's entire family for 13 months while the detainee studied the Koran full time at a nearby mosque.

5. The detainee also admitted that while in Afghanistan he studied in a Tajik Madrasa and he made money growing and selling marijuana.

6. The detainee claimed he left Kabul, Afghanistan in October 2001 to work as a cook for the Taliban.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL RAHIM

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's uncle worked for the Taliban.
2. A source identified the detainee as an extremist associated with a criminal/jihadist group in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to join the eastern Turkistan Islamic movement leader and become a terrorist.
4. The eastern Turkistan Islamic movement is listed by the United States Department of Homeland Security as a terrorist organization that is suspected to have received assistance from al Qaida.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured by united Islamic front for the salvation of Afghanistan troops on 2 December 2001, in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was identified by a source as al Qaida.
3. The detainee renounced his Kazakh citizenship, stating he abandoned it when he moved to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that if he was released he will attempt to move to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
4. When asked what his thoughts were regarding the attacks on America, the detainee laughed and smiled.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b. The detainee stated he did not take part in any military activities in Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2007

To: ISMAIL, YASIN QASEM MUHAMMAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL, YASIN QASEM MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he met an individual at a mosque who supported al Qaida and the jihad against America. After speaking to the individual, the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan to train to go fight in Chechnya.
 2. The detainee stated that he traveled by airplane from Sana, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan where he stayed in a hotel for four or five days, and then he was taken to a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 3. The detainee stated that he stayed in guest houses in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee stated he went to the Azam guest house in Kabul in the late spring of 2000.
 5. An individual stated the Azam guest house in Kabul was one of Usama bin Laden's private safe houses.
 6. An individual identified the detainee as the Emir of the Bagram front in July 2001 and as being proficient with mines.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL, YASIN QASEM MUHAMMAD

7. An individual stated the detainee was a commander of a military group.
8. An individual identified the detainee as having fought with the Taliban on the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.
9. As of December 2001, the detainee was identified as a Yemeni jihadist believed to be in Afghanistan and holding a Yemeni passport.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he went to Kabul, Afghanistan to train at Camp Farouq where he trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, the PK machine gun, rocket propelled grenades, explosives, topography, and mountain fighting and tactics. The detainee stated that he was at Camp Farouq for four months.
2. The detainee stated that he went to the Malek Training Camp north of Kabul, Afghanistan where he trained on anti-aircraft weapons, heavy artillery and surface-to-air missiles. The detainee stated that he was at Malek Training Camp for three weeks to one month.
3. The Malek Center, located in Kahul, Afghanistan, is used to support Taliban fighters by training foreign fighters in basic riflmanship. The Malek Center also has a motor pool, used to repair and maintain transport vehicles utilized by Taliban forces, and a barracks designated for front line fighters to stay in.
4. The detainee stated that he returned to Malik Training Camp for training in 82 and 75 millimeter mortars, the SPG-9, and the recoilless rifle. The detainee fired one 82 millimeter round.
5. The detainee stated that he returned to Camp Farouq for a two-week course on the PK machine gun.
6. The detainee stated he received training on the following mines while on the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan: Claymore, SB-33, TM-89, TS-50, P3-MK2, an Israeli mine, and a mine that looked similar to the V69. The training lasted two weeks, and consisted of the placement, camouflage, and extraction of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
7. Detainee's name appears on a training camp form with the information that he completed a Basic course and mountain tactics training. The Battlefield Supervisor report stated the detainee has put great effort at the frontline.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL, YASIN QASEM MUHAMMAD

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he knew two senior al Qaida members and openly affiliated himself with al Qaida.
2. The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden three times. The first time, at the Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house where Usama bin Laden met for fifteen-minutes with twenty listeners. The second time was at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Usama bin Laden stayed for approximately five minutes and left without speaking. The third time was at a guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan before the detainee left for Tora Bora.
3. The detainee's name is on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a computer hard drive connected with a senior al Qaida operative.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he went to Tora Bora where he was eventually captured.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he does not belong to al Qaida. He stated he has never been asked to join al Qaida, and, if he had been asked, he would have refused.
- b. The detainee stated that he was in Tora Bora to hide, and denied he was fighting.
- c. The detainee stated he received weapons training for the purpose of fighting in Chechnya. He stated the instructors at al Farouq training camp did not talk about fighting Americans. The detainee stated he did not know he had joined a Taliban unit and only found out afterwards.
- d. The detainee stated if he were released he would like to go to college and earn a degree.
- e. The detainee stated he did not believe in the fighting that was going on in Afghanistan because it was between Muslims and other Muslims, and he believes that the Taliban and the Northern Alliance were wrong. He stated he joined the jihad and trained for fighting in Chechnya, not Afghanistan. The detainee stated he never fought in Afghanistan.
- f. The detainee stated if he were released, he would not join the jihad in Chechnya because he does not want to return to prison. The detainee he believes he has fulfilled his commitment to jihad, and he wants to return home to start a family and live a quiet life.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL, YASIN QASEM MUHAMMAD

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 June 2007

TO: MOHMOOD SALIM AL-MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMOOD SALIM AL-MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee developed an interest in receiving jihad training as a result of owning several commercially available videos, which he had purchased in a shop in Kuwait.

2. The detainee was motivated to fight jihad after reading a fatwa in a newspaper, issued by a Saudi cleric who was encouraging Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. The detainee began his travel to Afghanistan within two weeks of reading the fatwa.

3. On or about 20 October 2001, the detainee traveled from his home in Kuwait to Damascus, Syria, to Tehran, Iran, to Mashad, Iran, and then on to Tayebat, Iran, in an attempt to cross the border into Afghanistan. The detainee was finally successful in crossing the Afghanistan border at Zabol, Iran.

4. After leaving for jihad, the detainee informed his wife and mother of his decision to fight in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that an unidentified Taliban official in Tamrouz, Afghanistan, cited that people who wanted to fight in the jihad should go to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to receive military training. The detainee was informed that the base at Kandahar was damaged and that he should go to Kabul, Afghanistan, for his training.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMOOD SALIM AL-
MOHAMMED**

6. The detainee stated that he knew that the training camp was run by Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization prior to leaving Kuwait.

7. The detainee was identified as a Taliban fighter who was in Kabul, Afghanistan, approximately two weeks before he was captured. At the time of his capture, the detainee was carrying his Kalashnikov rifle.

8. The detainee described jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam. He traveled to Afghanistan after 11 September, 2001 to defend Muslims in Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Azam Arab guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. A source who worked for a senior al Qaida member stated that the Azam guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, was used for fighters who were going and coming from the front lines fighting against the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee is on a list of foreign nationals targeted for deportation from Kuwait due to unspecified extremist activities or contacts with known extremists.

c. Intent

1. When the detainee was asked whether he wanted to fight against the United States, he replied that it was his desire to fight against non-Muslims categorically.

2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan specifically to attend training at the al Farouq camp, which he knew was run by Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization. The detainee stated he would have desired to fight the opposition on the front lines in support and defense of the Taliban. The detainee funded his travel from wages earned at a fruit and vegetable market in Soulabia, Kuwait.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he had not wanted to fight against the forces of the United States, but only against the Northern Alliance.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee said that he is a religious man with strong convictions. He stated that he is perfectly content in Cuba, that prison life has changed him, and he is a new man who is comfortable with a simple solitary lifestyle.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMOOD SALIM AL-
MOHAMMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 July 2007

TO: OMAR SAID SALEM ADAYN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR SAID SALEM ADAYN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In August 2001, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.

2. In Quetta, Pakistan an individual arranged for the detainee's airline tickets and gave him 500 United States Dollars to cover travel expenses.

3. When the detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan he was taken to a safe house run by a Saudi Arabian. The detainee was at this safe house for one day before becoming ill with malaria.

4. The detainee claimed that due to illness he had trouble standing and walking during his stay at the safe house. The detainee claims not to have received any training at the safe house, nor did he see any weapons.

5. After half a month at the Kandahar, Afghanistan safe house, the Arabs present were told to go to Jalalabad, Afghanistan due to the increase in bombing in Kandahar. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad by car and arrived at a safe house run by a Saudi.

6. After half a month, the detainee was told to head to Tora Bora, Afghanistan with the rest of the Arabs present at the Jalalabad, Afghanistan safe house.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR SAID SALEM ADAYN

7. When the detainee arrived in Tora Bora, Afghanistan he was shown to his position. A Saudi Arabian, who led the position, issued the detainee a Kalashnikov and showed him where to go. There were between 10 and 12 Arabs in the detainee's position.

8. A source stated that the Saudi Arabian individual in the previous statement was an al Farouq Camp Commander and a leader at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

9. All members of the detainee's group were armed with Kalashnikov's except for one individual who was armed with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The group spent most of its time hiding in one of the three caves located close to its position. The detainee was in this position for a month before being wounded in the leg by a missile.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A Saudi Arabian al Qaida member managed the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Arabs awaiting training at the al Farouq Camp stayed at this house.

2. The detainee's name was found on a list of Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from a safe house connected with suspected al Qaida members in Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name was listed as a captured Mujahedin on a document associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks prior to their execution. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 February 2007

TO: Zaid, Walid Said Bin Said

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF Zaid, Walid Said Bin Said

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan for training and was introduced to a person who financed and facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guest house for four days in Quetta, Pakistan.
 3. The detainee spent nine days in a Taliban guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where his passport, money and other identification was collected.
 4. The detainee was taken to the al Farouq Training Camp and was scheduled to stay there for two months.
 5. The detainee explained the reason he attended training at the al Farouq Training Camp was because he wanted to support the Taliban in their struggle against the Northern Alliance.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee arrived at the al Farouq Training Camp on approximately 1 August 2001.
 2. The detainee trained at the al Farouq Training Camp for six weeks on the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, rocket propelled grenade, land navigation and combat tactics.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAID, WALID SAID BIN SAID

3. The detainee's training was interrupted when the al Farouq Training Camp shut down in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

4. The detainee stated the camp leaders gave the order to evacuate the camp in anticipation of attacks. The trainees left the al Farouq Training Camp and went to an area of dense woods located in the foothills of the Tora Bora Mountains.

c. Connections/Associations

1. While the detainee was in training at the al Farouq Training Camp, Usama bin Laden and a group of guards came to visit.

2. The detainee's name was on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a safe house raid of suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee repeatedly stressed the only reason he supported the Taliban was because he thought they were good Muslims.

2. The detainee sustained multiple injuries as a result of the United States bombing campaign in the mountains surrounding Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee was taken to a hospital in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he was eventually detained by United States forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims training was only a prerequisite to obtaining employment in the country of Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated prior to his arrival at the al Farouq Training Camp, he did not know the camp was affiliated with al Qaida or the Taliban regime.

c. The detainee stated that he has been treated well since he was captured and harbors no ill will towards the United States or the Northern Alliance. The detainee only wishes to return home and put this part of his life behind him.

d. The detainee also stated he believes the American involvement in Afghanistan is a good thing as long as the Americans are assisting the Afghan people.

e. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAID, WALID SAID BIN SAID

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2007

To: AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual stated the detainee was at the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan for a week to ten days in January 1991, and, while the individual was at the camp, the detainee was in charge.
2. An individual stated the detainee was supervising on the front lines in Gardiz, Afghanistan in February 1992.
3. An individual stated the detainee worked for a Kuwaiti relief agency in Bosnia in 1995 distributing clothes and food to refugees, and also gave money out of his own pocket to Arab Mujahedin fighters.
4. The detainee stated he flew to Lahore, Pakistan, in July 2001, where a young Arab man whom the detainee believed to be al Qaida met them. The detainee stated that the next day, they took a taxi to the border, rode motorcycles around the checkpoint, and then traveled by taxi to meet the individual who originally invited the detainee to Afghanistan.
5. The detainee stated the individual who invited him to Afghanistan in July 2001 is a member of al Qaida.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN

6. The detainee stated that while he was in Afghanistan he stayed in the home of the individual who originally invited him to Afghanistan.
7. An individual stated the detainee gave Usama bin Laden a suitcase full of money and that the detainee was carrying a pistol by his side for protection.
8. The detainee stated that in September 2001 he was approached by an individual, in his office at his health club in Kuwait, about the possibility of going to Afghanistan for jihad. The detainee stated that he agreed to go to Afghanistan with the individual.
9. The detainee stated the individual that met him at his health club, in the previous statement, was most likely al Qaida.
10. An individual stated the detainee left the al Qaida media house and traveled to the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan in October 2001.
11. An individual stated the detainee had been at the Malik guesthouse in northern Kabul, Afghanistan and helped coordinate Taliban and al Qaida efforts at the Bagram, Afghanistan front line.
12. The detainee stated that he traveled from Kabul, Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan hiding from the Northern Alliance and United States forces. The detainee stated that before departing for Tora Bora, Afghanistan he stayed at an Arab guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan that was full of armed Mujahedin and stores of ammunition, clothes, and sleeping bags.
13. The detainee stated, that after he was informed that Jalalabad, Afghanistan fell to the Northern Alliance, Tora Bora, Afghanistan filled up with Mujahedin and everyone, including him, prepared for the impending Northern Alliance attack.
14. The detainee stated he advised an individual in charge on supply logistics at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he was sent to a storage depot location and his job was to coordinate the transportation of supplies to various locations in the Tora Bora mountain complex. The detainee stated that he headed a meeting of approximately eleven representatives of the twenty Tora Bora camps to resolve supply distribution problems.
15. An individual stated the detainee was in charge of logistics in Tora Bora, Afghanistan and distributed ammunition.
16. An individual stated the detainee was the chief of supply in Tora Bora, Afghanistan and the detainee supplied money, weapons, ammunition, food and

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN

supplies. The individual stated that the detainee also led a ten to twenty-five man group of fighters.

17. An individual stated the detainee owned a health club in Kuwait which trained young men to prepare for jihad.
18. An individual stated the detainee collected money from mosques and businessmen in Kuwait City, Kuwait, and gave the money to an individual.
19. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated the individual, to whom the detainee gave money collected in Kuwait, was a broker with extremist groups and raised money and provided support for jihad activities.

b. Training

The detainee stated he attended two weeks of basic military training in Kuwait in 1988 and spent three months in the military as a cook.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he met with members of al Wafa, once in July 2001 in Kandahar, Afghanistan and twice in October 2001 in the Kabul, Afghanistan area.
2. Al Wafa claimed to be a humanitarian Islamic charity organization. They in fact, funneled money and supplies to al Qaida and the Taliban, including medical equipment and weapons.
3. The detainee stated that in July 2001 he personally met with Usama bin Laden on four different occasions: twice at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, once at an old airport in Kandahar, and once outside of Kandahar where an Arab was hosting a dinner in Usama bin Laden's honor. The detainee stated he was one of Usama bin Laden's honored guests at the dinner.
4. An individual stated he was at a feast attended by Usama bin Laden, the detainee, and others. The individual stated the detainee sat to the immediate right of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards and the detainee's bodyguards sat to the immediate right of the detainee. The individual stated the detainee met with Usama bin Laden after the meal for a private discussion.
5. The detainee stated the individuals that trained at his health club in Kuwait included a jihadist and a jihadist recruiter.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN

6. The detainee stated he sat in the place of honor, directly to the right of the head of al Wafa, when he met with members of al Wafa during his second trip to Afghanistan.
 7. An individual stated the detainee was well connected to several Arab Gulf Sheikhs who constituted a major financial and extremist donor network.
 8. An individual stated the detainee is a high level al Qaida member.
 9. The detainee's name and phone number was found in a telephone and address book associated with an al Qaida operative. The document was found at the residence where a senior al Qaida operative was captured.
 10. The detainee was on a list of individuals obtained from an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan. The list showed individuals with safety deposit boxes in Afghanistan and the amounts of money taken from each to be added to the budget.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. An individual stated he and the detainee established their cover story after being captured by the Northern Alliance. The individual stated he was instructed by the detainee to say that they were both relief workers who had entered through Iran and were trying to flee the country.
 2. The detainee stated that after he was imprisoned by the Northern Alliance, he made up a cover story about his second trip to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated that known terrorists must have gotten his personal information from his business cards through his clubs or through his website.
- b. The detainee stated that in October 2001 he traveled to Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to conduct a field study of the Afghan refugee situation. The detainee stated he was to be hired by a joint relief committee.
- c. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.
- d. The detainee denied giving any money to people in Bosnia from late 1995 to early 1996.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2007

TO: FAEZ MOHAMMED AHMED AL-KANDARI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAEZ MOHAMMED AHMED AL-
KANDARI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. An individual stated the detainee fought in Bosnia.
 2. The detainee suggested that he and another individual travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad and the detainee assigned them aliases.
 3. An individual stated that in April 2000 the detainee traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan stayed at a guest house for one month, and then went to Kabul, Afghanistan where the detainee stayed two days at another guesthouse.
 4. The detainee's travel arrangements were made by a senior al Qaida operative.
 5. An individual stated the detainee stayed at the Usama bin Laden Guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan for one month.
 6. An individual stated the detainee worked hard to fund jihad through fliers and pamphlets, collected money for Usama bin Laden in Kuwait, and created and distributed videotapes to support jihad. The individual stated the detainee traveled often between Afghanistan and Kuwait.
 7. An individual stated the detainee was a representative of Usama bin Laden and that he was both a religious and military leader within al Qaida and the Taliban.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAEZ MOHAMMED AHMED AL-KANDARI

8. An individual stated the detainee frequently gave speeches to recruits at al Qaida training camps and to al Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

9. An individual stated that while in Tora Bora the detainee wore a military uniform, carried an AK-47, and that he fought with al Qaida and the Taliban.

10. An individual stated the detainee was in charge of a group in Tora Bora.

11. An individual stated that in late October 2001, in the Tora Bora mountains, the detainee attended a meeting of fighting location leaders to discuss fighting strategy and the distribution of surface-to-air missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons.

b. Training

1. An individual stated the detainee trained on the Kalashnikov and other automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft guns at the Khalden Camp.

2. An individual stated the detainee received explosives training, to include the production of TNT bombs, setting explosives, detonating synchronized timed bombs, Molotov cocktails, petrol bombs, and grenades at the al Farouq Camp.

3. An individual stated the detainee took a sniper-shooter training course at the Airport Training Camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. An individual stated the detainee was very close to Usama bin Laden, both in a psychological and physical sense. In Tora Bora, the detainee frequently slept near Usama bin Laden and carried out his instructions.

2. An individual stated that the detainee was a close friend and legal advisor to Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.

4. An individual stated the detainee was the leader of a group of Kuwaiti Mujahedin.

5. The detainee stated he was employed in Afghanistan with the al Wafa organization.

6. The Al Wafa organization is listed on the Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Exclusion List.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAEZ MOHAMMED AHMED AL-KANDARI

e. Other Relevant Data

1. An individual stated that the detainee recorded a propaganda tape titled "Jihad, Your Way to Heaven."
2. The detainee stated he was captured in a house in the Tora Bora mountains.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied ever visiting a training camp in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee denied ever meeting Usama bin Laden.
 - c. The detainee stated that he is not an extremist and does not have ties to high-level al Qaida members.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 February 2007

TO: AL BAYDANI, ABDUL KHALED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAYDANI, ABDUL KHALED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee resided in Yemen for many years, although he was born in Saudi Arabia. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in 2001 via Quetta, Pakistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was recruited by a known al Qaida and Taliban recruiter to travel to Afghanistan for training and participation in jihad.

3. The detainee states that he went to Afghanistan to receive military training.

4. The detainee has admitted he has spoken about committing jihad against the United States if released from detention.

5. The detainee claims he went to Afghanistan for jihad training. The detainee claims he received no training due to the evacuations after the attacks of 11 September 2001.

b. Training

The detainee stated he was given very basic instructions on the use of the AK-47 while at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAYDANI, ABDUL KHALED

1. The detainee stayed at various safe houses during his time in Afghanistan, including one in Kandahar, two in Kabul and one in Jalalabad.
2. The detainee had direct access to the reports of the attacks on 11 September 2001 on the United States due to his presence at the Kabul, Afghanistan safe house on 11 September 2001.
3. The detainee stated he decided to head for Pakistan with a large group of Arabs attempting to avoid the approaching Northern Alliance forces.
4. The detainee stayed in various bunkers during the bombing of the Tora Bora, Afghanistan region. While in these bunkers, the detainee was in the close presence of armed Arab men, possibly al Qaida. Some of these men were actively engaged in fighting against the Northern Alliance.

d. Intent

The detainee has discussed committing jihad against the United States if released from detention.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was wounded by United States bombing in Tora Bora, Afghanistan and was then picked up by local Afghans, who took him to the Northern Alliance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the al Qaida attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denies knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks.
- b. The detainee originally entered Pakistan, to establish a textile trading business.
- c. The detainee insists he did not travel to Afghanistan to train for jihad.
- d. The detainee said he wanted military training in order to fulfill his religious obligations.
- e. The detainee denies using any weapons against Northern Alliance, but admits that he was provided with a rifle while in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan region.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 March 2007

To: FAHMI SALEM SAID AL ASANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAHMI SALEM SAID AL SANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend. The friend provided the detainee money for the bus trip from the detainee's home to Sanaa, Yemen.

2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.

3. The detainee's travel from Sanaa, Yemen to Afghanistan was facilitated by an individual.

4. The same individual obtained a Pakistan visa on the detainee's passport and provided the detainee with tickets from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

5. After arriving in Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee traveled with a group to the Afghanistan border. The detainee avoided a border check point and entered Afghanistan without showing his passport.

6. The detainee stated he left his passport, money and all other forms of identification at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated he traveled from a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to the al Farouq training camp, Afghanistan, where he stayed for approximately two and a half weeks.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAHMI SALEM SAID AL SANI

8. Training stopped at the al Farouq training camp in October 2001 due to the United States attacks on Taliban and al Qaida targets.
9. The detainee stated he traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan with approximately 50 other men.
10. Near the end of Ramadan, United States forces began bombing the detainee's location. With the assistance of a guide, the detainee and his group withdrew to another location. At this unspecified location, the detainee was injured in his lower right side by shrapnel from United States bombing.
11. The group subsequently surrendered to Afghan soldiers. The Afghan soldiers took the injured detainee to a hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan where the detainee spent a month and a half recuperating from his wounds.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.
2. Training conducted at al Farouq training camp, Afghanistan in September 2001 through October 2001 included three weeks of operation and maintenance of the AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Usama bin Laden while at the al Farouq training camp.
2. The detainee saw Ayman al-Zawahiri, who accompanied Usama bin Laden on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
3. The detainee saw Abu Gayth, who accompanied Usama bin Laden on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
4. Abu Gayth is a spokesman for al Qaida.
5. The detainee's name was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safe house raids. The document listed names, aliases, nationality, and possessions.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAHMI SALEM SAID AL SANI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee was queried if he knew where Usama bin Ladin is, if Usama bin Ladin spoke publicly about anti-American feelings or planned attacks on the United States, with negative results.

b. The detainee was queried about plans to escape Guantanamo Bay, Cuba or harm the guards, with negative results.

c. The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.

d. The detainee wants to go home and to serve his parents, if he ever goes home. The detainee has no specific career aspirations, and he believes that Allah will find him a job.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 October 2007

To: KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee identified himself as a born Afghan of Uzbek descent, but does not speak fluent Uzbek. The detainee will say something in Uzbek and not be able to continue on in that language and will change to Tajik, and when he can not go on in Tajik the detainee will change to Turkish.
 2. The detainee stated he spent approximately two years fighting the Soviet invasion as a cook prior to 1989.
 3. The detainee stated he attended part time study at a Madrasa in Pakistan. The detainee stated he became acquainted with an Arab while attending the Madrasa. The Arab introduced him to a Turk who offered to provide the detainee with a counterfeit Turkish passport for 500 United States Dollars.
 4. The Madrasa in the previous statement is controlled and used by a group to recruit and encourage students to participate in the resistance movements in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

5. The detainee stated he purchased a Turkish passport with the name Ali or Urqhan for 500 United States Dollars.
6. The detainee stated that the authorities who arrested him may have claimed he was Abdul Latif al Turki because that was the name printed on his fake Turkish passport.
7. The detainee stated he did not read the passport. The detainee stated he was coached on what to say in case officials questioned the detainee during his travels. The detainee could not recall what he was told about the passport.
8. The detainee was identified from a photograph as Abdul Latif al-Turki who was at a guest house in Peshwar, Pakistan in approximately 1995 or 1996.
9. The detainee stated the Pakistani authorities accused him of being an explosives expert who smuggled explosives from Tora Bora. The detainee's hands were tested for explosive residue and the test result was positive.
10. Indications are that the detainee was at the Nebras guest house.
11. The Nebras guest house is an al Qaida guest house where new students gathered before deploying via bus to a camp for basic training.

b. Training

1. The detainee may be Abu Abdallah al-Turki, reportedly an explosives expert and the commander of Margun al Qaida camp.
2. The Margun Training Camp in Afghanistan was operated by Usama bin Laden. The trainees at this camp were instructed in various aspects of terrorism, including the production of Improvised Explosive Devices.
3. An al Qaida detainee identified the detainee and said he took basic training at the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan in 1998.
4. Khalden Camp was co-managed by a senior al Qaida Lieutenant. An entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.
5. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan fighting for the Northern Alliance against the Russians, he used a Kalashnikov, but had only witnessed explosives others had used. The detainee stated explosives were only used by specially

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trained groups of individuals.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a Mujahedin travel facilitator who brought individuals for training from approximately 1993 to 2001.
2. The detainee was a Mujahedin, but it was not known what group, if any, he belonged to.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. During the raid of the detainee's location, 19 English-language manuals were discovered. The manuals covered the manufacture of improvised explosives and detailed explanations of the manufacture of poisons.
2. A source stated the detainee used to pray to encourage murder of Americans and say that they would be successful.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he never served in the military and never attended any military style training camps, but did attend a physical fitness camp in Afghanistan for six months. The detainee advised he knows how to operate a Kalashnikov rifle, but never received formal training in how to use it.
- b. The detainee stated that he was not Abdul Latif al-Turki and maybe they were looking for Abdul Latif the passport maker, whom he believed was Turkish. The detainee also argued that he was not at Tora Bora. The detainee stated he had remained in Pakistan at the Islamic school throughout this time period and only entered Afghanistan once after being released from the Pakistani officials an earlier time he was arrested.
- c. The detainee said if he were released he would like to be released to a country where there is peace and he would have the ability to obtain a job to make ends meet such as Canada, Turkey, Germany and America.
- d. The detainee stated he did not know a senior al Qaida Lieutenant. The detainee stated he was traditionally opposed to the Taliban government and had never heard of al Qaida until interned in Kandahar.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 Jul 2007

TO: ABU SUFLAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMOUDA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU SUFLAN IBRAHIM AHMED
HAMOUDA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and was assigned to the military committee. The detainee withdrew from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in 1998 and joined the Taliban movement.

2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They declared the government of Libya and its leader, Muammar Qadhafi, un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the International Mujahedin network.

3. The detainee took part in the war in Afghanistan. The detainee fought with the Taliban against the forces of Ahmad Shah Masood.

b. Training

1. The detainee joined the Libyan Army in 1979, where he completed basic training, and was assigned to a tank unit. The detainee was trained on the AK-47, rocket propelled grenade, and artillery rockets.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU SUFLAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMOUDA

2. The detainee received military training at Usama bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee worked as a truck driver in Sudan for a company that was owned by Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee's name and family information was listed on a document which contained details of al Qaida operatives' families. The document is associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

3. The detainee met with al Qaida operatives at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, after 11 September 2001, to discuss the evacuation of women and children.

4. The detainee worked in the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan from August 2001 to November 2001.

5. The nongovernmental organization, Wafa, officially named al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia, Wafa Humanitarian Organization, and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. While serving in the Libyan military, the detainee was arrested and jailed multiple times for drug and alcohol offenses, going absent without leave and attempted rape.

2. The detainee was arrested by Libyan authorities and was sentenced to four years in prison for drug trafficking. The detainee escaped from prison and fled to Sudan in 1992.

3. The detainee made two trips to Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan, in September and October 2001 to deliver equipment.

4. A foreign government considers the detainee a dangerous man with no qualms about committing terrorist acts. They believe the detainee was one of the extremist commanders of the Afghan Arabs.

5. An individual gave the detainee two stolen Mauritanian passports for use to leave Sudan in May 1997.

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6. The detainee stated he does not want to be sent back to Libya because of previous criminal charges related to drug trafficking and the detainee's escape from prison.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of terrorist activity and insisted that he only worked for al Wafa as a means to feed his family.

b. The detainee insists that he never delivered weapons, never fought, never went to a guesthouse and was never around weapons in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 January 2007

TO: AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee reported that he spoke with an individual who was a recruiter and travel facilitator for military training in Afghanistan. The detainee met the individual in Hadramaut, Yemen.

2. The detainee stated he was told by the recruiter how nice Afghanistan was and the recruiter pushed the idea of going for military training. The detainee was told that if he trained in Afghanistan he could go to Chechnya afterwards to fight in the jihad.

3. The detainee traveled from Hadramaut, Yemen to Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee then proceeded to Karachi, Pakistan and on to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee continued on to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as someone who came to the Khan Gulam Betche Guest House from the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. The detainee admitted he went to train because Muslims have a religious duty to do so.

3. The detainee trained at the Libyan camp annex in the vicinity of Kabul, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

4. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, the rocket-propelled grenade launcher, the PK machine gun and other weapons.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan at a guest house called al Ansar before deciding to go to the Libyan camp for training.

2. The al Ansar Guest House in Kabul, Afghanistan is a two-story house with a basement. It accommodates Arabs immigrating to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.

4. A source saw the detainee at a Karachi, Pakistan guest house.

5. The detainee was arrested at a Karachi, Pakistan safe house.

6. The detainee was arrested at an Arab safe house with others attempting to flee Pakistan. Many of the other people arrested at the safe house were either confirmed terrorists or highly suspected terrorists.

7. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as being a Yemeni bodyguard for Usama bin Laden who he saw in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he was not interested in training, but wanted to move to Afghanistan to start a family.

b. The detainee was asked where the Libyan camp was located. The detainee stated he had never been there but heard about it through people who were there as transients. The detainee refused to answer anything else about the Libyan camp.

c. The detainee stated he was not trained at the Libyan camp, but he was trained by a Libyan man.

d. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan ostensibly for the purpose of getting married, finding work and settling down.

e. The detainee maintains that he originally went to Afghanistan to immigrate and not for training.

f. The detainee stated he wants to be released to be with his family. The detainee stated if released, he would work in carpentry, building and painting houses.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States prior to their execution and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 August 2007

To: ALI, MASOUR MOHAMED MUTAYA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, MASOUR MOHAMED MUTAYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was influenced to go to Afghanistan after viewing a video dedicated to training for the Bosnian War.
 2. The detainee made all the travel arrangements himself, obtaining the necessary visas and airline tickets.
 3. The detainee spent approximately three months in Yemen before traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Kahul, Afghanistan, via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
 4. The detainee stated he entered Afghanistan for training.
 5. The detainee spent approximately one month in Loghar, Afghanistan, while waiting for training. The detainee walked to a fighting position and stayed for approximately five weeks. The detainee left for Pakistan after the first week of Ramadan, around 22 November 2001.
 6. The detainee traveled to the border with a guide and stayed at the guide's house for approximately three weeks, planning his trip back to Saudi Arabia. The detainee spent

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, MASOUR MOHAMED MUTAYA

six weeks traveling to Karachi, Pakistan, hiding at several homes along the way.

7. The detainee was taken to a home in Karachi, Pakistan, and spent three weeks there. There were approximately 15-16 people living in the house. The home's owner was reported to have been helping the detainee obtain a new passport so he could return home.
8. The detainee was arrested, with the rest of the occupants of the house, when the Pakistani Police raided the house. The detainee spent approximately three weeks in Pakistan custody before being transferred to United States custody.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard two men speak about the jihad in Afghanistan at a local mosque. The speakers encouraged males to travel to Afghanistan to receive military training.
2. The detainee's name was among the names of 324 suspected al Qaida members listed on a document found in a safe house raided in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- b. The detainee stated that he had not heard of al Qaida until the American World Trade Center attack.
- c. The detainee stated he did not receive any training.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 April 2007

TO: SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan to fulfill his religious dawa.

2. The detainee stated he agreed to work with Jamat al Tabligh for one month and paid his own way to Karachi, Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated he arrived at the airport in Karachi, Pakistan with other al Tabligh members.

4. The Jamat al Tabligh organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

5. An individual told the detainee there was a large al Tabligh headquarters in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the individual told him he was leaving in a few days and offered to take the detainee with him to Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated an individual told the detainee he should come with him to the al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and complete his religious requirement to train and prepare for jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was transported to the al Farouq Military Training Camp. The detainee stated he trained on the Kalashnikov and the PK.
2. The detainee identified the leader of his group and the leader of the al Farouq Camp.
3. The detainee stated he stayed at the al Farouq Camp for about 45 days.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated an individual who was a travel facilitator was his point of contact in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. The detainee stayed at a house in Kandahar, Afghanistan which was occupied by other Arabs.
3. The detainee stated he was instructed to surrender all his possessions which consisted of 3,000 United States Dollars, a passport, telephone book, and a Yemeni identification to an individual at the house.
4. The detainee revealed he stayed at the al Ansar guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan for over one month in October/November 2000.
5. The detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and met with an individual who was helping others to get out of Afghanistan. The detainee stated the attacks of 11 September 2001 took place and the individual told the detainee he could no longer help him because of the heightened state of alert.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he joined a group of Arabs who were staying in the mountain regions of Afghanistan. The detainee observed about 100 Arabs, of which, more than half were armed with Kalashnikov weapons.
2. A source recognized the detainee as being in the safe house with him at the time of his arrest.
3. The detainee stated when he was arrested all his property was taken from him, including his Casio watch.
4. The Casio digital watch was commonly given to al Farouq attendees.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

5. The detainee had interactions with the guard force which resulted in disciplinary actions against the detainee. The detainee stated he was not remorseful for any acts and explained the guards are his enemies.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to the execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee recanted his story about attending the al Farouq training camp.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 April 2007

To: HAMOOD ABDULLA HAMOOD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMOOD ABDULLA HAMOOD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wanted to fight for jihad in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee had 2,000 United States Dollars of his own money saved for the trip to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan by an individual at the Hayel Said Mosque in Aden, Yemen. The individual gave the detainee 500 United States Dollars and travel instructions to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was motivated to commit jihad after learning any Muslim who dies for jihad goes straight to Allah and into paradise.

5. The detainee served as an assistant officer on the northern Afghanistan front.

b. Training

1. The detainee admits he knows how to use the Kalashnikov rifle, but stated he never went to an al Qaida or Taliban training camp.

2. The detainee stayed at the Said Center, a military post in the Bagram area in Afghanistan, for twenty-five days.

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3. The Said Center Camp was a Taliban run training camp for Arab recruits enroute to fight General Dostum's soldiers to the north of Konduz, Afghanistan. Training consisted of small arms familiarization and range qualification.

4. The detainee was identified as an expert in using the SAM-7 missile system.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, an unidentified guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, and at a guest house in Karachi, Pakistan where he was captured in a raid.

2. The Arab House was a Taliban sponsored safe house for Arab Mujahedin in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee made three trips delivering money in Herat, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated he was given 2,000 Saudi Riyals, 20,000 Pakistani Rupees, and Afghani money worth about 10,000 Pakistani Rupees to be taken to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee gave the money to the second in command of the government in Herat.

5. A source identified the detainee as having been present at an al Qaida member's Karachi, Pakistan guest house.

d. (U) Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled through Syria on his way to Afghanistan, and also made two other previous trips to Syria.

2. The detainee was detained by Pakistan police with 6,000 United States Dollars, 2,700 Saudi Riyals, 6,000 Pakistani Rupees, a camera, and a new cellular phone.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he never received any type of training in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee was adamant about the fact that while in Afghanistan he did not fire any weapons, kill any people, or fight in any way.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMOOD ABDULLA HAMOOD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2007

To: HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR HAMIS BIN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR HAMIS BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A parishioner at the Takwa Mosque convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan for Dawa. The detainee went to Afghanistan eight months after graduating high school.
2. The detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Yemen and Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
3. The detainee stated he stayed at a Taliban embassy house in Quetta, Pakistan.
4. The detainee was at a guest house called Muddafah al Ansar in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
5. A source stated the al Ansar Mudafa was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the area of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated he stopped at a house called Madafa, known as the House of the Saudi Ambassador, located in Wazir Akbahr Khan, Shahree Nao, Afghanistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR HAMIS BIN

7. The Ambassador of Saudi Arabia Guest House is known as Azzam Guest House.
 8. The Azzam Guest House is run by one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people.
 9. A source stated the Azam Guest House was used by groups fighting in the northern frontline areas of Afghanistan, exclusively.
 10. The detainee stated an individual told him he should go to Farouk Camp for dawa. The detainee stated that when he arrived at Farouk Camp, he was asked to take weapons training for jihad and he willingly agreed.
- b. Training
1. The detainee trained at Camp al Farouq for two to three months on various weapons including the Kalashnikov, M-16, pistols, PK, Rocket-Propelled Grenades, and hand grenades.
 2. The al Farouq Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.
- c. Connections/Associations
1. The detainee stated that in 2000 an individual paid for the detainee's eye surgery in Karachi, Pakistan as a gift.
 2. The individual in the previous statement was an important al Qaida official.
 3. The detainee stated an individual made all travel arrangements, and bought food and clothing for the detainee while the detainee was staying in a house in Karachi, Pakistan, the location of the detainee's arrest.
 4. This individual was a former facilitator to senior al Qaida members.
 5. The detainee was seen after September 2001 in Zurmat, Afghanistan. The detainee might have been an al Qaida instructor and was responsible for the frontlines.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. The detainee stated that during his training at Farouk Camp, Usama bin Laden visited the Camp to give a lecture on the battle of Jagi in Northern Afghanistan.

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2. On 7 February 2002, a search was conducted on a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, used by an al Qaida associate. Among the items found in the facility were two brand new aircraft passenger life vests.
3. At the time of the detainee's arrest, life jackets from an airline were found at the house in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee acknowledged he saw one vest lying on a second floor balcony.
4. Initial testing on the two life vests and a backpack found at the safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, tested positive for explosives.
5. An individual identified the detainee as the primary weapons instructor at Camp al Farouq. Reportedly, the detainee also taught explosives.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he did not know why the vest was lying on a second floor balcony of the Karachi, Pakistan house he was arrested in. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of how the vest got there or who put the vest on the floor. The detainee stated he never saw any explosives in the house.
- b. The detainee stated he initially lied about his attendance at al Farouq because he was told that al Farouq related admissions would guarantee that the detainee was transferred to United States custody and away from Arab custody. The detainee stated he was told that the Americans treated attendance at al Farouq as a minor issue, and that the detainee would be released from United States custody faster when compared to being jailed in Pakistan.
- c. The detainee stated he told his initial interviewers he attended small arms training at a Taliban camp because his captors told him if he would admit to jihad he would be taken to a nice American prison instead of a bad Arab prison where he would be tortured.
- d. When questioned about how the detainee knew specifics of the al Farouq Camp if the detainee had never attended, the detainee stated that the details he knew about the al Farouq Camp were common knowledge and the names he mentioned were made up.
- e. The detainee stated he never trained with or met Usama bin Laden.
- f. The detainee denied previous reporting and stated he went to Afghanistan for two years as an Islamic missionary.

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- g. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to teach people the Koran and how to pray.
- h. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated that he had never trained at any training camp, including al Farouq
- i. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated he had never seen Usama bin Laden in person but that he only saw him on the television.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 June 2007

TO: KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI KHAIRKHWANA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI
KHAIRKHWANA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. In 1994, when the Taliban started their rise to power, the detainee traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan and lived in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee acted as the Pashtu spokesman for the Taliban from 1994 to 1999.
 3. The detainee is a former Taliban Interior Minister and was the commander of Taliban forces that took Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, in 1996.
 4. In 1998, the detainee shipped weapons captured by the Taliban to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee was selected to be Governor of Herat province, Afghanistan, by a senior Taliban leader.
 6. The detainee was trusted by the Taliban to keep order in Herat, Afghanistan, and to send taxes collected back to senior Taliban members.
 7. Only the detainee or Usama bin Laden could authorize entrance to one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Herat, Afghanistan. The Taliban facility was controlled by Usama bin Laden and conducted terrorist training two times per week.

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8. A source stated that prior to 11 September 2001 he fought with a group that included the detainee and others who were Afghan Taliban members.

9. On 25 October 2001, the detainee provided money for troops and money for fuel purchases used to send 300 men from the Taliban 17th Army Division in Herat, Afghanistan, to Sabzak Pass in Badghis Province, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated he attended a meeting after the start of the American offensive and bombing in Afghanistan in early November 2001. The Taliban was brokering for a coalition between the Taliban and Northern Alliance against the United States, the purchase and supply of Russian SAM-7 missiles for use against United States warplanes, and an open border to Iran for any Arab or Taliban to smuggle money or goods out of Afghanistan.

11. The detainee was identified as a hardliner in terms of Taliban philosophy.

b. Training

When the detainee was in his teens, he received military training for a short period of time at Camp Marof, near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee attended a meeting with Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin officials, Taliban officials, and Ayman al Zawahiri. Topics for discussion included United States intervention in the region and restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

2. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is a foreign terrorist organization with long established ties to Usama bin Laden.

3. In the fall of 2001, the detainee met with senior Taliban leaders for a period of approximately 10 minutes, at a house across from the Kharq-e-Sharif shrine.

4. The detainee was known to have close ties to Usama bin Laden.

5. In 1996, the detainee attended a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which included jihad fighters and guests of Usama bin Laden, who was also present.

6. Usama bin Laden said the detainee should be part of a joint delegation to arrange meetings with the goal of splitting up the Northern Alliance.

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