



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *SLH*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *AS 12/10/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 574 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 10 Oct 2008 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5)

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
*12/30/08*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 574

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the detainee in accordance with JDG Standard Operating Procedures. The AMO received written confirmation from the JDG stating the documents were not accepted by the detainee.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 574  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 5

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN


# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-25.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)




(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 574  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 5

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



b. **(S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



c. **(U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

d. (U) Recommendation

(b)(1),(b)(5)

7. (U) **Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)  
(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Colonel [redacted] Air Force  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

06 October 2008

To: HAMOOD, HAMOOD ABDULLA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMOOD, HAMOOD ABDULLA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated that a man spoke to him about jihad at the Hayel Said Mosque. The detainee stated his motivation to do jihad came after learning that any Muslim who died for jihad goes straight to Allah and into paradise.
- 2) The detainee stated he was recruited to go to Afghanistan in the Halyel Said Mosque in Adan, Yemen. The detainee stated that the man that recruited him provided the detainee with 500 United States Dollars and travel instructions to Afghanistan. The detainee also had 2,000 Dollars of his own money saved for the trip to Afghanistan for Jihad.
- 3) The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan for jihad against Masood. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Iran via Syria. The detainee stated he then crossed the border into Afghanistan and traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he stayed for one month.
- 4) The detainee stayed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for approximately one month, and then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and then to Bagram, Afghanistan. The detainee spent ten days in a military post with Arab, Afghani, and Pakistani fighters.

ISN 574  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMOOD, HAMOOD ABDULLA

- a. The training camp was a Taliban run training camp. The students were a mix of Saudi, Yemeni, Pakistani, and Afghani nationals. The courses of instruction lasted over a month and consisted of small arms familiarization. Students were taught how to fire the Kalashnikov Rifle, Beka, and Rocket Propelled Grenade.
- 5) The detainee stated he traveled from Syria to Iran alone, but met two Arabs who were willing to help him travel because they too were on their way to do jihad. The detainee stated that all three ended up at the Arab guesthouse.
- 6) The detainee stated he served as a rear guard in the Bagram, Afghanistan, area for approximately 25 days, but stated he left the front when he discovered they were fighting against other Muslims.
- 7) The detainee stated he tried to exit Afghanistan through Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that when he discovered he would not be able to leave through Jalalabad he returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he then went to Chuman, Afghanistan, on the Afghan/Pakistan border where the detainee was smuggled into Pakistan. The detainee stated he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, where he was taken to a guest house.
- 8) It was reported the detainee served as an assistant officer, was in charge of a military group, and trained on all types of weapons.
- 9) It was reported the detainee was a famous military commander in the 1980's and also in Bosnia and Chechnya. It was also reported the detainee was an expert in surface to air missiles and the detainee's favorite weapon was the rocket propelled grenade.

### b) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated a man he met told the detainee to go to Kandahar, Afghanistan and wait for him there in a guest house. The detainee stated he waited for ten days.
  - a. The guest house was a Taliban sponsored safe house for Arab Mujahedin in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

### c) Training

- 1) The detainee stated he has no formal military training or experience, but knows how to use a Kalashnikov rifle.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMOOD, HAMOOD ABDULLA**

## **d) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee stated while in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee made three trips to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the first was when he was given 2,000 Riyals, 20,000 Pakistani Dollars, and a small pile of Afghani money to deliver. The detainee stated the second time he was given 30,000 Pakistani Dollars and a big block of Afghani money to deliver. The detainee stated the third time was to deliver 200 American Dollars to an Imam at a mosque.
- 2) The detainee stated he spent about one month at the Arab guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he wanted to leave Afghanistan, but could not arrange for an Iranian visa.
- 3) The detainee stated he was detained in a safe house in Pakistan, by Pakistani police with 6,000 United States dollars, 2,700 Saudi riyals, 6,000 Pakistani rupees, a camera, and a new cellular phone.
- 4) It was reported that the detainee was at the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, about one year before the American bombing began.

## **4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:**

- a) The detainee stated he had never received any type of training in Afghanistan. The detainee had sold the only weapon he owned prior to his marriage. The detainee also stated that while in Afghanistan he did not fire any weapons, kill any people or fight in any way.
  - b) The detainee stated he had no knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, nor knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
  - c) The detainee stated he never attended an al Qaida or Taliban training camp. The detainee stated he never fought for the Taliban and had only heard about al Qaida.
  - d) The detainee stated he felt it was wrong to fight against his Muslim brothers so he left the front lines although he never received permission, and returned to Kabul, Afghanistan on his own.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 3 of 4

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMOOD, HAMOOD ABDULLA**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official (U)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(5),(b)(6)

THRU: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U)

FROM: Director, OARDEC (U) *18:12/08*

SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 575 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 4 September 2008, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5)

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
FBI	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(Detain)

Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

SECRET//NOFORN

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 575

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee understood the process. When offered copies of both the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence, the detainee refused to accept them.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

### 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 575

Enclosure (5)

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SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-40.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 5

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**


(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



b. **(S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
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(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 August 2008

To: AZNI, JARD AL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) **Commitment**
    - 1) The detainee stated that he was first approached to join the Jamat-al-Tabligh when his education in Yemen was given by the Jamat-al-Tabligh people.
      - a) Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
    - 2) The detainee stated that a group known as Jamat-al-Tabligh entered his village and their message piqued his interest. The detainee stated their message was an explanation of the principals of Islam and this made him decide to travel with them to learn more.
    - 3) The detainee stated that on his flight to Pakistan he met several other men who asked him if he would like to join them in Afghanistan. The detainee stated the men on the airplane convinced him he could get the same level of religious education in Afghanistan from Mauritanian sheikhs.
    - 4) The detainee stated he studied recitation of the Koran for one and one half years at a school in Radai, Yemen. Following that, he attended an advanced religious school in Hadramout, Yemen, in order to learn religious science and become an Imam. He

ISN 575  
DMO Exhibit 1  
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## UNCLASSIFIED

### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

graduated after one year of study but did not reach the stage of becoming an Imam. The detainee stated that following graduation, he entered a college where he studied religious science for two years, but did not complete the full course of studies.

- 5) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to study religious science further. The detainee stated this was paid by his cousin, who was visiting from Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated his cousin purchased an airplane ticket for the detainee from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan, and sent the detainee 100 United States dollars in cash.
- 6) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan as a way to get to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he did not plan on staying in Pakistan to study Islam. The detainee was asked specifically if his plan was to fight in Afghanistan instead of studying Islam in Pakistan. The detainee stated yes.
- 7) The detainee stated that he flew out of Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated on the flight, he met several individuals who told him about an institute in Afghanistan where sheikhs from Mauritania taught the Koran. The detainee stated upon arrival in Karachi, he accompanied the three men to a hotel in Karachi then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan. In Quetta, an Afghani picked up the men and drove them to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee stated he lived and studied for two years at a college located east of Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated his tuition was covered by Mauritanian sheikhs at the college.
- 9) The detainee stated he left the college because of the war, when the Arabs decided to leave Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the college also shut down.
- 10) The detainee stated he left the Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan, with several Philipinos. The detainee stated the men traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan, where they slept in a tent in the valley for approximately 15 days.
- 11) The detainee stated in Khowst, Afghanistan, he met four Arabs who took the detainee to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stated the Arabs gave him 1,200 dollars and 500 Saudi Riyals to aid him in his travels.
- 12) The detainee stated it was his plan to go to another Jamat-al-Tabligh school in Lahore, Pakistan, where he could call someone to get him back to Yemen. The detainee stated he got to Lahore via smugglers.
- 13) The detainee stated he was taken to the train station. He met two Arabs at the train station who traveled with him to Karachi, Pakistan. Upon their arrival in Karachi, the

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

two Arabs made a phone call and a man picked them up and took them to a house in Karachi. The detainee stated he believed the man was in charge of the house.

- 14) The detainee stated he was waiting at the house for the man to get him a passport and visa so the detainee could get back to Yemen.
- 15) The detainee stated he was at the house for approximately 30 days before they were arrested.
- 16) The detainee stated he attended a gathering where Usama bin Laden gave a speech and talked to approximately 30 students at an institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 17) Reportedly, approximately 20 to 25 unidentified plain-clothed Pakistanis entered the safe house in Pakistan and captured several individuals. Reportedly, the detainee was one of the individuals.
- 18) The detainee stated the men were in custody for approximately 20 to 30 days before being turned over to United States authorities.

### b) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he was not Shiite or Sunni, he claimed to be part of a group called Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
- 2) The detainee stated the mosque in Radai, Yemen, was also the Jamat-al-Tabiligh center.
- 3) The detainee stated at 22-23 years old, he decided to leave Yemen to go to Pakistan in support of Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
- 4) Reportedly, assignments to carry out certain operations or perform certain business matters are done on a more selective basis by the Dawa al Tabiligh. Reportedly, the detainee was selected for one of these operations. Reportedly, Dawa al Tabiligh and Jamat-al-Tabiligh are the same organization.
- 5) The detainee stated the students at the Institute of Islamic Studies consisted primarily of Afghani and Philippine Taliban members.
- 6) Reportedly, the Islamic Institute was financed directly by Usama bin Laden. Reportedly, the detainee was involved in the delivery of the money.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

- 7) Reportedly, the detainee was a Yemeni who was very high in the al Qaida chain of command. Reportedly, the mission of the detainee was to issue religious fatwas and religious teachings.
- 8) The detainee stated he contacted the supreme leader of the Jamat-al-Tabligh to help him get into Pakistan.

### c) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated he has no military service or experience.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he was not affiliated with al Qaida.
- b) The detainee stated he did not study any weaponry. The detainee stated there were no weapons at the college.
- c) The detainee stated he is not aware of any individuals who have received training to conduct terrorist operations and who may have been dispatched to carry out unspecified attacks.
- d) The detainee stated he does not have knowledge of any potential operatives who may be involved in terrorist activities against the United States or Western interests.
- e) The detainee stated he does not like Usama bin Laden or terrorism. The detainee has never been approached by anyone seeking assistance or money for terrorist related activities. The detainee has not observed anyone preparing to conduct terrorist acts.
- f) The detainee stated he denied ever seeing Usama bin Laden at the institute, as previously reported. The detainee stated he had previously told this to interrogators in Afghanistan because he had been beaten. The detainee stated that he did not know of any affiliations between anyone at the institute and al Qaida.
- g) The detainee stated he was not affiliated with al Qaida or the Taliban.
- h) The detainee stated he studied in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and never participated in training of Jihad activities in Afghanistan.
- i) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to recruit or convert people to Islam.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official (U)

THRU: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *DF*

FROM: Director, OARDEC (U) *AS 10/14/08*

SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 576 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 19 Aug 2008, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5):

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detainee) *11-3-08*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 576

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings


a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee understood the process.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 576

Enclosure (5)

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# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN


# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-37.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).


### (1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)




### (2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



### (3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)




### (4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



### (5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 576  
Enclosure (5)  
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**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)


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ISN 576  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

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Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

**CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy**  
**Presiding Officer**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 July 2008

To: KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he left for Afghanistan eight months after graduating high school. The detainee graduated high school in 1999. He had been convinced, by a parishioner at the Mosque, to go to Afghanistan for "Dawa", a religious calling to teach Islam. The parishioner bought the detainee an airline ticket and gave the detainee \$50 in United States currency.
  - a. The house in Kandahar was reportedly a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the area of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - b. An individual was reported to have done computer work for al Qaida from the house in the Kart Barwan area of Kandahar.
- 2) The detainee stated he traveled, with a group of three individuals, to Sana, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan, to Quetta, Pakistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he and his group stayed at the guesthouses in Quetta, Kandahar, and in the Karte Barwan area.

ISN 576  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER**

- 3) The detainee stated that an individual from his group told him he should go to a camp (al Farouq) he knows for Dawa.
  - a. This camp (al Farouq) is reportedly in Afghanistan and funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
- 4) The detainee stated that after finishing his training at the camp, he returned to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he stayed in a house located in Kabul, near a Mosque. The person in charge of this house took detainee in to study and memorize the Koran. The detainee stated he stayed for about 6-7 months.
- 5) The detainee stated he traveled to Karachi, a time period estimated to be near the end of the summer of 2000, for laser eye surgery. The detainee stated the person in charge of the quest house paid for the eye surgery as a gift to the detainee. The detainee stated that after approximately one month in Karachi, he returned to Kabul.
- 6) The detainee stated he, his house mates, and about seven other Arabs jumped into a car with an Afghani driver and headed towards Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated they arrived at mountains at sunrise and found trenches in the mountain for shelter. The detainee stated they were armed but no attacks were made for the month he stayed at that location.
- 7) The detainee stated that after the fall of Kabul, he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, via Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he arrived at a safe house in Karachi and was there twenty days before the raid and his capture.
- 8) The detainee was reportedly a commander serving with the Taliban on the front lines near Konduz.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated that at the beginning of the Allied bombings, around the beginning of Ramadan, he wanted to leave the country. The detainee stated that three to four days from Ramadan, he and three individuals went to a house of the Saudi Ambassador.
- 2) On 7 February 2002, the Pakistanis reportedly raided a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, and captured 15 individuals, one of which was the detainee.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER**

- a. One of the captured individuals stated that one of the al Qaeda operatives worked with senior al Qaida leaders and bribed officials, forge documents, and provide visas and passports for people traveling to Afghanistan.
  - b. The detainee stated that a man made all the travel arrangements, and bought food and clothing for him while he was staying in a house in Karachi, Pakistan, the location of his arrest.
- 3) The detainee stated that during his training at the camp, Usama bin Laden visited to give a lecture on the battle of Jagi in Northern Afghanistan. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden was accompanied by ten body guards. Usama bin Laden was only seen at the camp for this one day period.
  - 4) The detainee was seen after September 2001 in Zurmat, Afghanistan. The detainee might have been an al Qaida instructor and was responsible for the frontlines.
- c) Training**
- 1) The detainee stated he trained at a camp for two to three months, during a period believed to be in the fall of 1999.
  - 2) The detainee stated that when he arrived at the training camp, he was told he should take weapons training. The detainee stated the training was for jihad and agreed to take the training willingly.
  - 3) The detainee stated he trained on various weapons including the Kalashnikov or AK-47, M-16, pistols, PK, Rocket Propelled Grenade, hand grenades, physical activity and religious studies.
  - 4) The detainee was reportedly the primary trainer on weapons and explosives. The detainee was reportedly an associate of trainers at a training camp.
  - 5) The detainee reportedly taught Pashtu and Farsi at the training camp along with training in weapons and explosives.
  - 6) The detainee reportedly provided individuals with information about training in an al-Qaida training video.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

### d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) On 7 February 2002, a search was conducted on a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, used by an al Qaida associate. Among the items found in the facility were two brand new aircraft passenger life vests.
  - a. Initial testing on the two life vests and a backpack found at the safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, tested positive for explosives.
  - b. Reportedly, when asked about the life jackets found at the house in Karachi, Pakistan, at the time of the detainee's arrest, the detainee stated he saw one vest lying on a second floor balcony of the house.
- 2) The detainee's passport indicated he was in Jordan from 14 April 2000 to 18 August 2000. The detainee denied traveling to Jordan. The detainee stated his passport was taken from him and when it was returned, it contained Jordan stamps. The detainee was told that the stamps were needed to make the passport appear legitimate.

### 4. (U) Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he did not know why the life vest was lying on a second floor balcony of the Karachi, Pakistan house where he was arrested. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of how the life vest got there or who put the vest on the floor. The detainee thought the vest might be a souvenir from an airline. The detainee stated he never saw any explosives in the house.
- b) The detainee stated he did not handle the vests at any time nor did he see anybody else handle the vests. The detainee also stated the vests were not discussed at any time by anybody in the guesthouse. The detainee stated the only property he had with him at the guesthouse were his personal belongings such as his clothing and passport. He denied having any books of any sort at the house.
- c) The detainee stated he initially lied to United States investigators concerning his attendance at the training camp because the Pakistani police told the detainee that such admissions would guarantee that the detainee was transferred to United States custody, away from Arab custody. The detainee stated Pakistani authorities told him that the Americans treated attendance at the training camp as a "minor issue", and that the detainee would be released from United States custody faster when compared to being jailed in Pakistan.
- d) The detainee stated that he told his initial interviewers he attended small arms training at a Taliban camp because his captors told him if he would admit to jihad he would be

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

taken to a "nice American prison" instead of a "bad Arab prison" where he would be tortured.

- e) When questioned about how the detainee knew specifics of the training camp if the detainee had never attended, the detainee stated that the details he knew about the training camp were common knowledge and the names he mentioned were made up.
- f) The detainee stated he never trained with or met Usama bin Laden.
- g) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan for two years as an Islamic missionary.
- h) The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to study and memorize the Koran. He stated he did not work during that time and did not do anything other than study for the two years he was in Afghanistan. He further stated a man he met at the mosque who assisted him in his travel to Afghanistan.
- i) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to teach people the Koran and how to pray.
- j) The detainee stated he had never trained at any training camp. The detainee stated he had never seen Usama Bin laden in person but that he only saw Usama bin Laden on television.
- k) The detainee stated that he had no prior knowledge of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *5/4*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *15<sup>th</sup>/12/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 577 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 19 Sep 08 resulting in a (b)(1),(b) recommendation to (b)(1),(b) (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5) (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_ *11-10-08*

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 577**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

- a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.
- b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.
- c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview.
- d. (U) The ARB confirmed the JTF-Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) hand-carried the original English and Arabic Unclassified Summary of Evidence to the detainee. The AMO received an affidavit from the SJA stating the documents were delivered.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-34.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (6):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. **(S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

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(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 September 2008

To: ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated in Kandahar, Afghanistan, a man spent several days talking with the detainee about the al Wafa organization and its mission.
  - a. The Secretary of State placed al Wafa on the Terrorist Exclusion List on 5 December 2001. An organization is placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List if the Secretary of State finds that the organization commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information potential targets for terrorist activity or provides material support to further terrorist activity.
- 2) The detainee stated he left Yemen in 1991 and traveled to Baku, Azerbaijan, to study Petroleum Engineering. The detainee stated that after graduation, he began working with the al Haramayn organization there in 1997.
  - a. Al Haramain has been identified as supporting to a certain extent Islamic extremist elements in seventeen countries or regions. Support is not only financial but also consists of freeing activist from prisons, procurement of fraudulent travel documents, support of family members of imprisoned, and providing medical care for wounded mujahedin. Al Haramain is closely associated with al Qaida.

ISN 577  
DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

- 3) The detainee stated he was with al Haramayn for approximately one year (1997-1998) before he got his job as the director.
- 4) The detainee stated in 1998 all employees of al Haramayn worked for him. The detainee stated he was responsible for distributing money to them, as paid by al Haramayn, as well as receiving money for five refugee camps.
- 5) Reportedly, al Haramayn sent money to Chechnya. Reportedly, the detainee left Azerbaijan because he was scared after media reports came out accusing the organization of sending money to Chechnya. Reportedly, the detainee left his belongings behind, indicating he was in a hurry to leave the country.
- 6) Reportedly, the al Haramayn organization transported one million dollars to Chechnya. Reportedly, the detainee spoke about transporting money as if it had been done many times and he had done it himself.
- 7) Reportedly, the detainee received 100,000 United States dollars for al Haramayn in November 1999.
- 8) The detainee stated after quitting the Baku, Azerbaijan, office of al Haramayn around January 2000, he arrived in Yemen to begin work as a government employee.
- 9) The detainee stated in late 2000/early 2001, he traveled alone to Tanzania to visit the al Haramayn office and stayed about three weeks. The detainee stated he then returned to Yemen.
- 10) The detainee stated he was sent to Afghanistan to report on the viability of an al Haramayn office.
- 11) The detainee stated a Saudi friend arranged for him to travel to Karachi, Pakistan, for employment with an Islamic relief organization.
- 12) The detainee stated he was met at the Karachi airport by two members of the al Wafa organization. One of the members told the detainee he needed to meet the head of the al Wafa organization in Kandahar, Afghanistan. This member arranged the detainee's travel to meet the head of al Wafa and the detainee flew to Quetta, Pakistan.
- 13) The detainee stated he stayed at a special Taliban guest house in Karachi, Pakistan. According to the detainee, this guest house was the launch point for Taliban leaving Pakistan and as a reception point for those coming from abroad.
- 14) The detainee stated when he arrived in Quetta, Pakistan, he was met by an al Wafa employee. He and the employee then drove to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he began working for the al Wafa office.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED**

- 15) The detainee stated he spent two weeks in Kandahar, Afghanistan, before he was instructed to return to Karachi, Pakistan, by the head of al Wafa in Pakistan.
- 16) The detainee stated because al Wafa had not been officially registered as a business/organization, he had to place al Wafa funds in a personal account under his name.
- 17) The detainee stated the al Wafa office in Karachi, Pakistan did not have an official office, and consequently he relied on the local Taliban office for storage space and access to office equipment. The detainee stated he would retrieve medical supplies sent directly to the Taliban office and forward the supplies to Afghanistan.
- 18) The detainee reportedly received money to purchase twenty-five anti-chemical masks from Peshawar, Pakistan.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated he was a high level manager in al Haramayn but left in 2000 due to an expired visa.
- 2) The detainee stated he worked for the al Wafa organization from the beginning of June or July 2001 until his arrest in September 2001.
- 3) Reportedly, the detainee was brought to Pakistan to start up an al Wafa office in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee was later sent to Karachi, Pakistan to open an office there.
- 4) The detainee stated he was headquartered in Karachi, Pakistan, and was in charge of all Pakistan al Wafa operations. The detainee stated he also handled all financial and logistical matters of al Wafa in Pakistan.
- 5) The detainee stated he knew two al Qaida members.

### **c) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee stated while at the Karachi al Wafa office, he received 3 money transfers totaling 110,000 United States dollars.
- 2) The detainee stated shortly after 11 September 2001, he received a call informing him the al Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan, was closing for fear of the United States air attacks. The detainee was sent several boxes of Kandahar office documents and paperwork for safekeeping.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

- 3) The detainee stated he had 2,000 United States dollars in the bank and 11,300 United States dollars in cash at the time of his arrest.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a) The detainee stated al Haramayn was a humanitarian organization, which provided aid and supplies to displaced people as well as donating food and books to the less fortunate.
  - b) The detainee stated al Haramayn did not have anything to do with funding the Chechnyan jihad or mujahed fighters. He further stated to his knowledge the only items that were sent to Chechnya through al Haramayn were several boxes of blankets and supplies that went through the Russian embassy directly to Chechnya.
  - c) The detainee stated he was unaware of any connections between al Wafa and al Qaida. The detainee added that he would not have been involved with al Wafa if he had known that.
  - d) Reportedly, there is no relation between al Qaida and al Wafa organization, explaining al Qaida disliked al Wafa and both organizations were in a disagreement.
  - e) The detainee stated the al Wafa office in Karachi, Pakistan, was strictly a charitable organization.
  - f) The detainee stated he never opened the boxes that he received from the al Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - g) The detainee stated he never saw the notebooks sent in the boxes from the al Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which reportedly contained notes of weapons capabilities, explosives chemical and pharmaceutical lists and attack scenarios.
  - h) The detainee stated he never received cash to purchase anti-chemical masks. The detainee stated he only purchased medical equipment, medical supplies and furniture while working with al Wafa.
  - i) The detainee stated he had no contact with members of the Taliban government or the al Qaida terrorist organization.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *5/1*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *12/9/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 578 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 12 Nov 08 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5)

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 12-30-08  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

- o (U) Attachments:  
 Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
 Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 578

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive. The detainee's ARB interview was scheduled for 5 November 2008; however, upon learning the purpose of the meeting, the detainee refused to leave his cell for the interview. In accordance with Joint Detention Group (JDG) Standard Operating Procedures, copies of the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence were hand carried to the detainee by the JDG liaison. The AMO received written confirmation from the JDG liaison stating the detainee accepted the documents.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the detainee in accordance with JDG Standard Operating Procedures. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the detainee from the JDG.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 578  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 1 of 8

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered. >

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**


a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-52.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (7):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



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**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**


**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(1),(b)(5)

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**


(b)(1),(b)(5)

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
(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

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
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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



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(b)(1),(b)(5)



**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**


(b)(1),(b)(5)



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(b)(1),(b)(5)



d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**7. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy  
Presiding Officer

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Enclosure (6)  
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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 November 2008

To: ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. **Commitment**
    - 1) The detainee stated he wanted to learn to fight, knowing that he would most likely go to the northern front lines. The detainee further stated that his decision to participate in the jihad was due to the fact that he was told Afghanistan was at war with the Russians.
    - 2) The detainee stated he heard about jihad from a Sheikh lecturing at a mosque located in Yemen. The detainee stated that when the Sheikh's sermon ended, an individual talked with the detainee about the jihad in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that, afterwards, the individual contacted him a number of times, urging him to go to Afghanistan and help in the jihad against the Russians.
    - 3) The detainee stated that the man who recruited him in Yemen convinced him that participation in jihad would be a prime opportunity to assist widows and orphans in Afghanistan.
    - 4) The detainee stated that approximately one to two months later, an individual assisted him in traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee stated this individual provided him with an airline ticket to Afghanistan via Syria and Iran and gave him approximately 500 United States Dollars for expenses.

ISN 578  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ**

- 5) The detainee stated that he flew from Yemen to Damascus, Syria, and then to Tehran, Iran; he spent two or three days in Tehran, Iran, and then took the train to the Afghanistan border.
  - 6) The detainee stated he stayed at the Arab House in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for two to three weeks; the house contained 50 to 60 people. The detainee stated that while at the guest house, an individual took his ticket and passport.
  - 7) The detainee was reportedly an assistant instructor at the explosives training course taught at Abu Obeida (Tarnak Farms) Training Camp in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the detainee worked on designs for a shoe bomb and a limpet mine.
  - 8) The detainee stated he was taken to an area between the Said Center and the front line where he was told to familiarize himself with the area; if he was going to be fighting on the front line, he needed to know the area.
    - a. The Said Center was reportedly a Taliban run training camp located in Afghanistan. The course of instruction lasted over one month and consisted of small arms familiarization. Students at the camp were reportedly taught how to assemble, disassemble and fire the Kalashnikov rifle and rocket propelled grenade.
  - 9) The detainee stated he returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to a mosque near the Habash House. The detainee stated he stayed there for one month, during which time he met with an individual about obtaining a visa and his return tickets. The detainee stated that after the individual informed him the tickets had expired, he then went back to Kabul because he thought the Iranian Embassy was there. The detainee stated he learned obtaining a visa from the Iranians would be too difficult; therefore, he decided to travel through Pakistan to get to Yemen.
    - a. Al Qaida reportedly maintained a safe house in Kandahar near the Haji Habash Mosque. Arabs who came to Kandahar for military training at the al Farouq Training Camp used this house, in particular.
  - 10) Reportedly, while staying at a guest house in Pakistan, the detainee fixed passports.
- b. Connections/Associations**
- 1) The detainee was named as a captured Mujahedin on a list kept by a senior al Qaida operative.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ**

- 2) Reportedly, the detainee was one of two individuals chosen by a Usama bin Laden to carry out an unidentified mission outside of Afghanistan.
- 3) Reportedly, the detainee was at a guest house in Afghanistan during August 2001 while he awaited training.

### **c. Training**

- 1) The detainee stated he worked in the Yemen National Guard, where he received training with the rocket propelled grenade, AK-47, PK and a weapon similar to a .50 caliber. The detainee stated this training took place around 1991-1992; he worked in this capacity for approximately one year.
- 2) The detainee stated he attended al Farouq for one day but left after hearing the United States Ship Cole was attacked.
  - a. The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was reportedly funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography and explosives.
- 3) Reportedly, the detainee had been at both the al Farouq and Abu Obeida Camps during 2000 and 2001. Reportedly, the detainee received training in weapons, tactics and physical training while at al Farouq.
- 4) Reportedly, the detainee received exclusive instruction on chemical explosives one week before the attack of September 11, 2001.

### **d. Other Relevant Information**

- 1) The detainee stated he worked at a mosque as an Imam. The detainee stated that for approximately four years, he studied Islam under a sheikh at al Sunna Mosque, Zayid Street in Hudaydah, Yemen. The detainee further stated that towards the end of his third year of studying Islam, he went to Dammaj, Yemen, and studied at the Dar al Hadith Mosque under another sheikh.
  - a. A recruiter met an individual at the al Sunna Mosque located in the Harat Zayid Street in Hudaydah. Reportedly, recruiters go to every mosque in Hudaydah, Yemen, and the imams would not refuse a jihad recruiter time to address the people in the mosque.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ**

- 2) Reportedly, the detainee arrived at a safe house in Pakistan approximately one month prior to his arrest, waiting to get forged papers to return to Yemen.
- 3) On 7 February 2002, a search was conducted on a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, used by an al Qaida associate. Among the items found in the facility were two brand new aircraft passenger life vests.
- 4) Initial testing on the two life vests and a backpack found at the safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, tested positive for explosives.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he had worked as an electrician's helper with his father, but does not have any technical skill in this field.
- b. The detainee stated that if he were released, then he would like to study to be an attorney.
- c. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to perform missionary work. The detainee further stated he did not go to fight.
- d. The detainee stated he hitchhiked and made his way to the front lines, borrowed a pair of binoculars, and scanned the area for Russian flags but did not see any; therefore, he returned to Kabul, Afghanistan, and began planning his return trip to Yemen.
- e. The detainee stated he did not have any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001 or knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' interests.
- f. The detainee stated he never trained on the use of weapons.
- g. The detainee stated he never took up arms against the United States.
- h. The detainee stated he has no ill feelings toward America or Americans.
- i. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of al Qaida.
- j. The detainee stated he never heard of Tarnak Farms or Abu Abeida.
- k. The detainee stated he was never asked to join the Taliban nor did he talk about the Taliban while he was in Afghanistan.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *[Signature]*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *JS 11/7/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 579 (AFGHANISTAN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 5 September 2008, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: [Redacted]
- Other Factors: [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5) [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	[Redacted]
FBI	[Redacted]

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]* 11-18-08  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 579

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the detainee understood the process. During the AMO interview, however, after the ARB's purpose and procedures were explained and a reading of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence began, the detainee requested the translator stop the reading. The AMO and translator complied. A copy of both the English and Pashtu translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence were handed to the detainee.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 579  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 6

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-52.

(U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).


**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 579  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 2 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human


ISN 579  
Enclosure (4)  
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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)




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
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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

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**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 August 2008

To: KHAIRKHTWA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHTWA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) **Commitment**
    - 1) The detainee is a former Taliban interior minister and was the commander of Taliban forces that took Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, in 1996.
    - 2) The detainee was reportedly the Herat Province Taliban Governor, and once held the position of Division Commander, Commander of a Military Corps, was the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif and in particular was a sub-commander and trusted person of a Senior Taliban official.
    - 3) The detainee reportedly fought against the Northern Alliance with Afghan Taliban members prior to 11 September 2001.
    - 4) The detainee stated he had detailed knowledge of the disposition of Stinger missiles possessed by the Taliban.
    - 5) The detainee stated he was trusted by the Taliban to keep order in Herat and to send taxes collected back the Taliban.
    - 6) The detainee stated that while Governor of Herat, the detainee took revenue and expense orders from the Central Communication Officer in Kandahar, Afghanistan who spread orders from a Taliban leadership to field components.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI**

- 7) After arriving in Herat, Afghanistan, the detainee spent much of his time establishing himself as the premier narcotics trafficker in the region. The Taliban government used opium and other smuggling operations as a funding mechanism for combat operations throughout western Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee reportedly participated in operational planning meetings conducted by Taliban and al Qaida members.
- 9) The detainee stated that the Taliban's two largest divisions and a smaller division were located in Herat, Afghanistan during his term as governor there.
- 10) Only the detainee or Usama bin Laden could authorize entrance to one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Herat, Afghanistan. The Taliban facility was controlled by Usama bin Laden and conducted terrorist training two times per week.
- 11) The detainee stated that he attended a secret meeting in October 2001 between officials of the Iranian Foreign Intelligence Service and Taliban officials at an unnamed military post south of Islam Qala, Afghanistan, on the Iranian side of the border. The Iranians offered Soviet-made SA-7 shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, other unspecified military equipment, and an offer to allow an open border between Iran and Afghanistan to allow Arabs from the Gulf States unfettered access to Afghanistan in order to help the Taliban against United States and Allied forces.
- 12) On 25 October, 2001, the detainee provided money for troops and money for fuel purchases used to send 300 men from the Taliban 17th Army Division in Herat, Afghanistan, to Sabzak Pass in Badghis Province, Afghanistan.
- 13) The detainee stated when the bombing of Afghanistan started, the detainee traveled in a convoy of 10 vehicles to Arghastan, Afghanistan. The vehicles were full of weapons, and the detainee stated he turned the weapons over to the sheriff in Arghastan.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) Usama bin Laden said the detainee should be part of a joint delegation to arrange meetings with the goal of splitting up the Northern Alliance.
- 2) The detainee stated that he was a leader in his tribe before the Taliban came to power and his people trusted him. The Taliban knew this and therefore chose him to become the Taliban spokesperson for the British Broadcasting Company and Voice of America. He stated that he would receive information by satellite phone from a Taliban person and would then drive to Chaman, Pakistan and give the press report to

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHWA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI

the British Broadcasting Company and/or Voice of America correspondents. The detainee stated that in this job, he met many of the influential Taliban leaders.

- 3) In 1994, the detainee stated he spent some time at a Taliban government building trying to secure a job. The Taliban offered him the position of "Wayand," or spokesman, for the Taliban for the Pashtu language. He acted as the Pashtu Wayand from 1994 to 1999, traveling around Afghanistan and speaking to the press.
- 4) The detainee stated that because of the relationship he had built with the Taliban, the detainee was appointed the Governor of Herat province for a two-year period from about 1999 to 2001.
- 5) The detainee was selected to be Governor of Herat province, Afghanistan, by a senior Taliban leader.
- 6) Reportedly, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had a secret camp in Herat province, Afghanistan. The camp started in approximately mid-2000.
  - a. Reportedly, Zarqawi's goal in Afghanistan was to lead a group of Jordanian jihadists to kill leaders of the current Jordanian government.
- 7) The detainee attended a meeting with Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin officials, Taliban officials, and Ayman al Zawahiri. Topics for discussion included United States intervention in the region and restoration of peace in Afghanistan.
  - a. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is a foreign terrorist organization founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.
- 8) The detainee stated that his only personal interaction with Arabs was a meeting he attended in 1996 in Kandahar. The detainee was told that these individuals were jihad fighters and guests of Usama bin Laden, who was also present. The detainee was not personally introduced to Usama bin Laden.
- 9) The detainee stated that he attended the funeral of the brother of a senior Taliban official in November 2000. The detainee stated that all the guests stayed in the guest house set aside for the funeral.
- 10) The detainee assigned a relative the duties of Taliban Financial Officer responsible for raising money for the medical treatment of injured Taliban fighters and also put

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHWAWA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI**

him in charge of all Taliban guest houses in the Pashtunabad section of Quetta, Afghanistan.

### **c) Training**

- 1) The detainee stated that the only military training he has consisted of a short period of time at Camp Marof, near Kandahar, Afghanistan, when the detainee was in his teens. This camp was a Mujahedin training facility where people were sent during the Afghanistan/Soviet war.

### **d) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee stated that while serving as the Taliban spokesperson in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, the detainee was also serving as county supervisor in that area.
- 2) The detainee worked as a Deputy Sheriff in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.

## **4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:**

- a) The detainee stated that in their capacities as Governor and Deputy Governor, the detainee performed civilian work and his Deputy performed military work.
- b) The detainee stated that during his tenure as Governor of Herat Province, Afghanistan he had limited control over police and military functions in Herat. He stated that all major decisions regarding police, military or government functions had to be approved through Taliban leadership in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- c) The detainee stated that while he was the governor of Herat Province, Afghanistan, that the military bases were not under his control and that by law, the military bases were under the command of the Defense Minister in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that as governor, he had no control over the military and was not part of the military chain of command.
- d) The detainee stated that while in Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee lived at the Ministry of the Interior building, leading to speculation and rumors, that he was, in fact, the Minister of the Interior. The detainee adamantly denied this, stating that he was still a correspondent for the Taliban at this time, and he just happened to be residing at this location.
- e) The detainee stated that while he was governor of Herat province, Afghanistan, no al Qaida training camps were located in Herat province.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI**

- f) The detainee stated that he was compelled to work for the Taliban because they were in power at the time and, if one didn't then the Taliban could "create problems" for someone.
  - g) The detainee stated that he wanted his file be changed to reflect the fact that he had never received training at a camp. The detainee stated that when he was 10-12 years old, he and a few friends that went to Mujahedin training camp for three days to have a look, but did not receive any training.
  - h) The detainee stated that he was not aware of the activities of the military arm of the Taliban and repeatedly stated that he did not handle military affairs. The detainee stated that he was not aware of direct action being taken by the Iranian military or intelligence services in Afghanistan. The detainee denied that he ever held the position of Minister of the Interior. The detainee denied that he ever received military training. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of the drug trade in Afghanistan.
  - i) The detainee stated that in the fall of 2001, he met with a senior Taliban official to discuss ending the recruitment of people from Herat province to fight against the Northern Alliance.
  - j) The detainee stated he has no knowledge of al Qaida.
  - k) With regards to the meeting with Iranian intelligence attended by the detainee, the detainee stated that he had no official capacity at the meeting and was only there as an escort.
  - l) The detainee stated that he has no ill feelings towards the United States and was only working for the Taliban to protect his family and his tribe.
  - m) The detainee stated that when he is released from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he plans to return home to Afghanistan, but not if Afghanistan is still in turmoil. He stated that he just wants to stay with his children and stay out of politics.
  - n) The detainee stated that he never participated in any attacks against the United States and that he never would. The detainee said he is not a violent person and states that he is a mild man that likes stability and is not aggressive.
  - o) The detainee stated that if he were released he would not know what he would do because he is afraid to go back to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he feels his life would be in danger if he went back and would want some protection from the government if he returned.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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DMO Exhibit 01  
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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *7/14/08*

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 654 (LIBYA)

o Subject ARB was held on 02 June 2008 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5)

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: [Redacted]
- Other Factors: [Redacted]

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
*8-22-08*

Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 654

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the detainee. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the detainee from the JDG.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

### 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

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Enclosure (6)  
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(b)(5)



**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)


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**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**c. (S//NF) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(5)



**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**7. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b.(b)(6)

Captain, U.S. Navy  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 May 2008

To: ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID  
ABDALSALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention::
  - a) **Commitment**
    - 1) The detainee stated he moved to Libya and talked to several other people who suggested he go to Afghanistan and fight with the mujahedin. The detainee stated he then relocated to Peshawar, Pakistan to take up the "Afghan case."
    - 2) The detainee stated he resided at the Madafa al Ansar in Peshawar for approximately one month during 1988. The detainee stated many people came and went from the Madafa al Ansar, most of who came to train before they went to the front lines of Afghanistan. The detainee stated most of the individuals who came to train probably did so at the Sada Training Camp located in Pakistan near the Afghanistan border. The detainee stated that after staying at the Madafa al Ansar, he moved to the Babi Madafa guest house at the end of 1988. The detainee stated the Babi Madafa was run by a sheikh who was a commander of the mujahedin in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he stayed at the Babi Madafa on three separate occasions in 1988, 1989, and 1990.
    - 3) The detainee stated he remained at the madafa in Peshawar for approximately 15 to 20 days before leaving for Afghanistan via Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he found his way to the Jaji Training Camp located in the rear of the battle area where people came

ISN 654  
DMO Exhibit 1  
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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM**

to regroup. After a week near the end of 1988, the detainee got sick and returned to Libya. In 1989, the detainee was ordered to go back into the Navy so he decided to leave Libya once and for all.

- 4) The detainee was reportedly returning to Libya around 1993 or 1994 and leaving for the United Kingdom to seek asylum. However, when detained in the United Kingdom, the detainee informed the authorities that he did not request asylum, nor did he desire it. The detainee requested deportation and went to Pakistan.
- 5) The detainee stated he moved to Afghanistan in 1995 when the Pakistani authorities began to arrest Arabs in Pakistan.
- 6) The detainee stated that when he left Pakistan, he went to Kabul, Afghanistan where he tried and failed to acquire Afghan citizenship documents. The detainee stated that when he tried to return to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he was arrested and spent approximately 18 months in prison. The detainee was released in 1995 and opened a shop in 1996 and married an Afghan woman.
- 7) The detainee stated he stayed at The Libyan Madafa in Jalalabad on and off for a total of approximately five months from 1997 to 1998. While residing at this Madafa, the detainee was shown a video of an attempted assassination of a Libyan leader. The detainee stated all of the residents of this Madafa, except for himself, were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
- 8) The detainee reportedly took part in fighting in Afghanistan. The detainee was reportedly an organizer for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
- 9) The detainee stated he met several individuals at a camp in Jalalabad and indicated the camp was associated with al Qaida and had a large guest house.
- 10) The detainee stated that when he lived at a guest house in Afghanistan, the detainee sometimes traveled to Kabul. The detainee stated he would pass verbal messages to people in Kabul, but never took letters anywhere.

**b) Training**

- 1) The detainee stated he was required to serve compulsory military service in 1980, but escaped from the training camp. The detainee stated he was arrested and sent to the Abu Sitta Naval Training Center for approximately one year.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM**

- 2) The detainee stated that in 1986 the Libyan government decided anyone who graduated in 1984 had to complete one year of military service. He stated he returned to basic training at Abu Sitta for approximately four months where he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and an unnamed Italian rifle.
- 3) The detainee stated he traveled to the Jaji camp, but was unable to train because of a stomach problem. The detainee returned to Peshawar for treatment, then went to the Sadah camp and remained there for several days.
- 4) The detainee reportedly trained at a camp in Afghanistan.
- 5) The detainee stated he attended the Sada training camp at the end of 1988. The detainee stated he received training on several different types of firearms including 6-mm and 8-mm pistols, a machine gun, and a Kalashnikov rifle.
- 6) The detainee stated that after he left the Sadah camp, he entered Afghanistan and joined Khalden camp for 10 days. The detainee stated he then returned to Peshawar and stayed at the Libyan guest house for three years teaching Arabic and the Koran.
  - a) The Khalden program was a complete course covering light and heavy weaponry, explosives, topography, and tactical operations.

**c) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated he made a trip from Peshawar, Pakistan to Saudi Arabia for Umra in 1988. The detainee stated he spoke to an individual while in Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated he heard many stories about the plight of the people of Afghanistan in their war with the Soviet Union.
  - a) The detainee stated he knew the individual in the previous statement (3.c.(1) above) was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
  - b) The United States Department of Homeland Security has designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as a foreign terrorist organization. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group pledged to overthrow the Libyan government. Some members are aligned with Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.
- 2) The detainee was on a list of 115 individuals who belonged to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and were suspected of terrorist and criminal activities.
- 3) The detainee was reportedly a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
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ABDALSALAM**

- 4) The detainee was identified as being a security leader for Usama bin Laden during a trip to a guest house in 2001. The detainee inspected the guest house prior to Usama bin Laden's arrival, accompanied Usama bin Laden to the house, and sat near Usama bin Laden throughout his speech.
  - 5) The detainee stated he met people from al Qaida. When the detainee was in Pakistan there were many al Qaida members. The detainee stated the al Qaida members could be recognized by their dress and weapons.
  - 6) The detainee's name and details of his family are listed on an al Qaida document listing new al Qaida families.
  - 7) The detainee stated he was approached at his food shop in Jalalabad and invited to be a guest at the Jalalabad Libyan Islamic Fighting Group guesthouse.
  - 8) The detainee stated he was an instructor at Atharia University in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee stated he originally met many of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members at the university while instructing.
  - 9) The detainee reportedly frequented a mosque and established relationships with extremist elements, including individuals who espoused the ideas of jihad. These individuals rallied supporters through meetings and distributed tapes that preached jihad.
- d) Intent**
- 1) Nothing Significant To Report (NSTR)
- e) Other Relevant Data**
- 1) After the fall of Jalalabad, the detainee fled to Konar, Afghanistan where he was captured by Coalition Forces.
  - 2) The detainee stated he acquired a fraudulent Iraqi passport through friends he knew from a mosque in Khartoum, Sudan. The detainee stated he was arrested by the Afghan Intelligence Service as he was leaving Kabul, Afghanistan because they found his Iraqi passport and accused him of entering Afghanistan illegally. The detainee stated he spent 18 months in prison.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:**

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM**

1. The detainee stated he had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The detainee stated if anyone knew of attacks, such as 11 September 2001, but failed to act to prevent them would be just as guilty as the perpetrators of the attack. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of future attacks planned against the United States or United States interests.
2. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan out of curiosity. The detainee stated he did not go to the Khalden training camp to train, but felt obligated to check it out because occupants of the Madafa encouraged him to do so. The detainee stated in the total of 13 years which he lived in Afghanistan, he never fired a single shot.
3. The detainee stated he does not think it is a problem to travel with bad documents so long as one doesn't intend to hurt people. The detainee stated he always used his true name to travel, even when he used an Iraqi passport while traveling from the Sudan to Yemen. The detainee stated he needed the Iraqi passport because he sent his Libyan passport home to relatives for renewal, but it never came back.
4. The detainee stated his trips to foreign countries were for tourism and were taken with tickets he and his brother obtained as employees of Libyan Civilian Aviation. When the detainee was told the years he worked at Libyan Civil Aviation did not encompass all his travel, the detainee stated he continued to have the same travel privileges even after leaving the Libyan Civil Aviation.
5. The detainee stated the only support he gave the jihad was to teach the children of the Mujahedin. For this the detainee received a salary, so it was not voluntary work for the jihad. The detainee stated he was pressured to train as a fighter, but he refused.
6. The detainee stated he is not a member of either al Qaida or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The detainee stated he did not know whether members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group were members of al Qaida or if any members of al Qaida were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
7. The detainee stated all religions teach peace and killing innocents is not acceptable. Individuals or groups that engage in terrorism are not preaching real religions; they are merely distorting Islam.
8. The detainee stated he had gone to Pakistan originally to find work, not to fight as a jihadist. The detainee stated he did not fight at all in Afghanistan and he did not have the will to fight.
9. When asked what plans he had if released from detention, the detainee stated he would live a normal life. When asked where would he go and what would he do, the detainee

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM**

stated he would go to any country where he could live a normal life and desired to return to Afghanistan where his family is located, and he would attempt to work as a merchant.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U)

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) 15 <sup>11/20/08</sup>

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 669 (Saudi Arabia)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 9 October 2008 resulting in a (b)(1), (b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1), (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1), (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1), (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1), (b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1), (b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5) (b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5) (Detainee) Or Transfer: 1-23 Release

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 669

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee understood the process. The detainee acknowledged he understood the linguist and confirmed his identity at the beginning of the interview; however, remained silent from that point on throughout the interview. The AMO handed the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence to the detainee according to Joint Detention Group Standard Operating Procedures.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 669  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 5

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN


**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-41.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (6).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
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**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 669  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 5

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Colonel, United States Marine Corps  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 October 2008

To: ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated that in the winter of 1995 he traveled to Bosnia and Croatia and stayed for two years.
- 2) The detainee stated he returned to Sanaa and Mudaidah, Yemen after serving about 15 months in prison in Bosnia.
- 3) The detainee stated he and his friend, Yahiya Khan, decided to travel from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Pakistan to buy motorcycle parts around October 2001. The detainee stated Yahiya Khan was originally from Karachi, Pakistan, and knew the places in Pakistan where he could get these parts cheaply.
- 4) The detainee stated he drove to see his wife in Sanaa, Yemen.
- 5) The detainee stated after spending three days in Yemen, he flew to Karachi, Pakistan, and met Yahiya Khan. The detainee stated they then drove to Lahore, Pakistan, and rented a house for three months. The detainee stated he had 3000 United States dollars he had planned on using to buy motorcycles and/or motorcycle parts.

ISN 669  
DMO Exhibit 01  
Page 1 of 7

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIK, AHMED ZEID SALEM

- 6) The detainee stated that while in Lahore, Pakistan, he received a phone call with information about his cousin from his aunt. The detainee stated his female cousin was taken by an Afghani man sometime in the year 2000. The detainee stated he told his aunt that he would go to Gardiz, Afghanistan, and attempt to find and bring his cousin back to Saudi Arabia.
- 7) The detainee stated he found and hired four Pakistani men to go with him to Gardiz, Afghanistan, to secure his cousin's release. The detainee stated he could not remember the names of the four Pakistani men he hired. The detainee stated he could only recall that he met them at the Dawa Center in Lahore, Pakistan.
- 8) The detainee stated he and the four Pakistanis drove into Afghanistan through Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated they found the home of the Afghan family that was holding his cousin. The detainee stated that eventually this family turned over his cousin, and the detainee and his cousin left Afghanistan immediately through Khowst, then straight on to Lahore, Pakistan.
- 9) The detainee stated the Afghan man who originally took his cousin ten months earlier came to Pakistan to take her again about a week to ten days after they arrived in Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stated the Afghani man told the police in Lahore, Pakistan, that the detainee kidnapped his wife (the detainee's cousin). The detainee stated the police in Pakistan immediately arrested the detainee on kidnapping charges.
- 10) The detainee stated the Pakistani police turned him over to the American Army. The detainee stated this happened approximately fifteen days after the end of Ramadan (approximately December, 2001/January, 2002). The detainee stated he thinks he was in an American prison in Islamabad, Pakistan, for about two to three months. The detainee stated he was then transferred to an American prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for another two months. The detainee stated he was finally moved to his present location in Camp Delta.
- 11) Reportedly, the detainee was on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2001. Reportedly, the detainee stayed at a man's guest house for two to three months.
  - a) Reportedly, the man created his own hamza guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. Reportedly, this man reported directly to Usama bin Laden, and his duties were to finance the training, obtain supplies and indoctrinate new recruits.
- 12) Reportedly, the detainee was responsible for the murder with a firearm of United States person, William Jefferson, in Tuzla Canton, Bosnia. Reportedly, the evidence found in the detainee's home included a watch and portable stereo belonging to Jefferson.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

- 13) The detainee claimed that while in Bosnia between 1995 and 1997, he was arrested by the Bosnian police after he was involved in a traffic collision while driving a car.
- 14) The detainee stated he was sentenced to five years in prison for the traffic accident. The detainee stated he served about seven or eight months in the Bosnian prison located in Newfi Traffic, Bosnia, and then moved to another prison in Mostar, Bosnia, for about seven or eight more months.
- 15) Reportedly, three automatic rifles, two bombs, two pistols and a large quantity of ammunition were found in the detainee's vehicle after a traffic accident near Travnik, Bosnia on 22 January 1996.
- 16) The detainee stated the only reason for his imprisonment was the traffic collision.
- 17) Reportedly, the detainee was subsequently imprisoned on illegal weapons charges but was later released in an amnesty for Bosnian Army War Veterans.
- 18) During a visit to Bosnia in 1993, al Qaida gave financial support to a special unit led by the detainee. During the 1992-1993 timeframe the detainee had access to at least 500 blank Bosnia passports which the detainee provided to Mujahedin.
- 19) Reportedly, the detainee was directly involved, along with four other Islamic terrorists, in a car bombing that damaged many buildings and injured dozens of people in Mostar, Bosnia, on 18 September 1997.
- 20) Reportedly, the detainee was actively involved in criminal activities such as the theft and illegal trade of vehicles, illegal weapons, military equipment and falsified documents. There were also indications they were involved in the 1996 murder of Hamid Hotic in Zavidovici, Bosnia, and other terrorist activities throughout the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 21) Reportedly, between January and September 1997, the detainee, together with two others, planned the emplacement of an explosive device with a timing mechanism in a car bomb. Reportedly, on 18 September 1997, they took the explosive device from Zeljezno Polje, Bosnia, to Mostar, Bosnia, where at 2330 hours it exploded at Splitska Ulica, Bosnia.
- 22) Reportedly, under a Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Supreme Court decision dated 18 April 2000, the detainee was sentenced to 12 years in prison for the criminal act of terrorism.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAI, AHMED ZEID SALEM**

- 23) Reportedly, the detainee was the organizer and perpetrator of the Mostar, Bosnia, bombing, and that he and others worked closely with an Army of the Bosnia and Herzegovina armorer.
  - 24) The detainee was a topography trainer at al Farouq Camp.
    - a) Reportedly, the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consisted of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography and explosives.
  - 25) Reportedly, a man met with the mujahedin, known as the Zubair Group, of which the detainee was a member.
    - a) Reportedly, this man had a program that he was supposed to air on al-Jazeera about how the attacks of 9/11 were planned and carried out. Reportedly, this man started to explain how he conducted the operation but was captured before he could complete it. Reportedly, Al-Jazeera was often used by al Qaida to air plans.
  - 26) Reportedly, the detainee name was listed on a line and block chart listing "Emirs" for the battle of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, with indications of whether the individuals are at Guantanamo, or whether they were killed or escaped.
- b) Connections/Associations**
- 1) Reportedly, the detainee was affiliated with the terrorist group Takvir Ve Hijra who are connected to the al Qaida network.
  - 2) Reportedly, the detainee was definitely a member of al Qaida.
  - 3) Reportedly, the detainee was linked to an extremist religious leader who preached against the United States, making statements to the effect that the United States was waging a war against Islam and not just against terrorism.
  - 4) Reportedly, the detainee's name and telephone numbers were listed in a date book that also contained information about establishing training camps; sending mujahedin to the lines; weapon supply lists and a meeting about spies, training camps, refugees and jihad.
  - 5) Reportedly, the detainee is an old fighter who encouraged jihad, had connections with Taliban leaders and used to meet with Usama bin Laden.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIK, AHMED ZEID SALEM**

- 6) Reportedly, a Yemeni jihadist is a known associate of the detainee and has a long history of terrorist and criminal activities ranging across France, Italy and Bosnia.
  - 7) Reportedly, the detainee was a known associate of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  - 8) Reportedly, the detainee was close to an al Haramain director.
  - 9) Reportedly, the detainee was seen at the Nebras guest house and later in Kabul, Afghanistan, at the Azem guest house.
    - a) Reportedly, the Nebras Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, was used by Usama bin Laden and fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp. Arabs bound for training at al Farouq would gather at Nebras until about 25-30 were in the group and then they were transported to al Farouq. Usama bin Laden would come to Nebras to greet the fighters before they went to training.
    - b) Reportedly, the Azam guest house was one of three guest houses in Kabul, Afghanistan, controlled by a senior al Qaida member. These guest houses were financed by both al Qaida and the Taliban sources. Reportedly, groups fighting in the northern frontline areas of Afghanistan used the Azam guest house exclusively.
- c) Training**
- 1) Reportedly, the detainee first trained at the Javer Camp in Afghanistan and then at other camps to include al Farouq, Khalden and al Sada. Reportedly, the detainee was already trained as the "perfect soldier" when the detainee eventually came to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
    - a) Reportedly, at the Khalden training camp new jihadists arrived every week. Reportedly, the four courses at the Khalden camp included basic weapons training for two weeks, artillery training for approximately one week, topography training for one to two weeks and military tactics training for approximately four weeks.
    - b) Reportedly, the Sada camp was a jihad training facility in the mountains near Peshawar, Pakistan, where there was physical training and training on rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, B-82 cannon and mortars. Reportedly, there were al Qaida members in advanced training there, separated from the new trainees. Reportedly, Usama bin Laden visited the camp.
  - 2) Reportedly, the detainee received all of the training available at both Khaldan and al Farouq training camps.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAI, AHMED ZEID SALEM

### d) Intent

- 1) Reportedly, the detainee believed America was the greatest enemy of Islam.

### e) Other Relevant Data

- 1) Reportedly, the detainee was a member of the Army of the Bosnia and Herzegovina in Travnik, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7th Reconnaissance-Diversionary Battalion.
  - 2) Reportedly, the detainee worked as a freelance terrorist without specific affiliations to any particular group.
  - 3) The detainee stated he believed the Americans and Saudi Arabians were the same in that they were all criminals.
  - 4) The detainee stated he had not been truthful with each interrogator.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he was a Bedouin and stated he has worked buying and selling sheep since he was a child. The detainee stated he was a trader and independent businessman.
  - b. The detainee stated his original purpose for traveling to Pakistan was business, not for a fatwa or to fight a jihad. The detainee stated he has no affiliation with the Taliban or al Qaida organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other country.
  - c. The detainee stated everyone suspects he is mujahedin, which he is not.
  - d. The detainee stated he has never been arrested and has a clean record with the Saudi government.
  - e. After identifying himself from a picture of the man convicted in absentia for a car bombing in Mostar, Bosnia, the detainee stated he had never heard of the car bombing and had no information about it.
  - f. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of the assassination of William Jefferson, a United States Special Forces soldier who was killed 18 November 1997 in Tuzla, Bosnia.
  - g. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of terrorist operations or operatives in Yemen.
  - h. The detainee claims to have no information about the "Takfiri" group, which he was suspected of formerly heading in Bosnia.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM**

- i. The detainee stated that the reason he was convicted in Bosnia and sentenced to five years in prison after his traffic accident was that he was wearing military pants and boots and looked like a militant. The detainee stated no weapons were found in his car after the accident.
  - j. The detainee stated he never served in the Saudi Army or received military training of any kind. The detainee stated he has never owned or carried a weapon.
  - k. The detainee stated the Pakistanis who were responsible for his capture and subsequent turnover to United States Forces a bunch of pirates because they just wanted money.
  - l. The detainee stated he loved the USA and wished to move there once he was released from prison in Cuba. The detainee stated he wanted to learn English and marry (once again) when he got to America.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official (U)

THRU: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *2X*

FROM: Director, OARDEC (U) *15 10/6/08*

SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 679 (YEMEN)

- o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 14 Aug 2008, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

- o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

- o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
FBI	

- o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

- o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *11-3-08*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

- o (U) Attachments:  
 Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
 Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 679

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings


a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee understood the process.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Exhibits. The ARB entered the classified exhibits into evidence and closed the session for review and deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 679  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 5

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-1 through DMO-25.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 679

Enclosure (5)

Page 3 of 5

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 679  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 5

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

[Redacted]

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

[Redacted]

CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

06 August 2008

To: TAHAR, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he had an interest in studying medicine in Pakistan. The detainee stated he was told by a visiting Tablighi missionary that before he could do so, he would have to study the Koran.
- 2) The detainee stated an individual from the Jamat-al-Tabligh mission went to the Pakistani embassy and got the detainee a visa for twenty-five dollars.
- 3) The detainee stated he was sent to Pakistan by a member of the Jamat-al-Tabligh. The detainee stated he does not remember the name of the Jamat-al-Tabligh member who asked him to go to Pakistan but remembers meeting him in a mosque that was reportedly the Jamat-al-Tabligh center in Aden, Yemen.
- 4) The detainee stated that in mid-September of 2001, he flew from San'aa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan. He was met at the Karachi airport by someone from the Jamat-al-Tabligh who took him to a mosque in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, spent two days there, and went to the Raywand mosque.

**b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated he enrolled at the Salafeyah University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
- 2) The detainee stated all of his expenses were provided by the Salafeyah University.

ISN 679  
DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMED

- 3) The detainee stated that after Ramadan, a Pakistani took him and other Yemenis to an off-campus house. The detainee stated there were about twelve other students already at the house. The detainee stated that several months later, he and the others were arrested by Pakistani authorities and subsequently turned over to United States forces.
- 4) The detainee stated this Pakistani came to the Salafeyah University and instructed him and four other students to go to a guest house. The detainee stated that this Pakistani was employed by Salafeyah University, but he did not know in what capacity.
- 5) The detainee was reportedly an occupant of a guest house, which was the property of Jaamia Salafeyah University, when he was captured in March 2002.
- 6) Reportedly, the detainee's brother was a Yemeni that committed suicide while detained at Guantanamo Bay.

### c) Intent

- 1) The detainee stated he wants the infidels, or non-Muslims, destroyed because they are attacking God. The detainee stated those who do not follow Islam will go to hell or be killed.
- 2) The detainee stated if Muslim scholars say that people must die, Muslims must follow the scholars' words. The detainee stated that if the Muslim scholars said the attacks of September 11, 2001 were the correct actions to take, he would support the scholars. The detainee stated if the scholars issued a fatwa, or religious calling, for the attacks of September 11, 2001, then the attacks would have been legitimate. The detainee stated if the scholars did not issue a fatwa, then the attacks would be sins.
- 3) The detainee stated he should be considered a terrorist.
- 4) During an interrogation, the detainee spat at the linguist and prayed to God that the linguist would be killed.
- 5) The detainee threatened to instigate some sort of uprising in the camp, claiming that the Americans are assaulting Islam.
- 6) The detainee stated he wishes to remain in the group of detainees who do not cooperate and who will never leave.

### d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated he has fired a Kalashnikov rifle and a handgun when he used to live in Yemen. The detainee stated everyone has a rifle in Yemen and you can buy guns from the Government or at a local market.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMED**

- 2) The detainee stated he read about the attacks of September 11, 2001 while he was at the university. The detainee stated he has no particular feelings about the attacks, but was shocked it could happen in America with its intelligence capabilities.
- 3) The detainee stated that in Pakistan, Jamat-al-Tabligh students studied in the Urdu language but the detainee could not understand them.

**4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:**

- a) The detainee stated he knows of no plans to harm the guards at Camp Delta, or of plans to escape.
- b) The detainee stated that if he were to be released from United States custody, he would either finish his studies or return home to Yemen.
- c) The detainee stated he did not receive any military training in Yemen. The detainee stated his high grade average in school allowed him to avoid being recruited into the Yemeni military.
- d) The detainee stated he did not respond to a fatwa. The detainee stated he visited Pakistan to attend a university to study medicine to aid Muslims. The detainee stated he withdrew from the classes because they were too difficult. The detainee stated he is not a Jamat-al-Tabligh member but needed their assistance to get into medical school.
- e) The detainee stated he did not observe any type of weapons, computers, or telephones in the guest house. The detainee further stated that he did not observe or hear anyone preaching about the jihad or recruiting for the Taliban and al Qaida.
- f) The detainee stated he did not know why he was being held by the United States, he was only studying Islam.
- g) After being shown a 60 minute video documentary concerning the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City, the detainee stated what he saw was a terrible event.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *SLH*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *18/10/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 686 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 5 Sep 08, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: [Redacted]
- Other Factors: [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)  
 [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 Or (Transfer) \_\_\_\_\_ (Release) \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 686

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings


a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the detainee. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the detainee from the JDG.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 686  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 1 of 6


# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-1 through DMO-28.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7):


**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 686  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 2 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)




**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)



**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 686  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 3 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**


(b)(1),(b)(5)



**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**


(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 686  
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(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

el, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 August 2008

To: HAKIM, ABDUL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) **Commitment**
    - 1) The detainee stated he decided to join the Jamat-al-Tabiligh because he heard a lot about their mission in his mosque.
    - 2) The detainee reportedly traveled to Afghanistan to fight.
  - b) **Connections/Associations**
    - 1) The detainee stated he flew from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan as a Jamat-al-Tabilighi.
    - 2) The detainee stated he attempted to obtain a visa two different times. The first time he went to the embassy in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee stated he was unable to obtain a passport at this time. After a few months, the detainee went to the Jamat-al-Tabiligh Center in Ta'izz, Yemen. The detainee handed over his passport to an unknown individual there. After two or three days, the detainee received his passport and visa to Pakistan.
    - 3) The detainee stated he traveled alone by train to Lahore, Pakistan, to study the Koran at the Rawand Jamat-al-Tabiligh Center. The detainee stated he stayed in Lahore for approximately 5-6 months.

ISN 686  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDUL

- 4) The detainee stated he received permission from the owner of a house to live at his home. The detainee stated he stayed at this house for "several months" before he and a group of other Arabs staying at the house were arrested by Pakistani Police.
- 5) The detainee was reportedly a relatively important individual and had been given a Toyota Corolla by the Taliban/al Qaida.
- 6) The detainee was reportedly very well respected by all the fighters and used to travel with Usama bin Laden on his trips to various places in Afghanistan to give speeches and have people swear bayat to Usama bin Laden.

### c) Training

- 1) The detainee was at al Farouq in the summer of 2001.

### 4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he was not recruited by an al Qaida or Taliban operative in Yemen.
- b) The detainee stated that the owner of the home had no connection to al Qaida or the Taliban.
- c) The detainee stated he did not travel to Afghanistan or receive any type of military training either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
- d) The detainee stated he would never go to Afghanistan to fight.
- e) The detainee stated he probably wouldn't even fight in a war in his own country of Yemen, as he doesn't believe in fighting.
- f) The detainee stated he was not involved in any training to fight jihad.
- g) The detainee stated he never entered Afghanistan and denied having ever met Usama bin Laden.
- h) The detainee stated he had no intention to fight in any conflict. The detainee also stated he considered the attacks on America unacceptable and believes the people who attacked the United States need to be captured and prosecuted.
- i) The detainee stated his purpose for going to the Jamat-al-Tabligh was to memorize the Koran. He did not want to "officially" become a member of the Jamat-al-Tabligh, but believed it would further his own goal of memorizing the Koran.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDUL**

- j) The detainee stated he never met anyone associated with al Qaida or the Taliban while at the owner's house.
  - k) The detainee stated that lectures at the Raywand Religious Center in Lahore, Pakistan, did not promote violence.
  - l) The detainee stated the only possible reason for his arrest is a visa-overstay infraction.
  - m) The detainee stated, if he were released, he would go back to Yemen and live with his family. The detainee stated he probably wouldn't look for a job, but just stay around the house eating and drinking.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *MS*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *AS 12/10/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 687 (SAUDI ARABIA)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 15 Oct 2008, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION:

(b)(1),(b)(5) (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Or Transfer *MS* Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments: *12-30-08*  
 Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
 Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 687**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**


a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the detainee made during the AMO's interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee understood the process.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 687  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-42.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (6).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 687  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 6

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 687  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 6


(b)(1),(b)(5)




(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 687  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 6

(b)(5)

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b.(b)(6)

COLONEL, United States Marine Corps  
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 687  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 6 of 6

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 October 2008

To: KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he worked for seven months collecting contributions from merchants and businessmen in al Taif, Saudi Arabia. The detainee then took a job for two years earning good wages as an accountant and helping to sell vegetables at his friend's market although he does not recall the market name. Cold weather induced back pain for the detainee and his doctor suggested traveling to Pakistan for treatment.
- 2) The detainee stated he traveled from al Taif, Saudi Arabia to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia by cab and then flew to Damascus, Syria where he stayed for three days. The next legs of travel by airplane went through Tehran, Iran to Lahore, Pakistan.
- 3) The detainee later stated he left Syria by bus to Tehran, Iran.
- 4) The detainee stated he stayed for three days in Lahore, Pakistan before proceeding to Karachi, Pakistan by bus for medical treatment. While he was in Pakistan, the detainee decided to go to the Raywan Islamic Center in Lahore to study the Koran. The Raywan Administration would not let the detainee enroll as a student since he did not have the proper paperwork. The detainee was allowed to stay at the Center as a guest for one month.

ISN 687  
DMO Exhibit 01  
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

- 5) The detainee stated that he traveled to Faisalabad, Pakistan on the advice of someone, who the detainee met at the Jamat-al-Tabligh, located in Raywan, Pakistan. The detainee reported he and this person traveled together to the guesthouse located in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  - 6) The detainee later stated he traveled alone to Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  - 7) The detainee's passport states that he was in Oman for eleven months. The detainee stated that if the passport was received from Pakistan, the government of Pakistan alters passports all the time.
  - 8) When questioned why he waited for so long in Pakistan instead of returning to Saudi Arabia, the detainee stated he lost his passport. The detainee also stated no one in the guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan took his passport.
  - 9) The detainee stayed in a known al Qaida facilitator's guest house in 1997 or 1998 then again in 1999.
  - 10) The detainee was reportedly at a guest house in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. Reportedly, the detainee was also at the airport camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    - a. The guest house in the previous statement, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, was used by Usama bin Laden and fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp. Arabs bound for training at al Farouq would gather at this guest house until about 25-30 were in the group and then they were transported to al Farouq. Usama bin Laden would come to this guest house to greet the fighters before they went to training.
- b) Connections/Associations**
- 1) The detainee stated that an individual at the house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, where the detainee was arrested was known to be a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh.
    - a. Jamat-al-Tabligh supports Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. Recruiters worked undercover as preachers for Jamat-al-Tabligh and then sent recruited individuals to Afghanistan. Many high-ranking Pakistanis devote part of their annual leave to Jamat-al-Tabligh and the Pakistani branch has been clandestinely involved in jihad activity. Usama bin Laden used Jamat-al-Tabligh preachers to communicate instructions.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

### e) Training

- 1) The detainee was at the Crescent Mills house in Faisalabad, Pakistan and trained at Khalden training camp circa 1997 and was in Afghanistan prior to September 11th.
  - a. The Khalden training camp was a six-month course involving the practical application of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical element.

### d) Intent

- 1) The detainee was in possession of a Casio F-91 W watch when captured. This watch model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist groups with improvised explosive devices.
  - a. A known al Qaida bomb making instructor stated a course was taught at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan on the use of Casio wrist watches to build explosive timing devices.
- 2) The detainee stated that, if released, he would like to open a fruit store and perhaps get married and start a family anywhere, even America. However, the detainee stated that many Muslims regard Jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam and unbelievers that refuse to convert will be killed because justification for killing infidels is written in the Koran. The detainee further stated that Christians and Jews are enemies of Islam and Usama bin Laden is a great man. The detainee stated that he would kill Ah'lah Demi, a protected group of non-Muslims, if it were ordered by religious leaders.
- 3) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden is a good man. The detainee said that God has stated that non-believers should never be considered allies or friends and deserve to be hated.
- 4) The detainee stated that he believed being a Martyr was a great thing and when he was released from custody he intended to become a Martyr.
- 5) In a letter addressed to the United States President, the detainee stated, "The Muslims will come soon with their armies and their braves and take over your kingdom".
- 6) In another letter to the United States President, the detainee refers to himself as one of Allah's lions. The detainee adds, "Your destruction will be done by a small group of people called Allah's Lions".

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ**

- 7) In a letter addressed to "Muslims everywhere", the detainee referred to himself and other detainees as "the heroes of Muslims everywhere." He espoused support of the Palestinian people in violence against Jews and infidels, and called for Muslims to be prepared for martyrdom.
- 8) In a letter to "America and its allies," detainee stated, "America's end is death and destruction".

### **e) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) In March 2002, the detainee was one of eighteen people arrested by the Pakistani Police in a house and accused of being Mujahedin. The detainee was in jail in Lahore, Pakistan for three days, Islamabad, Pakistan for two months, then spent two weeks each at Bagram, Afghanistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan on the way to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he had no knowledge of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States before their execution.
- b) The detainee stated he was not a member or associated with the Taliban or al Qaida.
- c) The detainee stated he was not a part of the Mujahedin.
- d) The detainee stated if he were released from Guantanamo Bay, he would return to Saudi Arabia and save money to get married. For work, the detainee stated that he wanted to work on his brother's fruit farm or join the Saudi military. The detainee stated that he has no problems with the Saudi government and that he would not participate in any attacks against the United States. The detainee stated he had no desire to seek revenge against the United States for his detention because he viewed it as a trial by Allah, not the Americans.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

*RE*  
*31 Dec 09*

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *[Signature]*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *[Signature]*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 688 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 24 Sep 2008, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: [Redacted]
- Other Factors: [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	[Redacted]
FBI	[Redacted]

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]* 2-2-09  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

- o (U) Attachments:  
 Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
 Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 688

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the detainee in accordance with JDG Standard Operating Procedures. The AMO received written confirmation from the JDG SJA that the documents were not accepted by the detainee.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

### 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 688  
Enclosure (5)  
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SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-44.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (6).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1) (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 688  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 5

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
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**7. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

COLONEL, USMC  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 September 2008

To: AKHMED, FAHI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) In 2000 or 2001, the detainee was approached by a holy man at a mosque in Taiz, Yemen. The holy man told the detainee it was his duty to go to Afghanistan and help the poor people because they were being mistreated. The detainee stated that the holy man told him the story to influence him to go help the Taliban.
- 2) The detainee stated the job of his facilitator was to take people to jihad.
- 3) The detainee stated when the Russians were in Afghanistan, people supported jihad because the Russians were killing women and children. The detainee stated he wanted to join jihad and help resist the North.
- 4) The detainee stated that he stayed at the Haji Habash guest house before leaving for Kabul, Afghanistan.

a. Al Qaida reportedly maintained a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan near the Haji Habash mosque. Arabs who came to Kandahar for military training at the al Farouq training reportedly used this house.

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DMO Exhibit 01  
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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI

- 5) The detainee was seen many times at the Hasan guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2001. The detainee had probably completed basic training since the detainee was at the Guest House for trained mujahedin.
  - a. Usama bin Laden reportedly only sent trusted, hand-picked individuals to the Hassan guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. These individuals were hand-picked to participate in special missions such as the United States Ship Cole bombing or the September 11 attacks.
- 6) The detainee was seen at the Abu Suhayb guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan in Spring 2000 and in a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan around February 2002.
  - a. The Hajj Habash guest house is reportedly also known as the al Ansar guest house, the Abu Khullud guest house, the Zubair guest house and the Suhaib guest house. Reportedly, the guest house was often referred to by the name of the person who was in charge of it.
- 7) The detainee stated he was given directions and money for traveling to Kabul from an Egyptian man staying at the Hajj Habash guest house. The detainee stated he didn't know how the Egyptian got the money but heard that the Taliban gave money to Arabs. The detainee traveled to Kabul where he arrived at the Kotaiba guest house.
  - a. The Kotaiba safe house was reportedly owned by al Qaida. The guest house was reportedly used by al Qaida members from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya.
- 8) The detainee stated after one week at the Kotaiba safe house, he traveled to the front lines of Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 9) The detainee stated he spent approximately two years on the front lines fighting the Northern Alliance.
- 10) The detainee stated during the last two and a half months in Kabul, Afghanistan, he began driving a truck to and from the front lines loaded with supplies and personnel.
- 11) The detainee stated in Bagram, Afghanistan he served by driving a pickup truck with food and other supplies to people at the front lines.
- 12) The detainee stated a man invited him to come and stay at a house reportedly connected to the Jamat-al-Tabligh. He stayed at this house for approximately two weeks when he was captured.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI**

a. The Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated between 2000 and 2002, he served with the Taliban. The detainee stated the first year he was just a guard and the second year he was provided a vehicle and became a driver for the Taliban on the front lines.
- 2) The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member as of 15 December 2001.
- 3) The detainee met a senior al Qaida Lieutenant in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000 or 2001.

### **c) Training**

- 1) The detainee reportedly trained at al Farouq.
  - a. The al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan was reportedly funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consisted of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
- 2) The detainee stated he was provided with Kalashnikov training by the Taliban while on the front lines fighting. The detainee stated he shoots the Kalashnikov rifle very well.
- 3) The detainee was identified as having received a training course, which was held at the al Farouq Camp. Usama bin Laden directed that the course be held as a result of complaints from al Qaida members of Yemeni and Saudi origin over the poor quality of Egyptian trainers.

### **d) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee stated he had been on a jihad in Afghanistan and his religion encourages this type of action. The detainee referred to a verse in the Koran which inspired him. He could not remember it exactly but it was something to the effect, "If two sides are at war, try to make peace. If one does not want peace, fight the other."

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI

### 4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he lied when he confessed to being in Afghanistan, driving a truck, being a member of the Taliban and driving for them at the lines near Bagram, Afghanistan. He stated all of the information provided was only to get the interrogators to give him what he wanted.
- b) The detainee stated he never received military training of any kind.
- c) The detainee stated he never killed anyone including Americans.
- d) The detainee stated he had never been in Afghanistan.
- e) The detainee stated he had never been to the Khana Ghulam Batshah guest house. He stated he never stayed at a guest house of any kind while in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
- f) The detainee stated he decided to stop helping the Taliban when they began fighting against the Americans.
- g) The detainee stated that he thought he would be helping the Taliban feed people and assist with the poor. The detainee stated he did not plan to go to the front lines as a guard but felt compelled to do it once he arrived.
- h) The detainee stated he does not have an opinion of the Taliban because he doesn't know any of them.
- i) The detainee stated he was never in the presence of al Qaida.
- j) The detainee stated he never met Abu Zubaydah and did not even know who he was.
- k) The detainee stated his purpose at the house was to obtain a visa to return to Yemen because his visa had expired. The detainee stated he never saw anything suspicious in the house and there were no weapons in the house.
- l) The detainee stated when the time comes for his release he will remain in the city he is from in Yemen. The detainee stated he is scared to travel to another country because he does not want any insurgent groups to pick him up thinking he still wants to fight.
- m) When the detainee was advised that there was reportedly information regarding him and his activities while he was in Afghanistan, the detainee stated the sources of the information were either lying or had him confused with somebody who looked like him.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

ISN 688  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *SLH*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *10/14/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 689 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 24 Sep 2008 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]* 11-18-08  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

SECRET//NOFORN

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 689**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed the JTF-Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) hand-carried the original English and Arabic Unclassified Summary of Evidence to the detainee. The AMO received a written affidavit from the SJA stating the documents were not accepted by the detainee.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (6)  
Page 1 of 5

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-32.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (7):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

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(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
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b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 689  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 5 of 5

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 September 2008

To: AL-HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a) **Commitment**

1) The detainee stated that at the end of May 2001, he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan for medical treatment of a sinus condition. The detainee stated a man he met at a Tai'zz, Yemen Jamat-al-Tabligh mosque suggested the detainee go to Pakistan. The detainee further stated the man paid approximately eight hundred United States dollars for the detainee's airline ticket and the detainee traveled alone on Gulf Airlines from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan.

a. The Jamat-al-Tabligh organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

2) The detainee stated he met an individual in Karachi, Pakistan, whose name was provided by the man he had met at the Jamat-al-Tablighi mosque in Ta'izz, Yemen. The detainee stated that within two weeks of his arrival, he received medical treatment at a clinic in Karachi. The detainee stated he stayed three months in Karachi and spent time visiting mosques during his stay.

ISN 689  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM**

- 3) The detainee stated he was convinced to work as a missionary in Pakistan, so the detainee moved to Faisalabad, Pakistan. He stayed at an unknown hotel for two months, and then moved into the Jama Salafia Darul Koran center for four months. The detainee stated that two months prior to his capture, he was moved to a house. The detainee stated the personnel at the center were staying in Pakistan illegally and moved to avoid arrest.

- a. The Jama Salafia school reportedly taught the Sunni school of thought and is located in the city of Faisalabad, Pakistan. Reportedly, there is a possibility that some extremists or terrorists are receiving their Islamic training at this religious center.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated the Jamat-al-Tabiligh paid for all his travels. The detainee stated the individual he met in Karachi, Pakistan was part of Jamat-al-Tabiligh and paid for his lodgings in Karachi.
- 2) A Senior al Qaida member stated he saw the detainee in early summer 2001 at al Qaida's Nibras guest house, where new students gathered before being transported to al Farouq for basic training.

- a. The Niberas guest house was reportedly an al Qaida guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which was used for new recruits who were on their way to the al Farouq camp in order to receive basic training.

- 3) A senior al Qaida member stated he saw the detainee in late summer 2001 at the Hasan guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which was a guest house for trained Mujahedin.

- a. The Hassan guest house was reportedly used as a reception point where Mujahedin fighters would report when they arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Emir of the guest house would reportedly appoint future assignments to the Mujahedin fighters and facilitate transportation for the Mujahedin. A bus would come to the guest house and pick up the fighters and take them to the front lines.

### **c) Training**

- 1) A senior al Qaida member stated he saw the detainee in early summer 2001 at al Farouq Training Camp.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM**

a. The al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan was reportedly funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The basic training at al Farouq is reportedly the same for all students, and consists of two weeks of weapons training, two weeks of basic commando course, two weeks of topography training, and two weeks of explosives training.

### **d) Intent**

1) The detainee was reportedly at the Salafist University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

a. According to Salafist Islam, a modern state is fundamentally incompatible with true Islam and has to be fought for in a jihad. Salafism rejects all other forms of Islam and foreign influence. Radical Salafism is practiced by many terrorist organizations including al Qaida.

### **e) Other Relevant Data**

1) The detainee stated he had eight United States one hundred dollar bills when he arrived in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated this was his life savings, which he had acquired gradually between 1999 and 2001, from working and gifts from his brothers.

2) The detainee possessed a Casio watch model A159W.

a. The Casio model A159W watch is a silver version of the Casio model F-91W watch which has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

3) The detainee stated he went to Faisalabad, Pakistan, for the purpose of studying the Koran at the Salafi Mosque. The detainee stated he was in Faisalabad seven to eight months when he was captured by the Pakistan Army.

## **4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer**

a) The detainee stated he had never stayed at the Hasan or Nibras guest houses.

b) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to get medical attention for his sinuses and he has never been to Afghanistan.

c) The detainee stated he has no knowledge of anyone involved with al Qaida.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM**

- d) The detainee stated he had never seen any al Qaida or Taliban members. The detainee also stated that he did not know the person who ran the guest house where he was staying.
- e) The detainee stated that if released he wanted to get married and possibly work in his father's store.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

*RE  
3 FEB 09*

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *3 FEB 09*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *18/29/09*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 691 (Yemen)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 21 NOV 2008 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

- o (U) Attachments:
  - Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
  - Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 691

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview and confirmed the detainee understood the ARB process. The detainee, however, stopped the AMO from reading the Unclassified Summary of Evidence. After the AMO offered copies of the English and Arabic translated Summary of Evidence, the detainee refused to accept them.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

### 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 691  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 1 of 6

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-40.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (7).


(1) (U) **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




(2) (U) **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




(3) (U) **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)




(4) (U) **Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(5) (U) **Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 691  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 2 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)


**6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(1) (b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 691  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 4 of 6

(b)(1) (b)(5)



**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1) (b)(5)

(b)(1) (b)(5)



**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 691  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 5 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**7. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)



(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)



Colonel  
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 691  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 6 of 6

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 October 2008

To: ZARNUQI, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZARNUQI, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) **Commitment**
    - 1) The detainee stated he met with 12 Tabligh missionaries at al Husaneyah mosque who encouraged him to become a missionary and go on Tabligh with them. The detainee stated two months later he met a Sheikh, who also encouraged the detainee to go on Tabligh. The detainee stated this Sheikh gave him a letter for the Pakistani embassy that identified the detainee as a missionary so the detainee could obtain a visa.
      - a. Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
    - 2) The detainee in 1998 was on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan and later at the al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was acting as a doctor or nurse.
      - a. A source stated the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consisted of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography and explosives.

ISN 691  
DMO Exhibit 01  
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUQI, MOHAMMED**

- 3) The detainee stated he traveled throughout Yemen for about one year with different Tabligh missionary groups. The detainee stated that in October 2001, he traveled to Pakistan alone and was met by two unidentified Pakistani males. The detainee stated they traveled to the Maki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan, stayed for two days, then went to the Raywand Mosque outside Lahore, Pakistan, and stayed for two days. The detainee stated he and 10 other missionaries traveled back into Lahore, where they traveled from mosque to mosque for two months.
  - a. Reportedly, the Makki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan, was a Jamat-al-Tabiligh mosque where various functions, such as obtaining visas and approving travel requests to Pakistan for Jamat-al-Tabiligh members, were coordinated and administered.
  - b. Reportedly, the Raiwand Center was the Jamat-al-Tabiligh World Center.
- 4) Reportedly, the detainee was part of a traveling group that arrived at a safe house between Barmal, Afghanistan, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Reportedly, two busses arrived at the safe house to transport the group to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and each bus had two members of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami to assist the movement across the border. Reportedly, members of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami identified themselves as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami members and urged other members of the group to supplicate for Fadel al Rahman, the leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami.
  - a. Jamiat Ulema e Islami is a radical Sunni religio-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Laden and sponsorship of some 3000 religious schools which inoculate a religious ideology of armed jihad.
- 5) Reportedly, the detainee was among a group of 30 Arabs traveling from Zurmat, Afghanistan, to Barmal, Afghanistan. Reportedly, the group was taken to a Madrasa that was owned and operated by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami.
- 6) The detainee stated he joined a different group of 12 missionaries and went with them to Islamabad, Pakistan, where they traveled for two months from mosque to mosque. The detainee stated that after two months, he returned to the Raywand Mosque, got his money and passport, traveled to Faisalabad, Pakistan, and enrolled at the Salafeyah University.
- 7) (U//FOUO-LES) Reportedly, the detainee was at the Ghulam Bacha guesthouse in 1999 and remained there for two to two and a half months before he was transferred to another guesthouse in Kandahar. Reportedly, the detainee was put in command of the Kandahar guest house.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUQI, MOHAMMED**

- a. Reportedly the Ghulam Bacha safe house was one of four safe houses owned by al Qaida and operated by a senior al Qaida member. Reportedly, the safe house was used by al Qaida members from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Libya.
  - 8) Reportedly, the detainee was a religious leader at a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - 9) Reportedly, the detainee was a medic for the frontlines.
  - 10) The detainee stated that while attending Salafeyah University, he and 16 other students lived in an off-campus house run by a Pakistani man. The detainee stated he had been staying at this house for about one and a half months when everyone in the house, except the man running the house, was arrested by the Pakistanis.
  - 11) Reportedly, a man went to Afghanistan to fight the jihad and was with a Taliban group there, and the detainee was a member of this group.
  - 12) Reportedly, the detainee was a member of Usama bin Laden's torture team in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - 13) Reportedly, the detainee was in a Kandahar, Afghanistan, guest house in April or May of 2001. Reportedly, the guest house was simply known as the Arab house and was located in the Hajji Habash district of Kandahar. Reportedly, the detainee led five prayers every other day and would preach about jihad.
    - a. Reportedly, al Qaida maintained a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, near the Haji Habash mosque. Arabs who came to Kandahar for military training at al Farouq training camp, operated by al Qaida, used this house. Usama bin Laden spent a brief period of time at this house.
- b) Connections/Associations**
- 1) Reportedly, the detainee was a member of the Jamat-al-Tabiligh in Yemen.
  - 2) Reportedly, the detainee said he was a member of Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
- c) Training**
- 1) The detainee had already completed training in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1999. The detainee remained in Kandahar, Afghanistan for several months and then returned to Yemen in about spring 1999.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUQI, MOHAMMED**

- a. Reportedly, trainees at the Aynak Training Camp, located south of Kabul, Afghanistan, received weapons training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and hand grenades.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he never traveled to Afghanistan.
  - b) The detainee stated he never went on Jamat-al-Tabligh in the Lahore, Pakistan, area.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *TX*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *159/1/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 692 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 6 Aug 08, resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: [Redacted]
- Other Factors: [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)  
 [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	[Redacted]
FBI	[Redacted]

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 692

1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the detainee made during the AMO's interview and these comments are documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee appeared to understand the process.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 692  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 6

3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-1 through DMO-30.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)


**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 692  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 6


(b)(1) (b)(5)



**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. (b)(1),(b)(5)


(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 692  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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b. **(S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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c. **(U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

8. (U) **Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 July 2008

TO: ALI, HALA BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, HALA BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he wanted to go to Pakistan to learn the Koran so he could someday be a teacher. He planned to go to Pakistan, for approximately 30 days, to decide on a school, and then return to Yemen. He said his mother gave him the equivalent of 800 United States dollars to purchase airfare and live on for the month he was in Pakistan.
- 2) The detainee traveled from Yemen, to the United Arab Emirates and to Pakistan.
- 3) The detainee stated he stayed at a hotel in United Arab Emirates until he moved to a guest house in Pakistan.
- 4) The detainee stated he stayed at the guest house in Pakistan for approximately four and a half months.

**b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee's alias was found on a listing of captured Mujahedin. This information was found on a hard drive, associated with al Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.
- 2) Intelligence sources indicate the detainee was a member of a group of

ISN 692  
DMO Exhibit 01  
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, HALA BIN**

approximately 30 Arabs that traveled through Afghanistan in December 2001. The group spent a couple of days in Afghanistan, at a madrasa used by foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan and operated by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami.

a. The Jamiat Ulema E Islami or Assembly of the Scholars of Islam is a radical Sunni deobandi religio-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Laden, and sponsorship of some 3000 religious schools. Their stated goal is the Talibanization of Pakistan.

**c) Training**

1) The detainee stated he stayed at Issa's guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, for approximately four and a half months, and only left the house a couple of times.

**d) Other Relevant Data**

1) The detainee was captured at the guest house by Pakistani police in March

**4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer:**

- a) The detainee denied ever going to Afghanistan.
- b) The detainee stated he did not receive any military training while living in Pakistan.
- c) The detainee denied being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
- d) The detainee denied ever traveling to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
- e) Detainee stated he knows nothing about terrorist use of migration, maritime infrastructure/finances, terrorist operations in PACOM area, or women in al-Qaida network.
- f) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to go to school and denied knowing detainees prior to arriving at Guantanamo Bay.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, HALA BIN**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Page 3 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *off*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *18 11/2/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION ICO ISN 702 (RUSSIA)

- o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 18 SEP 2008, resulting in a (b)(1) (b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1) (b)(5) (b)(1),(b)(5)

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

- o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

- o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

- o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION (b)(1),(b)(5) (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]* *11-18-08*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

- o (U) Attachments:  
 Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
 Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 702

1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive. Upon arriving at the interview, he stated he did not want to be there and did not want to hear any of it.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. The ARB confirmed a copy of the English and translated Russian Unclassified Summary of Evidence was offered to the detainee, but the detainee refused to accept them.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-1 through DMO-37.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7):


**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

(b)(5)

5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(5)

6. (U) Additional Information

(b)(1),(b)(5)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. (S//NF) Threat Level

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 702  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 3 of 6

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 702  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 4 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 702  
Enclosure (6)  
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(b)(1),(b)(5)




**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)



(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)



Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 702  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 6 of 6

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2008

To: ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he served in the Russian military from 1986 to 2001. He was a Private in the First Military Band of Chita from 1986 to 1988, a Warrant Officer in the Border Guards from 1988 to 1995, and a Warrant Officer Regimental Supply Officer serving the Ministry of Emergency Management in Naberezhniye Chelny, Russia, from 1995 to 2001.
- 2) The detainee stated that he committed himself to Islam while serving in the Russian Army. It was difficult for the detainee to attend a mosque because of the location of his military post so he decided to leave his wife and son and travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to pursue living in a pure Muslim state.
- 3) The detainee stated the history of Afghanistan and how things improved for the "true Muslim nature of life" after the Taliban came to power. The detainee also contrasted Russia from Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The detainee expressed his dislike for the Russian government which he compared to the mafia. The detainee explained that the Russian government is involved in all aspects of life, and yet does nothing to solve problems. In contrast, the Taliban government, which the detainee holds in high regard, dealt with problems immediately.

ISN 702  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV**

- 4) The detainee stated he traveled into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan utilizing railroads and avoiding main roads because passports were not checked and visas were not required as the passenger did not exit the train.
- 5) The detainee stated he and approximately 80 other Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members were flown by Tajikistan government helicopters to Konduz, Afghanistan, in late 2000 or early 2001 at the request of the Tajikistan government.
- 6) Following 11 September 2001, the detainee stated he traveled and lived with a group of individuals in the mountains between Khowst, Afghanistan, and Banu, Pakistan. The detainee was then directed to go to Lahore, Pakistan, where he was taken to the Tabiligh Islamic Center of Lahore.
- 7) The detainee stated he stayed at the Islamic Center in Lahore, Pakistan, from January 2002 to March 2002.
- 8) The detainee stated that the Tabiligh Center of Rowand, Pakistan, provided the room and board for his two and a half month stay and that during that period he studied the Koran and basically did nothing.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) While at the al Farouq Camp, Afghanistan detainee stated he was "forced" to attend Usama bin Laden's speeches on politics and religion. The detainee stated that he attended the speeches even though he did not understand the language. The detainee never personally met Usama bin Laden.

### **c) Training**

- 1) The detainee stated that he attended basic training which consisted of battle drills, tactics, infantry weapons, orienteering, survival training, mines and explosives familiarization, physical training, and first aid while at a camp run by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
- 2) The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Camp, Afghanistan for one month with 60 to 70 students and received training on pistols, rifles, how to make small bombs, chemicals, and how to use a sniper rifle. While at al Farouq, a commander told the detainee to listen to the radio. A few days later, the September 11 attacks occurred. The detainee stated the camp was evacuated and all were told not to stay in any major cities since those would be the ones bombed first.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV**

- a) The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and was therefore more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. All students take 2 weeks of weapons training, 2 weeks at a basic commando course, 2 weeks of topography training, and 2 weeks of explosives training.
- 3) The detainee stated he attended Kara Karga Camp, an explosives and poison training camp located in Afghanistan. The camp had only ten students and was taught by an Arab. They were taught how to make explosives out of common items such as fertilizer and ammonia. The poisons training included how to make poisons that could be inhaled, swallowed, or absorbed through the skin. The detainee stated the students made and tested poisons on rabbits, which got sick but did not die. The detainee stated the camp closed after one week due to the commencement of the United States bombing campaign.

### **d) Intent**

- 1) The detainee stated he was fairly religious and would fight for Islam.

### **e) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee stated that he was unable to compromise with the United States and that he would not answer questions as to being a Russian Komityet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) source. The detainee stated he would not explain why he can not cooperate.
- 2) In response to investigators beliefs that the detainee was involved in fighting in Afghanistan, the detainee stated it may be so but there are some things in life that are so important you must protect them at all cost.

## **4. (U) Factors Favoring Release or Transfer**

- a) The detainee denied stated he had no knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b) The detainee stated he never went to training in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he made up the story about going to training camps because he did not want to return to Russia. The detainee stated the Red Cross told him that GTMO was a nicer place to stay with better food.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV**

- c) The detainee claims that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight. The detainee stated if that was his goal, he would have gone to Chechnya, where everyone speaks Russian. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to live in a nice country among Muslims. The detainee went to the training camps in Afghanistan because he had no money and no place to stay.
- d) The detainee stated he has no knowledge of al Qaida or Taliban personalities or networks.
- e) The detainee stated he is not anti-American and recognizes the United States policies of freedom of religion and does not oppose the US Government.
- f) The detainee stated he considers Muslims living in a western country lucky as they are able to practice their religion freely without the prosecution Muslims in Russia have to deal with. The detainee stated that if he had a choice of where to study, he would choose the United Kingdom.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *16 4/20/08*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 708 (Libya)**

o Subject ARB was held on 13 Mar 2008 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(1) (Detain) *[Signature]* 4-28

Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 708**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO-presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

(1) (U) **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) **Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) **Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) **U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) **Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

4. (U) **Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**. The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. (An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.)

a. (U) **Recruitment**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

b. (U) **Travel**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) **Training**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)


(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**


(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

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
(b)(1),(b)(5)

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(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**e. (U) Organizational Affiliations**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**f. (U) Individual Affiliations**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**g. (U) Behavior**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**i. (U) Factors in Support of Release**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**c. (S//NF) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

04 March 2008

To: BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI

Subject: **UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE**  
**REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated that in 1991 he traveled from Libya to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where he lived for four months.
    - 2) While the detainee was in Saudi Arabia, the detainee was arrested for assaulting a woman.
    - 3) While the detainee was in Saudi Arabia, the detainee worked to rally Libyan youth and lived on donations and alms.
    - 4) The detainee stated he moved from Mecca, Saudi Arabia to Peshawar, Pakistan. After two weeks, the detainee entered Afghanistan and resided near Jalalabad, Afghanistan for approximately four years.
    - 5) The detainee stated that while in Saudi Arabia he decided to travel to Afghanistan to help support the Mujahedin fight against the Russian occupation forces. The detainee made the decision based on seeing television news reports depicting Russian forces killing Afghans and destroying their homes.

ISN 708  
DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI

- 6) The detainee stated he remained at the Torkhom camp for approximately two months, after which he traveled to Logar, Afghanistan, and fought against the Russian occupation forces. Around 1992 the Russian forces left Logar, Afghanistan, leaving the detainee to fight against the communist Afghan regime.
- 7) The detainee stated he stayed in Logar, Afghanistan until the collapse of the government in 1992. The detainee then traveled to Torkhum, Afghanistan, where he stayed until 1994.
- 8) The detainee stated he has been a member of the Islamic Fighting Group since 1994.
- 9) Many of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's founders were members of an underground Islamist network that worked against the Qadhafi regime in the 1980s. Late in the 1980s the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group relocated to Afghanistan, where they received al Qaida training and gained combat experience. During the 1990s the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group returned to Libya, operated out of Sudan, and then followed Usama bin Laden back to Afghanistan where group members devoted themselves to supporting the Taliban, al Qaida, and jihadi causes internationally.
- 10) The detainee stated that in 1994 he flew from Pakistan to Khartoum, Sudan, where he attempted to enter Libya through the desert. The detainee stated the plans to enter Libya covertly were never able to develop so the detainee began selling perfumes to supplement his income. The detainee remained in Sudan approximately two years.
- 11) The detainee traveled from Pakistan to Sudan carrying a Tunisian passport with the name Subhi Bin Jumah al Nayli. In 1997, the Sudanese authorities arrested the detainee.
- 12) The detainee stated that following his arrest by the Sudanese he was asked to leave the country. The detainee flew from Sudan to Damascus, Syria, where he was arrested and accused of being a spy for Israel. The detainee stated he was interrogated and tortured for three months. After finding no evidence against him the detainee was told to leave Syria.
- 13) The detainee stated he traveled from Syria to Zarka, Jordan where he stayed for three to four months. While in Jordan the detainee was supported by members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. In July or August of 1997, because of growing security concerns in Jordan, the detainee stated he traveled from Jordan through Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he stayed until 1999.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI**

- 14) The detainee stated while in Afghanistan he stayed in a safe house owned by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group with four other individuals.
  - 15) The detainee stated that in 1999 he and the four other individuals moved to Kabul, Afghanistan. The group decided to fight with the Taliban. The detainee stated his group would fight sporadically whenever there was a fight between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The detainee and his group continued to fight in and around Kabul until it fell to the Northern Alliance in 2001.
  - 16) The detainee stated on 11 September 2001, he was in Kabul, Afghanistan fighting the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated when the bombing started he was aware it was American bombers dropping the bombs. The detainee also stated he never saw any American troops and believed America would bomb Afghanistan for three to four months and then leave.
  - 17) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance.
  - 18) The detainee stated the reason he decided to help fight with the Taliban was because he lived in Afghanistan both prior to Taliban control and after Taliban control. Prior to Taliban control there were robberies, thefts, and fights between groups, but after the Taliban took over, the area became safe.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated after leaving Peshawar, Pakistan he traveled to Torkhom, Afghanistan, where he entered the Camp Kun Sayaf/Torkhom training camp. While at the Kun Sayaf/Torkhom camp, the detainee received training on light weapons, such as the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket propelled grenades, and the Siminov pistol.
  - 2) The Libyan camp and the Torkhom camp, outside of Jalalabad, are one in the same. The camp had one four-room building and several tents.
  - 3) The detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and received training at a camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. At the camp, the detainee was part of a Military Committee and was considered an activist and an explosives expert. The detainee specialized in electronics and was the only member from the group with all of these abilities. The detainee was undergoing training at the Turgham Camp.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI**

- 4) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group has five specialized governing committees, including a Military Committee.
  - 5) The detainee participated in the building and equipping of the Sumer Khayl camp. The detainee stayed with members of the Military Committee in the camp after it was equipped. After the camp moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee moved with them and stayed again at the camp in two rooms of the camp belonging to the Military Committee. The detainee worked on preparing the equipment for the camp, particularly electronics.
  - 6) The Libyan Islamist Fighting Group's first camp was opened in 1990 near Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The camp was moved to the Turkham, Afghanistan region in 1993 and closed when the members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group went to Sudan. The camp was reopened in 1998 in the Samarkhil, Afghanistan region next to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and was given the name Salman al-Farsi. The camp moved to Kabul, Afghanistan in 1999. The Libyan Islamist Fighting Group made some efforts to build a center in Kabul with the objective of supporting the frontline, which was loyal to the Taliban.
  - 7) In 1998, the detainee entered Afghanistan and was assigned training in Ghani Khayl camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  - 8) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's Ghani Khayl camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan had connections to al Qaida.
  - 9) In 1998, the detainee provided military training at camps in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 10) The detainee received military training at the al Farouq camp.
  - 11) Usama bin Laden visited camp al Farouq, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, after 11 September 2001, gave a speech to the trainees, and celebrated the attacks on the United States.
- c) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he bought and sold perfumes which he had brought from Pakistan.
  - 2) The detainee was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group military commission and an expert in explosives.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI

- 3) The detainee stated at the time the Northern Alliance entered Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee was in Logger, Afghanistan. From Logger, Afghanistan the detainee withdrew through Khost, Afghanistan to Zurmud, Afghanistan, then to Miram Shah, Pakistan, and finally to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee was in Lahore, Pakistan two days before being arrested by the Pakistani Authority. Upon capture, the detainee stated he was not al Qaida but was a fighter for the Taliban.
  - 4) The detainee stated he considers the Taliban a state, while he sees al Qaida as an organization.
  - 5) The detainee stated he would like to be released to any non-Arabic country other than Libya. The detainee believes the government of Libya would not treat him well if returned.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied any knowledge of explosives, relating he was neither an expert of explosives nor remote detonation. The detainee denied receiving training and training individuals on explosives or remote detonation.
  - b) The detainee stated he never swore allegiance to any extremist groups.
  - c) The detainee stated he would like to find a wife and start a family. The detainee would work in any job that would allow him to support his family.
  - d) The detainee stated prior to the events of 11 September 2001 he had no feelings towards the United States and considered the United States like any other country.
  - e) The detainee stated at no time did he conduct any operations against American forces.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
 Office for the Administrative Review  
 of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)  
 at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba  
 1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

*RE*  
*31 Jan 09*

**SECRET//NOFORN  
 ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official (U)

THRU: *[Signature]* Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U)

FROM: Director, OARDEC (U) *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 713 (SAUDI ARABIA)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 15 Dec 08 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

- o (U) Attachments:
  - Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
  - Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

SECRET//NOFORN

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 713

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed an AMO interview was scheduled with the detainee. Enclosure (2) stated the detainee refused to leave his cell for the interview once he learned the purpose of it. The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the detainee in accordance with JDG Standard Operating Procedures. The AMO received written confirmation from the JDG liaison stating the documents were not accepted by the detainee.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

### 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 713

Enclosure (4)

Page 1 of 6

SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-53.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (5).

(1) (U) **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) **Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) **Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**


(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) **U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)



**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)




**6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**


**a. (S//NF) Threat Level.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 713  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)



Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**d. (U) Recommendation.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**7. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

[Redacted]

CAPTAIN, USN  
Presiding Officer

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

09 December 2008

To: MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he served as a fighter in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance.
- 2) The detainee stated he was recruited for jihad and ultimately into al Qaida.
- 3) The detainee stated he already had in his heart the desire for jihad.
- 4) The detainee stated he decided to go fight jihad after a fatwa was issued declaring jihad should be waged against Americans.
- 5) The detainee stated the cleric who issued the fatwa to kill the Northern Alliance leader had a strong relationship with Usama bin Laden.
- 6) The detainee stated he is honored as a man to belong to al Qaida.
- 7) The detainee stated he spent approximately a year and a half or two years in Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 through Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, via Kuwait City, Kuwait; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; Islamabad, Pakistan; and Peshawar, Pakistan.

ISN 713  
DMO Exhibit 01  
Page 1 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

- 9) The detainee stated that upon arriving at the guest house he immediately began training.
- 10) The detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, for his bayat meeting with Usama bin Laden.
- 11) The detainee stated after attending the al Farouq Camp, he went to Lahore, Pakistan, and then returned to Saudi Arabia.
- 12) The detainee stated he swore bayat to Usama Bin Laden after going through the al Qaida screening process.
- 13) The detainee stated he swore bayat before becoming part of the planning for the assassination of the Northern Alliance leader.
- 14) The detainee stated it was suggested to put an explosive in a camera and it would detonate when the picture was taken. The detainee stated he presented this idea to bin Laden who gave his blessing. The detainee stated the camera bomb was used to assassinate the Northern Alliance Leader on 10 September 2001.

#### b) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he executed a man suspected of spying on jihadists in Afghanistan for a foreign government.
- 2) The detainee stated that while recuperating for two months in the hospital, he was visited at least three times by al Qaida's second in command.
- 3) The detainee stated he was transferred from Afghanistan to Pakistan for medical care. The detainee stated he moved into the home of a man who visited him at the hospital until the detainee was arrested at the man's home by Pakistani authorities.
- 4) The detainee stated he and an al Qaida jihadist, who fought against the Soviets, lived together and they planned and carried out attacks in Afghanistan.
- 5) The detainee stated while he was in Afghanistan, after he became involved with al Qaida, he saw a reported senior al Qaida leader about once every three to five days and saw two other reported senior al Qaida leaders once or twice a month. The detainee also stated he met with Usama bin Laden about once every three to five months, once just outside of Kabul, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

- 6) The detainee stated he met with a senior al Qaida lieutenant several times in Afghanistan about such issues as logistics and personnel for the fight against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
- 7) The detainee stated that an al Qaida leader talked to him about the attempt in Ethiopia to assassinate the Egyptian president.
- 8) The detainee stated he was friends with an 11 September 2001 hijacker.

#### c) Training

- 1) The detainee stated his father taught him how to use a Kalashnikov and a pistol.
- 2) The detainee stated he attended a school which trained electrical technicians because he wanted to learn how to carry out attacks by means of explosions.
- 3) The detainee stated he attended al Qaida special operations and assassination training over a two year period from 1999-2001. The detainee stated the training included movement and operations on foot, in vehicles and on motorcycles; tactical operations; weapons assembly; disassembly; frequent weapons qualifications; and land navigation which was practiced both day and night using military style maps and compasses.
- 4) The detainee stated he received specialized al Qaida training that focused on intelligence collection techniques, explosives, bombings, hijackings, mechanical repair, hotwiring, poisons, and forced entry.
- 5) The detainee stated he and one of the 11 September 2001 highjackers, attended al Qaida special operations training, and received specialized training on kidnappings and assassinations, bombings, poisons, weapons training and suicide missions.
- 6) The detainee stated the specialized training included studying the Koran, assassination, interrogation and resistance to interrogation training, how to treat the captured enemy, how to deal with the capture of an enemy, and an in depth study of the meaning of jihad.
- 7) The detainee stated he was trained on explosives, battlefield tactics and enemy territory infiltration.
- 8) The detainee stated while in Afghanistan he and a reported 11 September 2001 hijacker trained for nighttime combat and weapons training.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

- 9) The detainee stated he was trained on how to use mobile, fixed, and wireless battlefield communications systems, and how to turn a radio into a deceptive improvised explosive device.
  - 10) The detainee stated he attended an advanced explosives training course for specially selected al Qaida operatives that had previous explosive training.
  - 11) The detainee stated while he attended the Khalden Camp he trained to use a pistol.
    - a. Reportedly, the Khalden camp trained students on basic weapons, artillery, topography, and military tactics.
  - 12) The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Camp for seven to ten days and received training on weapons, including anti-aircraft weapons.
    - a. Reportedly the al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida, more advanced than other training camps, and consisted of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography and explosives.
  - 13) The detainee stated he met a poisons trainer quite a few times, but the detainee did not attend poisons training.
  - 14) The detainee stated he went to the front lines in Afghanistan and continued training using manuals and actual enemy contact. .
  - 15) The detainee stated he attended Faqh al jihad, the forbidden and secret training that took two years to complete which prepared him for jihad.
- d) **Intent**
- 1) The detainee stated he is a soldier and would continue to engage the fight whenever possible.
  - 2) The detainee stated "I fought before and I will fight again".
- e) **Other Relevant Information**
- 1) The detainee stated he asked Muslim leaders and religious scholars about jihad training in Afghanistan.
  - 2) The detainee stated he attended technical schools in Saudi Arabia in which he received a diploma in vocational studies and another as a diesel mechanic.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED**

- 3) The detainee stated he went to an Islamic studies school in Pakistan run by Jamat-al-Tabligh to study Koran exegesis.
  - a. The Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
- 4) The detainee was captured in Pakistan in 2002.

### **4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:**

- a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *SLX*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *18 10/20/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 722 (Lebanon)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 18 Sep 08 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)
CIA	
FBI	

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *SLX* 11-10-08  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

**SECRET//NOFORN**

(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 722

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**


a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed the JTF-Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) hand-carried the original English and Arabic Unclassified Summary of Evidence to the detainee. The AMO received an affidavit from the SJA stating the documents were not accepted by the detainee.

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 722

Enclosure (5)

Page 1 of 7

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-39.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (6)

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 722  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 7

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**


(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
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Enclosure (5)  
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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.** (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**


(b)(1),(b)(5)




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(b)(1) (b)(5)



(b)(5)



(b)(1) (b)(5)



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d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

8. (U) **Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy  
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (5)  
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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2008

To: DEYAB, JIHAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he and his family traveled to Pakistan with a stop in Damascus, Syria. From Damascus they flew to Tehran, Iran, and met an Iranian. From Tehran, the detainee and his family went to Zahedan, Iran with the Iranian, where they stayed at the Iranian's house. The detainee and his family then went to Quetta, Pakistan, and then to Afghanistan.
- 2) The detainee stated he went to Peshawar, Pakistan by himself in August of 2001. The detainee stated he then traveled to Afghanistan, through Jalalabad, to retrieve his family two days after the bombing. The detainee stated he then went back to Kabul, then to Khowst, Afghanistan. After finding his family, the detainee took them to Ring Road in Pakistan. They then left Peshawar, Pakistan and went to Islamabad, Pakistan and then to Lahore, Pakistan.
- 3) A senior al Qaida operative stated he met the detainee under an alias in the mid 1990's. The senior al Qaida operative noted the detainee was an expert in passport and document forgery. The detainee also worked with the Libyan groups and used computers in his passport forgery work. The senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee again in Lahore, Pakistan, in approximately 2002.
- 4) The detainee showed up in Afghanistan in 2000 expecting to attend the Khalden

ISN 722  
DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD**

training camp and was seen with a group of Libyan jihad members in Kabul, Afghanistan. In late 2001, the detainee received from a senior al Qaida operative, approximately 600 rupees so the detainee could travel to meet his family in Afghanistan.

a. Reportedly, new jihadists arrived at the Khalden training camp every week. Reportedly, the four courses at the Khalden camp included basic weapons training for two weeks, artillery training for approximately one week, topography training for one to two weeks, and military tactics training for approximately four weeks.

### **b) Connections/Associations**

- 1) While the senior al Qaida operative was in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in March 2002, he received a telephone call from the detainee. The detainee stated he needed the senior al Qaida operative's financial assistance to travel to Iran and onward to Europe.
- 2) The detainee's name was found on a spreadsheet account of stipend assistance provided to al Qaida operative families covering a six-month period of May to October 2002. The spreadsheet was on a twenty-gigabyte laptop computer hard drive associated with an al Qaida financial operative.
- 3) The detainee's name was on a list of individuals whose telephone numbers were associated with assorted jihadists based in Yemen.
- 4) During an 11 September, 2002 raid by a foreign governmental agency on an alleged al Qaida residence on Tariq Road in Karachi, Pakistan, they recovered a personal address book and pocket litter containing names and telephone numbers. The detainee's name and phone number were among a list of names and numbers recovered.
- 5) The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida members recovered in 2001.
- 6) The detainee was identified as a member of a terrorist cell linked to Usama bin Laden.
- 7) The detainee allowed a senior al Qaida operative to stay in his house.
- 8) The detainee met an al Qaida facilitator in Afghanistan shortly after the 11 September, 2001 attacks.

### **c) Training**

- 1) The detainee's name was found on a list of Syrians who were trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and believed to be fighting with, or on behalf of, Usama bin Laden.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD**

- 2) The detainee stated he served in the Syrian Air Force from 1991-1993. During basic training he learned how to take apart and clean a pistol and received an AK-47, but did not receive adequate training. While in the Syrian Air Force, the detainee received training on driving large trucks.

### **d) Intent**

- 1) The detainee stated he could never live in the United States because one day God's wrath is going to strike America.

### **4. Factors Favoring Release or Transfer**

- a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b) The detainee stated he never went to a training camp for fighting. He stated if he wanted to fight, he would not have brought his wife and children with him during his travels.
- c) The detainee stated that he does not believe that Muslims should fight each other and that he did not want any part of the Taliban or Northern Alliance.
- d) The detainee said if Usama bin Laden is responsible for the bombings on September 11, 2001 in the United States, he is a bad person. The detainee stated he wants the Americans to know not all of the Arabs in Afghanistan were fighting against the United States. The detainee said he did not have anything to do with the fighting in Afghanistan.
- e) The detainee stated he would like to live in peace with his family should he ever be released from Guantanamo.
- f) The detainee adamantly reiterated his innocence. The detainee claimed to have had no relationships with any groups or organizations and no contact with anyone outside the sphere of his business.
- g) The detainee stated he "hates" United States foreign policy, but stated he does not feel the same way about Americans.
- h) The detainee stated that all of the accusations against him are "pure fallacy."

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official (U)

**THRU:** Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *[Signature]*

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC (U) *12/11/08*

**SUBJECT:** (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 ICO ISN 728 (YEMEN)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 05 Nov 08 resulting in a (b)(1),(b)(5) recommendation to (b)(1),(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(1),(b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: [Redacted]
- Other Factors: [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1),(b)(5)  
 [Redacted]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)
CIA	[Redacted]
FBI	[Redacted]

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: (b)(1),(b)(5)  
 (b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*  
 Or Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release *12-30-08*

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

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# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

## (U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 728

### 1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

### 2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive. The AMO verbally summarized comments the detainee made during the AMO's interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and that the detainee appeared to understand the process.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

### 3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
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ISN 728  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 6


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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.
- b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-34.
- c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (5):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)




**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)




**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



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**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

(b)(5)

**5. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(5)

**6. (U) Additional Information**

(b)(5)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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Enclosure (4)  
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(b)(1).(b)(5)


(b)(5)

(b)(1).(b)(5)

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Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (4)  
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
(b)(1),(b)(5)



**b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value.**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(1),(b)(5)



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**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

8. (U) **Board Members' Voting Results**

(b)(5)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 6

**SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

29 October 2008

To: SAID, JAMIL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, JAMIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a) Commitment**

- 1) The detainee stated he was recruited by an acquaintance after the detainee had applied for a visa to Pakistan and was turned down by the Pakistani Embassy. The acquaintance told the detainee that for 2,500 Yemeni Riyals, approximately 13 United States Dollars, he could facilitate the detainee's travel to Pakistan.
  - a. The acquaintance was reported to be a very active Taliban and al Qaida recruiter, with experience fighting in both Chechnya and Afghanistan.
- 2) The detainee stated that in July 2001 he traveled from Yemen to Pakistan to have knee surgery. He claimed to have had a soccer injury that caused him pain for fifteen years. The detainee stated a doctor in Yemen advised him to travel outside of Yemen to have the knee surgery.
- 3) The detainee stated he flew to Pakistan and stayed at a hotel for one week. The detainee chose not to have surgery because the doctor at the hospital said that it would take three months to recover.

ISN 728  
DMO Exhibit 01  
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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, JAMIL**

- 4) The detainee stated while at the hospital he met an Afghan who said Afghanistan was poor and needed educators.
  - 5) The detainee stated he traveled with the Afghan to Quetta, Pakistan, and stayed in a house there for ten to twelve days. Approximately ten Afghans came and went from the house that the detainee thought were Taliban. The detainee stated he heard the Taliban was fighting the Northern Alliance in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - 6) The detainee stated that he and the Afghan and three others traveled by car to Kandahar, Afghanistan, stopping at check points along the way, but with no overnight stops. The detainee and the Afghan stayed at an Afghan house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for three days.
  - 7) The detainee had traveled to Afghanistan a number of times, the last time, with his wife, in July 2001. The detainee was met at the airport by an individual responsible for arranging travel of jihad personnel to Afghanistan. The detainee and his wife then flew to Karachi, Pakistan where they were received by an individual who arranged their transportation to Afghanistan.
  - 8) The detainee rented a house next to the residence of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad 'Umar in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was among the jihadist personnel in Afghanistan.
  - 9) The detainee stated when the bombing of Kandahar, Afghanistan, began in October 2001, the detainee traveled in a large van with approximately seven Afghans to a town on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where they stayed for ten days.
- b) Training**
- 1) The detainee stated he attended a mandatory 30-day military training course where he learned to dismantle and reassemble a 7.63mm AK-47 and how to march.
- c) Connections/Associations**
- 1) The detainee stated he was invited by a Yemeni man to stay at his house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at this house for one month and ten days.
    - a. The Yemeni man was reported to be an al Qaida facilitator that ran a guest house and had sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden. It was also reported that he attended Khalden Camp and was in charge of the Kandahar guest house. It was also reported this Yemeni would provide a visa, money, and airline tickets to those needing to travel to Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, JAMIL**

- 2) The detainee was a member of al Wafa and a Karachi University microbiology graduate student that purchased materials from New Chemicals Company.
  - a. The Secretary of State placed al Wafa on the Terrorist Exclusion List on 5 December 2001. An organization is placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List if the Secretary of State finds that the organization commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provides material support to further terrorist activity.
- d) **Intent**
  - 1) The detainee stated he considers the United States an enemy.
- e) **Other Relevant Data**
  - 1) Reportedly, the majority of people passing through the detainee's house/compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan were Mujahedin. Some were working with the humanitarian aid organization and a very few passed through who were going to teach the Koran.
  - 2) The detainee stated he was in Lahore, Pakistan, in November of 2001 for the purpose of getting laser eye surgery and a dental root canal. The detainee stated it took a month and a half to recover from these surgical procedures.
  - 3) The detainee stated he was a teacher from 1988 to 1991 and was self-employed selling religious tapes from 1995 to 2002.
4. **The following primary factors favor release or transfer:**
  - a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.
  - b) The detainee stated that he had no affiliation with the al Wafa organization.
  - c) The detainee stated that the only camp that he had ever attended was a summer camp in 1985 or 1986 located in the suburbs of Taiz, Yemen, on a military base. The detainee denied receiving any other training. The detainee also stated he never attended Karachi University, although it was something he wanted to do.
  - d) Reportedly, the detainee was not a guard nor affiliated with al Qaida, and the detainee moved to Afghanistan with his wife and children.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, JAMIL**

- e) The detainee stated he knew nothing about whether the house he was arrested in was Taliban or al Qaida.
- f) The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to join any group, but to continue his Islamic studies.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.